ADBR JUL-AUG 2020 by adbr5

WAT CH T HIS

SPACE JULY-AUG 2020 · Volume 39 | No. 04

ADBR.COM.AU

CONTENTS

.COM.AU

FEATURES & ANALYSIS

The ADF is making big strides in the acquisition and development of space-based capabilities.

4 EDITORIAL 6 BATTLESPACE 70

ON TARGET

WAT CH T HIS

SPACE JULY-AUG 2020

SPACEX

REGULAR ITEMS

ADBR

COVER

ADBR is published by: Felix Defence 7 Finlay Rd Eumundi QLD 4562 Australia adbr.com.au adbr@felix.net.au +61 (07) 5442 8377 Twitter: @DefenceBusiness

Volume 39 No. 4 JULY-AUGUST 2020

STRATEGIC DEPTH

Analysis of the Force Structure Plan

NEXT GEN FIC

A new defence industry model?

WATCH THIS SPACE

The ADF has big plans in space

JUMBO FINALE

Farewell to the Qantas 747

AUSTRALIAN ARMY EW

LAND 555 update

OSINT - JAPAN ORBAT

Japan Self Defense Force

BOEING T-7A RED HAWK

AIR 6002 LIFTS Contender

TECH BRIEF - SIGINT

Signals Intelligence explained

TECH BRIEF - LINK 16

Link 16 Modernisation

THE CHANGING ART OF WAR

Why linear deterrence won’t win

UNDER CONTROL

UAS and MTCR changes

OSINT - INDO-PACIFIC UAS

UAS systems in the Indo-Pacific

JULY-AUG 2020 · Volume 39 | No. 04

Managing Editor Andrew McLaughlin andrew@adbr.com.au

Senior Contributors Owen Zupp Max Blenkin

Publisher John Conway john.conway@felixdefence.com

Contributors this issue Dougal Robertson, John Conway, Dr Thomas Whithington, Mike Yeo, Peter Hunter, Brian Weston

Assistant Editor Steve Gibbons

Art Director Daniel Frawley Sub Editor Bruce McLaughlin

None of the content in this publication may be reproduced without the express permission of the Publisher.

Felix Advantage 2020. All material published in ADBR is copyright and may not be used without the express permission of the publisher. ISSN 1033-2898

INITIAL POINT

Initial Point

STATEMENT OF INTENT Andrew McLaughlin

he 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU) and accompanying Force Structure Plan (FSP) released on July 1 provides arguably the most significant statement of intent for the ADF since the 1987 White Paper. In 1987, the White Paper claimed that Australia faced no credible threats, and that we would have 10 years’ warning time to deal with any threat that might arise. In three decades since, the ADF has participated in several regional skirmishes and police actions, and drawn-out coalition counter-insurgencies. At the same time, it has progressed ad-hoc updates and improvements to the individual services as new technologies and capabilities have developed, and new requirements emerged. In the years after 1987, the Defence mission was broad and the threats distant. In contrast to past strategies, the 2020 DSU and FSP have set out and identified the new geostrategic reality Australia now faces. With a large and somewhat belligerent neighbour increasingly asserting itself across the Indo-Pacific, the documents demonstrate that the ADF will soon have sufficient capability to deter aggression against Australia’s interests at tactically-relevant ranges, or to cause sufficient damage to give a potential adversary pause. But if pressed, the ADF must be prepared to fight as a system that links all the elements of national power. The defence of Australia will only be effective if the ADF uses a systems approach to counter the threats arrayed against us, and it is those systems that the FSP seeks to build and integrate. So now, the ADF needs to deliver a countercommand capability for the Government. The old counter-force option is no longer enough. But while the capability goals of the FSP are admirable, the public documents were short on detail and, in some areas, somewhat puzzling. It confusingly refers to replacements for the RAAF’s KC-30A MRTT, E-7A Wedgetail, EA-18G Growler, and Army’s M1A1 Abrams, all of which are yet to

‘...the DSU and FSP have set out and identified the new geostrategic reality Australia now faces.’

complete even half of their planned lives-of-type, and all of which will be upgraded many times before they are withdrawn sometime in the late 2040s or after. The FSP also discusses additional fuel storage and bunkerage for ADF bases and assets, but makes no mention of bolstering Australia’s strategic reserve, or at least moving it closer to Australia than the US so it can be quickly accessed in the time of crisis.

NO DEFENCE If you’ve just come from the Contents page of the magazine or if you’ve read ahead, you may have noticed we have published a non-defence story this issue. Owen Zupp (below) recently came on board with ADBR’s parent company Felix Defence as an Executive Analyst in Human Factors and Aerospace Technologies, so I’m in the very enviable position of being able to more regularly draw upon Owen’s vast experience and talents as a pilot and author to provide some fantastic stories for ADBR. Although he has written for ADBR previously, Owen’s Jumbo Finale story on page 34 is a great way to introduce him to our readers. And, as one of the operating crew members of Qantas’ final 747 flight on July 22, Owen’s unique insight into the technical and planning aspects of the occasion is, frankly, too good a story not to share. I hope you appreciate it as much as I did. And if you do, check out Owen’s numerous book titles at owenzupp.com.

Proven technology. Advanced system integration. The Leidos team has developed a superior solution for Defence that goes well beyond the platform. A next generation TUAS enabling time sensitive, mission critical support to the soldier. Modern capability that will integrate into a joint battlespace. A solution for the next decade and beyond.

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To learn more, email: Leidos-Australia-Communications@Leidos.com

BATTLESPACE ADBR DEFENCE NEWS ROUNDUP

DEF ENCE NE WS ROUNDUP

.COM.AU

BATTLESPACE

Govt brings forward Defence spending

Prime Minister Scott Morrison and Defence Minister Senator Linda Reynolds have announced a spending package in Defence to stimulate the economy as it continues to founder due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The $1 billion package will be invested in bringing forward some projects, in the recruitment of additional reservists, in works programs in the Defence estate in regional and bushfire-affected regions, in additional cyber training and innovation grants, and in additional investment into sustainment of some capabilities. “Like much of the economy, our local defence industry is doing it tough because of COVID-19,” the Prime Minister said in a statement. “This is especially so for small and medium sized businesses, that are critical to jobs. “We want to build our sovereign industrial capabilities and Australian workforce to keep our people safe,” he added. “We will also support our ADF members and families, particularly any Reservists who are doing it tough because of COVID-19.” The Defence Minister added, “Already, over $11 billion has been provided in early payment for invoices and work to improve or sustain industry capacity for the delivery of critical supplies,” she said. “We’re getting on with the job of delivering critical capability outcomes to Army, Air Force, and Navy, as well as continuing to support our personnel, including ADF Reserve members.”

The notice advises that Defence is seeking a prime contractor to deliver marketing services, recruiting operations, medical and psychology testing and assessment, ICT services, facilities management, and administration services. The RFP will be the first of a two-stage tendering process, the second of which will be the issuing of a request for tender (RFT) in July 2021. The department proposes to conduct a virtual industry briefing before two rounds of one-on-one briefings from 21 September to 9 October and from 9 to 23 November 2020. The RFP will close on 18 December 2020, and respondents will be advised on the RFP outcome in July 2021.

IBCS proves capability against multiple targets

The Northrop Grumman Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) being developed for the US Army has successfully conducted a multiple target engagement during testing at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.

IBCS is expected to be a key element of any involvement Northrop Grumman may have in the ADF’s AIR 6500 integrated battle management system program. The testing is being conducted as part of the IBCS Limited User Test (LUT) which is designed to demonstrate the system’s ability to fuse data from multiple sensors and thus maintain continuous track of targets in contested environment conditions. The first planned operational flight test was conducted by US Army personnel, and comprised an air and missile defence task force of two Battery and one Battalion engagement operations centres, two Patriot and Sentinel radars, and three Patriot Advanced Capability Three (PAC3) launchers, all of which were connected at the component level to the IBCS Integrated Fire Control Network (IFCN). The targets were two cruise missile surrogate threats which flew at low altitude and in a manoeuvring formation through a mountain. The IBCS fused real-time data from all sensors into a single, accurate composite track for each threat, presented engagement solutions, and two PAC-3 missiles were launched and controlled by IBCS to successfully intercept both threats.

Defence to issue RFP for recruiting services

Defence has issued a pre-release notice advising it will release a request for proposals (RFP) to market for the provision of recruiting services under the ADF’s Recruiting Services Contract (RSC).

ADF

ADBR

Sikorsky Australia wins RAN MH-60R sustainment work

Sikorsky Australia has been awarded a five-year $200 million foreign military sales (FMS) contract through the US Navy to provide through-life support to the Royal Australian Navy’s fleet of Sikorsky MH-60R Romeo Seahawk helicopters. The work will be performed at Sikorsky Australia’s growing facility at Nowra in NSW, located adjacent to the MH-60R’s home base of HMAS Albatross, and includes on-base and deployed maintenance, training, warehousing, supply support system, and test equipment services. Sikorsky Australia is a division of Lockheed Martin Australia, and its operations were consolidated at Nowra in 2019 following the closure of its Brisbane Airport facility. “Based at the Albatross Aviation Technology Park in Nowra, this contract will sustain the existing workforce of 140 employees and create an additional 39 new positions, including several apprenticeships in the Shoalhaven Region of NSW,” Defence Industry Minister Melissa Price said. The RAN operates 24 MH-60Rs with 725 and 816SQNs based at Nowra, the last of which was delivered in September 2016. ADBR understands that the acquisition of an additional eight MH-60R or MH-60S utility helicopters is being considered to replace the MRH90 Taipan helicopters of the RAN’s 808SQN in service.

Three M113AS4 Optionally Crewed Combat Vehicles (OCCV) at Puckapunyal Army Base. ADF

ADF

Defence commits to more Army UGVs and research

The Commonwealth has announced a $12.2 million investment into the development of additional unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) and associated research for the Australian Army. The announcement says 16 more M113AS4 armoured personnel carriers (APC) will be converted to an optionally crewed combat vehicle (OCCV) configuration by BAE Systems. The first four OCCV M113s were built and trialled in late 2019 and proved they could be successfully integrated into an armoured force. In addition to the M113AS4 conversions, an additional $3.5 million contract has been awarded to the Institute for Intelligent Research and Innovation (IISRI) at Deakin University for the expansion of Army’s leader-follower vehicle technology prototyping.

The Commonwealth has also awarded $897,000 to EPE for small wheeled robots to experiment with human and machine teaming in reconnaissance roles, and has made a $135,000 investment with QinetiQ Australia for the modelling of the value of conversion of a Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicle (PMV) to hybrid-electric drive. These investments highlight a growing awareness within Army and the wider ADF of the potential value of integrating unmanned ground vehicles into a joint force.

Navy buys anti-submarine training capability

The Commonwealth has announced it will buy the Saab AUV62-AT intermediate anti-submarine warfare training target in a deal valued at $11 million. The AUV62-AT, which resembles a torpedo, is designed to replicate submarines for training and can be used to train with other submarines, surface ships, maritime patrol aircraft, and helicopters. The AUV62-AT system comprises the submersible vehicle, a signal generation and analysis system, a mission planning system, a mission evaluation system, and a launch and recovery system (LARS). The 620kg unmanned submersible vehicle can be launched and recovered from a ship, a submarine, or from land. The vehicle has an extendable tail with emitters that can give it the signature of a larger submarine. It has a maximum speed of about 12 knots and an endurance of three hours, but this can be extended to up to 24 hours at lower speeds.

BATTLESPACE ADBR DEFENCE NEWS ROUNDUP

ADF

Army seeking special operations rotary-wing support capability

The Commonwealth has released a Request for Proposals (RFP) to industry to provide capability enhancements to the LAND 2097 Phase 4 special operations rotary-wing (SORW) light helicopter which will operate with Army’s 6 Aviation Regiment (6Avn) at Holsworthy in Sydney. Issued under the auspices of Project LAND 2097 Phase 4, the RFP is seeking a contractor that “will explore technology options on behalf of the Commonwealth and provide recommendations on an annual basis regarding potential modifications that the SORW capability will benefit from.” It is important to note that the RFP is separate to the LAND 2097 Phase 4 SORW requirement – tenders for which closed on June 30 – and is instead seeking “innovative proposals” for the CEP. The RFP says the successful CEP contractor “will implement solutions by either integrating GFM (Govt furnished material) to the SORW capability through standardised interfaces, or through a full design, production and certification process.” ADBR understands the CEP will seek to explore the development and integration of new sensors, weapons, electronic warfare, and communications capabilities for the SORW to support its mission, and that the Commonwealth is keen to maximise Australian Industry Capability (AIC) in the CEP. Up to 18 new four-tonne class twinengine helicopters will augment the larger MRH90 Taipan in the SORW support role

with 6Avn. To date, Airbus has declared it bid its H145M, while Babcock has indicated it will bid with the Bell 429 Global Ranger. A notification of the RFP outcome is programmed for November.

Boeing awarded P-8A sustainment work

Boeing Defence Australia (BDA) has been awarded a six-year contract valued at $287 million to provide support and sustainment as the platform steward for the RAAF’s fleet of P-8A Poseidon maritime ISR aircraft (above). The new award takes effect from October and sees three previous support contracts amalgamated to cover maintenance, engineering, and logistics on the RAAF’s 12 jets. BDA sub-contracts some of the work to Airbus Australia Pacific. “Under this new contract, BDA will not only be responsible for the Australian elements of the sustainment program but also takes on a platform steward role,” he added. “This means taking full ownership for everything needed to keep the platform flying and broadens BDA’s responsibilities to include asset management, aircraft-on-ground responsibilities, and cyber-worthiness amongst other tasks,” BDA’s director of Commercial Derivative Aircraft, Darryn Fletcher said in a statement. The P-8A entered RAAF service in 2016, and the 12th aircraft was delivered in November 2019. The ADF holds options for an additional three P-8As, and these will need to be confirmed before the options lapse in late 2020.

SEA 129/5 Maritime UAS requirement progresses

The Commonwealth has released more information to industry for the Royal Australian Navy’s SEA 129 Phase 5 Block 1, Block 2, and Block 3 Maritime UAS requirements. Originally designated SEA 129 Phases 5 and 6, and more recently SEA 129 Phase 5 Stages 1 and 2, the latest designation reflects Navy’s desire to introduce the UAS in three incremental stages or capability ‘blocks’. Block 1 will acquire a maritime UAS for the RAN’s ANZAC class frigates (FFH) and its new Arafura class offshore patrol vessels (OPV) and is scheduled to enter service in 2024. ADBR understands some of the same systems being offered for Army’s Project LAND 129 Phase 3 (page 16) tactical UAS (TUAS) will likely also be offered for Block 1. The follow-on Block 2 requirement will equip the new Hunter class frigates, the first of which is expected to be launched in 2028. Whereas previously the SEA 129 Phase 6 requirement had reportedly favoured a larger air vehicle, the lack of a second hangar on any of the RAN’s current major surface combatants will likely preclude this. The Block 2 air vehicle may or may not be common to Block 1, but ADBR understands the RAN is likely to favour a common system. Block 3 is scheduled for the early 2030s and will comprise a comprehensive technical refresh of the system to accommodate new payloads and other capability enhancements. It is envisaged SEA 129 will ultimately acquire about 36 systems, enough to be integrated with all the RAN’s major surface combatants, and for an onshore training capability. The Maritime UAS will utilise a common ground control segment (GCS) currently being developed for LAND 129 Phase 3, and ADBR understands it will be integrated into the vessels’ combat system rather than being a stand-alone system. Block 1 is currently running approximately 12 months behind Army’s LAND 129 Phase 3, for which tenders were due to be submitted on July 24. It is likely an Invitation to Respond (ITR) for SEA 129 will be issued with responses due to be submitted on October 8.

BATTLESPACE ADBR DEFENCE NEWS ROUNDUP

ADF

Northrop Grumman to build RAAF Triton NITE

Northrop Grumman has been awarded a contract by the ADF to build an MQ-4C Triton Network Integration Test Environment (NITE) at RAAF Base Edinburgh. The NITE will be a key element in the development of the RAAF Triton capability prior to the delivery of the first ground control segment in 2022 and the first air vehicle entering service in 2023, and will support an estimated 75 jobs. “The NITE will enable the RAAF to develop networks for test and engineering, as well as operations, ahead of Australia receiving its first Triton ground control stations and air vehicles,” Northrop Grumman Australia chief executive Chris Deeble said in a statement. “This is a significant milestone as the Australian Triton program continues to mature.” The installation of the NITE will be conducted in three phases and will succeed the company-funded Australian mission systems trainer (Aus-MST) which has been used at Edinburgh since 2016 to support the development of the RAAF’s maritime ISR requirements and initial Triton concepts of operation.

RAAF C-27J Spartan capability put on notice

The Royal Australian Air Force’s Leonardo/L-3 C-27J Spartan battlefield airlifter capability operated by 35SQN at Amberley (above) has been added to Defence’s Projects of Interest watchlist after missing several key capability milestones. As reported in the Australian Financial Review in July, RAAF Head of Capability AVM Cath Roberts told the parliamentary public works committee that, “The C-27J program has been challenging and … there

have been significant delays in terms of achieving the capability outcomes that were originally determined.” But AVM Roberts defended the C-27J’s performance in Operation Bushfire Assist over the 2019/2020 summer where three aircraft operated out of RAAF East Sale in Victoria to support evacuation and recovery efforts, and in supporting Australia’s ongoing foreign policy efforts in the south-west Pacific region. “You can see that the C-27J, even without the ability to go into a fully contested environment, still has a significant role in our defence activities,” she told the committee. The committee oversight comes after the C-27J failed to achieve its planned final operational capability (FOC) in December 2019 – a milestone that had already been delayed by three years from December 2016. The capability was placed on the Projects of Interest list in March this year (formerly the Projects of Concern list) pending it being granted its Australian military type certificate (MTC). Although the MTC was granted in May, the project remains on the watchlist and may stay there until the re-scheduled FOC milestone – now planned for the end of the year – is achieved. Acquired under Project AIR 8000 Phase 2 to replace the DHC-4 Caribou which was retired from RAAF service in 2009, the C-27J was selected under a combined first and second pass in 2012 ahead of the rival Airbus C-295M. Ten aircraft were ordered under a foreign military sales (FMS) deal through L3, the prime contractor for the USAF/US Army Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) requirement of up to 150 aircraft, for which the C-27J had been selected. The Pentagon cancelled the JCA program in 2013, and subsequently divested itself of the approximately 30

aircraft it had taken delivery of to that point. Even though the advantages of the ADF acquiring a certified aircraft and support system common to a larger fleet through the FMS deal evaporated with the US cancellation, the ADF decided to persist with the C-27J. The first RAAF C-27J was delivered to Richmond in June 2015, and the final aircraft was delivered in April 2018. Despite an initially successful introduction and achieving its planned initial operational capability (IOC) of four aircraft in December 2016, the aircraft has become increasingly difficult to sustain in RAAF service, with availability rates reportedly dropping below 50 per cent in recent months.

Rohde & Schwarz wins RAAF ATC work

Rohde & Schwarz Australia has been awarded a contract by BAE Systems Australia to provide equipment for the RAAF’s Project AIR 5431 Phase 3 air traffic control project. Under the project which will see the current fixed military air traffic management and control systems at 12 locations replaced with new systems, Rohde & Schwarz will supply software defined radios, back up communications systems, and monitoring. “The support being provided by Rohde & Schwarz includes CERTIUM radios and ancillaries, CERTIUM VCS-4G as the backup voice communications system, and CERTIUM management systems for all of the 12 ATC facilities,” Managing Director of Rohde & Schwarz (Australia), Gareth Evans said in a statement. “Rohde & Schwarz will deliver all required elements over the next 12 months. We have the capability in Australia to sustain CERTIUM systems from our integration laboratory, maintenance, and calibration facilities in Sydney,” he added. BAE Systems Australia Program Manager, Peter Cantwell said BAE Systems “CERTIUM software defined radio products are key elements of the advanced air-ground-air communications capability that BAE Systems is designing, integrating, and deploying for the RAAF.” The CERTIUM ATC communications suite was launched by Rohde & Schwarz in March and is based on the company’s Series4200 software-defined architecture.

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BATTLESPACE ADBR DEFENCE NEWS ROUNDUP

Lockheed Martin wins TADRS sustainment work

Lockheed Martin Australia has been awarded a five-year contract by the Commonwealth to sustain the RAAF’s four tactical air defence radar systems (TADRS). The $50 million contract will sustain the four systems and support 25 existing and five new Lockheed Martin Australia systems, hardware, and logistics engineers, technicians, program managers, commercial and business staff. “This is a great example of the importance of partnerships between Defence and industry with the creation of additional highly skilled positions in what is a vibrant regional defence hub,” Defence Industry Minister Melissa Price said in a

statement. “With more than 90 per cent of the contract dedicated to Australian industry content, this project not only delivers new technology for a cutting edge ADF, but also represents an enormous opportunity for Australian industry.” In a company statement, Lockheed Martin Australia Chief Executive Joe North said, “The TADRS is absolutely vital to Australia’s ability to rapidly deploy air surveillance as well as command and control functions wherever the mission requires. The deployable TADRS system entered service with the RAAF in 2004, and has been upgraded several time since. Based on the AN/TPS-77 long-range radar systems, the RAAF’S four TADRS systems are operated and maintained by 3 Control and Reporting Unit (3CRU) at RAAF Williamtown and

114 Mobile Control and Reporting Unit (114MCRU) at Darwin, both elements of 41WG.

Defence Intelligence Group formed

The Commonwealth has announced the formation of the Defence Intelligence Group (DIG) to bring all the ADF’s intelligence capabilities under a single oversight organisation and to coordinate the introduction of new capabilities. The new group include the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation (AGO), and other critical intelligence components from across the ADF. It will be led by LTGEN Gavan Reynolds who was promoted on July 1, and his responsibilities will include the training of the intelligence profession across the ADF and APS workforce, and the management of intelligence capability projects. “Rapid technological change and increasing investment in intelligence means it is more important than ever that our department and military intelligence functions are coordinated and aligned across the entire organisation,” Defence Minister Senator Linda Reynolds said in a statement. The formation of DIG is the result of recommendations from an independent review of the Defence intelligence enterprise. Senator Reynolds says the new group not only aligns Defence intelligence management with the National Intelligence Community, but also more closely mirrors those of Australia’s five-eyes allies: the US, UK, Canada and NZ. LTGEN Reynolds’ most recent posting was as Head Military Strategic Plans and he has previously served as the Australian Military Representative to NATO and the EU, Commander 6th Combat Support Brigade, Director General Personnel – Army, and commanded the 1st Intelligence Battalion.

Belgium signs for MQ-9B, partners with UK ADF

Belgium has signed a foreign military sales (FMS) contract to acquire four General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc (GA-ASI) MQ-9B SkyGuardian unmanned systems.

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The US$188.8m (A$261m) acquisition – which was signed on August 14 – includes the air vehicles, two certifiable ground control stations (GCS), spares, and support equipment. The sale comes after an April 2019 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notification which has flagged a spend of up to US$600m (A$828m) which also included sensors and a five year support package. The certifiable MQ-9B has been developed by GA-ASI to be able to operate in controlled airspace, and features longer range and greater endurance compared to the USAF’s MQ-9A Reaper Block 5 upon which it is based. The Belgian announcement was quickly followed by the signing of a bilateral statement of intent (SOI) by the air force chiefs of Belgium and the UK to collaborate on their respective MQ-9B programs, to be known as the Protector RG Mk1 in RAF service. “This Statement of Intent between the UK and Belgium reflects our shared ambition for Protector, the MQ-9B Remotely Piloted Aircraft System, working in partnership to tackle threats to our national and collective security RAF Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Mike Wigston said in a statement. “The Royal Air Force and Belgian Air Force will explore opportunities to train, maintain and work together on this game changing aircraft using its cutting-edge sensors and systems to protect national, NATO and European security.” Belgium’s Major General Frederik Vansina added, “As the second Air Force acquiring this system, we are proud to join the UK in setting the first milestones towards interoperability between both our systems. Both our nations see great opportunity in developing strategic partnership and in doing so we will tackle shared challenges with greater strength on top of streamlining our Forces’ interoperability in employing this state-ofthe-art asset. “As other NATO Air Force’s join the United Kingdom and Belgium in acquiring this cutting-edge capability, which we will seamlessly integrate into densely navigated airspaces around the globe, I’m proud to announce today’s signing of our bi-national Statement of Intent. This is a first and important step toward the foundation of a reliable partnership between our Air Force’s involving key aspects in the development of this novel system.”

GENERAL ATOMICS

The Royal Australian Air Force selected the SkyGuardian – previously marketed as the Certified Predator B – in November 2019 to fulfil its Project AIR 7003 armed UAS requirement, and is expected to go to contract in 2021 for the first deliveries of 12 systems in 2024 or 2025. The first production representative SkyGuardian was rolled out in April 2020, and will be used to conduct flight tests to validate the certified status of the system, and the various sensor fits for customer air forces.

Saber Astronautics plays traffic cop for multi-national space exercise

Demonstrating Australia’s growing space expertise, Australian space company Saber Astronautics has led the space traffic monitoring cell for the Pacific region for a recent joint civil and military space operations exercise with the US.. The Sprint Advanced Concept Training (SACT) event was a US Space Forcerun event to test combat readiness of its space forces using live data from realworld commercial and defence sensors to track objects in space. SACT also included a civil space component for the military to practice working with civilian and commercial space operators. Based in Sydney, Saber Astronautics was recently chosen to establish the Australian Space Agency Mission Control Centre at the Lot Fourteen technology precinct in Adelaide. For SACT, Saber operated from their Responsive Space Operations Centre (RSOC) in Sydney, conducting civil space

traffic management while receiving additional requests from the military teams. RSOC then tasked commercial sensor networks from companies from the USA, Japan, and Australia, and analysed changes to orbiting satellites. They received data from sensors, compared them to known and expected satellite positions, and identified manoeuvres for live spacecraft. “SACT explored our actions as a national civil Mission Control Centre if there was a war in space,” Saber chief executive officer Jason Held said in a statement. “We’re not space warriors, we’re more space traffic cops. “But as a national centre we also have a relationship to government so it is important to explore how we can work with other agencies and the broader multinational community if something goes wrong.” SACT was initially a US-only exercise but, in 2019 Saber’s international presence allowed Australian integration with the US Space Operations Center for 24hour operational readiness from Saber’s RSOCs. The civilian SACT formed soon afterwards with companies from the USA, France, and Australia leading three regional cells, each responsible for their eight-hour windows. Mr Held said, with the space industry set to triple in size over the next decade there was increased interest in a global space traffic management. “We’re about to leave the barnstorming era of the space industry and like the aviation sector, the space sector will also need cooperation, coordination and interaction between civil and military stakeholders worldwide.”

TECHNOLOGY

ALL-IN! Australia commits to the Next Generation Jammer – Low Band BY ANDREW MCLAUGHLIN

ustralia has increased its investment in the AN/ALQ-249 Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) system by signing an extension to its cooperative development agreement with the US Navy. Designed to replace the AN/ALQ-99 jammer system on the Boeing EA-18G Growler, the NGJ is being developed in three versions: the AN/ALQ-249(V)1 NGJ Mid Band (NGJ-MB), (V)2 Low Band (NGJ-LB), and (V)3 High Band (NGJ-HB) systems. After the RAAF committed to a cooperative development investment for the AN/ALQ-249(V)1 NGJ-MB in October 2017, and in May 2020, it was extended to cover the production, sustainment, and follow-on development phase for the NGJ-MB. In July 2020, the Commonwealth’s investment was further extended to cover a cooperative development memorandum of agreement for the next version of the NGJ, the AN/ALQ-249(V)2 NGJ-LB system. “We’ve now signed two new agreements to expand this partnership,” Defence Minister Senator Linda Reynolds said in an August 10 statement. “The first includes production, sustainment, and follow-on development of the ALQ-249(V)1 which supports the introduction of advanced electronic jamming technology and will ensure Australia’s Growler aircraft retain commonality with their US counterparts. “This is a rapidly evolving area and to ensure these aircraft remain at the technological forefront throughout their service life, we will continue to work in partnership with the US Navy to develop the next generation jamming capability,” she added. “The expansion of the jammer partnership will build on Australia’s strong and long standing relationship with the US Navy giving Australia access to cutting edge technologies.” The NGJ-MB system is being developed by Raytheon, while Northrop Grumman and L3Harris are currently participating in a technology demonstration of their systems for the NGJ-LB material solutions analysis phase, after which a development contract is expected to be awarded in the 4th quarter of 2020. “Our processes are further enhanced by international partnerships like this one,” Program Executive Officer for the US Navy’s Tactical Aircraft Programs, Rear Adm Shane

Gahagan said in a NAVAIR release. “I commend everyone involved in making this happen for their great work so that together we can reduce costs and increase capabilities for our partners and our Navy.” US Navy AEA Systems program manager (PMA-234), Capt Michael Orr, added: “This expanded partnership with Australia to develop the newest Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) jamming capability shows the level of commitment of both countries to ensure continued superiority of the electromagnetic spectrum. The NGJ-LB (partnership agreement) allows for joint sharing of the best technologies in the world, furthering the AEA capabilities of both the US Navy and the RAAF.” The US Navy also successfully conducted the first flight of the AN/ALQ-249(V)1 NGJ-MB aboard a Boeing EA-18G Growler on August 7. The first safety-of-flight checkout flight is a significant milestone in the new NGJ’s flight test program, and follows the delivery of the first pod to the US Navy in 2019, and the completion of Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) testing in March 2020. “What an incredible day for the US Navy, our Australian partners, and the Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) community,” Capt Orr said in a release. “We witnessed a successful first flight with the NGJMB capability fully integrated onto the EA-18G Growler, validating the last four years of development and the extensive efforts of these last several months in preparation. I’m extremely proud of the entire Government and industry team.” US Navy test squadron VX-23 pilot, Lt Jonathan Williams added, “There was a lot of discussion on how the NGJ-MB pod would affect how the Growler handles, and it was exciting to have the jet feel like any other flight. We have a great test team to thank for making today happen, and I look forward to seeing how the Growler team brings out the full potential of the NGJ-MB pod.” Being procured under the ADF’s Project AIR 5349 Phase A VX-23 EA-18G Growler with the 6, the NGJ-MB is planned to NGJ-MB pod on the enter service with the US Navy starboard wing. US NAVY and RAAF in 2024, with the subsequent systems due to follow at approximately twoyear intervals. The NGJ-LB is currently in a development phase, with technology development contracts awarded to Northrop Grumman and L3Harris in 2018 and 2019.

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FORCE STRUCTURE PLAN

FORCE STRUCTURE PL AN

STRATEGIC DEPTH

The 2020 Force Structure Plan and Defence Strategic Update will provide the ADF with greater strategic depth BY ANDREW McLAUGHLIN & MAX BLENKIN

rime Minister Scott Morrison released a major update by his government to the 2016 Defence White Paper and Defence Integrated Investment Plan on July 1. The 2020 Defence Strategy Update and the accompanying Force Structure Plan are designed to provide guidance on the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) posture and recapitalisation plans for the coming decade, with a growing emphasis on the Indo-Pacific region. It clearly signals an intent to shape the ADF to position Australia to be able to deter or to deal with belligerent threats with credible military force. Set in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated growing economic recession, the government’s commitment to the Defence budget hasn’t wavered. Indeed, spending increases in several key areas should see the previous commitment to defence spending of two per cent of GDP increase significantly, especially with economic activity expected to flatline over the next few years until the global economy has fully recovered from the pandemic. “We have been a favoured isle for many decades,” Prime Minister Scott Morrison said at the launch at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) in Canberra. “The only time Australia has faced an existential threat was when the global and regional order

collapsed in the 1930s and 1940s. “Now, we must face the reality that we have moved into a new and less benign strategic era – one in which the institutions and patterns of cooperation that have benefited our prosperity and security for decades are under increasing strain,” he added. “The Indo-Pacific is the epicentre of rising strategic competition. Our region will not only shape our future – increasingly it is the focus of the dominant global contest of our age.” This 2020 Force Structure Plan (FSP) details the Government’s intentions for new and adjusted ADF capability investments to implement the new strategic objectives in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU). It links Defence’s capability plans with Defence’s reform program, the More Together: Defence Science and Technology Strategy 2030 for innovation, and resourcing plans. The Plan also builds on existing defence industry initiatives, such as the 2016 Defence Industry Policy Statement and the Defence Export Strategy, to maximise Australian industry involvement in Defence projects. The Prime Minister highlighted tensions over territorial claims heightening the risk of miscalculation or conflict, unprecedented regional military modernisation, increased capabilities and reach, coercive activities, disinformation and foreign interference, terrorism, and state sovereignty being under pressure as the foundations for the strategy.

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ADF

POSTURE SHIFT

MARITIME POWER

Much of what the documents outline has already been announced or is already in build, but there were a few new capabilities and announcements. The package highlights a shift in Australia’s posture which has previously been a defensive one prioritising Australia’s immediate region – the IndoPacific – while remaining prepared to make coalitionstyle military contributions outside our immediate region. Whereas the objectives outlined in the 2016 DWP gave an equal weighting to Australia’s northern approaches, South-East Asia, and the Pacific, the new document prioritises the ADF’s ability to project power into the geographical area ranging from the north-east Indian Ocean, through maritime and mainland South-East Asia, to PNG and the SouthWest Pacific. This is an important distinction and highlights Australia’s ‘first island chain’ of defence, ranging from Sri Lanka through Sumatra and Java, PNG, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Fiji, a line which the Sir Richard Williams Foundation’s Brian Weston has discussed in a three-part series of the On Target column in recent issues of ADBR. A quick snapshot of the documents shows the Commonwealth will increase Defence spending from the $195 billion allocated in the 2016/17 to 2025/26 period, to $270 million in the decade 2020/21 to 2029/30. It will include a growth in annual defence spending from $42 billion in 2020/21, to $73 billion in 2029/30. Over the same period, the acquisition of new capability will grow from 34 per cent of the annual defence budget to 40 per cent. There will also be a greater emphasis on more potent and long-range combat systems, on cyber security, and on more secure and robust supply chains. And there will be an increase in Defence manning of 800 personnel, comprising 650 for Navy, 100 for the Air Force, and 50 for Army. Again, it should be noted that, while many of the government’s capability announcements were updates of previously announced capabilities, many of which already have project offices established and are on the acquisition path, the DSU and FSP have added some additional strategic context and political backing to these capabilities.

In the Maritime domain, new capabilities will include spending of a not-insignificant amount of between $5 billion and $7 billion on an integrated undersea surveillance system. While few details were given on what this system may comprise, the FSP did say it would include “exploration of optionally crewed and/or un-crewed surface systems and un-crewed undersea systems, an undersea signature management range, and expanded undersea warfare facilities and infrastructure”. The documents also flagged the acquisition from 2024 of a ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability based on the Raytheon RIM-174 (SM-6) missile system for the Hobart class Aegis destroyers, and possibly the follow-on Hunter class frigates. The 240km range SM-6 is an extended range development of the familiar RIM-67 SM-2 missile in service with the RAN. It features an added booster, advanced guidance system, and a hit-to-kill warhead capable of intercepting incoming anti-ship and medium-range ballistic missiles. The RAN’s previously-announced adoption of cooperative engagement capability (CEC) and the Baseline 9 upgrade of the Aegis combat system will enable this BMD capability to be networked into a future wider integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) system planned under Project AIR 6500. Offboard targeting data can be provided to Aegis via CEC from advanced sensor platforms such as an E-7A Wedgetail AEW&C, F-35A fighters, or other RAN or allied Aegis-equipped vessels. Also re-announced was a new shiplaunched surfaceto-surface anti-ship missile (ASM) to replace the ageing RGM-84 Harpoon. New systems such as the KONGSBERG Naval Strike Missile (NSM) or a planned surface-launched variant of Lockheed Martin’s AGM-158C long-range anti-ship

HMAS Choules is set to be replaced by two Australianbuilt multi-role sealift and replenishment vessels. ADF

Flagged from 2024 is the possible acquisition of the Raytheon RIM-174 (SM-6) missile system for the RAN’s Hobart class Aegis destroyers . US NAVY

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‘The documents also flagged the acquisition from 2024 of a ballistic missile defence capability’

The RAAF Super Hornets are in line for the Lockheed Martin AGM-158C LRASM. pictured below on a US F/A18. US NAVY

missile (LRASMSL) have two to four times the range of the Harpoon, significantly more advanced and autonomous guidance systems, and lower visual and electronic signatures. The US State Department approved a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) to Australia of up to 200 LRASMs in February 2020 to equip the RAAF’s F/A-18F Super Hornet and possibly the P-8A Poseidon and F-35A under the Project AIR 3023 Phase 1 enhanced maritime strike requirement. The LRASM-SL or the NSM are planned to be acquired under Project SEA 4100 Phase 1. While the LRASM will be re-packaged so it can be launched from the Mk41 vertical launch system (VLS) used by the Hobart and Hunter class vessels, the NSM is launched from dedicated tubes like those required by the Harpoon. The RAN will also acquire an expended mine warfare capability under various phases of the Project SEA 1905 Maritime Mine Countermeasures Program. Currently restricted to three Huon class vessels and a small number of AUVs being operated on a trial basis, the FSP proposes an acquisition of up to eight new vessels. Government statements have suggested these may be based on the Lurssen OPV80 design upon which the Arafura offshore patrol vessels (OPV) are based, as has the proposed new hydrographic vessel under the Project SEA 2400 Hydrographic Data Collection Capability requirement.

With future mine countermeasures primarily expected to be conducted by remotely-operated vehicles from motherships, the requirement for specialist vessels made of non-magnetic materials has been reduced. And with 12 OPVs currently being built at Osborne in SA and Henderson in WA for Project SEA 1180 Phase 1, it would be an easy decision to extend this run to fulfill the RAN’s mine warfare and hydrographic projects’ requirements. As an extension of this mine warfare requirement, the Commonwealth announced on August 25 that, in conjunction with the Trusted Autonomous Systems Defence Cooperative Research Centre (TAS DCRC) and Thales Australia, it will fund the development of autonomous technologies for closeto-shore mine warfare operations to the tune of $15 million. That announcement says the aim of this research is to “design, develop, test, and evaluate various teams of micro AUV swarms and Autonomous Surface Vessels, to develop new systems for underwater mine detection and clearance.” From 2021, work will commence on the design, development, and acquisition of two Australianbuilt multi-role sealift and replenishment vessels to replace HMAS Choules in service, presumably one for each coast. The Bay class Choules entered service in 2006 with the UK’s Royal Fleet Auxiliary before being mothballed and acquired by the RAN in 2011. Based in Sydney, it has proved to be invaluable in supporting humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR) and other soft-power missions in the southwest Pacific region. The FSP also identifies a requirement for a new logistics helicopter. The RAN currently operates six Airbus MRH90 Taipan helicopters in this role, but ADBR understands these aircraft will soon be retired from Navy service due to ongoing sustainment difficulties. While the FSP forecasts a new helicopter will be acquired from 2025, ADBR further understands that this may either be brought forward, or a commercial-off-the-shelf type such as

Future mine warfare capability may be based on the core design of the Arafura class offshore patrol vessels under construction. ADF

FORCE STRUCTURE PLAN

the Leonardo AW139 may be leased or acquired as an interim capability. The new logistics helicopter may be drawn from an acquisition of additional Sikorsky MH-60R Romeo Seahawks to complement the 24 naval combat helicopters currently in RAN service, or possibly the similar MH-60S Sierra Seahawk. Both of these sub-types use common dynamic components, avionics, and some sensors, although the Sierra has a much larger cabin derived from the UH-60 Black Hawk, and thus can carry more cargo and/or passengers. But Sierra production has ended following the completion of orders for the US Navy and Thailand, and it is unclear if it can be restarted. Romeo production continues, albeit at a relative trickle for a few FMS sales. In the longer term, the ADF will be looking initially to extend and then replace MV Ocean Protector – a commercial-off-the-shelf research, rescue, and HADR vessel which featured prominently in the search for MH370 – with an ice-rated vessel from 2028. From 2030, the RAN’s 12 Navantia LHD landing craft (LLC) will also come due for replacement, and work will start in 2035 on a new future destroyer design to replace the Hobart class DDGs in the 2040s.

LAND POWER In an ADF that is increasingly investing in long-range intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike capabilities, Army hasn’t missed out. The FSP has confirmed a long-held Army requirement for a regiment comprising three batteries of long-range rocket artillery and missile systems in three phases from 2024, 2027, and 2028. One such capability is the 160km range Lockheed Martin MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATacMS), a four metre long GPS-guided rocket with a 500lb warhead which is fired from the truck-mounted M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HiMARS) that can be deployed aboard a C-130 transport. HiMARS was demonstrated to the ADF during Exercise Talisman Saber in 2019 (TS19). The M142 can fire a single ATacMS, or six smaller M26 or M30 rockets with ranges out to 70km. The US Marine Corps also demonstrated the ability of an M142 to fire an ATacMS against a land target from the deck of a large US Navy amphibious vessel in 2017. As part of Army’s requirement for longer-range engagements, the FSP also re-announced the Government’s two-phased plan to acquire two regiments of self-propelled howitzers from 2021 and 2026. Likely to be based on the Hanwha K9 Thunder, these vehicles were announced in the runup to the 2018 federal election, and will be built in Geelong in Victoria which, coincidentally, sits astride the marginal federal seats of Corio and Corangamite. Hanwha is also proposing to manufacture its LAND

400 Phase 3 contender – the Redback IFV – in Geelong. In the rotary-wing domain, the FSP envisages the acquisition of a new long-range rotorcraft to enable land force projection and support at greater ranges in the late 2020s, and the investment in a new next generation rotorcraft from 2034. Logic suggests the latter would be the replacement for the 41 Airbus MRH90 Taipans in Army service, with the US Army’s Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) being a logical leading candidate. Part of the US Army’s larger Future Vertical Lift (FVL) program, FLRAA seeks to initially complement and eventually replace the Sikorsky UH-60M Black Hawk medium transport helicopter in service, with an aircraft with much longer range and higher transit speeds. If the ADF gets on to the FLRAA program early enough, there may be substantial Australian industry opportunities to supply components into the global manufacturing and sustainment program which will likely realise several thousand aircraft. Based on the limited language in the FSP, the new long-range rotorcraft appears to be a new

Top: The Hanwha K9 Thunder is the likely basis of the ADF’s new selfpropelled howitzers . HANWHA

Above: The US Army Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft is a leading candidate to replace Army’s MRH 90s, while Navy’s MRH 90s will be replaced under a separate new logistics helicopter requirement . ADF

ADBR

Options will be developed for the replacement of the Army’s Abrams main battle tanks from 2032. ADF

The truck-mounted M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System was demonstrated to the ADF in 2019 and can be deployed aboard a C-130transport. ADF

capability, so it is difficult to determine what the requirement for such an aircraft would look like. On face value, the only aircraft that might fit that requirement would appear to be the Bell/Boeing MV22 Osprey but, short of any new US or FMS orders, V-22 production is scheduled to conclude by around 2023, several years before the ADF is scheduled to initiate its project. But with the RAAF’s Leonardo/L3 C-27J Spartan suffering from very poor availability in recent months, ADBR understands the ADF may be looking to cut its losses on that program and replace the fixed-wing battlefield airlifter with something like the

MV-22 which would provide more flexibility when operating in our wider region. Before then, the Army will possibly upgrade but more likely replace its Airbus Tiger ARH from 2024 under Project LAND 4503, the tender for which closed in July 2020. It will also induct a new light special operations rotary-wing (SORW) capability under LAND 2097 Ph 4 for which an RFP was issued in August 2020. The FSP also foreshadows the acquisition on up to 12 inshore or riverine patrol watercraft for river and littoral operations. It also proposed several amphibious vessels of up to 2,000 tonnes under the Project JP2048 Phase 5 Future Watercraft Program to replace the Balikpapan class LCHs which were retired in 2014 and transferred to the Philippine and PNG navies, and a number of smaller amphibious transport vessels. The FSP also identifies a requirement for additional unspecified watercraft to be based in northern Australia to expand the current fleet. Also announced in the FSP was increased investment in autonomous vehicles, and on August 8 the government announced separately that 16 more M113AS4 armoured personnel carriers (APC) will be converted to an optionally-crewed combat vehicle (OCCV) configuration by BAE Systems, to add to the four already converted (see Battlespace).. The August 8 statement also said additional $3.5m investment would be made with the Institute for Intelligent Research and Innovation (IISRI) at Deakin University for the expansion of Army’s leader-follower vehicle technology prototyping, and that $897,000 had been awarded to Australian company EPE for small wheeled robots to experiment with human and machine teaming in reconnaissance roles. The FSP says a larger future autonomous vehicle program valued at between $7.4 billion and $11.1 billion is scheduled to commence in 2032. For special operations, the Government said it would invest in a replacement fleet of medium/heavy vehicles, acquire small submersible and surface boat capabilities to support maritime counter-terrorism, special reconnaissance and warfare, and precision strike missions. The FSP also said it will develop options for a system to replace Army’s M1A1 AIM-SA Abrams main battle tanks from 2032, with an emphasis of being able to integrate with new combat reconnaissance and infantry fighting vehicles (CRV and IFV) currently being acquired under Projects LAND 400 Phases 2 and 3 respectively. Acquired in 2007 from remanufactured former US Army hulls, the M1A1 is currently scheduled for an upgrade under Project LAND 907 Phase 2 which will enable the capability to remain relevant to the mid-2030s. The LAND 907 Phase 2 upgrade will focus on the Abrams’ network-enabled capability interface control systems, training systems and equipment, vehicle health and usage monitoring

FORCE STRUCTURE PLAN

systems, sensors, and possibly the addition of a reactive armour system. But with no US Army MBT replacement program on the horizon and that service focused on continuing to upgrade the Abrams’ combat capabilities, the eventual Australian Abrams replacement will likely be an enhanced Abrams. Importantly, the FSP also forecasts the development of a more robust bulk fuel storage and distribution system, not just for Army, but for all three services.

AIR & SPACE POWER The big ticket item which drew plenty of attention was confirmation that the ADF will acquire advanced longer-range strike systems. First on the list is likely to be the Lockheed Martin AGM-158C long-range anti-ship missile (LRASM) for employment from the RAAF’s F/A-18F Super Hornet and likely other platforms such as the P-8A Poseidon and possibly the F-35A. As stated above, approval for an LRASM acquisition was granted by the US State Department in February 2020. The LRASM will put adversary maritime targets at high risk at four times the range of the current airlaunched AGM-84 Harpoon ASM, well outside the range of sea or land-based sensors and counter-air capabilities. Its advanced sensors allow it to fly an indirect flight profile and to recognise a target from a pre-loaded database, while its low-signature shaping and emissions makes it difficult to intercept. The RAAF’s F/A-18A/B classic Hornet currently carries the AGM-158A JASSM strike missile, a fixed-target version of LRASM with similar range and warhead size. But unless JASSM is integrated with the F/A-18F or F-35A, this weapon will retire along with the RAAF’s final squadron of classic Hornets in 2021. The KONGSBERG JSM – an air-launched version of the surface-launched NSM – is also a possible acquisition, as it can be carried internally by the F-35A which allows that aircraft to engage a target and maintain its very low signature much closer to it. Curiously, the FSP flags a replacement and expansion of the ADF’s “airborne electronic attack capability upon the retirement of the EA-18G Growler”. But with the Growler having only just achieved an initial operational capability (IOC) in 2019 and unlikely to be replaced well into the 2040s, this is likely a poorly worded reference to ongoing upgrades to that airframe. These include the adoption of the US Navy’s Block II upgrade, new anti-radar weapons like the AARGM-ER, and the integration of the AN/ALQ-249(V)1 mid-band, (V)2 low-band, and (V)3 high-band next generation jammer systems from 2024 through to 2030. The FSP also identifies expanded air combat capabilities, including a $10 billion to $17 billion investment in fighter aircraft. Again, while short on

details, this likely refers to Tranche 3 of Project AIR 6000 which will either be an additional 28-30 F-35As, or an upgrade of the RAAF’s 24 F/A-18Fs to the US Navy’s Block III standard, or possibly a combination of both. There is likely also a funding allocation within that amount for ongoing block and sub-block upgrades to the RAAF’s 72 F-35As already on order, and possibly to fund further development or an initial operational capability of the Boeing ATS/Loyal Wingman UAS. The FSP also refers to an expansion of the ADF’s remotely piloted and autonomous systems, including air teaming vehicles, valued at between $7.4 and $11 billion. This is likely referring to the completion of the Project AIR 7000 Phase 1B MQ-4C Triton maritime ISR program, the AIR 7003 Phase 1 MQ-9B SkyGuardian armed RPAS, and further development and possible acquisition of the Loyal Wingman. Having entered service in 1999, the ADF’s C-130J Hercules will be due for replacement from the late 2020s. The FSP identifies this and refers to the expanded replacement of the C-130J. Like Growler, this may just involve a substantial block upgrade program and the integration of additional situational awareness capabilities such as the SATCOM communications and Litening AT pod that has been fitted to one aircraft already, and possibly a structural upgrade to the aircraft’s wing box like that currently being performed on the RAF’s C-130Js. Another possibility is that, rather than

Options in play ... undertake a complex upgrade of the ADF’s C-130J Hercules fleet ,or replace with the MC130J? (above). USAF

‘The big ticket item ... was confirmation the ADF will acquire advanced longerrange strike systems’

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The MV-22 Osprey appears to be the only current airframe capable of fulfilling the long-range rotorcraft ambitions, but in the absence of new orders, production will finish earlier than the ADF schedule. JSDF/USMC

upgrade the 12 current C-130Js, the ADF may instead choose to initially complement and later replace them with a new-build model such as the MC-130J which offers much greater levels of capability in support of ground forces. The FSP also forecasts a replacement for the Airbus KC-30A MRTT and Boeing E-7A AEW&C capabilities. But again, ADBR expects these commercial-derivative airframes to remain viable well into the 2040s and, instead, be subject to a number of capability block upgrades through enhancements to their onboard and support systems. Unfortunately, an opportunity to acquire more KC-30As – either new-build or converted commercial airframes of which there is a surplus – appears to have passed, with the FSP saying no additional aircraft will be considered. Air-toair refuelling is critical to being able to project and sustain air power and, despite showing great reliability in Operation OKRA in the Middle East, with just seven KC-30As the RAAF would be unlikely to be able to sustain combat operations at range for more than a few consecutive days. The NKAWTG acronym aptly applies here! Between $6.2 billion and $9.3 billion has been allocated in the FSP for research and development into high-speed long-range strike, including hypersonic research to inform future investments for remotely-piloted and autonomous combat aircraft, including air teaming vehicles. Australia has already conducted hypersonic research through educational institutions, or it may team with the US on one of a number of programs in development there. In the Space domain – which largely falls under the responsibility of the RAAF (and which we expand upon from page 28 of this issue) – the FSP proposes a substantial investment in space

capability upon which the ADF is becoming increasingly reliant for communications, surveillance, and positioning. Almost all of that capability is currently delivered through other nations’ assets, particularly those of the US and, in a future conflict, that capability could be congested, degraded, or denied. The investment of up to $7 billion will improve resilience and self-reliance, and much of this funding will likely go to upgrading satellite communications systems, including satellites themselves and ground control stations under sovereign Australian control. An additional $2 billion will be spent to develop space situational awareness capabilities, to keep track of space junk as well as friendly and other satellites.

CYBER The Government had already announced its plans to enhance cyber capabilities on June 30, including offensive and defensive measures designed to protect the Australian mainland and deployed forces. Up to $5 billion will be used to strengthen the ADF’s networks against attacks and intrusion by malicious actors, while a further $2-3 billion will go to improving signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems and enhancing top secret information systems. “There is a new dynamic of strategic competition, and the largely benign security environment Australia has enjoyed – roughly from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the Global Financial Crisis – is gone,” the Prime Minister said. “Since the Government’s 2016 Defence White Paper was released, we have witnessed an acceleration of the strategic trends that were already under way.” He said the Update “makes clear the strategic environment we face, and this clarity will guide Australia’s actions”, and, “sees an evolution of strategic defence objectives in accord with our new strategic environment”.

CONCLUSION Defence White Papers and Defence Strategic Updates often only last as long as the Governments that publish them, and are usually reviewed at four to five year intervals. But in a post-pandemic world, the strategic and economic circumstances in the IndoPacific are likely to be extremely challenging over the next decade. Therefore, it is wise for Australia to extend its strategic interests and its ability to project military force as well as diplomatic soft-power beyond the traditional sea-air gap, either as part of an integrated multi-national joint force, or even on our own. This DSU and FSP provide some of the intent and funding to be able to add some strategic depth to Australia’s borders, and at the same time to bolster the ADF’s logistics lines, spares inventories, and magazines.

INDUSTRY

NEXT GEN FIC The time is right to review the integration of defence industry with ADF capability BY JOHN CONWAY

escribing Australian defence industry as a fundamental input to capability (FIC) is like saying the military is a fundamental input to warfare. Capability simply does not exist without industry, the means to produce defence materiel. As the strategic environment is changing, so too is the need for the ADF to link capability with all elements of national power. Part of the challenge is a too-broad definition of industry and a too-narrow focus of the capability life cycle (CLC). None of the other Five Eyes members separate industry as an input to capability. Instead, they have a mindset which considers industry as interwoven with all components of capability. For example, how are major systems, supplies, support, or facilities delivered in Australia? Of course, they all rely on industry and a national defence industry base. To deliver the types of complex adaptive systems that provide options for Government and synchronise with other elements of national power, Australian defence industry needs to be re-conceptualised as a substrate of capability. Military capability is affected by disruptive, earlystage technology in the same way as other capital and labour-intensive industries. Australian defence industry requires a mechanism for innovation, and an environment that encourages exploration, experimentation, and risk-taking. In his article in ASPI’s The Strategist on 12 August 2020 entitled Strategic suspicion and coronavirus consequences: the cost of Australia’s defence, Dr Marcus Hellyer says, “While the basic settings of the government’s 2016 defence industry

policy statement are the right ones, it’s likely that it’s going to have to do more to develop the kind of local industrial ecosystem necessary to deliver the level of sovereign capability described in the 2020 update and force structure plan.” A start point could be a sovereign capability mindset that sees industry within an ecosystem that exists to solve problems and support the achievement of capability goals, rather than simply delivering products or services.

COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE Despite the increasing complexity of the operational environment and our inability to accurately predict the future, many western defence organisations remain wedded to a linear, reductionist process for the management and development of capability delivered by projects, with layers of management at program and domain level ensuring contractual and regulatory compliance and benefit realisation. A weakness in this approach is that the process is constantly lagging the environment when it needs to be in the lead. It should be shaping and influencing outcomes rather than reacting to events and leaving us vulnerable to strategic surprise. It also leaves small to medium enterprises with a difficult task to develop innovative solutions and penetrate the supply chains of major system acquisitions when, often, it is too late. As Dr Hellyer says, “… assembling foreign vehicles here is not going to help you with sovereign capability”. The question now is how to apply increasing foresight to the Defence and industry capability planning construct to better identify and address

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lead threat and technology indicators. The emerging relationship between capability development and industry is changing our current understanding of the FICs, especially within the context of the advanced, data-intensive next generation technologies which characterise the ADF. The re-conceptualisation of the FICs is an option, involving the analysis of those essential to the management of the CLC and those which are intelligence-led, enterprise inputs, that address the operational, comparative interaction with the competition, both militarily and commercially. Moreover, these enterprise inputs exploit the advantages of a relatively small yet imaginative, intelligent, technology-savvy population – the accelerants in next generation warfare.

SENSE OF URGENCY

ADF

The ADF needs capability now so that it has the time to prepare for the sophisticated missions it must perform as part of an integrated joint force able to act simultaneously across air and space, sea, land, and cyberspace. These missions involve dangerous tasks that must be completed at speed in order to preserve decision-making time and space, and avoid uncontrolled escalation. The lives of ADF personnel must not be put at risk by trading off operational capability for industry outcomes, especially if those industry outcomes are driven by interests which are counter to our own. An early priority, therefore, is to establish a common understanding of what Defence expects from industry and vice-versa when building sovereign capability. This should start with a common understanding of what is meant by capability with a revisit of its fundamental inputs and the ways and means by which they are managed and developed. This must go beyond contracting and offering grants because the operational environment is fluid and constantly changing, and Defence and industry interoperability does not have a one-sizefits-all answer.

CAPABILITY IS POWER Defence describes capability as the power to achieve an objective or create an effect in a given environment at a specified time, and for that effect to be sustained for a designated period. Air and space power, maritime power, and land power contribute to capability, but information power applied in cyberspace or within the electromagnetic spectrum is becoming a more important way of building influence and shaping the environment. Conducting operations as an integrated and joint force across these power domains introduces significant challenges, not least because of the differences in the speed by which people, platforms, and data move through them. This requires not only domain expertise, but also interoperability and synchronisation so that the outcome is greater than the sum of the constituent parts. This outcome is increased capability, and thus, increased power. Australian defence industry needs to have a clear understanding of where it fits into the capability system, as well as the constraints placed upon it by the operational needs of Defence. Therein lies another challenge. On security and intelligence grounds, Defence can only be transparent to a point, while major system providers are careful to protect their intellectual property. This need for confidentiality means there is no clear pathway between science and technology R&D, and fielded or future ADF capability. Without a formal mechanism to connect R&D investment with operational outcomes or effects, there is limited incentive for Australian industry to co-invest with the Commonwealth to counter new threats and new risks.

BACK TO FIRST PRINCIPLES By any standards, the First Principles Review of Defence released in 2015 should be considered a success. The establishment of the Joint Capabilities Group (JCG), formal appointment of single service chiefs as capability managers, and the ‘Smart Buyer’ risk management framework ,stand out for special mention alongside a broad range of reforms within CASG, not least in relationship to the management of the CLC. This period of reform saw industry formally recognised as the ninth FIC. Each of the nine FICs is further reduced into individual sub-elements which, in theory, ensures that all non-financial resources and activities required to develop, manage, sustain, and support a capability are acknowledged and the relevant costs attributed. This was an important objective of the First Principles Review which highlighted at the time that, “costing methodology does not account for all of the inputs to capability, at acquisition and over project life, and the true total cost of ownership is opaque”. The FIC framework itself is nothing new. It continues to guide Commonwealth management decisions and is used by other partner defence

NEXT GEN FIC

ADF

UK MOD

US DOD

CANADA DOD

Organisation

Organisations

Infrastructure & organization

Facilities & Training Ranges

Infrastructure

Facilities

R&D / Ops research

Personnel

Collective Training

Training

Concepts, doctrine & collective training

Leadership Major Systems

Equipment

Supplies

Logistics

Materiel

Information Command & Management

Equipment, supplies & services

IT Infrastructure

Concepts & Doctrine

Policy Doctrine

Support Industry

organisations, but context is everything. The First Principles Review added industry to a legacy FIC framework which was assumed to be fit for purpose, whereas hindsight would now suggest it is time to revisit this approach. There is no internationally agreed template for defining the fundamental inputs to capability with Five Eyes partners – the US, Australia, Canada, and the UK – each adopting subtly different models to describe the framework around which defence capability is developed and managed. Only Australia singles out industry as a discrete input and, while it signalled the growing importance of industry in the delivery of capability, the definition of industry is too broad. It would benefit from a tighter focus and definition. There is, however, an opportunity to examine FICs from first principles and consider whether it remains appropriate for the Australian context when dealing with next generation threats, and the science and technologies which now characterise the ADF force structure. A further examination would consider whether the FICs need to be restructured to better reflect current and emerging next generation capability paradigms, and whether there is a need for a set of higher level FICs that, in turn, need to be analysed and prioritised in greater detail before entering the CLC at Gate 0, and the Smart Buyer framework. This process would facilitate the early identification of risks and opportunities to underpin targeted Australian science and technology R&D and experimentation programs aimed at enhancing fielded and future Australian Defence Force capability. It would also identify supply chain and national infrastructure vulnerabilities to be addressed within a broader national security and whole of Government apparatus. Moreover, it would also play to our greatest strength by putting people at the heart of the solution and examining ways of optimising the

workforce – for example, by looking at platform crewing ratios and identifying roles at an enterprise level that are better performed by industry. This change represents an evolutionary approach rather than ‘throwing the baby out with the bath water’, and builds upon the early success of the First Principles Review. But this approach needs to be supported by a narrative that promotes the growing importance of the relationship between advanced technology R&D and people to counter new threats and new risks.

INTELLIGENCE-LED This would be an intelligence-led approach which examines the interaction with strategic competitors at a system level and address the growing importance of counter-intelligence and the potential theft of national secrets to gain military and commercial advantage. This information gathering and analysis would happen ahead of the formal CLC process, and shape the development of the sovereign capability ecosystem while synchronising Defence capability with other instruments of national power at the conceptual level. A candidate FIC construct is offered for consideration which restructures the current FICs to better align them with present and emerging areas of capability generation emphasis, and identifies four ‘enterprise FICs’ to be considered in advance of major weapon system choices. The principle focus areas of the enterprise FICs are: Intelligence, Innovation, Integration, and Interoperability. This early stage planning would identify R&D incentives for industry as well as establishing the framework for competition. It would ensure policy settings were in place, ensure infrastructure and basing were appropriate to the emerging needs of the joint force, and ensure organisations were optimised for Defence enterprise level outcomes.

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The enterprise FIC would better inform the capability acquisition and sustainment considerations of the remaining FIC, with feedback loops to deliver ongoing connectivity with Government and Defence strategic guidance. The most important aspect is that defence industry is considered from the outset as an integral part of a capability system, not just an input. The subsequent acquisition of the major system in the Smart Buyer risk management framework, based substantially upon systems engineering and project management principles for which they are optimised, would be made with a greater level of confidence that it would deliver a sovereign ecosystem existing to solve problems – not to deliver a product or a service. The vital link between the enterprise FIC and those focused upon the CLC is the people and the numerous workforce-related issues which add complexity to the Defence enterprise. It is also a workforce that must deliver both capability and capacity. As Dr Hellyer points out, “There’s no point acquiring equipment you can’t crew.” There is also little point acquiring equipment you cannot test, or if the basing posture is wrong.

CAPABILITY ADVANTAGE To deliver the Force Structure Plan, defence industry should be incentivised to generate new ideas and create sovereign, Australian-controlled capability rather than simply creating jobs – as important as that is. Workforce is a core part of the solution, but a deliberate higher-order focus on developing defence power through superior technology and ingenuity is necessary to create the desired outcomes of selfreliant security and prosperity. And R&D is the driver. Post-COVID planning should rightly address supply-side risks, such as supply chain vulnerability and value for money in acquisition and sustainment. But the demand-side risks are accelerating and many of those risks are new and unknown. It is therefore important to differentiate between the

icing on the cake and the cake itself. This involves understanding the gaps and risks in the Australian defence and industry construct in terms of capability and capacity, both of which are required to generate power. Representing the cake, the most significant gap can be filled by a substantial increase in the amount of money invested in Defence R&D. That funding can be found by trading off near-term capability for longterm national security outcomes, without putting at risk the acquisition of new capability systems. This involves using funds in the sustainment budget by retiring legacy capabilities early or reducing their readiness levels, and investing the balance in next generation technology R&D. A by-product of the process would be to accelerate the major system acquisition process. While there is no guarantee it will work here, experience in Israel suggests a national endeavour to focus on R&D and the lead indicators of technology enabled by smart people is worthy of further analysis. According to a 2016 Forbes article entitled Secrets To Israel’s Innovative Edge, more than 250 global companies have R&D labs in Israel today, with 80 of them Fortune 500 companies. Despite Israel’s relatively small population, this was the result of a deliberate effort to build an advanced technology ecosystem highly integrated with industry, not just defence. The CLC is vital in providing clarity to the total cost of ownership of a weapon system, but does not operate in a vacuum – it is part of this wider ecosystem. An integrated capability and acquisition process which is focused on the generation of Defence power as an outcome, rather than a Defence force, is the goal. And there is no need to re-invent the wheel. An extension of the intelligence-led, enterprise CLC concept into the strategic centre, a greater investment in R&D within a re-vitalised FIC framework, and a renewed focus on enterprise workforce gaps and risks, is one way of addressing the challenges of strategic competition.

CURRENT FICS

NEXT GENERATION FICS

CAPABILITY FOCUS

Organisation

Policy, Command & Management

Facilities

Concepts & Doctrine

Personnel

Science & Technology

Intelligence Innovation Integration Interoperability

Collective Training

Infrastructure, Facilities, & Ranges

Major Systems

People

Defence Enterprise Workforce

Supplies

Equipment & Supplies

Materiel Acquisition & Sustainment

Command & Management

Data & Information Systems

Support

Support (Ops, Engineering, Maintenance, Supply, Training)

Industry

Training (Live Virtual Collective)

SPACE

WATCH THIS SPACE ADF in the race to secure a sovereign slot in orbit BY MAX BLENKIN

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n a future conflict, vital space-delivered services – communications, navigation, and surveillance – could be the very first casualties. Without them, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) would be fighting pretty much as it did in 1945. This vulnerability is well-recognised and applies almost equally across the board – to allies and potential adversaries alike. Nor is it a problem exclusive to Defence. Any conflict that impacts Defence space assets would also impact civil space services. Navigation systems, which use the same US GPS (global positioning system) satellite constellation as the military, would likely be the first to go. So, no more Google Maps, satellite TV or all other useful capability we take for granted, beamed from objects in orbit. The 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU) – which was released on July 1 – acknowledges that assured access to space is critical for the ADF’s warfighting effectiveness, situational awareness, and delivery of real-time communications and information. To that end, there are big plans afoot with investment in space capabilities over the next decade of about $7 billion. “This includes plans for a network of satellites to provide an independent and sovereign communications network and an enhanced space control program,” the DSU reads. This is a significant advance on the 2016 Defence White Paper in recognising that space is central to warfighting, not just an adjunct. Further, the accompanying 2020 Force Structure Plan (FSP) says Defence will need capabilities that directly contribute to warfighting outcomes in the space domain, using terrestrial and/or space-based systems. Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) senior analyst Malcom Davis says this shows the ADF accepts that space is contested.

In a statement accompanying the DSU and FSP release, Defence Minister Senator Linda Reynolds said, “… we are enhancing our sovereign capabilities to assure our access to space. That means Australian forces being able to control what we see and when we see it. This is crucial to the safety and capability of our deployed forces. “The Morrison Government is taking the first step towards introducing Australia’s first fully-owned and controlled military satellite-communications constellation,” she added. “In addition, we will strengthen our sovereign capability by building upon existing plans to develop overhead imagery capability by 2035. This will provide a greater understanding of the IndoPacific.” This sounds ambitious, and it is. It means being in total control of our own space assets, and may also mean building our own satellites and launching them on our own rockets. But Australia’s starting point is a long way short of the goal. So, what do we have now in the way of our own sovereign space-related assets? The answer is ground infrastructure, but – as far as actual assets in space are concerned – not much more. Australia owns a communications payload aboard the Optus C-1 satellite which was launched in 2003. With a projected lifespan of about 15 years, C1 is pretty much ‘running on fumes’. But with an adjustment to its orbit it is hoped it will remain operational to 2027. In 2009, the ADF also signed a 15-year deal for access to 20 channels on a UHF communications payload on commercial satellite Intelsat IS-22. That asset was launched in 2012 and provides coverage of the Indian Ocean region. Through an agreement in which Australia funded the sixth WGS (Wideband Global SATCOM) satellite, Australia also has access to the other satellites of the US WGS network. “The (US) Air Force saw

SPACE

a ‘win-win’ opportunity to partner with Australia to gain much needed additional capability while also satisfying Australia’s SATCOM requirements,” then Deputy Under Secretary of the USAF for Space Programs, Gary Payton said in a November 2007 statement when the contract was signed. This is Australia’s go-to SATCOM capability, with vast, reliable capacity to meet insatiable communications demands, particularly of deployed forces. And we have privileged access; having funded WGS-6, we have proportional use of the network. The first WGS satellite was launched in 2007, providing the same capability as all 14 satellites of the previous generation DSCS network. And, as more WGS satellites have been launched, they have further improved. The USAF considered the WGS constellation complete at 10 and sought no more satellites, but it is getting more, nonetheless. In 2018 the US Congress inserted US$605m (A$843m) funding into the US defence budget for WGS-11 and WGS-12, with Boeing contracted to deliver WGS-11. This one satellite could be double the capacity of earlier WGS satellites, thus eliminating the need for WGS-12. The USAF has asked Boeing to recruit international partners for WGS-11 so Australia might be asked to contribute. WGS-6 isn’t Australian, however. It is run by the USAF and there are other international partners in the constellation including Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and New Zealand. So, in times of conflict the network could get very congested, especially as any adversary surely appreciates the importance of WGS. It is likely the WGS network could be degraded, or access wholly denied, early in any near-peer conflict. That wouldn’t necessarily leave the ADF wholly without communications thanks to its legacy HF (high frequency) network, a sovereign capability steadily modernised over time. But it doesn’t have anywhere near the capacity of SATCOM. So just where is the ADF heading? “The vision is for a sovereign-owned and controlled SATCOM system, consisting of our own satellites for long-range communications capability that is more resilient, flexible and agile,” the RAAF’s Director-General of Air Defence and Space, AIRCDRE Philip Gordon told ADBR. “Defence has invested a significant amount of time and effort into building our ground infrastructure into the current SATCOM capability. Defence will seek to leverage that investment by modifying and enhancing it, in line with moving to develop a sovereign capability. “Defence will continue cooperation with international partners and share some of what we have in exchange for access to their capabilities for global reach, and will continue to use commercial SATCOM contracts to supplement and augment our capability where required.”

Under Joint Project (JP) 9102, up to $3 billion will be spent to enhance SATCOM capability out to 2029. This project will succeed the multi-decade, multi-phase, multiple-contractor JP 2008 which has delivered ground infrastructure in Australia, and the agreement with the US for access to WGS. SATCOM is vital and so are other satellitedelivered services – surveillance, navigation, mapping, and precision timing. All are on the agenda. AIRCDRE Gordon said Defence acquired satellite imagery through international and commercial partners. In practice, that means from satellites operated by the US National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), plus commercial operators. Defence is working to improve access to commercial satellite imagery through the $500 million Project DEF 799 Phase 1 which emerged from the 2016 Defence White Paper. “The acquisition stage of the project is complete with three antenna sites built that enable direct tasking of imaging satellites,” AIRCDRE Gordon said. “This project is now supporting Defence operations and was used extensively during Operation Bushfire Assist. “The recent DSU announced investment in sovereign space-based imagery to build Australia’s self-reliant geospatial-information and intelligence capability to support strategic intelligence requirements and precision guided weapons,” he said. A follow-on DEF 799 Phase 2 envisages possible acquisition of a sovereign geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) space surveillance system, and this will be preceded by a two-year study into costs and options. Then there’s GPS – initially developed for the US military in the 1980s but now available to anyone with a smartphone – which remains, in common with many other nations, the ADF’s primary source of positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) data. This is a vital capability and some nations have invested vast sums to create their own sovereign networks – China’s Beidou, Russia’s Glonast, and Europe’s Galileo. “Defence is investigating in alternate capabilities to GPS that would help it to access necessary PNT data when operating in a contested environment,” AIRCDRE Gordon said.

Australia has a payload aboard the Optus-C1 satellite launched in 2003, which had an expected lifespan of 15 years. It is hoped this can be extended to 2027 with an orbital adjustment. OPTUS

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SPACE DOMAIN AWARENESS

Australia has privileged access and proportional use of the WGS-6 satellite, However, it remains a USAF asset. BOEING

There is one other area where Australia has already made a substantial investment with more to come – space situational awareness, now termed as space domain awareness (SDA). Put simply, it means providing information on what’s ‘out there’, which is a lot and ever-changing. It is well known that there is a vast amount of space debris, especially in low earth orbit (LEO), ranging from functioning and defunct satellites, spent rocket components, and even slag from solid fuel rocket engines. There are about 20,000 items of a trackable size but millions more which are not. Even a paint chip moving at several kilometres per second can cause damage. If that wasn’t a big enough problem, more satellites are arriving all the time. Elon Musk’s Starlink plans a constellation of up to 12,000 to deliver global internet services. There are already more than 500 of these in orbit, with a further 60 at-a-time launched every few weeks. Other companies are planning smaller constellations offering similar services. The upshot us that traffic management is an important SDA capability – with notice, satellite operators can adjust orbits to minimise collision risk. At the same time there is advantage in keeping track of what others are doing with new satellites, including any suspicious manoeuvres. In February 2020, US officials described a Russian satellite in low Earth orbit (LEO) as manoeuvring to ‘stalk’ the US’s spy satellite USA 245. In space, close is relative – the two satellites were still more than 100 kilometres apart but close enough to raise US concerns. There are very real concerns about the consequences of war in space. The objective would be to destroy or deny enemy satellite capability. There there are various ways that could be achieved, among them cyber attack, laser blinding of sensors, or the most effective, and perilous, use of kinetic anti-satellite weapons (ASATs). The US, Russia, China, India, and possibly others possess viable ASAT systems featuring ground or air-launched missiles. But they come with the huge associated risk that destruction of a satellite would produce a blizzard of fast moving debris which could strike other satellites producing even more debris. The worst possible outcome would be what is termed the Kessler

Syndrome, named after NASA scientist Donald Kessler who posited a chain reaction of collisions each producing more debris. Conceivably that could make space inaccessible to everyone, potentially for centuries. Fortunately, most satellites and objects in LEO will de-orbit and burn up of their own accord because of atmospheric drag. Depending on satellite design, at 400 kilometres altitude the nominal life of a satellite is about one year without orbital adjustment. At 500 kilometres that extends to 10 years, while at 900 kilometres it can be 1,000 years. Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee guidelines established in 2002 say operators should de-orbit their satellites within 25 years of end of mission, but there’s a growing international view that any new satellite should feature a capability to deliberately de-orbit at end of mission. Australia is already an important part of a global SDA network, hosting a pair of systems: a USAF C-Band Space Surveillance Radar which reached full operational capability in 2017, and a Groundbased Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance (GEODSS) telescope. Both are located at Naval Communications Station, Harold E Holt at Exmouth in Western Australia. The GEODSS was relocated from the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, and has been installed in a purpose-built facility under Project AIR 3029 Phase 2. It is set to reach full operational capability (FOC) in 2021. Reports from the US suggest it would like more SDA capability Down Under, possibly another telescope system at Coonabarabran in NSW and another Space Fence radar akin to the system on the pacific island of Kwajalein Atoll, maybe also at Exmouth. A spokesman said Defence could not comment on Space Fence or the development of the system, as these were matters for the US Government and Lockheed Martin. But it seems you can never have enough SDA, and Australia is looking to develop a sovereign capability by acquiring a suite of multi-technology SDA sensors to detect, track, identify, and characterise space objects. “Variety of sensors is required to achieve a complete and resilient capability to detect objects of interest from low Earth orbit all the way to geosynchronous orbit – different sensors have different strengths and weaknesses. Only through diversity can we achieve a credible capability,” AIRCDRE Gordon said. These will be acquired through JP 9360, a brand new project acquiring an entirely new capability. An RFP released by Defence on July 20 reads: “The Department of Defence Space Domain Awareness (SDA) Project JP 9360 will provide the ADF with an ability to characterise threats to Australian and allied space-based capabilities, monitor debris (human-made and natural), and identify space weather events.”

SPACE

The RFP closes in October, but funding is yet to be approved. Defence says SDA underpins all other space missions, providing the ability to identify, characterise, and understand factors affecting the space domain. “Effective SDA will enable Australia to make considered decisions as to what objects constitute a threat and how to counter that threat,” a spokesman said. “The Government’s plans include the development of options to enhance Defence’s ability to counter emerging space threats to Australia’s free use of the space domain, and assure our continued access to space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.” In 2012, Defence stood up The Australian Space Operations Centre (AUSSpOC) within headquarters Joint Operational Command (JOC) near Canberra. AUSSpOC has a staff of 14 and provides Defence with the ability to command and control space operations in support of joint activities. It also provides the Chief of Joint Operations with expert knowledge on space operations, space intelligence support and contributes to planning for joint operations. Importantly, AUSSpOC works closely with partner nations through the Combined Space Operations Centre (CSpOC) at Vandenberg US Air Force Base in California. CSpOC is a is a strategic partnership between the US, Australia, Canada, and UK, working in collaboration with France, Germany, and New Zealand. This is the peak international defence body for SDA information.

READY TO LAUNCH? While Australia is not yet a satellite launching nation it looks to be getting closer in line with the government’s push to expand national space capability and the creation of the Australian Space Agency (ASA), officially established in July 2018. When the need arises, Defence could choose from three possible commercial launch sites – Southern Launch in South Australia, Equatorial Launch Australia in the Northern Territory, or a new site the Queensland government has proposed for Abbott Point near Bowen in North Queensland. Queensland firm Gilmour Space Technologies is developing a hybrid design using solid and liquid propellant, a combination that evades the complexity of liquid propellant-powered rockets while allowing output to be throttled. The company conducted a successful low altitude trial in 2016, but a planned sub-orbital launch last year failed to get off the ground when a component failed. More recently, Gilmour conducted successful long duration ground test burns. In May, Gilmour signed a strategic agreement with the Defence Science and Technology (DST) group for research on propulsion, materials, and avionics technologies to help develop a three-stage hybrid rocket.

PAYLOADS MATTER But as important as the launch process is, it is still just a means to get a payload into space and those payloads are the subject of considerable research. In no other area of Defence activities will industry large and small, and research bodies, public sector organisations, and universities, be as deeply engaged in furthering the ADF and the national space agenda through development of advanced technologies. A key vehicle is the Adelaide-based SmartSat Cooperative Research Centre, a consortium of universities and research organisations partnered with industry that has been funded by the Commonwealth to develop advanced satellite technology. DST – which lists space technology high in its research priorities – is a core partner, as are defence primes Airbus and BAE Systems, and universities including UNSW Canberra. It is not broadly appreciated that the ADF already has a number of research satellites out there, with the most recent launch on June 15 when a Rocket Lab rocket blasted off from New Zealand carrying, among other satellites, M2 Pathfinder (M2PF), a joint project of UNSW Canberra Space and the RAAF. So far, M2PF is looking very successful with operators achieving contact and steadily commissioning the various home-grown subsystems on board. M2PF and its predecessor M1 followed the launch of Buccaneer in November 2017, a joint project of DST and UNSW Canberra. None of these was intended to deliver actual capability, but rather to develop skills and give the ADF satellite experience while performing some useful research. This trajectory to orbit illustrates Australia’s growing space capability and vision, plus the challenges inherent in the space business. Other Australian universities have space research programs with growing capabilities, but UNSW Canberra Space at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) Canberra has the lead. “When it comes to a fully professional space engineering team that covers all the disciplines and able to develop new technologies and even spin those technologies out, we are currently it,” Director of UNSW Canberra Space, Professor Russell Boyce told ADBR. “What we are trying to do with our group, what we believe, and … consistent with the shift in global thinking (about) the future for space, is not in more satellites,” he added. “It’s in intelligent satellites and ultimately intelligent constellations of intelligent satellites. So our space team has been undergoing a transformation to become an artificial intelligence group that does its AI in space.” “The M2PF mission is significant because we have onboard processing capabilities which are quite powerful and which represent a building block towards in-orbit artificial intelligence.” Buccaneer – referred to as ‘Bucky’ but officially dubbed Buccaneer Risk Mitigation Mission – was

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Underway ... the launch of a WGS satellite payload from Cape Canaveral in 2015. US AF

conducted by UNSW Canberra Space and DST, and launched from Vandenberg in November 2017. Bucky’s primary purpose was to flight-prove a deployable antenna able to detect transmissions from the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) in the ionosphere to gain a better understanding of the physics of high frequency (HF) radio propagation. For this, Bucky needed a deployable antenna able to receive HF signals. DST’s solution was a length of steel tape measure coiled tightly in a can and which successfully unfurled into a 3.4 metre bow tie-shaped array. Bucky was operated from RAAF Edinburgh and UNSW Canberra, giving valuable experience in operating a small satellite. The launch was conducted through the NASA’s ELANA program which supports cubesat launches by universities and even high schools. The follow-on Buccaneer Main Mission which is under development by DST and Adelaide-based Inovor Technologies, has yet to launch. Following the success of Bucky, UNSW Canberra Space and the RAAF developed and flew the M1 mission which launched in December 2018. M1 comprised UNSW-developed and off-the-shelf components. “It was meant to demonstrate some softwaredefined radio-based maritime surveillance capability, basically listening for ships’ AIS beacons,” Professor Boyce told us. “It was also meant to demonstrate agility in terms of how fast a professional cubesat mission could be developed from concept to launch, and we certainly did that.” While M1 successfully reached orbit, it hasn’t been heard from since. It’s still out there and is possibly functional, but it’s just not communicating.

Professor Boyce said they have suspicions about what went wrong, and UNSW Canberra Space has used that for a very intensive lessons learned exercise. “What we concluded was there were aspects of our development process that needed more maturity, including the extent of our testing process,” he said. “We learnt from that and do things very differently now.” M2PF was launched in June aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket from Vandenberg AFB and, so far, it’s looking good. Technically, M2PF is a carton-sized cubesat intended to serve as a risk mitigator for the M2 mission which is under development and set for launch early next year. M2PF features the M2 platform sub-systems but not the M2 payloads. M2 will actually comprise two satellites intended to separate and fly in formation. Each features radios and antennae for VHF and UHF able to receive ship AIS and aircraft ADSB beacons, as well as an optical telescope with five-metre ground resolution. “We will demonstrate potential maritime and aviation surveillance and onboard processing and other capabilities to the RAAF,” Professor Boyce said. Why two satellites? For experiments in satellite networking and in formation flying. The will also be in radio communication with each other.

SATURATED Given the vast numbers of satellites out there and many more planned, the radio frequency spectrum is becoming increasingly saturated. As the future of satellite-to-satellite and satellite-to-ground comms is via laser, greater satellite stability will be required to ensure the laser continues to point where it’s supposed to. “One of the demonstrations we hope to perform with M2 is an inter-satellite link as part of improving pointing stability,” Professor Boyce said. “Optical communications is a form of secure communications that is also setting us up to be able to pursue a mission we have been developing very slowly in the background for a quantum communications demonstration.” The objective would be to exchange quantum encryption keys between two satellites. This is an alluring capability at the frontiers of physics, with promise for totally secure communications. In a paper published in Nature in June, Chinese researchers claim to have succeeded in using a satellite to simultaneously transmit secret quantum keys to two ground stations more than 1,000 kilometres apart to establish a direct secure link. UNSW Canberra Space has been researching this very subject. “That’s something we have been doing with the National University of Singapore,” Professor Boyce said. “It’s a science experiment where they provide the quantum part and we provide the spacecraft and the optics.”

AEROSPACE - A JUMBO FINALE

AEROSPACE

A JUMBO FINALE A farewell fit for a Queen BY OWEN ZUPP

‘In so many ways, the 747 was the people’s aeroplane. It had opened up the world to Australians on a previously unknown scale’

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After 49 years of service, the final Qantas Boeing 747 leaves Australian soil for the final time, as VH-OEJ sets course for its final resting place in the US. KURT AMS

hallmark of the aerospace industry is its dynamic and ever-evolving nature. A little over a century has passed since the Wright Brothers made their momentous flights at Kitty Hawk in frail machines of rag and tube, and now we have private ventures flying to space stations and aircraft that can fly farther and faster than we once not dared to imagine. Conversely, such a rate of advancement results in a sparsity of longevity. Today’s technology is often gone tomorrow. There have been some exceptions to the rule. The venerable Douglas DC3/C47 Dakota, the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress, and the Bell UH-1 ‘Huey’ and their many sub-variants are just a few that come to mind – survivors of generational changes that have seen their contemporaries long consigned to boneyards and scrappers. At their core exists a sound design, yet with time such machines develop something more by evoking emotion in their operators and enthusiasts alike.

This emotion was no more evident than in July’s retirement of the final QANTAS Boeing 747 after nearly 50 years of service with the airline. Spectators lined the runways and various other vantage points to wave goodbye, and a lucky few were privileged to take one last flight before VHOEJ was relegated to history. In a final salute, the aircraft set course for Los Angeles and ultimately the Mojave Desert in a departure that had Sydneysiders craning their necks to the sky, and the world fascinated by what was etched upon their computer screens. It was a farewell to remember for many, and the culmination of incredible planning from a small team.

LONG MAY SHE REIGN Like so many great stories, the Boeing 747 emerged from an unlikely combination of circumstances. Despite Boeing’s loss to Lockheed for the contract to build a massive military transport aircraft for the USAF in 1965 – which resulted in the Lockheed C-5A Galaxy – certain design features and technologies from Boeing’s bid were refined and retained. There was the emerging high-bypass engine technology that could be adapted to an airliner and, like their successful 707 line, the military contract had seen the rise of Boeing’s swept-wing aircraft as airliner contenders. Additionally, to allow the loading of equipment through the nose, the flight deck was positioned atop the cargo area.

AEROSPACE - A JUMBO FINALE

As Boeing re-directed its focus to commercial air travel, the industry was witnessing unprecedented passenger numbers and lower airfares. The 707 had generated a revolution of its own, but PanAm founder Juan Trippe was keen to see an aircraft of far higher capacity take to the increasingly crowded skies to further drive down fares and significantly increase passenger numbers. Even so, Trippe ultimately saw the rise of supersonic air travel as the future for passengers, meaning that his vision of a giant of the sky would need to provide for freighter conversion as it was superseded by speed. In December 1965, Juan Trippe and Boeing’s Bill Allen signed an initial order for 25 aircraft, in a US$25 million deal that had the potential to financially cripple both companies. From the outset, the Boeing 747 had dimensions that dwarfed its predecessor, the 707. To be offered in both passenger and freight roles, the original 747 was over 220 feet long with a tail over 62 feet high, an increase of more than 50 per cent over the 707 in both aspects. So large was the design that Boeing needed to build a new facility at Everett in Washington state to cater for the 747 and, in doing so, constructed the world’s largest building by volume. Moving from the 737 team, Joe Sutter was assigned the role of Chief Engineer for the development of the project, and history has come to know him as the ‘Father of the 747’. Along with a team of 50,000 at Boeing, they came to be known as ‘The Incredibles’ as they sought to create a commercial airframe and engine combination, the likes of which had not been seen before. But with the backdrop of the United States’ space program, it was a time when anything seemed possible. In February 1969, the faith of so many was repaid when the prototype 747 first took to the skies, only five months before man stepped on the moon. The 747 caught the interest of QANTAS very early in its genesis, with the Australian airline placing then changing its initial order for the 747100 to four of the longer range 747-200s in 1967. The first QANTAS 747 arrived in August 1971, flying its first revenue service to Perth and Singapore a month later. It was the beginning of a relationship between airline and aircraft that would see QANTAS operate the 747 in a range of variants. Ultimately the airline would order 60 747s, from the -100s, which QANTAS leased, to the ‘Classic’ -200s and -300s, the distinctively shortened 747SP or Special Performance version, the -400s, and -400ER (Extended Range) models. It was a union that endured for almost half a century and, for a period, marked QANTAS as the only all-747 airline in the world. As the landmark of 50 years approached, it was a sunset retirement that was to be celebrated by QANTAS for their airliner that democratised global air travel. That was until the COVID pandemic landed in 2020.

BEST LAID PLANS The retirement of the Boeing 747 from the QANTAS ranks was inevitable. While it was still loved by the travelling public and its crews alike, its generation was being replaced by the efficiency of the dawn of newer twin-jets, such as the Boeing 787 Dreamliner and the Airbus A350. QANTAS’s ambitious ‘Project Sunrise’ had made its first appearance above the horizon, aspiring to non-stop flights of a duration that was even beyond the commercial reach of the 747-400ER. The time had come for the 747 to exit with grace. The retirement of an aircraft fleet is a complex, staged process. For the QANTAS 747s, it meant a gradual reduction of the network it was flying as the aircraft were progressively flown to the US where they would be retired to a boneyard and sourced for their well-maintained and increasingly scarce components. Or in the case of the airline’s 747-400 VH-OJU, rebirthed as an engine test-bed for Rolls Royce. Concurrently, the number of crew would be reduced and retrained, and assigned to other fleets until the final airframe’s departure would see the last pilots relocated through a reduction-in-number, or RIN process. The plan was in place about a final hurrah in March 2021, offering the 747 for one final season of memorable Antarctica charters and adding the symmetry of 50 years of service from 1971–2021. A full schedule of events marking the longevity and loyal service of the 747 in QANTAS colours was in the planning when the global pandemic cancelled the parade. With the initial outbreak, the remaining fleet was removed from service on an accelerated timeframe and ferried to the Mojave Desert. In the first instance, this repositioning was for storage but, with every passing week and then month, the chance of the 747 ever returning to service diminished rapidly.

The sky art ‘Roo’ that captured the imagination of so many - the result of meticulous navigation planning. OWEN ZUPP

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A fitting final salute ... the water cannon farewell on taxi to the runway at Sydney Airport. SET H JAWORSKI

The final arrivals of aircraft were greeted by news coverage as media and public sense of the end grew. At the same time, the crew of the final flight had been selected and called to the simulator to confirm currency and proficiency. This included those pilots that would occupy the control seats for the last, unfamiliar sector into the boneyard at the Mojave Air and Space Port, about 140km north of Los Angeles. One by one, the QANTAS 747 fleet departed Australian shores, all keenly tracked by aviation enthusiasts around the world. By late June, only the 747-400ER, VH-OEJ Wunala remained on Australian soil. Speculation began to grow in the media about the final departure date with a growing sentiment of regret that the last QANTAS 747 would ‘go gently into that good night’. With the airline in its centenary year and recognising the significance of the final flight, QANTAS Manager of Fleet Operations – Boeing 747, Captain Owen Weaver – successfully sought a stay of execution for the aircraft to provide a more fitting send-off. The concept was embraced by the Executive Team led by QANTAS International CEO Tino La Spina, although time was running short and there remained the constant spectre of closed borders preventing any crew from easily returning to Australia. On June 25, the rumours were confirmed as part of the major QANTAS announcement outlining its future in the face of COVID: the remaining Boeing 747s were to be retired immediately. Soon after, the airline announced three farewell flights and a final departure to be remembered. The wheels were set in motion.

FOND FAREWELLS In so many ways, the 747 was the peoples’ aeroplane. It had opened up the world to Australians on a previously unknown scale, through memories of amazing holidays and emotional family reunions. If there was a poignant moment in an Australian life beyond her shores, the chance was great that the 747 had made that possible. With this in mind, QANTAS wanted to share the moment with the people, albeit with strict COVID-19 protocols in place. A plan was drafted with one each of the farewll flights departing Sydney, Brisbane, and Melbourne. But with the tenuous state of its borders and public health situation, the first casualty was the Melbourne flight which had to be moved to Canberra. With the harsh reality of costs hitting all airlines, the flights were brought to life through a skeleton of staff being stood up from their relative hibernation to attend to every issue from media relations, to engineering, flight planning, crewing, and so much more. Even assigning the flight number of QF747 presented a significant challenge within the airline’s IT systems. However, it soon became apparent that the flights meant a great deal to staff and the QANTAS family came together to make the event happen. A lottery system was devised to allow some of that family to gain a seat on their airline’s final 747 flights, while other seats were sold online to offset some of the costs involved and raise funds for two aviation museums. The demand far outweighed availability, and the tickets sold in minutes. A good

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many more flights could have been sold, but the timeframe was already in place. Each of the three flights was blessed by clear skies. The atmosphere was festive, although tinged with emotion as passengers gathered in gate lounges and exchanged memories of the ‘Queen of the Skies’. Past employees in retro uniforms, aviation enthusiasts and current crew mingled and posed for photos. Commemorative QANTAS bags and memorabilia were a treasured part of the experience, but the flights would prove to be the ultimate memory. Socially-distanced and COVID-conscious, passengers boarded their flights, seen off by pilots offering hand sanitiser in a subtle but visible reminder of aviation and the world’s current concerns. But those concerns quickly melted away each time that the 747 pushed back and took to the skies. Over Sydney, the harbour swept by beneath, while Brisbane’s skyline and coastline provided a stark contrast to the snow-capped ranges and circular roadways of the nation’s capital. Onboard, conversation and champagne flowed, while landings were met with applause, and disembarkations with tears. To conclude each event, the crowds gathered beneath her swept wings and towering tailplane for a final photograph, or simply to take in her graceful form in their mind’s eye. Still, the ‘Queen of the Skies’ had one more statement to make and those plans were well underway beneath a veil of secrecy.

PLANNING AN ADIEU & THE ROO When the farewell flights were conceived, so too was the plan to make the departure of OEJ a flight for all to remember. Central to the departure were three key elements – a flypast of Sydney harbour, a salute to the record-breaking and first 747-400, VH-OJA, which is now in residence at the HARS Museum at Shellharbour Airport, and ‘sky art’ in the form of the QANTAS kangaroo. The entire exercise had to be founded on a basis of safety and, to that end, each component was planned, trained, and executed according to a safety plan that needed to gain approval from CASA. Far from simply conceiving a route, myriad elements had to be addressed. Unlike the farewell flights, OEJ would be operating at a significantly heavier weight, and flight margins needed to be considered accordingly. The crew would be in attendance at the event before departure and, with substantial flight time, potential fatigue issues needed to be addressed and satisfied. Security considerations and customs clearance at the QANTAS hangar, rather than the international terminal had to be organised.

VH-OEJ flies up Sydney Harbour on the first of its two farewell passes before heading south to overfly VHOJA at Albion Park. SETH JAWORSKI

‘The Queen of the Skies had one more statement to make and those plans were well underway under a veil of secrecy’

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A previous farewell under stormy skies. Qantas has been retiring its 747s progressively, and VH-OEB was the oldest remaining -400 series 747 in the fleet when it was retired in 2019. NIGEL COGHLAN

Calculating the weight and balance of the aircraft and loading it accordingly, with a cargo of many pets bound for the US … the list went on. Captain Weaver drew together teams from all areas within the airline. Matthew Bouttell as manager of Air Traffic Management was responsible for organising the complex airways clearances, as well as designing the Temporary Restricted Area (TRA) that was needed to safely overly the HARS Museum outside controlled airspace. The navigation team led by Cass Moeller and Jevan Wong was tasked with tailoring the existing flight planning system to incorporate the many complex waypoints involved in drawing the sky art and calculating the fuel requirements. Catering was needed to provide a non-standard configuration of meals for the crew, and the refuellers had to load the aircraft to maximum limits without fuel overflowing through the surge tanks. The Airports Team and Sydney Airports Corporation Limited (SACL) had to confirm the pavement strength in the alley way from the hangar where OEJ would taxi at a weight of 368,000 kg. The QMET section was consistently providing weather and upper wind forecasts, as the sky art and flypasts were weather-dependent upon predefined parameters – another reason for the secrecy. Furthermore, they were continually organising weather forecasts for Mojave as they are not normally provided. The engineering team had to prepare the aircraft for international flying once again, ground testing the autopilot for auto-land capability, and configuring the cabin for its ultimate state when finally parked in the boneyard, among many other tasks. The event itself at QANTAS Hangar 96 fell on the shoulders of the QANTAS Events Team,

while the associated media was managed by the Communications Department, led by Amanda Bolger. The crew for the flight had been selected weeks before. Sharelle Quinn, the first female QANTAS Captain, and the airline’s most senior 747 Captain Ewen Cameron, would fly the initial departure. Also, onboard would be Captains Owen Weaver and Greg Fitzgerald, First Officer Quin Ledden, and your writer, Second Officer Owen Zupp. Together, the crew had more than 124,000 hours of flight experience, including more than 78,000 hours on the 747. The centrepiece of the departure was set to be the sky art kangaroo, yet when Captain Weaver first conceived the idea, he wasn’t even sure if it was possible. In the first instance, he overlaid the outline in Google Earth Pro and generated a series of waypoints. As these were expressed in decimal points, all 75 had to be converted into latitudes and longitudes. Scaling the sky art was the next challenge. Turns had to be of a radius within the capability of the heavily-laden 747 and of a size and location to be seen by the flight tracking ‘apps’ without dropping out of ADS-B coverage. Captain Weaver flew a series of secretive simulator sessions with Captain ‘Marty’ Gardiner in a range of configurations to trial the kangaroo. Finally, remaining below 20,000 feet so that flaps could be extended and then utilising Flaps 20 and the autopilot, all turns within the ‘Roo’ could be safely flown. With the approval and co-operation of the Royal Australian Air Force, the airspace was made available. The flight crew then made a series of visits to the flight simulator where the various elements of the departure were rehearsed as well as the arrival into Mojave. The scene was finally set.

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FAREWELL TO THE QUEEN The QANTAS Hangar 96 was abuzz with gathered guests and dignitaries. CEO Alan Joyce spoke of the significance of the 747 to the airline’s history, and First Officer Geoff Cowell recited a moving poem dedicated to his steed. Media moved about busily, and all present were invited to sign their names and a message on the belly of Wunala. The numbers were scaled down due to COVID, but the appreciation of a fitting farewell was not lost amid the excitement. The crew mingled with the guests, with Captains Weaver and Fitzgerald discreetly sneaking away to enter and cross-check the 75 waypoints of the ‘Roo’ sky art into the Flight Management Computer (FMC). It had been hoped that the hard work of the navigation and “Constellation” flight planning teams would allow an automatic uploading of the waypoints However, an earlier trial had shown it to be beyond the capability of the 747’s FMC. With the final words and waves completed, the crew took their stations and after pushback and an intermediate stop to finalise loading the aircraft, we were underway. The initial departure involved a turn to the west before returning to overhead Sydney Airport, so Runway 16 Right was offered up by Air Traffic Control to maximise separation from the Bankstown Airport airspace. The subsequent taxi out was a tour of water cannon salutes, media helicopters, and hundreds of gathered well-wishers at the ‘Shep’s Mound’ spotters park, in front of which Captain Quinn paused QF7474 – again, a flight number that had presented an IT challenge. As the thrust levers moved up, the flight deck was focused on the task rather than the emotion. Over the next hour, they managed the 747’s extensive radius of turn to cross the coast at the designated points, aware of the gatherings beneath. The sight of the Harbour Bridge and Opera House passing 1,500 feet below were spectacular, as a lap along the Parramatta River terminated with a reversal turn and a second overflight. Air Traffic Control wished them well as the aircraft tracked coastal to Shellharbour where OJA and a substantial crowd looked skyward. The radio broadcasts from Wunala were met with a response and tribute for those below. A pass along the runway, a left turn out to sea and the final QANTAS 747 had departed Australia. Unknown to the crew, more than a quarter of a million people were watching the track they were flying as they approached the commencement of the sky art. But only when the various wind and weather parameters were confirmed was the final go-ahead decided upon and the QANTAS Integrated Operations Centre (IOC) advised to release the well-kept secret. Some thought the initial turn was the 747 returning to Australia for some reason, but it soon became apparent there was something special in store. For the next 90 minutes the ‘Queen of

the Skies’ etched her goodbye in the sky, accelerating along the extended lines of the kangaroo’s back and tail and decelerating and extending flaps to manoeuvre around the paws and other tighter turns. By the time the art was complete, the sun had set, and so too had QANTAS 747 operations in Australian airspace. Now the Pacific beckoned for one final time.

ONE LAST HOP The arrival into Los Angeles for the crew was somewhat surreal. Familiar with the rapid-fire radio transmissions and multiple targets on the Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), the COVID-affected airwaves and airspace were uncharacteristically and eerily quiet. When Captain Quinn finally brought Wunala to a halt, a walkway was extended and the crew met by mask-wearing staff as they fitted their own. At the airport’s perimeter fence and LAX’s famous but unofficial Imperial Hill spotters park, another crowd of enthusiasts and expats had gathered to welcome the aircraft and crew, some waving Australian flags. After nearly 48 hours locked down in their Manhattan Beach apartments, the crew readied for the final 20-minute sector to the Mojave Air and Space Port. Captain Cameron would fly in command

Top: Author Owen Zupp and wife Kirrily, also a Qantas 747 pilot, volunteered their time in a ground role for the farewell flights from Sydney and Canberra. TONY LUCAS Centre: At rest - the final shutdown of VH-OEJ with tech log at Mojave. OWEN ZUPP Bottom: Owen’s message on the underside of OEJ speaks volumes. OWEN ZUPP

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‘To be part of such an event was a privilege that was not lost upon the crew’

VH-OEJ leaves Sydney for its final farewell against the backdrop of a stark reminder of the pandemic toll on commercial aviation. NIGEL COGHLAN

with Captain Fitzgerald alongside him in a fitting end to their substantial QANTAS careers. Both pilots had rehearsed the sector in the simulator numerous times, aware of the proximal terrain and the nearby airspace of the famous Edwards AFB facility and other sensitive military facilities. The QANTAS Base Manager at Los Angeles Airport had something special in mind to say goodbye - an Australian style barbeque of sausages, bacon, and eggs to the accompaniment of I Still Call Australia Home being sung by the present staff was a very moving moment. Two dedicated 747 cakes were cut to a backdrop of QANTAS banners and pedal car, and the sense of a QANTAS family was as strong as it could possibly be. One final walkaround inspection, one final engine start and one last taxi out for takeoff, this time at a weight of only 228,000 kg. Water cannons again said goodbye as hundreds of QANTAS staff and other airport workers lined the taxiway, and emergency vehicles ahead and on the flanks escorted the Boeing 747 to the runway’s end. A last farewell from Air Traffic Control and a clearance to takeoff, and the aircraft took to the skies from RWY 25L beneath Captain Cameron’s hands as helicopters filmed and the people below waved. A right turn and climb to only 13,000 feet, the 747 cut through the clear air, crossing the coast

overhead Malibu and set course for the desert and Mojave. Numerous light aircraft populated the TCAS, possibly catching one last look. To stay well clear, the crew brought the 747 into a sweeping left orbit near Mojave airfield until the sky was empty once again. Joining overhead, a visual circuit was flown, and the runway loomed ahead. The long black strip grew larger until Captain Cameron finally eased Wunala to earth for the final time. Aside from the mandatory checks and calls, the flight deck was quiet as the aircraft was taxied and parked in a line astern to three QANTAS 747 sisters already in residence. The crew each took their turn at shutting down an engine and putting OEJ to bed for the final time. Only then, with the task finally complete, did the focus shift to reflection on what this all meant. On the ground, the crew were met by more media and answered questions beside the now quiet 747, although it was impossible to ignore the sad sight of hundreds of scrapped airliner hulks on the far side of the airfield. Perhaps it was those mixed emotions, perhaps it was a weariness, but very few words were spoken on the two-hour bus ride back to their accommodation in Los Angeles. Undoubtedly, it was the realisation that this was the end of an era and, unfortunately for some, a career. To be part of such an event was a privilege that was not lost upon the crew. And it was an absolute honour to farewell the ‘Queen’.

AUSTRALIAN ARMY EW

E L E C T RONIC WA RFA RE

AUSTRALIAN ARMY EW ACT 3 Following two recent Australian Army initiatives to overhaul its electronic warfare posture, the force is planning a third instalment through the acquisition of a mobile electronic attack and electronic support platform BY DR THOMAS WITHINGTON

he Australian Army announced in May that it plans to enhance its Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities with a new system to be procured via its LAND 555 Phase 6 Tranche 2 program. Based on a platform that can perform both electronic attack and electronic support, it marks the latest in a series of steps enhancing the force’s EW posture. The Australian Army’s project mirrors moves by the US Army to overhaul its EW posture with the procurement of new platforms such as the forthcoming vehicle-mounted Terrestrial Layered System (TLS). The TLS will provide a brigade-level, vehicle-mounted electronic and cyber attack system mounted on the General Dynamics M-1133 medical evacuation variant of the M-1126 Stryker, eightwheel drive, armoured fighting vehicle. Other ongoing flagship US Army EW acquisitions include Lockheed Martin’s multi-function electronic warfare Air Large Communications/ Electronic Intelligence (COMINT/ELINT)

gathering pod to outfit the army’s General Atomics MQ-1C Grey Eagle unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and Raytheon’s Electronic Warfare Planning and Management Tool EW battle management system. The LAND 555 Phase 6 Tranche 2 program is arguably motivated by a drive to ensure the continuing relevance of Army EW assets in the face of investments into advanced tactical communications and battle management systems by near-peer adversaries. In the Asia Pacific, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would be the Australian Army’s most likely adversary during any regional confrontation involving Australia and her allies. The US Defence Intelligence Agency’s 2019 China Military Power assessment sheds some light on the PLA’s motivations for overhauling its command and control (C2) tools and communications. It says, at the strategic and operational levels, China’s armed forces place a premium on winning regional conflict using “… integrated, real-time command and control

The Australian Army’s dismounted EW assets include Chemring’s Resolve-3 COMINT gathering backpack. CHEMRING

‘It marks the latest in a series of steps enhancing the force’s EW posture’

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networks”, with the goal being to “…use advanced information technology and communications systems to gain operational advantage over an adversary”. The assessment adds that the PLA is enhancing its C2 elements as it reorients its structure towards a corps-brigade-battalion order-of-battle, with the intention of making manoeuvre formations more deployable and mobile. Of late, the PLA has adopted a manoeuvrist doctrine stressing the attack of key nodes and centres of gravity upon which a hostile force may depend, with the motivation being to degrade an adversary’s will to fight. Advanced communications as a conduit through which situational awareness and C2 can flow around the force, ideally in a more agile manner to the PLA’s adversary, form a key part in supporting this doctrine. But any such confrontation with China would almost certainly involve US forces. For the Australian Army, this creates an imperative to ensure a robust level of interoperability with US Marine Corps and US Army EW assets. In the Australian Army, EW is the responsibility of the 7th Signals Regiment (7SR), an element of the 6th Combat Support Brigade. Open sources note that the 7th Signals Regiment includes three squadrons: the 71st, 72nd and 73rd, plus an operations support squadron. Currently, 7SR uses Chemring’s Resolve-3 manpack COMINT gathering system which is thought to cover a waveband of 3MHz to 3GHz, and which is assumed to be used by dismounted cadres to collect COMINT at the tactical level. Reports state that US$11.5m (A$16m) was spent on the Resolve-3 acquisition via the LAND 500 Phase 1 contract which Chemring won in 2016. The Resolve-3 architecture has also formed the basis for LAND 555 Phase 6 Tranche 1. This has seen Resolve-3 architecture installed onboard a Bushmaster protected mobility vehicle (PMV). In all, six platforms have been upgraded in preparation for expected service entry by mid-2021. The addition of the EW-configured Bushmasters will provide Army with a mobile as well as dismounted EW capability. No details have been publicly released about the number of Resolve-3 backpacks delivered to Army. But, based on an average unit price of A$278,000 per system, and on average unit price for comparable equipment, it is possible that about 55 systems have been procured for 7SR, with the balance of US$500,000 covering training and additional costs. As regards these EW systems, 7SR may accompany its Resolve-3 manpacks with the EWequipped Bushmasters it is receiving to support Army’s manoeuvre force which – according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies’ 2020 Military Balance – includes two mechanised infantry brigades, an amphibious battalion and an aviation brigade.

NEXT STEPS The acquisition of new EW capabilities under LAND 555 Phase 6 Tranche 2 will, at a stroke, enhance Army’s EW posture. Compared to the previous two acquisitions, however, one crucial difference is that Army will also receive an electronic attack capability. The Resolve-3 incarnations are thought to be restricted to an electronic support role gathering COMINT, but few details have been released regarding the precise specification for LAND 555 Phase 6 Tranche 2. Given that the capability is equipping the army, it would be safe to assume that the platform will detect and jam radio transmissions across frequencies of 30MHz to at least 3GHz. These encompass the Very High Frequency (VHF) and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) transmissions routinely used by land tactical communications. The solution will almost certainly be tasked with detecting, locating, and identifying radio emissions. This will be important for the ground commander as it will assist in pinpointing hostile troops based on the source of their radio transmissions. While deployed troops can take steps to hide their location through camouflage and other concealment techniques, their need to send and receive voice and data traffic can potentially betray their location to COMINT systems. Beyond the location of hostile units via their radio emissions, the COMINT stipulations of LAND 555 Phase 6 Tranche 2 may also include a requirement for the system to demodulate and decrypt hostile transmissions, allowing traffic to be exploited to the advantage of the manoeuvre force commander. Once a covert gateway is made into the opposing force’s communications, it becomes possible to initiate discreet electronic attack. This could include the insertion of false or misleading voice or data

The General Dynamics M1133 medical evacuation variant of the M1126 Stryker AVC. The M1133 is the platform of choice for the US’s forthcoming vehiclemounted electronic and cyber attack system. US MIL

‘The Australian Army is already alive to the possibilities cyber warfare could bring to the force’

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traffic into hostile communications networks and can result in a lack of situational awareness in the opposing force causing a loss of coordination and C2 when the friendly force attacks. A further consideration from the electronic attack perspective is the ability to use the LAND 555 Phase 6 Tranche 2 solution as a means of delivering cyber attacks into enemy Battle Management Systems (BMS). As noted above, the PLA is pouring investment into IP (Internet Protocol)-based BMSs at all echelons.

CYBER

LAND 555 Phase 6 Tranche 1 is rolling electronic warfare capabilities onto a small number of Australian Army Bushmaster vehicles. These are expected to enter service over the coming year. THALES

Including a cyber attack capability in the LAND 555 Phase 6 Tranche 2 architecture could enable the system to penetrate hostile communications networks with traditional communications jamming, but to use this to deliver hostile code. This code could be used to both disrupt the operation of these BMSs while trawling for relevant intelligence which can be exploited by the manoeuvre force commander and fed into the wider ADF defence intelligence infrastructure for exploitation by other services. The Australian Army is already alive with the possibilities cyber warfare could bring to the force and, in 2018, it published a dedicated cyber edition of the Australian Army Journal. This included an article by CAPT Lachlan Abbott, The Utility of Offensive Operations in Conventional Military Engagements. In it, CAPT Abbott debated the role of cyber warfare in supporting military operations, contending that the use of military communications to carry IP data alongside its traditional task of carrying voice communications,

results in the creation of battlefield communications networks which, he says, are “…not unlike the internet”. As such, he wrote, “a denial-of-services attack could be used to deny a headquarters its situational awareness, providing a measurable advantage to the aggressor.” Another potential opportunity eyed by CAPT Abbott is the emergence of the military ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT). In the civilian context, the Oxford English Dictionary defines the IoT as “…the interconnection via the internet of computing devices embedded in everyday objects enabling them to send and receive data.” This definition has been taken a step further by the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers and the Computer Society, which refers to the Internet of Military Things (IoMT) as connecting military platforms, sensors, personnel, weapons systems and bases into “…a cohesive network that increases situational awareness, risk assessment and response time.” It is clear the advent of the IoMT could revolutionise military operations, enhancing situational awareness (SA), C2, and logistics in ways today’s troops can only dream of. The flipside is that the IoMT may offer yet more networks which can be attacked cybernetically, whether this be to deprive the adversary of SA or C2 data, or in a scenario reminiscent of the Terminator movie franchise, have the weapons of an opposing force turning on themselves. More prosaically, but nonetheless important, in the article Examining the Australian Army Adaptation to Cyber-enabled Warfare – Organisational and Cultural Challenges published in the same journal,

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author Captain ‘J’ argues that the manoeuvre force could begin to engage an adversary in the electromagnetic spectrum before their first kinetic engagement. This could see the LAND 555 Phase 6 Tranche 2 solution being employed to deliver a cyberattack into a hostile BMS. In such a scenario, malicious code could be used to subtly change small, yet vital, amounts of data to introduce errors into the adversary’s C2 processes that are perhaps not immediately discernible. At the other end of the spectrum, the capability could inflict a full denial of service attack rendering the BMS completely inoperable. The advantage of such an approach – no pun intended – is that it provides the commander with a wide spectrum of non-kinetic options prior to, and during, combat.

As evidence from the Syrian civil war demonstrates, UAS will become an increasing menace on the battlefield. The electronic attack requirements of LAND 555 Phase 6 Tranche 2 could help to neutralise such threats. ISRAELI DEFENCE FORCE

The EA-18G Growler, flagship of the RAAF’s air defence suppression capability. ADF

COUNTER-UAV Beyond the potential for cyber warfare, the electronic attack aspect of LAND 555 Phase 6 Tranche 2 may also have utility against unmanned aerial systems (UAS). The threat that UAS present to deployed forces both as an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) gathering asset, and as an armed ‘kamikaze’ platform has been vividly demonstrated during the Syrian civil war. Since the start of the conflict in 2011, at least 25 UAVs are documented to have been lost in the Syrian theatre of operations, the vast majority to surface-to-air or air-to-air attack using missiles and gunfire. The real number is almost certainly higher. It is likely that UAS will be increasingly engaged electronically in the coming years. This avoids the expenditure of ordnance, and may allow the air vehicle to land, or return to its point of origin in a controlled manner. A standard feature of most UUAS avionics is an auto-land if the radio frequency link between the air vehicle and its ground control station (GCS) or GNSS (global navigation satellite system) signal is lost. Alternatively, following the air vehicle’s flight path back to its GCS could allow the latter to be engaged kinetically. It would not be surprising if the specification for LAND 555 Phase 6 Tranche 2 included the necessity to electronically attack UAS. This could be achieved through waveforms configured to intercept the signals linking the air vehicle to its GCS. For example, civilian UAS tend to use frequencies of 2.4GHz to 5.8GHz to connect the aircraft to its GCS. Likewise, frequencies of 1.164GHz to 1.591GHz are routinely used by GNSS providers such as Europe’s Galileo constellation, Russia’s GLONASS, the PRC’s Beidou system, and US and allied GPS. Given that the solution procured via LAND 555 Phase 6 Tranche 2 will electronically attack frequencies across the expected 30MHz to 3GHz waveband, UAS to GCS and GNSS RF links could be potential targets with the correct electronic attack waveforms.

SISTER SERVICES While this article has chiefly discussed the LAND 555 Phase 6 Tranche 2 requirement, it is important that this future capability is not seen in a vacuum. As the above discussion shows, this new capability will form not only a part of a Army EW modernisation, but will also comprise one part of a wider cross-service EW posture equipping the wider ADF. As such, LAND 555 Phase 6 Tranche 2 is just the latest effort in a long-running modernisation of the ADF’s EW assets. In recent years, this modernisation effort has largely targeted the RAAF, with the obvious flagship being the air defence suppression capabilities of 12 Boeing EA-18G Growlers. The Growler is equipped with L3Harris’ AN/ALQ-99 electronic warfare system which, open sources state, can electronically attack ground-based air surveillance and fire control/ground-controlled interception radars transmitting across 30MHz to 10GHz wavebands at ranges of up to 400km. But the ALQ-99 is in its twilight years and will soon be replaced in RAAF service by the AN/ALQ249(V) Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) system of three pods covering wavebands of 100MHz, to at least 18GHz expected to enter RAAF service from 2024. The NGJ is also an important capability as far the Australian Army is concerned. As missions by

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A render of the new Gulfstream/L3 Harris MC-55A Peregrine electronic warfare support aircraft that will complement the suppression work of the EA-18G. GULFSTREAM

US Navy and US Marine Corps Grumman EA-6B Prowler – the Growler’s predecessor – illustrated during US-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, this capability has a valuable role to play in influencing the battle on the ground. its ability to exploit hostile land forces communications for COMINT, and to electronically attack such targets shows that the army can exploit the airborne electronic attack capability in a similar fashion to the electronic attack attributes of that planned for LAND 555 Phase 6 Tranche 2. Supplementing the EA-18Gs in RAAF service will be the forthcoming new Gulfstream/L3Harris MC-55A Pegasus SIGINT aircraft that will replace the two Lockheed AP-3C (EW) Orions which were modified with an enhanced SIGINT capability in the early 2000s, while the P-8A Poseidon and E-7A Wedgetail are also reported to have very capable electronic support measures (ESM) systems. The MC-55As are expected to be furnished with (ESM) which can reportedly gather COMINT transmitted across the 30MHz to 1.2GHz wavebands, and collect ELINT on hostile radars transmitting on frequencies of 300MHz to 18GHz. As with the EA-18G/NGJ combination, this has implications for Army, where the MC-55A could theoretically be used to gather operational-level COMINT on hostile emitters at the theatre level to be exploited for intelligence and to betray the position of hostile forces on the basis of their communications transmissions. This electronic order-of-battle information could then be shared with assets like the EA-18G and/ or the LAND 555 Phase 6 Tranche 2 platform for electronic attack or, alternatively, the targets could be engaged kinetically. Operational-level SIGINT collection will be enhanced by a new strategic SIGINT-gathering capability that the ADF is realising via the Miniaturised Orbital EW Sensor System (MOESS) programme. DEWC Systems Pty Ltd is leading this effort to develop a constellation of 20 cubesats, the first of which could be launched in 2022. Cubesats typically weigh less than 1.3 kilograms, which means several can often be launched together, thus reducing launch costs.

Trends seen in electronics miniaturisation since the invention of the microchip have helped to confer impressive capabilities in these ever-shrinking spacecraft. This has put space-based SIGINT collection – which would previously have been out of reach or pocket for all but the richest or most ambitious nations – squarely within the grasp of nations which might not have previously considered such a capability. DEWC was awarded a contract worth US$930,000 (A$1.3 million) in July 2020 to move forward with Phase 2 of the MOESS initiative which will develop a concept demonstrator representative of the final MOESS cubesat configuration. Phase 1 – valued at US$107,119 (A$149,000) kicked off in 2018 – saw DEWC collaborate with several Australian universities and research institutions to prove the MOESS concept, while Phase 3 will develop the first prototype cubesat. The MOESS undertaking is highly relevant to LAND 555 Phase 6 Tranche 2, as it will be able to collect SIGINT on a sustained basis and, although details of the wavebands covered by the MOESS satellites have not been revealed, it is reasonable to expect that they could encompass communications emissions. All in all, with the advent of MOESS and the MC-55A platform alongside its own apparatus, the Australian Army will have a variety of SIGINT gathering assets it can call upon to ensure that it has the most detailed electronic order-of-battle possible in theatre during deployments. Hostile emitters can then be engaged kinetically or electronically by the LAND 555 Phase 6 Tranche 2 platform or by the EA-18G. Thus it is important to see the LAND 555 Phase 6 Tranche 2 requirement not in isolation, but as part of a wider enhancement of force-level electronic attack and electronic support capabilities by the ADF in a regional environment where the digitisation of battlefield C2 and situational awareness among Australia’s potential adversaries is becoming ever more important.

SCHEDULE Army has disclosed that it expects the LAND 555 Phase 6 Tranche 2 program to follow a similar path to previous army EW programs, but has not ruled out furnishing other platforms apart from the Bushmaster with whichever kit is acquired, or developing a trailermounted capability. The ADF has already taken important steps regarding the project, with an invitation to register (ITR) and participate in the tender published in September 2018 and a request for tender (RFT) imminent. These sources add that initial deliveries could commence in 2023 – a similar timeframe to deliveries of the NGJ, MC-55A and MOESS – thus underscoring Australia’s determination to enhance its electromagnetic capabilities across the ADF.

OSINT

JAPAN SDF ORBAT With Australia, Japan, and other nations in the Indo-Pacific region increasingly being drawn together to counter Chinese territorial aspirations, ADBRâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s OSINT series of analysing the various regional orders of battle in play continues. In this issue, we look at the Japan Air Self Defense Force. BY MIKE YEO

ADBR

or a country that is technically disallowed by its constitution to have a military, Japan’s Self-Defense Force (JSDF) is among the best equipped militaries in the region. In its English translation, Article 9 of the country’s constitution which was drawn up in the wake of World War II, states, “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” Nevertheless, that part of the constitution has been interpreted by successive Japanese governments that the country was able to build and maintain an inherent right of self-defence. So, with the security treaty signed by Japan with the United States in 1951 allowing the latter’s forces stationed in Japan to deal with external aggression against the country, Japanese forces would deal with internal threats and natural disasters. This started out as the National Police Reserve consisting of 75,000 men equipped with light infantry weapons formed in 1950, with a maritime counterpart – the Coastal Safety Force – coming into being two years later. These were renamed as the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) and Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) on July

‘This posture change is driven in part by China’s rapid military modernisation and increasing assertiveness’

(LEFT) An F-15J from

the JASDF’s dedicated aggressor unit. The F-15 is currently the nation’s primary interceptor. MIKE YEO

(RIGHT) One of the JASDF’s

remaining F-4EJ Phantoms which, along with force’s older F-15Js, are about to be replaced by more than 140 F-35s. MARK JESSOP

1 1954, while a third service – the Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) – was also created on this date. To keep within its self-defence remit, Japan has taken pains to ensure the JSDF does not have the capability to conduct offensive operations. For example, the JASDF’s soon-to-be-retired licencebuilt Mitsubishi F-4EJ Phantom IIs have all ground attack systems removed, retaining only its air-to-air capability. The JSDF also currently has no long-range surface or air-to-surface missiles in its inventory, and – for now – the services are expressly forbidden to strike ground targets overseas. But plans to acquire KONGSBERG JSM air-to-surface missiles have only recently been cemented, and a tentative debate around conducting strike operations as part of a response to, for example, ballistic missile launches against Japan, has not been resolved.

A NEW PARADIGM This posture change is driven in part by China’s rapid military modernisation and increasing assertiveness. This includes regular voyages by its coast guard vessels into the contiguous zone around the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea of which China is disputing the ownership. The geopolitical changes have made a push by Japan’s current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for a more liberal interpretation of the self-defence clauses of the country’s constitution. It is a key plank of his agenda and an easier sell to the Japanese political establishment and public. The unease about China is made patently clear in the latest iteration of Japan’s annual White Paper. Named Defense of Japan 2020 and released in mid-July, the paper mentions China a total of 56 times, working out to twice as many mentions compared with North Korea, and three times more

OSINT - JAPAN SDF ORBAT

than Russia. The language used to describe China is also evolving. The first of the annual Japanese defence white papers in 2006 described China’s military build-up and increasing assertiveness as a matter for “attention”, with language escalating over time to reference this year as a “grave matter of concern”. Similarly, North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and ongoing development of its ballistic missile delivery systems ranks it as posing a “grave and imminent” threat to Japan’s security. Against this backdrop Japan’s defence budget has been rising since 2012 after years of reduction, growing to US$65bn (A$90bn) for the current fiscal year, although it is still nowhere near the growth trajectory of its neighbours such as China or South Korea.

CROSS-DOMAIN OPERATIONS In the past few years, Japanese defence planners have focused on multi-domain operations and have put into place effort to develop a force for such operations. Successive white papers have underscored this emphasis, with an eye on defending Japan’s “remote islands”, shorthand for the contested Senkaku Islands which lie between Okinawa and Taiwan. But joint force operations are still very much a new thing for the SDF, with tentative first steps now being taken in this area. The formation of the JGSDF’s Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB) in 2018 is one such example, although the unit still lacks suitable training areas inside Japan to conduct amphibious landing and follow-on operations. As such, the ARDB’s participation in amphibious assault training at Exercise Talisman Sabre 2019

alongside US Marine Corps and ADF amphibious elements while deployed on board JMSDF ships was the first opportunity for the unit to conduct such activities. Indeed, the unit’s leadership expressed appreciation for the ability to use the expansive training areas along Queensland’s coastline to hone their skills. A similar, smaller-scale unilateral exercise in Japan later that year saw a JASDF Mitsubishi F-2 drop a live GPS-guided bomb on a simulated target, with the fact that the SDF saw fit to publicise the event underscoring how rare and newsworthy it was. These domains also include space, and Japan has been active in recent years preparing and launching satellites into space for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions. In May the country inaugurated its own Space Operations Squadron with an initial cadre of 20 personnel. The unit is part of the JJASDF, and its strength is expected to grow to 100 by 2023. The new unit will be integral to the targeting cycle for hypersonic weapons Japan is developing, which will rely on space-based sensors to provide initial and mid-course target data.

Defence planners are focusing on multi-domain operations which led to the formation of the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade seen here (below and bottom) on assault training during Exercise Talisman Saber in 2019. ADF

ARDB forces (above) are set to be joined by an additional regiment, with plans underway to develop a replacement for the AAV-7 amphibious vehicle (top) currently operated by the unit. MIKE YEO / ADF

GROUND SELF-DEFENCE FORCE The JGSDF is the largest of the three branches, with about 150,000 personnel on its books. As its name suggests, its remit is land operations in the defence of Japan and its outlying islands. The JGSDF is further organised into five separate Army Groups based on geography – the Northern, Northeastern, Eastern, Central, and Western Armies. Each Army has it subordinate combat divisions and brigades assigned from the JGSDF’s nine active divisions (eight infantry and one armoured), and eight brigades that include the ARDB and one airborne brigade. The divisions and brigades are organised as a combined arms outfit, each having its own infantry, specialist and support sub-units, such as armoured, reconnaissance, engineering, or anti-aircraft vocations assigned, depending on its location and role. The JGSDF’s armoured spearhead is the Type 10 main battle tank (MBT) which entered service in 2012 and is due to replace the older Type 90 and Type 74 tanks still in service.

Built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), the Type 10 is equipped with an onboard C4I system, a capability that Japan determined could not be retrofitted to its older tanks. It also features a new indigenous 120mm main gun that can fire NATO ammunition, as well as the locally-developed Type 10 Armour Piercing Fin Stabilised Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) round. At 48-tonnes fully loaded, the Type 10 can be employed throughout Japan, compared to the heavier Type 90 that could only be deployed on Hokkaido, the northernmost of Japan’s three main islands where historically the JGSDF saw as the most likely starting point of a Soviet invasion should the Cold War turn ‘hot’. Going forward, the JGSDF plans to transform one of its divisions and two of its brigades into rapid deployment brigades furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. These will see the bulk of the JGSDF’s armoured forces deployed into its Northern and Western Armies, instead of being distributed all over Japan. It is also likely to see the increased deployment of the rapidly deployable Type 16 manoeuvre combat vehicle (MCV) among its other units, particularly those earmarked for rapid deployment. Also built by MHI, the Type 16 MCV is a 26-tonne armoured 8x8 wheeled vehicle fitted with a 105mm high velocity main gun. MHI is also touting an armoured personnel carrier (APC based on the Type 16 MCV for a new vehicle to replace the JGSDF’s Type 96 8x8 wheeled APC). The vehicle will be evaluated by Japan’s Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics Agency (ATLA) alongside the Patria AMV and GDLS LAV 6.0 for selection in 2022. Improved mobility and portability is also behind Japan’s development of a wheeled self-propelled howitzer (SPH). The country’s licence-built FH70 155mm towed howitzers are being replaced by the newer Type 19. Also built by MHI, the Type 19

OSINT - JAPAN SDF ORBAT

features a 52-calibre howitzer mounted on an 8x8 truck chassis, with prototypes seen so far using MAN HX-series trucks. Japan will acquire seven more Type 19s under its 2020 defence budget, adding to the seven prototypes acquired in 2019. The ongoing reorganisation of the JGSDF will see the new howitzers come under the direct command of the respective Armies in 2023, as opposed to the current assignment of the FH-70s to individual divisions and brigades. Meanwhile, the ARDB will get an additional regiment under current plans, and Japan is also developing a new tracked amphibious vehicle to replace the AAV-7s currently being operated by the unit. Japan’s acquisition of 17 Bell-Boeing MV-22B Osprey tiltrotors was done with supporting the ARDB in mind. But only five have been contracted and delivered so far and, of these, only two have been delivered to Japan, with the remaining aircraft remaining in the US for training. Vocal opposition by the local government and residents over safety concerns about the MV-22 has meant that plans to base them at an airport close to the ARDB’s base at Camp Ainoura in Western Japan have been put on hold. The two aircraft that arrived in Japan in April currently operate temporarily out of Camp Kisarazu southeast of the capital Tokyo, where the JGSDF’s 1st Helicopter Brigade is based.

MARITIME SELF-DEFENCE FORCE The 50,000-strong JMSDF is the SDF’s maritime arm. Equipped with highly-capable Aegis destroyers for air and missile defence, and locally-developed Soryu class diesel-electric attack submarines widely regarded as among the best in the world. The JMSDF will also soon have its own aircraft carrier for the Short Take Off Vertical Landing

(STOVL) Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning II. The carrier is being adapted from the helicopter destroyer (DDH) Izumo, a 27,000-ton vessel with a through-deck design for flight operations. The ship is being converted from carrying only helicopters to enable F-35B operations, drawing its air wing from the 42 F-35Bs that Japan is acquiring. The fleet is split primarily between four bases: Yokosuka near Tokyo – the JMSDF’s headquarters – Maizuru, Sasebo, and Kure. The JMSDF’s primary surface combatants – known in the JMSDF as escorts – are split into eight escort flotillas of four ships each, with two flotillas at each base. The bases all have a single replenishment ship (AOE) assigned. Each of the bases, along with Ominato, also have an additional escort squadron belonging to the Naval District Forces operating older destroyers or destroyerescorts. Apart from Izumo, Japan has three more DDHs, these being a second Izumo class ship and two smaller Hyuga class designs. These are the biggest ships in the JMSDF and, while lightly armed, have utility as anti-submarine platforms with their helicopters for which they were originally designed, or supporting disaster relief operations with transport helicopters. This leaves the title of the most potent ships in the JMSDF being its Aegis destroyers. Japan currently has seven of these ships split among the Kongo (4), Atago (2) and Maya (1) classes, with another Maya class vessel due to enter the fleet in 2021. All of these ships are or will be equipped with the equivalent of Aegis Baseline 9 for Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) and, like the Royal

The helicopter destroyer Izumo which is undergoing conversion to carry STOVL F-35Bs. JASDF

‘Over the past decade the ratio of Chinese military aircraft being intercepted has grown steadily’

ADBR

Australian Navy, will all eventually get Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) for improved networking with assets such as the JASDF’s E-2D Airborne Early Warning aircraft, US, and other similarly-equipped allied ISR airborne and surface platforms. For the anti-air and BMD missions, the ships can employ Raytheon SM-2 and the SM-3 Block I missiles. Raytheon and MHI have also designed the larger SM-3 Block IIA that can intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles, and this is currently in development. A new class of eight 3,900-ton 30FFM multirole frigates is also being built to replace some of the older destroyer classes. These will have improved multi-role capability such as mine countermeasures, and will eventually bring the total number of combatants in the JMSDF to 54. Kure and Yokosuka are the home ports of the JMSDF’s impressive submarine fleet. Split into two flotillas with three squadrons each, the 18 boats will grow to 22 in the coming years as Japan continues to build up its undersea capabilities. This will be centred around a dozen Soryu class boats, 11 of which are now in service. The 11th boat made history as the first operational submarine fitted with lithiumion batteries when it commissioned into the JMSDF in March 2020. The last boat in the Soryu class will also utilise lithium-ion batteries, along with the followon submarine class Japan is already planning. Currently known only as the 29SS class, these are an evolution of the Soryu boats, with reports claiming that these will utilise pump-jets instead of a conventional screw.

One of the 11 Soryu class submarines in service with the JMSDF. Plans are underway to expand the current 18-boat submarine fleet to a total of 22. JASDF

AIR SELF-DEFENSE FORCE The 50,000-strong JASDF is responsible for the air defence of Japanese mainland and outlying islands. Indeed, China’s rising military assertiveness has meant that the JASDF air combat force has been

kept busy in recent years. Japan maintains an expansive Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) around its territory, and its interceptors are regularly tasked with identifying and monitoring foreign military aircraft that enter it. Over the past decade, the ratio of Chinese military aircraft being intercepted has grown steadily, with Japan’s Defense Ministry revealing that 675 out 947 intercepts in the last fiscal year were against China, most of these taking place over the East China Sea. In response, Japan has already relocated one of its Mitsubishi F-15J Eagle squadrons to the southern island of Okinawa, along with a detachment of Northrop Grumman E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning (AEW&C) aircraft. The F-15J remains the JASDF’s primary interceptor. Japan built some 200 F-15s under licence in the 1980s, these being currently operated by seven different operational squadrons, plus a training squadron and a dedicated aggressor unit. At least 98 of these will be upgraded in the coming years to F-15JSI standard with a new Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, mission computer, improved electronic warfare (EW) and other systems akin to the USAF’s new F-15EX. Japan will also be the biggest non-US operator of the Lockheed Martin F-35, with plans to eventually acquire 105 Conventional Take Off and Landing (CTOL) F-35As and 42 STOVL F-35Bs. These will replace the last Mitsubishi F-4EJ Phantom IIs and some of the older F-15Js in JASDF service, with one of the squadrons operating the F-4 already in the process of transitioning. A new fighter is also being developed to replace 87 Mitsubishi F-2A/B multirole fighters currently serving with three operational and one training squadron. Japan is keen to restart its own fighter production line, which ended when deliveries of the F-16-based F-2 were completed in 2011, as it could only secure final assembly and check out (FACO) rights for the F-35. During the intervening years, Japan continued research into technology such as AESA radars, engines, and stealth shaping and coatings, with MHI building a technology demonstrator aircraft for ATLA which undertook almost 40 test flights between 2016 and 2018. The data from these flights has allowed Japan to continue its R&D into fighter technology, and it will develop the F-X to replace the F-2 as an indigenous program, although it will still seek foreign partners to assist as required. The prime contractor will be selected by early 2021. Japan has also investing in force-multipliers, with the recent acquisition of the newer AESA-equipped Northrop Grumman E-2D to complement its older E-2Cs and E-767s, and is soon to receive the first of at least four KC-46 Pegasus tankers to replace its four KC-767s.

LE AD-IN FIGHTER TRAINING SYSTEM

RED HAWK FOR RAAF?

Boeing pitches its new T-7A Red Hawk advanced trainer for the ADFâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Project AIR 6002 lead-in fighter training system (LIFTS) requirement BY ANDREW McLAUGHLIN

Xxxxxxxx xxxxx. xxxxxxx

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oeing has confirmed it has responded to a Request for Information (RFI) from the Commonwealth for the Project AIR 6002 Phase 1 future lead-in fighter training system (LIFTS) requirement, with its new T-7A Red Hawk. Boeing’s response comes as the RAAF considers options for a new lead-in fighter that will best prepare fast jet aircrew for integration into the growing Australian 5th generation air combat system. The Boeing response forms part of a strong field of candidates for the LIFTS from the likes of Lockheed Martin, KAI, and Leonardo, with Boeing perhaps holding a slight advantage after the USAF selected the T-7A to replace the T-38C trainer.

The distinctive twinstabiliser configuration of the T-7A Red Hawk with the equally distinctive tail markings of the Tuskagee Airmen of World War 2. BOEING

LIFTS As ADBR reported in our May-June 2020 issue, the RFI was issued on 3 June 2020 by CASG’s Aerospace Systems Division through AUSTENDER, and submissions closed on 31 July. It said it was seeking, “information about these technologies while providing industry an opportunity to engage early on the capability lifecycle as it considers options that may contribute towards the next generation of LIF capability”. While still very early in the planning phase, it says responses to the RFI will “inform Defence decisionmaking in relation to the future of the LIFTS capability”, and stresses that the RFI, “does not form any part of any Commonwealth procurement process”. The LIFTS will eventually replace the BAE Hawk 127 in RAAF service. The RFI says, “The LIFTS provides the ways and means to train fast-jet aircrew between graduation from the PC-21 to commencing conversion training on frontline fast-jet aircraft (F/A-18F, EA-18G and/ or F-35A). The current LIFTS has a secondary role to support other ADF capabilities as friendly or adversary force training elements across maritime, land, and air domains.”

BOEING

ADBR understands that, while AIR 6002 Phase 1 will seek the LIFTS, a nascent Phase 2 will seek to expand and place a greater emphasis on the current ‘secondary role’ of ADF support. This will see the successful system performing anti-ship strike training, adversary air-to-air basic fighter manoeuvring (BFM), strike force augmentation for large force employment training (e.g. Pitch Black), forward air control (FAC) and joint terminal air controller (JTAC) training, and possibly a mannedunmanned teaming (MUM-T) role in conjunction with the Loyal Wingman unmanned capability. To this end, the successful system will likely require a high-performance – likely supersonic – aircraft with open architecture systems to allow for the integration of avionics, sensors, communications, electronic warfare emulators, and weapons. All of these systems will be required to challenge a 5th gen combat capability such as the F-35A during training. Importantly, the new LIFTS will be required to also perform weapons system operator (WSO) aircrew training for the RAAF’s F/A-18F and EA-18G backseaters, respectively. Currently, RAAF WSOs are trained on the Super Hornet by the US Navy at NAS Oceania in Virginia, while Growler WSOs are trained by the US Navy at NAS Whidbey Island in Washington state. But if much of the initial WSO training can be conducted on the much more economical LIFTS, this will eliminate the need to send these trainees overseas and will also free up hours from the front-line aircraft.

INCUMBENT The RAAF ordered 33 Hawk 127s in 1997 to replace the Macchi MB.326. The first 12 jets were built by BAE Systems in the UK while the remaining 21 Hawks were assembled at a new facility at RAAF Williamtown, and the first Hawk 127 entered service in 1999.

RED HAWK

The RAAF’s Hawk fleet underwent a comprehensive upgrade of its avionics and training systems from 2016 to 2018 under Project AIR 5438 Lead-in Fighter Capability Assurance Program (LIFCAP) in order to better prepare fast jet pilots for the F-35A Lightning II and other nextgeneration aircraft. But, at a time where RAAF fast-jet pilot training throughput is at a critical stage as the F-35A comes online, the Hawk has suffered in recent years from poor availability. This has resulted in at least two fleet-wide groundings – the most recent being in May and June 2019 – due to ongoing reliability issues with its Rolls-Royce Adour 871 engine. While Defence said there were no operational restrictions placed on the fleet immediately following the 2019 grounding, a spokesman told ADBR that “aircrew have been advised to be stringent in their application of existing operational controls to ensure any risk is reduced so far as reasonably practicable”. Following the closure of RFI submissions, BAE Systems Australia released a statement in August emphasising the remaining fatigue life of the RAAF’s fleet of 33 Hawk 127s before it needs to be retired. The company says a Hawk full scale fatigue test airframe has been subjected to 14 years of fatigue testing since 2006 under a joint program with the Defence Science & Technology (DST) Group at DST’s Fisherman’s Bend facility in Melbourne. It says that, while the RAAF’s Hawks have a planned fatigue life of 10,000 flying hours each, the test article has been subjected to 50,000 hours of loads that simulate flight and real-life airframe use in service. “The full scale fatigue test is a hugely important achievement for the Australian Lead-In Fighter program and was made possible by the collaboration of a small dedicated team across many thousands of kilometres,” BAE Systems Australia Director Aircraft Sustainment and Training, Andrew Chapman, said in the statement. The company says the RAAF’s Hawk fleet has recorded a total of 122,000 hours in service, an average of less than 4,000 hours each, or less than half their planned fatigue life, meaning the now 20year old fleet has a theoretical life-of-type extending into the 2040s. BAE Systems did not confirm whether it has responded to the RFI with further upgrades to the Hawk beyond those conducted under the AIR 5438 which was completed in 2019. But ADBR understands informal discussions about a possible re-engine of the aircraft with the latest Rolls-Royce Adour 951 engine have been held, and that this may form the basis of any BAE Systems proposal.

BOEING/SAAB T-7A RED HAWK Boeing says the T-7A – which the USAF has selected to replace its Northrop T-38C Talon supersonic trainer – will provide a “scalable, interoperable, and

configurable capability, and is ideally suited to address the RAAF’s next-generation frontline fast-jet aircraft training requirements”. “No other training system in the world today will better develop the skills required to operate the RAAF’s most advanced frontline aircraft like the F/A-18 Super Hornet, EA-18G Growler and the F-35,” Vice President Boeing T-7 Programs, Chuck Dabundo said in a statement. Boeing Defence Australia Vice President and Managing Director, Scott Carpendale added, “The T-7 stands apart as a compelling solution for Australia’s future training requirements. We believe it meets Australia’s current and future fast-jet training needs with its next-generation system that combines live, virtual and synthetic training environments.” Two prototype T-7As have been flying since December 2016 and April 2017. Designed with significant input from Saab, the T-7A is powered by a single 17,000lb augmented thrust General Electric F404-GE-103 turbofan, the same as that on the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18A-D ‘classic’ Hornet and Saab JAS-39A-D Gripen. The airframe has a similar configuration to the F/A-18 family, with twin vertical stabilisers set forward of the mid-set horizontal stabilisers, a highset trapezoid wing, and the engine intakes set under the wing leading edge root extension (LEX). Boeing says the T-7A is designed to provide “fighter-like performance” and handling. The aft fuselage is built by Saab at its Linköping facility in Sweden, while the rest of the jet is manufactured by Boeing at its St Louis facility in Missouri and by its various suppliers. Importantly, ADF sources describe the T-7A’s stepped tandem cockpit as “huge”, saying it offers excellent visibility from both seats, and can easily accommodate 90th percentile humans and large wide-screen cockpit displays. It has been designed for the avionics, displays, and controls to be reconfigurable as new frontline combat aircraft are introduced, or upgraded, to retain as much training and conversion commonality as possible. The T-7A was selected under the USAF’s T-X

The Hawk 127 has been in service with the RAAF since 1999, but has suffered from engine fatigue issues in recent years. ADF

ADBR

‘The T-7 stands apart as a compelling solution for Australia’s future training requirements ’

In the race for the the RAAF requirement is the Leonardo M346 Master and its embedded tactical training simulation system. HONEYWELL

requirement to replace the USAF’s T-38C, and Boeing was awarded a US$9.2bn (A$12.5bn) contract for 351 T-7As in September 2018 with options to deliver an additional 124 aircraft. The program will also deliver 46 simulators and associated training systems. The clean-sheet T-7A beat out the Leonardo M346 Master and the Lockheed Martin/ Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI) T-50A for T-X. Five engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) T-7As are currently in production by Boeing and Saab, and the first of these is slated to roll out in June 2021 and to fly in September 2021. The initial US$813m (A$1.103bn) EMD contract will also see seven simulators delivered to Joint Base San Antonio-Randolph in Texas in 2023 for the development of pilot training and an aircrew training syllabus. In testing, the T-7A has completed 80 per cent of its phase one developmental testing through more than 200 flights, and the training system has successfully undergone an overall system critical design review. Two low-rate initial production (LRIP) lots and eight full-rate production lots are planned, and the USAF plans to declare an initial operational capability (IOC) by 2024, with all 351 aircraft due to be delivered by 2033. The aircraft was named Red Hawk in September 2019 in honour of the Tuskagee Airmen, an AfricanAmerican combat unit in WW2 who painted the tails of many of their aircraft red, and the Curtiss P-40 Warhawk which many of them flew. The T-7A’s ground-based training system is described by Boeing as “highly immersive”. It says it will offload skill development from the aircraft on to synthetic devices and live-virtual constructive (LVC) training. It says that, including the aircraft, the system offers a complete training solution. Importantly for the RAAF’s follow-on Phase 2 of AIR 6002, Boeing is studying the development

of an armed light-attack version of the T-7 which is plans to offer as a replacement for air forces looking to replace Northrop F-5, Dornier AlphaJet, or even early-marque Lockheed F-16s and other light combat aircraft in service. The development of this version will enable the missionised capabilities required by the RAAF’s Phase 2. This could also include the development of a fastjet manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) training capability in conjunction with Boeing Airpower Teaming System (ATS) currently being developed for the RAAF’s Loyal Wingman requirement. The potential of the integration of a number of unmanned aircraft with a manned fast-jet for fleet support or large strike force employment training against blue forces is compelling and, through the use of artificial intelligence, not unrealistic. After losing the Joint Strike Fighter competition in 2001, Boeing appears to have focused on creating an air combat system that includes everything except the F-35. This system covers airpower roles from strike (F/A-18F), maritime surveillance (P-8A), airborne control and battle management (E-7A), airborne electronic attack (EA18G), and unmanned systems (ATS).

OTHER OPTIONS AIR 6002 will likely feature the same contenders that bid for the USAF’s T-X, plus several more. As mentioned above, with BAE Systems emphasising the remaining fatigue-life of the RAAF’s Hawk 127, it is expected to offer a reengined and upgraded Hawk. Another option is the Leonardo M346 Master which is in service with Italy, Israel, Poland, Azerbaijan, and Singapore. Leonardo says the M346’s embedded tactical training simulation (ETTS) system allows it to emulate on-board sensors, weapons, and computer generated forces (CGF), and allows pilots to interact in real time with a virtual tactical scenario in an LVC environment. And while KAI has confirmed it has offered the T-50, it remains to be seen whether it and Lockheed Martin can come together to offer the aircraft, or if Lockheed Martin goes it alone with its T-50A version. The original T-50 was originally developed using significant design and systems input from the F-16C, so Lockheed Martin likely owns significant intellectual property on all versions of the T-50, and may even have the rights to offer it alone in specific markets. The T-50A was developed specifically for T-X and, as the manufacturer of the F-35, Lockheed Martin is more likely to be able to successfully develop a training system for the T-50A that will more directly align with the requirements of future F-35A pilots. The US-based OEM would be better placed to integrate the advanced training and other systems needed to meet the nascent AIR 6002 Phase 2 requirement.

TECH BRIEF - SIGINT

TECH BRIEF

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE 101 BY DAVID HOPKINS

n March 20 2003 hundreds of US and coalition aviators prepared for what would be the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The opening missions of the “shock and awe” campaign saw hundreds of aircraft attack the ‘Super-MEZ’ – the missile engagement zone protecting Baghdad and the Iraqi regime. Their targets were surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery batteries, as well as command and control installations. In the preceding years. through the first Gulf War of 1991 and the follow-on Operations Northern and Southern Watch, Iraqi forces had learned the consequences of keeping their anti-air systems static and became increasingly mobile, employing ‘shoot-and-scoot’ techniques to avoid the onslaught of coalition attacks. But while this provided a challenge to the coalition forces, they had a powerful weapon supporting their mission. In the weeks and months leading up to March 2003, a large intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) campaign had been collecting intelligence on the Iraqi forces, analysing their locations, plans and intent. A key part of this ISR effort was signals intelligence – or SIGINT – combining the capabilities of national space-based collectors with airborne collection platforms. SIGINT provided continuous updates as systems came online in new locations and threatened the air campaign above. While all this was happening, there was also significant effort being made in collecting and analysing communications intelligence – or COMINT – to identify leadership targets, their plans and intent. Overall, SIGINT made a significant contribution to the efforts to degrade the Iraqi antiair capability in Baghdad, paving the way for followon operations in and around the Iraqi capital. SIGINT is one of the many intelligence disciplines that feeds information into the intelligence cycle and comprises intelligence derived from electronic signals and systems such as communications, radars, and weapons systems. SIGINT is comprised of two main sub-disciplines – COMINT and

electronic intelligence, or ELINT. SIGINT provides intelligence on adversary capabilities, disposition, composition, actions, and intent. Demand for SIGINT has grown exponentially in the last decade, for its utility in understanding capability and intent of adversaries. As well as providing vital intelligence against the rise of terrorism, SIGINT is crucial in supplying 5th gen military platforms with the mission data they need to achieve advantage in the battlespace. SIGINT has its origins in the interception of German radio traffic in the early years of World War I, with the intercepted radio traffic providing insight into German plans and operations. Attempts to encrypt radio traffic led to cryptography becoming a central part of SIGINT analysis. Since the start of the Cold War, a significant number of space-based signals collection capabilities have been launched, collecting SIGINT alongside military air, land, and maritime-based capabilities. Militaries, governments, and nations rely on the ability to communicate to achieve their national security objectives, be it during peace, contest, or conflict, and much of this communication occurs using radio, satellite communications, telephone networks, or the internet, and all these means are vulnerable to interception. In fact, the more connected we become, the more opportunities there are for communications to be intercepted.

‘Since the start of the Cold War, a significant number of space-based signals collection capabilities have been launched’

ADBR

COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE – COMINT COMINT is intelligence gathered from the interception of communications between people and groups, and is focused primarily on the translation and interpretation of the actual conversations or messages being passed. Sources of COMINT include radio messages, telephone conversations, text messages, and emails. Intelligence derived from the translation and analysis of COMINT can provide valuable insight into enemy intent, plans, and operations, as well as identifying individuals and their responsibilities in an organisation. Intelligence agencies rely on large numbers of security-cleared people to manually translate and interpret the thousands of hours of communications intercepted each day.

ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE – ELINT ELINT is technical intelligence gathered using electronic sensors to collect electromagnetic (EM) emissions from systems. Sources of ELINT include radars, radio and datalinks, GPS and navigation equipment. ELINT contributes to understanding of the technical capabilities of the system transmitting the signals, and insight into the location and operating patterns of the force using the system. Analysis of the collected technical signals (Tech ELINT) can determine information such as the type of equipment generating the signal, the frequency, wavelength, and other attributes. The collected information can then be analysed to determine the capabilities of the system. and to plan countermeasures. Tech ELINT can be collected in the early stages of a new system’s development, sometimes referred to as foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, where telemetry and instrumentation of a system being tested is collected. It can take years to collect, interpret, analyse, and build into useable databases. In contrast, operational ELINT (Op ELINT) is focused on detecting the location and operating patterns of a system and can provide timecritical intelligence during the execution of operations. Electronic support, a sub-discipline of electronic warfare, overlaps with ELINT. While electronic support is focused on the immediate detection of threats, much of the information is recorded and can be analysed to produce both Op and Tech ELINT.

SIGINT OPERATIONS Like all intelligence sources, SIGINT is tasked, collected, processed, analysed, and disseminated. It provides intelligence at the strategic level to inform national security decisions, at one end of the spectrum, and provides real-time intelligence to tactical commanders across defence and security forces at the other. SIGINT is a key component of a military ISR system. In support of military ISR operations, SIGINT provides a nearly continuous feed of intelligence that contributes to situational awareness. Military platforms are fed from databases built from Tech ELINT, and many are fitted with sensors that collect COMINT and ELINT while conducting their missions in the battlespace. SIGINT from national intelligence agencies and military platforms is fused and presented to operational commanders to contribute to their situational understanding and decisionmaking advantage.

A CHALLENGING FUTURE SIGINT is playing an ever-increasing role in the understanding, location and targeting of adversary forces. The next generation of SIGINT capabilities will have to deal with three key challenges – increasing demand, rapid advances in technology, and the pace at which policy can keep up. Demand for SIGINT is growing from traditional users such as military forces and newer users in the broader national security environment. This will drive the need for more collection, data processing and storage, and faster processing, exploitation, and dissemination of intelligence as part of a broader ISR system. It will force the adoption of technologies such as machine learning to process data and artificial intelligence (AI) to exploit and analyse the data. Rapid technology advances are providing an increasingly complicated challenge as new collection capabilities are quickly countered, shortening the lifespan of the advantage gained. One of the biggest emerging challenges facing SIGINT is that of encryption. Commercial encryption is rapidly advancing and decreasing in price, and research into quantum encryption is showing early signs of success. As potential adversaries invest in improving the resilience of their communications, SIGINT capabilities will need to evolve faster. However, to enjoy the same advantages experienced in 2003 during Operation Enduring Freedom, the biggest challenge may not be that of technology. While SIGINT policy and regulations have adapted to changing technology, the pace of change does not match that of technology. David Hopkins is an Executive Analyst at Felix Defence. He is a graduate of the Fighter Intelligence Instructor Course and has more than 20 years’ experience in the Royal Australian Air Force. He is a veteran of multiple tours across the Middle East theatres of operation.

TECH BRIEF - LINK 16 MODERNISATION

TECH BRIEF

LINK 16 MODERNISATION Part 2 – Strategy Development BY FELIX DEFENCE

he May - June issue of ADBR explored the four key enhancements delivered by Link 16 modernisation. Modernisation of the ADF’s primary Tactical Data Link (TDL) will directly affect the joint force’s capability and capacity to remain at the tactical edge and will most certainly impact our ability to remain fully interoperable with our closest operational ally, the United States. There are two considerations associated with Link 16 modernisation which involve either upgrading the pre-existing MIDS-Low Volume Terminal (LVT), or acquiring the new MIDS-Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS). This is not a straightforward decision as capability managers need to balance how to remain fully interoperable and ensure a complete operational capability while meeting mandated operational deadlines, procurement schedules, costs, integration effort and the subsequent maintenance and support needs. In this issue we will examine the strengths and weaknesses of choosing to upgrade an existing MIDS-LVT against acquiring a new MIDS-JTRS, while ensuring an interoperable Link 16 capability.

BLOCK UPGRADE 2 Block Upgrade (BU) 2 is the name given to upgrade the older hardware-defined MIDS-LVT Link 16 terminals, and the level of effort necessary requires further analysis due to several factors. Firstly, while BU2 provides three of the four enhancements – Cryptographic Modernisation (CM), Frequency Remapping, and Enhanced Throughput (ET) – it does not support the fourth –

Concurrent Multi-Netting (CMN)-4. The CMN-4 enhancement is described as an advanced capability and is currently only applied to the MIDS-JTRS Software-Defined Radio (SDR). This instantly puts a user who has chosen the BU2 upgrade path into the category of being classed as a disadvantaged user in future Link 16 networks, and potentially undermine the user’s operational capability and thus interoperability. However, CMN-4 has not yet been mandated for use but for how long that remains the case is still unclear. Secondly, for a platform to realise the full potential of ET and be able to employ all five ET rates, it would have to make considerable changes to the host system and most likely the interface that connects their MIDS-LVT to the host. For example, the host would have to be able to ‘push, pull, and process’ far more Link 16 data than normal. Furthermore, many MIDS-LVT users utilise a 1553 data bus interface to enable this connection, and the problem is that some platforms use this same 1553 data bus to support the transfer of other data outside of Link 16. Consequently, the ability to operate at some ET rates may not be achievable as the 1553 bus quite simply cannot handle the increase in data. The only option is for the user to configure a double bus, ie a second connection. But ET has not yet been mandated for use and, even if it is, what would be the minimum ET rate required?

‘Capability managers are already aware of the operational deadline regarding cryptographic modernisation’

ADBR

CAPABILITY MANAGER’S LINK 16 MODERNISATION CHALLENGE

MODERN ISATION PATH OPERAT IO DEADLINNAL ES PROCUR

EMENT

COST CAPABIL INTEROP

INTEGRA TION ERABILIT

It’s a question of getting the balance right (above) between the variables. Below: an MIDS-LVT(1) Link-16 Tactical Airborne Terminal. VIASAT

This MIDS-JTRS unit allows for simultaneous 4-channel operation for Link-16, TACAN and Advanced Waveforms. VIASAT

ITY

MAINTEN A & SUPPO NCE RT

Understandably, capability managers do not want to implement only as far as ET rate 1 to subsequently discover ET rate 2, 3, or 4 is the minimum requirement. Moreover, they do not want to make unnecessary changes to accommodate these higher ET rates if the operational community will never use them. Thus, BU2 provides enough capability for a user to meet the minimum requirements and should be viewed as a short-term option. The risk for users who choose this path and want to maintain their Link 16 capability in the long-term is that they become a ‘disadvantaged user’ and can only play a reduced part in future operational Link 16 networks.

MIDS-JTRS MIDS-JTRS is undoubtedly the SDR of choice when it comes to Link 16. There are a range of MIDSJTRS from the basic MIDS-JTRS (4) through to the MIDS-JTRS (7), all offering a range of capabilities that complement Link 16 or exist outside of it. Currently, for many users the four-channel MIDSJTRS (5) is the most practical option and provides the user with all four enhancements. Nonetheless, while MIDS-JTRS users would not require a double bus, capability managers are still faced with the same issue – what ET rate to integrate? The problem is further compounded with a requirement for the host to be able to process even more data when the MIDS-JTRS is set to receive even more data. As mentioned earlier, the second advanced capability is that of CMN-4, and this enhancement allows a user to receive considerably more data simultaneously, all of which puts increased pressure on the host. In conclusion, MIDS-JTRS has many advantages over BU2 in that, if changes are integrated to the host system, a user can employ all four enhancements. The addition of the three further programmable channels to support future growth only adds to the list of advantages, and simply being a Software-Defined Radio should allow for a more rapid maintenance and support process. But there are disadvantages, most notably demand and cost, and one should not view the replacement of a MIDS-LVT with a MIDS-JTRS as a simple plugand-play process. Capability managers are already aware of the operational deadline regarding cryptographic modernisation. They can potentially meet this by choosing BU2, but that will only delay the inevitable move to MIDS-JTRS. Understanding how long a user can survive before the advanced capabilities are mandated is the predicament regrettably no-one can currently answer. The basic trade-off involves sacrificing near-term interoperability for a much more capable system in the future. In the next issue of ADBR we will introduce and discuss the latest TDL being procured by the ADF – Link 22.

S T R AT E G Y

THE CHANGING ART OF WAR Why linear deterrence won’t win BY PETER HUNTER

s the recently-released 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU) makes clear, the prevalence of coercive statecraft in the Indo– Pacific has revealed the need for new thinking about the value proposition of Australia’s military forces as a deterrent to statebased aggression. The DSU’s strong emphasis on the strategic effects of shape, deter and respond in the IndoPacific reflects the need to move beyond an overly narrow focus on combat capability. As important as the ADF’s continuing program of modernisation and acquisition will be in the event of force-on-force conflict, it has, at the same time, not been sufficient to deter aggressor states such as China from undertaking political warfare and grey zone methods to secure strategic advantage. This is partly because those methods are calculated to sidestep models of vertical escalation which weave in the idea of a ‘capability edge’ as the acme of deterrence.

A recent NATO definition describes influence as the ability to get others to do what you want. Historically, Australia has tended to see a linear relationship between influence and the application of force. This one-dimensional equation has underpinned traditional strategic models of coercion: in order for one actor to coerce or compel another, it is necessary to be able to apply greater statesanctioned violence than can be tolerated. But such conservative thinking has unhelpfully sustained security theories that, if not obsolescent, are not flexible or inclusive enough to account for contemporary Russian and Chinese strategies. Moreover, this one-dimensional model has fuelled the West’s investment in exquisite military platforms as the providers of security and influence. But this silver-bullet mentality fails to address deeper, more consequential questions regarding the nature of power and influence. Since the platform-centric model takes as a given that coercion still resides chiefly in violence,

ADBR

The old and the new of RAAF ISR platforms ... a 10SQN AP-3C EW Orion side by side with a 2SQN E-7A Wedgetail. ADF

and that greater influence can therefore be bought with more exquisite tools-of-violence, it simultaneously neglects the lessons of history which reveal a track record of failures when state-sanctioned force has been mistaken as the guarantor of influence. Worse still, it fails to account for the changing nature of international competition and influence. But as Chinese and Russian strategies have shown, the nature of the game has changed and Western platform-centric concepts do not properly recognise this. Neither Russian nor Chinese strategies are as linear or one-dimensional as their Western counterparts. Where Western strategists have, until recently, persisted with Clausewitz’s dictum that war is the continuation of politics by other means, Russian and Chinese models effectively invert this logic. China and Russia both see themselves in a condition of perpetual struggle – or indeed, war – for survival against Western interference, and within this continual war footing, politics is but one of many means for wielding state power. Unlike Clausewitz’s model, which places war at the extreme of a linear progression of state-based efforts to achieve influence, contemporary Russian and Chinese models take war to be a constant condition, with the variables being the tools of statecraft which are deployed to prosecute its aims. Rather than seeing war exclusively as the presence of armed conflict, Russian and Chinese strategic behaviour suggests that sub-conventional means, including information, ideological, economic, subversive, and diplomatic methods are considered just as – if not more – than armed violence. This is a paradigmatic shift from the traditional understanding of war as defined by armed violence. China’s approach to coercive statecraft in the Indo–Pacific deliberately blurs the distinction between war and peace. So western notions of

‘Russian and Chinese models take war to be a constant condition’

Lines drawn ... like Russia, China sees itself in a condition of perpetual struggle for survival against Western influence. WIKICOMMONS

deterrence, dissuasion, and denial will need to adapt to this different reality. While Australia may seek to deter Chinese military action if it cannot deter other forms of state aggression, such as economic coercion or political interference, then the value proposition of military capability as an element of national power seems questionable. Unless a more holistic version of Australian national power is adopted which deters and defeats other forms of coercion, then the investment in military capabilities may be of little value. Evidently, a more holistic appreciation of deterrence is required if Australia’s sophisticated military capabilities are to contribute to whole-ofgovernment approaches to countering the effects of coercive statecraft in our region. This must start with a better understanding of what is being deterred. If we stick with Cold War models that only see the role of the military as being a deterrent against aggressor military forces, then our major capital investments risk being consigned to irrelevance until the ‘break glass in case of emergency’ scenario arises. But with such major investments of national treasure in these capabilities still underway, is this good enough? The DSU’s focus on new paradigms for the efficacy of military power is a laudable step in the right direction. But more comprehensive analyses will be necessary if Defence is to realise its potential as a contributor to national strategies of influence and counter-coercion. Weaving Defence’s operations and capabilities into a wider concept of national influence will be the key. If Australia is to more effectively counter the destabilising effects of coercive statecraft in the region, then Defence will need to complement the other elements of Australia’s national power and contribute to long-term campaigns for enhancing our security and prosperity in the region. By enhancing the effectiveness of the other elements of national power, whether diplomatic, economic, or informational, Defence’s approach to multi-domain operations could be mapped to a broader approach of multi-domain influence. In this way, Defence’s diverse capabilities, from electronic warfare to cyber operations to special operations, could be incorporated into more holistic approaches to gaining competitive advantage. And by cooperating with friends and partners in the region, including India, Indonesia, Japan, and the Pacific Island countries, Australia can bolster its ability to not only expose malign statecraft, but to develop options for cost-imposing strategies that will deter grey zone political warfare. By working diligently with regional partners, particularly through the application of growing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in our new-generation air power platforms, the ADF can provide rich options to whole of government influence campaigns.

MTCR

UNDER CONTROL?

There are questions of access and influence behind a US decision to redraw part of the MTCR BY DOUGAL ROBERTSON

n a statement issued on 24 July this year, the White House announced the decision to move a “carefully selected subset” of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) from the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I to Category II. The decision is significant for two reasons. The first is it potentially makes high-end UAS – including armed medium altitude long-endurance (MALE) systems – available to a range of non-traditional US security partners. This means we may see more sales in the Indo-Pacific of UAS based on the successful General Atomics Aeronautical Systems International (GA-ASI) Predator B and Reaper airframes. The second is it shows how the US may be seeking to reduce Chinese influence in strategic areas by linking non-allied countries through technology. The White House statement came as no surprise to those following the UAS export debate in the US. In April 2018 President Trump had signed a memorandum approving a new Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) policy. The revised CAT was intended to make it easier for US defence companies to sell high-value technology to allies and partners, and called for a plan to align

UAS export policy more closely with US national and economic security interests. To those not following the UAS export debate, the vagaries of the MTCR could seem a dusty corner of international policy. The MTCR was established in 1987 to limit the spread of ballistic missiles and other unmanned delivery systems that could be used for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defence (CBRND) attacks. In the closing stages of the Cold War, the MTCR – a voluntary agreement between signatory nations – seemed the most effective way of preventing Soviet weapons and technology directly or inadvertently falling into the hands of rogue or pariah states. Fourteen years later in 2001, the MTCR received a further boost as partner nations sought to prevent missile technology being sold or transferred to terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda or Lebanese Hezbollah. The MTCR requires each member nation to control the export of technologies that could be used to deliver CBRND payloads, and these technologies are listed in an annex to the MTCR containing Category I and Category II items. The MTCR guidelines state there should be a “strong

The grouping of larger UAS with cruise and ballistic missiles under the MTCR means airframes such as the Global Hawk (above) have been restricted to a select group of customers. NORTHROP GRUMMAN

ADBR

‘Israeli systems come with the benefit of operational test and evaluation by the Israeli Defence Force’

There are mixed views about the competitive viability in the ‘near Category 1’ of Chinese airframes such as the Wing Loong II. CHINA MIL

presumption to deny” Category I transfers. But when the MTCR Material and Technology Annex was drafted in 1987 military UAS development was still in its infancy, UAS with a range of at least 300km and a payload of at least 500kg are defined as Category I, while Category II UAS are defined as those with a range of at least 300km regardless of payload. In essence, a UAV is considered the same as a cruise or ballistic missile where the mission is outbound only. The vagaries of the MTCR might not seem immediately relevant. But the grouping of larger UAS with cruise and ballistic missiles means high-end systems such as GA-ASI Predator and Northrop Grumman Global Hawk airframes have only been sold to a select range of customers, primarily the Five Eyes (Australia, Canada, Great Britain, the US and New Zealand) group or full NATO members. Key US bilateral security partners South Korea and Japan have also purchased RQ-4B Global Hawk, while India is still ‘negotiating’ to buy 22 GA-ASI SeaGuardian (maritime MQ-9B) systems. Meanwhile, China and Israel (and to a lesser extent Turkey) appear to be meeting market demand by providing smaller Category II UAS for immediate sale – SIPRI figures indicate China may have already signed contracts for over 200 CH-4 and Wing Loong II airframes, with most of the sales in the Middle East. It’s unclear if the Chinese and Israeli systems are actually competing with US airframes. A 2017 RAND study noted that larger Category II UAS such as CH-4 and Wing Loong and Hermes 900 should be considered “near Category I”. But there is a lot more to capability than an airframe and power source. The PRC systems appear to be competing on price alone, but questions have been raised about the reliability of Chinese-made low-cost airframes. Jordan is reportedly disposing of its armed CH-4B UAS, while the Iraqi Army CH-4B airframes have a serviceability rate of 10 per cent (although this may also be due to Iraqi maintenance practices).

Israeli systems come with the benefit of an operational test and evaluation by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). The IDF has for a long time used commercial sales of IDF systems to fund improvements and upgrades to equipment – the Elbit and IAI UAS are no exception. Perhaps most importantly, the Chinese, Israeli, and Turkish UAS (including the ground segment) are not able to connect to US information networks such as Link 16 due to security concerns. A spokesperson for GA-ASI made the case succinctly to ADBR: “GA-ASI does not compete on price. Our reputation for trusted, proven, highly-capable, interoperable, and secure RPAS that provide assured capability … backed by the US Government, remains a very attractive value package to first-tier RPAS military and security operators.” And this may be where the unilateral US changes to MTCR will have the greatest effect. GA-ASI added that, “Customer requirements, including those from a growing international customer base… are driving a range of advanced capabilities for the MQ-9A and MQ-9B RPAS. Development of a wide range of advanced networking systems continues, along with a range of new radar, EW, and EO/IR payload options.” GA-ASI and Northrop Grumman have maintained a performance edge due largely to natural advantages in propulsion technology and airframe design – for example the Honeywell TPE331 engine in Predator B was first introduced in 1961, and has been subject to constant improvement and refinement for its numerous commercial and military applications. Likewise, airframe and payload improvements have been upgraded based on customer requirements and internal research and development – GA-ASI states the MQ-9B SkyGuardian was developed in-house by the company. But the real capability behind the sticker price of a US-built Category I UAS is access to US information-sharing networks and sensor technology. And with that access comes a level of assurance that the system will function as advertised, and that it will provide a layer of security to protect the information that is being collected. GA-ASI was reluctant to comment directly about the White House announcement on MTCR, but said the company welcomed the changes. “We look forward to this announcement leading to approvals for sales to a larger portion of the international market.” Many states in the Indo-Pacific are now looking to procure UAS to boost maritime and border security, and to provide domain awareness of grey zone activity in contested areas. The increased availability of high-end US-built UAS may be the method that links these states into the US security framework, without unduly affecting the regional balance of power.

OSINT - INDO-PACIFIC UAS

OSINT

INDO-PACIFIC UAS

Market challengers in the burgeoning unmanned space BY DOUGAL ROBERTSON

he value of the global unmanned aircraft system (UAS) market over the next 10 years is largely speculative. The real value of future contracts IS unknown, but there is agreement on one fact – the potential value of the military UAS market is huge. US-based market research firm Teal Group forecast annual sales, research and development of US$15.8bn (A$21.9bn) in 2020, rising to US$20bn (A$27.7bn) by 2029. This figure includes US unclassified and classified procurement. In the Asia-Pacific, Jane’s Market Forecast estimates the potential size of the Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) UAV market, excluding US security partners such as Japan, Singapore, and Australia, to be US$890m (A$1.23bn) a year. Armed UAVs have proven their utility over the past two decades of counter insurgency and lowintensity conflict in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other parts of the Middle East. The relatively low cost per airframe, reduced training burden, perceived reduction in risk, and prestige and country status associated with operating armed UAVs, all contribute to this burgeoning market. While the US-made General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc (GA-ASI) Predator and Reaper airframes are the most well-known armed UAVs, sales of the GA-ASI aircraft have been limited by US adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR states that signatories should have a “strong presumption to deny” the sale of ‘Category I’ UAS capable of carrying a 500kg payload a distance of 300km. The intent of the MTCR is to prevent the spread of delivery systems for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Adherence by the US to the MTCR has meant non-signatory states such as Israel, China, and

Turkey have been able to sell armed UAVs to a range of customers, including many in the Middle East, South America, and Africa, although it is unclear if the products on offer from these states are direct competitors to the US airframes in Category I of the MTCR. In a 2018 report, UK-based NGO Drone Wars noted that, “while many assume that China is now flouting MTCR rules by exporting its armed UAVs … the systems that it has sold appear limited to ones that fall into the less sensitive Category II status.” A 2017 RAND Corporation study found all Chinese and Israeli export sales of MALE UAS were ‘near-Category I’ UAVs with a payload below 500kg and line of sight (LOS) range under 300km – but also noted most of these systems could perform many of the missions of Category I UAVs and were ‘significantly less expensive’. However, Israel and China are aggressively pursuing armed UAV sales in the Asia Pacific, and appear to be competing for sales with US-made systems. Based on current open source intelligence, ADBR estimates five non-US UAS designs are being actively marketed in the Indo-Pacific region.

Early entrant - the MQ-1 Predator first entered service with the USAF in 1995, pictured here armed with AGM-114 Hellfire air-tosurface missiles. USAF

ADBR

CASC CH-4

In RAAF livery, the potent GA-ASI MQ-9B SkyGuardian it intends to acquire under Project AIR 7003. GA-ASI

The China Aerospace Corporation CH-5 appears to be designed to compete with the MQ-9 Reaper (Predator B). CHC

AVIC WING LOONG II The Aviation Industry of China (AVIC) Wing Loong II (Pterodactyl) has been exported to the UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reporting on arms trades, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also purchased Wing Loong variants around 2015-16, although Drone Wars notes neither country appears to be flying the aircraft. Media reporting suggests the UAE used Wing Loong II UAVs in 2017 during air operations in the Libyan civil war (a claim the UAE denies), although it is unknown if the UAVs were used in a strike or ISR role. Externally the Wing Loong II is a copy of the MQ-9 Predator with an almost identical airframe configuration. The wings have three underwing hardpoints for external stores. Payload capacity is claimed at 480kg, and AVIC advertises a range of Chinese-made air-to-surface weapons as compatible with the Wing Loong II, including antitank missiles, guided rockets, glide bombs and laserguided bombs (LGB). Sensor fit is unknown, but based on airshow and arms sales literature the Wing Loong II carries an EO/IR camera and laser designator in the sensor ball under the nose. Airframes are fitted with a SATCOM antenna, and AVIC claims an operational radius of 1,000nm with SATCOM. The engine is probably the 500kW AEP50E turboprop, giving a maximum speed of 200kts and maximum altitude of 30,000ft, with an endurance of 32 hours.

The China Aerospace Corporation (CASC) CH-4 Rainbow is offered as an unarmed and armed CH-4B variant, while Jane’s International Defence Review reported in April 2020 that an updated CH-4C variant is now in development. SIPRI figures record CH-4 sales to Algeria, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan, although in November 2018 the Assistant Commander of the Royal Jordanian Air Force (RJAF) said the RJAF “wasn’t happy with the performance” of the four CH-4B UAV, and was planning to retire the airframes. Indonesia’s purchase of the CH-4 is also unclear – while SIPRI records a sale of four CH-4s delivered in 2019, Indonesia’s indigenous Elang Hitam (Black Eagle) armed MALE UAV will reportedly be in service by 2022 and is planned to replace the CH-4. The CH-4 also closely resembles the Predator UAS, although CASC officials claim the airframe is a clean-sheet design. The CH-4B airframe has four underwing hardpoints, and can carry four AR-1 LGBs. Sensor fit includes the standard EO/IR imager, while CASC offers synthetic aperture radar (SAR), electronic support measures (ESM) and electronic countermeasures (ECM) self-protection suites, laser range-finding, and communications relay equipment as payloads. The maximum payload is 345kg. Export versions are offered with SATCOM, providing range performance up to 850nm. The CH-4 has a turboprop as standard fit (although the type is unknown) giving a maximum speed of 100kts, a maximum altitude of 26,000ft, and an endurance of 14 hours. CASC is reportedly developing a heavy fuel engine for the CH-4 to increase endurance, payload, and maximum altitude performance, although reporting on this is vague.

CASC CH-5 The CH-5 to date has not been exported, however it appears to be designed to compete with the Predator B (Reaper) and CASC is reportedly offering the CH-5 airframe as an upgrade option for existing CH-4 operators. Payload is increased to 1,200kg, with six underwing hardpoints and an additional four fuselage mounts. Compared with the CH-4, the CH-5 can carry up to 16 AR-1 and AR-2 LGBs, or FT-9 SATNAV (JDAM copy) bombs. CASC has marketed a sensor fit including EO/ IR camera with high definition imaging, SAR, and an electronic warfare or electronic intelligence configurable internal mission payload. With SATCOM BLOS datalink, the CH-5 has a range of over 1,000nm, a cruise speed of around 100kts and a claimed maximum speed of 162kts. Maximum altitude is likely around 25,000ft. Endurance is claimed at 39 hours with a petrol engine, and 60 hours with a heavy fuel engine.

OSINT - INDO-PACIFIC UAS

IAI HERON TP-XP The Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) Heron TP-XP is an export version of the Heron Turboprop (TP). To avoid MTCR restrictions IAI reduced the payload capacity of the Heron TP from 1,000kg to 450kg, putting it into MTCR Category II. To date, India is the only export customer of the TP-XP, although Germany and South Korea both operate the smaller Category I Heron UAV. The Israeli Air Force has reportedly operated the Heron TP since 2010, and Germany has it on order. The TP-XP version of the Heron has a claimed 30+ hours endurance (compared to 36 hours for the baseline Heron TP), and IAI appears to have reduced payload capacity by increasing range and endurance. The 2017 RAND study notes that both Heron TP and TP-XP aircraft have identical specifications outside payload weight and space, so the reduction in payload capacity could be reversible. Weapons fit on the Heron TP-XP is unknown, although the airframe has underwing hardpoints. Sensor fit is mission dependent, and IAI offers the usual EO/IR camera, as well as SAR, maritime patrol radar (possibly inverse synthetic aperture radar), and electronic warfare payloads including electronic support (ES), ELINT, and COMINT collection. The Heron TP-XP likely uses the same Pratt & Whitney Canada (P&WC) turboprop engine with four blade prop as the Heron TP. The P&WC PT6A-67 generates 895kW. Range is claimed at 540nm with BLOS operation, and IAI claims a maximum speed of 220kts and an operating altitude of 45,000ft.

ELBIT HERMES 900 Elbit’s Hermes 900 has been exported to Azerbaijan, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Philippines, and Switzerland, and was leased to Thales to support United Nations peacekeeping operations in Mali between 2016-19. Unconfirmed reports indicate Kazakhstan signed a license production deal with Elbit Systems in 2016, while the Hermes 900 has been in Israeli Air Force service since at least 2010. According to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), all known exports of the Hermes 900 (and other Israeli UAS) were supplied unarmed. The Hermes 900 has an internal payload bay and underwing hardpoints which could allow for four Spike anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM). Sensor fit includes long-range EO/IR cameras, SAR radar with ground moving target indication (GMTI), SIGINT and electronic warfare payloads. Elbit also offers a dedicated maritime patrol version with a maritime surveillance radar and automatic identification system (AIS) fit. The Hermes 900 uses a Rotax 914F turbocharged flat four engine, generating 78.3kW. Endurance is claimed as 36 hours with a payload of 350kg, placing it in the MTCR Category II, and range is advertised as 1,350nm with an operating altitude of 30,000ft.

Elbit also offers a StarLiner HFE engine variant of the Hermes 900, which increases the payload to 450kg. The StarLiner is also NATO STANAG 4671 compliant, meaning it can be certified to operate in other NATO member countries’ civilian airspace.

India is currently the only buyer of the export version of the IAI Heron, the TP-XP, with Germany taking the TP variant. Meanwhile Germany and South Korea both operate the Category 1 Heron UAV. IAI

COMMENT On paper, there don’t appear to be any direct competitors for the GA-ASI MQ-9B SkyGuardian the RAAF plans to acquire under Project AIR 7003. The MQ-9B has a combined internal payload of 360kg and external payload of 2,155kg, and while range is dependent on payload it can be up to 6,000nm with a 40-hour endurance and 40,000ft operating altitude. While a UAS is significantly cheaper to operate than a manned aircraft, the cost of owning a system compared with the basic air vehicle is difficult to estimate. A UAS is only as effective as its ground segment in both controlling the air vehicle and collecting, analysing, and disseminating the information to ‘customers’ from the mission payload. Indeed, the ground-based component of a UAS – and by implication the training and support provided by a vendor – is arguably more important than airframe performance.

Azerbaijan, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Philippines, and Switzerland are among customers for the Israeli Elbit Systems Hermes 900 which has been in service with the Israeli military since 2010. ELBIT SYSTEMS

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ON TARGET - SIR RICHARD WILLIAMS FOUNDATION

On Target

Go hard, or go home! By Brian Weston

ne of the themes of recent On Target columns has been how recent force structure decisions have shaped the evolution of the RAAF into a potent middle-weight air force, well-suited to operations in the Indo-Pacific region. But there is a substantial difference between having a capable force-in-being, and being able to sustain a creditable tempo of operations for lengthy periods. This is not a new a new issue. Indeed, in 1944 in the SouthWest Pacific Area theatre, RAAF operational units were confronted with such an issue which, expressed bluntly, was to either go hard, or go home. At the time, the Commander-in-Chief of the South-West Pacific Area, Gen Douglas MacArthur was pursuing a strategy of by-passing substantial Japanese-occupied territory to expedite his rapid advance towards and through the Philippines. The strategy largely rendered the by-passed Japanese forces ineffective, expedited the advance, and also avoided incurring the large numbers of casualties that would have resulted had Allied forces been tasked with clearing every concentration of Japanese forces. But MacArthur’s strategy depended heavily on the effective employment of air power by the air forces commanded by Lieutenant General George Kenney (USAAF). At the forefront of MacArthur’s advance was No 10 Group, the RAAF tactical strike group which evolved into the RAAF First Tactical Air Force. No 78WG – comprising 75, 78 and 80 SQNs equipped with the P-40N Kittyhawk (picture below) – was the largest unit within No 10 Group which was commanded by AIRCDRE (later AVM) Frederick Scherger. With the pace of the allied advancement largely tied to the operational capacity and tempo of the allied air forces, and with limited availability of airfields, Kenney did not wish to allocate any airfield space to units that could not sustain a high operational tempo. That policy soon had the RAAF’s obsolete Vultee Vengeance units returning to Australia. With the assault on the Admiralty Islands pending, Scherger was called to a meeting with Major General Ennis Whitehead, Commander of Kenney’s Allied Air Forces, Advanced Echelon Headquarters, in Port Moresby. Whitehead bluntly informed Scherger that 78WG was to be broken up, with its three squadrons dispersed to

Dobodura, Finschhafen, and Nadzab – a decision which would have effectively transferred the Kittyhawk squadrons to the rear. Scherger strongly objected and, after some hours of argument, Whitehead reluctantly agreed 78WG could remain on the front line, but only if its squadrons could generate 1,000 flying hours per month ‒ the flying rate of an equivalent USAAF squadron. RAAF operational squadrons were organised in accordance with RAF doctrine, and that organisational construct allowed a RAAF Kittyhawk squadron to generate 600 flying hours per month. Scherger, noting the differences between RAF and USAAF operational organisation and doctrine, set about radical change following a visit in March 1944 by Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, AIRCDRE John McCauley. The most obvious change was an increase in the establishments of the Kittyhawk squadrons to 24 aircraft and 30 pilots, but many other changes were also implemented. Scherger also noted the disruptive impact of the RAAF practice of rotating pilots continually through the squadrons, a consequence of the RAAF setting the length on an aircrew operational tour at nine months. In contrast, the USAAF set the length of their aircrew operational tours at 18 months, interspersed with two three-week breaks for rest and recuperation. Scherger thought the American system was “infinitely superior with spirit, morale, and operational efficiency increasing all the time. (In contrast) our efficiency graph was like the serrated edge of a saw … with none of the peaks very high”. On this, it is useful to note that George Odgers, the RAAF Historian, noted, “there was by no means unanimity in the RAAF on the question of tours of duty”. But it is unclear whether this was debate between a highly-experienced and respected operational commander and staff officers residing well away from the operational front. There can be no doubt Scherger’s initiative achieved the desired change as, in June 1944, 75, 78 and 80SQNs flew 1,318, 1,405, and 1,614 hours respectively. But while it is appropriate to reflect on 78WG’s remarkable achievement ‒ the point of this column is to ask how will the 21st century RAAF generate the significant and sustained increases in operational effort that will be required should a nearer-term contingency arise in the Indo-Pacific?

Brian Weston is a Board Member of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation. He served tours in Defence’s Force Analysis Division and the HQADF Force Development Planning Branch.

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ADBR JUL-AUG 2020

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