Tian Shan Policy Center
CENTRAL ASIA POLICY REVIEW
Volume 1 Issue 4 December 2015 1
CENTRAL ASIA POLICY REVIEW
EDITOR Franco Galdini
EDITORIAL COMMITTEE Daniele Rumolo, Nicholas J. Mazik, Kanat Sultanaliev
CONTRIBUTORS Lillian Langford, Raushan Kerimalieva, Hillary Margolis, Mirgul Karimova, Phillipp Lottholz
MISSION The Central Asia Policy Review is an English-language on-line publication of the Tian Shan Policy Center of the American University of Central Asia dedicated to promoting dialogue and raising awareness on relevant issues in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia on human rights, good governance, sustainable development, migration and social protection. Contributions to the Central Asia Policy Review are encouraged from local, regional and international experts, professors, students, as well as alumni of the American University of Central Asia and other Universities of or with a focus on Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia. Representatives of local institutions, civil society organisations, regional and international organisations are also encouraged to contribute. The Central Asia Policy Review aims at addressing issues of public interest with the aim of furthering support for the democratic development of Kyrgyzstan and neighbouring countries, as well as for enhanced compliance with human rights obligations and principles in an inclusive manner.
SUBMISSION GUIDELINES Contributors shall submit articles to the following email address: capr@auca.kg. An article’s ideal length will be between 1,000 and 2,500 words, including a 100 word abstract. The articles should include a brief introduction to the subject at hand, an analytical section, and policy recommendations to foster dialogue and discussion. The Editor and the Editorial Committee reserve the right to decide whether to publish or edit the article in accordance with the internal publication guidelines of the Tian Shan Policy Center. By submitting the article, the author agrees to its publication and to relinquish his/her copyrights to the Tian Shan Policy Center. Unless otherwise stated in written form by the Editorial Committee, no honorarium will be paid for the contributions.
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CONTENT OF THE ISSUE Page #4 Violence against women: a pandemic of global proportions By the Editorial Committee Page #5 “There was a case”: gender-based violence, property rights, and the data dilemma in Kyrgyzstan - Part two: filling the void By Lillian Langford Page #11 Domestic violence in Kyrgyzstan and the impact of culture on the professional conduct of law enforcement agents By Raushan Kerimalieva Page #15 “Call me when he tries to kill you”: State responses to domestic violence in Kyrgyzstan By Hillary Margolis Page #19 Youth, unemployment, and systemic corruption in Kyrgyzstan By Mirgul Karimova Page #22 Reproducing the Soviet policy paradox? The problem of restrictive approaches to regulating religion and countering violent extremism By Philipp Lottholz
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VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A PANDEMIC OF GLOBAL PROPORTIONS By The Editorial Committee
Dear Reader, Welcome to Issue number 4 of the Central Asia Policy Review (Review), a publication of the Tian Shan Policy Center (TSPC) of the American University of Central Asia (AUCA) in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The TSPC is a research-based organisation that explores the topics of human rights, good governance, sustainable development, migration and social protection in the wider region of Central Asia. The Review is intended to be a forum for discussion and scholarly debate where students, teachers, activists, practitioners, experts, journalists, civil society organisations and anyone with a keen interest in Central Asia may express ideas, highlight pressing issues or advocate for legislative change in areas covered by the TSPC. UN Women recently declared: “A staggering one in three women have experienced physical or sexual violence in their lifetime – a pandemic of global proportions. Unlike an illness, however, perpetrators and even entire societies choose to commit violence – and can choose to stop.” “Prevention is the 2015 theme of the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women on 25 November and of the UNiTE to End Violence against Women Campaign’s 16 days call for action. This year, at the official commemoration at UN Headquarters in New York, the first UN Framework on Preventing Violence against Women was launched.” In this line, this issue of the Review explores in detail the challenges faced by victims of domestic and gender-based violence in Kyrgyzstan. Lillian Langford concludes her two part series on the lack of reliable data on domestic violence in Kyrgyzstan, and discusses how those shortcomings can be addressed in the future. Raushan Kerimalieva discusses the effect that ‘traditional’ culture has on the professional behaviour of contemporary Kyrgyz law enforcement officers, and suggests that social change needs to be coupled with legislative reforms. The legal rights of women are studied by Hillary Margolis, and the challenges that victims of domestic abuse face are described in detail. The remaining two articles found in Issue 4 discuss how historical attitudes are complicating reforms that are needed today. Mirgul Karimova writes about the future employment prospects of young people in Kyrgyzstan, and explains how culture and corruption are still limiting youth potential today. Phillipp Lottholz takes on the issue of religious regulation in today’s Kyrgyzstan, and examines it in the context of the Soviet policy-making procedures of old. This is the last issue for 2015. The Editorial Committee awaits your submissions for Volume 2, Issue 1, of the Review by February 29, 2016. The Editorial Committee remains available for further discussions and clarifications at the email address capr@auca.kg or at the new campus of the American University of Central Asia in Bishkek (office 235). 4
“THERE WAS A CASE”: GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE DATA DILEMMA IN KYRGYZSTAN - PART TWO: FILLING THE VOID By Lillian Langford
This is the second and final part of a two-part series on how the lack of a sufficiently data-driven approach to addressing gender-based violence and ensuring women’s property rights in Kyrgyzstan has made it practically impossible to enforce the existing legislation in these areas. “How are you going to write a report from these interviews? Everyone says something different about what’s happening.” (A research assistant in Naryn)
The Data Dilemma Setting a policy without understanding the problem to be addressed by it is like prescribing antibiotics to a sick patient without having examined her. In the bestcase scenario, the cure might coincidentally resolve the ailment, but nothing can be learned from the intervention that would be of use for reproducing the results in the future. In the worst-case scenario, the treatment will be entirely inappropriate for the underlying disease, representing a waste of valuable time and money for both the patient and the doctor, and may even exacerbate the patient’s condition.
Pa r t O n e p r o p o s e d a s e r i e s o f implementation gaps in the existing legislative framework for addressing gender-based violence and obstacles to property access for women in abusive relationships. However, this study is based on what can only be described as anecdotal evidence. The analysis falls victim to the same phenomenon that led to the tripartite analysis of the high-profile bride kidnapping prosecution described in the introduction of Part One: “there was a case” has become routine, not just among citizens, NGOs, and activists in the Kyrgyz Republic, but also among legislators, policy-makers, and international organisations.
Similarly in Kyrgyzstan, the lack of sufficient baseline and evaluative data on gender-based violence has not prevented the application of millions of USD toward addressing it. Prescribed interventions by governmental and non-governmental actors have ranged from legislative reform to primary school education programmes, from police education to public awareness campaigns, from the construction of shelters to self-defence training for harassment victims.
These anecdote-driven themes cannot provide a comprehensive understanding of the situation in Kyrgyzstan with relation to gender-based violence. What they can do, however, is cast light on the most jarring gaps and provide some general overarching suggestions for potential steps forward. As the title of the piece suggests, the most important of these is for the development of a widespread, coordinated, and competently designed data collection effort.
These and many other well-intentioned programs have come at a cost of hundreds of millions of USD over the past 15 years, but to date no comprehensive data collection effort has allowed for an analysis of what, if any, concrete 5
improvement for the safety, health, and financial status of women has been observed as a result. In fact, the data available on the physical wellbeing and financial status of women in the family in Kyrgyzstan is surprisingly thin.
The study represents an authoritative source on nationwide health indicators, including an entire chapter devoted to domestic violence. The breadth of the study – which in 2012 surveyed 8,208 women and 2,413 men across the country – allows the data to be disaggregated further into regional, age, income, education, and other demographic categories. The study found that the percentage of women who had ever experienced physical violence since age 15 climbed steadily for surveyed women in increasingly higher age brackets, beginning at 6.3% for women aged 15-19 and levelling out at around 33% for women aged 30 to 49.
Gender-Disaggregated Data At present, there are two primary sources of gender-disaggregated data on a national scale in Kyrgyzstan that provide a reasonable, if general, source of data on a range of indicators. The first is the annual report of the National Statistical Committee, “Women and Men of the Kyrgyz Republic,” produced with financial support from the UN Population Fund. The annual publication provides general demographic data on education, health, employment, income, and crime compiled from data collected by a range of governmental sources and a few nongovernmental sources.
Although the 2012 DHS also reports data on sexual violence, the percentage of women who reported having ever experienced such violence since age 15 was so low – an average of 3.4% for women aged 15 to 49 – that the survey results may belie the actual occurrence rate for such violence, likely due to the sensitive nature and perceived shame associated with being a victim thereof.
While this collection of data does specifically address gender-based violence, it is starkly limited in its ability to do so given that it can only report data provided by other entities, primarily government agencies including the police, health care centres, and courts that handle cases, in addition to a restricted amount of NGO data. However, as explained in Part One, for a variety of reasons, domestic violence, forced marriage, and rape cases often aren’t reported to any of these entities, or in some cases will be reported but not recorded.
The 2012 DHS does, however, contain data on controlling behaviour of romantic partners, widely understood to be correlated with patterns of abuse in a domestic partnership. Fully 71% of women surveyed reported that their partner was angry or jealous when she spoke with other men; more than half of women said that they were afraid of their husband or partner. While these publications are a useful start, they are, due to their very broad nature, limited in specificity with regard to violence against women. First of all, the cost of producing the gargantuan 2012 DHS limits its frequency – the 2012 study was the most recent conducted since 1997. As noted above, the sensitive nature of gender violence-related issues, especially in the Kyrgyzstan context, means that there will be under-reporting in some critical areas. This is evident in
The second major source of genderdisaggregated data, including indicators on violence against women, is the far more comprehensive Kyrgyz Republic Demographic and Health Survey (2012 DHS), a wide-ranging population survey study published by the National Statistical Committee with broad technical and financial support from the US Agency for International Development and the UN Population Fund. 6
some of the discord seen between the two data sources. For example, the 2012 DHS found that 13% of women between the ages of 15 and 49 reported having experienced physical violence at some point in the previous 12 months. Making a very rough estimate based on that finding and using general population data from Kyrgyzstan in 2012, approximately 197,000 women aged 15 to 49 in the country experienced physical violence in 2012. By contrast, “Women and Men of the Kyrgyz Republic” reported just 2,341 incidents of domestic violence registered with police in 2012, and 4,877 reports from domestic violence crisis centres for women seeking help in relation to domestic violence.
reflect the findings of a systematic and methodologically sound research effort. The country has also witnessed a few modest attempts to methodologically gather data on the question of forcible marriage. Researcher Russell Kleinbach has been one leader in this effort. His survey research conducted in Karakol City (Issyk-Kul Province) among 101 married female respondents in 2011 found that 45% of those surveyed had been kidnapped and forcibly married. The study also found that 18% of the women who reported kidnapping had been raped prior to the marriage ceremony. Aside from the two major sources of gender-disaggregated data described above, reliable sources of statistical information on violence against women are similarly rare. Many NGOs, international organisations, and individual researchers (including the author) have documented anecdotal instances of abuse. The devastation experienced by victims of domestic violence and forcible marriage in Kyrgyzstan was documented by Human Rights Watch first in 2006; nine years later, the organisation’s follow-up report reflected that the same fundamental problems persisted.
Detailed Data on ‘Bride Kidnapping’ and Violence against Women Although kidnapping for forcible marriage represents one of the most widelypublicised forms of violence against women in Kyrgyzstan, it is also the subject of the least quantitative study. The 2012 DHS does not contain any specific indicators on this crime, and Women and Men of the Kyrgyz Republic reports just 25 registered cases of the offense in 2012. Some civil society groups have tried to put together patchwork estimates of the number of bride kidnappings occurring annually in Kyrgyzstan. Most notably, in 2011 the NGO “Women Support Centre” released an estimate, based on its own compilation of reports from its nationwide network, that approximately 11,800 women were bride-kidnapped annually in the country.
While the HRW reports and the extensive su rvivor st orie s t h e y con t a in a re important for highlighting the situation for individual victims of gender-based violence, as well as for their ability to pull at the heartstrings of donors and governments, they do not resolve the issue of the lack of true baseline and evaluative data by which to measure the impact of the government and civil society interventions for which they advocate.
This figure has been cited repeatedly by the media, in public service campaigns and by the Ombudsman for Human Rights. However, the Women Support Centre itself confirmed in a meeting during the course of this research that the estimate is tentative and does not
Towards a Data-Driven Approach There is a general reluctance for governments and foundations to invest scarce financial resources in the gathering of data. Spreadsheets and graphs lack the 7
emotional appeal and feeling of action that anti-violence campaigns and even successful legislative amendments entail. Donors tend to favour sponsoring a series of short-term, tangible activities – the impact of which is difficult or impossible to assess – over long-term, systematically tracked interventions that yield no immediate photogenic result.
Shelters for domestic violence and forcible marriage victims are critical in this respect. As Human Rights Watch addressed in its 2015 report, such facilities are exceedingly rare in Kyrgyzstan, yet where they are available they often represent the sole escape option for victims who have nowhere else to turn. Similarly, support should continue to be afforded to free legal aid providers that advise victims on their rights and help them gain access to their legally-guaranteed share of marital property and child custody following divorce from an abusive partner.
Project cycles often operate on one- or two-year timelines, sending NGOs, international organisations, and even donor-supported government agencies scrambling to devise seemingly fresh new proposals to attract donor interest for addressing the ‘stale’ problem of violence against women. As a result, most project proposals fail to build in sufficient time and resources for adequate baseline and follow-up data collection on the problem to be addressed, preferring to spend the scarce resources available on eyecatching activities.
However, the provision of these services is not incompatible with a data-informed approach; on the contrary, with a modest amount of additional investment into coordination and system design, these service providers are best-positioned to collect some of the most important evidence available for policymakers to design effective, responsive policies for addressing gender-based violence and forced marriage.
This approach is a mistake. While innovation, creative project design, and flexibility are, of course, key in devising effective solutions to emerging problems, experimentation that is not framed within sufficiently measurable parameters is a waste of money, time, and public confidence in government social policy.
Recommendations First, the Kyrgyz government and international donors should work together in supporting the implementation of a detailed, nationwide follow-up study on the causes of violence against women and the factors correlated with it to supplant the data provided in the 2012 DHS and the National Statistical Committee’s annual report.
To argue for a systematic and evidencebased approach to a pressing policy issue is not, however, to argue for the immediate suspension of all interventions that are not based on these principles. There are many programmes in Kyrgyzstan currently addressing the problem of gender-based violence that fill an urgent need for services and should be continued, without interruption, even as more data-driven solutions are designed and put into implementation. Such initiatives are p r i m a r i l y, b u t n o t e x c l u s i v e l y, programmes providing immediate and potentially life-saving services to victims.
Second, to spur the development of more evidence-based project design, international organisations and other donors should take a coordinated approach to grant proposal requirements for NGOs and other implementing partners. While not every individual project should be required to carry out baseline and follow up studies on a grand scale, they should be required to demonstrate a monitoring and evaluation plan that builds on existing data and 8
offers a real indicator for measuring impact (which “trainings conducted” is not). One way to incubate ideas and train energetic young professionals in this area would be for universities to run competitions for students in social sciences and policy programmes to devise creative solutions for incorporating data collection into project designs, while offering cash prizes for implementation of the best ideas.
article. Yet when funding is scarce, it is too easy for governments – that of Kyrgyzstan being no exception – to shirk their responsibilities by proclaiming that inadequate funds exist for successful fulfilment of those duties. This is as true of data collection as with service provision more generally. In addressing the problem of genderbased violence and the need for a sound basis from which to launch a better policy, the Kyrgyz government and its many international donors and partners must therefore understand that wellintentioned ‘sustainable’ approaches that attempt to embed each and every social welfare function within the complex and fractionalised organism of the government are not always appropriate and sometimes even counter-productive to the goals to be achieved.
Third, the use of innovative technologies to support data collection efforts has remained largely unexplored in Kyrgyzstan, but offers very promising prospects for addressing the data deficit with regard to gender based violence. New mobile- and internet-based tools can provide services while simultaneously supporting anonymous data collection in a streamlined process. For example, texting hotlines, which are becoming increasingly popular in other countries as a mechanism for depressed or abused children or adults to receive support and assistance, offer a costeffective and efficient means of delivering information and resources to women who are victims of violence in rural areas. It is also easy to track the broad contours of usage in order to understand how many people are using the system, which general area of the country they are in, and what kind of problem they seek assistance with. One way to explore the options for utilising such technologies would be for a national institution, international organisation, private entity, or some partnership of the three to offer a competition for NGOs or government agencies to develop the best high-tech solutions.
Public-private partnerships offer one potential tool, alongside many others, that could offer some relief in this regard. While many bemoan the deficits of government and NGO services and criticise the power and influence that private businesspeople in the country have managed to amass in the years since independence, little has been done to effectively harness the power of the latter for improving the former. This is an area rife with possibilities, and one that NGOs and IGOs are well-placed to help facilitate. Already, legal clinics based in NGOs and university law faculties provide some pro bono legal services to underserved clientele, including victims of gender-based violence and forced marriage. At the time of writing, a new initiative to launch a pro bono system of legal representation among members of the Kyrgyz Republic Bar Association (Advokatura) was underway, spearheaded by UNDP.
Finally, policymakers seeking to design effective, evidence-based interventions in any country must accept that no government can do everything. The government of Kyrgyzstan, like all others, bears extensive legal duties towards its citizens, discussed in Part One of this
Effective initiatives for an integrated approach to evidence-based policymaking must also consider the vast potential of 9
the private sector. Corporate resources are already being used to fuel highly impactful initiatives to serve genderbased violence victims around the world. As Kyrgyzstan’s private sector continues to gain momentum and influence, the country’s cash-strapped government – and the international organisations and governments that support it – should begin looking for opportunities to improve t h e c o u n t r y ’s c o r p o r a t e s o c i a l responsibility culture, encouraging companies to give back to the citizenry that contributes to its profit margins.
Lillian Langford is a Legal Officer with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Previously she worked as a Fulbright researcher and lecturer-in-law at the American University of Central Asia
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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN KYRGYZSTAN AND THE IMPACT OF CULTURE ON THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENTS By Raushan Kerimalieva Introduction
attempts to address this gap. It is argued that cultural norms override professional responsibilities when law enforcement officers deal with gender based crimes in Kyrgyzstan.
Violence against women in its most extreme forms continues to be one of the most prevalent human rights issues in Kyrgyzstan. According to some estimates, at least 30 young women are abducted and forced into marriage every day, while the Committee on the Elimination of Violence against Women found that ‘every second woman had been a victim of some form of domestic violence.’ More than 60 percent of victims do not report abuse, even though all necessary legal mechanisms are supposedly available to them.
This article analyses on testimonial evidence drawn from semi-structured interviews with ten representatives of all four district police units in Bishkek, a forensic examiner, a duty doctor of the Neuro-traumatology Department of the National Republican Hospital in Bishkek, two women’s rights advocates, and three victims of domestic violence. The goal of the interviews was to establish the impact of culture on the legal rights of women. The first part of the paper concentrates on the cultural understanding of the role of women in Kyrgyzstan, while the second part illustrates how this understanding impacts the professional conduct of law enforcement agents.
Kyrgyzstan is a member of a number of international treaties on human rights, including the most important document on women’s rights – the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The country has established comprehensive domestic mechanisms to promote gender equality, and women are free to file a complaint about violations of their rights with the Office of the Ombudsman, the Office of the State Prosecutor, local courts and municipalities. Meanwhile, the National Council on Gender Development is the primary advisory board on gender policy and there are working groups on gender issues in all state agencies.
Cultural Understanding of the Role of Women Referring to the power of culture in constructing social identities that have a direct impact on gender relations, Aleksandra Alund has concluded that “the cultural has colonized the social” (1995: 319). According to Sally Engle Merry (2006), the cultural constructs of traditional institutions such as marriage or kinship are at the root of gender-based violence as they prescribe a certain role for a woman with the aim of controlling her sexuality. In order to maintain these discriminatory institutions, societies create certain value systems, within which a certain degree of violence against women is acceptable and is used to discipline them.
Nevertheless, according to some reports, state officials demonstrate insensitivity to women’s issues. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports that neighbourhood police officers show a great deal of reluctance to process complaints on domestic violence or bride kidnapping. Although in a 2006 report the organisation mentions cultural attitudes among some of the reasons for such insensitivity, only few published works establish links between the cultural background of people and their professional attitude towards gender-based violence. This essay
In Kyrgyzstan, domestic violence and bride kidnapping fall within accepted and even normalised behaviour. According to HRW, thirty three percent of women and 11
girls and 50 percent of men and boys between the ages of 15 and 49 believe that it is normal for a man to beat one’s wife. An interesting finding is that women themselves are often supportive of such discriminatory and violent practices. Cynthia Werner (2009) explains this paradox by looking at anthropological theories of shame and honour. Young girls in Kyrgyzstan are raised according to certain standards of femininity and are to follow such ‘virtues’ as modesty and submissiveness, which often perpetuates their vulnerability to violence. Social concepts as uyat (shame) and family honour contribute to social acceptance of the victimisation of women and play a defining role in a woman’s life. The social stigma of uyat kilgan kyz (a girl that brought dishonour) places substantial limitations on the choices women can make.
resistance to the promotion of women’s rights which frustrates efforts by Kyrgyz civil society to promote equality for all. Such common attitudes are in explicit conflict with what local law enforcement personnel are expected to stand for. Law Enforcement and Gender-Based Crimes The common values of Kyrgyzstan’s society can be observed in the conduct of state officials dealing with gender-based crimes. Interviews with representatives of state institutions show that the methods used to confront cases of domestic violence and bride kidnapping are directly related to the cultural values and attributes given to the family unit. HRW draws similar conclusions in their latest report entitled “Call Me When He Tries to Kill You.” One of the police officers confessed that he does not agree with reforming Kyrgyzstan’s legislation on domestic violence to comply with international standards because of the “Kyrgyz mentality.” He went on to state that “if we bring in international standards for punishment for violence at home, then we will destroy many families, and this is not appropriate for Kyrgyzstan.”
The fear of stigmatisation is an effect of raising children within a culture where a family’s honour is intimately tied to female modesty and submissiveness (ibid.). Children are constantly told that the primary goal of a woman is to get married, have children and be submissive to their husbands and their families. Traditional Kyrgyz proverbs illustrate the widespread patriarchal attitude towards girls in society: “Kyzka kyrk uidon tyiuu” (one girl is to report to 40 households) and “Kyz oz uidon konok” (a girl is only a guest in her parents’ house) are but two examples.
The research suggests that neighbourhood police officers fail to comply with their duties in the following ways: (1) by ignoring emergency calls from the victims of domestic violence; (2) by talking women into reconciling with the perpetrators instead of applying standard legal procedures; and (3) by withholding information about legal mechanisms of protection and social services that are available. Moreover, the organisation reports that often representatives of law enforcement may be perpetrators of similar crimes themselves.
This patriarchal culture with strong family and kinship ties shapes a mentality where uyat, public reprimand, and family honour are the cornerstones of national behaviour. This is clearly demonstrated by the general population’s permissive attitudes towards instances of domestic violence and the commonly accepted practice of victim blaming. One of the women’s rights advocates interviewed for this essay stated that “there is a belief in our society that good wives are never beaten up.” This indicates the persistent
Neighbourhood police officers are often reluctant to accept complaints about domestic violence, or to even respond to emergency calls from victims thereof. As 12
the author found out during her interviews, while most of the police representatives denied ignoring emergency calls and mentioned they would face disciplinary actions for doing so, one of them admitted that sometimes he does not rush to the “supposed” scene of violence as “sometimes women overreact and are not in immediate danger.”
jail and ruining his life.” A psychologist at a women’s crisis centre described the difference between procedures in Kyrgyzstan and abroad: “One of our colleagues was invited to the US to see how the system of victim’s support operates there. She visited court trials on domestic abuse as part of the programme. [I]t is amazing how cultures and attitudes differ. First of all, anyone can call the police and no one has to file a claim or a complaint. Neighbours can call if they hear noises or screaming; the police comes and takes [the perpetrator] away. No one is listening [to the reasons] why he is beating his wife. They just take him. Second, they examine a victim’s condition and if she needs help they take her either to a hospital or a crisis centre. Within 24 hours, there is a court hearing. The victim is in a separate room and has no contact with the perpetrator. Meanwhile, he is brought before the judge in a prison uniform, in hand-cuffs. And, again, no one is listening to his excuses, no one accepts them.
There is a widespread belief among law enforcement agents that battered women become victims due to their own inability to control their emotions, which in turn provokes violence. This victim blaming combined with the “Kyrgyz mentality” of preserving the family at all costs result in police officers often refusing to accept complaints from victims. One of the common practices replacing an initial investigation and the issuing of a protective order is that of having a ‘preventive talk.’ All neighbourhood police officers interviewed by the author revealed the use of preventive talks as a primary method of dealing with cases of domestic abuse. This method is intended not only to warn the perpetrator of the possible consequences of his actions, but also to caution a victim that her behaviour may be the cause of the crime, and that filing a complaint against her partner may destroy her family. Police officers added that the first thing they do upon receiving a call about domestic abuse is not to issue a protective order, but to try to determine why the conflict began and who the instigator was. Surprisingly, isolating perpetrators from victims in order to investigate a crime is not a common practice.
What happens in Kyrgyzstan? The perpetrator of a crime has more voice than the victim; he demands to be heard! Why would anyone listen to his excuses, when he’s just beaten up his wife? It is a crime! But what do we do? Everyone, including the police, start to listen to his excuses and look for some rational things in his words that can justify his actions. And, almost always, they find that “she is guilty herself…she came home late…she is a bad mother, wife…and so I beat her up” and everyone start to rethink [who is actually guilty].
There appears to be a lack of understanding that a perpetrator should be held responsible for his actions regardless of any evidence suggesting that he was somehow provoked. Moreover, domestic violence – especially when a woman is believed to have caused it – is considered to be a minor crime that doesn’t warrant “closing up a poor guy in
Interviews with victims of domestic violence reveal that all of them were intimidated by their partners or their relatives and were talked into, or forced into, withdrawing their complaints of abuse. All of the victims interviewed were abused to such an extent that they had to be taken to a hospital. When asked whether they received protective orders, 13
none of them knew of the existence of such procedure, even though all of them filed complaints with the police. The victims said that they never received any explanation about their rights, nor were they informed about specialised social and legal services available to them.
allow this abuse to continue. As a result, a beaten-but-still-married woman seems to be the preferred option for perpetrators and law enforcement officer alike. Even some women seem to prefer this scenario, when faced with seeking justice and protection at the cost of losing or damaging their family.
Some testimonies show that law enforcement officers are not only reluctant and indifferent towards cases of domestic violence, but are often perpetrators themselves. A forensic examiner stated that the most violent husbands are often those who work in law enforcement, and one of the victims shared the fact that her husband was a police officer. The recent HRW report reveals that often police officers try to conceal the cases of domestic violence as they themselves or their colleagues or relatives are perpetrators. Regardless of whether police officers or ordinary citizens are committing such crimes, the statistics are quite disturbing. HRW states that only three out of 28 reviewed cases covered went to court. All victims interviewed for this article withdrew their complaints because of pressure and lack of protection.
This complex picture of domestic violence suggests that these issues are rooted in traditional culture and the interaction of that culture with the apparatus of the state. This poses a great challenge not only to the state as the main guarantor of human rights, but also to international organisations that try to counter domestic violence. The actions of both may prove futile if they rely only on conventional measures such as legislation to eliminate domestic violence.
Conclusion Domestic violence continues to be the most common human rights abuse in Kyrgyzstan. While the state claims to be addressing it through legal reforms, the real issue is not that the law is flawed, but that it is poorly implemented. Poor quality law enforcement and dominant beliefs about women’s place in society
Raushan Kerimalieva has over five years of experience as a human rights advocate in the non-governmental sector. Her research interests include the intersections of gender and culture, human rights and nationalism. She holds an MA in Politics and Security from the OSCE Academy in Bishkek.
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“CALL ME WHEN HE TRIES TO KILL YOU”: STATE RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN KYRGYZSTAN By Hillary Margolis Gulnara (all survivor’s names are pseudonyms) and her husband lived together for 15 years before he began brutally attacking her in 2003. One evening in 2012, he returned to their Bishkek home after a school reunion and started to criticise her. She said:
Since Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) first report on domestic violence and bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan in 2006, the government has introduced legal amendments and awareness-raising campaigns in attempts to change attitudes towards violence against women and reduce impunity. In 2013, the government increased penalties for bride kidnapping. In 2014, Kyrgyzstan entered into a “Partnership for Democracy” with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. In doing so, it affirmed its commitment to human rights, including combating violence against women. The United Nations Trust Fund to End Violence against Women awarded a large grant to K y r g y z s t a n ’s M i n i s t r y o f S o c i a l Development in 2015, which can help fund improved response to violence against women and girls. Unfortunately, problems persist.
I asked him to calm down, to not insult me. He said, “It’s my home, I can do whatever I want.” I got up and said, “Okay, you can do whatever you want.” I wanted to leave the room but he said, “Stand there.” I looked over and he was already approaching me. I ran away outside. He caught me by the hair. He banged my head against the cement ground. I was very scared. Gulnara was hospitalised for 10 days with a severe concussion. During her hospital stay, medical staff reported her case to police without informing her or obtaining her consent. Although Gulnara provided an incident report, the police did not to tell her she could request a protection order against her abuser and never took any action against her husband. During years of beatings, Gulnara attempted to separate from her husband several times, even divorcing him in 2010. But she said she returned to him largely because she felt her children would suffer stigma and shame if they were “fatherless.” After 10 years of abuse, in 2013, Gulnara’s husband stabbed her, and she decided to press charges against him. The case has dragged on for over two years; as of this writing, Gulnara’s husband has faced no conviction or penalties.
Women and girls in Kyrgyzstan suffer high rates of domestic violence, yet few cases are reported and even fewer are p r o s e c u t e d . I n K y r g y z s t a n ’s 2 0 1 2 Demographic and Health Survey, 28% of women and girls aged 15-49 who are or have ever been married reported having experienced domestic violence (defined in the survey as physical, sexual, or emotional violence by a spouse or partner). According to the survey, 41% of women and girls who experienced physical or sexual violence never sought help or told anyone about the violence. Government data shows that only a fraction of domestic violence complaints registered with police are reviewed by courts. Those that do reach courts are frequently considered administrative offenses, not crimes, and thus face lighter penalties. Even among administrative cases, few perpetrators are convicted of domestic violence; most face penalties for offenses such as “disorderly conduct.”
Gulnara’s experience demonstrates the multiple ways in which the government of Kyrgyzstan is not providing adequate support, protection and remedies to survivors of domestic violence. ****** 15
Despite a 2003 domestic violence law, which guarantees survivors’ rights to protection, social services and redress, HRW documented gaps in state response to domestic violence, including police refusing to register or investigate complaints, police and courts failing to issue or enforce protection orders, and courts and prosecutors treating domestic violence as a minor offense carrying light penalties. The government is also doing too little to provide shelter and other services for survivors of abuse.
Several women also told HRW that they were forced into marriage, sometimes following abduction; three of the survivors HRW interviewed were married before the legal age of 18. In many cases, women told HRW that they experienced domestic abuse for years, almost always at the hands of husbands or partners, but also by in-laws and, in one case, a brother. Some of the women suffer from long-term physical or psychological distress as a result of domestic violence. Difficult for victims to seek assistance, protection and justice
In interviews in 2014-15 with survivors of domestic violence, service providers, police, judges, community leaders and representatives of state agencies, HRW found that domestic violence remains a grave concern in Kyrgyzstan, and that multiple barriers hinder survivors from seeking help or accessing justice. Kyrgyzstan’s government is currently reviewing a new domestic violence law, which offers a critical opportunity to strengthen protections.
Survivors of domestic violence in Kyrgyzstan face a daunting array of barriers to seeking assistance, protection and justice. Social barriers include pressure to maintain the family at all costs, stigma and shame, economic dependence, vulnerability and isolation – especially among those in unregistered marriages – and fear of reprisals by abusers. Many survivors told HRW that they felt trapped because they depend on their abusers or abusers’ families for housing and food, and had “nowhere to go.”
HRW’s research involved over 90 interviews, including 28 interviews with female survivors of domestic violence, as well as crisis centre and shelter staff, health professionals, police officers, judges, lawyers, religious leaders and elders’ court members. HRW documented cases of severe physical and psychological domestic abuse, sometimes with long-lasting consequences. Women told HRW about instances in which perpetrators pounded their heads against walls and pavement; broke their jaws; caused concussions and skull fractures; stabbed them; beat them with rolling pins, metal kitchenware and other objects; locked them outside in extreme cold without shoes or appropriate clothing; beat them while pregnant to the point of miscarriage; chased them with knives and spades; attempted to choke or suffocate them; threatened to kill them; spit in their mouths; and verbally humiliated them at their workplaces.
Aigul suffered nine years of abuse by her husband, who denied her access to medical treatment when she suffered a head injury due to his beatings. She went to her father and stepmother’s house in an attempt to escape the abuse, but her father told her to return to her husband and endure the violence. Aigul never filed a complaint with police because she knew her husband would kick her and her children out of the house. “I put up with his beatings, but at least I have a place to stay,” she told HRW. Some survivors told HRW that police turned them away when they attempted to file domestic violence complaints. Asya said that she called police twice in 2012 after her partner beat her severely. She said that the police asked whether her partner had tried to stab or kill her: “I 16
would say, ‘No,’ and they [police] would say, ‘Okay, you call me when he tries to kill you, because we have more important things to do.’” Other survivors said that police registered their complaints but did not investigate.
Not all police, judges and state service providers ignore their responsibilities with respect to domestic violence. Some police told HRW that they regularly take domestic violence complaints and issue temporary protection orders. Some survivors said that judges helped them obtain a divorce or access alimony from abusive husbands. Ministry of Health and Ministry of Internal Affairs officials have introduced manuals offering guidance on domestic violence response and data collection. However, service provision for survivors of domestic violence, including shelter, psychosocial care and facilitation of access to justice, lies almost entirely in the hands of nongovernmental organisations, most of which receive no state support.
Among the cases documented by HRW, law enforcement personnel often did not issue or enforce protection orders meant to keep domestic violence survivors safe. Kyrgyzstan’s domestic violence law allows police and courts to issue temporary or long-term orders that specify protective measures, such as prohibiting abuse or barring contact between the perpetrator and victim. Perpetrators who violate these orders should be penalised. However, many survivors told HRW that police never informed them about protection orders. Others said police did not enforce the orders or penalise perpetrators who violated them.
Time to act This is a critical time to examine Kyrgyzstan’s record on domestic violence. A new law developed by experts and government agencies, which would overhaul the 2003 Domestic Violence Law, is still being finalised. It is vital that any new domestic violence legislation retains those elements of the existing law that ensure protections and redress, while at the same time addresses its weaknesses and incorporates enforcement mechanisms. While the 2003 Domestic Violence Law was ground-breaking, it promised far more than it accomplished.
Police, judges, lawyers and service providers told HRW that longer-term, more stringent court protection orders are almost never issued. Several survivors said they tried to get these orders, but lawyers or judges told them they did not meet the criteria. Women’s rights activists and crisis centre workers told HRW that police often refuse to collect the materials required for court protection orders or spend an excessive amount of time doing so, leading to lengthy delays.
Kyrgyzstan has ratified several international human rights treaties that obligate it to protect women and girls from violence and discrimination. However, it has not ratified an important regional treaty, the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, which came into force in 2014. Although not a Council of Europe member state, Kyrgyzstan can and should ratify this treaty, which provides detailed guidance on measures to address domestic violence.
In some cases, police referred domestic violence cases involving serious injury to community elders’ (aksakals) courts, with the intention that they reconcile the couple. Elders’ courts emphasise mediation and conflict resolution, and may only issue penalties of financial compensation or public shaming. Under the law, these community courts should not handle active criminal cases, and police should only refer cases with the prosecutor’s approval.
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The government of Kyrgyzstan should enforce its national laws on violence against women, and change laws and practices that put women and girls at risk of violence. The government should ensure that police, prosecutors and judges comply with their duties under the domestic violence law. This includes issuing and enforcing protection orders, and investigating and prosecuting cases of domestic violence. Officials who fail to do so should be disciplined. The government should also support shelter, health, psychosocial and legal services for survivors.
stigmatisation of survivors. The government should also ensure that any new domestic violence legislation contains strong protective measures, including immediate, short-term protection orders and longer-term courtissued protection and enforcement mechanisms. In failing to enforce its laws, the government of Kyrgyzstan has left women and girls facing domestic abuse without a safety net. This is a pivotal moment for Kyrgyzstan to update its legal framework and implement effective systems to stop domestic violence and hold perpetrators to account. Until it does so, the government of Kyrgyzstan continues to put the lives of women and girls at risk.
Government agencies should establish clear protocols and mandatory training and retraining curriculums in line with international standards on domestic violence response, and train all law enforcement, judicial and health personnel. In addition, the government should enforce and clarify laws that limit referral of serious cases of domestic violence to community elders (aksakals) courts, which emphasise reconciliation and may limit survivors’ access to the full range of measures for redress. It should also enforce laws prohibiting marriage below the age of 18 and all forms of forced marriage, including bride kidnapping.
In addition, the government should expand key services for survivors of domestic violence, such as shelters and legal and psychosocial assistance, and work to combat harmful attitudes and social norms that foster domestic violence, victim-blaming and
Hillary Margolis is a Human Rights Watch researcher on Europe and Central Asia with the Women’s Rights Division. She has experience on gender-based violence in conflict and postconflict situations, including Syria, Africa, and South East Asia. Hillary earned a bachelor’s degree from Yale University and a master’s degree from the London School of Economics.
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YOUTH, UNEMPLOYMENT AND SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION IN KYRGYZSTAN By Mirgul Karimova
If one assumes that the youth is the future of Kyrgyzstan, the Kyrgyz state appears to have failed – at least so far – to prioritise the 29.1 percent of its 5.8million population. Youth is one of the country’s most vulnerable groups, with an 8 percent unemployment rate nationwide. Following youth participation in the 2010 revolution which deposed autocratic President Bakiyev, the Ministry of Youth Affairs was created in the same year. However, it was re-organised into the Ministry of Labour, Employment, and Youth in December 2011 – or, as it is commonly known, the Ministry of ‘Everything,’ with the conspicuous exclusion of youth development.
translate into socio-political turmoil, exacerbating the situation for the general population, 37 percent of which is already living in poverty. As children and young adults under 29 comprise 60 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s population, the extent of the problem of u n e m p l o y m e n t a n d t h e c o u n t r y ’s vulnerability to it become apparent. Low quality of education, gender stereotypes and cultural expectations – namely, that the youth should be obedient to elders and passive – aggravate the issue even further. Thus, for lack of a better alternative, around 42 percent of young people agree to family duties which limit their potential. These range from subsistence farming to housework, including babysitting.
Due to the absence of a clear youth policy in Kyrgyzstan, the country’s youth face a myriad of socio-economic and human development challenges. The further inability of the government to implement existing policies and disburse the funds allocated to youth programs has led to youth passivity in fighting corruption, which in turn has a negative impact on their capacity to find paid employment. I will first discuss the threat posed to the state by unemployed youth, will then turn to the institutional failure to address these issues and, finally, offer a few policy recommendations to start addressing the situation.
71.4 percent of youth rely on informal networks – such as asking relatives and friends for help – as the principal means to access the Kyrgyz labour market. This feeds into a widespread system of corruption that, in turn, limits the youth’s potential by allocating jobs according to personal ties rather than merit. Such dependence on informal support networks help to explain the general population’s low level of trust in the government, which Transparency International sets at 27 percent.
Unemployment and Corruption
Similarly to their peers in more developed economies, almost 65 percent of the Millennial generation in Kyrgyzstan wish to obtain salaried employment upon graduation from high school or university. H o w e v e r, g i v e n t h e a b s e n c e o f meritocracy – a widely accepted value system encouraging diligence and honesty, coupled with the rule of law – young, educated people are left to heavily rely on patronage networks linked to their parents or other family members.
The unemployment rate in the 15-29 age group in Kyrgyzstan is over 10 percent, while youth represent an estimated 50 percent of the unemployed in the country. As a result, Kyrgyzstan features among the most vulnerable in the World Bank’s lower middle income group of countries, where it has been since 2014. The number of unemployed youth speaks of a potentially unstable future for Kyrgyzstan. If not addressed, this could 19
Often, they have to pay expensive bribes to future employers.
creation of the Ministry of Labour, Employment, and Youth, access to its budget and operating costs is not transparent. Moreover, while the budget for 2015allocated 7 million soms (100,000 USD) for ‘the implementation of state youth policy,’ it is difficult to understand what that even means without more open access to information.
It may sound paradoxical for a poor country such as Kyrgyzstan, but it is not unheard of that a young man ‘donate’ a luxury car such as a Lexus to a government official as a gift, in order to gain employment in one of the corrupt state institutions. It shouldn’t come as a surprise that Kyrgyzstan occupies the 1 3 6 t h p o s i t i o n i n Tr a n s p a r e n c y International’s corruption perception index, out of 175 countries.
The 2010 UNDP National Human Development Report indicates that only a small percentage of the allocated budget to state agencies actually benefits the target population. For instance, out of 30 million soms (roughly 430,000 USD)planned for the ‘Kyrgyzstan Jashtary’ (or ‘Youth of Kyrgyzstan’) program in 2006-2008, only 6.5 million soms – less than 22 percent – benefited youth through cultural or sport events conducted at the national level. The remaining 78 percent covered the salaries of civil servants and the operating expenses of state agencies.
Most young people, however, possess neither the connections nor the financial resources to do that. They will then either try their luck during a highly corrupt selection process, or become an agricultural labourer or migrate to Russia to find employment. Kyrgyzstan’s youth often work over 70 hours per week in retail, transport services, cafeteria businesses, and assisting politicians to make ends meet. They do so even if it means contributing to the expansion of the shadow economy, as these often unregistered businesses don’t pay taxes.
Kyrgyzstan lacks a strong policymaking tradition due to its Soviet legacy: numerous regulations, laws, and conceptual documents tend not to be implemented. Government is reactive rather than pro-active. While the Ministry of Labour, Employment, and Youth spends millions of soms to organise job fairs for the country’s university graduates, who represent 19.4 percent of the country's youth, the great majority is left to their own means to find a career.
The choice for young women looks even bleaker: according to statistics, 28.2 percent are pressured into leaving high school between 15 and 19, and get married, ostensibly to avoid future hardship. Research shows, however, that uneducated women – in the case of Kyrgyzstan, this means 47.5 percent of women who married in the 15-19 age bracket – only reproduce poverty.
This is why the role of non-governmental organisations in Kyrgyzstan has grown exponentially. German, Swiss, American, British, and Danish donors fuel youth activism through financing research and analytical, educational and gender empowering projects across the nation, reaching out to the most remote and underfunded areas in Batken and Naryn provinces. The shifting priorities of the donor community, however, hide a huge risk on its own and the government cannot depend on donors to ensure the youth’s future employability.
No Progress Over the years, there was no shortage of attempts by the state’s institutions to address ‘the young people issue.’ Only after the youth’s involvement in the violent uprising against the government in 2010, however, was the process of establishing an official government representative for the youth of Kyrgyzstan expedited. Despite the 20
Any Chance for Success? As every challenge presents an opportunity, youth in Kyrgyzstan should recognise their vested interest in solving the existing problems. These recommendations aim at initiating a broader debate on ways to address youth unemployment in the country.
Build capacity in entrepreneurship: this sector offers profitable opportunities for young minds and talents in Kyrgyzstan, as it continues its transition into a free m a r k e t e c o n o m y. P r o f e s s i o n a l development seminars and workshops are often offered free of charge online. The existing resource centres within state institutions, career centres at universities, public libraries, as well as reading areas in the offices of international organisations (the World Bank and the UN agencies) can provide s u c h m a t e r i a l , t o o . T E D x Ta l k s o r alternative public lectures by experts in various fields can also provide a further platform for capacity building.
Study avenues to formalise the underground economy in order for small firms to contribute to the real economy: this requires a fundamental change in policy making aimed at establishing a business-friendly environment in Kyrgyzstan. This could contribute to the creation of new jobs, the reduction of the number of unemployed (including among the youth) and, concomitantly, the increase in tax revenues for the state.
Raise awareness about the economic downsides of not educating young women: this campaign requires the longterm commitment of both the government and civil society to reducing poverty through educating the new generation of young women and girls. The objective should not only be achieving mandatory completion of high school by all women, but also introducing public lectures on professional development for women with direct links to concrete training and employment opportunities in the country. Such workshops could be led by already existing women leaders’ forums, such as the Kurak Initiative Group of women entrepreneurs, Global Shapers and others.
Open dialogue between youth representatives and the state authorities at the local, provincial and national level: the youth of Kyrgyzstan should find ways to consult with state authorities in order for their ideas and proposals to be included in the decision making process in issues directly concerning the youth. Advocate transparency of and accessibility to the budgeting and annual work planning process at the Ministry of Labour, Employment, and Youth: this is where youth who migrate from the countryside to the city can affect the list of priorities designed by the ministry. Millennials can provide vital feedback for creative solutions and innovative projects to the ministry.
Mirgul Karimova is a Quality Control Supervisor with UN Women’s Gender in Society Perception Study project. She has recently graduated with a Master’s degree in International Security and Diplomacy as a Fulbright Scholar. Prior to her study, she worked for the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to provide technical assistance to Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies and advocate community policing in Kyrgyzstan border regions.
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REPRODUCING THE SOVIET POLICY PARADOX? THE PROBLEM OF RESTRICTIVE APPROACHES TO REGULATING RELIGION AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM By Philipp Lottholz Introduction
possible solutions are being constructed is similar to the design of Soviet policy in
This article will focus on the case of Kyrgyzstan to discuss the inherent limits of understanding problems and making policy in the field of religion and countering violent extremism. The main question it seeks to answer is whether the so-called ‘paradox of Soviet policy making’ is reproduced, and how this is being done. The work of Russian sociologist Alexey Yurchak provides the basis to understand this paradox. He argued that Soviet ideological discourse, while in itself coherent, was lacking a logical or rationally explainable justification and was thus dependent on an external “objective truth” to derive its legitimacy from (2006: 10). During the days of the Soviet Union, this external truth or referent was either embodied in almighty figures such as Lenin or Stalin or, later on, constructed through reference to the canon of MarxistLeninist writings.
both appearance and practice. It can be argued that the external referent for legitimising policies has merely been replaced with national security or strategic concerns, while genuine expertise or a critical, open debate on the issues at hand appear to be insufficient. Second, this is not to say that this policy paradox can merely be observed in the former Soviet Union. On the contrary, a lot of the reactions to terrorism in Western Europe and the emergence of extremist groups in the Middle East mirror Kyrgyzstan’s policy paradox. Indeed, reactive military and intelligence m e a s u re s h a v e t a k e n p re c e d e n c e worldwide over the idea of proactively discussing the reasons for violent extremism and finding ways to limit its spread.
This provided a way of overcoming the inherent contradiction of Soviet policy, which was officially driven by the “objective of achieving full liberation of society and the individual [...] by means of subsuming that society and individual under full party control” (ibid: 11). The results of 70 years of this conduct are well documented. Deniz Kandiyoti’s (2007) account is most instructive here, as it traces the entrenchment of patriarchal social structures and practices under the surface of the apparently effective implementation of Soviet emancipatory policies in Central Asia.
The article will indicate how the Soviet policy paradox in Kyrgyzstan can be overcome by discussing the sources of violent religious extremism and the factors predisposing new recruits to it; the possible strategies for limiting these factors; and examples of concrete measures that have been taken to address the issue. As will be shown, reactive measures and the criminalisation of anyone who may potentially embrace violent religious extremism seem to prevail over proactive approaches based on sound knowledge and prevention. The article draws on a number of interviews with experts and observers actively working on the question, and a desk-based examination of recent state activities and initiatives in the field of religion.
The importance of this analysis is grounded in two facts. First, the way in which problems with religion and their
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Religious Freedom and Security Imperatives
construed as important with regard to both national security interests and the global fight against terrorism. The critical point here, however, is that this new awareness created an ever higher need to classify the possible root causes of radical Islam and identify people potentially exposed to radicalisation. Tromble’s article provides a preliminary insight into how people would try to gauge one’s adherence to radical interpretations of Islam (and implicitly, potential participation in violent extremism) based on their outward appearance. This framing of radical Islam as a security issue and the appearance-based identification of individuals potentially presenting a threat shows the negative perceptions involved with these issues.
In discussing the factors of religious radicalisation, a basic tension can be immediately found between the constitutional provision on religious freedom (articles 16.2 and 32.1 in the 2010 version; 15.3 and 16.2 in the 1993 one) and the “Law on Religious Freedom and Religious Organisations” adopted in 2008. The latter has significantly limited religious practices, especially by limiting the ability to register as a legal religious organisation, which has caused criticism from human rights organisations. As one observer stated in an interview with the author, this law and other legislative measures are seen as an adaptation of legislation to the specific context of Kyrgyzstan. This isn’t compatible with the liberal approach of Kyrgyzstan’s 1993 constitution and its compliance with human rights standards and conventions, as it requires stricter legislation and greater powers for law enforcement organs in the regulation of religious activities.
How to Deal with Religious Radicalisation: Constructive Measures vs. Criminalisation Before discussing how the securitisation of Islam and the insufficient understanding of the matter gave rise to its criminalisation and the reproduction of the Soviet policy paradox, I will explore the potential of dealing with religious radicalisation in a more viable, less intrusive way. Counter-acting ra d i c a li sa t i on re q u i re s a ge n u i n e discussion of its different sources and the extent to which religious and other spheres of life need to be addressed. In doing so, a decomposition of the trajectory of radicalisation into factors such as poverty and deprivation, political marginalisation, and other social problems should at least be attempted. A constructive dialogue would also serve to nurture awareness and proactive measures in understanding and counteracting patterns of radicalisation in one’s own environment.
The benign nature and desirability of religious freedom has been put into doubt since officials began to understand religious radicalisation as part of a more global phenomenon. Rebekah Tromble (2014) has identified both this shift towards a global security discourse and the securitisation of Islam. The shift that occurred after the so-called ‘Batken events’ – an incursion of fighters from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) that led to a week-long conflict – is well illustrated by a quote from the then head of the Security Council of the Kyrgyz Republic in 2005: “The problems of terrorism and extremism are looming across the global community. [A]s members of the global community, we must develop laws that prevent and fight these activities” (ibid: 534). Religious radicalism was not only framed as a security problem, but simultaneously
An expert advisor to the State Agency on Religious Affairs pointed out that a dialogue is indeed being held between registered religious organisations, the 23
Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan (or Muftiate) and representatives from different state and law enforcement agencies. The discussion of reasons for radicalisation, ‘traditional’ forms of Islam and approaches to nurture the latter is facilitated on a decentralised level and information is disseminated by the representatives of the respective participant organisations, as the expert confirmed. The publicly visible responses to radicalisation, on the other hand, appear to express a rather restrictive stance vis-à-vis the religious community, mostly resulting in the alienation – if not criminalisation – of certain groups within it, especially those who have not managed to register officially and aren’t part of the dialogue.
religion and religious radicalism at first sight. The main points include the understanding of the Kyrgyz Republic as secular with a Muslim majority population; a model for cooperation between state institutions and the religious community; state interference in religious affairs should the law be broken by religious actors; the definition of criteria to identify extremist materials and individuals; educational and informative activities to counter radicalism; and the widening of expertise both in the educational sector and in public bodies dealing with religious issues. The Conception appears convincing in the broad range of measures and the share of actions aimed at filling the gap of knowledge both within society and among civil servants. Even more so, the Conception expresses the desire to promote “an alternative to the radicalextremist discourse [in] media and social media with the goal of weakening the manipulative methods of destructive and extremist propaganda” (p. 21, para 21). This lays the foundation for a constructive and society-focused strategy to counter religious radicalism. Still, the default position of embracing the “strengthening of Kyrgyz statehood [and] the preservation of state sovereignty” (p. 5) reveals the basic posture of the government.
It is worth outlining the ontology underlying this reactive approach. This reading of religion seems to be rooted in the secular understanding of the state in Kyrgyzstan, insufficient government expert knowledge on religious topics and/ or a lack of connection between the former and the latter. This affects two inter-related issues: first, a marginalisation of concerns of the religious community in state policy in general; second, and more concerning, a creeping criminalisation of certain forms and practices of Islam as potentially affiliated with or being expressions of religious radicalism. This process lies at the heart of Kyrgyzstan’s policy paradox in the religious sphere. Rather than counter-acting radicalisation, certain actions appear to reinforce radicalisation e i t h e r d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y, v i a criminalisation and marginalisation of certain groups.
It is yet unclear how this spectrum of constructive ideas and security provisions will develop. As Nurgul Esenamanova remarks in her analysis of the C o n c e p t i o n , h o w e v e r, g i v e n t h e government’s budgetary constraints, many doubts surround the extent to which different components of the Conception can be implemented. These issues and other factors might lead to a scenario where, in Esenamanova’s words, “state servants could be overzealous in the implementation of the state Conception, thinking that their main point of departure is the securing of state
Concrete Measures: Giving Dialogue a Chance? The “Conception for State Policy of the K y r g y z Re p u b l i c i n t h e Re l i g i o u s Sphere” (hereafter Conception) appears to espouse a balanced and generally constructive system of dealing with 24
security.” Such zeal found expression in the proposal to amend the Law on religious freedom, including the prohibition of the “spreading of religious beliefs” in virtually all public spaces and institutions. The online discussion of this draft proposition apparently led to its withdrawal (details are lacking as the State Agency’s website is currently offline), but this initiative clearly showed the tendency of state officials to concentrate on restrictive measures.
radicalisation, rather than countering it. In reference to the high number of trials under article 299 of the criminal code (“Instigation of Religious Hatred”), the same member of Kamalov’s defence team stated: “They jail the people for things that are not even there. Now they pruned Kamalov’s wings. [B]ut you need to talk to these people in the language of religion, how can you tackle this question with the fist? After all, people become extremists in prison!”
Another case that put the reactive approach of state policy into sharp relief is the trial of Imam Rashod Kamalov. Kamalov is from Kara-Suu in Osh Province, a town bordering Uzbekistan that is considered a priority area in counter-radicalisation efforts. Kamalov’s defence team and the majority of expert observers maintain that the trial was marred by procedural irregularities and insufficient evidence to support his five year sentence. One glaring shortcoming was the flimsy expertise produced by the prosecution and accepted by the court, with Kanat Abdraimov – from the State Agency on Religious Affairs – playing a decisive role. Abdraimov's expert opinion was used to bolster the prosecution despite him not being a certified religious expert. Moreover, a member of the defence team pointed out that Abdraimov was trained as an area studies specialist for the Middle East, but not as an expert on religion.
In the meantime, a dialogue about religion and the problems of religious radicalism seems to be emerging, though it remains unclear if it will transition into a public discourse. For now, the development of a critical view on and awareness of religious extremism, its consequences and possible alternatives to it remains the task of civil society actors. One good example of open dialogue is a recent round table in Osh, during which possibilities for empowering women and protecting their rights on the basis of the Quran were discussed. Religious leaders and representatives of women’s rights organisations discussed their views about minimum standards of education for girls, the question of clothing both in general and with regard to a school uniform allowing girls to cover their head if they so wish, polygamy, widespread early marriages and ways to couple the Muslim nike ceremony with official marriage registration. This is not to say that such work is easy. Suspicions about women’s rights activists and disagreements about the sources of women’s rights in the Quran were quite apparent, as the head of the implementing NGO explained in an interview with the author. Still, the core idea of actually having a discussion about the role of religion in people’s lives is an important step. It remains to be seen if more such initiatives will be conducted to further dialogue within society that can help to counter religious radicalism in Kyrgyzstan.
Such vague grounds for the verdict and superficial knowledge of Islam on the part of state actors will undoubtedly increase the distrust for the judiciary and the government in the religious community. It is here that we can see how the Soviet policy paradox takes its course. Verdicts and decisions are not based on expertise, but rather justified with reference to priorities and principles that are external to the actual debate. The criminalisation and oppression of religious people on such questionable basis could easily fuel 25
*** As I have shown, it is quite likely that people’s perceptions about religion are mainly formed by the restrictive stance that the State Agency on Religious Affairs and other state actors have taken when dealing with religious issues. Through legislative initiatives and the provision of uncertified and insufficient expertise, the Agency is positioning itself as the guardian of the Constitution and the security of the Kyrgyz Republic. In so doing, however, state institutions have been shown to conflict with that very Constitution. It can be concluded that, at the very least, rather than creating an alternative to the radical-extremist discourse for religious people, the policy of religious regulation in Kyrgyzstan appears to reproduce the Soviet policy paradox. While claiming to protect and defend the freedom of its citizens, those very freedoms are often limited or suspended entirely. The disturbing result is that state policies appear to reinforce the marginalisation and disenfranchisement that produce radicalisation instead of countering it.
Philipp Lottholz is a PhD candidate at the University of Birmingham and currently a Visiting Scholar at the Central Asian Studies Institute (CASI), American University of Central Asia (AUCA). He conducted research on state-society relations and post-conflict reconstruction in Kyrgyzstan. His current doctoral research looks into state building processes in Kyrgyzstan under the title “State building in Central Asia: Moving towards a post-liberal model? Inquiring local agency and hybridisation processes in Kyrgyzstan.”
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Tian Shan Policy Center
The Tian Shan Policy Center (TSPC) is an innovative nonprofit, public interest organization focused on research, analysis, and implementation of appropriate and effective public policy in the nations and communities of Central Asia. The TSPC specializes in the critical fields of strategic development policy, human rights, and sustainable environment programs, and through its efforts strives to strengthen good governance as the bedrock for efforts to better the lives of the peoples of our emerging countries.
Contact details: Tian Shan Policy Center American University of Central Asia 7/6 Aaly Tokombaeva St. Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic Tel: +996 312 915 000 tspc@auca.kg www.auca.kg/en/tspc
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