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FRANCE EUROPE'S SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED STATES

INTERVIEW WITH TYLER COWAN THE ULTIMATE FREE MARKETEER

DOSSIER

THE SYRIA THERE ONCE WAS

FEARLESS!

A Jubilee of dialogue against terror in God’s name

contents [JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2016] 1

front page

4 6

22 Separated under the same roof?

EUROPE

From East to Eastwest: the Pope, terrorism…

16

no comment

by Mana neyestani

18

by rodolfo Toè

Bruxelles noteBook

by Gian Paolo accardo

26

UNIONE EUROPEA

Global intelligence! east/west

by Giovanni russo

Europe’s September 11

by romano Prodi and Giuseppe Cucchi

20 Islam in Europe

by Giuseppe Scognamiglio

point of view

Four pals hanging out…

Bergoglio, Putin, Obama, Xi Jin Ping 28

by Danilo Taino

FRANCE

The heart of Europe

COVER

18

8 Jubilee of Mercy Pope Francis’ Quantitative Easing

by enrico Letta

31

POLAND

Towards new horizons? by evgeni utkin

by Piero Schiavazzi

11 A threat to Europe

by Gianandrea Gaiani

13 All roads lead to Rome

by Dimitri Deliolanes

31 34

TURKEY

The Sultan on the hot tin roof

by Sevil erkuş

38

european conscience

Europe’s Christian roots

by Giovanni Moro

40

8

28

by Fabrizio Goria

eastwest THE WORLD. PAGE AFTER PAGE

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interview

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EASTWEST january February 2016

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BACK ISSUES

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44 WORLD americas

DOSSIER:

66

USA

Challenges on every front

The United States lesson on terrorism

by eduard Cousin

58 the future is shaped in vienna, with no syrians in sight

83

70

CHILE

EGYPT

AFRICA/RUSSIA

A treasure hunt on the dark continent

COLOMBIA

by Orsetta bellani

by Danilo Ceccarelli

83

The country of inequality

by Patricia Mayorga Marcos

asia 73

INDONESIA

The end of the economic miracle

by Fabrizio Goria

by Marco Petrelli

80

The guerrillas puts down their weapons

53 the fate of raqqa during the caliphate

56 the huge strength of historical ties

by Fadi elhusseini

by Michael Gross

68

by alberto negri

PERSPECTIVE

A new regional order arises

new york noteBook by james Fontanella Kan

44 portfolio 50 assad, from firelighter to firefighter

55 The book the desperation of the refugees

78

64

The syria there once was

by Lorenzo Trombetta

middle east and africa

by alessandro ursic

76

TAIWAN

Elections in January, voting to exist

by Ching-Ping Qian

by julien barnes-Dacey

water and conflicts

86

by erik nielsen

62 cultural genocide

by Mauro Pompili

63 the migrant's kitchen by elisabeth roman

mercati & politica

The world in 2016

by Paolo Celi

73

88

technology & resources

Internet, a primary asset

by Maja Kecojevic and Luca Pizzato

spazio abbonamenti anuary/February 2016 EASTWEST

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Global intelligence!

In a scenario in which the enemy is no longer identified with "established states", the management of information when fighting criminal organisations and terrorism requires a constant and timely exchange of transnational data. And more…

by Giovanni Russo *

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ration and information exchange.

For some time, Italy’s National Antimafia Office (DNA) has been pooling many different intelligence sources so they can be made available to the local offices (DDAs), in conjunction with policies aimed at safeguarding the secrecy of investigations.

Indeed, Italy’s judicial information system – so extensive it has its own acronym, JBD, or Judicial Big Data – acknowledges that the DNA’s research and intelligence systems are its natural point of reference.

The ARES (Advanced Research Engine System) and SIDDA/SIDNA (the DNA/DDA information systems) systems are rightly viewed as important tools, so much so they have now become reference models at the national and international level.

Now that the Italian Anti-mafia Office has also taken over the coordination and promotion of judicial anti-terrorism investigations, technological tools developed to fight the mafia are now being wielded against this more global criminal threat as part of a modern and integrated application of knowledge management.

Specially trained police officers (information analysts) process the relevant data supplied by the DDA network, counterterrorist district public prosecutors and a number of other outside sources. The processing is also performed using specific automated software, created in the DNA’s intelligence lab.

The upgrading of these technological tools has gone hand in hand with improvements in knowledge management processes. The importance and sensitivity surrounding the integrity, reliability and usability of this wealth of intelligence underpins the National Anti-mafia Office’s many functions, which require the use of advanced systems so that these vast quantities of data can be duly exploited, catalogued and analysed to produce trustworthy and consistent results.

REUTERS/CONTRASTO/YVES HERMAN

n today’s world, where crime is transnational and criminals now operate as part of separate cells that perform specific roles, the effectiveness of strategies to combat organised crime or terrorism inevitably depends on increasingly sophisticated tools for gathering, processing and sharing intelligence.

Nowadays one has to develop the awareness that international terrorism operates within a new world of ‘non-states’ located in undefined territories.

Only a few parts of a specific criminal action need necessarily be tied to a physical location: the recent dramatic terrorist attacks in Paris were masterminded and carried out by operational cells based thousands of kilometres away from the places actually hit (initial reports refer to Syria, Belgium and other non-European countries).

Similarly, a hypothetical attack on the NATO base in Naples could be planned and tested entirely in a garage in the northern Italian city of Tradate, while an assault on Saint Peter’s Square in Rome could be prepared in a shed in the Sicilian town of Gela, or – more likely – in Syria, Malaysia or Nigeria.

As a result, traditional security systems are no longer capable of dealing with these problems and an approach involving coordinated management of intelligence has become essential. This means unifying data collection centres, real-time information sharing, careful coordination of its use (tiered knowledge access) and the development of analytics systems able to handle the complexity of big data.

The various forces officially assigned to the task of safeguarding a country’s internal and external security (the military, intelligence units and investigating magistrates) are now getting to grips with these new scenarios in which they must show commitment, due diligence and respect for legality. They realise that the national sphere must also feed off the essential intelligence contribution provided by similar institutional sources in other countries, establishing a virtuous circle of collabo-

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REUTERS/ CONTRASTO/BENOIT TESSIER

Left. Belgian police forces during a blitz in Molenbeek, as western suburb of Brussels, looking for Islamic fundamentalists involved in the Paris attacks. Below. The French Police checking an area in Saint-Denis, a city of 110,000 inhabitants to the north of Paris, where members of the special forces stormed two apartments where a few terrorists were holed out.

Although the mission is the same as ever (collecting updated intelligence about organised crime investigations and making it immediately available to the DNA/DDA network), needs and priorities have now changed.

The SIDDA/SIDNA database has become part of a more general, integrated system of intelligence, vital for legal action against organised criminals and terrorist groups. The technology resources service, which acts as a sort of steering committee overseeing the SIDDA/SIDNA databases, is responsible for ensuring magistrates who belong to the aforementioned network can access the key services necessary for the judicial system to function efficiently, using a set of digital tools.

This is achieved not merely through research into advanced software and automatic procedures and constant technical refresher courses for all users (roughly 700 digital workers across Italy) but, above all, through intelligencesharing policies, governed by rules guaranteeing the security and traceability of communication flows.

New ways of giving weight to individual records in the SIDDA/SIDNA database have also been developed.

Each record is assigned a number, which increases the more that specific record leads to the supply of concrete intelligence. The use of an “incremental intelligence index”, developed in research performed at the National Anti-mafia Office, has been particularly successful. Identified with the “i3” code, this index is calculated on the basis of “quotes”, meaning the concepts and links between intelligence data, extracted from the analysed texts.

The very latest experiments are included in actions being carried out as part of the Big Hawk project, designed to streamline the acquisition and sharing of investigative data and introduce a reliable way of automatically analysing texts. Research is also being conducted into modern systems for investigation verification (the Fact Checking project), to support the needs of the judicial offices with ever increasingly efficiency.

Only the effective realisation of a cooperative system of relations focused on the speedy exchange of data and intelligence – between countries and among the individual law enforcement agencies fighting organised crime and terrorism – will enable us to contain and defeat the third millennium’s most fearsome forms of crime. e  Giovanni Russo is the assistant public prosecutor for the National Antimafia Office and heads the technological resources and security department. .

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Islam in Europe The majority of Muslims seeks refuge in Europe to escape the entrenched sectarian fundamentalism in their chaotic countries. These refugees can form a strong political movement, so the Muslim majority can finally speak out.

by Danilo Taino *

urope needs an organized, moderate Muslim front in order to counter radical Islam, jihadist terrorism and the idea of a clash of civilizations promoted by Islamic State (IS). In these months marked by fear and terror, when an immediate end to the anguish would clearly be the most desirable outcome, it is difficult to accept that the road ahead is both long and arduous. Yet the issue is set to be one of the European Union’s greatest challenges in 2016. In the 21st century, it is an illusion to believe that the West can isolate itself from Islam without building fortresses and waging wars.

The question is, therefore, can we strengthen the proponents of moderate Islam, enabling them to act as a counterweight to radicalism and to quell the fears of Europeans? Do the conditions for such a development exist? In theory, the answer is yes.

On 20 August of this year, an Iraqi engineer, Laith Majid, was photographed after reaching the Greek island of Kos. He embraced his two children and burst into tears. The photograph spread around the world as an iconic image of the plight of

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refugees fleeing the armed gangs roaming Syria and Iraq.

In many cases, the actions of these criminal gangs are motivated by religious sectarianism, Muslims terrorizing and massacring other Muslims.

In September, the engineer Majid was photographed in Berlin, standing in front of the Brandenburg Gate. He was holding his daughter on his left arm, and in his right hand he held the photograph that had become famous weeks earlier. The photo had not only shifted Western sentiment, it had also ended up on the posters of protesters in Baghdad beneath the claim, “this is what our government does to its people”. The story of Majid’s family narrates a more hidden aspect of what has been going on for months.

The refugees that arrive in Europe are fully aware of the tragedy that they have experienced, of selling their homes to pay for their voyage to safety, of having to leave behind their careers, friends and loved ones in order to save their own children. They know that one of the main causes of all of this is radical Islam. They know too that their destination is Europe and the countries that have promised

to offer them asylum. Those fleeing know this, as do those who remain behind in Baghdad and Damascus.

It is possible to work together with these refugees to strengthen a modern, moderate, politically aware and organized Islam in Europe (and perhaps beyond). A modern Islam, with structured social associations, should be able to speak with its own voice, promoting integration and coexistence in Europe and dialogue with the cultures and institutions of the Old Continent. This opportunity undoubtedly exists, and it offers arguably the best option since the question of Islamic immigration arose.

There is a social base that recognises that its scars have been inflicted by sectarianism and Islamist terrorism and that the West has offered Muslims shelter and protection. This awareness should form the foundations upon which European policies and society can build.

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REUTERS/CONTRASTO/ALESSANDRO GAROFALO

REUTERS/ CONTRASTO/JUAN MEDINA

Left. The Muslim demonstration in Milan on 21 November last.

After the terrorist attacks in Paris and Mali, the Italian Islamic communities have marched against the violence. Below. A Muslim wake in Madrid for one of the victims of the attacks.

“Whenever I see them, I always give ten euros to a couple of poor Muslim refugees that live near my house”, an intellectual, who lives in both Italy and Switzerland recently told me. “We chat a little from time to time. But I sometimes I ask myself whether they actually see me as an infidel”. It would be nice to help the Swiss-Italian intellectual avoid feeling threatened by his Muslim neighbours.

And it might be possible. The solution, though, is not to cut off the hands of the two Muslims. Neither is it to expel them from Europe, an impossible outcome. Closing the borders in order to prevent others arriving is also no solution as they would come anyway. And besides, any of these radical solutions would be a betrayal of Western ideals and the culture that the intellectual wishes to defend from the threat of a hostile interpretation of religion.

There is no alternative: refugees

must be offered asylum and must be integrated into society.

Nevertheless, the fears and concerns of European citizens should not be underestimated or ridiculed.

Every sociological study explains that the fear of those who are different is deeply rooted in societies and can often be seen in people’s willingness to help similar neighbours rather than foreign strangers. The reciprocal mistrust that feeds extremism does the rest. Social integration should be the focus of governments’ discussions and policies. Providing work, housing, schools, and cultural and religious spaces to refugees also makes sense if we wish to avoid the French and British experience of ghettoization, where terrorism has been able to capture second and third-generation immigrants that have been marginalized from the mainstream. Likewise, it is necessary that those arriving respect the laws and customs of their host

countries. Unfortunately, this aspect is not discussed enough in Europe.

The large influx of refugees offers an unprecedented and inescapable opportunity. Hidden amongst them are also the terrorists of IS or other organizations, but we have already seen that such individuals would find alternative ways to enter Europe anyway. The overwhelming majority of arrivals are those fleeing sectarian extremism and violence. Can we succeed in giving them a voice and the tools to build a social and political entity in their own image, one capable of reciprocal respect? If the answer to this question is no, then the allure of liberal Europe’s culture is not as strong as we had previously thought. e  Danilo Taino is a correspondent and columnist who focuses on international and economic issues for Corriere della Sera.

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Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico during a press conference held after the summit of European Union leaders on the migrant crisis. Slovakia has offered to welcome 200 Syrian refugees on condition that they are Christians.

Following page. Angela Merkel and Viktor Orban during a conference in Budapest

Separated N under the same roof After being accused of a lack of solidarity on the refugee issue, relations between Brussels and East European countries are showing signs of wear, and old feuds resurface

by Rodolfo Toè *

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ot since the fall of the Berlin Wall have Eastern and Western Europe appeared so far removed.

This divide began making even more headlines as a consequence of the refugee crisis and the European Commission’s decision, in late September, to relocate 120,000 asylum seekers among various member states (with the added participation of Switzerland, Norway and Iceland). The ruling was opposed by the governments of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania and received none too warmly by the Baltic countries, Finland and Poland.

North American and Western European media began to reproach the East for a “lack of solidarity” that, as Rick Lyman pointed out in The New York Times, “highlights Europe’s cultural and political divisions”.

“When joining the European Union”, writes Lyman, “nations are asked to pledge support to a raft of so-called European values, including open markets, transparent government (and) open borders and cultural diversity”.

This, it seems, has not come to pass. In recent months, while the Balkans were struggling to deal with the transit of hundreds of thousands of immigrants, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban started putting up walls along his

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country’s borders with Serbia and Croatia and authorising the use of non-lethal force – rubber bullets and tear gas – against anyone trying to climb over them.

Slovakian leader Robert Fico said he would only accept Christian refugees, while authorities in the Czech Republic were confiscating money from refugees and forcing them to pay to stay in the detention centres, and the party in Poland at the time (now in government) solemnly stated it was against receiving “refugees from the Middle East, who could bring disease and parasites”.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel openly accused the governments of this new Eastern bloc of having forgotten their own experiences as refugees during the communist years and after the fall of the Wall. In the UK, overlooking the fact that even London has proved extremely reluctant to accept asylum seekers, newspapers like the Guardian began trying to unearth the roots of this phenomenon, citing as possible reasons the lack of contact between Eastern European societies and African or Middle Eastern cultures, and these countries’ essentially uniform ethnic populations.

“In Eastern Europe”, writes Andreas Schweitzer in a Guardian opinion piece, “the nation is still widely seen

as an ethnic/cultural entity rather than a political one.

The two multinational countries of the region – Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia – broke up almost instantly after communist dictatorships were gone”.

Yet beyond the rhetoric, the undertow leading up to this new Iron Curtain had already been flowing for some time. The recent refugee emergency did nothing more than exacerbate the divergences between Brussels and the former socialist states.

At a first glance, this might seem like a paradox: ever since 2009 and the advent of the economic crisis, the Eastern European economies, with the notable exceptions of Croatia and Slovenia, enjoyed growth rates above the European average. Barring some stagnation in the Czech Republic, from 2009 to 2014, EU member states such as Hungary, Poland and Estonia have seen their economies grow by 5%, 25% and 31% respectively, according to the World Bank.

However, this growth did not reach everyone. All the governments in the region have had to implemented austerity measures, reducing welfare benefits and family cash transfers. So while on the one hand the GDP was rising in Eastern countries, on the other, cohesion and social rights were suffering.

The miraculous Estonian economy saw its GDP rise by 31 points, yet the percentage of people at risk of poverty remained essentially unchanged (23%). And while Italy was extolling Warsaw as the new “tiger of Central Europe”, in 2013 the Poles took to the streets USSR to protest against austerity measures and call for an increase in the minimum wage (at the time less than 400 euros).

Against such a backdrop it comes as no surprise that the relationship between Brussels and these countries is beginning to show signs of strain. The Greek crisis – a major concern for European chancelleries throughout the summer – evoked “little sympathy in Eastern Europe”, wrote Joanna Berendt in The New York Times last July.

Meanwhile, President Dalia Grybauskaite of Lithuania was stating that “the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are too poor to pay for the mistakes of the wealthier Greeks”. Some of the most forthright critics of Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras were the governments in these countries (Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania), whose citizens felt to some extent poorer than those who after decades of unbridled public spending were now appealing to ‘European solidarity’ to bail them out.

“A Less Perfect Union” is how Foreign Policy magazine saw Europe once a compromise had been found over Athens’ economic crisis. The refugee crisis hadn’t yet hit the headlines, but we were already living in a union  JANUARY FEBRUARY 2015 EASTWEST

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POINTS OF VIEW

Four pals hanging out… Bergoglio, Putin, Obama, Xi Jin Ping These leaders, each delegated by their people to represent their will, have the power to make history.

That's why their meetings carry such moment

by Romano Prodi and Giuseppe Cucchi *

hese days, the opportunities for personal meetings between the world's major political leaders are few and far between given the commitments of heads of state and government, which are always so pressing in today's complex world. This was clearly illustrated by a statistical analysis performed a few years ago. It revealed that during the course of a normal working day the Italian Prime Minister was asked to address so many different problems that he couldn't allocate more than ten minutes to each.

So leaders from various countries end up being more or less glued to their chairs and their opportunities for contact with their peers is usually limited to phone calls and video conferences. These are undoubtedly very useful surrogates, but they certainly cannot replace direct, one-to-one meetings.

This is why celebrations to mark important events take on a new significance beyond the official reason for the occasion because they enable leaders to meet and engage in a whirlwind of private, bilateral talks and eventually even multilateral meetings. Last October’s 70th anniversary gathering marking the founding of the United Nations was a case in point.

These UN celebrations meant that four of the world’s most important leaders – United States President Barack Obama,

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Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Pope Francis (who, regardless of his Argentinean birth was representing the global Catholic community and so is not assigned a nationality) – were all in the United States at the same time.

And they took advantage of the opportunity for an exchange of views that is only now beginning to produce results.

The fifth major world leader, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, was not given any of the limelight and did not attract the media’s attention, even though she was also present. This is further proof of how the German-led European Union’s influence will continue to be totally irrelevant on the wider world stage at least until it develops a common foreign affairs and security policy. Given Europe’s irrelevance, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon assumed the role of fifth major leader on this occasion. In his opening address before the UN Assembly, he spoke with the freedom of someone whose mandate is nearing its conclusion, launching a scathing attack on the permanent members of the UN Security Council that accused them of systematically paralysing the UN’s operations by using and abusing their right of veto.

In the discussions between the four leaders, Obama was undoubtedly in the most delicate and difficult position. Since he was playing the role of host, in some ways he

was obliged to engage in bilateral discussions with all the others, even though this meant receiving Putin, whom the West has effectively labelled as persona non grata since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis. This rift meant the US President felt the need to stress the US' declaratory policy in his speech to the UN General Assembly, reiterating, among other things, his commitment to reject any solution for Syria that does not involve the immediate removal of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Putin, on the other hand, while appearing uncompromising in his plan to revive Russia’s superpower status to the levels reached during the Soviet Union, was particularly adamant that any kind of agreement to stabilise the Middle East needs the complete, pro-active commitment of all those involved – not only major world powers but regional ones too. The subsequent round of Syrian peace talks in Vienna, which also involve Russia and the US, on

POINTS OF VIEW

REUTERS/CONTRASTO/ADREES LATIF (PAPA)

REUTERS/ CONTRASTO/KEVIN LAMARQUE

Left. The Pope’s address before the UN’s General Assembly on the 70th anniversary of the foundation of the United Nations. Bergoglio is the fifth pontiff to visit the UN headquarters. Sotto. During the celebrations President Barack Obama met President Vladimir Putin.

The United States reiterated their commitment not to accept any solution for Syria that does not entail the immediate removal of Bashir al-Assad.

the one hand showed how declarations and facts can sometimes diverge, and on the other revealed the main topic of conversation probably covered by Putin and Obama in their one-to-one meeting.

China’s leader Xi Jinping travelled to the US at a time when relations between China and the US were particularly strained. He therefore took every possible opportunity to be reassuring. He promised the United Nations greater Chinese involvement in peacekeeping activities and donated a considerable amount of funds to a number of UN-run bodies. Then with Obama, he laid the ground for an initial collaboration in the sphere of information technology. The deal only covers industrial espionage for now, but this first step could lead to important developments in the future. It also touched on an issue that is extremely sensitive for the Americans who base their overarching military superiority on the unimpeded use of computers.

Other conciliatory moves, which may have been agreed during the private discussions between the two presidents, followed in the wake of the meeting. So it was that US warships deployed as a deterrent against Beijing’s land claims in the South China Sea were allowed to sail past a few of the disputed islands with the only repercussion being a diplomatic note, pure and simple verbal gesticulation. Very shortly afterwards, the meeting between the leaders of China and Taiwan helped to further appease tensions in the area.

What about the pope in all this? The pontiff sent his first message by stopping off in Cuba before beginning his visit to the United States, a gesture meant to underline to the whole world, and the US in particular, how the time has come for all barriers setting human beings apart must be removed. The pope’s second message was issued during his speech to the UN General Assembly, which focused on the need to care for the

have-nots as well as for the environment, another of God’s gifts, which very few people respect. Universal messages, which one hopes may also produce results in the future.

After the next round of meetings, it is unlikely that we will immediately find ourselves in a radically better world than before.

However, a few steps in the right direction have certainly been taken. Isn’t this actually quite an achievement, given the short time the four leaders were able to spend away from the grey routine of their respective ‘White Houses’ to get together in the US? e  Romano Prodi served two terms as Italian prime minister and was president of the European Commission for five years. He is a member of East’s advisory board.

Giuseppe Cucchi served as Italy’s military representative to the European Union and was director of the Italian Security Intelligence Department.

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The heart of Europe The year 2015 was the toughest in recent French history. A country dismayed by terrorist attacks and targeted because it represents a model that is undoubtedly central to our western world

by Enrico Letta *

iscussions over France’s role in Europe have been going on for some time, and the conversation is by no means one-sided. Various points of view overlap. Some see France as having completely lost its competitive edge. Others believe France represents the only hope of achieving European integration, given the weakness of European institutions and Germany’s reluctance to push for greater unity.

Some view France as the only European country with the military capacity to shoulder the EU’s global responsibilities. And still others focus on the muddle in which the French political system finds itself. The year 2017 could see a rerun of the three-way challenge of 2012, a peculiar situation at a time when the electorate is calling for renewal. As it stands, the two traditional party leaders, Francois Hollande and Nicolas Sarkozy, will be challenged

by Marine Le Pen, viewed as the barbarian whose siege on Rome is getting too close for comfort. France undoubtedly plays a leading role in the European debate and

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even in the complex Brexit referendum, which may result in the United Kingdom leaving the EU. At the moment, only Paris seems to be prepared to expose the lie of a united front against Brexit, perhaps reminiscent of De Gaulle keeping London out of Europe for the whole of the 1960s. Cameron is seeking concessions in order to campaign for a yes to Europe vote in the UK. It is thought that when the negotiations come to a head, France will stand strong in the belief that a truly united Europe is perhaps better off without Great Britain.

Whenever Brussels, Berlin, London and Frankfurt bring up the famous structural reforms, France is always mentioned among the structurally unruly countries.

And these are only a few of the recurring viewpoints that place France, in many different lights, at the centre of the European debate.

This ‘controversial centrality’ is one of the more interesting points that arise when discussing France and is perhaps the key to understanding both what the French

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[FRANCE] EUROPE

Above. Paris, 16 November 2015. The Minister for State Reform Thierry Mandon, the Education Minister Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, French President François Hollande and Prime Minister Manuel Vals during a minute’s silence in the courtyard of the University of the Sorbonne. “I solemnly promise – Hollande said – that France will do everything in its power to protect its sons and that France will remain true to itself. We now the enemy: it’s hate, fanaticism and obscurantism”.

Left. One of the many demonstrations in France on the day after the attacks.

are arguing about and their current role in Europe. At a time when the financial and economic crisis has gripped the continent and placed even the single currency at risk, analyses and considerations link the French to a number of different issues and the outcome of exceedingly complex developments.

French centrality, in any case, is undeniable. It became clear during the unprecedented wave of intense global emotion in the days following the Charlie Hebdo attack and the tragic events of the night of 13 November. The expression of positive feelings towards the French model is the emotional representation of complex bonds that must be carefully assessed. Let’s begin by looking at France in the context of the European community.

Along with references to a general historical continuity, France's centrality is also the result of specific European dynamics connected to the new ‘intergovernmentalism’ that has taken root in the community’s institutions over the past five years. The European Commission has, to its

own detriment, watched as the role of the European Council has grown. During the last term, the Commission was superseded by the Council in its central role as the community’s ‘engine room’. And rather than community motions, the Council employs the intergovernmental method.

To coin a slogan, the European Union is being replaced by the Union of European States. The member states prevail over Brussels and the agreements between them set the agenda for the community’s institutions. In this context, the clout of nation states is what matters. As a result, Germany counts more than anyone else because it’s the largest country and its economy currently appears to be the most competitive in the EU area.

But it is also true that Germany can’t accomplish much against France's will or without France’s consent. This new phase of intergovernmentalism has effectively redefined the role of the French-German relationship and gifted France a new standing despite its domestic problems.  JANUARY FEBRUARY 2015 EASTWEST

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WHY IS EASTERN EUROPE SO INSENSITIVE? he governments of Eastern Europe have chosen to close their borders rather than open them up to refugees from the Middle East who are fleeing war. This stance can be traced back to traumatic memories and the scars left by times of deep suffering. The history of these nations has been punctuated by episodes of forced cohabitation that have resulted in religious violence and episodes of ethnic cleansing.

The Balkan Peninsula has always been a strategic crossroads, a point of contact between Western Europe and the East. Though geographically part of Europe, a large part of the peninsula was under the dominion of the Ottoman Empire until the end of the 1800s. That history began in 1389, when invaders from Anatolia defeated the Kingdom of Serbia in the Battle of Kosovo. They went on to conquer the Kingdom of Bulgaria in 1393 and won the Battle of Nicopolis against Hungary in 1396. This initiated a period of Islamisation across the newly conquered territories. Mosques sprang up everywhere, and people who refused to convert to the new rulers’ creed saw their property confiscated and were subjected to economic restrictions.

Since that time, the history of the Balkans has been an endless cycle of tension and war.

Just 20 years ago, Bosnia survived an atrocious ethnic genocide in which more than 38,000 civilians, most of them Muslims, lost their lives.

Such a critical territory, scarred by its own history, continues to be an enigma to political leaders in Western Europe. The refugee crisis is only the latest issue to reinforce the unbridgeable divide between the EU and its neighbours.

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that was less than perfect. A union in which, from Ljubljana to Tallinn, many feel that the hopes of a better life they nurtured after years of communist rule have been betrayed. In which Vladimir Putin’s Russia, having waged war in Ukraine, is once again intimidating Poland and the Baltic countries that are now tempted to sidestep Europe, seeing as Brussels ignores them, and deal directly with NATO and Washington.

A union that above all is becoming a fertile breeding ground for new victories by conservative and anti-European parties. And in which East and West increasingly struggle to see eye to eye. e  Rodolfo Toè is the Sarajevo correspondent for the French website Le Courrier des Balkans and for the think tank Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso.

EUROPE [FRANCE]

A Super Etendard fighter plane on the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier setting of for the Persian Gulf. France is the only European nation that during these crisis years has not cut back its military apparatus.

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Germany needs France, particularly in foreign affairs and security, as has been shown in the crises in Ukraine and Syria that are having so many repercussions on the lives of European citizens. If, as a result, Europe discovers a new role for the nation states, France will obviously return to the centre of things.

France was one of the EU’s six founding states and an undisputed guide during the first decades of community life, so much so that it managed to impose acronyms and linguistic terminologies – from COREPER to community acquis – that still mark the life of the institutions. But France’s centrality today is different from that of the past because Germany is the country profiting from intergovernmentalism.

Further, on the issue of centrality, France undoubtedly plays a crucial role in military matters and foreign affairs.

It is the only European country that did not cut back on its military spending in these years of financial crisis. France has retained a striking power that few in the EU can still boast today. Its military might, and ensuing centrality in the geopolitical power game, is even more pronounced when compared to that of the other three G7 member states. Germany’s reluctance to operate on this front is structural and can’t be changed in the short term. Italy has seen its capacity to take part in international military actions increase over the past 20 years but never as a stand-alone force or with any degree of leadership. Great Britain is perhaps the most special case. It has severely cut its military spending, and the Blair-Iraq issue remains very much alive in the mind of a public that still doesn’t want to see its soldiers involved in new military adventures.

Baring in mind its status as a member of the UN Security Council, France is the US’ only direct partner in Europe.

The Syrian affair and the French attacks from continent Europe on the Islamic State (IS) are clear evidence of this.

Thus, there are a number of reasons that we should speak of a new central role for France and just as many that point to a controversial centrality, owing to the contradictions that have arisen in recent years in both its economic and political spheres. The many problems that have 30

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been bubbling under the surface now seem to be erupting.

France hasn’t had to endure the crises that have befallen southern Europe. The role of politics, the state and institutions has never been taken to task as it has in Italy or Spain. Although France has also witnessed the rise of non-political movements and various forms of populism, the strong two-party system has held up, thanks to the time-tested strength of its institutions.

The two main parties have managed to shore up the situation. But they haven’t yet succeeded in shifting gears or neutralising the populist threat of the National Front.

There’s a growing anti-political pressure whose power and tangible effects are hard to predict in the short term.

What will be the likely repercussions of this rising tidal wave? The traditional parties could find a way of infusing fresh blood into their ranks and promoting new leaders.

Or these parties could break up, regroup and lead to the formation of new political entities. It also can’t be completely ruled out that the system is unable to cope with the Le Pen phenomenon. Even France could witness a political crisis that might undermine the state and its institutions.

In the end, France’s centrality cannot help but be controversial, full of expectations and problems, highlighted by the dramatic attacks that hit Paris in an attempt to break the model that the French capital represents around the world. The ultimate effect has been to make this model even stronger, confirming and reinforcing France’s controversial centrality in Europe. e  Enrico Letta is an Italian politician. He was prime minister from April 2013 to February 2014. Since September 2015, he has headed the School of International Affairs of the Paris Institute of Political Studies.

EUROPEAN CONSCIENCE

Europe’s Christian roots Might the mention of Christian roots in the European constitution thwarted the terrorist attacks of these last months? Or would it have made it easier to pigeon-hole them into a "war of religions"?

by Giovanni Moro *

ifteen years have passed since the drafting of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and more than ten since the luckless attempt to write a European Constitution. During the drafting and approval phases of these documents, considerable pressure was exerted to include an explicit reference to the continent's Christian roots. In the Constitutional Treaty, the Italian government in particular suggested that the new constitution should include a reference to Europe’s “Judeo-Christian heritage”, adding a touch of involuntary yet rather grim irony by juxtaposing the Christian religion to one we Europeans almost wiped off the face of the earth just a few decades ago.

Be that as it may, in both cases the issue was resolved in the preamble to the texts thanks to the boundless linguistic creativity of our political scribes. The first stated that, “Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity”. In the second, there is instead a general reference to the “the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe”. Ultimately, this was more of a semi-defeat for supporters, rather than a semi-victory.

The proposal, however, hinted at an issue that has continued to make headlines, especially following the dramatic events that Pope Francis has termed, and with

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good reason, a “piecemeal Third World War”, though he has never suggested that we are engaged in a clash of religions or civilisations. Nevertheless, it would not seem to be too pointless an exercise to consider the pertinence of such a proposal within the context of the European framework and whether it would have been helpful had it been approved.

On the first issue, the answer is that yes, on our continent is where Christianity developed for two millennia, profoundly influencing our social intercourse and leading to the institution of a number of different faiths and churches. Who could reasonably claim that this is not a statement of fact?

However, a less obvious yet perhaps more pertinent answer is that the concept of the European Union as an institutional and social construct based on Christian roots derives from a major misunderstanding that is both semantic and substantial.

In terms of semantics, as many scholars have pointed out, those suggesting that the European edifice should be anchored to its traditions, in this case religious traditions, view the community of Europeans as a Gemeinschaft, or, in simpler terms, an original social grouping precisely identified and linked by its history, language, culture, traditions and of course religion.

The European approach, however, both in the intentions of its founders and in its subsequent development, was the creation of a Communauté, meaning a community

of fate, where what renders similar those who belong to it is their responsibility in building said community, while in most other ways, they remain unwaveringly different.

Thus, the European Union’s 24 official languages and its motto, In varietate concordia (“United in diversity”), clearly refer to a stance that is non-ideological yet just as rooted in reality as the previous one.

The substantial part of the misunderstanding, therefore, lies in considering Europe as an unchanging and monolithic physical and cultural entity. The celebrated German sociologist Ulrich Beck, who first suggested the idea of “risk society” that recent historical events seem to bear out, said that Europe, rather than a club of national states or a federal entity, should be viewed as a cosmopolitan empire in constant evolution. Yet there are two important differences compared to previous ones: it is not forged by fire and the sword but through treatises and

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EUROPEAN CONSCIENCE

Above. Pope Francis during a session of the European Parliament. In the EU’s Charter of fundamental rights there is no explicit reference to the continent’s Christian roots. Even in the European Constitution there’s a mention of “cultural, religious and humanistic heritage”, with no mention of Christianity.

money; and that the nations of which it is comprised are a multi-faceted plethora of identities, faiths, lifestyles, ethnic groups, material cultures, languages, religions and political perspectives, embodied by both its social groups and its individuals.

That all this has come to pass in one continent rather than another is certainly linked to Christianity and its history, though the relationship is complex and by no means linear. That it could instead all have been inspired by a European Christian Gemeinschaft is much harder to conceive.

What's more, the identification of Europe with Christianity could also be more of a hindrance than a help when confronting both internal and external threats. Reaching the conclusion that the conflict that has now been raging for a couple of decades is a clash between civilizations or, worse still, religions would seem a losing game. This approach would paradoxically affirm the cartoonish representation of Europe promoted by ‘post-nationalist’ Islam and construed with the very intent of justifying its own existence, establishing a clear identity and singling out an enemy, all instrumental in bolstering its image – a process that in truth would seem intent on scuttling and shackling the aspects of religion and faith of both Islam and Christianity.

Instead, as Beck put it “the colourful, individualistic, secular culture in which religion does not determine politics is of greater value than a culture in which women are stoned. Everything the fundamentalists hate is to be celebrated and cherished as what is authentically European”. In the end, those who risk their lives to reach our shores or cross our borders do so partly as a result of Europe’s open and manifold identity, represented primarily by the institution of human rights. Which Christianity is imbued with, of course, but for which it cannot claim to be directly responsible. e  Giovanni Moro teaches political sociology at the Roma Tre and Gregoriana universities and is the president of the think tank FONDACA. He is the author of Cittadini in Europa (2009).

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THE SYRIA THERE ONCE WAS

hen trying to understand the historical and geopolitical context in which Russia’s ties with the Middle East developed over time, we should not reduce Russia’s presence in Syria to a mere legacy of Soviet diplomacy. We must travel back in time to take in the big picture of Moscow’s ambitions in the eastern Mediterranean arena to the era of Russia’s wars with the Ottoman Empire.

In 1774, the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca ended the war (1768-1774) between the Russian and Ottoman Empires. St. Petersburg emerged victorious, gaining the port of Kherson, the Crimean ports of Yeni-Kale and Kerch, and passage through the Dardanelles Strait for Russian sea vessels, though the latter access created new tensions with their Turkish neighbours.

The Greek War of Independence in 1821 provoked a harsh reaction from the Ottoman Empire’s central government, and the bloody repression by the Turks and Mehmet Ali’s Egyptian army compelled the British, French and Russians to intervene. In Navarino in 1831, British, French and Russian vessels crushed the Ottoman forces.

Throughout the 19th century, the Russian Empire’s foreign policy intersected with Greek and Balkan nationalism; the latter was a deeply destabilising element in Europe’s domination of the Ottomans.

In 1877, Tsar Alexander II saw a concrete opportunity for expansion in the Mediterranean. The previous year, Serbia had come to the aid of the revolts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, areas that had been violently suppressed by the sultan’s troops.

Inspired by the ‘liberation’ of people of Orthodox Christianity from Muslim rule, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 brought St. Petersburg’s army to the Walls of Constantinople in the span of a few months. In March 1878, the Ottomans signed the Treaty of San Stefano with Russia: Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia officially gained their independence from the Ottoman Empire and the Bulgarian state was re-established on the Aegean Sea and Black Sea, a Turkish tributary under de facto Russian protection. At the Congress of Berlin of July 1878, borders were

The huge strength of historical ties

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With its military operations in Syria, Moscow’s influence on the international stage has increased.

But the ties between the two countries date way back and provide insight into the current situation

REUTERS/ALEXEI DRUZHININ/RIA NOVOSTI/KREMLIN

by Marco Petrelli *

XINHUA NEWS AGENCY / EYEVINE /CONTRASTO

DOSSIER

redrawn and Russia lost its access to the Mediterranean.

Nevertheless, the question of the strait remained. In 1945, the Soviet Union pressured Turkey for control of the Dardanelles, sparking one of the first episodes of the Cold War. When the Ottoman Empire fell apart, Syria came under 26 years (1920-1946) of French military mandate. It gained its independence in 1946 when the Syrian Arab Republic was created and immediately recognised by the USSR. The Suez crisis only strengthened ties between the two countries. In 1956, Syrian President Shukri al-Quwatli began official relations with the Kremlin that were solidified the following year with an economic and military accord that included supplying Damascus with Czechoslovakian weapons.

The Six-Day War and the rise to power of Hafez al-Assad in 1971 intensified relations.

The USSR supplied Syrians with technologies, worth billions of dollars. A further indication of the tight bond between the two countries came in 1987 when the MIR space station welcomed its first Syrian astronaut, Muhammad Ahmed Faris. After the Soviet Union disintegrated, Russia focused on solving domestic problems caused by tremendous inflation, social unrest and the secession of Chechnya. But it did not cut its ties with its Middle Eastern ally, ties that received new lifeblood during the presidencies of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev.

“NATO’s expansion from 1999 to 2004”, explained professor Leila Tavi of Roma Tre

Above. A Russian fighter plane taking off from the airbase in Lataka. Other page. The Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in the Kremlin. Last October Assad made a surprise visit to Putin after the Russian attack against Islamic State.

University, “towards the formerly socialist nations of Central and Southern Europe and the Baltic nations essentially surrounded Russia, which tried to shed the humiliations of the 1990s and reclaim an important role for itself in international policy, including in the Middle East, re-establishing its privileged relationship with Syria”.

When Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father in 2000 as Syria’s president, he formed a new bond with the Russian Federation.

Tavi added: “In January 2005, President (Bashar) al-Assad travelled to Moscow, where the two countries signed an agreement that cancelled 73% of the debt, roughly 13 billion dollars, or €12 billion, that Hafez al-Assad had accrued with the USSR. Bashar al-Assad acquired new and more sophisticated weapons from Moscow, guaranteeing cash payments. In 2006, approximately 2,000 Russian military advisers travelled to Damascus; two years later a new agreement allowed the Russian Federation to reinforce its military bases in Tartus and Latakia”.

Today, Syria still owes Moscow three billion dollars (€2.8 billion). And Moscow and Damascus have also signed long-term energy agreements for the exploration and extraction of natural gas. These elements alone illuminate

Putin’s interests in the outcome of the Syrian war.

Another clear sign came in the form of the seven-point road map that the Kremlin elaborated for resolving the crisis. These are the most significant points: “Russia should provide assurances that Assad will not participate in the next presidential election personally, but may nominate someone from his family or inner circle” and “Russian military presence will continue in Syria through a special resolution of the UN Security Council as a guarantor for the implementation of the settlement agreements reached.” The future of Bashar al-Assad's government is clear. And then there is the peace plan: “All armed opposition groups and pro-Iranian militias should be assimilated into the Syrian national army”.

With this document, Putin has outlined the future structure of the Syrian nation.

But even without it, it is easy to surmise that Damascus’ fate will be marked by limited sovereignty over its economy, defence and internal policy. How could it be otherwise?

Weapons, fighter jets, special forces and diplomatic intervention from the Kremlin come with a price and a raison d'être. They are simultaneously a life preserver for a government that has endured four years of civil war and a debt that cannot be cancelled by a ceasefire. e  Marco Petrelli is an author and journalist who contributes to GQ Italia and LiberoQuotidiano.it.

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