March 2008 by Daniel May

merican Foreign Polic Y A March 2008

MIDDLE EAST REALISM The $20 Billion Saudi Arms Deal

Declawing the Bear

U.S. Strategic Thought Towards Russia

Political Violence in Kenya The Perilous Road Back to Peace

Freedom, Free Markets, and Democracy Princeton Student Editorials on America and its Place in the World

From the Editor and Publisher

ear Members and Readers of American Foreign Policy, As of January this year, AFP is under new management. Manav and I assume leadership of the magazine in the wake of a year of outstanding achievements. Following on the heels of Zvi (Editor-inChief Emeritus) and Joel (Publisher Emeritus) is no easy task – they leave an impressive legacy, one which we hope to uphold. Casual readers are likely unaware of the evolution AFP has undergone. Two years ago, this magazine was facing cancellation. Had it not been for the dedication of our outgoing Editor and Publisher and the ones they succeeded, it very well might have become defunct; instead, their efforts have secured its funding, its audience (including 30 think tanks), and a solid advisory board. While we cannot overstate the impact Zvi and Joel have had on the magazine, we readily acknowledge that AFP is nothing without its staff. Every member of AFP is essential to the magazine’s operations. We would especially like to thank a few unsung heroes our Managing Editors (Adam Harris and Zhenling Lai) as well as our Production Manager (Jonathan Giuffrida). Lastly, we would also like to thank our readership – for without you, there would be no reason to publish. Today, AFP has a pool of gifted writers, talented editors, and an exceptional layout staff. Its editing cycle is without doubt one of the most rigorous and efficient on campus, and its layout one of the most professional. Its views are diverse – because we believe debate and discourse should always trump dogma and ideology, AFP has proudly published articles from both ends of the political spectrum. Manav and I believe that AFP’s success is as much attributable to the quality of its staff as it is to the vision of its leadership. We would therefore like to dedicate this issue to Zvi, Joel, and all those who have worked tirelessly to produce one of the campus’s best publications and the nation’s only foreign policy magazine written, edited, and run by students. Thanks to your efforts, this is a rising publication poised for growth, and we are both excited and humbled by the opportunity to take this magazine forward.

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Anne-Marie Slaughter: Dean, Woodrow Wilson School Nolan McCarty: Acting Dean, Woodrow Wilson School Katherine Newman: Director, Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies Robert P. George: Director, James Madison Program G. John Ikenberry: Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs Bernard A. Haykel: Director, Institute for Transregional Study of the Contemporary Middle East

American Foreign Policy March 2008 Volume VII, Issue 5

CONTENTS Cover Story

A Dose of Middle East Realism

The $20 Billion Saudi Arms Deal Dan May ‘11

Europe

Declawing the Bear U.S. Strategic Thought Towards Russia The Saudis Reloaded

Political Violence in Kenya The Perilous Road Back to Peace Lucas Issacharoff ‘10

AFP Quiz

Franco Lopez ‘11

Running for President

Can’t Touch This!

Global Update

Vishal Chanani ‘11 The Tragedy of Beneficence Ghana’s Overreliance on Foreign Aid Mohit Agrawal ‘11

U.S. Foreign Policy

Constitutionality and Foreign Policy Pelosi’s Rejection of Executive Monopoly Matthew Drecun ‘11

East Asia

15 Have You Seen My Trade Partner?

Don’t Fear the Dragon The Appropriate American Response to China’s Rise Hyoung Sung Kim ‘11

Know Your IR

Joshua Harris ‘11

Africa

Duncan Fitz ‘08

Photo Sources: Amr Nabil, Khalil Senosi, Chris Greenberg, Marco Garcia/AP

Cover Photo: U.S. Navy, Danny Ewing Jr., HO/AP

March 2008

Cover Story

Susan Walsh/AP

A Dose of Middle East Realism The $20 Billion Saudi Arms Deal

n February 15th, the deadline for Congress to stop a twenty billion dollar weapons deal with several Persian Gulf states passed without any media fanfare. Amid the wall-to-wall election coverage, most Americans overlooked this important development in the ongoing quarrel with Iran. While the United States has provided Gulf States with weapons during and since the Cold War, this arms deal is different in that it includes not only the obsolescent weapons systems that the United States often provides to its second tier allies, but also 900 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) valued

Dan May â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;11 at 123 million dollars. These GPS guided bombs are among the most advanced and accurate weapons in the American arsenal, critical to the bombing campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The deal has attracted criticism from the usual suspects on the left, who oppose American business ties with a regime that denies basic human rights protections to women and religious minorities. The JDAM section of the deal, however, has a new set of detractors on the right who worry that the sale of advanced weapons to Saudi customers might threaten Israel as well as American forces in Iraq. This new set of criticisms warrants serious

American Foreign Policy

Brandishing more than swords - Bush and Saudi Prince Salman meet to discuss the landmark arms deal.

consideration. The Saudi regime has always been an ally of necessity rather than one of choice. Its human rights record is abysmal; its relationship with the new Iraqi regime is tenuous at best. All things considered, however, the Bush administration made the right choice in offering and standing by the arms deal. The new weapons will solidify Saudi Arabiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s position in the Gulf as a powerful and friendly balancer against rising Iranian revisionism. More importantly, the deal represents an authentic attempt at regional coalition building by the Bush administration and a slight separation from the unilateralist, neoconservative orthodoxy that has characterized its Middle East policy in the past. The Bush team seems to have learned something from its debacle in Iraq after all. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States have been consistent if not outspoken

Cover Story partners against Iran in the current nuclear standoff. The Saudis in particular have every reason to be wary of Shiite expansionism, not only in Iran, but also in Iraq and Lebanon. Still, this security overlap alone will not keep Saudi Arabia in the American fold. Only if the Saudis feel safe from immediate Iranian retribution will they be willing to cooperate with a superpower that is half a world away. The arms deal provides this security both by increasing the Saudi’s actual defensive capabilities and by reaffirming America’s longstanding commitment to these Persian Gulf states. Keeping these natural allies within the American sphere of influence is crucial. These Gulf States are in excellent geographical position to prevent Iranian expansionism, particularly any attempt to seize the Persian Gulf ’s strategic oil fields. Moreover, their large oil reserves could mitigate any Iranian attempt to shock global oil markets by terminating its own exports or closing the Strait of Hormuz. Less tangibly, keeping major Sunni Muslim powers in the American regional coalition prevents Iran from making a religious case for regional hegemony. As long as key actors in the Persian Gulf oppose Iranian expansionism, the rising Shiite power cannot credibly claim to speak for the Muslim world as a whole. As important as they are to peaceful containment efforts, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States might be even more useful if the nuclear standoff gets violent. For one, they could facilitate an air strike to prevent Iranian nuclear acquisition, providing military bases and fly-over rights to U.S. forces. Equally important is the Gulf States’ own military might. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) possess a combined 627 combatready aircraft compared to Iran’s 286. Moreover, the GCC air forces consist mostly of modern American F-15s and F-16s, while Iran still relies on outdated F-4s purchased before the fall of the Shah. Using American munitions, GCC air forces could strike Iranian nuclear facilities without U.S. airstrikes. Even if the Gulf States refuse to participate

militarily, their diplomatic support alone would lend legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. This legitimacy would be crucial in controlling the diplomatic fallout that would surely follow any American military action. This is not to say that air strikes against Iran would be a good solution to the current nuclear standoff. Even with the support of Gulf States, any military action would have tremendous negative consequences in terms of oil prices, terrorism, and stability in neighboring Iraq. Still, the prospect of a nuclear Iran may be even less palatable than the admittedly

Shiite neighbor across the Gulf ? Saudi Arabia has absolutely no interest in undermining U.S. efforts in Iraq. While the American-backed Maliki government is Shiite-led, it is a government that the Saudis can tolerate. If America were to withdraw from Iraq, not only would Saudi Arabia be more vulnerable to direct pressure from Iran, but Iraq would almost certainly fall under Iranian influence. An Iranian backed Iraqi government would be more radical and more anti-Saudi than Maliki’s existing regime. Even if Saudi Arabia did attempt to drop JDAMs on American soldiers or allies, their guidance mechanism is dependent on American controlled GPS satellites. If they lose contact with these satellites, they are no more accurate than standard “dumb” bombs. JDAMs are no threat to American forces in Iraq. In reality, the 20 billion dollar arms deal with Saudi Arabia represents a step forward not only in terms of regional security but also in terms of American foreign policy. In advocating the weapons sale, the Bush administration seems to have modified its mission to remake the Middle East into a liberal democratic paradise, retreating to the more traditional tactics of containment and counterbalancing. While one arms deal is no substitute for a comprehensive policy shift toward Iran or the Middle East more generally, President Bush can build on this success if he combines these arms sales with equally serious attempts at public diplomacy and fostering Iranian dissent. While a strong balancing coalition is a big step toward resolving the current standoff, arms sales alone will not create lasting peace. Still, it is encouraging that the Bush administration’s first instinct is toward coalition building rather than air strikes. The arms deal is an important policy success for the President, achieved despite the opposition of many within his own party. It is a healthy dose of realism from a President too often seduced by the allure of neoconservative interventionism. Afp

“The Bush administration made the right choice in offering and standing by the arms deal with Saudi Arabia.” high costs of an attack. In the event that an American air strike on Iran becomes necessary, secure bases, convenient air approaches, several hundred extra warplanes, and some helpful diplomatic clout can only make the difficult task easier. Despite these benefits, a number of security conservatives have argued vociferously against the arms deal. They claim that JDAMs in Saudi hands might be used against Israel or American soldiers stationed in Iraq. Both of these criticisms fall apart under serious scrutiny. In press statements about the deal, State Department officials have affirmed America’s commitment to Israel and her qualitative military superiority over Saudi Arabia. Israel has possessed JDAMs since 1990 and will receive a more advanced version of the bomb kit as part of the arms package. While the deal is unpopular with Israel supporters in Washington, the Israeli government itself has no intention of denouncing the weapons sale. In fact, Israel almost certainly benefits from a strengthened Sunni Arab coalition that can play the role of regional balancer against a revisionist Iran. Less persuasive is the notion Saudi Arabia might use JDAMs on U.S. soldiers stationed in Iraq. What country on earth has a greater incentive to maintain Iraqi stability than Saudi Arabia? Moreover, what benefit could the Saudi royal family possibly derive from alienating the one great power committed to containing its

March 2008

Dan may be reached at dbmay@princeton.edu

Europe

Declawing the Bear U.S. Strategic Thought Towards Russia

Joshua Harris ‘11

f all the misconceptions within American foreign policy, exceptionalism is perhaps the gravest. Contemporary statesmen seem to labor under the notion that our power is invincible; the United States, it seems, can always get what it wants. This conviction is far from benign: it backfired in suggesting we could export democracy to Iraq, and it has poisoned of relations with Moscow. Over the past decade, Washington has systematically sought to expand its power and influence over Russia’s neighbors in the misguided belief that Moscow cannot stop it. Alas, the White House entirely failed to realize that the Russian Bear has grown a sharp set of claws. In light of

Russia’s new strength, we must abandon our false conceptions of primacy. We should replace our failed policy of rollback with a sound strategy of reciprocal accommodation.

“Since Vladimir Putin assumed power in 2000, Russia’s ability to harm American security interests has only grown.”

This sad tale of foolish overconfidence began after the fall of the Soviet Union. During the 1990s, the Kremlin was a debilitated and passive opponent plagued by ruinous inflation, severe corruption, poor leadership, a crippled military, and farflung provinces that flouted central authority. Washington took advantage of this weakness by extending American influence into the former Soviet Union. In 1997, NATO expanded to include Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland. Promises of both NATO and EU accession, meanwhile, were given to many of the other former Soviet republics. Russia was sidelined: it was given some development aid, and allowed to the join the G7, but Washington largely ignored Moscow’s interests in its former satellites. The current Bush Administration even more vigorously pursued this policy of rolling back Russian influence. NATO again expanded, now encompassing three Baltic states diMikhail Klimentyev/AP rectly on Russia’s border from

which the United States began to conduct aerial patrols. Washington further sought to undermine Russian power in Ukraine and Georgia, supporting proAmerican revolutions and hanging the lure of future NATO membership. The White House also embarked on an ambitious program of nuclear modernization, seeking to build a national missile defense shield as well as new nuclear warheads and bombs. Russian interests were once more ignored. Russian history is marked by a severe pattern of insecurity that indelibly stamped the nation’s strategic culture. The steppes separating the country from its enemies in Europe were flat, offering little tactical protection. Russia has in-

American Foreign Policy

stead relied heavily on strategic depth for defense, protecting Moscow by maintaining a long corridor of territory between it and Europe. American efforts to strip the Kremlin of control over Eastern Europe engendered acute insecurity. The attempt to bring Ukraine, an area of key strategic depth as well as a valuable gas transit point, into the Western ‘camp’ was particularly troubling for Moscow. America’s nuclear program, meanwhile, seemed designed to nullify the one military edge Moscow had: its nuclear deterrent. Russia finally reacted to these threats when Vladimir Putin assumed power in 2000. With high oil prices offering a substantial revenue stream, Putin ruthlessly centralized political power and consolidated the country’s natural resources under state holding companies. By 2004, he had made significant progress toward restoring national stability and strength and handily won reelection. Since then, Russia’s ability to harm American security interests has only grown. Moscow now has the financial resources to modernize and rebuild its decrepit nuclear forces. In response to Washington’s growing nuclear edge, the Kremlin has developed a suite of new nuclear instruments, including a mis-

Europe sile that can evade active defenses. This nuclear renaissance threatens to facilitate global proliferation. By design or by corruption, there is a substantial risk that the new technologies will find their way to other nuclear – or, worse, non-nuclear – powers. Even beyond the further spread of the bomb, increases in the lethality of nuclear weapons lead to conditions that make nuclear war more likely. Possessors of such weapons are emboldened to engage in reckless coercion; those on the receiving end are frightened by the increased risk of a decapitation strike and likely to put their own weapons on a high alert status that risks accidental launch. Russia also has a sophisticated conventional military-industrial complex, and the government has been more than willing to export advanced arms to ‘rogue’ states, especially in the Middle East. Moscow currently sells modern air defense systems, fourth-generation combat fighters, anti-ship and anti-air missiles, and a variety of technologies, such as GPS jammers, designed to counter the American military. The Kremlin plans to invest some of its newfound oil resources in funding more of the advanced military platforms that endow it with a considerable amount of annual export revenue. Though these weapons have so far been mere nuisances to American forces, this will likely change in the future. More effective anti-shipping weapons, particularly supercavitating torpedoes, will increase the ability of its clients to disrupt shipping lanes. Worse, by arming states like Iran and Syria, the Kremlin seeds instability in the Middle East and reduces the effectiveness of American forces. Peace there, in fact, is not necessarily in its interest: instability and crisis keep oil prices high, which bankrolls the Russian government. Finally, Russia is making increasing efforts to attain control over the lucrative and economically vital oil and gas reserves of Central Asia. Although Beijing has forged links with Central Asian producers, Moscow remains the dominant political, economic, and military presence in the region. Put together with Russia’s own formidable reserves, control of the 200 billion barrels of oil and gas found in the area would give Russia extraordinary sway over prices. Though OPEC has pursued a doctrine of price stability in order to prevent the emergence of alternative

Misha Japaridze/AP

Oil: one of the bear’s sharpest claws. Russia has used its deep oil reserves, built from drilling in oil fields like the Arctic Val Gamburtseva (shown here), to exert clout over neighbors like Belarus.

energy sources, Russia has shown no compunction about using hydrocarbons as geopolitical weapons, regularly reducing or breaking off the flow of fossil fuels for strategic effect. Considering that oil price instability has cost the American economy more than $7 trillion in the past four decades, the risks of a Russian natural resource monopoly in Central Asia are enormous. Given that the price of Russian en-

March 2008

mity is high and the benefits of rollback slim, Washington would be well served to recognize Moscow as a power to be reckoned with. When the White House and the Kremlin trade tit-for-tat blows, neither wins. Rather, the situation calls for a grand bargain. Accommodating Russian interests in exchange for Moscow accommodating our own is a mutually advantageous arrangement. Such a strategy would not call for passively accepting

Africa Kremlin policies that endanger America; rather, it would comprise a reciprocal change in policy that simultaneously advanced each side’s security priorities. Washington would cease attempting to extend the Western political and military sphere along the Russian border; it would also abandon its quest for nuclear primacy. Russia would agree to reductions in its nuclear forces and restrictions on the export of sensitive military technology to “rogue” states. It would also reaffirm the sovereignty of the Central Asian states and refrain from any military intervention that would compromise that sovereignty. Should Russia fail to abide by

the provisions of this ‘grand bargain’, we would apply proportionate countervailing pressure with our own resources. The policy of rollback as pursued by the Bush Administration is not intrinsically flawed. Against a weak and self-concerned Russia, the United States would likely succeed in attaining political and commercial influence over Moscow’s neighbors. Unfortunately, Russia is neither powerless nor provincial: a massive influx of oil revenue, combined with a traditional obsession over strategic depth, has endowed the bear with sharp claws indeed. It would be perilous to behave as if we were invulnerable to Russian coercion and foolhardy not to recognize the potential for accommodative

Political Violence in Kenya

The Perilous Road Back to Peace

n December 27, 2007, Mwai Kibaki was declared the winner of Kenya’s presidential elections, after an electoral process marked by widespread fraud. It seems quite clear that Mr. Kibaki rigged the vote: exit polls, early returns, and concurrent parliamentary elections all indicated his opponent, Raila Odinga, would win decisively. While international observers have declared the results invalid, Kenya’s Electoral Commission quickly confirmed Kibaki’s victory, and he was sworn in on December 30th. Odinga and his supporters promptly rejected this verdict, and massive demonstrations and riots erupted. As of publication, more than 1,000 Kenyans have died. Unlike regional tinderboxes such as Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan, Kenya has enjoyed remarkable stability. In contrast to its conflict-ridden neighbors in sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya boasted a thriving tourist industry, steady economic growth, and a democratic political process. Indeed, some in the EU

Lucas Issacharoff ‘10 even felt it would be unnecessary to send electoral observers to a country as stable as Kenya. Hence, the suddenness

diplomacy. Should such negotiation fail and Moscow continue its antagonistic disposition toward America, we would be more than justified in continuing our present policies. But the Kremlin has proven highly calculating and sensible before, and it is likely to be receptive to a bargain, particularly given the upcoming accession of pragmatist Dmitri Medvedev to the presidency. It would, regardless, be senseless not to even try. Afp

Joshua may be reached at jehtwo@princeton.edu

and intensity of the recent violence caught the world by surprise. This violence demonstrates the fragility of Kenya’s previous stability, and indicates that the country is not immune to the problems that plague much of Africa. The failure of political leadership in Kenya has revealed the underlying weakness of its democratic institutions, and its festering tribal and ethnic rivalries have now erupted into the open. While the causes of the vio-

Antony Njuguna/AP

Kofi Annan’s highly public involvement in negotiating the election crisis has been key to ending the violence.

American Foreign Policy

Africa lence are easy enough to understand, they are much harder to address. Fortunately, Kenya can learn from other nations’ successes and failures, and chart its course accordingly. Kenya’s political scene is dangerously polarized along tribal lines. In this respect, it resembles Rwanda at the time of its 1994 genocide, although Kenya’s demographics are far more complicated. Mr. Kibaki hails from the Kikuyu tribe, the country’s wealthiest and largest tribe. Though the Kikuyus make up only 22% of Kenya’s population, they have long dominated its economic and political scene, such that members of other tribes have complained of discrimination. These disaffected groups, like Odinga’s Luo tribe and the Kalenjin tribe, have gathered under the banner of Odinga’s Orange Party. Where such tensions exist, elections have often proved to be the cata-

in Kenya would obviously be inappropriate at this time; but to the extent that there has been any recent progress, it is unequivocally due to international pressure and to the peace talks hosted by Kofi Annan. Second, security needs to be reestablished as quickly as possible. In Iraq, the American failure to contain the insurgency led to a security vacuum, in which sectarian militias like the Sadr brigade proliferated. This type of situation should be avoided in Kenya. Though the Kenyan militias are currently small-scale and armed mostly with machetes or primitive weapons like bows and arrows, the present level of violence is a clear warning that we cannot allow the instability to continue, nor can we allow competing groups to become more heavily armed and centralized. So far, the Kenyan police and national army have only been deployed

“This violence demonstrates the fragility of Kenya’s previous stability, and indicates that the country is not immune to the problems that plague much of Africa.” lyst rather than the cure for such strife. The pattern where contested elections have led to conflict can be seen in Palestine, Algeria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo; to name but a few recent examples. Drastic shifts in the balance of domestic political power, however, do not necessarily have to be followed by violence, as shown by the example of South Africa. The recent successes and failures of states making the transition to democracy offer both guidance and warning to Kenya. There are three steps needed to stem the tide of violence: vigorous international engagement, rapid reestablishment of security, and political accommodation. The international community has seen the value of sustained engagement in South Sudan and in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s tumultuous east, where international arbitration has put an end to ethnic and religious conflict. In contrast, the ethnic cleansing and genocide in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia clearly demonstrates the costs of inaction. Military intervention

sporadically and unevenly. The police response needs to be more coherent, as incidents where unarmed protesters were shot in front of a camera crew alternate with cases where police stood idly by as looting and worse occurred. The army needs to be deployed immediately to crack down on emerging but rudimentary militias and to ensure basic security in the most violent regions. Finally, the leadership must be willing to make concessions to the opposition. One need only look to the contrasting examples of Zimbabwe and South Africa to be convinced of the necessity of compromise. In both countries, the black majority took power from the previous apartheid government, but their fates drastically diverged following this political transition. In Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe’s policy of seizing virtually all white-owned land and redistributing it to his supporters brought the country to the verge of economic collapse; while the South African government’s moderate program of increasing opportunity for black (continued on p. 12)

March 2008

AFP Quiz

Multiple Choice Monthly Franco Lopez ‘10 1. Which country recently experienced significant infighting between rebel forces and governmental troops in its capital city? a) Nepal b) Peru c) Chad d) Holy See e) Sri Lanka 2. Which country’s President was critically wounded in a recent assassination attempt? a) Pakistan b) East Timor c) Philippines d) Colombia e) European Union 3. Which prominent Christian religious leader’s comments on Sharia (Islamic law) have recently made him the center of controversy? a) Rowan Williams, Archbishop b) Benedict XVI, Pope c) Mike Huckabee, Preacher d) Bartholomew I, Patriarch e) Alexius II, Primate 4. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan is mediating a post-election crisis in which country? a) Jamaica b) Sudan c) Belarus d) Kenya e) U.S. (forget post-election, we have a pre-election crisis) 5. Which historic architectural structure was recently destroyed by a fire? a) Angkor Wat, Cambodia b) Sungnyemun Gate, South Korea c) The Great Wall of China, People’s Republic of China d) Leaning Tower of Pisa, Italy e) Palace of Versailles’ Hall of Mirrors, France Answers on p. 19

GLOBAL Alan Greenspan, former Federal Reserve Chairman, says that the UNITED STATES’ economy has a “50% or better” chance of slipping into a recession, as domestic and world markets remain in a slump. President Bush’s $152 billion economic stimulus package is designed to offset the impact of falling real estate prices on consumer spending by providing tax rebates of up to $600 per person.

The Archbishop of Canterbury sparks controversy after declaring in an interview that the incorporation of some aspects of Islamic law in the legal system of the UNITED KINGDOM is “unavoidable.” His comments come amidst continued concern over Muslim integration in the country.

ITALIAN Premier Romano Prodi resigns after only 20 months in office following a vote of no confidence in his government. New elections are scheduled for midApril, with former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and Walter Veltroni, Mayor of Rome, campaigning for the post.

The primary season continues in the UNITED STATES. John McCain emerges as the Republican front-runner following Super Tuesday, while Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton engage in a close race for the Democratic nomination. Hugo Chávez makes progress in the COLOMBIAN hostage situation, as the rebels of FARC release three hostages. Among those still in captivity are three American hostages, who have been held for over five years.

Close to 12,000 refugees flee SUDAN in an attempt to find safety in Chad. More than 200 are killed in military air strikes over western Darfur, but the Sudanese government claims the attacks only targeted rebels.

Hugo Chávez of VENEZUELA threatens to stop supplying the United States with oil as Exxon-Mobil manages to obtain a court freeze on Venezuelan assets worth up to $12 billion. The U.S. oil company is challenging the nationalization of multibillion dollar oil projects by Chávez’s government on legal grounds and seeks compensation.

American Foreign Policy

Kofi Annan is called in to mediate after KENYA descends into tribal violence, resulting in a thousand deaths. The recent violence was stirred up by the highly contested presidential elections, in which Mwai Kibaki of the Kikuyu tribe was declared the winner amidst allegations of fraud and vote manipulation.

UPDATE Collected by Vishal Chanani ‘11

On the eve of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the recently reelected President Boris Tadic of SERBIA warns he will “never give up the fight of our Kosovo.” He hints Serbia may downgrade diplomatic relations with countries that recognize an independent Kosovo.

As suicide attacks continue, PAKISTAN postpones parliamentary elections to February 18th. Meanwhile, American intelligence agencies claim that senior Taliban and al-Qaeda officials are taking refuge in Pakistan, an allegation which Islamabad denies.

During U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ visit to Baghdad to discuss troop levels, IRAQ is rocked by an attack in the city of Balad, in which 33 people were killed. In the previous week, a major suicide attack left close to 100 dead, and Iraq’s security situation does not look like it will improve anytime soon.

As CHINA ushers in the Year of the Rat, the country struggles with terrible winter blizzards. The storms were described as the worst experienced in 50 years.

After Hamas tears down the wall separating Gaza from EGYPT, thousands of Palestinians rush to buy food and other necessities at affordable prices. Egypt finally reseals the border after 11 days.

The government of AUSTRALIA formally issues an apology for the “Stolen Generations” of 1915 to 1969, when Aboriginal children were forcibly taken by their parents to be raised as white. Indigenous affairs minister Jenny Macklin rejects, however, the idea of a compensation fund for the kidnapped victims and their families.

March 2008

Africa

Sayyid Azim/AP

The descent into violence is always too rapid.

citizens has led to continued economic growth. Kenya, unfortunately, seems to be hewing closer to Zimbabwe’s path, as both sides have shown little interest in compromise thus far. In the weeks following the election, Mr. Kibaki suggested trying Mr. Odinga and other Orange Party leaders for war crimes, while the latter called for mass demonstrations that inevitably led to more violence. While hopes were high that Mr. Annan’s mediation would lead to a unity government, the former UN Secretary-General denied that such a solution was imminent. Given that Mr. Kibaki has so far refused to consider a unity government with the Orange Party, and that Mr. Odinga had previously

resisted peace talks out of fear that this step would legitimize Mr. Kibaki’s rule, both sides have a long way to go.

Kikuyus, and almost certainly will hold the upper hand when the dust settles, they must nevertheless resist the temptation to take revenge. Because Kenya’s tribal demographics preclude the dominance of one particular group, a unity government of some sort will be essential. Finally, the international community, learning from Rwanda, seems little inclined to turn a blind eye to the crisis. Let us hope that both Kenya and the international community have internalized the lessons of the past. Afp

“Security needs to be reestablished as quickly as possible.”

That the two continue to toss inflammatory rhetoric at one another while their country burns is depressing but unsurprising, given the current dearth of African leadership. Kenya will probably emerge from this crisis battered, but not broken. Kenya has – or had – the advantage of a vibrant economy, which gives both sides incentives to compromise before it is irreparably damaged. While the Luos do have legitimate grievances against the

American Foreign Policy

Lucas may be reached at lissacha@princeton.edu

Africa common in Delhi: intermittent electricity, potholed roads, massive traffic jams, he ragedy of eneficence and hordes of beggars at every street corner. Ghana has one of Africa’s best road networks, and the government is currently modernizing the country’s railways and ports. But after a week in the capital city, my enthusiasm began to fade. It soon became clear that despite the NGO and infrastructural development, Mohit Agrawal ‘11 activity Ghana lacks organic economic growth. ver intersession, I visited the becoming economically and politically While entrepreneurship is often the encountry of Ghana in West Af- stable. The economy has grown 5% for gine of any economy, there is a notable rica as part of an assessment several years now and is primed to grow absence of it in Ghana. Perhaps this is trip for Engineers Without 7% this year. But belying this promising best explained by the risk-averse lethargy Borders (EWB). The group focuses on story is a darker, more insidious one: the brought about by excessive philanthropy alleviating poverty by identifying small country’s economic growth is simply un- from the outside world. projects in poor communities that can be sustainable. Major international donors This lethargy is particularly insidiimplemented in order to make big differ- and NGO’s are pouring money into the ous because it forces workers into safe ences for the area’s people. In Ghana, country to test their programs for Africa jobs rather than high-risk/high-return we were able to conduct interviews, visit in a relatively stable environment. Just startups. For example, until the early communities, and evaluate schools and as in the oil-rich countries of the Middle 1990’s, India’s most coveted jobs were in health clinics, among other things. Our East, Ghana’s political leaders aren’t tak- government bureaucracies, where the pay assessment report of the trip focused ing advantage of this economic high tide may not have been the highest but where on microscale housing, education, and to implement reforms that will create job security, housing and retirement arrangements were guaranteed. Ghana health projects that EWB could pursue permanent growth in their country. At first, Ghana’s economy seems is currently in a similar situation. The in the nation. After having spent only a week in the strong and its infrastructure appears ten profligacy of philanthropists has caused country, however, I realized that Ghana to fifteen years ahead of booming India’s. the Ghanaians to lose the incentive to be requires far more than simple microscale In fact upon landing at Kotaka Interna- entrepreneurial. Unlike the Indians who interventions by groups of student- tional Airport, I was pleasantly surprised lusted for government jobs, Ghanaians engineers from the United States. On to learn that Ghana has what for years have their eyes fixed on desk jobs in one the face of things, the country is boom- India has lacked – a well-functioning air- of the hundreds of NGO’s in the couning: Ghana just celebrated 50 years of port. The casual visitor to Ghana will not try. In Accra, every street seems to be independence, and the country is finally notice any of the detritus which is all so filled with an endless supply of NGO offices: Opportunity International, the Salvation Army, Oxfam, etc. Our guide also told us that Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary General, chose to locate large UN operations in Ghana; indeed, operations like the UNHCR and UNICEF have outposts in the country. These NGO’s have created a new middle class of bureaucrats; however, the availability of such jobs means that Ghanaians have no incentive to take risks in industry or commerce. Why try to start a new venture which may fail when you can grab a life-long bureaucratic position? Until Ghanaians Olivier Asselin/AP can become more entrepre-

Ghana’s Overreliance on Foreign Aid

If the well of foreign aid dries up, who will pay the rent?

March 2008

Africa neurial and risk-tolerant, foreign aid will crowd out organic economic growth in the country. Another factor driving the popularity of bureaucratic positions is the lack of affordable land and housing in the nation; indeed, land and housing costs are so high that even middle-class professionals like teachers and doctors must save for decades before they can afford a home. Thus, because of high housing costs, Ghanaians prefer bureaucratic jobs in NGO’s and the government; these jobs provide housing for employees which they cannot otherwise afford for themselves. Together, the availability of bureaucratic positions and the need for employer provided housing means that educated Ghanaians tend away from entrepreneurial activities. The downside to a risk-averse economic environment is serious. Ghana’s economy is based mostly on primary goods (the exporting of agricultural and mining products) and has little secondary or tertiary activity. In short, Ghana lacks a manufacturing base. For example, many of Ghana’s cars appear to be Indian imports. Tata SUV’s, Maruti hatchbacks, Mahindra jeeps – the stalwarts of the Indian auto industry are omnipresent on the streets of Accra, emphasizing the lack of domestic industry in Ghana. Even simpler items like minifridges, AC units, ceiling fans, and sinks and toilets are also all imported – which begs visitors to ask what Ghana itself manufactures. In exasperation, I posed this question to our Ghanaian guide, who after some thought, responded that perhaps Nestlé produces some chocolate in the country. For Ghana’s economy to become sustainable, reforms are essential. Firstly, the country is in dire need of land

reform. The cost of land and housing is high because the notion of land “ownership” is itself still a murky concept. Who do you pay to buy a plot of land: the “official” owner, the local chief, or the family who has generational claims to the plot? Common practice today is to simply pay all involved parties, which raises the cost of acquisition. The high

scale banking reform. Banking is currently dominated in the country by British conglomerates like Barclay’s and Standard Chartered. These banks lend only to those very few who can provide collateral. The government needs to step in and partially guarantee loans to small businesses and entrepreneurs – this will bring down the cost of borrowing and increase business activity. The government should also partially guarantee home mortgages, which would bring down the cost of mortgages and therefore make housing more affordable. Lastly, the government needs to revamp its state industries. Old government agricultural and mining monopolies must be divided and privatized so that they can be made more competitive. These companies should be sold to Ghanaians, and the profits should then be rolled into entrepreneurial grants (much like venture capital funds in the U.S.). Though Ghana faces deep-seated economic problems, there is still hope. The country is blessed with impressive natural resources, political stability, and relatively advanced infrastructure. These advantages, however, will not bring a better life for millions of Ghanaians unless the social capital of the country can be likewise improved – Ghanaians need to be freed from their shackles of risk-aversion. Once the entrepreneurial spirit is unleashed, Ghana can enjoy the fruits of organic economic growth. No longer will the country be held hostage by the whims of international commodity markets or the budgets of international NGO’s: economic growth will come from the inside-out, not from the outside-in. Afp

“It soon became clear that despite the NGO activity and infrastructural development, Ghana lacks organic economic growth.”

These Ghanaian children were rescued from indentured servitude by NGO’s. Now Ghana’s government must provide them with a future.

cost of land makes housing too expensive for many, forcing them to seek jobs as bureaucrats to secure housing. Implementation of a property tax could fix this problem: whoever pays the tax is the rightful owner. This would bring down the cost of land and thus the cost of housing; consequently, more affordable housing will allow people to feel more comfortable setting off in their own entrepreneurial direction. Secondly, the country needs large-

Mohit may be reached at magrawal@princeton.edu

Cassandra Vinograd/AP

American Foreign Policy

Constitutionality and Foreign Policy Pelosi’s Rejection of Executive Monopoly

n the spring of 2007, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi made two specific forays into the arena of foreign affairs that have been praised by some and harshly criticized by others. Many of these critics, including Jakub Voboril writing in the December issue of American Foreign Policy, have argued that Speaker Pelosi overstepped the bounds of her authority in opening relations with the head of the Syrian state and in temporarily supporting a House resolution condemning the Armenian genocide. That criticism, also coming from sources such as the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post and the Bush Administration, carries the implication that the executive branch ought to be the sole arbiter of America’s foreign policy, unimpeded by Congress. This notion, however, suffers from several conceptual and constitutional defects, placing it outside the historical norms of American government and causing it to fail as a critique of Speaker Pelosi. Reducing this question to its essential issues and temporarily laying aside its details, the concept of an executive operating autonomously in such an important field is both troubling and risky. When the executive formulates new policy, it needs to be subjected to scrutiny and debate. In this sense, the more minds that are brought to bear, the better; more of the nation’s concerns are taken into account and more of the policy’s holes are plugged. Indeed, the executive that resists discussion and analysis encounters a greater risk of failure. Furthermore, the term “foreign policy” covers a range of complex and diverse challenges that unavoidably relate to domestic issues, as well. A wall erected to exclude the legislative branch from foreign policy will be arbitrary, artificial and ignorant of the intersections between foreign and domestic concerns in virtually every field of government work. Fortunately the Constitution of the

Matthew Drecun ‘11

US Foreign Policy competition between the President and Congress throughout American history, from the 19th-century tariff disputes, through the Vietnam-era debates over the extent of presidential power in prosecuting a war, up to the contemporary battles over funding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Partisanship has often intensified that rivalry. Particularly in situations like the current one, with a President of one party and a Congress controlled by the other, antagonism is bound to develop. In the case of Speaker Pelosi’s actions in early 2007, proponents of executive authority attempted to skirt the battle over justification by claiming that no specific authority is delegated to the Speaker of the House in particular, so that official can have no influence on foreign policy. This criticism, however, is better understood as a criticism from one side of the aforementioned rivalry, rather than from

United States rejects this construct. Even a brief reading of Articles I and II will reveal how the various powers granted to Congress related to foreign affairs – the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, to declare war and to appropriate related funds, among others – and the absence of any declaration of presidential hegemony delegitimizes the idea that the President wields such unilateral power. The President is further limited by Article I’s various powers of oversight and consent given to the Congress. While some may point to the general principle of the separation of powers in order to justify presidential control over foreign policy, an equal part of that principle is the balance of those powers: separation acts to limit control, not expand it. With this in mind, it is worthwhile to consider a logical extension of the idea in question. In order to give the President sole control over diplomacy, the military, foreign aid and the myriad of other components of foreign policy, it would be necessary to transfer away from Congress the power of appropriating budgets, since policy is meaningless without monetary support. The impropriety of such a move is obvious. This constitutional division of Pelosi in Lebanon: counterbalancing, powers has spurred

not subverting, the President’s policies.

March 2008

US Foreign Policy a dispassionate observer. The Speaker of the House is not the executive’s representative for foreign affairs and does not have to rely on executive authority to operate in that arena. Rather, Speaker Pelosi, being the head of the House of Representatives and therefore the thirdhighest elected official in the country, operates on an extension of congressional powers, and her actions can be justified as such. Contextually, one can understand Speaker Pelosi’s trip to Israel and Syria, construed by some as an outright usurpation of the President’s diplomatic authority, as something resembling a Supreme Court justice’s dissenting opinion. It registers official disagreement with current policy by displaying two messages: first, that there exists opposition to the majority view at a high level; and second, since such opposition exists, that there may be a time in the future when it becomes the majority position. Pelosi has good reason to anticipate a significant change in the Oval Office in the near future, no matter which party wins the presidential election. As the most powerful elected Democrat in the country, her trip to Syria was an assertion of that party’s view and a way of influencing the course to be set by whoever succeeds President Bush. Further, her excursion actually influenced the actions of the current president. After being of such importance

during the Clinton Administration, the affairs of that part of the Middle East had lost priority to Iraq and Iran under the Bush Administration. Arguably due to Speaker Pelosi’s trip to the area, the attentions of the President and his Secretary of State have shifted to the region. In this way, the involvement of a legisla-

lution, the arguments of the two sides placed the pragmatism of maintaining our relationships in the Middle East in opposition to the moral obligation of condemning genocide. Since Turkey allows us to route supply lines to Iraq through its territory, the fear of upsetting the government took precedence over joining our state governments in condemnation of the genocide. While this is a reasonable point, Speaker Pelosi and other supporters of the resolution should not be criticized for reminding the pragmatists of foreign policy’s moral dimension. In a debate between pragmatism and principle, if the executive considers only the former, then someone in government has a duty to remind him of the latter. America is a pluralist society with myriad concerns and interests. The writers of the Constitution recognized this, as does Speaker Pelosi today. They designed a government in the varied and diverse image of that society. It is a vision of balance and pluralism that we would be wise to honor. Afp

“Speaker Pelosi should not be criticized for reminding the pragmatists of foreign policy’s moral dimensions.” tor persuaded an executive accustomed to acting unilaterally to remember one of America’s ignored priorities. Pelosi’s support of the non-binding resolution condemning the Armenian genocide in Turkey during World War I is also justifiable. According to the Armenian National Committee of America, 40 of the 50 state legislatures throughout the United States have recognized and condemned the Armenian genocide. So if the complaint is with the resolution itself rather than with Pelosi’s involvement, then the problem can be found in state legislatures that have spoken out on the issue, the entire House of Representatives for taking up the question, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee for passing the resolution up to the House to begin with. The quarrel need not be with Speaker Pelosi herself. Regarding the debate over the reso-

Matthew may be reached at mdrecun@princeton.edu

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American Foreign Policy

East Asia

Andy Wong/AP

Don’t Fear the Dragon

The Appropriate American Response to China’s Rise

mong the many different slogans, catchphrases, and stump speeches of the recent election cycle, one sentiment rings loudly and clearly, coming as it does from politicians and economists, policy makers and media: “We have to meet the Rise of China.” In America, many firmly believe that China will overtake the U.S. in the near future, and there are incessant warnings of how China will become the next superpower. Such statements dominate and often form the basis of any discussion on Sino-American relations. Implicit in these warnings is the fleeting question concerning the security

Hyoung Sung Kim ‘11 and insurance of America’s hegemony over the rest of the world. This increased apprehension towards China’s rise is not a rebirth of the Cold War, but rather the slow recognition that America might lose its overarching dominance in world affairs. In Africa, China is providing underdeveloped countries such as Chad, Sudan, and the Republic of Congo with the necessary investment to develop their untapped oil reserves. And China’s increasing willingness to veto key proposals in the United Nations Security Council, most notably in regards to Darfur and Cambodia, points to a previously unseen assertiveness. These events are interpret-

March 2008

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates reviews an honor guard with his Chinese counterpart Cao Gangchuan.

ed by American policymakers as threats to American hegemony and form the basis for thought amongst policy makers in the United States. But if America is to achieve any headway in its Sino-American diplomacy, this underlying premise that China’s “rise” is a situation that requires urgent and aggressive attention is in need of radical rethinking. Chinese attempts to “buy influence” in Africa, as it is often dubbed, in fact have historical roots that are often ignored or glossed over. Mainstream media outlets scarcely note that Chinese influence in Africa is not a new phenomenon; in fact, it is the continuation of a relationship that began in the 1950’s when newly independent states across the globe attempted to resist coercion from both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, prompting a search for “a Third Way.” After a century of humiliation by Western powers and half a century of

East Asia internal turmoil, China is slowly reestablishing its role in international affairs and pursuing the role it failed to fill half a century ago – the role of an alternative option to the dominant political order. In fact, the last thing China wants in the international political arena is a conflict of any sort with America. While the Chinese have built a large, modern military, it has only been in response to a rise in American militarism around the world and the risk of a potential conflict over Taiwan. China’s foremost priority is the suppression of internal dissent. Managing what the Chinese see as the increasingly precarious balance between growing economic freedoms and the lack of political liberties is becoming more difficult daily with the new, widespread availability of the Internet and other sources of information to penetrate

party ideology. Even controlling a small religious sect such as the Falun Gong has forced the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to expend an enormous amount of energy and resources. Internal dissent

over Taiwan no longer makes political and economic sense to both parties. On China’s part, there is an increasing willingness to seek peaceful reunification in the framework of the return of Hong Kong and Macau as Special Administrative Regions. With American military forces stretched across the world, the last thing America needs is a conflict over an issue that has lost political significance over the past half century. Nothing in China’s present foreign relations suggests that it seeks to challenge American hegemony in any way. It has actively sought cooperation on every major issue concerning the world today: free trade, reducing carbon emissions, and nuclear proliferation, in stark contrast to the unilateral policies of the current Bush administration. If anything, Chinese foreign relations constitute attempts at balancing American power. China’s in-

“Shedding the skin that has characterized American diplomacy for half a century will be the first step towards a rosier future in Sino-American relations.” remains the single most important issue for theCCP as China enters a new phase of rapid modernization and globalization. The most significant threat to SinoAmerican relations is a potential conflict over Taiwan. In the 1950’s and 1960’s, American intervention made strategic and ideological sense as part of the struggle against Communism. But the world has radically changed since then. A war

KNOW YOUR IR Military Alliances Duncan Fitz ‘08 The United States and its allies face security threats to their interests all over the world. As a result, the past fifty years have seen rapid growth in the number of military alliances dedicated to promoting global peace and prosperity. These alliances deal with wartime planning, strategic commitments, and contingency planning for emergency situations. Many also involve non-military agreements in addition to their primary raison d’être. Here is a brief description of some of the most important of these military alliances – what they do, why they do it, and with whom. Enjoy!

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

This is one of the best known and most effective military alliances in the entire world. Initially founded in April 1949, primarily to counter growing Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, the organization survived and in fact flourished after the end of the Cold War. Its 26 members include the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, most of Western and Central Europe, and recently, nations in Eastern Europe as well as Turkey. The core of NATO’s strategic mission is the doctrine of collective defense, whereby each member states pledges itself to the mutual defense of any state falling under the attack of an external party. This doctrine was most recently invoked after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. NATO continues

to operate throughout Afghanistan, with American, Canadian, British, and Australian troops playing the most prominent roles. Recent disagreements about burden sharing of combat operations have partially strained the alliance.

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command

NORAD is a joint military defensive alliance between the United States and Canada. Since its inception in May 1958, it has been responsible for providing aerospace warning, coordination, and control for the North American continent. Its main technical facility since 1963 has been the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center, based in Colorado, and therefore NORAD is often unofficially referred to as the

American Foreign Policy

East Asia the West and its institutions. American citizens should reciprocate this with an equal respect for Chinese intentions, and be wary of sensationalist claims about the “Rise of China”. The American people would do well not to succumb to such fears and simple logic; instead, they should seek to lay the bedrocks for a Sino-American relationship based on mutual respect and cooperation. Afp

Hyoung Sung may be reached at hyoungk@princeton.edu 07062105873 Greg Baker/AP

creasing resistance to American attempts to impose its will is a source of major frustration to policymakers who are used to the notion of American unilateralism. Shedding the skin that has characterized American diplomacy for half a century will be the first step towards a rosier fu-

ture in Sino-American relations. In sum, the only thing the United States has to fear regarding China is its own fear of China itself. The Chinese leadership and its people, while perhaps divergent in internal unity, converge in one area: their immense respect for

Cheyenne Mountain Defense Alliance. The responsibility for managing this alliance is held by the United States Air Force, under the direct command of the 721st Mission Support Group, which falls under the umbrella of the 21st Space Wing. NORAD’s defense force is comprised of the United States Air Force, the Canadian NORAD regional forces, and the Continental NORAD regional forces. While its founding strategic objective was to increase American and Canadian defenses against long-range Soviet bombers armed with nuclear weapons attacking via the Arctic Ocean, the end of the Cold War forced NORAD commanders to reassess their mission. Since the early 1990s, therefore, NORAD has also been charged with managing counter-drug operations which involve small and unlicensed aircraft. After the September 11th attacks, this mission was broadened to include monitoring all aircraft flying within the continental United States.

ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty

As its name suggests, ANZUS is a military alliance which covers American strategic interests in the Pacific theatre. While ANZUS directly binds Australia and New Zealand, however, it has only bound the United States to Australia since ties were strained when New Zealand opposed President Reagan’s Cold War strategy by banning nucleararmed ships from operating in their waters in the late 1980s. Nonetheless, both Australia and New Zealand invoked the

Answers for quiz on page 9: 1) c 4) d 2) b 5) b 3) a

ANZUS alliance and provided military units, including special forces and naval ships, in response to the 2001 terrorist attacks on their American ally. The alliance remains strong to this day.

SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, founded in 2001, is an intergovernmental mutual-security alliance between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The SCO is primarily concerned with security-related issues in the Central Asian theatre, including threats such as terrorism, separatism and extremism. In addition to security issues, the SCO is working towards a free trade zone for member nations as well as cultural and goodwill exchange programs. In the wake of recent tensions between America and Russia, many United States officials fear that the SCO could begin to serve as a counterbalance to American strategic interests.

FPDA Five Powers Defense Arrangements

The Five Powers Defense Arrangements are a series of mutual defense agreements which were signed between the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore in 1971. In particular, the FPDA commit all member nations to consult each other in the event of an attack against either Malaysia or Singapore.

March 2008

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