Tian Shan Policy Center
CENTRAL ASIA POLICY REVIEW
Volume 1 Issue 2 June 2015 1
CENTRAL ASIA POLICY REVIEW
EDITOR Franco Galdini
EDITORIAL COMMITTEE Ainura Asimidinova, Seth Fearey, Daniele Rumolo, Kanat Sultanaliev
CONTRIBUTORS Aibek Davletov, Fred Huston, Arslan Sabyrbekov, Lucio Valerio Sarandrea, Karlygach Nurmanbetova, Andrew Wachtel, Rodger Dillon, Kanat Sultanaliev, Daniele Rumolo, Seth Fearey
MISSION The Central Asia Policy Review is an English-language on-line publication of the Tian Shan Policy Center of the American University of Central Asia dedicated to promoting dialogue and raising awareness on relevant issues in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia on human rights, good governance, sustainable development, migration and social protection. Contributions to the Central Asia Policy Review are encouraged from local, regional and international experts, professors, students, as well as alumni of the American University of Central Asia and other Universities of or with a focus on Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia. Representatives of local institutions, civil society organisations, regional and international organisations are also encouraged to contribute. The Central Asia Policy Review aims at addressing issues of public interest with the aim of furthering support for the democratic development of Kyrgyzstan and neighbouring countries, as well as for enhanced compliance with human rights obligations and principles in an inclusive manner.
SUBMISSION GUIDELINES Contributors shall submit articles to the following email address: capr@auca.kg. An article’s ideal length will be between 1,000 and 2,500 words, including a 100 word abstract. The articles should include a brief introduction to the subject at hand, an analytical section, and policy recommendations to foster dialogue and discussion. The Editor and the Editorial Committee reserve the right to decide whether to publish or edit the article in accordance with the internal publication guidelines of the Tian Shan Policy Center. By submitting the article, the author agrees to its publication and to relinquish his/her copyrights to the Tian Shan Policy Center. Unless otherwise stated in written form by the Editorial Committee, no honorarium will be paid for the contributions.
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CONTENT OF THE ISSUE Page #4 Democracy and rule of law at the center of Issue 2 By the Editorial Committee Page #5 The index of judicial independence: a practical tool to measure and compare the independence of judiciaries By Aibek Davletov and Fred Huston Page #10 Is Kyrgyzstan’s democracy at risk in the Eurasian Economic Union? By Arslan Sabyrbekov Page #12 Crime prevention in the Kyrgyz Republic By Lucio Valerio Sarandrea Page #14 Analytical digest on monitoring and evaluation of the Jogorku Kenesh By Karlygach Nurmanbetova
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DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF LAW AT THE CENTER OF ISSUE 2 By The Editorial Committee
Dear Reader, thank you for choosing the Central Asia Policy Review (the Review), a publication of the Tian Shan Policy Center (TSPC) of the American University of Central Asia (AUCA). Since its inception, the Review has been intended as a Kyrgyzstan-based forum for students, teachers, practitioners, activists, civil society organizations, journalists, experts and anyone with a keen interest in Central Asia to express their views, highlight pressing issues and, if applicable, provide tailored recommendations to influence policies and change legislation on the issues at the heart of the TSPC, namely human rights, good governance, sustainable development, migration, and social protection. Issue number 2 of the Review addresses the topic of rule of law from several angles. Aibek Davletov and Fred Huston introduce the Index of Judicial Independence (IJI), an innovative tool to measure and compare the independence of judiciaries around the world. This is an important contribution to the ongoing debate on this subject in Kyrgyzstan. Arslan Sabyrbekov explores the possible risks to Kyrgyzstan's democracy due to the country's imminent entry into the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), while Lucio Valerio Sarandrea broaches crime prevention in Kyrgyzstan, focusing on the thorny issues of corruption and 'bride kidnapping.' Finally, Karlygach Nurmanbetova touches on gaps and opportunities to improve the monitoring and evaluation of the Jogorku Kenesh (Kyrgyzstan's Parliament) in a digest that shows geographic breadth and analytic depth. The Editorial Committee awaits your submissions to the Review for the third issue by 1st September 2015. The Editorial Committee remains available for further discussions and clarifications at the email address capr@auca.kg or at American University of Central Asia.Â
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THE INDEX OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: A PRACTICAL TOOL TO MEASURE AND COMPARE THE INDEPENDENCE OF JUDICIARIES By Aibek Davletov and Fred Huston
The Index of Judicial Independence or IJI is a practical tool offered for use by its authors, Aibek Davletov and Fred Huston. © All rights reserved. Mr. Davletov is a former justice of the Supreme Court of the Kyrgyz Republic. Mr. Huston is a non-practicing attorney licensed by the State of Colorado. Either may be contacted through the International Development Law Organization (www.idlo.int) or directly by e-mail at Aibek-davletov@yandex.ru or fredhuston@gmail.com
Introducing the IJI A major challenge for any country is to create a political, economic and social environment that allows its people to feel comfortable, free and safe. Ideally, this environment is created for everyone to enjoy equally, regardless of race, sex, political affiliation, health, financial condition and other possible criteria.
judiciaries that do successfully nurture healthier, more stable political, economic and social environments. For instance, de facto judicial independence positively influences GDP growth. Time/value demands within modern societies require reliable information presented succinctly, to assist in policy and other decision making. A widely recognized Index of Judicial Independence, or IJI, expressed as a simple numerical ranking, will help focus attention on where a country stands with regard to its efforts to create an independent judiciary, while information generated creating an IJI will provide guidance about how to improve independence.
Efforts to create such an environment in any country are possible where there are both democratic rule and an achieved level of rule of law that provide for full and timely protection of each person’s rights and legitimate interests. This environment is achievable where a country’s judicial system and its individual judges are responsible and responsive to peoples’ fundamental needs to have their legal disputes considered and resolved fairly by unbiased, independent decision makers.
Others have carefully considered indexing judicial independence and producing overall numerical ratings, but refrained from doing so because of a myriad of perceived complexities. At this time, however, in light of the broad application and usefulness of other numerical indices that are based upon surveys of stakeholders, such as the Global Competitiveness Index, developing a numerical IJI makes sense, as numerical r a n k i n g o f a c o u n t r y ’s j u d i c i a l independence is a missing and essential tool for stakeholders and policy makers.
Independence of judiciaries is an a priori and fundamental need. Where relatively more independent courts and judges are able to engender respect for laws and their substance, more progressive development happens, i.e. stable political and economic growth is supported and multifaceted social needs are better met. Pure judicial independence, of course, is only theoretical. Many countries, however, have pursued this theoretical goal of pure judicial independence and made notable strides towards the creation of relatively independent
Producing IJIs will allow broad numbers of people who aren’t judicial or legal experts to understand information and opinions collected from the experience of 5
a country’s own people with the judicial system. This will allow the public to easily see where a country stands concerning independence of its judiciary, while helping any concerned party to focus on the types of activities more likely to increase it.
words, the IJI uses criteria adopted and generally applicable in the majority of countries in the world, thus providing an objective picture about the relative independence of a country’s judiciary in a simple, overall numerical ranking. What exactly is the IJI?
How can relative independence be measured and ranked?
The IJI is based upon 30 surveyed criteria that allow a comprehensive and detailed picture of a country’s judicial system. The purposive survey includes blocks of questions related to
Approaches and practices of countries trying to create independent judiciaries are not merely general examples, but their steps and results can be measured and ranked to provide an objective IJI. Indexing the relative independence of judiciaries is possible using the Index of Judicial Independence (IJI) tool presented at the end of this article. Generally, an IJI is to be generated for any country based upon the results of a “purposive” survey with a minimum of 100 people, including a cross section of experts and ordinary citizens actively participating in, using or otherwise familiar with a particular country’s courts (i.e. those people seeking or responsible to protect a full range of social, political and/or economic rights or legal interests).
1. the mechanism for selection and appointment or election of judges; 2. the legal status of judges; 3. the accountability of judges; 4. the dismissal of judges; 5. social benefits, protection and security for judges; 6. professional development for judges and court personnel; 7. judicial self-governing organs; 8. judicial system financing; 9. the powers of a judiciary relative to the powers of the executive and legislative powers.
Of the minimum 100 people sample to be surveyed, 10 will be court personnel, 10 active trial attorneys/criminal defense lawyers, 10 in house counsel, 10 media representatives, 10 private individuals/ representatives of households, 10 representatives of non-governmental entities, 10 owners or managers of larger businesses (with more than 100 employees), 10 owners or managers of small and medium businesses (less than 100 employees), 10 government officials (excluding law enforcement agencies), 10 representatives of law enforcement agencies (prosecutors, police, representatives of penal institutions) and/or representatives of inmates.
By sampling such a variety of stakeholders, the IJI will eschew bias towards the interests of those involved in business or economic disputes only. The IJI instead surveys the opinions of those involved in all common disputes, i n c l u d i n g c r i m i n a l , f a m i l y l a w, inheritance, and electoral cases, which outnumber by several orders of magnitude economic disputes. The IJI survey questions and derived ranking is based on well-known principles of judicial independence enshrined in numerous international declarations and charters, such as the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. In other 6
Index of Judicial Independence (IJI) The following IJI is a table of questions, short answers and accrued points (subject to revision based upon future use). A country receiving a higher score is ranked higher. Criteria The independent status of the judiciary is recognized by law
3 Points In the Constitution
2 Points In adopted laws other than the Constitution
1 Point By regulation or other normative document
A governmental body exists that is responsible for screening and nominating judges Members of the governmental body responsible for screening and nominating judges are from the judiciary itself The governmental body responsible for screening and nominating judges makes decisions independently from executive, legislative and/or presidential branches of power A governmental body exists that is responsible for appointing judges
Exists
Exists but is not functional or only partially functions
Does not exist
51-100%
25-50%
0-24%
Independently
Somewhat independently
Dependently
Exists and functions
Exists but is not functional or only minimally functions
Does not exist
The governmental body that appoints judges is made up of representatives of the judiciary The governmental body that appoints judges makes its decisions independently from executive, legislative and presidential branches of power A governmental body exists responsible for dismissing judges The governmental body responsible to dismiss judges is made up of representatives of the judiciary The governmental body responsible for dismissing judges makes its decisions independently from executive, legislative and presidential branches of power A judicial community entity (union, association, council of judges, other) exists that is responsible to represent/ defend the interests of judges
51-100%
25-50%
0-24%
Independently
Somewhat independently
Dependently
Exists and functions
Exists but does not function or only minimally functions 25-50%
Does not exist
Independently
Somewhat independently
Dependently
Exists and functions
Exists but is not functional or only minimally functions
Does not exist
The judicial community entity exercises its authority to represent/defend interests of judges
Yes
Sometimes
No
51-100%
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0-24%
Criteria The government adequately finances the judiciary
3 Points Provides 71-100% of its needs
2 Points Provides 31-70% of its needs
1 Point Provides 0-30% of its needs
The government provides adequate wages to judges
Wages fully cover the needs of a judge and the judge’s family
Wages partially cover the needs of a judge and the judge’s family
Wages are clearly insufficient to meet the needs of the judge and the judge’s family
The government provides adequate social guarantees and pensions to judges
Yes
Partially
No
Judges are appointed for life or to a definite age limit
Yes
No, but judges are appointed for more than 10 years
No, judges are appointed from 1year up to 10 years
A judge can be transferred to a different judgeship in a different court without the judge’s agreement
No
Yes, but only in special circumstances established in an adopted law
Yes
A judge can be dismissed in accordance with provisions of law Judges have immunity
Established in the Constitution
In a law(s)
In regulations or other normative acts
In all circumstances
They do not have immunity
Judges are disciplined
Only by judicial bodies
Judges have discretion where rights or laws are missing Courts have the right to determine that actions of other branches are unlawful and exercise this right Remands from higher courts to lower courts
Yes
Only with regard to actions related to court proceedings By judicial bodies and by other governmental bodies Sometimes, where a law allows Limited as specified by law
Do not predetermine the use of certain laws nor the case outcome No requirement other than as set forth in the judge’s written decision
Predetermine the use of certain laws but not the case outcome Limited explanation(s) required as set forth in a relevant law
Predetermine the use of certain laws and the case outcome Must explain decision when requested to do so by government official
No opportunities exist
Opportunities may exist but are not clear
Clear opportunities exist
No opportunities exist
Opportunities may exist but are not clear
Clear opportunities exist
Real consequences against governmental officials for interference in judicial processes are provided by law and are used Most or all judicial decisions are published
Consequences exist but they are not real or enforced
No real consequences against government officials interfering in judicial processes have been provided
Judicial decisions are published in a limited fashion
Judicial decisions are not published
Accountability of judges to other government officials to explain why a decision was entered
Opportunities for government officials to influence decision making processes Opportunities for private persons and entities to influence decision making processes The existence of real penalties against government officials for interference in judicial processes
Publication of Judicial decisions
Yes
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By other (non-judicial) governmental bodies No No
Criteria Recording of court proceedings
3 Points All court proceedings are recorded verbatim
2 Points Court proceeding are recorded at the discretion of the judge
1 Point Court proceedings are not recorded verbatim
Improved qualifications of judges
Mandatory and Systematic
Mandatory but not systematic (addressed through special trainings, seminars)
Neither mandatory, nor systematic (addressed by special trainings, seminars)
The Index of Judicial Independence is calculated by the total points divided by a maximum score of 90 and may be reflected as a percentage.
Mr. Davletov is a former Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Kyrgyz Republic. Since then, he worked on judicial reform efforts as a Judicial Reform Advisor in programs sponsored by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, USAID and the International Development Law Organization. Mr. Huston is an American attorney licensed by the State of Colorado who, since 1995, has either helped coordinate or led various donor sponsored economic and/or legal reform programs in the Kyrgyz Republic. Since 2011, he has been the Country Director of the USAID-IDLO Kyrgyzstan Judicial Strengthening Program, a judicial reform program initiated in 2011.
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IS KYRGYZSTAN’S DEMOCRACY AT RISK IN THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION? By Arslan Sabyrbekov
Introduction
a harbinger of a future slide towards authoritarianism in Kyrgyzstan.
On May 21, after two years of negotiations, Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev signed an accession treaty into law, paving the way for Kyrgyzstan’s joining the Kremlin-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). The Central Asian Republic, once described as an “island of democracy” will become the fifth member of the EEU, joining relatively authoritarian regimes that afford little room to political competition, public deliberation and press freedom. This raises the crucial question, as to whether Bishkek will be in a position to maintain its democratic trajectory or whether its membership comes at the expense of its relatively successful democratic transition.
Two laws and some amendments to the Constitution Recent socio-political developments in Kyrgyzstan seem to indicate that Central Asia’s only democracy – imperfect at it may be – is under threat. Last February, in its second reading, the Kyrgyz Parliament passed a law discriminating against people of non-traditional sexual orientation. The law contradicts the fundamental values of democracy and violates the country’s national legislation as well as international commitments, which prohibit any form of discrimination. Lawmakers are currently discussing a bill requiring non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to register as ‘foreign agents,’ if they receive any foreign funding. The bill – which recently passed the first reading in Parliament – risks curtailing the activities of the country’s vibrant civil society. It is hardly a coincidence that in 2012 the Russian Parliament passed similar laws, so many suspect that the Kremlin is behind these developments in Kyrgyzstan.
Current developments Over the past four years, the Kyrgyz authorities, expert circles and the public have been engaged in constant dialogue over the pros and cons of joining the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), especially in economic terms. In order to gain the support of the public, government officials have often cited the free flow of goods and simplified employment requirements for thousands of migrant workers as one of the major benefits of the integration process. However, no concrete statistical data have been provided and, oftentimes, expectations have been presented as facts.
Proposed amendments to Kyrgyzstan’s constitution, despite a special clause prohibiting changes until 2020, come in the framework of the country’s EEU accession. Concerning the revision of article 73 of the Constitution, local experts maintain that it would severely weaken the independence of Members of Parliament (MPs), as parliamentary factions could vote for the early dismissal of MPs, if so proposed by the governing body of their respective political party, thus establishing a form of party dictatorship. The proponents of the amendment argue that citizens vote for a party rather than individual candidates. However, given political parties’ low level of institutional development in
As the current sanctions over the Ukrainian crisis hit the Russian economy hard, Bishkek should start revising its optimistic expectations concerning the EEU’s economic benefits. Moreover, the political side of joining the EEU has received little attention, despite the fact that Bishkek has now entered into a Union with authoritarian states such as Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, perhaps 10
Kyrgyzstan, voters often look first at individuals in the party list and only later at the party itself.
In Kyrgyzstan, these alarming initiatives were at least accompanied by open discussion and criticism, which is all but absent in the other EEU member countries. Such freedom is likely to decrease, however, given Bishkek’s new international orientation, which as developments show, tends to come at the expense of the country’s democratic achievements.
Moreover, the proposed changes – these experts argue – strengthen the role of the Prime Minister, who would be in a position to dismiss members of the government, as well as directly appoint and dismiss the heads of regional administrations. This would weaken the role and independence of local selfgovernments. Speculations in local media are rife about the fact that this initiative serves the interests of the current President, Almazbek Atambayev, who after his mandate expires in 2017 may seek a new term in office as Prime Minister with extensive powers and no term limits. Once again, this appears to be a carbon-copy of the scenario played out in Russia. Revising the constitution will hardly improve pluralism in Kyrgyzstan’s political life, as the foreseen measures would instead strengthen the ‘power vertical,’ by concentrating more prerogatives to fewer people at the top, while gradually diminishing the room for political competition. In more than two decades of independence, the country’s political elites have grown accustomed to blaming the constitution for their own inability to launch public reforms. The real problem doesn’t lie with the constitution, however, but with the power holders’ unwillingness to abide by it and their constant scramble to redraw it for their own benefit.
Arslan Sabyrbekov, Communications and Civil society expert at the UNDP Project “Enhancing democratic rule of law to promote peace and stability in the Kyrgyz Republic.” The views expressed here are the author’s own.
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CRIME PREVENTION IN THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC By Lucio Valerio Sarandrea Judicial reform in Kyrgyzstan
that prevention only works for the small fish and nourishes the big ones.
The Kyrgyz Republic is undertaking a laudable effort to improve its justice system by reforming the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, the Law on Free Legal Aid and other relevant legislation pertaining to the judicial system. However, much remains to be done particularly on the preventive side, which according to Paragraph 3 of the Economic and Social Council Guidelines for Prevention of Crime encompasses ‘strategies and measures that seek to reduce the risk of crimes occurring, and their potential harmful effects on individuals and society, including fear of crime, by intervening to influence their multiple causes.’
While a comprehensive study of the general and specific factors influencing crime and violence in Kyrgyzstan is beyond the scope of this analysis, I intend to focus my attention on two specific issues which are often associated with the country. Women’s rights and bride-kidnapping The first one is the so-called phenomenon of ‘bride-kidnapping,’ which is essentially the ritual of ambushing a young woman and detaining her until she agrees to marry her kidnapper. In the best-case scenario, she is subject to enormous psychological pressure from the kidnapper’s female relatives to consent to the marriage; in many cases, she is raped into acceptance. Reports reveal that up to 32 women are kidnapped for marriage every day with criminal investigations conducted in just 1 every 700 cases.
Since taking up the position of Chief Technical Adviser on Rule of Law for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Kyrgyzstan, one priority has been to identify what the people’s understanding of justice is in the country. To do that, I engaged in dialogue with different sectors of society including children, university students, civil society activists, journalists, lawyers and even pensioners. Often, I asked interlocutors to give their visual representation of justice.
Preventing ‘bride-kidnapping’ requires primarily a social development approach that breaks a system of abuse which is considered as traditional and thus justified or tolerated by a large part of the population. Even in the definition, the term ‘bride’ appears to infer notion of the acceptance of the marriage by the kidnapped girl. Prevention activities within the UNDP Rule of Law projects started from the necessity of naming the act differently in order to underline its violent nature and how damaging it is for society.
U n s u r p r i s i n g l y, t h e o v e r w h e l m i n g majority answered with the main features of a truly inadequate and, in my view, outdated symbol of Lady Justice, the blindfolded lady holding a scale in one hand and a sword in the other. Punishment, imprisonment, handcuffs, police officers made the top of the list with equity, objectivity and impartiality at the bottom. I then asked people whether they preferred that crimes be severely punished or that they not happen at all. Respondents chose the latter option, but then voiced the pessimistic view that it is impossible to prevent crimes. Somebody even quipped
The topic has been discussed with University students with the added request that they collect stories related to this phenomenon for distribution to vulnerable groups. Each story of human tragedy will carry a powerful message which, it is hoped, will lead to what is 12
commonly called community-based and situational crime prevention. Stories, however, will be related from both the victims’ and the perpetrators’ perspective, in order to deepen our understanding of the topic as well as to facilitate the reintegration of individuals already involved in the criminal justice system. This should be viewed as a first step towards a more robust state response, as highlighted by multiple recommendations on the subject issued in the 2015 Universal Periodic Review of Kyrgyzstan’s Human Rights Records before the Human Rights Council.
were started with the question: what would you do with this money? Moreover, a Facebook page was created for people to share their views, with the best input – judged by the number of likes – being awarded 120 USD. The main message of the campaign was to counter the widely held belief that corruption is an unchangeable cultural tradition benefitting both parties, those receiving a bribe and those avoiding further trouble by dint of paying it. No corruption prevention campaign can succeed if corruption becomes culturally acceptable and is actually presented as an example of being ‘socially smart.’ The campaign grabbed the attention of the national media and it was estimated that about one third of Kyrgyzstanis heard about it, directly or indirectly.
Fight against corruption The second issue is corruption. According to Transparency International’s 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index – which measures the perceived level of public sector corruption – Kyrgyzstan scores 136 out of 175 countries and territories. The entry point to win the interest of a large portion of the population has been a 2014 study by the local Ministry of Economy according to which corruption costs the country the staggering amount of 700 million USD a year, or 120 USD per citizen. For the sake of comparison the monthly salary of a teacher is around 100 USD while the average pension only reaches 70 USD.
These are but two examples of the most recent crime prevention policies. Work remains to be done on the root causes of the problems, as the most sustainable approach to combat crime needs to be forward looking and proactive, rather than based on coercion and repression (Lady Justice’s sword, as most people visualized it). The Rule of Law can be entrenched in Kyrgyzstan through prevention, as well as through seeing justice as a means to help society, rather than a threat to it.
A campaign on this topic was held in December 2014, on the occasion of AntiC o r r u p t i o n d a y. B u s i n e s s m e n , entrepreneurs and UN staff spoke to more than 3,000 students in schools and universities across the country. A mock 120 USD bill was printed and distributed to the population, and presentations
Lucio Valerio Sarandrea is the Chief Technical Adviser on Rule of Law for the United Nations Development Program in Kyrgyzstan. Mr. Sarandrea previously worked as Legal Adviser on Rule of Law for the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
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ANALYTICAL DIGEST ON MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF THE JOGORKU KENESH By Karlygach Nurmanbetova
The systematic monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the work of the Jogorku Kenesh, the Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic (henceforth, Kyrgyzstan) on the basis of clear criteria such as rating scales and specific indicators is necessary to increase the effectiveness of its work, identify gaps, and develop measures aimed at addressing them.
document falls short of adopting a comprehensive approach. In its articles 1 and 24, the Rules of Procedure empower the Coordinating Council of the Parliament to take decisions on the effectiveness of the organization of the work of the Parliament, evaluate the linguistic appropriateness of draft laws, and their compliance with already existing norms. Moreover, the Coordinating Council is mandated to consider the results of the monitoring of and control over the implementation of the yearly work plan and the plan for legislative activities.
Currently, the most effective M&E system in Kyrgyzstan is carried out by Public Advisory Boards which assess government performance via the work of Ministries rather than the Parliament. The best example of M&E of the legislative branch can instead be found in the work of the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society, a non-governmental organization (NGO) that issues monthly reviews of the Parliament’s work. This is the only organization monitoring more or less systemically the JK, and only covering the legislative function so far.
Regrettably, these are the only two instances in which the Rules of Procedure make reference to M&E. Of additional concern is that these mechanisms do not focus on the appropriateness and effectiveness of the overall Parliamentary activities but rather on its legislative activity with regard to text-matching of the draft legislation with existing laws. Therefore, the current M&E mechanisms neglect to assess the substantive work of the Parliament.
No significant mechanisms are in place to assess the quality of the Parliament’s work. This makes it impossible to measure the performance of the 120 Members of Parliament (MPs), as well as to design and adopt remedial actions to address concerns. Hence, there is a pressing need to establish and implement effective M&E mechanisms for Parliament in order to promote transparency, accountability, and – it is hoped, as a result – the country’s development.
The Development Strategy of the Kyrgyz Parliament recognizes that no adequate M&E mechanisms are in place and stresses the need to strengthen accountability of the Government, the National Bank, the General Prosecutor’s Office, and the Court of Auditors. The document further mentions the necessity to monitor the compliance of the authorities with international obligations, the adoption and implementation of programs, policy papers and strategies, including in relation to pre-election platforms, the publication of information on the Parliament’s website, the provision of mandatory M&E of the implementation of sectorial programs, of the effects of new
M&E in the Parliament’s main strategic documents To achieve these goals, it is necessary to first address the regulatory and policy frameworks. The Rules of Procedure of the Parliament and the Development Strategy of the Kyrgyz Parliament provide some basis for M&E. However, these terms are sporadically mentioned and the 14
laws six months after their adoption, and of agreements and resolutions endorsed by inter-parliamentary organizations. Despite addressing these important points, however, the document stops short of recommending the adoption of a comprehensive approach vis-à-vis Parliament as an institution.
informative overviews to strengthen transparency and good governance. At a press conference on 14 April 2015, the Coalition presented a report outlining their four years of monitoring in Parliament, whose main aim was to compare MPs’ campaign promises with their work during the legislature, as well as monitoring the Parliament’s web-site. The majority of this analysis, however, remains mostly quantitative with limited attention to the qualitative aspect of Parliament’s work.
Civil Society and M&E Civil society actors offer some positive examples of M&E of Parliament’s work. These include the web-portal politmer.kg, a report on Parliament’s transparency published by the NGO Bir Duino, and the above-mentioned monthly reports by the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society. Politmer.kg was created in September 2011 and is a one-of-a-kind portal in Kyrgyzstan which evaluates the performance of MPs and other officials by comparing the number of promises they make to the public with the follow up actions to actually keep them. Although it provides some degree of accountability, the evaluation is purely quantitative. It does not analyze the qualitative impact of the actions in improving the general conditions in Kyrgyzstan. Additionally, the portal needs promotion to become known among the public at large in order to increase its effectiveness and ability to encourage positive changes.
The efforts of civil society actors and coalitions are commendable and extremely important to further promote democratic principles in Kyrgyzstan. Such efforts would require further technical and financial support, including the development of concrete indicators and criteria to monitor and evaluate both quantitative and qualitative aspects of the work of Parliament. M&E best practice abroad The process of developing adequate M&E criteria can be also enhanced through information sharing of best practices from other countries. Positive examples show that M&E activities can be carried out both within Parliament by specifically mandated departments or externally by NGOs, M&E experts, or non-parliamentary agencies.
In 2012, Bir Duino published a report entitled “Jogorku Kenesh: issues of efficiency and transparency,” which broached the level of transparency in the Parliament and included several M&E aspects. However, the focus of the report is on financial accountability and fails to take into consideration the activities of Parliament as a whole. Moreover, this was a one-time exercise that could not ensure consistent and continuous monitoring of the activities of Parliament.
For instance, until 2009 the Parliament of India was relying on an external expertassessment-based M&E system. Then, a specific mechanism within the Parliament was created to increase the level of follow up on recommendations. Parallel to this and due to the increasing demand for accountability on public expenditures, the Government of India established the Independent Evaluation Office with the scope of pressuring line Ministries to proactively address the findings and concerns stemming from the evaluations.
In an attempt to fill this gap, the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society publishes monthly reviews of parliamentary activities, which provide 15
In the EU Parliament, the European Commission and the Impact Assessment Council are in charge of M&E; the Parliament of Great Britain has the Commission of Parliament Scrutiny; in the Parliament of Canada, there is the Joint Committee on Scrutiny of Regulations; the M&E of the Polish Parliament is run by its Bureau of Research, and the Pakistani Pa r l i a m e n t h a s i t s M & E d o n e i n cooperation with the NGO Pildat.
The NDI questionnaire is designed to monitor and evaluate the standards of work in Parliament, namely internal organization, legislative functions, and parliamentary values. The table is complemented by 25 questions covering both the formal requirements of the parliamentary procedures and the actual implementation of the activities. The grading system varies between “absolutely agree” and “absolutely disagree.” Options for “I do not know” and “not applicable” are also foreseen.
The example of Uganda is of particular interest for its efficacy. The African Institute of Leadership, which is mandated to carry out M&E of the Parliament, uses a scorecard system for M&E. These cards help to measure the performance of each parliamentarian. The scorecards contain personal information for the identification of the MP, the evaluation of their participation in plenary and committee meetings, the amount of time spent on key issues, and financial reports. This information makes possible to grade the parliamentarian’s performance on a scale from A to D. Such experience proved quite successful.
The NDI questionnaire has been used in some countries in Latin America and the Balkans. The IPU’s toolkit has been used by parliament in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, as well as the Cambodian Senate and a Pakistani think tank. According to the UNDP report on Benchmarks and SelfAssessment Frameworks for Democratic Legislatures (2010), this kind of toolkits helped to reveal certain deficiencies and gaps that were present in the work of the given Parliaments. “Parliaments should not be discouraged if they do not meet a specific benchmark,” the report continues, “rather they should take the opportunity to debate the principle behind the benchmark, the relevance of the benchmark to their specific context, and whether they would benefit from changes that would allow them to meet the benchmark in question.”
The Inter-Parliamentary Union and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) have developed a similar M&E toolkit and questionnaire in 2008 and 2006, respectively, to assess parliaments in general and for voluntary use. Such proposals are intended to help representatives of the institutions and civil society in the information gathering process. They could be used to create our o w n f r a m e w o r k f o r K y r g y z s t a n ’s Parliament.
Conclusions and recommendations Parliament and civil society organizations in Kyrgyzstan have a long way to go in terms of building an efficient system of M&E aimed at fostering transparency and accountability.
The Inter-Parliamentary Union put forward a set of criteria to cover several aspects of Parliament's activities, including transparency and accessibility, accountability, as well as representative, control, and legislative functions. For each topic respondents are expected to grade the activities implemented on a scale from 1 to 5 based on the level of satisfaction.
In order to achieve that, it is critical to amend parliamentary policies and regulations to introduce into the system appropriate measures to enable the implementation of comprehensive quantitative and qualitative assessments on the activities carried out by the Pa r l i a m e n t . A s p e c i f i c i n t e r n a l 16
department should be created to take full responsibility for the process of M&E.
the Parliament, would also facilitate the analysis of the gaps, issues of concerns, and the consequent policy directions that need to be taken to produce positive change. Moreover, it would provide clear tools for civil society to measure the effectiveness of Parliament and propose alternative courses of action to improve the general situation in Kyrgyzstan.
Alternatively, the Parliament could receive external technical assistance from the civil society sector to support the implementation of the assessments. The use of scorecards appears to be the most effective way forward due to its relative simplicity in the collection of information and analysis of the findings. Additionally, the scorecard results could be placed on the Parliament’s website to increase the ability of the public to access such information. For the same reason, the use of indicators proposed by the InterParliamentary Union could represent a feasible solution. The adoption of these tools, together with improving the quality of the work of
Karlygach Nurmanbetova is the Governance Program Assistant at the Tian Shan Policy Center of the American University of Central Asia.
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Tian Shan Policy Center
The Tian Shan Policy Center (TSPC) is an innovative nonprofit, public interest organization focused on research, analysis, and implementation of appropriate and effective public policy in the nations and communities of Central Asia. The TSPC specializes in the critical fields of strategic development policy, human rights, and sustainable environment programs, and through its efforts strives to strengthen good governance as the bedrock for efforts to better the lives of the peoples of our emerging countries.
Contact details: Tian Shan Policy Center American University of Central Asia 205 Abdymomunov St. Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic Tel: +996 312 66 40 89 tspc@auca.kg www.auca.kg/en/tspc
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