December 2008 by Daniel May

american foreign policy December 2008

Volume VIII, Issue 3

India China Darfur North Korea Latin America Anti-Americanism Hard and Soft Power

A World Reflected

From the Editor

Staff

n South Asia, the U.S. has a history of leaving the job unfinished. In the 1980’s, we supported the Afghani Mujahedeen against Soviet invasion but didn’t support reconstruction or state-building, a misstep which laid the foundation for the Taliban and put 9/11 into motion. Two decades later, we overthrew the Taliban but failed to secure the peace, diverting troops to Iraq instead. This time, our mistake has potentially larger consequences—the Taliban have moved into Pakistan and are destabilizing that nuclear-armed state. Our cover story notes that we have an opportunity for redemption. Afghanistan and Pakistan’s futures are tied: we cannot win the war in the former country nor stabilize the government of the latter without securing the Afghan-Pakistan border. Asif Ali Zardari, Pakistan’s first civilian leader in a decade, understands the importance of pacifying this region. He is currently waging a costly but effective all-out war on the Taliban in Pakistan’s northwest. Our cover story explains why this new strategy requires American financial assistance to remain a success. While financial assistance is essential to help the new President in the short-term, it is but one part of the puzzle. Stability in South Asia requires us to do more. First, in the long term, we must commit to rebuilding Pakistan’s institutions and civil society to prevent radicalism from spreading and to avoid yet another military coup. Pakistan does not have a rich democratic tradition, and it remains uncertain whether power lies with the government, the army, or the ISI. Helping Zardari secure his domestic flank will give Pakistan a chance to transition toward democracy, and helping Pakistan rebuild its civil institutions will cement those democratic gains. Additionally, the U.S. cannot take for granted the temporary peace between India and Pakistan. Lingering threat perceptions influence each nation’s policies. Unless Pakistan is assured that its larger neighbor does not harbor hostile intent, it will be difficult for it to divert resources from defense to anti-terrorism. While brokering a genuine resolution on Kashmir is still a pipe dream, the U.S. can act as a stabilizing force by participating more fully in the region. Indeed, if ever there were a time for the U.S. to increase its efforts in South Asia, that time is now. The War on Terror cannot be won through military operations alone; stability requires rebuilding civil societies and managing South Asia’s complex diplomacy. New President Zardari is a rare break from Pakistan’s generally hawkish military leadership. He is interested in cooperation with India and dedicated to combating domestic extremism. He is the window to a new South Asian policy. Despite our costly failures in the region, it seems for once our objectives in South Asia may actually be realizable—at least, as long as we don’t quit before the job is finished.

Editor-in-Chief

Rush Doshi ’11 Publisher Manav Lalwani ’09 Managing Editors Katherine Gaudyn ’11 Dan May ’11 Eric Stern ’11 Editors

Carlos Hanco ’09 Emily Norris ’09 Jessica Sheehan ’09 ’09 Zvi Smith ’10 Ahson Azmat ’10 Jon Bradshaw Heejin Cho ’10 Matthew Drecun ’10 ’10 Jon Extein Jonathan Giuffrida’10 Lucas Issacharoff ’10 Catalina Valencia ’10 Brendan Carroll ’11

Vishal Chanani Ellen Choi Jamie LaMontagne Addie Lerner Tara Lewis Elias Sánchez-Eppler Eric Stern Kit Thayer Oliver Bloom Yun Chung Benjamin Cogan Charlie Metzger Peter Wang

Layout

Jonathan Giuffrida ’10, Production Manager Kelly Lack ’10 Ellen Choi ’11 Emily Myerson ’12

Business Staff

Peter McCall ’10

Ellen Chen ’12

Editor-in-Chief Emeritus Zvi Smith ’09 Publisher Emeritus Joel Alicea ’10

Rush Doshi Editor-in-Chief

AFP Advisory Board

American Foreign Policy is a student-written, student-run publication based at Princeton University. It was founded in the wake of September 11th to provide Princeton students with a forum to discuss the difficult problems and choices facing the United States in the world. American Foreign Policy magazine is sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, and the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions. No part of this publication should be construed to promote any pending legislation or to support any candidate for office. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Woodrow Wilson School, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the James Madison Program, Princeton University, or American Foreign Policy. AFP gladly accepts letters to the editor, article proposals, and donations, which are fully tax-deductible. All correspondence may be directed to: American Foreign Policy, 5406 Frist Center, Princeton, NJ 08544 afp@princeton.edu www.princeton.edu/~afp

’11 ’11 ’11 ’11 ’11 ’11 ’11 ’11 ’12 ’12 ’12 ’12 ’12

Anne-Marie Slaughter: Dean, Woodrow Wilson School Nolan McCarty: Acting Dean, Woodrow Wilson School Katherine Newman: Director, Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies Robert P. George: Director, James Madison Program G. John Ikenberry: Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs Bernard A. Haykel: Director, Institute for Transregional Study of the Contemporary Middle East

American Foreign Policy

American Foreign Policy December 2008 Volume VIII, Issue 3

CONTENTS U.S. Foreign Policy With the World Watching Courtney Emerson ’10 Restoring America’s Tarnished Image Two Perspectives: Obama and Rogue States

The Hard Logic of Soft Power Jamie LaMontagne ’11 Time for the U.S. to Embrace the World

Change You Can Pocket-Size

Dan May ’11

Franco Lopez ’11

Positive Sum Perspectives Hyoung Sung Kim ’11 How Obama Should Manage China

Realistic Engagement The Need for Credible Threats

AFP Quiz

Asia

Roma for Obama

Global Update

Vishal Chanani ’11

A Serious Setback Kevin Kim ’12 How Obama Can Stabilize the Six Party Talks

Befriending the Tiger Sweta Haldar ’12 16 Why Obama Must Solidify Ties with India

Latin America

A Rising Tide Lifts All Hopes

Looking South Obama and Latin America

In Context Africa

Ending an Atrocity Obama’s Policy for Darfur

By the Numbers

Nidya Sarria ’12

Tara Lewis ’11

Mohit Agrawal ’11

Photo Credits: Frank Augstein, Alessandra Tarantino, Biswaranjan Rout, Itsuo Inouye / AP

December 2008

Voting Absentee?

Cover Photo: Jae C. Hong / AP

U.S. Foreign Policy

AP / Color China Photo

With the World Watching Restoring America’s Tarnished Image

uring the past 8 years, the international community has increasingly questioned the United States’ adherence to the moral code and democratic dogma of which it claims to be the supreme example. The Bush administration’s willingness to disregard human rights and Constitutional ideals in the name of domestic safety, engaging in acts such as extraordinary rendition, the torture of prisoners, and unwarranted wiretapping, has eroded the perception of the United States abroad. The unilateralism

Courtney Emerson ’10 under which the Bush administration has operated has transformed the image of the United States into that of a bully and a symbol of hypocrisy. Given the overwhelming support that the world community has shown for Barack Obama, there is the potential to transform and redeem our tarnished image.German newspapers have compared Obama to Abraham Lincoln and John Kennedy, two of America’s most popular and beloved presidents. Kenya, the birthplace of Obama’s father, has established a national holiday in

American Foreign Policy

his name. While we do not know what specific policies Barack Obama will pursue in office or how his foreign policy will impact popular opinion abroad, his election to one of the most powerful offices on earth has already re-energized America’s claim to being the land of opportunity and possibility. The international community has embraced this conception, and placed much hope on him. However, while Obama has the potential to positively influence the way the United States is perceived abroad, this will not happen overnight. Current foreign policy realities will make pleasing everyone impossible, and heightened expectations could easily lead to international disillusionment if immediate change is not apparent. In light of this, both the United States and the world would do well to reassess their hopes. Obama is certainly capable of restoring America’s global prestige, but the process will be both lengthy and arduous. The reasons for the international com-

U.S. Foreign Policy munity’s outpouring of support are obvious. Obama is not a child of imperialists, nor born a member of the upper class. He is not a Bush, Clinton, Kennedy, Roosevelt or Taft. His election has been a forceful repudiation of what the unpopular Bush administration represented. Support for Obama abroad has to do with the American people’s clear rejection of the foreign policies pursued in the past eight years. For some, Obama’s ascendance to the presidency as an AfricanAmerican in it of itself has restored faith in the American principles of equality. Whether we can realize all these expectations and hopes, however, must be considered in the context of international realities. Although Obama has won the support of much of the world, he must now be prepared for the world’s somewhat inevitable disappointment. The current economic downturn, combined with America’s budget deficit, has limited the resources of the country. Although Obama is popular in the Middle East, the United States, for the foreseeable future, will need to continue military campaigns in the region and, by all indications, escalate the conflict in Afghanistan even further. In addition, the presidentelect has indicated that his commitment and aid for Israel will remain steadfast. As many Middle Eastern states refuse to even recognize Israel’s right to exist, the United States’ continued support for Israel will undoubtedly generate anger and distrust. European enthusiasm may also prove difficult to maintain. Obama drew huge crowds in his visit to Berlin this past summer and French opinion polls claim that 8 out of every 10 citizens support him in the election. French and German governments may, however, be hesitant to place as many troops in Afghanistan as Obama envisions they should. European countries have grown increasingly dismissive of purely unilateral U.S. tendencies over the past 8 years and have begun pursuing negotiations and

talks with Iran independent of U.S. involvement. Despite engaging in these talks, EU diplomats have stated that they will likely be unsuccessful without U.S. participation. In this regard, Obama’s indication that he will cooperate on this front seems to be a welcomed change. Already Obama’s demeanor towards Iran appears to be growing colder, if anything. Just recently, the president-elect politically sidestepped thanking Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for his open letter of congratulations, claiming he would not respond to this thanks in a “knee-jerk fashion”.

ternational Criminal Court, and withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia. Obama’s potential ability to unite and mobilize multi-nation action could have a huge impact on reversing the U.S. policy of withholding cooperation on issues of international consensus. Such issues for which a reversed U.S. attitude may be expected and welcomed include global warming, nuclear disarmament, response plans for environmental problems and natural disasters, and counter-terrorism strategies. The perceived ability of the new presidentelect to compromise could therefore be of the utmost importance, but once again, political realities may interfere with tangible results to this effect. The same interests that motivated President Bush’s policies still exist, and Obama will have to address these interests before he can fully engage the international community’s desires. The worry, then, is that international disappointment may be in store when the change expected does not match the change actualized. Every nation seems to want something a little different from the president-elect and often, these wants are mutually exclusive. The intricate and complicated realities of foreign affairs and policies will make it nearly impossible for Obama to enact all substantive changes, a fact that runs counter to what the world seems to almost impossibly expect of him. The most important issue is how the world will react when it becomes apparent that all changes have not been realized, and that certain future disappointments are inevitable. It will be interesting to see how Obama will respond to such reactions. There is potential to redeem America’s tarnished image, but it is unclear to what extent this will be possible considering current American interests and the state of the international system. Nevertheless, the eyes of the world are on the United States. For the first time in years, there appear to be glints of hope. Afp

Although Obama has won the support of much of the world, he must now be prepared for the world’s somewhat inevitable disappointment. Moreover, Obama’s apparent desire for widespread increases in diplomatic engagement has not been exclusively well received. Regarding North Korea, Obama’s approach may be met with less than enthusiasm from certain countries, particularly South Korea, whose president has taken a particularly hawkish stance in regard to its northern neighbor. Even in South America, where President Hugo Chavez has indicated that U.S.-Venezuelan relations may begin to improve with an Obama presidency, many other hemispheric leaders are keeping quiet until Obama’s actual policies are put into place. It is not simply relationships with individual countries that are at stake, though. With the world community becoming increasingly interdependent, collaboration, especially for transnational issues is of critical importance. The United States, however, due to its individual goals and priorities, has often withheld its cooperation in regard to solving these issues over the past 8 years. Under the Bush administration, the United States refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol or the Mine Ban Treaty (otherwise known as the Ottawa Treaty), refused to join the In-

See the extent of international support for Obama in By the Numbers , page 23.

December 2008

Courtney may be reached at clemerso@princeton.edu

Two Perspectives: Obama

The Hard Logic of Soft Power Why Now is the Time for America to Embrace the World

hen Barack Obama assumes the Presidency in January, the international political landscape will be wrought with more potential crises than perhaps ever before. While no single nation is yet able to challenge America’s military supremacy, a remarkable number of rogue states are capable of inciting regional or international crises. In the face of these dangers, many U.S. policy makers will insist upon the necessity of typical hegemonic behavior towards these rogue states. They may threaten force, set deadlines for cooperation, and levy economic sanctions. For Obama, however, falling back on traditional

Jamie LaMontagne ’11 power-politics maneuvering would be a serious mistake; such action would nullify his greatest asset, namely the global perception he enjoys of representing a sharp departure from recent American leadership. In order to capitalize on this strength, Obama should set aside typical notions of hard power posturing and concentrate instead solely on the use of soft power diplomatic maneuvering to manage rogue nations. Such a strategy will allow the U.S. to pursue its foreign policy objectives while reserving its strength and international influence for effectively engaging in broader current and potential crises, like a newly assertive Russia or a rising China.

To begin, it is necessary to understand that a “hard power” policy of intimidating an opponent into cooperation relies on the ability of a leader to make a threat credible. This strategy failed President Bush, and similar threats from Obama are unlikely to carry more weight. Barack Obama was elected on a mandate of negotiation and withdrawal, by a party that is none too eager to embrace more global military commitments. He will inherit a faltering American economy and a staggering national deficit that need anything but increased military expenditures. Both his international and domestic audiences are likely to react negatively to any suggestion of increased military commitments: the former with skepticism, and the latter with reluctance. Add to these concerns the emerging multi-polar nature of the international system, which makes unilateral action even less feasible, and U.S. ability to make credible threats is seriously compromised. Moreover, it is unclear whether the U.S. has the resources to generate the level

Francois Mori / AP

Obama with French President Nicolas Sarkozy. With massive acclaim in Europe, Obama will begin restoring America’s soft power.

American Foreign Policy

Two Perspectives: Obama of threat that would sufficiently intimidate a rogue state. Consider a scenario where an anti-American regime is pursuing or already possesses nuclear capabilities, such as Iran or North Korea. Hard power logic would call for the U.S. to establish a deadline for a cessation of nuclear activity, and back it up with a threat of military force if ignored. Unfortunately, the only type of military intervention the U.S. could feasibly make is a tactical air strike, which is unlikely to result in the complete destruction of a state’s nuclear program, since such regimes safeguard their nuclear facilities in secret locations around different parts of the country. Even if the U.S. were capable of taking out all of a state’s nuclear ambitions in a military strike, the threat of force in itself is insufficient incentive to cooperate. From the regime’s perspective, if both U.S. military action and negotiations will result in the loss of its nuclear program, it may be preferable to test America’s resolve to take military action rather than concede benignly. The former gives its nuclear ambitions a higher chance of survival, and also provides a moral victory for the rogue regime, allowing it to accuse the U.S. of acting like a belligerent, imperialist hegemon. Though critics may argue that no rogue state will capitulate solely in the face of diplomatic pressures, we have concrete proof that negotiations can succeed. Recent U.S. relations with North Korea have demonstrated that even the most anti-American of regimes can be brought to the table; diplomatic engagement succeeded in opening up the totalitarian regime where economic sanctions and political isolation had failed. There is no reason why similar results cannot be achieved with other rogue nations. The U.S. has an array of soft power techniques at its disposal, including offers of membership into international organizations like the World Trade Organization. If wielded appropriately, there is potential to socialize rogue nations into the international system. The logic for Obama to pursue an exclusively soft-power strategy towards rogue states is threefold. First, when Obama takes office he will be in a unique position to tackle issues diplomatically. Obama’s victory itself challenged the rhetoric of these

rogue regimes, which characterize the U.S. as imperialist and inherently evil. Though his election will not inspire any coups, it may force these states to alter their messages in vilifying America to a lesser degree. As the Soviet Union needed a U.S. enemy to justify its oppressive rule, so too do the rogue nations of today rely to some degree on the existence of an “American threat” to consolidate their power. In Venezuela, Hugo Chavez will find it difficult to assert that American foreign policy is designed to keep down the oppressed nations of the third world when those policies are being crafted by an African-American with ties to Kenya and Indonesia. Similar problems are being encountered by leaders in Islamist circles. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s recent awkward extension of congratulations demonstrates that the political status quo in many anti-American states is ill

ened. To succeed in this endeavor, Obama needs to avoid giving European leaders excuses to repulse U.S. engagement, which will mean taking all steps to avoid further military conflicts. The onus for providing troops for the conflict in Afghanistan has already proved a divisive topic in U.S. relations with Europe. Entangling itself by intervening militarily in another rogue nation like Iran would not endear America to the international community. Obama’s greatest responsibility is to ensure that 20 years from now, U.S. interests worldwide will still be secure. At the moment, threatening military strikes against rogue states could potentially disillusion Europe or antagonize Russia and China, straining America’s relations with its allies. Furthermore, for Obama to use hard power threats against rogue states would be simply tactically unsound. A close examination of the Iranian nuclear crisis substantiates this. All the possible outcomes of a hard power approach designed to force Iranian capitulation are sub-optimal. In a best case scenario, faced with U.S. threats of military strikes, Iran would halt its nuclear program and allow IAEA inspectors free reign. Though this strategy achieves the objective of denuclearization, it comes with high costs. Currently, several European nations are attempting to negotiate with Iran. U.S. threats of force would not only undermine these efforts, but those European nations would feel significantly slighted. Furthermore, it is unlikely that threats of force would have the blessing of the UN Security Council. For hard power to succeed, international opinion will have to be sacrificed. This would be a waste of the popular reception Obama has received abroad, especially when soft power strategies could produce similar results. In a worst-case scenario, the deadline accompanying hard diplomacy passes and the U.S. is forced to take military action against Iran. Even if this intervention consisted only of tactical strikes on supposed silos or refinement plants, it would hardly produce ideal results. If U.S. strikes did manage to successfully destroy all of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, Obama would still be left facing an enraged Iranian regime that might respond by redoubling its efforts to

Obama will be sworn in possessing an unprecedented amount of international political capital. equipped to interact with an Obama presidency. Regimes might not change, but personalities and demeanors could certainly begin to tend toward cooperation if Obama takes the correct steps. For once, though the battle is sure to be lengthy, the U.S. may have a chance to change the way it is popularly perceived in these countries. Absolute deadlines and threats of force would waste an opportunity to give moderates in these nations a chance. Instead, Obama needs to make every attempt to negotiate with these anti-American regimes, because shows of good faith will weaken the domestic power base of the rogue state apparatus. Secondly, Obama will be sworn in possessing an unprecedented amount of international political capital. To begin his presidency with echoes of his predecessor would waste this advantage. Once empowered, Obama should immediately seek to repair the ties between America and Europe before a more serious conflict necessitates such alliance-building. If Obama initiates the process now, before American hegemony comes under greater fire, his bargaining position will be much strength-

December 2008

Two Perspectives: Obama produce nuclear weapons and increasing its funding of Islamic terrorism abroad. In fact, from an ideological standpoint, such an attack would play almost perfectly into the hands of the Iranian regime. Ayatollah Khamenei would have enough propaganda to justify his domestic, anti-American rule for decades. Moreover, Obama would almost certainly lose face internationally, at least outside of Europe, and if the action taken was unilateral, it could prove a detriment to the coalition building efforts that Obama will need to devise if he is to deal with other issues of pressing importance, such as the global financial crisis and international terrorism. In the opposite scenario, if the deadline passed without change, and Obama chose not to attack, his presidency would be equally crippled. Any ability he may have

had to pose a credible threat would almost certainly evaporate, and the entire world would witness Iran successfully standing up to the U.S.. One can only imagine how the countries of Europe would view such a show of weakness as Russia grows more aggressive. Military engagement is clearly not currently in the best interests of the U.S., and so Obama would do well to first pursue all soft power alternatives. Obama is best served by foregoing hard power posturing in order to reserve U.S. military strength for genuine existential threats. As antagonistic as Iran and North Korea have seemed at times, only nations like Russia and China could wreak irrevocable havoc on the international community. With China on the rise and a more belligerent Russia, many realist policy analysts predict that the world is destined for another

Realistic Engagement Why Diplomacy Alone Cannot Stop Rogue States

ext January, Barack Obama will enter the White House facing serious challenges from rogue states like Iran and North Korea. Weapons experts, including former UN chief weapons inspector David Kay, believe Iran to be within two to five years of achieving a deployable nuclear weapon. Moreover, Iran’s 6,000 operating or nearoperational uranium-enriching centrifuges would eventually provide enough nuclear fissile material for several bombs. However, while Iran may present a difficult but solvable foreign policy challenge, North Korea’s nuclear proliferation may be impossible to reverse. The autarkic and secretive state already possesses nuclear weapons, not to mention hundreds of conventional artillery tubes within range of the densely populated South Korean capital of Seoul. Despite recent progress on disarmament, North Korea has now barred international weapons inspectors from taking any physical samples at its Yongbyon nuclear facility.

Dan May ’11 This measure makes it almost impossible for the United States to verify North Korea’s nuclear disarmament and represents yet another step backwards in the long and fruitless negotiations between the two states. At this point, North Korea’s nuclear proliferation is probably an irreversible fact. The Six-Party talks have become more focused on economic extortion than profitable negotiation. The United States has fulfilled its obligations at every step of the process, removing North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism and procuring an additional 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to be delivered next month. North Korea has responded only with delays and reneging. Because the North can already inflict so many casualties and so much economic pain on its neighbor with its conventional weapons alone, the United States cannot compel North Korea to forfeit its nuclear capability or accelerate negotiations. Iran need not end the same way. The experience with North Korea indicates the importance

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Great Power conflict in the coming decades. U.S. policy towards rogue nations should be crafted so as to address smaller concerns as sufficiently as possible while still retaining the necessary military flexibility to contain these larger potential threats. The strategy that would currently best satisfy those dual objectives is an exclusively soft power policy towards the rogue states of the world, where the U.S. avoids antagonizing its current allies, overextending an already strained American military, or having its resources tied up in minor conflicts around the globe. The world expects diplomacy from Obama, and he should provide it. Afp Jamie may be reached at flamonta@princeton.edu

of preventing proliferation before it happens and provides some important insight as to how President Obama should handle rogue states. Obama must develop the subtlety and flexibility required to threaten rogue states and initiate engagement simultaneously. Only with a credible threat of force can President Obama encourage states like Iran to negotiate in good faith and move toward non-proliferation. The use of diplomatic or economic concessions in themselves provide rogue states like Iran with little incentive to halt nuclearization because they can always bargain from a position of much greater strength once they achieve an operational nuclear weapon. Why should Iran negotiate with the United States or the EU Three (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) in the short term if it will be able to exact more concessions from the Western powers once it possesses a bomb, just as North Korea has done? If, on the other hand, Iran faces a certain U.S. airstrike before it completes the bomb, it has an incentive to come to the negotiating table early. Therefore, a credible threat of force represents the key to successful negotiations. Even staunch advocates of talks with rogue states, like Henry Kissinger, acknowledge that these talks will not succeed without the threat of military action should talks break down. This strategy does not mean large-scale saber rattling or intimidation. It does not mean abandon-

Two Perspectives: Obama

Sue Ogrocki / AP

ing Obama’s strong commitment to multilateralism or diplomacy. Instead, it implies the need for carefully crafted, enforceable threats against rogue states so that they have an incentive to come to the table. Because the threat of force is so critical to successful negotiations, President Obama must take steps to ensure that rogue states view his threats as credible. Iran will be the first test case for this new type of assertive diplomacy. First, the president must set a firm disarmament date by which Iran must verifiably halt its uranium enrichment activity or face military action. Iran has simply ignored deadlines set by the IAEA and the European Union—among other international institutions—because it faced only economic sanctions for doing so. A firm timeline for disarmament, enforced by the threat of military action, would require Iran to take negotiations seriously or face more meaningful consequences. While diplomacy comes naturally to Barack Obama, his staunchly anti-war electoral base and his relative inexperience on

foreign policy may weaken his credibility when threatening to use force. He can overcome this perceived shortcoming by linking his domestic political reputation to the Iranian nuclear issue early in his presidency. The president or one of his key foreign policy advisors should give a speech in the first few weeks of his term promising that his administration will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons and making explicit the threat to launch airstrikes if Iran refuses to negotiate a settlement. Obama’s popularity actually makes this threat more credible because it allows him to pull reluctant Democrats along with his agenda in a way that his predecessor could not. Unlike the unpopular George W. Bush, Barack Obama could actually convince Congress and the American public to carry out an airstrike against Iran if he believed it necessary. While this approach carries obvious political risks particularly for an Obama presidency, it would be a viable option especially if the president made these threats alongside calls for renewed diplomacy. From a strategic

December 2008

These “bunker busters” can destroy underground military facilities, such as those housing Iran’s nuclear program.

standpoint, putting the president’s electoral fortunes on the line makes the threat of an airstrike much more believable. American capitulation on the nuclear issue would harm American interests in the Middle East and mean political ruin for the president. Some experts have argued that the U.S. cannot credibly threaten the use of force when its military options are so limited. The American armed forces cannot sustain a full-scale invasion of Iran with so many of their troops tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a Special Forces’ insertion at Iran’s many nuclear sites would be a logistical nightmare. The United States’ only realistic option is the use of airstrikes. While these strikes might not destroy every one of Iran’s dispersed, buried, and clandestine nuclear sites, a well-coordinated attack could hit enough key facilities to set the program back a number of years. More importantly,

Two Perspectives: Obama

AFP Quiz

Multiple Choice Monthly Franco Lopez ’11 1. Which nation’s government recently denied entry to Jimmy Carter and Kofi Annan, claiming they were “personalities deemed hostile” to the country? a) Iran b) Zimbabwe c) Bolivia d) North Korea e) Canada 2. The UN Security Council recently authorized the deployment of 3,000 additional peacekeeping troops to which country? a) Democratic Republic of the Congo b) Somalia c) East Timor d) Sudan e) Sri Lanka 3. Somali Islamists declared they will take action against the pirates responsible for the “major crime” of hijacking which Muslim country’s ship? a) Yemen b) Iran c) Indonesia d) Saudi Arabia e) United Arab Emirates 4. Which country is on the verge of passing legislation to extend presidential terms from four to six years, in a move some condemn as undemocratic? a) Japan b) South Africa c) Russia d) Chile e) United States 5. Which country’s government recently said it is nearing victory over a rebel group that has waged a secessionist campaign for the past 25 years? a) Sri Lanka b) Colombia c) Somalia d) Rwanda e) Turkey Answers on page 17

however, the tactical success of an airstrike is immaterial: as long as Iran can be persuaded that an airstrike would likely succeed, they will have a sufficient incentive to bargain rather than run the risk of American attack. Thus, the next president must find ways to convince Iran that America possesses the capability to carry out a successful strike. If Iran can be persuaded that the operation would be successful, the United States would not have to carry out the strike at all because Iran would come to the negotiating table rather than run the risk of military action. Last year Israel successfully spooked the Syrians by striking a possible nuclear site while remaining undetected by Syrian armed forces. Iran uses the same Russian air defense radar and surface-to-air missile system to protect its nuclear sites. By evading Syria’s radar cover so easily, Israel demonstrated that Iran’s air defenses could not stop a strike on its nuclear program.

presidency alone will not overcome propaganda-fueled anti-American sentiment in the Middle East and elsewhere. His push for diplomacy does not address the most fundamental reasons for anti-Americanism in the Muslim world, including U.S. occupation of Muslim countries, maintenance of military bases on the Arabian peninsula, aid to Arab dictators, support for Israel or America’s morally permissive culture. In terms of coalition building, Obama sacrifices nothing by taking a tough stance on rogue states. Alliances are forged and strengthened by shared interests and common challenges, and indeed, our European allies share our anxieties about Iranian proliferation. Barack Obama can use the issue of Iranian proliferation as a rallying tool for disaffected European powers. Obama’s substantial efforts at diplomacy will insulate him from charges of hegemonism and his toughness will reassure many European states whose leaders have been as insistent

Barack Obama’s presidency alone will not overcome propaganda-fueled anti-American sentiment in the Middle East and elsewhere. The United States can send a similar message by engaging in high-profile military maneuvers and testing. The United States could, for example, conduct a publicized air exercise, displaying the capabilities of its recently developed “Massive Ordinance Penetrator” bunker-busting bomb. Such a test would indicate to Iran and other potential rogues that even underground facilities are vulnerable to American strikes. It should be admitted that signaling carries costs, as rogue states might bury their bunkers deeper underground as a result of greater intelligence on American capabilities. Still, the benefits of such a strong signal outweigh the tactical costs. Foreign policy doves have objected to this strategy on the grounds that it would weaken American soft power at a time when the United States needs to be rebuilding international relationships after the Bush years. An Obama presidency, these critics argue, will weaken anti-American sentiment globally and encourage stronger ties with traditional European allies. Both pieces of this argument are flawed. Barack Obama’s

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as their American counterparts on tough action toward Iran. Ultimately, the United States cannot afford to wait and hope for the best when dealing with Iran or the threat of rogue states more broadly. The costs of Iranian proliferation would be astronomical. Directly, a nuclear Iran would threaten American troops, Israel, and Arab allies. It has the potential to spark a Middle East arms race. Indirectly, Iran could give an atomic bomb to a terrorist group like Hezbollah that has already killed hundreds of Americans. Obama has the right instinct to pursue strong diplomatic efforts to disarm Iran and improve relations with other rogue states. Without a credible threat of force, however, these states do not have a meaningful incentive to negotiate in good faith. Diplomacy sounds attractive, but without a credible threat it will not bring about the change that Obama has promised. Afp Dan may be reached at dbmay@princeton.edu

A sia

Positive Sum Perspectives How Obama Should Manage China

f China and America both had Facebook, “It’s Complicated” would hardly suffice to characterize the ever-changing relationship between the two nations. To America, China has oscillated from friend (source of trade and spices) to enemy (the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1888) to friend (World War II) to enemy (the Cold War) to friend again (Nixon’s rapprochement). The current hawkish consensus in Washington is that the United States cannot afford to consider China an unconditional friend, and that continued confrontation with China on major issues is necessary to protect American superpower status in both relative and absolute terms.. These hawks point to China’s outer-space projects, its rising influence in Latin America and the Middle East, and the recent announcement of its desire to acquire an aircraft carrier as indications that China’s

Hyoung Sung Kim ’11 rise threatens American primacy. Barack Obama’s election as president promises a change in that negative perception. He rides a wave of international goodwill that he should use to his advantage: 300,000 people cheering in Berlin and the more formal “global electoral college” poll by the Economist suggest that he is not just an American president but also a global one. Where can President-elect Obama expect to run into conflict with China, and what should he do? The following explores several sources of potential conflict and suggests strategies for Obama in approaching critical issues.

The economy and the financial crisis

During his presidential campaign, Obama continued a long-standing tradition

of portraying China as a source of economic woe. Obama promised to use “all diplomatic means” to prevent China from manipulating its currency to gain an unfair trading advantage, and, addressing the National Council of Textile Organizations, he also promised to increase monitoring for unfair trade practices. According to one senior advisor, Obama wants a China that “plays by the rules.” Unfortunately for Obama, the only rules that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will follow are those that will solidify the party’s domestic control and expand China’s international influence. To the CCP, the health of the economy is absolutely necessary to the domestic stability, which maintains its rule. Thus, the fact that the CCP is currently underwriting some $1 trillion worth of American debt is not, as some have suggested, a threat to the U.S. economy. To use this reserve as some sort of “leverage” against the United States would be political suicide for the CCP, as it needs a strong American economy as a reliable export market. At home, the CCP needs to keep food prices artificially low for the Chinese people, whose average per capita income is just $6,000 per year. Higher food prices could create civil unrest, undermining the “harmonious society” that Chinese lead-

ImagineChina / AP “Build, baby, build!”

December 2008

Asia ers claim to be constructing. President-elect Obama, in line with the calculated and sober posture he demonstrated so well during the campaign, needs to take a measured approach to these complex issues. First, Obama needs to make clear to Americans that China’s economic policy is not designed to steal American jobs; rather, the Chinese people are simply accepting the economic opportunities that their government provides for them. One of the challenges Obama faces on this front is, ironically, a Democratically-controlled Congress, whose speaker, Nancy Pelosi, is a vocal critic of China’s economic policy. Building on this, Obama needs to demonstrate to China that this economic partnership is one of friendly competition; past dialogues have too often been characterized by unrealistic American demands on currency and trade issues that the Chinese simply cannot accept. At least within the economic realm, as the first and third highest traders in the world respectively, America and China will soon find themselves in a love-hate relationship: they can’t live with each other, and they can’t live without each other. Given this reality, the two states must strive to find mutually beneficial solutions to these critical economic issues.

area, but it also undercuts China’s excuse for continuing to pollute so heavily. On the other hand, decreasing the importance of oil in long-term geopolitical calculations is one way to diminish tension over “spheres of influence” in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. As an energy-hungry China steps up investment in oil-rich areas, these places are becoming regions of great power contestation. When it comes to urging Chinese environmental conservation, Obama needs to take a more refined and subtle approach than his predecessor. First, he should recognize that, despite worries in mainstream circles, the American economy is in a far superior position to the Chinese economy. China’s reliance on exports leaves it particularly vulnerable to decreasing consumption abroad.

Obama, especially given his liberal stance on human rights issues. The majority of the world will appreciate Obama’s promises to protect human rights, to close down Guantanamo Bay, and to restore civil liberties that were lost under the current administration. However, the CCP may interpret Obama’s determination to retake the moral high ground and his renewed focus on values issues as potential affronts to China’s harsh domestic methods. Again, Obama should approach this potentially thorny issue confidently but slowly. First, Obama should not shirk from condemning cases of clear human rights abuse. In the short term, he can begin by urging China to become more involved in humanitarian conflicts such as Darfur and signing international treaties that emphasize basic human rights protection. If China is serious about achieving “peaceful development” and integration into the world community, Obama can argue that this integration requires compromise on these important human rights issues and that such cooperation only improves China’s international reputation. All in all, Obama needs to take what can be broadly construed as a liberal approach to Sino-American relations. For the so-called “realists” who advocate a more hard-line approach to China, it is impossible to deny that internal considerations make up the majority of Chinese calculations in international relations. Rather than simply force China further and further into a corner, the next administration must further incorporate and intertwine China into international institutions in a way that is commensurate with its status as a rising power. In this way, both Americans and Chinese can approach issues not as “mine” and “theirs” but rather as “ours.” This approach is perfectly in line with Obama’s call for multilateralism, and is especially needed at this historic turning point. If Obama is successful in cultivating a spirit of bipartisanship on the international level, the result will be a positive-sum relationship between the United States and China that benefits both parties. Afp

The next adminsitration must incorporate China into international institutions in a way commensurate with its status as a rising power.

The environment

China and many other developing countries have capitalized on the Bush administration’s rejection of the Kyoto Protocols and general reluctance to participate—perhaps even believe—in the fight against climate change as a justification for their own failure to curb emissions. Ironically, one of the reasons the Bush administration and a Republican Congress cited for opposing the Kyoto Protocols during the Clinton years was that key developing countries were exempt from its regulations despite being some of the world’s worst polluters. The United States under the Obama administration must take a leading role in solving this collective action problem. Obama has promised to reduce oil dependence and increase environmental conservation, and with the right policies, he can kill two political birds with one stone. On the one hand, investing heavily in renewable energy not only sends a signal to the world that America is serious about research and development in a currently underfunded

Next, Obama should point out possible areas of cooperation between the two nations, rather than repeatedly touting statistics that show China coughing from the pollution that has accompanied its breathtaking growth. Instead, Obama should impose “soft” pressure on the Chinese by insisting that China’s rise on the world stage comes with a proportional rise in responsibilities. Additionally, arguments that highlight the potential domestic benefits of environmental conservation—the creation of new jobs, investment opportunities, and potential health benefits—are far more likely to resonate with China than ones based on some vague moral imperative.

Terrorism and human rights abuse

China has traditionally supported Republican presidents for their perceived predictability and reduced interference in China’s internal affairs, and have especially preferred their toned-down rhetoric on human rights abuses. It was, after all, Republican president Nixon who first approached China with his rapprochement in 1973. And President Bush’s declaration of the War on Terror has given China a security-based justification for oppressing minorities in Western China and Tibet. This is decidedly a tricky issue for

American Foreign Policy

Hyoung may be reached at hyoungk@princeton.edu

global update Collected by Vishal Chanani ’11 In the UNITED STATES, Barack Obama is elected President winning both the popular and electoral votes, marking the first time an African-American will occupy that office. His Democratic Party increases its majorities in both houses of Congress. The economic crisis continued in the UNITED STATES as unemployment rose to the highest levels in 14 years. Additionally, the gross domestic product contracted by 0.3% in October, related to the first drop in consumer spending in 17 years. In CANADA, incumbent Prime Minister Steven Harper is reelected as his Conservative Party triumphs. The party, however, falls short of a majority and forms its third minority government in four years. A plane crash in MEXICO kills, among others, two top advisers to Felipe Calderon. Among them is the secretary of the interior Juan Camillo Mauriño, who led the Mexican effort against drugs. Reports suggest that the cause was simply pilot error. In the city of Pétionville, HAITI a school building collapses, killing an estimated 91 students and injuring over 150 more. Shortly thereafter, in Port-au-Prince, another school building collapses. The second round of parliamentary elections conclude in LITHUANIA with Andrius Kubilius of the Homeland Union party regaining the position of Prime Minister, a seat he briefly held in 1999 and 2000. With the support of two minority parties, his party has formed a new governing coalition. In an attempt to incentivize the halting of militant attacks, ISRAEL closes important crossings at the Gaza Strip in order to choke off vital supplies, including food. Defense Minister Ehud Barak noted that rockets were being fired indiscriminately from Gaza to civilian targets in the area. A magnitude 6.4 earthquake strikes southwest PAKISTAN near Ziarat in the Baluchistan region. Over 150 are confirmed dead and over 10,000 are estimated to be displaced. Pirates from SOMALIA acting in the Gulf of Aden unsuccessfully attempt to capture Indian merchant vessels in the region. The attack is cut off by the Indian Navy which responds using marine commandos in an armed helicopter launched from a warship. The Russian Navy has also deployed forces to this area. In ZAMBIA, incumbent President Rubiah Banda, who assumed office in June, is elected by a margin less than two percent, representing the ruling Movement for Multi-Party Democracy. The election was a special election with only the presidency up for contest. Conflict continues in the Kivu province of the DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO between rebel groups and the armed forces. The rebel groups under Laurent Nkunda declare a unilateral cease-fire as they approached Goma and propose the creation of a no-fire zone for humanitarian purposes. Three terrorists deemed responsible for the 2002 bombings of Bali nightclubs are executed in INDONESIA. Security forces remained on alert for fear of retaliatory action by Islamist extremist groups. Elections are held in NEW ZEALAND, with the National Party gaining a plurality, as well as support from minority parties to form a governing coalition. John Key is elected as Prime Minister. In TAIWAN, ousted President Chen Shui-Bian is arrested and jailed. He is facing various corruption and money laundering charges, but claims the ruling Kuomintang, led by Ma Ying-jeou, is illegitimately persecuting him to curry the favor of the Chinese.

December 2008

Asia

A Serious Setback How Obama Can Stabilize the Six-Party Talks

Kevin Kim ’12

espite the fact that the North Korean government has taken steps toward a more cooperative relationship with the United States over the past two years, its actions in recent weeks constitute a serious setback in negotiations both with regards to its nuclear program and its relationship with South Korea. This behavioral shift is seemingly motivated by North Korea’s desire to extract additional foreign economic aid through coercive means. As the George W. Bush administration bequeaths its command, it is up to the incoming Barack Obama administration to play a critical role in reversing North Korea’s evident backsliding. To achieve this, the Obama administration ought to pursue a policy of moderation guided by the action-for-action principle, which would reward North Korea’s cooperative behaviors while using diplomacy to deter North Korea from using aggression. Obama must also encourage and facilitate direct talks between North and South Korea to restore their cooperative relationship. Recent years have witnessed significant progress in the nuclear disarmament of North Korea. On February 13, 2007, North Korea agreed to begin disarming its most prominent nuclear site in Yongbyon. North Korea went so far as to destroy the cooling tower at Yongbyon on June 27, 2008. Finally, on October 11, 2008, North Korea was removed from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list after handing over documents detailing its nuclear capabilities and engaging in other cooperative actions regarding its nuclear disarmament. Despite this progress, North Korea’s most recent actions have reignited tensions with the United States and impeded progress on disarmament issues. On No-

vember 12, North Korea announced that it would bar international nuclear inspectors from taking physical samples from its nuclear sites and limit inspections to the Yongbyon nuclear complex. Such restrictions are problematic, as they will prevent the United States from effectively measuring the extent of the current North Korean nuclear program particularly outside of Yongbyon. The North Korean government contends that these constraints will not be lifted until the U.S. delivers the economic assistance it pledged during the negotiations for North Korea’s nuclear disarmament. Understandably, the U.S. State Department has already cried foul play and

president, Roh Moo-Hyun, continued this conciliatory policy towards North Korea and relations between the two nations continued to thaw until current South Korean president Lee Myung-Bak took office. Lee Myung-Bak, a longtime conservative opponent of the Sunshine Policy, took a more hard-line approach towards North Korea. Instead of bestowing unconditional aid, Bak promised aid only after North Korea demolished its suspected nuclear programs. Pyongyang was enraged by this announcement and responded by quickly expelling South Korean officials from Kaesong and positioning troops dangerously close to the DMZ. Then on November 12, 2008, North Korea declared that beginning on December 1, its borders would be closed to South Korea. Without open borders, the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which requires South Korean funds for its continuation, will almost certainly wither. In short, current relations between the two Koreas seem icier than ever. These new political developments concerning North Korea’s nuclear program and its relations with South Korea make clear a consistent aspect of North Korean strategy: brinksmanship. Because it is politically and economically powerless compared to its neighbors, North Korea utilizes military threats to escalate tensions and compel concessions from its neighbors. In the case of its U.S. relations, North Korea leveraged the lack of an official verification protocol in order to prolong the denuclearization process and extract further U.S. economic aid. In the case of South Korea, Pyongyang used Lee Myung-Bak’s hard-line policies as an excuse to escalate tensions and put pressure on Seoul. Lee Myung-Bak is already facing major criticism regarding his harsher policy towards North Korea and is taking most of the blame for the deteriorating relations. Pyongyang hopes that by closing the borders and forcing the collapse of Kaesong, a prominent political symbol of hope in South Korea, it can put Bak under enough political pressure to return to the Sunshine Policy of his predecessors. South Korea’s return to this policy would mean the continuation of unconditional aid, which is one of North Korea’s main goals

President-elect Barack Obama must continue the action-for-action principle that has constituted the spirit of the Six Party Talks.

criticized North Korea for reneging on its earlier agreement to disarm its nuclear program fully and verifiably. In response to these criticisms, North Korea claims that the member nations of the Six Party Talks never signed an agreement outlining the specific verification measures that inspectors could perform. The political history between North Korea and its neighbor South Korea follows a similar trend. In 1998, Kim DaeJung, president of South Korea at the time, introduced the Sunshine Policy, which provided an increase in private sector investment and humanitarian aid for North Korea. The ensuing development of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, a joint economic effort between the South and the North, marks one of the Sunshine Policy’s greatest successes. Situated in a special administrative region of North Korea, Kaesong is predicted to generate 725,000 jobs and $500 million dollars of annual wage income for North Korea by 2012. The next

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Asia

Newsis, Hu Kyung / AP

in its brinksmanship strategy. Given this state of affairs, the United States ought to pursue several policy approaches to ease tensions and move negotiations forward. For one, President-elect Barack Obama must continue the action-for-action principle that has constituted the spirit of the Six Party Talks. In other words, he must continue to reward North Korea for its progress towards denuclearization. Before North Korea announced its barring of inspections, the United States had scheduled a shipment of 50,000 metric tons of heavy fuel to arrive in North Korea by December. Notwithstanding the recent conduct of North Korea in international affairs, Obama should still proceed with this shipment as a statement of his willingness to utilize conciliatory negotiations rather than force. Along the same lines, Obama must open channels for direct, bilateral negotiation with Pyongyang. Because North Korea has always claimed to pursue nuclear technology in order to protect itself against the United States, conciliatory gestures by Obama would undermine North Korea’s stated justification for developing nuclear weapons. Also, such conciliatory measures will deprive North Korea of excuses to escalate tensions, thereby hindering its strategy of brinkmanship. The conciliatory principle of actionfor-action does not mean that North Kore-

an misdeeds should be ignored. In addition to rewarding North Korea for its progress, Obama must also act towards addressing North Korean misconduct. Hence, Obama must put forward a verification protocol as the top priority in the next Six Party Talks. The protocol should contain clear stipulations to allow necessary inspections and verifications of nuclear activities in North Korea. In the previous round of this multilateral negotiation, the six nations involved did not explicitly sign a verification protocol, which in turn left North Korea with enough diplomatic loopholes to circumvent verification altogether. By introducing a verification protocol and having all members express their agreement in writing, Obama will close the existing loopholes and make great strides towards denuclearization in the Korean peninsula. Also, an enforceable protocol will make it difficult for North Korea to revamp its nuclear program in the future. With regard to the relations between the two Koreas, Obama must encourage more bilateral negotiations between the North and the South. In these discussions, the maintenance of the Kaesong Industrial Complex must be a top priority. Kaesong serves as a prominent symbol of hope in South Korea and, perhaps more importantly, as a vital economic stabilizer in North Korea. Furthermore, South Korea

December 2008

In the past few days, North Korea has begun shutting down cross-border traffic to the Kaesong Industrial Park due to rising tensions on the peninsula.

has been one of North Korea’s greatest economic benefactors in recent years, so shutting out its neighbor will only cause North Korea’s unstable economy to suffer even more. With direct, bilateral negotiations, Lee Myung-Bak and Barack Obama must help North Korea realize that cooperation, rather than escalating tension, will ultimately lead to more economic assistance. These policy recommendations are not comprehensive, but they provide a starting point for Obama to put the denuclearization of North Korea, and ultimately the stabilization of the Korean peninsula, back on track. Afp

Kevin may be reached at kkim731@gmail.com

Asia

Befriending the Tiger Why Obama Must Solidify Ties with India

Sweta Haldar ’12

n March 2005, the Bush Administration announced its intention to “help India become a major world power for the 21st century.” Within months, the implications of this vaguelyworded promise became evident. In July, President Bush issued a joint statement with India’s Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, promising not merely full “civilian nuclear energy cooperation” with India but also a comprehensive global partnership, encompassing every issue of mutual concern, from energy to defense. And thus, the stage was set for a new, warmer era in relations between the world’s two largest democracies. Indo-U.S. relations, though never actively hostile, have been marred by alternating bouts of quiet distrust and not-so-benign neglect ever since India’s entrance into the global sphere as an independent power in 1947. In 1998, after India detonated nuclear devices in the Pokharan desert region, the U.S. reacted with general disapproval and the promise of economic sanctions. The 2005 nuclear deal represented a repudiation of America’s earlier policy and the Bush administration’s recognition of a truth that President-elect Obama cannot afford to ignore: at the dawn of the 21st century, alienating India or treating it as an irresponsible rogue state would deprive the United States of the rich economic and strategic benefits a partnership with such a dynamic nation would confer. Aiding India can only promote American interests. In the mere decade-and-a-half since its government shook off the socialist-inspired economic policies of the post-Independence era and embraced growth with open arms, the country has grown into an economic powerhouse. Its annual GDP growth rates are second only to China’s among the world’s largest economies and

its emergence as the clear world leader in IT outsourcing and offshoring has facilitated the development of a Westernized middle class, which makes up in sheer size what it lacks in individual purchasing power. In coming years, this could constitute a lucrative emerging market for Western entrepreneurs. Perhaps even more significantly, India has enormous geopolitical importance and unplumbed potential as a strategic partner. Wedged between China and the Middle East, it is ideally positioned to help the United States confront radical Islam in Afghanistan and Pakistan, to provide a reliable counterweight to China and to promote greater global security in a number of other, diverse ways.

United States was emboldening North Korea and Iran in their quests for nuclear legitimacy. Senator Obama was himself the author of two “killer” amendments that would have greatly dulled the impact of the deal, though both were defeated. The President-elect’s passion for the cause of nuclear non-proliferation is admirable but in this situation, misplaced. It is predicated on the notion that India is an irrational and impulsive actor—similar to Iran or North Korea—rather than a responsible, secular democracy (which it is). India is unlikely to ever use nuclear weapons offensively. India’s nuclear policy is currently that it would never launch a first strike. Furthermore, Marxists, who nurse visions of a non-nuclear world, retain significant domestic-political influence. Obama has everything to gain from throwing his unequivocal support behind the nuclear deal. For decades, India maintained an uncomfortably close relationship with the Soviet Union, receiving military equipment and financial assistance during the 1960s and openly supporting them during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1971. Since the collapse of the USSR, no nation has emerged to fill this role. Though China and India currently have only lukewarm relations, China is projected to replace the United States as India’s chief trade partner by 2010. Furthermore, anti-American elements persist in India’s domestic politics, and the ruling elite is wary of American hegemonism. Endorsing the nuclear deal is a promising first step to prevent India from moving into China’s axis or balancing against the U.S. and to prod it into realizing the importance of a strategic relationship with the U.S. Once such a relationship is achieved, the possibilities are endless. For one, India is perfectly situated to provide a friendly, pro-American counterweight to Chinese influence in Asia, particularly in South and Southeast Asia. India seems interested in such balancing. In October 2008, India signed a security agreement and pledge for further economic cooperation with Japan, seemingly directed against China. Should China become a serious threat at any point in the future, India can be relied upon to leverage its growing regional power to represent American interests in

Obama must signal his willingness to accept and engage with India as a fellow nuclear power.

To capitalize on India’s enormous resources, growing economic significance and strategic importance, the Obama administration must continue to offer the emerging power, the respect, affirmation and basic confidence it received for the eight years of the Bush administration. In the short run, this means that Obama must assuage Indian suspicions that he is likely to renege on the crucial civilian nuclear deal and signal his willingness to accept and engage with India as a fellow nuclear power. The nuclear deal passed Congress in 2008, and while Obama did eventually back it, it is not difficult to understand the root of Indian worries that he may act contrary to its spirit. The deal’s fiercest opposition came from congressional Democrats, some of whom argued that by recognizing India as a nuclear power, the

American Foreign Policy

Asia in Afghanistan. If it chose to mine its relationship with Kabul or the Karzai government, it could use its enormous cultural and political influence within the region to make pro-West, pro-democracy sentiments felt: cultural exchange programs and investments in infrastructure could be as useful as actual military aid. If the U.S. were to use the nuclear deal as the jumping-off point for a new, closer and more mutually respectful relationship with India, it would be in a much better position to request financial aid and help of a less tangible kind: attempts to construct a more secular and pro-Western culture within this troubled region. To continue building the strong defense and diplomatic relationship with India initiated by President Bush several years ago, Presidentelect Obama would be betterserved by remembering a set of core principles than any particular policy prescriptions. The most important of these is that India, like any other emerging world power, needs to feel itself respected, encouraged, and enabled by Joshua Martin, U.S. Navy / AP the U.S. in its ambitions. In return, the country will ofA U.S. Marine provides weapons training to gic significance from its closeness to two fer the many strategic benefits inherent in Indian soldiers aboard the USS Boxer. hubs of Islamic fundamentalism crucial its location, including a critical piece of to the American war on terror: Afghani- the solution to the puzzle of Afghanistan. Asia. stan and Pakistan. With minimal policy changes, the Obama India has also recently proved itself India is in a good position to under- administration can build a relationship to be persistent in its pursuit of safer in- stand the threat posed by Afghanistani in Asia likely to be of great relevance and ternational waterways. In early November militants. In May 2008, supporters of the utility in the future. Afp 2008, the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s navy sunk a Somali pi- Taliban bombed an Indian embassy in Karate vessel in the Gulf of Aden. The week bul, not the first terrorist attack to threatSweta may be reached at before, helicopter-borne Indian merchant en Indian interests within the region. But commandos had prevented pirates from following some mistaken belief that it has shaldar@princeton.edu hijacking yet another merchant vessel. more to lose than to gain from pursuing Piracy off the coast of East Africa is an more aggressive involvement in mainenormously costly crime and Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s com- taining peace within the region, India has mitment to fighting it can only be a great not played a major role in Afghanistan. Answers to quiz on p. 10: global good. By pursuing a closer relation- Though requested several times by the ship with India, the U.S. can further en- United States to send troops, most recent1) B 4) C courage it to use its resources in the ser- ly in September, it has always declined and 2) A 5) A has generally distanced itself from the war vice of greater international security. 3) D effort. India could be a hugely valuable ally But India accrues its greatest strate-

December 2008

Latin America

Dado Galdieri / AP

Looking South

Hoping to talk? Hugo Chavez and Raul Castro, right, are optimistic about Obama.

U.S.-Latin America Relations Under Obama

bama’s election promises a new era in American politics. The image of an African-American President-elect gives hope to racial and ethnic minorities, including Hispanics, striving to succeed despite overwhelming challenges. Though the Hispanic vote usually leans Democratic, the two to one margin Obama enjoyed was unprecedented. In light of Hispanic-American support, as well as current global economic and political realities, Obama needs to follow through on promises to renew U.S. relations with Latin America, strengthening ties with Mexico, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. U.S.-Latin American relations are at a low point. Though many Latin American nations shifted toward democracy and free-

Nidya Sarria ’12 market economics in the 1980s and 90s, the U.S. did not appropriately take advantage of the opportunity to establish closer ties. Moreover, since September 11 and the beginning of the “War on Terror,” the U.S. has largely ignored the region. This has been a mistake. No other region in the world impacts the United States as much in terms of the flow of investments, natural resources, and goods. Economic conditions in Latin America can affect immigration patterns, thereby deeply affecting U.S. markets and society. By working with Latin American nations to bring economic opportunities to would-be immigrants, the U.S. government can drastically decrease illegal immigration here at home. Furthermore, the United States faces a moral obligation, brought upon it by its complex history with Latin

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America, to support democracy and human rights while still respecting national sovereignty. Ignoring Latin America jeopardizes American ability to influence the South American political and economic landscape. And as a result of such neglect, many Latin American nations have been receptive to the growing Chinese presence in Latin America. Presently, most Latin American countries face slow economic growth and certain economic deterioration as a result of minimal investment in technology and infrastructure, political divisions, meager savings and high taxes. In light of American indifference, many nations have turned to China. China offers huge financial resources to Latin America, including military aid, in exchange for Latin America’s materials and food exports. This clearly threatens U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere. The Obama Administration must restore the economic relationship between the United States and Latin America in order to protect our markets there. The best way to advance

Latin America American leadership in Latin America is by promoting free trade. Such agreements offer Latin American countries access to the U.S. consumer market, promoting growth

in agriculture and manufacturing, while simultaneously making American goods and technologies cheaper for them. Opening borders stands to increase not only U.S.

regional economic presence, but also U.S. political capital. In negotiating free trade agreements, access to U.S. consumer markets is a major bargaining chip that can be used

In Context

Compiled by Tara Lewis ’11 International Responses to Barack Obama’s election: “Europe, which is celebrating [the victory of ] Obama, must know that Europe will be called on to be a producer of security and no longer merely a consumer. I think Obama will rightly call on us to take our responsibilities more seriously.” Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini “Your election marks a new chapter in the remarkable history of the United States. For long, the ideas of democracy, liberty and freedom espoused by the United States has been a source of inspiration...I hope that under your dynamic leadership, the United States will continue to be a source of global peace and new ideas for humanity.” Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, speaking to President-elect Obama “We don’t expect any change through our previous experience with the Democrats. When it comes to foreign policy there is no difference between the Republicans and the Democrats.” Sudanese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ali Al-Sadig, commenting on his expectations of an Obama administration’s policy toward Sudan “Even if Obama had not won, I would still have done the same.” Pamela Adhiambo of Kenya, explaining why she named her newborn twins Barack and Michelle. On November fifth, over half of the babies born in Kenya were named either Barack or Michelle. “I hope that Barack Obama will respect the mandate given to him, and instead of using the [US] public’s taxes to convert the world into a pile of dynamite, spend it on their welfare and well-being.” Pakistan Taleban spokesman Muslim Khan “We hope the president-elect in the United States will stay the course and would continue the U.S. engagement in the peace process without delay. We hope the two-state vision would be transferred from a vision to a realistic track immediately.” Saeb Erekat, Aide To Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, discussing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process

AP Photo

“I’ve told the President [Medvedev] that Obama has everything that it takes to agree with him. He is young, good looking and suntanned. I think good relations can be developed.” Italian president Silvio Berlusconi at a news conference, jesting about Obama’s ability to cooperate with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev “I applaud the American people for their great decision and I hope that this new administration in the United States of America, and the fact of the massive show of concern for human beings and lack of interest in race and color while electing the president, will go a long way in bringing the same values to the rest of world sooner or later.” Afghan President Hamid Karzai

December 2008

Africa to pressure Latin American governments to take environmental protection, labor rights, and even general civil liberties seriously. Passing a free trade agreement with Colombia, for example, would reward President Uribe for his fight against right-wing drug cartels and demonstrate that the U.S. stands by its partners in South America. As such, free trade offers a way to both build cooperative relationships with Latin American governments and to apply pressure for increased democratization of the region. Few domestic issues have such repercussions in our foreign relations as immigration reform. Obama will be judged not only by Hispanics and others in the U.S., but also by Latin American leaders concerned about expatriates and their families. Immigration reform that keeps families together and ends the blackmail, humiliation, and fear faced by illegal immigrants in the United States would dramatically increase Latin American goodwill towards the U.S. Conversely, if Obama fails to deliver comprehensive immigration reform, he will face disillusionment among Hispanic supporters in the next election as well as a poor reception in many Latin American countries. While far from a comprehensive plan, the DREAM Act offers Obama an easy place to begin. This act, which allows undocumented high school students the opportunity to gain permanent residency in the United States so long as they go to college or join the armed forces, could serve several purposes. Passing the DREAM Act would be seen as a step forward for Latin American expatriates in the U.S., which would allow Obama to ease into a new, positive relationship with Latin America. At home, the passage of the DREAM Act would guarantee Hispanic support during the next election. It stands to provide thousands of young Hispanics the opportunity to go to remain in American schools. Education would allow them to contribute to the American economy as professionals, thereby reducing criminal justice and social welfare costs and increasing the number of taxpayers contributing to the system. Nevertheless, some conservatives are likely to see the DREAM act as amnesty and will oppose the bill regardless of its benefits.

Finally, Obama must promote democracy in Latin America, while still respecting the sovereignty of other nations. To this end, Obama must eventually meet with leaders such as Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and perhaps even Raul Castro of Cuba. Though some may argue that meeting with the leaders of oppressive socialist regimes legitimizes these governments, opening a dialogue with these nations would in fact

can relationships. The United States and Latin American share a complex history, rife with disagreements and resentments, but ready to be reestablished as a positive relationship. The United States stands to benefit from renewing this relationship as a result of Latin America’s economic importance, as well as its ability to influence Latin America’s migration trends. The rapid population growth of Hispanics in the United States provides an even greater importance to the renewal of a U.S.-Latin American relationship. By 2050, one in four Americans will be Hispanic and most will be young, part of a new generation of Americans ready to lead and prosper. Many Hispanic Americans will vote according to how they feel about U.S. relations with Latin America. It is now the responsibility of President-elect Barack Obama to take the first steps toward renewing America’s relationship with our southern neighbors. Afp

Since September 11 and the beginning of the “War on Terror,” the U.S. has largely ignored Latin America. This has been a mistake.

provide an avenue for reform, weaken the hand of anti-American hardliners and give moderates a chance. For example, discussions with Chavez may undermine the antiAmerican rhetoric which props up his regime. Engaging Raul Castro allows American negotiators to wield the current trade embargo as leverage in exchange for economic or political reform. More generally, pursuing trade and talks with the leaders of these nations could help soften authoritarianism and unleash political reform by way of economic liberalization. It is therefore clear that Obama must take a course of action different from that of his predecessors and meet with these leaders, promoting democracy while renewing U.S.-Latin Ameri-

Nidya may be reached at nsarria@princeton.edu

Ending an Atrocity Obama’s Policy for Darfur

merican foreign policy towards Africa received scant attention in this election cycle. With the global economic crisis, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and domestic debates over universal healthcare, the President-elect’s passion for ending the genocide in Darfur was rarely discussed. As a senator and a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Obama supported numerous bills and led national efforts attempting to bring an end to the conflict in Darfur. Though Obama’s current policy to-

American Foreign Policy

Tara Lewis ’11 ward Darfur is an excellent starting point, his plan to establish long term peace it the region must effectively address Sudan’s North-South conflict. To achieve this, Obama must actively support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, while incorporating a multilateral approach and the skillful use of engagement. In its current form, Obama’s plan recommends several ways to strengthen and improve U.S. efforts at ending the conflict. It calls for the U.S. to lead the international community in providing support for UN-

Africa AMID—the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur—and establish penalties for Khartoum if it tries to obstruct UNAMID. The plan challenges Washington to improve upon the Bush Administration’s efforts by ensuring that UNAMID is fully equipped for success, and it urges the U.S. to cooperate with the African Union, the United Nations, the Arab League, and the European Union. Furthermore, Obama wants Washington to support indictments of Sudanese officials in the International Criminal Court (ICC) to pressure Khartoum into cooperation. Obama’s Sudan policy would require interacting with many different world leaders, from Africa, Europe, and the Middle East, to India, China, Russia, and international organizations like the United Nations. Looking towards the future, the form this policy takes will shape both how he addresses future humanitarian crises and how he negotiates and engages with the international community—non-allies included— so it is crucial to the success of his new administration that he handles this correctly. As such, there are a number of other concerns that the Obama administration must remember come January. As a result of the U.S.’s failure to intervene in the Rwandan genocide and its controversial war in Iraq, the U.S. has acquired the reputation of an opportunist operating under the guise of a commitment to freedom and democracy. Responding to this, Obama has emphasized that ending the conflict in Sudan is a “moral obligation” and part of America’s promise to never again remain a bystander to gross human rights violations. A policy that includes viable solutions to the conflicts of both Sudan’s North-South divide and Darfur would demonstrate a genuine U.S. commitment to ending human rights violations abroad and would encourage assistance from the international community. A comprehensive plan of action in Sudan must deal with the struggle between North and South. The violence in Darfur is closely tied to Sudan’s decades of civil strife between northern Sudanese Arabs and southern Sudanese Christians and Animists. Indeed, a rebellion by the South in 2003 was an initial cause of the violence that now pervades Darfur. After a coalition of three rebellious ethnic groups attacked government and transportation facilities there, the official governing party in Sudan, the National Congress Party, commit-

Mannie Garcia / AP

ted genocide against members of the rebel groups’ villages to deter future violence. They murdered 250,000 of the villagers and displaced another two million. A successful policy must therefore confront the source of the hostility and focus on the North-South conflict in addition to the humanitarian disaster it caused in Darfur. This road however, is not without obstacles. Sudan wants the U.S. to lift its sanctions, stop the ICC’s indictment of Sudanese President al-Bashir, and remove it from the U.S.’s list of state sponsors of terrorism. In July, the ICC had charged al-Bashir with committing genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Al-Bashir perhaps hopes that by granting enough conces-

December 2008

Barack Obama with George Clooney at a conference on Darfur, April 2006. Obama’s longstanding support for ending the genocide must be matched by immediate action as President.

sions, he can evade his indictment. Instead, Obama should exploit the pressure that the indictment places on al-Bashir. He should use Khartoum’s weakness as leverage to demand that it stop obstructing the deployment of the UNAMID force, remove restrictions on aid workers, and engage rebel forces in talks. Andrew Natsios, former head of the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan, has advised that engagement may be the surest way to

Africa gain Khartoum and al-Bashir’s cooperation with the international community. This suggestion complements the foreign policy approach that Obama has advocated. Throughout the campaign he talked about how he, unlike Bush, would be willing to negotiate with international leaders who are considered enemies of the U.S. Obama should engage Khartoum and provide positive reinforcement. Talks conducted in this tone could improve alBashir’s willingness to comply with Obama’s policies. After all, as Natsios points out, the U.S.’ engagement with Khartoum in 2005 helped produce the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). On the other hand, the bill Congress passed last year to protect U.S. entities who cut off business ties to Sudan for political reasons only incited Khartoum into attempting a coup in Chad and attacking UN peacekeeping troops. Obama should help support the CPA by redirecting some of the U.S.’ funds allocated to Darfur. Signed in 2005, it temporarily stopped the decades-long North-South conflict. Among other things, the CPA is required to set a timetable for Sudan’s elections, increase representation in the national government, establish a system for sharing oil revenues, develop a peace plan for three regions in conflict, allow a vote on whether Southern Sudan should secede, and mandate the deployment of domestic

troops, controlled by the UN, to maintain peace in hostile areas of Sudan. The agreement, however, which resulted from a joint effort by African and Western countries under U.S. leadership, is now at risk. A policy that focuses on establishing lasting stability in the entire country would therefore provide a more sustainable solution. A policy that does not address the tensions between the North and the South leaves Sudan vul-

arms to Sudan in violation of the UN arms embargo. To facilitate cooperation, Obama should abide by his own suggestion from April, and work to establish “a single mediator, actively supported by countries with significant leverage.” However the Obama administration decides to approach Sudan, the U.S. must be careful not to project itself as imposing or controlling. Obama must use his willingness to negotiate as leverage in Khartoum, and he must demonstrate a new commitment to cooperation in order to regain international trust and achieve multilateral collaboration in the effort to bring peace to Sudan. Specifically, President Obama must address the North-South divide in Sudan in order to achieve true peace and stability in the wartorn country. Given the extreme complexity of the conflict there, the U.S. may be able to do very little, and with the public’s attention focused more on problems at home, gaining support for new efforts may also prove difficult. That said, if Obama is as committed to ending the atrocities in Darfur as he has suggested thus far, perhaps the U.S. can lead the world in ending one of the 21st century’s worst human rights catastrophes. Afp

Obama has emphasized that ending the conflict in Sudan is a “moral obligation” and part of America’s promise to never again remain a bystander to gross human rights violations. nerable to civil war. In such a case, Khartoum would have even less authority with rebel groups, and the international community would surely endure an even more difficult time conducting negotiations with the Sudanese government. Carrying out peacekeeping and relief operations would become much more complex as well. The U.S. cannot solve the crisis in Sudan alone. Al-Bashir has called for a ceasefire, but the rebels, highly skeptical of Khartoum’s commitment to peace, have rejected his offer. Obama should lead the way by making sure the UNAMID mission is successful and that al-Bashir gains the rebels’ trust by demonstrating his commitment to peace. He must also actively include China, India, Russia, and Kenya, all of whom sell

Tara may be reached at taral@princeton.edu

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American Foreign Policy

By the Numbers

High Expectations

AMERICAS

Obama’s Worldwide Support

Canada

United States

Mohit Agrawal ’11

resident-elect Barack Obama has yet to swear the oath of office, but already the weight of the world falls at his shoulders. An economic meltdown, a health-care system in disarray, two wars, and the rebuilding of frayed alliances are just a few things the Obama administration will need to tackle next year. Americans, and the world, will judge Barack Obama after the inauguration. But until then, here’s something that we already know: people abroad highly support the

new president. Survey after survey worldwide found that in nearly all countries polled, foreigners wanted Obama elected over John McCain. The charts on this page show Obama’s support in many countries, collected from different polling agencies. However, with such popular support comes the danger of a backlash if foreigners become disappointed with the new administration. This is yet another challenge for Obama to address.

Mexico Costa Rica Brazil Chile Colombia

EUROPE France

Switzerland United Kingdom Germany Italy Russia Poland

Kenya

AFRICA 50

MIDDLE EAST

Saudi Arabia

India

Ethiopia

Lebanon

China

Sierra Leone

Palestinian Territories

Japan

Zimbabwe

Egypt

South Korea

Mali

Turkey

Armenia

Tanzania

United Arab Emirates

Georgia

December 2008

ASIA 50

Need the Facts?

Carolyn Kaster / AP

Donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t Worry. AFP is online at www.princeton.edu/~afp