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MANUFACTURING HISTORY: A look back in time

STILL CONVINCING AN ALLY

WW2: Laurence is still in the US meeting its top brass in order to change its perception that offering Lend Lease war materiel to Australia would be a waste. Only a personal presentation of what Australia had already done could change this illusion. Laurence is fully armed.

In the US, everywhere I went - I had something from Australia to contribute: an idea, a technique, a short-cut. This helped tremendously to win America’s support for our needs. One development that was of great interest to the Americans was a new concentrated emergency ration developed by Sir Stanton Hicks at Adelaide University, who had done valuable work in creating palatable, highvitamin field rations for our troops. His new ration contained dried apricots and everyone agreed it was very pleasant to eat. The Americans wanted all the details we could give them. These we gladly gave - and I handed out dozens of slabs, which they started to nibble straight away. Our experience in combating tropical fungi on radio and electrical equipment in the islands also enabled me to give the Americans much help in the development of their own tropic-proofing materials. These two-way discussions were of great value to both sides: information from me and equipment for Australia from them. The personal contact overcame many initial misunderstandings which had caused PM Curtin and MacArthur such headaches. Here's an example: We in Australia desperately needed machine-tools to help our output of eighteen-inch airborne torpedoes, but the Lend-Lease people said flatly: "No. We're not going to help you. The eighteen-inch torpedo is no good. We've given it up." I couldn't understand this. We were making the British Beaufort aeroplane, the ideal torpedo-carrying aircraft, and we knew the eighteen-inch torpedo was just perfect for the Beaufort. But the Americans wouldn't buy that argument. "Our Navy tells us the eighteen-inch torp is a dud. You can forget it". But I refused to accept that, and asked for a conference with the Navy experts who had condemned it. This was arranged and I attended a meeting which included an admiral and four captains of the U.S. Navy. They said: ''You can take it from us, Mr. Hartnett, this torpedo is a lemon. We had it in the First War and it did more damage to us than to the enemy. It was erratic, inaccurate and darn dangerous. We feel so strongly about this that if you're making the eighteen-inch torpedo we'll do everything we can to stop you." I was still mystified. I knew how good our torpedo was. "There's some mistake here," I said. ”I’m talking about the eighteen-inch

In 1942 the US was short of prisms and lenses and whilst in the country, Laurence was asked if an order could be placed in Australia. In the brief space of two years, Australia had achieved a reputation for both quality and quantity. The order was accepted and the supplying laboratories were the Commonwealth Solar Observatory, the Munitions Supply Lab, and the Uni. of Melbourne’s Optical Annexe. In 1943 the US asked if Australia could supply a larger order of 1.3 million optical parts. Pictured are two men operating equipment in Prof. Hartung’s University of Melbourne, Optical Munitions. Dept. University of Melbourne Library, Optical Munitions, 1940-42.

Vickers-type torpedo with a compressedair vessel and a very powerful engine.'' One of the Americans sat up like a shot. ''Wait a minute! Our eighteen incher was an electric torpedo. This one's probably different." Another American, who'd been silent until then said, "Come to think of it, gentlemen, it was an eighteen-inch aerial torpedo that sank my ship at Pearl Harbour. There was nothing wrong with that one, I can tell you!" The committee then realized we'd been talking about two entirely different types of torpedo, and they changed their tune completely. They invited me to visit their torpedo-making plant at Richmond, near Washington, and did everything possible to offset their earlier mistake. And they told Lend-Lease there was now no objection to our making the weapon and the Americans gave us top priority for the twenty-odd machine-tools we wanted. We were friends with the U.S. Navy from then on. America was very new to the war, and was almost completely without experience of the type of war she would be fighting in the tropics. We had been forced to learn the hard way, and some of our developments in machine-tool operations were news to them. But once I had explained our ideas, and they tested and proved them, they began to realize we weren't such babes in the Antipodean woods after all. But in those first few weeks it was very hard going. At my first meeting with the Lend-Lease administrators I got a very cold reception. They virtually knocked back 60-70% of our requests, and most of their objections were based on misconceptions of Australia and the problems of war in the Pacific. One comment from a top Lend Lease official sums this up: “You're wasting your time and effort on a lot of things. You talk glibly about making all these shells and ammunition for a variety of guns, but we know you can't do it!” Laurence was about to prove them wrong.

To be continued…

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