January 2009

american foreign policy January 2009

Volume VIII, Issue 4

Guns, Greed and bad Government Zimbabwe Somalia Congo

January 2009

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Staff

From the Editor

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s of this month, AFP has a new management team. While we assume our new leadership roles with fresh ideas for the continued growth of the magazine, we also have big shoes to fill as Rush Doshi and Manav Lalwani depart. As we transition, we would like to recognize the outstanding achievements of our predecessors, who devoted so much of their time and energy to make AFP one of Princeton’s most academic and professional undergraduate publications. We would like to dedicate this issue of AFP to their exceptional efforts over the past year.

Rush and Manav’s most important accomplishments at AFP appear on our masthead. During their tenure, they assembled the most talented group of editors and layout staff in the magazine’s history. This excellent group of individuals will carry AFP forward for years to come. Rush and Manav also took care to recruit intelligent and thoughtful writers from a wide variety of personal backgrounds and ideological persuasions, upholding AFP’s tradition of rigorous intellectual discourse and debate.

Thanks to their hard work, AFP has become a unique and constructive forum for discussing the most important foreign policy questions of the day. No other publication on campus provides such nuanced and ideologically diverse coverage of global politics.

For all their dedication, Rush and Manav are not the only ones who deserve praise for AFP’s success. Each writer, editor, and member of the layout staff plays a critical role in the functioning of the magazine. Without each of their efforts, we could not produce the high-quality publication that we turn out each month. In particular, Steve and I would like to recognize our Managing Editors, Eric Stern and Katherine Gaudyn, who work tirelessly to run AFP’s demanding editing cycle. We’d also like to thank our production manager, Jonathan Giuffrida, for all of his expertise in leading AFP’s layout team.

Thanks to Rush and Manav’s energetic leadership, AFP is poised for continued growth and success. As Steve and I take the magazine forward, we owe these two a huge debt of gratitude.

Editor-in-Chief

Dan May ’11 Publisher Steve Lindsay ’09 Managing Editors Katherine Gaudyn ’11 Eric Stern ’11 Editors Carlos Hanco ’09 Emily Norris ’09 Jessica Sheehan ’09 ’09 Zvi Smith ’10 Ahson Azmat ’10 Jon Bradshaw Heejin Cho ’10 Matthew Drecun ’10 ’10 Jon Extein Jonathan Giuffrida’10 Lucas Issacharoff ’10 Catalina Valencia ’10 Brendan Carroll ’11

Layout

Business Staff

Peter McCall ’10

Publisher Emeritus Manav Lalwani ’09

Publisher Steve Lindsay

No part of this publication should be construed to promote any pending legislation or to support any candidate for office. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Woodrow Wilson School, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the James Madison Program, Princeton University, or American Foreign Policy. AFP gladly accepts letters to the editor, article proposals, and donations, which are fully tax-deductible.

AFP Advisory Board

Anne-Marie Slaughter: Dean, Woodrow Wilson School Nolan McCarty: Acting Dean, Woodrow Wilson School Katherine Newman: Director, Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies Robert P. George: Director, James Madison Program G. John Ikenberry: Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs Bernard A. Haykel: Director, Institute for Transregional Study of the Contemporary Middle East

All correspondence may be directed to: American Foreign Policy, 5406 Frist Center, Princeton, NJ 08544 afp@princeton.edu www.princeton.edu/~afp

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Ellen Chen ’12

Editor-in-Chief Emeritus Rush Doshi ’11

Editor-in-Chief Dan May

American Foreign Policy is a student-written, student-run publication based at Princeton University. It was founded in the wake of September 11th to provide Princeton students with a forum to discuss the difficult problems and choices facing the United States in the world. American Foreign Policy magazine is sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, and the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions.

’11 ’11 ’11 ’11 ’11 ’11 ’11 ’11 ’12 ’12 ’12 ’12 ’12

Ellen Choi ’11, Production Manager Jonathan Giuffrida ’10 Kelly Lack ’10 Emily Myerson ’12

All the best,

Vishal Chanani Ellen Choi Jamie LaMontagne Addie Lerner Tara Lewis Elias Sánchez-Eppler Eric Stern Kit Thayer Oliver Bloom Yun Chung Benjamin Cogan Charlie Metzger Peter Wang

American Foreign Policy

American Foreign Policy January 2009 Volume VIII, Issue 4

CONTENTS Africa

Somali Pirates

Fixing the Root Causes

Kevin Kim ’12

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Ending the Violence Brian Lipshutz ’11

A Stronger Bridge for Congo

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AFP Quiz

Rush Doshi ’11

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A Necessary Evil Yanran Chen ’12

The U.S. Should Engage Mugabe

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Global Update

Voter Turnout

Vishal Chanani ’11 10 Got MiGs?

U.S. Foreign Policy

Obama’s Cabinet

Continuity at the DoD

Emily Norris ’09 12

Asia Wide Load Skyrockets in Flight

The ASEAN Charter “Alex Noriega” ’11

Landmark Deal or More “Talk Shop”?

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In Context

Tara Lewis ’11

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Populism’s Decline Catalina Valencia ’10

A Major Shift in Latin America

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Latin America

Middle East

Passive Engagement Amara Nwannunu ’11

Separating Syria from Iran Photo Credits: Kim Byung-man, Dmitry Astakhov, Vahid Salemi, Seth Wenig / AP

January 2009

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Cover Photo: Osman Hassan / AP

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Cover Story

AP / French Navy / French Defense Ministry / HO

French marine commandos intercept suspected pirates in the Gulf of Aden.

Eighteen nations currently have forces in the area to deter piracy.

Somali Pirates Fixing the Root Causes

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overty, endless fighting, and political chaos all testify to Somalia’s status as a failed state. With the absence of a functioning government, the entire country has descended into lawlessness. This, in turn, has exacerbated piracy off the Somali coast. Although they began by hijacking small fishing ships, Somali pirates have recently expanded their operations into much bolder undertakings.

Last November, they seized a $100 million Saudi Arabian oil tanker, having previously captured a number of other major trade ships. This expansion in piracy is slowing traffic through the Suez Canal, which will undoubtedly threaten international trade.

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Kevin Kim ’12 Furthermore, allowing the Somali government to further deteriorate—specifically, allowing a complete takeover by the Islamic extremists who run much of the country— would provide an easy breeding ground for terrorism. The recent resignation of Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf and the new Obama administration, however, provide a golden opportunity for the U.S. and its allies to pursue several policies to stabilize the country while also eradicating its embarrassing piracy.

Current attempts to address piracy focus too much on the pirates themselves, rather than the political instability and economic deprivation that allow the pi-

American Foreign Policy

rates to flourish in Somalia. In response to increasingly sophisticated pirate attacks, the United Nations, backed by the United States, has passed a resolution that will allow military forces to chase Somali pirates onto land in cases of “hot pursuit.” Unfortunately, this latest action by the international community is extremely myopic. It fails to realize that piracy is merely a symptom of the deeper problem in Somalia: its fundamental inability to provide for its citizens.

Thus, while continuing efforts to deter the pirate attacks, the U.S. ought to address the roots of Somali piracy and devote more resources to resolve the unstable political and economic crises that cause it.

The current instability in Somalia stems from a civil war that never really ended. After the overthrow of the dictator Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia dissolved into anarchy. The following year, the UN Security Council stepped in with coalition forces to

Cover Story bring humanitarian aid and establish peace.

The Somali people, however, interpreted this intervention as imperialism and turned against the UN coalition. The coalition was ousted and Somalia once again fell into disarray. Two political factions eventually emerged from the chaos: the secular Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the extremist Islamic Courts Union (ICU). Although the ICU initially had greater political influence, it was ousted by the TFG, with the help of Ethiopian soldiers and American diplomatic support. While the TFG currently holds power in Somalia, it controls only a few cities. The nation is still far from unified, and the Al-Shabaab, an Islamic insurgent group affiliated with the ICU, continues to wage guerilla warfare, driving millions of Somalis from their homes.

Considering the decades of political turmoil in Somalia, it is unsurprising that its economy is in shambles. Because of the lack of a strong, unified government to support economic infrastructure, its per capita GDP has dwindled to $600 per year. Millions of Somalis still depend on UN food aid, and 73% of the population lives on less than $2 a day—dangerously close to the World Bank’s definition of extreme poverty.

The constant fighting has also created floods of refugees, further contributing to the lack of infrastructure development and national economic growth.

In stark contrast to the rest of the country, the villages from which the pirates operate enjoy an opulent lifestyle funded by the profits of hijacking. In one episode involving a Spanish fishing boat, the pirates secured a ransom of $1.2 million for the return of the vessel, a substantial amount of money, especially when compared to the $600 per year per capita GDP of the country as a whole. Many successful hijackings reap even larger ransoms. It is no wonder that the pirate villages in Somalia have turned into prospering boomtowns. Because of this economic prosperity, many Somalis have come to support the pirates. According to the Associated Press, the residents of one of the boomtowns, Haradhere, came out on shore to celebrate when the $100 million Saudi Arabian oil tanker The Sirius Star anchored after being hijacked by pirates.

Because of the economic state of Somalia, more and more Somalis seeking a mon-

etarily stable life will turn to piracy. Simply chasing the pirates onto land and capturing them will never solve the problem. Because Somali pirates operate out of economic necessity and not out of the ideological malice of terrorists, the U.S. and its allies need to address the economic and political upheaval in Somalia in order to combat piracy effectively.

First, America needs to reopen its embassy in Somalia. Although the United

the Arab League have expressed interest in contributing as well. Increased participation from the U.S., a prominent supporter of the recent UN resolution, will add legitimacy to a growing international coalition. A greater U.S. and international presence would serve to deter piracy in the short term while steps are being taken to stabilize the country as a whole.

On the economic front, the U.S. needs to encourage a new stream of capital into Somalia. While four major U.S. oil companies struck deals with the Somali government before the overthrow of Siad Barre, officials from both the Somali and U.S. governments have insisted that oil operations can restart only after Somalia is stabilized. Because an unstable Somalia prohibits collection on the oil investments, the U.S. government could encourage these companies to invest in Somalia. These financial investments would, in turn, serve to stabilize the nation economically and begin to develop the infrastructure to promote legitimate entrepreneurship. This approach would allow the U.S. to avoid direct economic aid, which is often ineffective.

Piracy off the Horn of Africa is really an extension of the deeper political and economic problems that plague Somalia.

Eliminating piracy in the long run requires political and economic stabilization, not just naval deployments. Without viable economic alternatives to piracy, many Somalis will continue to hijack ships because of the lucrative ransom payments involved.

Admittedly, the above steps alone will not suffice in rectifying or counteracting decades of political and economic turmoil.

Still, it is necessary to begin somewhere, and these suggestions will certainly serve as starting points for Somalia’s gradual return to stability. Afp

The pirate villages in Somalia have turned into prospering boomtowns. Because of this economic prosperity, many Somalis have come to support the pirates.

States never formally severed diplomatic relations with Somalia, its embassy has remained closed since the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991. The absence of a functioning embassy has made it difficult for the U.S. to communicate with the Somali government.

Currently, the U.S. is only able to communicate with the TFG through its embassy in Kenya. A reopening of the embassy in Somalia would facilitate direct communication between the two governments and expedite the process of stabilizing Somalia.

The U.S. must also encourage the Somali government to extend an olive branch to the moderate Islamist factions in the nation. One such faction, the Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca, recently seized two major port towns from the Al-Shabaab and continues to pledge opposition to the extremists. A military alliance between the TFG and moderate Islamists would greatly facilitate the ongoing battle against the Al-Shabaab. Such an alliance would give the TFG an opportunity to bring moderate Islamists back into the political fold in Somalia. The participation of religious moderates in Somali politics would ease the current secular-Islamist divide and deter future Islamist extremism in the country. The possibility of political participation may even win the favor of moderates in the ICU, which will open opportunities for the TFG to regain territory through diplomacy rather than fighting.

Although the protection of the Somali coasts should be an international effort, the U.S. should devote more ships to the region.

Currently, 18 nations have contributed fleets to deter Somali piracy; China has recently sent additional ships, and many members of

January 2009

Kevin may be reached at kkim731@gmail.com

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Africa

Ending Violence A Stronger Bridge for Congo

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Brian Lipshutz ’12

espite the presence of a UN peacekeeping operation, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is once again overwhelmed by conflict. Since spring 2008 the DRC’s government has clashed with Rwandan Hutu militias and Tutsi fighters led by Laurent Nkunda. The Congolese government has accused Rwanda of backing Nkunda’s forces. Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obesanjo has been mediating talks between the government and Nkunda’s National Congress for the Defense of the People (NCDP) movement, but with little success.

Additionally, unclaimed copper, cobalt, diamond, and gold deposits in the DRC pose further obstacles to stability. The international community has accused both sides of prolonging the violence in order to profit from the exploitation of natural resources.

Current conditions threaten the lives of thousands if not millions of Congolese. If the United Nations is serious about strengthening its challenged credibility and upholding its “Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” doctrine of intervening when states cannot or do not protect their citizens, its member states must take more action in the DRC. In order to prevent the DRC’s conflict from causing widespread instability and a humanitarian disaster, the U.S., EU, and UN must commit the needed forces and resources to the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, known by its French acronym MONUC. While the total number of troops available to MONUC needs to increase, the United States should also encourage Europe to provide troops for a temporary “bridging mission” to establish security in North Kivu and eastern Congo, the focus of the current fighting.

The DRC’s civil war last decade grew

into what some call Africa’s World War, with death tolls reaching 5.4 million since the outbreak of war in 1998. The conflict began when Laurent-Desire Kabila came to power with the support of Rwandanbacked militias in 1998. Later that year, the Rwandan- and Ugandan-backed militias turned against Kabila, prompting Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia to enter on his side. The following year, all six nations signed a United Nations-backed ceasefire at Lusaka, and in 2000 the UN Security Council authorized MONUC to support the ceasefire agreement. Despite persistent

enlarged MONUC. European objections to becoming involved in a complicated, seemingly endless situation are understandable. A bridging mission in 2009, therefore, needs to have a limited duration, clear objectives, guarantees of troops to bring MONUC to 20,000 soldiers when the EU withdraws, and a Security Council resolution establishing its legitimacy. Peacekeeping nations must realize that intervention by a bridging force is likely the best option for peace in the DRC. The idea of a bridging mission is not new, however, and a good model exists. In 2003, faced with an outbreak of violence in neighboring Ituri, then-Secretary General Kofi Annan sought a temporary force with a limited objective until reinforcements could be found for MONUC. Security Council Resolution 1484 authorized the Interim Multinational Emergency Force (IMEF), a three-month multi-national force led by France and the EU. Like in 2003, MONUC now awaits reinforcement and once more the world has turned to the EU and Europe’s rapid reaction forces as a stopgap. In December 2008, though, European governments chose not to deploy their troops. The nationality of the two battle groups on standby rotates each year, and with the situation persisting, it is worth trying again with the new countries at the helm. In 2008, the troops were chiefly British and German, and both nations rejected the idea of deploying to the DRC. In 2009, the troops will likely be mostly Greek and Spanish.

Many in Europe and the United States have ostensibly embraced the UN’s fledgling R2P doctrine, which states that governments have a responsibility to protect their populations and that the international community should intervene when states fail in that duty. France, the UK, the U.S., and Greece—a leader in the 2009 battle groups—voted for a Security Council resolution endorsing it in 2006. The UN and member states must act in the DRC if they are truly committed to the idea of R2P. Failure to do so would undermine the credibility of the doctrine.

Conflict in the DRC continues to impede negotiations on possible power-sharing arrangements between the government

The U.S. would be neglecting its duty as a democracy and advocate of human rights if it did not contribute to a mission in the DRC.

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fighting and Kabila’s assassination in 2001, progress continued towards withdrawal of foreign forces. Over the next five years, Laurent-Desire’s son Joseph completed a power-sharing agreement with some of the rebels and drafted a transitional and eventually a permanent constitution. In 2006, he ultimately won a presidential election, considered to be generally free by international observers. Despite this apparent progress, the situation escalated again last year.

Since 2000, the Security Council has increased the MONUC peacekeeping force from 5,537 troops to approximately 17,000, with plans for a further increase to 20,000 troops. The Security Council also granted MONUC Chapter VII authority, the strongest possible UN mandate, in 2004. Still, MONUC lacks the manpower to pacify the violence that has recently erupted in eastern DRC, especially North Kivu. A temporary “bridging mission” of 2,000 to 3,000 troops would establish desperately needed security in the short term while the Security Council seeks reinforcements for an

American Foreign Policy

Africa

Ron Haviv / AP

and the rebels. These negotiations concern situations in which lasting peace can be crafted, but the complicated situation involves half a dozen foreign nations, not to mention diamonds and gold. A modest bridging mission, however, can provide the stable security environment necessary for the peace process to resume and progress. Pacifying eastern Congo would also allow aid to safely reach those who need it and MONUC to resume disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.

Even with a bridging mission, MONUC must also confront numerous internal problems to be effective. First, UN member states must find the troops to bring MONUC to its new level of 20,000; the bridging mission would be pointless without adequate troop numbers in the long term.

Second, the UN must address the charges of physical and sexual abuse against its peacekeepers. These acts of abuse committed by peacekeepers reduce the credibility of the UN as a human rights enforcer both in the countries where it operates and in the international community as a whole.

MONUC has strong potential, and with the bridging force and reform, it could suc-

ceed. As other African crises loom in Somalia and Zimbabwe, the UN needs every bit of credibility it can find.

The U.S. would be neglecting its duty as a democracy and advocate of human rights if it did not contribute to a mission in the DRC. U.S. troops typically do not participate in great numbers on the ground in UN peacekeeping operations, and the U.S. has many other troop commitments around the world already. Therefore, instead of on the ground participation, the United States should encourage Europe to provide troops for the temporary “bridging mission” to establish security in North Kivu and eastern Congo. The United States can still offer airlift and other logistical services that it frequently provides for UN missions.

UN member states must also supply the necessary troops to strengthen MONUC for the long-term. After the bridging mission establishes security, MONUC would again take the lead in monitoring the situation. Even though the U.S. does not have the resources to support an entire mission, Washington should offer expertise and support, whether diplomatic, military, or financial, as needed. More im-

January 2009

Internally displaced persons mining for gold in Eastern Congo. Resources like cobalt, uranium, gold, and diamonds easily enter the world’s markets and perpetuate the conflict.

portantly, President Barack Obama should play a key role in persuading the Europeans, with whom he has promised closer alignment, to stay committed to the DRC until it achieves a lasting peace agreement.

After all, his Democratic Party has joined Europe in rejecting former President Bush’s willingness to intervene without the UN’s support through coalitions of the willing.

A combination of a strong bridging mission and a reinforced MONUC, therefore, is the international community’s’ best option for a stable DRC. Afp

Brian may be reached at lipshutz@princeton.edu

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Africa

AFP Quiz

A Necessary Evil The U.S. Should Engage Mugabe

Multiple Choice Monthly Franco Lopez ’11 1. The Sirius Star, an oil tanker recently released by Somali pirates, flew the flag of what nation? a) Saudi Arabia b) United Arab Emirates c) United States d) India e) Pakistan 2. Russia has accused which of its Eastern European neighbors of stealing natural gas from its pipelines? a) Czech Republic b) Belarus c) Poland d) Ukraine e) Estonia 3. The government of which island nation is on the verge of crushing an ethnic, rebel group in a war which has raged 28 years? a) Indonesia b) Malaysia c) Sri Lanka d) Iceland e) Mauritania 4. According to the most recent estimates, roughly how many children fill ill from milk tainted by the industrial chemical melamine? a) 30 b) 300 c) 3,000 d) 30,000 e) 300,000 5. Which country is facing economic troubles as a result of a shortage in small change? a) Turkey b) Zimbabwe c) United States d) Argentina e) Brazil Answers on page 19

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his summer, Kirsty Coventry, a swimmer from Zimbabwe, set a world record in the 200-meter women’s backstroke on her way to winning all four of Zimbabwe’s medals at the Beijing Olympics. As a reward, she was given a suitcase of American dollars worth $100,000. Had she been given the same amount in Zimbabwe dollars, it would have been literally worthless.

Hyperinflation, currently in the 230 million percent range, is sadly only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to Zimbabwe’s troubles. Aside from a monetary crisis, there is also widespread poverty and a rampant cholera epidemic in the

Yanran Chen ’12 year. After months of tense negotiations mediated by South African President Thabo Mbeki and the South African Developmental Committee (SADC), Tsvangirai and Mugabe signed a power-sharing deal in September that would allow Mugabe to remain president. The agreement called for Tsvangirai to be installed in the newly created position of prime minister. Additionally, the 31 ministers would be divided among Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front party and Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara’s faction, the Movement for Democratic Change party. As prime minister, Tsvangirai would in theory be able to exert sig-

Stricter sanctions are not an effective alternative when dealing with a leader such as Mugabe.

African nation. These problems have only been worsened by the Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe’s policy decisions. A change in leadership, however, does not seem to be on the horizon for Zimbabwe.

Despite reports that Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the Movement for Democratic Change, won more votes than Mugabe in this past year’s presidential elections, the opposition leader refused to participate in run-off elections, citing violence against his supporters. In September, as Zimbabwe continued to slide into ruin, Mugabe and Tsvangirai signed a power-sharing deal. As of now, Mugabe seems unlikely to abide by the power-sharing agreement even as his country slips deeper into a humanitarian crisis. To make matters worse, the United States’ recent announcement that it no longer supports any power-sharing deal involving Mugabe seems likely to increase conflict in Zimbabwe while prolonging the diplomatic deadlock.

Despite initial optimism, it now appears that Mugabe will not abide by the power-sharing deal he agreed to late last

American Foreign Policy

nificant influence over policy formulation and implementation. The plan had flaws, certainly. Critics pointed out the high likelihood of deadlock between the ministers, as well as Tsvangirai’s likely lack of power, given Mugabe’s authoritarian past. While both leaders initially appeared enthused about the agreement, it has become increasingly clear that Mugabe had no intention of relinquishing any power.

As a result, Mugabe’s apparent rejection of the power-sharing agreement has accelerated Zimbabwe’s descent into chaos. Already, millions of people have fled the country. Hunger, AIDS, and a cholera epidemic plague those left behind. Inflation is so severe that most have taken to bartering, due to the worthlessness of paper money. While it is unlikely that the power-sharing agreement would have been the cure-all for Zimbabwe, it would have provided some much-needed political stability for this country. Zimbabwe needs this stability to have any hope of avoiding a complete humanitarian disaster. For instance, Zimbabwe may

Africa have been able to attract more foreign aid if other countries saw that Tsvangirai had some say in policy-making. Instead, worldwide contempt for Mugabe has led to severe sanctions and a reduction in humanitarian aid. Although the deal had its fair share of problems, it constituted the type of opportunity Zimbabwe desperately needs at this time. With the withdrawal of U.S. support, it now appears that this deal has no chance of being realized even if Mugabe were willing to agree. Moreover, the withdrawal of support has not had the desired effect of increasing pressure on the Mugabe regime.

By withdrawing support for any power-sharing deal that includes Mugabe, the United States had hoped to pressure other nations into doing the same. However, South Africa has since made it clear that it would not give up on a deal. As the broker of the accord, and a central player in African politics, South Africa’s position is significant. As Zimbabwe collapses, refugees are flooding into neighboring countries, including South Africa. With U.S. support for a power-sharing agreement withdrawn, any power-sharing deal becomes harder to implement.

By refusing to deal with a government that includes Mugabe, the United States removes any incentive for Mugabe to compromise with Western powers. Originally in September, several Western nations had expressed an interest in lifting sanctions if the deal were effectively implemented, and this was used as leverage in talks with Mugabe. Lifted sanctions were a major incentive for Mugabe to go along with the deal and improve the humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe. In December, however, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice broke ranks and called for increased sanctions from the international community without any type of recourse for Mugabe other than to step down from power. This is not an effective course of action as seen from past sanctions. When, in July 2008, the U.S. and EU both increased sanctions, Mugabe was not fazed and then blamed his country’s worsening condition on these sanctions.

Additionally, the U.S. has failed to propose a better strategy for alleviating the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe.

Stricter sanctions are not an effective alternative when dealing with a leader such as Mugabe. Mugabe will not willingly step down from power as indicated by his statement that “only God” can remove him

Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi / AP

from office. Hoping that he will resign as a result of further sanctions or international condemnation will not relieve the immediate suffering of the Zimbabwean people. Rather, this position will only goad Mugabe into adopting more extreme positions. To affect any positive change in Zimbabwe, the U.S. must deal with Mugabe.

This does not mean Chamberlain-style appeasement; it means a careful combination of diplomacy and incentives designed to encourage cooperation and power-sharing. Short of foreign military intervention, which lacks international support and would be extremely costly, cooperation with Mugabe in the hope of implement-

January 2009

A man in Zimbabwe carries some cash for groceries in March 2008.

ing a power-sharing deal is one of the only viable options for alleviating the country’s ongoing humanitarian crisis.

Zimbabwe has been in a state of decline for over a decade now, and recent US policy decisions have only served to worsen the situation. Once one of the more prosperous African nations, it has since become a textbook example of how faulty leadership can completely derail a country. While most were cautiously optimistic about the power-sharing deal proposed in

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global In ROMANIA, legislative elections take place, with the Social Democratic Party winning the most votes in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Despite that, the Democratic Liberal Party takes control of more seats in both houses.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper of CANADA, fearing a vote of no confidence, shuts down Parliament until the January 26. The decision was reached after the formation of a minority coalition government of three opposition parties.

In the UNITED STATES, the federal government announces various additional bailout plans to deal with the economic recession.

Among the recipients are the Detroit automakers and Citigroup. New loan programs are also introduced, with hedge funds gaining unprecedented access to the Federal Reserve.

Following his victory, new President-elect Barack Obama of the UNITED STATES begins to assemble his cabinet, naming, among others, Timothy Geithner to Treasury, Hillary Clinton to State, Bill Richardson to Commerce, Tom Daschle to Health and Human Services, and Eric Holder to Attorney General.

Lasana Conte, President of GUINEA for over 24 years, passes away. In the wake of his death, a military junta known as the National Council for Democracy and Development seizes power in a coup d’Êtat.

In VENEZUELA, regional elections take place. Of 21 governorships, 17 are filled by supporters of President Hugo Chavez. The two most populous states, Zulia and Miranda, however, were won by opposition leaders.

In the southern state of Santa Catarina in BRAZIL, serious flooding leads to over a hundred deaths, the displacement of over 75,000 people. Hundreds of thousands more were left without power.

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American Foreign Policy

Fighting breaks out over local elections in NIGERIA. Over 400 people are killed, and hundreds more are wounded. The violence appears religiously motivated, with Muslims and Christians burning down churches and mosques.

update Collected by Vishal Chanani ‘11

After Hamas launches rockets into ISRAEL, conflict escalates, with Israeli airstrikes killing over 350 people in the Gaza Strip. The renewed violence began shortly after the termination of a cease-fire that was reached in June.

In IRAQ, a journalist throws both of his shoes at President George W. Bush during the press conference. The reporter, Muntadhar al-Zaidi for Al Baghdadia, also calls the president a dog.

Terrorist attacks hit Mumbai, INDIA, with 10 gunmen carrying out the attack killing at least 170 people. The lone gunman captured alive claims the attacks were carried out under the auspices of Lakshar-e-Taiba, a terrorist organization based in PAKISTAN. Sheikh Hasina is elected Prime Minister of BANGLADESH, ending two years of emergency rule and marking a return to democracy in the nation. Hasina had previously served as Prime Minister from 1996 to 2001. She is the head of the party known as the Awami League.

In SOMALIA, President Abdullahi Ahmed dismisses Prime Minister Nur Hussein, despite Hussein’s support from parliament. When he then appoints Muhammad Gadmadhere to that post, Parliament reaffirms its confidence in Hussein, at which point Ahmed resigns.

In THAILAND, after the Constitutional Court disbands the governing party, Abhisit Vejjavija of the Democrat Party is elected Prime Minister by Parliament. The ousted People’s Power Party is banned from electoral politics for five years.

The International Criminal Tribunal for RWANDA, a court established by the United Nations, convicts Theoneste Bagosora of genocide for his involvement in the massacre of Tutsis in 1994. The tribunal sentenced him to life imprisonment.

January 2009

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U.S. Foreign Policy September, Mugabe has since undermined the intentions of that deal. American retraction of support for the accord has only served to make the achievement of any power-sharing deal more unlikely. There is no panacea that can heal Zimbabwe, but a diplomatic agreement is the closest thing to it. With two foreign wars and the eco-

nomic crisis, America is not in a position to deploy military forces to the region.

Without this, Mugabe’s continued role in Zimbabwe is assured. Secretary Rice’s retraction of support, and reluctance to propose a realistic alternative can only result in further chaos for the beleaguered South African country. Hopefully President-elect Barack Obama will bring some

Obama’s Cabinet Continuity at the DoD

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Emily Norris ’09

f Obama ran on a platform of change, especially when it comes to American foreign policy and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, then his choice to keep current Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, in office seems a strange on at best, and a betrayal at worst. But Obama made the right choice. Not only is Gates supportive of Obama’s defense priorities, including a timed withdrawal from Iraq, but he has already taken the Defense Department in a direction much in line with Obama’s foreign policy plans.

Gates began changing the Department of Defense slowly but surely. A CIA man by training, Gates became Secretary of Defense only in late 2006, after serving as Director of Central Intelligence. The appointment of Gates signaled a shift or maturing of strategy under Bush, whose first Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, presided over a range of problems in the Iraq War, most notably the Abu Ghraib debacle. Under Gates, the Department began to focus more efforts on closing Guantanamo Bay, improving strategic communication, increasing allied involvement in the Afghan conflict, and shifting the command of security forces in Iraq to the Iraqis. Furthermore, Gates worked to restructure Reserve and Coast Guard forces to better integrate them into

the main military structures and ensure their readiness to deal with domestic crises like Hurricane Katrina.

In a speech given to the National Defense University in September of last year, and an article in Foreign Affairs magazine in December 2008, Gates outlined his two main goals for the upcoming administration. The first is to shift military priorities away from “baroque” high tech weapons conceived during the Cold War. The second is to focus on more cost effective and pertinent weapons and training (linguistic, cultural) for the wars being fought by soldiers on the ground today.

“change” to this flawed piece of American foreign policy. Afp

Yanran may be reached at yanranc@princeton.edu

a steady reduction of forces in Iraq with as little friction as possible. It is most important during a time of war to maintain continuity of leadership in order to maintain continuity of strategy and method on the ground. Gates is set up to help Obama implement his policies of change without disrupting or removing the programs that have been tried and tested under the Bush administration.

Furthermore, in choosing Gates for Defense Secretary, Obama had a freer hand in choosing Hillary Clinton for Secretary of State. Clinton is often reviled for being an extremely partisan figure, and Obama did well by balancing his foreign policy team with members from across the political spectrum. Having a balanced administration allows Obama to avoid the pitfalls of the previous administration, which suffered from a lack of debate and dissent. Gates and Clinton may both agree on many issues, including the need to expand the role and scope of the State Department, but their opposing ideological backgrounds may prove useful for stimulating debate that will lead to better foreign policy decisionmaking.

Gates can also provide unique experience in shaping Obama’s Iran policy. Gates is one of the few individuals in the U.S. government who has met with Iran’s revolutionary leadership. Gates served as Zbigniew Brzezinski’s note taker at the famous prehostage crisis meeting in Algeria in 1979, when American officials attempted to offer concessions and keep Iran on the American side of the Cold War. Although talks broke down after the U.S. refused to turn over the Shah for trial in Iran, Gates did

Obama’s appointment of Gates will be the first time a Secretary of Defense has carried over between two opposing administrations.

12

Interestingly, Obama’s appointment of Gates will be the first time a Secretary of Defense has carried over between two opposing administrations. This unprecedented move has several benefits for Obama’s foreign policy. For one, Gates maintains some degree of continuity and experience at the Department during a time of war. Gates’ experience working on the two conflicts to date prepares him to help implement Obama’s plans so that they focus more on Afghanistan and on

American Foreign Policy

U.S. Foreign Policy

Charles Dharapak / AP

gain valuable insight and experience from the direct negotiations. In addition, Gates played a marginal role, or was at least close to those who played a role, in the infamous Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s. This extensive experience dealing with Iran over the years, although not directly or successfully, positions Gates as a valuable asset if Obama seeks a new Iran policy under his administration. Although many within the beltway have proposed policies for Iran and its nuclear program, there are few who have dealt directly with the Iranians in Washington. Having someone who actually has dealt with Iran directly on his team provides Obama with insight and experience that could prove invaluable in the upcoming months.

From a purely political point of view, the decision may have been prudent on Obama’s part in order for his administration to maintain a healthy distance from whatever may go wrong in the near future concerning the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of course, these conflicts are his responsibility to fight, fix, and finish,

but as it was not his administration that started them, Obama may want to maintain some separation between his own new foreign policy initiatives and the difficult, unpopular choices necessary to bring these inherited conflicts to a satisfactory resolution. With Gates on the foreign policy team, these unpopular but necessary policy choices can rest with Gates, rather than reflecting directly on the President.

This clear separation between Obama and his predecessor will have benefits in terms of international perception. Obama can avoid, in part, losing the international political capital his election gained the U.S. because he will not be blamed for emerging problems in Afghanistan and Iraq and there will be problems before there will be solutions.

Obama and Gates should make a good defense team in what appears to be an ideologically balanced administration.

Obama’s decision to keep Gates allowed him to pick more challenging candidates for other positions, maintains continuity in a time of war, and maintains a healthy

January 2009

President Barack Obama welcomes Robert Gates onto his cabinet as Secretary of Defense.

distance between himself and the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The challenges that the Obama administration will face in the upcoming months have no simple solutions, but keeping Gates on at least for the transition will greatly help. Afp

Emily may be reached at enorris@princeton.edu

13

A sia

The ASEAN Charter Landmark Deal or More “Talk Shop”?

O

n December 15, the Association of South East Asian Nation (ASEAN) officially ratified the ASEAN Charter, marking the beginning of the movement toward a European Union (EU) style community.

The 59-page document intends to transform ASEAN from a loose geopolitical and economic conglomeration into a more coherent and influential regional body with its own legal and institutional frameworks.

While this move has been globally hailed as the dawn of a new era for South East Asian nations, the Charter needs more work before it could become effective. To be truly effective as a regional organization, ASEAN needs to be more flexible with regard to its principles as well as its decision-making procedures, and to implement mechanisms to enforce its agreements.

ASEAN was founded as a means to foster a peaceful economic environment in South East Asia. Ratified by the Big 5—Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand in 1976, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) preached mutual

“Alex Noriega” ’11 respect for sovereignty, self-determination, non-interference, peaceful disputes, renunciation of force, and cooperation as ASEAN’s six fundamental principles. ASEAN could be most aptly described as a loose economic alliance focusing on progress and having no formal legal structure. It foregoes institutionalized multilateralism in favor of decades’ worth of norms and principles. These norms, dubbed the “ASEAN Way,” have certain meaningful weaknesses and limitations. First, the consensus-building process can be inefficient and unsuccessful. Second, the non-confrontational approach deprives ASEAN of any enforcement power to ensure proper execution of its policies. Finally, the non-interference principle allows for domestic crises to escalate and threaten the wellbeing of the region as a whole. As a result, ASEAN has often been branded as a “talk shop” for holding a staggering 700 meetings a year without accomplishing major breakthroughs on a number of critical issues.

The ASEAN Charter was drafted as an attempt to address some of these institutional weaknesses and turn ASEAN into a

more effective regional organization. First, it seeks to transform the ASEAN into a more coherent rules-based organization by establishing a long-overdue legal-institutional framework. Second, it promotes further economic integration by declaring a single free-trade zone by 2015. Third, the Charter signals the intention of moving toward an EU-like community to adapt to the changing international system and counterbalance the powers of hegemons like the U.S. and China. The last major goal is to strengthen democracy and promote human rights, as well as other fundamental freedoms. While the Charter is a much improved version of the original nine-page TAC, many of the aforementioned limitations still remain.

The Charter maintains the fundamental principles of non-interference and consensus-based decision making, which will come into conflict with ASEAN’s long-term goals.

Unlike the EU, which multilateralism is heavily institutionalized and membership is only open to democratic states, ASEAN has always operated in a manner that privileges national sovereignty over formalized multilateralism. This decentralized identity was crucial to ASEAN’s early success. After years of resisting outside colonizers, most members wanted a regional body that respected their sovereignty and promised not to intervene in the nation-rebuilding process. However, as ASEAN becomes a more coherent bloc and the higher representative of each member nation, its international reputation will depend on the individual internal conduct of its members, most notably Myanmar.

The country’s horrific human rights record

Irwin Fedriansyah / AP

They smile now.

14

American Foreign Policy

Asia has been a sticking point in U.S.-ASEAN relation. The U.S. has repeatedly criticized ASEAN for adhering to its non-interference policies and for allowing such suppression to go largely unchallenged.

As such, ASEAN will not achieve its goals if it maintains an absolute commitment to non-intervention and fails to compel members to act in the best interests of the region. It is not impossible to find the middle ground between non-interference and complete breach of national sovereignty. A policy allowing any individual country to highlight a domestic policy problem and propose some form of constructive intervention would be a reasonable first step.

ASEAN could then appoint a temporary committee to investigate and recommend what type of intervention should be taken to ameliorate the situation. After the report is made public, recommended intervention would only be taken if the measure is

approved by a super majority of ASEAN members. In this manner, national sovereignty is subverted only in cases where domestic crises pose serious threats to the entire region. This process would provide a mechanism to address challenging issues such as human rights in Myanmar or the Indonesian haze crisis (the slash-and-burn technique adopted by Indonesian farmers continues to pollute the atmosphere of several neighboring countries) without unduly infringing on any member’s sovereignty.

With globalization shrinking the world and transcending borders, ASEAN will not succeed unless it is prepared to take the necessary risk of interfering with its members’ internal conducts.

With respect to decision-making, ASEAN continues to rely on consultation, leaving vague the process of dealing with legislation that fails to garner consensuses.

While such approach has worked remark-

ably well for ASEAN, not all decisions, especially those in human rights and territorial disputes, can be reached by consensus.

The Charter defers decisions in these cases to the ASEAN summits without stipulating any specific guidelines. ASEAN does maintain its “ASEAN Minus X” formula, which allows members to opt out of economic policies that they are not ready to implement.

The “ASEAN Minus X” approach could potentially be useful to decision-making on (less sensitive) political and social issues, allowing countries that are willing but truly incapable of following through at the moment to sit out. ASEAN also practices positive discrimination, in which more developed members commit to provide aid and preferential treatment to their less developed counterparts. The combination of these two formulas could work to ASEAN’s advantage by allowing the Big 5 to take the lead on new initiatives, like investing in al-

In Context

Compiled by Tara Lewis ’11 “The war on terror is more than a battle of arms. It is an ideological struggle for hearts and minds, and to prevail we must counter the terrorists’ hateful ideology with a more hopeful alternative based on liberty and justice.”

President George Bush speaking at the U.S. Army War College “It means we have gotten rid of the most dangerous remains of the policies that the former regime adopted.”

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki commenting on the transfer of Baghdad’s Green Zone from American to Iraqi authority “Notwithstanding that it is unlikely Australia would accept these detainees ... the request demands proper consideration.”

Australian acting Prime Minister Julia Gillard refusing again to take detainees from Guantanamo Bay

“I didn’t know what the guy said, but I saw his sole.”

President Bush on an Iraqi journalist who threw shoes at him “We are peace seekers, we have restrained our surge for a long time, but now is the time to do what needs to be done.”

Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak explaining Israel’s decision to launch ground operation in Gaza “If you enter Gaza by land, a dark fate will await you.”

Top Hamas political leader Khaled Mashal threatening Israel

Khalil Hamra / AP

“This is now an international rather than a national emergency. International because disease crosses borders.”

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown calling upon other states to challenge President Robert Mugabe’s inaction on Zimbabwe’s crisis “The civilian population […] is under attack.”

UN spokesperson Ivo Brandau verifying that the Ugandan rebel group, the Lords Resistance Army , had killed nearly 200 people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in late December 2008

January 2009

15

Latin America ternative energy or experimenting with new regional-based political institution, and share the benefits with the other members when they are ready to adopt such policies.

Even if the aforementioned recommendations are adopted, the problem of enforcement will hamstring the organization.

It is difficult to call the ASEAN Charter legally binding when it lacks the most basic enforcement power. While the original draft by ASEAN’s Eminent Persons Group called for violators to be suspended or expelled, the final Charter stipulates only that “the matter shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit for decision.” ASEAN’s desire to achieve harmony has often been its Achil-

les’ heel. Without enforcing instruments, the ASEAN Charter is defacto useless when members are unwilling to comply voluntarily. This lack of accountability is perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that Myanmar was one of the first countries to ratify the Charter, while Indonesia, a fledgling democracy, was the last. As ASEAN becomes more integrated and places more emphasis on democratizing a region where no country is a full democracy, nothing but a credible and respected judicial mechanism will ensure that the Charter achieves its lofty goals.

The issue of human rights embodies the conflicts between the new vision and the norms of ASEAN. Promoting human rights in Southeast Asia will not be effective

Populism’s Decline A Major Shift in Latin America

W

Catalina Valencia ’10

ith its election of the charismatic Hugo Chavez in 1998, Venezuela showed the world that Latin American populism had survived the wave of neoliberal economic reforms then sweeping the continent. While neighbors coped with the harsh socioeconomic consequences of those reforms, Chavez remade his government in the image of populist Latin American governments common during the middle of the 20th century. As Chavez transformed the state into a lavish beneficiary of the previously neglected poor, he was simultaneously usurping institutional authority, relying on his charisma with the masses to ensure their support. Aiding the emergence of leaders like Evo Morales of Bolivia and Rafael Correa of Ecuador, Chavez sought “the moral regeneration of Latin America” through his Bolivarian Revolution. An attempt to emulate the famous 20th century Argentine populist, Juan Peron, it has been, in other words, a revival of socialism, funded by Venezuela’s seem-

ingly boundless oil revenues.

While these other men have known their limits, Chavez has instead sought to do more.

Fighting hard to be more than simply the stereotypical Latin American populist leader, he has aspired to the status of worldwide revolutionary figure standing up to American power, as Fidel Castro once did. As a part of this effort, Chavez has long been a thorn in the side of the Bush administration, at one point even calling Bush “the devil” before the General Assembly at the United Nations. In addition to his dramatic reproaches against

without substantial interference, because consensus is highly improbable, if not impossible. If ASEAN’s members want to truly tackle these difficult issues, the first thing on the agenda of the next ASEAN summit must be to ensure that the new Charter grows teeth. Without an enforcement mechanism and at least some willingness to compromise national sovereignty, the new Charter is simply another byproduct of the ASEAN talkfest. Afp

The author may be reached at afp@princeton.edu

the progress made in U.S.-Latin American relations during the Clinton administration.

More recently, Chavez has conducted negotiations with Russian leaders to secure strong economic ties between the two states. Despite these accomplishments, however, Chavez now faces a number of challenges from both inside and outside Venezuela. With his power and influence possibly on the decline, the question has arisen whether Chavez’s brand of populism and his particular penchant for international grandstanding are actually as viable as they once appeared.

In a recent attempt to demonstrate his international clout, Chavez received two noteworthy guests in late 2008: President Dmitri Medvedev of Russia and President Raul Castro of Cuba. With both leaders making their first ever visits to Venezuela, there were high expectations that Venezuela would strengthen diplomatic ties with both countries. Chavez’s desire for closer ties with Russia is well known. He has visited the country seven times throughout his presidency and has signed deals to buy more than $4 billion in arms. Up until now, the Russians have demonstrated little interest in cementing ties with Latin American states beyond weapon sales and limited energy deals. With this visit to Venezuela however, President Medvedev has indicated a change of heart. He is now hoping to use Venezuela as an economic and diplomatic stepping stone to the rest of Latin America, in the hope of increasing Russia’s economic

Despite his highly publicized meetings with Dmitri Medvedev and Raul Castro, Chavez’ popularity at home and prestige abroad are on the decline.

16

Washington’s hegemony and his courting of anti-American leaders such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Chavez has a number of achievements to show for his efforts. He has successfully alienated the United States from various Latin American countries this past decade, dividing the hemisphere into proChavez and pro-Bush camps and reversing

American Foreign Policy

Latin America

and diplomatic ties within the region. By following the same path China took with its economic expansion into Latin America and creating such ties in the United States’ backyard, Russia would send a message to the Americans and NATO as a whole, who have involved themselves in the affairs of Eastern Europe ever since the collapse of the USSR. During Medvedev’s visit, Chavez was able to secure Russian collaboration in pursuing nuclear energy development and oil exploration, although the timetable of the agreement was somewhat vague.

The new Cuban president’s visit was less surprising. With Cuba having had to depend on Venezuela in order to stay afloat since the fall of the USSR, Raul Castro’s visit was a sign of continued goodwill towards the Venezuelan leader in return for additional aid. Despite these high profile successes, however, the political climate in Latin America is actually turning against Chavez-style populism.

Both at home and abroad, Chavez faces challenges to his leadership and prestige.

The Bolivarian Revolution is in trouble, as evidenced by Chavez’s failed attempt to change the constitution in order to allow his candidacy in 2013 and the big blow dealt by the opposition to his party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), in the state and municipal elections held right before Medvedev’s visit. Despite going to extraordinary lengths to weaken the opposition in the weeks leading up to the election, including the disqualification of some of the more popular opposition candidates, the results

the charismatic Chavez at home, Chavez must also worry about his country’s declining regional influence. Although Raul Castro made sure his first diplomatic visit was to Venezuela, where he discussed familiar projects in agriculture, education, medicine, and athletic training with Chavez, Castro seems to be looking for a more reliable ally. Although his country still depends on Venezuela, Chavez’s diminishing oil revenues and popularity has Cuba looking elsewhere.

Already Cuba’s second largest trading partner, Brazil might be a more attractive foreign sponsor than the increasingly unreliable Venezuela.

Cuba cannot yet shake off Chavez and his generous aid, having established its ties to Venezuela amid the domestic financial crisis it sufFernando Llano / AP fered in the wake of the USSR’s disweakened Chavez’s position. Though his al- solution. Castro is instead working to forglies won 17 out of 22 states, the opposition ing new ties with President Lula of Brazil, carried most of Venezuela’s urban areas, in- whose pragmatic approach of buttressing the cluding Caracas, the country’s capital, giving macroeconomic orthodoxy of his predecesthem control of more than half of the popula- sor with extensive social welfare initiatives tion. The results indicated a substantial shift makes Brazil an appealing ally for Cuba. in Venezuelan politics. When Chavez came Learning from Lula and other pragmatic leftto power 10 years ago, he won the support of-center leaders in the region, Raul Castro is of the urban and rural poor by promising finally seeing that moderation is needed. It is to help and enfranchise them, but much of Chavez’s loss if he fails to do the same. this key constituency has now turned against Despite his highly publicized meetings him. No longer responding to his generous with Dmitri Medvedev and Raul Castro, spending plans, Venezuelans have become Chavez’ popularity at home and prestige concerned with the 30% inflation rate now abroad are on the decline. Domestically, crippling the country, the worst in Latin Chavez faces rampant inflation and a pair of America. Plunging oil prices have only made serious political setbacks. Internationally, the matters worse, as the dramatic fall in prices social democratic left of Latin America, which deprives the government of the revenues includes Chile and Uruguay in addition to necessary to fund Chavez’s generous welfare Brazil, has shown the region that economic programs and public works projects. prosperity and social welfare are not mutuIn the face of this opposition, Chavez ally exclusive. The curtain seems to be fallhas made it clear that he will not tolerate ing on the more populist-oriented version of “traitors,” even if he has to deprive the new leftist politics currently practiced by Chavez, governors of public funds or “roll out the Morales, and others. In this changing landtanks.” Ever hot-tempered, Chavez made scape, Cuba will not be the last to recalibrate these threats despite the opposition’s pledge its political interests. Unless Chavez can find to cooperate with the PSUV. Clearly, he sees a way to regain his momentum, it will not be these new opposition party governors as a long before Latin America’s current binge on challenge to his political power. Although he populism comes to a halt. Afp still controls the National Assembly, the Supreme Court, and the state-run companies, Chavez knows there is only so much he can Catalina may be reached at do with oil prices, and therefore his governcvalenci@princeton.edu ment’s budget, falling so low.

Although the opposition still lacks a popular national leader who can stand up to

January 2009

17

Middle East

Passive Engagement Separating Syria from Iran

D

uring the Cold War, Henry Kissinger attempted to draw Egypt away from the Soviet Union’s grasp. Now, the United States is again trying to pull an Arab nation away from the influence of an adversary; this time the players are Syria and Iran.

The Bush administration has had hostile relations with Syria due to Syria’s financial support of Saddam Hussein on the eve of the Iraq war, its sending of Al-Qaeda operatives into Iraq, and its involvement with the Hariri assassination in Lebanon in February 2005. After levying sanctions and pushing for UN resolutions against the belligerent country’s actions, the Bush administration (and much of the rest of world) has pursued a policy of isolation, recalling its Ambassador to Washington after the Hariri affair.

This isolation, however, has eroded in recent months thanks to diplomatic visits to Syria by the Iraqi Prime Minister and Congressional delegations led by US Speaker

Addie Lerner ’11 of the House Nancy Pelosi. Syria has also entered negotiations with Israel via Turkey concerning the status of the Golan Heights.

While a step in the right direction, these talks and diplomatic missions do not hold much promise for success because of Iran’s aversion to Israel and its tight hold on Syrian foreign policy. Similarly, the currently heightened anti-West sentiment in the Middle East would make direct talks between Syria and the US unproductive. Because both Syria and Iran are so dismissive of the West and of the US specifically, the United States must pursue an indirect course of action. Rather than directly engage with Syria to cut off its ties to Iran, the Obama Administration must quietly facilitate engagement through Arab intermediaries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. These indirect negotiations are the best way to pull Syria away from Iran’s orbit and weaken their increasingly dangerous alliance.

Although Syria’s ties to Iran are grow-

Sajjid Safari / AP

Syria’s President Bashar Assad welcomes Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

18

American Foreign Policy

ing stronger, they are fairly superficial. The alliance formed in response to an increasingly powerful Iraq under Saddam Hussein, a shared antagonism towards the US, and a common lack of allies in the region. In short, the Syria-Iran alliance is one of geopolitical convenience rather than one with strong cultural, historical, or economic underpinnings.

Without intervention, however, this alliance will grow stronger and more dangerous to US interests in the region. The two nations have affirmed communication, electricity, science, and economic agreements (they are planning to open a bank together), and have also engaged in military and defense cooperation. Although this relationship does not yet have a strong economic or historical basis, it must be weakened before the two nations become inextricably connected.

The alliance is, quite simply, too dangerous to be allowed to continue. The alliance has encouraged nuclear proliferation.

Although Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons would by itself have encouraged other Middle Eastern nations to pursue nuclear technologies, its friendship with Syria has accelerated that process. First, Iran’s nuclear developments may have sparked Syria’s interest in nuclear technology (a nuclear facility in al-Kabir was discovered after the Israelis bombed it in September 2007). More importantly, Saudi Arabia has announced, its own intention of seeking nuclear technology in part due to its fear of the Iran-Syria alliance. In other words, a Middle Eastern arms race is already in motion. Syria’s alliance with Iran makes a regional nuclear build-up more imminent because it creates two opposing alliances in the region, only one of which is close to a nuclear bomb. Bringing Syria away from Iran would lessen the immediacy of a nuclear arms race because it would further isolate Iran and reduce the threat from its nuclear capabilities.

The relationship also bolsters Hezbollah and other destabilizing terrorist groups.

Syria helps Iran in financing the work of Palestinian terrorists such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, and constantly refers to Hezbollah as a “close ally.” Syria also allegedly provides in-kind support to these terrorist organizations by allowing weapons smuggling across its border with Lebanon. Severing the Syria-Iran tie would weaken these groups, decrease terrorism, and prevent future escalations in violence like 2006 war in

Middle East Lebanon or the recent conflict in Gaza.

Despite the initial appearance of diplomatic breakthroughs, Syria cannot be pulled away from Iran through direct talks with either Israel or the United States. First, the Syria-Israel talks are unlikely to be fruitful: Iran has strongly cautioned Syria against making peace with Israel or the West and would not tolerate a Syrian-Israel peace agreement. Syria, heeding these warnings, does not seem serious about actually pursuing peace with Israel. During its negotiations, it has simultaneously exchanged diplomatic visits and constructed cooperative agreements with Iran.

These connections are more than just Syria sending a signal. Any IsraeliSyrian deal would require Syria to eliminate certain aspects of its friendship with Iran (such as its cofunding with Iran of Palestinian terrorist groups). The fact that Iran and Syria are integrating themselves further during Syria’s talks with Israel is a clear sign that Syria does not take these discussions seriously.

Furthermore, Iran is Syria’s sole partner in the region, and Syria receives political legitimacy and various economic and scientific benefits from its alliance with Iran. Because a peace agreement with Israel would only provoke anger from Iran, the majority of the population of the region, and fundamentalist groups across the Middle East, Syria knows it cannot seriously pursue such a deal. Anti-Israel sentiments are currently at a peak in the Middle East (especially in light of the recent Israeli retaliation towards Gaza in response to Hamas). Even gaining the Golan Heights and becoming a trade partner of the West would not be enough to outweigh the regional costs Syria would incur. Although Egypt and Jordan made peace deals with Israel and faced regional anger for doing so, they were not saddled with an alliance with Israel’s most fervent enemy like Syria is. In short, the fall-out of a peace deal with Israel is too great for Syria to seriously consider it.

The anti-Western attitudes throughout the Middle East also mean that the US cannot engage Syria directly. Direct US negotiations would only anger the US’s Arab allies, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. This moderate Arab bloc is wary about the US giving any carrots to Syria such as economic aid, weapons deals, nuclear energy, or political support that would decrease their

economic, military, and political leverage over Syria. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan are eager to see the United States continue its isolation of Syria as long as Syria remains closely tied to Iran. What the US can do, however, is use these states as intermediaries and encourage them to engage in their own negotiations with Syria. These countries will likely be willing to do so because they share the US’s fear of a nuclear Iran and know that by weakening the SyrianIranian relationship they can erode some of Iran’s power. Syria would also be more likely to engage seriously with these Arab nations

dan, but they have not had much clout or ability to pressure their government. Now, however, Syria faces relatively serious security problems in addition to its economic troubles. Over the past year there has been a slew of government assassinations, an Israeli air strike, and a US raid into Syria on the Iraqi border. An increase in such instability, in addition to increased threats of civil unrest, rebellion, and even potential internal regime change would pressure Syria to actually listen to the will of its people. The Arab states can accomplish this by spreading messages of Sunni nationalism and the threat of Shi’a Iran through the media, social and sports clubs, and universities. By targeting students Syria’s younger generation (75% of Syria’s 19 million person population is under the age of 35, and 46% of the population is under the age of 15), the Arab countries can use the Sunnis in Syria to put pressure on the regime to weaken its ties with Iran and strengthen them with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and other Sunni Arab states in the Middle East.

Perhaps as a harbinger to US foreign policy under President Obama, the United States must let certain regional issues be solved by the central regional players themselves. In this case, direct US involvement in steering Syria away from Iran would be ineffective. The best chance for success in realigning the power status quo in the Middle East, preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and decreasing the escalating threat of a regional arms race is having Arab leaders of the Middle East engage Syria directly. Time, however, is running out. If Iran does develop a nuclear bomb, the United States and Middle Eastern countries will have bigger problems to worry about. Afp

The anti-Western attitudes throughout the Middle East also mean that the US cannot engage Syria directly. than with the United States directly because it would face less condemnation from Iran and on the Arab street for doing so.

There are two ways these Arab nations can increase their leverage over Syria and pull it away from Iran. The first is to bolster their economic ties with Syria to create economic leverage. Over the last year Syria has experienced a growing fiscal deficit, an increase in food prices, and a decrease in its oil reserves. If Syria’s Arab neighbors make oil, trade, and investment deals with Syria and buy up Syria’s fiscal debt, greatly helping Syria economically, they can create an economic hold on Syria that would attach Damascus to Riyadh, Cairo, and Amman.

Although Iran might want to make a counteroffer, the Iran’s own fiscal crisis would make this unlikely. Iran has no extra money to invest in Syria the way Saudi Arabia with its vast oil wealth does. A trade deal that involved Egypt and Jordan as well would be a large economic boost to Syria and lead to diplomatic visits to discuss such plans, binding the nations together.

The second way for Arab nations to create leverage over Syria is more subversive. They can use soft power to court Sunni Syrians who are distrustful of Syria’s close relationship with Iran. The regime in Syria is Alawite, which is the largest minority in Syria. It has no problem befriending Iran’s Shi’a populace. The majority of Syrians, however, are Sunnis, whose hostility towards the Shi’is dates back to the 7th century. This Sunni population would much rather be allied with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jor-

January 2009

Addie may be reached at alerner@princeton.edu

Answers to quiz on p. 8:

1) A 2) D 3) C

4) E 5) D

19

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