(2000) Virtually nothing: re-evaluating the significance of cyberspace

Leisure Studies 19 (2000) 211–225

Virtually nothing: re-evaluating the signi cance of cyberspace ANDY MIAH School of Physical Education, Sport and Leisure, De Montfort University Bedford, 37 Lansdowne Road, Bedford, England, MK40 2BZ UK. E-mail: amiah@dmu.ac.uk

This paper provides a critical analysis of virtual environments made in recent leisure and cultural studies discussions, which claim virtual reality to be the technotopia of post-modern society. Such positions describe virtual realities as worlds of in nite freedom, which transcend human subjectivity and where identity becomes no longer burdened by the prejudices of persons. Arguing that cyberspace offers little more than a token gesture towards such liberation, the paper suggests a shift in focus from the power relations that might change or remain because of virtual environments, to an awareness of their implications for human beings. Such technologies as chat rooms, the Internet and cyber-sex, are used to illustrate the fundamental challenge of virtual leisure to the human condition. This human condition is often presumed to represent ‘reality/actuality’ and, as such, is said to be in contrast to virtual environments. However, this paper extends its critique of virtual reality, by questioning such a distinction and arguing that new cyber-virtual reality is no more or no less than a sophistication of virtualness that has always re ected the human, embodied experience. Consequently, it is argued how cyberspace is more profound for its challenge to identity construction than for its emancipatory function.

Introducing cyberspace The emergence of computer technology has been the subject of an overwhelming discourse for the last decade. The new cyberspatial environments have been argued as furthering society towards postmodernity and the realisation of a plural self (Rojek, 1995). Within this context, it has been written how cyberspace brings a state of mind to the individual that is beyond traditional leisure experiences and the language of homogeneity. It is a way to escape from the values and constraints of one’s immediate culture, the commodi cation and devaluation of conventional leisure (Rojek, 1993).

Computer culture presents itself as being the mode of freedom within which one can go anywhere and do anything, albeit in a very narrow sense (one must be tied to a computer or avatar). For these reasons, leisure requires radical reinterpretation for having become disassociated from its conventional constituents. Indeed, it remains unclear whether cyberspatial leisure can, in fact, be conceptualized as leisure at all. This new world, brave or otherwise, permits the browser to embark upon a new adventure, to initiate a new twist to the narrative, and a means to encounter the de-contextualized ‘other’ (with whom, supposedly, there are no means to comprehend it). As Leisure Studies ISSN 0261-4367 print/ISSN 1466-4496 online © 2000 Taylor & Francis Ltd http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals

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such, leisure in cyberspace challenges conventional conceptions of spatiality, time, geography and sexuality necessitating new modes of understanding (Aitchison, 1999). Such formalism within conventional leisure studies discourse has rendered its being focused upon established arenas of leisure pursuit, which neglects the more casual, everyday leisure activities that are re ective of an increasingly postmodern culture (Stebbins, 1997).

Within only the last ve years, it has become apparent that there is a need to distinguish between varying ages within the computer revolution, each of which demarcates varying capacities to which society has been in uenced by the computer. This is made most explicit in Mainzer (1998) where it is argued that we – being the developed, industrial world – exist within the second or maybe the third computer age, where we have moved away from the inanimate processors that described the calculating machines of previous decades, to a much more interactive computer experience, where machines learn, become lifelike and, perhaps, autonomous (Kelly, 1994). Though Mainzer does not write of a third computer age, it could be argued that further to the expert and human-like systems that Mainzer considers, humans are also becoming more machine-like. The circle is complete: humans create machines, machines assimilate the human, and the human becomes a machine.

Amidst such, dare I say, intelligent machines, humans become increasingly directed by the expert knowledge of computers, which mirrors that knowledge of humans. The awed reliability of the human thus becomes replaced by the unemotional, ever reliable and always accountable machine.

Texts addressing the computer revolution have discussed various aspects of its implication for society, from the globalizing effects of communications technology (Cairncross, 1997), to the social and ethical problems arising as a result of computer technology (Kizza, 1996). Furthermore, numerous texts have sought to articulate the social, cultural, and political implications of computers (Jones, 1995; Shields, 1996; Loader, 1997; Kitchin, 1998). With an esimated 35 million people connected to the Internet (Kitchin, 1998), to include well over 5000 newsgroups (Parks, 1996), the salience of computer mediated communication (CMC) is well recognized as being beyond needing justi cation for academic study. Within its con nes, the Internet has become an environment of unbridled consumption, voyeurism and fantasy. On-line shopping, chat rooms and cyber-cafes all serve, supposedly, to liberate the consumer from the constraints of physical limitations and reach new limits of the absurd, functional and absurdly functional.1 The effort of having to stand in a queue, or the nedless minutes spent on the phone trying to book a holiday are no longer an issue with this ‘1-click’ culture. Indeed, the very langauge of these systems is such that it implies essentially recreational qualities, with such terms as ‘browsers’ and ‘surfers’ describing how one – necessarily – participates on-line.

Central to these readings is how computers affect and will continue to affect what it means to be a human being and how one constructs identity.

This is made most explicit in Turkle (1995), and is further considered by Castells (1997), where it is recognized by both that the kinds of interactions that take place within cyberspace are of a quite unique kind. As such,

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underpinning each of these texts is a concern that, as time on-line increases and the use of the Internet widens, the potential for human relationships and, thus, communities to change is extraordinary. If people conduct the majority of their social interactions through mediation with computers, then what will become of the human being as a social animal? However, these texts are only useful to some degree for the present paper.

This paper wishes to specify further its consideration of the computer age, limiting itself to the consideration of identity in Virtual Reality (VR) communication technologies. Whilst the ef cacy of computer technologies remains somewhat questionable (Braun, 1995), there is only limited study addressing how VR machines stand to affect identity and social relations. To some extent, literature questioning how computer technologies, such as the Internet, in uence identity are of much use here, though they are insuf cient in articulating the overwhelmingly different implications of VR for human identity. Indeed, VR is most interesting for it represents the paradigmatic technology that will make real all the claims for computer technology being a truly liberating environment. In response to these claims, the current paper argues that the virtual in VR has been afforded an undeserved privilege, for its virtuality is little more than another form of virtuality that has always been the human condition. There will be three main claims made about VR within this paper, which serve to redirect studies about VR and eludicate problems arising from previous literature within this area. Thus, it will be argued that: (1) (2) (3)

Claims made about the liberating effects of VR (the cyber-libertarian position) remain at an experiential rather than social level.

The emphasis of the cyber-libertarian discourse distracts cyberenthusiasts from more pressing concerns about how cyberspace and, thus, how VR impacts upon the meaning of humanness and identity.

The virtual in VR has misled analysts to conclude that the kinds of experiences within VR are of no consequence, or without meaning.

Upon concluding that VR does impact upon the lived experience of a person’s leisure experience, the central question to be considered is whether such impact is enhancing human lives. In this respect, the paper proposes further research to be considered.

Interest in virtual reality is not new Initially, it will be useful to dispel some of the myths that VR is anything new.

Of course, the technology itself has yet to fulfuil the promise of the science ction writers. However, the seemingly recent body of literature outlined above cannot assume such a pioneering position, for it is well informed by a number of texts addressing the information revolution, or cybernetics more generally. To draw upon key proponents of this post-war era, the foundational work of Norbert Wiener, John von Neumann, Claude Shannon, Warren McCullock and other participants of the Macy Conferences on

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Cybernetics (1943–1954), embraced a new vision of the human being, one that encompassed its facility as an information-processing entity, essentially similar to machines (Hayles, 1999). The proceedings of these meetings cannot be underestimated for their having informed a wealth of future texts in both science ction or academia.

Following these paradigmatic studies, research into computer science and programming attracted a new audience with the emergence of studies into arti cial intelligence. The popular interest generated by the prospect of giving machines (computers) minds, stimulated a wealth of new popular science texts such as Moravec (1988), arti cial intelligence research (most notably the conversations of Turing (1950) and the later Searle (1990) that re ects much discussion about the possibilities of arti cial intelligence), and the science ction of Gibson’s Neuromancer (1984). Thus, emerging from the guise of science ction and presaging the literature of cyberpunk, research began to consider the ways in which computer technology was making, and could continue to make, possible new kinds of human experiences (Rheingold, 1991). Integral to such texts is the writing of a much more immersing technological interface than is re ective of the current and popular personal computer. The ambition of computer technology, so it was argued, was to make real cyberspaces that were indistinguishable from non-cyberspaces – the supposed real world. Thus, it is possible to trace ideas about virtual realities to these texts. Indeed, it can even be argued that the concept of virtual reality dates as far back as Leibniz’s Theodiocy (1710, cited in Keep, 1993), where a world is dreamt of, consisting of tactile, three-dimensional, ctional environments where one can physically move and experience the full spectrum of sensory stimuli. This last example draws attention to a central concern of this paper: that the virtual in virtual reality is misleading us to believe that it stands in opposition to a supposed reality. Yet, if one accepts Leibniz’s ideas about dreams constituting virtual realities, and presumably thoughts as well, then one might have dif culty in making a distinction between the real and the virtual world. The signi cance of this point will be addressed later, though it is rst necessary to place some critical re ection upon how studies about cyberspace and CMCs have become assumed as providing a means for the liberation of human subjects: the technotopia of cybersociety. Through understanding this theme within the context of literature about the cybernetic revolution, it will then be argued how such conclusions are at best, optimistic, and at worst, oppressing for their distracting persons from other, more pressing concerns relating to identity.

Where is cyberspace?

Before understanding how cyberspace has been assumed as being a liberating environment – an environment where persons are no longer prejudiced against, for example, social stereotyping – it is useful to describe what the contexts are for these conclusions; to understand where cyberspace is located and to what it refers. The term cyberspace is well renowned for being coined

by William Gibson (1984) as:

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a consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts. . . . A graphic representation of data abstracted from the bank of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations of data. Like city lights receding. (Gibson, 1984, p. 67)

Though perhaps most articulate in describing the possibilities and realities of cyber-environments is Rheingold (1991). His eloquent and, more importantly, extensive descriptions of how people interact and form identity in cyberspace are imbued with imagination and an air of realism. Rheingold also makes explicit the connection between cyberspace and VR and is thus paramount to the concerns here.2 From the literature, it would seem that cyberspace is this ‘world of wires’ (Kitchin, 1998), where individuals are able to interact, create communities and form relationships, through deception or otherwise. Moreover, VR tends to have been regarded as one medium that is most signi cant and most empowering when it manifests itself within a CMC, such as the Internet. Thus, virtual reality is presented as being the location where people can interact in a place with no boundaries and which offers real, ful lling interactive experiences. With this in mind, it seems clearer how VR has become assumed to be empowering for people, liberating them from their physical and psychological constraints.

What follows is a exposition on the kind of arguments that have been used to conclude that cyberspace is a truly liberating mechanism. Brie y, a description of the kinds of interactions and environments that are available in cyberspace is given, which illustrate the main contexts for the cyberlibertarian position. Whilst considering these arguments, it is useful to provoke the reader to be critical of these interpretations, since, following their consideration, it will be argued how they present ideological interpretations of what takes place in cyberspace. Whilst certainly allowing some degree of experiential freedom, where one can choose and direct one’s experiences in an environment free from social constraints, it cannot be concluded that cyberspace is without signi cant constraints. Furthermore, it is argued here that such claims distract the reader and user from more pressing concerns relating to how cyberspace alters the notion of what it means to interact in a social context and, indeed, what it means to be a human being. Thus, this paper extends the current criticism of the cyber-libertarian discourse, arguing that as far as allowing some ideological demonstration of freedom to take place, cyberspace (most relevant here as being the Internet) is more likely becoming a tool that perpetuates conventional social constraints and the implications of cyberspace are most relevant for how they affect the concept of humanness. The kinds of leisure experience that are taking place within cyberspace seem to be, at least, no less constrained than those that exist outside of it. With this in mind, it is then argued that the central concern of cyberspace environments is whether these alternative interactions contribute to or detract from human lives.

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Cyberspace: apocalypse or panacea? 3 Alongside developments in computer technology, a substantial amount of literature has emerged popularizing cyberspace as a location for the expression of freedom within society. The likes of William Gibson, John Perry Barlow, Mitch Kapor, and cyber-enthusiasts such as Howard Rheingold assert the importance of CMCs for ways in which the human subject can be empowered within an overwhelmingly complex society. Thus, it was asserted that cyberspace could create ‘a world that all may enter without privilege or prejudice accorded by race, economic power, military force’ (Barlow, 1996).

These kinds of arguments tend to have been made with speci c reference to the kinds of interaction and communication that could take place through something like the Internet. Of course, there are various kinds of environment within the Internet ranging from simple e-mailing, the use of newsgroups or listservs and the more voyeuristic and questionable relationships made through sex-rooms.4 Each of these media offers some degree of novelty to the way in which one constructs leisure experiences, sometimes quite subtly. Relationships emerging as a result of e-mailing facilities, where people make contact with persons who, for example, have their information and contact details posted on a web-based document, are able to collapse the social barriers of geography and status. Such technology is profound for it makes possible contact with those whom once were inaccessible. Of course, the most celebrated persons are wise enough to remain anonymous in cyberspace. However, certainly within academia, it is possible to seek direct communication with authors of the most authoritative texts. Where once only an interpretation of a reading was possible, one can now confront the author with criticism and points of clari cation. This collapsing of spatial barriers is not entirely different from the effect of other communication technologies, such as the postal service or the telephone, though cyberspace offers an immediacy and ease of access that is substantially greater than any previous technology. In addition to communications that are made through e-mail are the virtual communities that have emerged in various forms, such as chat groups, multi-user-dungeons (MUDs) such as LambdaMOO – the most popular MUD to date with over 3000 members (Markham, 1998) – bulletin boards, news groups and listservs. Again, the levels of virtuality within these various media do vary, from the text based non-real-time facility of emailing to the, still text-based, imaginary and immersing environments of MUDs, such as LambdaMOO. Within the latter, it is certainly possible (and popular) for a person to adopt a ctional persona and to discard those characteristics that are perceived by the individual as framing or limiting his/her personality. As such, with relative ease one can become one’s ideal self or ‘me as I would like to be’. Of the most popular methods to initiate such disguise is for individuals to use a pseudonym or ‘handle’ as it is known. The effects of this alone can be truly profound, as Markham (1998) describes: Changing my name online has provided an interesting twist to my experiences. I feel a sense of freedom in a dislocated place where one can be anyone or anything

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simply by describing oneself through words and names. I also feel a sense of angst in a context of disembodied personae with shifting identities that are largely de ned by names.5 (Markham, 1998, p. 35)

Within thse two very distinct examples (e-mailing and MUDs), there ranges limitless possibility to present oneself to the degree that one feels comfortable.

However, it would be misleading to suggest that all persons seek to disguise their identity in cyberspace as there are many experiences that simply do not call for that kind of deceit. For example, the conventional newsgroup communities delivered through Usenet, are bound together by similar interests, be it research, music, art or sport. As such, they do not tend to consist of people who are concealing their identity, since their knowing each other would promote their interests in which everyone shares their opinions in an open, friendly environment (Bayn, 1995). Of course, it could still be argued that such relationships are limited to a given level of intimacy, since cyberspace does not allow one to speak face-to-face with the other. However, research is limited in understanding whether people tend to develop more meaningful relationships on or of ine (Parks, 1996). Thus, even within these seemingly simple interactions, there is potential for relationships to adopt a new guise, where one can remain amidst the imageless text of e-mail, not disclosing even the sound of one’s voice to the other.

Whilst these experiential accounts do seem to describe cyberspace as a panacea for society, they re ect only one interpretation of what takes place in virtual environments and one that is overly skewed in its presentation of cyberspace as a necessarily liberating environment. It is not denied that CMCs make possible much more ef cient communications, for they can allow people of quite different origins and schedules to meet, limited only by convenience. There is no need to travel or even to communicate without being able to interact with another person visually. Video-conferencing, faxing, and e-mailing has made possible much more ef cient means for the organization of a company and increasingly, visions of future work places locate the employee at home with a computer rather than in an of ce building elsewhere. Indeed, perhaps the most successful ‘e-enterprise’ is Amazon.com, the Internet based distributor of books. To illustrate the growth of cyberspatial business or ‘e-commerce’, in the space of 4 years Amazon has established a customer base of over 10 million (as of July 1999), and continues to operate using a virtual library, spanning over 160 countries world-wide and operating through Internet sales alone. Whilst the company remains without having made pro t, its revenue is estimated at over US$25 billion.

Additionally, it is relevant to note the possibilities and achievements of academic and scienti c research in cyberspace. With the emergence of electronic journals, deriving from reputable associations and researchers, cutting edge research ndings can be made available much sooner than would be possible through conventional publishing methods. Furthermore, the nancial burden upon associations to sustain journals and quality communications becomes unnecessary, once membership can be administered through the Internet. 6

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However, aside from these bene ts, recent literature has recognized a number of concerns about cyberspace, which doubt its emancipatory function, and which identify problems arising from too much emphasis being placed upon the social consequences of cyberspace. These concerns can be summarized by considering the multi-user dungeon LambdaMOO. Undoubtedly, LambdaMOO does not respond to all criticisms of the cyber-libertarian position. For example, other issues might include the signi cance of the Internet becoming a universal, English spoken language as is suggested

by Cairncross (1997) and Kanitschieder (1999). Also, the signi cance of Microsoft as seeming to monopolize personal-computer software and, perhaps, the way in which people experience the Internet, has been the subject of much legal and social debate over the last few years. Furthermore, one could cite arguments about accessibility as reasons why cyberspace does not embrace the cyber-libertarian position; the Internet being accessible only to those cultures which are computer literate. Even for those who can access the Internet, it is not an environment where ‘surfers’ can browse freely. Firstly, the World Wide Web is only one protocol that is used on the Internet and thus, it is misleading to argue that the Internet is universal or entirely open to all.

Moreover, within the World Wide Web there are various pages that are only possible to view if one pays the subscription or becomes a member of the organization.

Nevertheless, in response to the major tenet of the cyber-libertarian position – that in cyberspace one is no longer burden to social prejudice or regulation – LambdaMOO is an excellent example of social-cyberspace in action. LambdaMOO has been on-line since 1990 and is a text-based virtual reality available through the Internet. MOOs (multi-user, object oriented) and MUDs are real-time interactive conferencing programmes, where various people can carry out conversations at the same time. The basis of this virtual world is through spatial metaphors, where textual descriptions of locations serve to create the environment, like an interactive book (though more like interacting in the non-virtual world). At any given time, hundreds of characters can be logged on at once, interacting with each other in varying ways. To the na¨õ ve MUD player, this might appear to be a fairly game-like environment and it would be easy to assume that what takes place in MUDs is mere fantasy. Of course, users are participating in a game of sorts and one would tend to spend time within this environment as a leisure activity. However, much like other leisure pursuits, it would be misleading to say that these interactions are without meaning. Indeed, LambdaMOO might be thought of as a virtual bar, night club or sports centre, each of which are possible contexts within this cyberspatial world. Though focusing more upon the social structure of LambdaMOO for now, it is misleading to conclude that LambdaMOO – as a virtual, interactive environment and thus, the very embodiment of the kinds of liberatory arguments about cyberspace – is entirely without regulation and constraint.

From its inception, LambdaMOO was without any formal system or structure, through which controversies amongst its members could be resolved. Nevertheless, the world was created and directed by ‘wizards’, who

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would ensure the technical integrity and social control of the system. The wizards set minimal rules of participation and conduct, decided when to increase a person’s quota of disk space (reserved for the creation of objects and spaces), and even gave punishments for bad conduct. In 1993, Pavel Curtis, the archwizard, decided that this method of management was no longer ef cient and posted a memo to the MOO community suggesting a more distributed method of social control (Mnookin, 1996). These kinds of conversation make it fallacious to conclude that such environments as LambdaMOO are devoid of constraint or regulation, and are thus, liberating.

Indeed, I have underscored Mnookin’s paper to a very large extent, which is an exposition on the emerging legal structure of LambdaMOO. This kind of structure and order does not seem to be the realization of the cyberlibertarianist’s utopia.

Thus, it would seem misleading to conclude that cyberspace or even VR offers the kind of liberation that is claimed by the cyber-libertarian thesis.

Furthermore, it is argued here that such focus is obscuring much more salient issues relating to how cyberspace interactions alter what it means to be a human engaging in interactions with other people. This kind of criticism is not unique to leisure studies. Indeed, Coalter (1998) recognizes the implications of making paramount concerns about how leisure experiences contribute to or detract from social inequality and freedom. Similar to Scraton (1994), Coalter argues that this creates an overemphasis on theorizing within a ‘normative “citizenship paradigm” ’ (p. 23) to the expense of research into identity formation, subjectivity, and emotion, which lacks substantially.

Within this context, the relevance of the current argument can derive, again, from the LambdaMOO context. Yet, it must be noted that its example illustrates only one way in which cyberspace alters human experiences.

Virtual rape and new de nitions of reality In 1993, LambdaMOO experienced its rst case of virtual-rape, the incident was widely publicized and has been argued as being the event that turned a ‘database into a society’ (Dibbell, 1993 cited in MacKinnon, 1997). When ‘virtual rape’ takes place, one member of the community (the violator) takes control of another person’s persona and proceeds to violate the character, in this case, in the presence of all other users. Whilst it is easy to make light of the act and argue that it is just a group of people having fun playing a game, and that what happens to the character is not really what happens to the person, this kind of environment blurs fantasy and reality. People are there with different motivations, some playing out fantasies, others meeting with friends and having ‘real’ conversations. As such, to argue that cyberspace is a created, arti cial and unreal environment, begs the question as to whether anything at all that takes place in cyberspace is real. It is argued by MacKinnon (1997) that, whilst it can be questioned whether the LambdaMOO incident did constitute ‘rape’, there is no doubt that ‘the current iteration of rape as constructed in LambdaMOO poses serious, real consequences for users of virtual reality’.7

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This perspective is made more conspicuous in Markham (1998) where the real/virtual distinction is reviewed in the context of cyberspace discourse. As Markham notes, ‘most authors presuppose a particular understanding of the term real . . . and often contrast real – when talking about computer technologies – to the term virtual’ (p. 117). Yet, as was made clear in the initial paragraphs, it is misleading to present such questioning as being relatively new. Ideas about what constitutes the real are apparent in such contemporary cinematic texts as The Truman Show (1998) and The Matrix (1999). The latter itself is imbued with many references to literary, philosophical and religious texts that have addressed what constitutes the ‘real’. From Neo’s (main character) possession of Baudrillard’s Simulacra and Simulations, to the imagery of Lewis Carroll’s white rabbits and falling down holes reminiscent of the Alice texts, to the religious connotations of the script.8 These sub-texts to The Matrix provide a useful insight into the extent to which the real and the non-real have been the subject of much debate and further requires the movie-goer to question their position in a world that is increasingly blurring the real with the ctional. Questions concerning reality, then, are extensive and it seems incredible that such discussions have not been central to writing about virtual reality. Furthermore, it is alarming that the term virtual reality has come to describe experiences that can be argued as being actual rather than virtual – why virtual reality and not just cyberspace without any connotations to reality?

Unquestionably, it seems that virtual interactions are real, they take place between real people. In making this conclusion, I feel it necessary to distance myself from Baudrillard’s hyperreality (1994), which is often so inextricable from discussions about cyberspace. First and foremost, the interactions between people within cyberspace are real, and – accepting a poststructuralist critique – therefore, not in the language of image and referent. Indeed, MacKinnon’s (1997) de nition of the real brings into question whether human existence has ever been real, since it will always have been mediated and interpreted: the primary difference then between the real and the virtually real is the interposition of some mediating and transforming agent or interface between the senses and the shared perception. (MacKinnon, 1997, p. 4)

Whilst MacKinnon places the condition of reality upon that which is interpreted through human senses, this de nition surely fails to accept its normative limitations; not all humans have the same senses nor the same levels of sensory sensitivity – people have different degrees of smell, sight, hearing, and touch. Thus, realizing that our sensory experiences do not necessarily provide us with a reliable comprehension of the real, it would seem more logical to follow Hayles’ (1999) position, which asserts that: For information to exist, it must always be instantiated in a medium. Whether that medium is the page from the Bell Laboratories Journal on which Shannon’s equations are printed, the computer generated topological maps used by the Human Genome Project, or the cathode ray tube on which virtual worlds are imaged. (Hayles, 1999, p. 13)

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Thus, distinguishing between the real and the non-real appears at best fallacious and at worst (in this context) distracting from the realness of online experiences. It would be more accurate to argue that human existence – having always been mediated through the senses or some other media – has always been virtual and that cyberspace is another media through which we experience the real.

A morality for cyberspace: is the cyberspace experience transferable?

It has been concluded that cyberspace is not free from regulation and constraint as the cyber-libertarian position would have it, realizing the limitations of cyberspace as a liberating mechanism discloses more signi cant concerns about how cyberspace affects leisure experiences and human relationships, and the kinds of experiences that take place in cyberspace are real and the real/virtual distinction is meaningless. Thus, in recognizing that human actions and interactions require a different kind of understanding in cyberspace, it is pertinent to comprehend whether such difference is enhancing human lives. In this nal section, the phenomena of cyber-sex and cyberdating are described to articulate why cyberspace requires a different kind of moral framework within which it can be determined whether cyberspace interactions are enhancing human lives. Whilst being far from exhaustive of these considerations, it is argued that cyberspace and cyber-dating offer an environment that allows one to form different attitudes towards morality in the context of sexual and romantic relationships, where prostitution meets pornography and where delity meets fantasy.

To clarify, cyber-sex can take many forms. The still futuristic and immersing experiences as described in The Lawnmower Man (1992), where the activity is entirely simulated and imagined, are becoming more probable with the emergence of Teledildonics (simulated sex at a distance), to the more voyeuristic experiences through settings such as ‘AmandaCam’ (http://www.amandacam.com). This latter experience is a web-based site, where customers can pay a subscription to view Amanda as she conducts her daily life at home. With cameras placed around her house, which are continually updated, the user is able to watch Amanda do the washing-up, sleep, watch television, bathe, and so on. For innocent surfers, AmandaCam tempts the browser with the GuestCam, which gives an insight into Amanda’s home through providing one image that is continually updated. Also, and perhaps more common, cyber-sex can adopt a text-based interaction, where people converse using text and create a sexual encounter using words alone.

Cyber-dating is also a means through which people meet, with numerous Internet-based marriages making headline news in recent months, where people have established their entire relationship on-line and have then chosen to meet and become wed.

The appeal of such environments is perhaps obvious; one can remain suf ciently anonymous and thus posit one’s real self until nding a person whom is accepting of this self.9 However, such experiences bring into question whether one is justi ed in using a non-cyberspace based morality since

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cyberspace creates a whole new framework for understanding sexual and romantic relationships. The signi cance of this is recognized by Rheingold (1991) where he states that: The secondary social effects of technosex are potentially revolutionary. If technology enables you to experience erotic frissons or deep physical, social, emotional communion with another person with no possibility of pregnancy or sexually transmitted disease, what then of conventional morality, and what of the social rituals and cultural codes that exist solely to enforce that morality? Is disembodiment the ultimate sexual revolution and/or the rst step towards abandoning our body? (Rheingold, 1991, p. 351)

Cyber-sex and cyber-dating forces the questioning of what constitutes human relationships and how one should conduct interactions when on-line. It has already been concluded that what takes place in cyberspace is real and has real consequences. However, it is not clear how such conclusions t with, for example, one’s concept of delity and fantasy. Does it constitute adultery if one engages in sexual relations within cyberspace? Would it matter if the interaction was with a real person or a fantasy name/character? An answer to these questions begs another paper, though these examples reinforce the suggestion that cyberspace is a context within which the moral rules outside of it must be re-evaluated. Moreover, given that cyberspace interactions are real and meaningful, any rede nition of moral attitudes must be sensitive to interactions conducted outside of cyberspace as well.

Conclusion This paper is not unique for criticizing the cyber-libertarian position, though it has adopted a context-speci c analysis to understand why it is that virtual realities have been presumed as being liberating for users. It has been argued that such experiences are limited to the experiential quality of liberation rather than being socially liberating, the feeling that one can act freely without regard for feeling inadequate or attributing value to what another person (or oneself) says. Cyberspace is a place where one can communicate private thoughts to others and, if one dislikes the reaction, where one can disconnect and try elsewhere without any sense of shame or need to address such rejection. As such, it could be argued as furthering Rojek’s (1993) thesis on leisure as ways to escape, though of course it makes a claim upon escape from identity, rather than of location. Furthermore, it is suggested that by focusing upon the liberating possibilities within cyberspace, critics (and users) have become distracted from the ways in which cyberspace interactions alter our leisure experiences and which thus, re ect real (and not virtual or arti cial) experiences. In this capacity, the ideas of Coalter (1998) are relevant and can be seen as provoking the interests of this paper. Finally, it is claimed that cyberspace calls for a re-de nition of human values and assumptions about our moral perspective, since it provides new kinds of human interactions, which do not t with non-cyber interactions and that require a new, broader, perspective upon what constitutes reality. The kinds of leisure

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experiences that are found through mediation with a computer screen permit a quite unique approach to understanding lifestyle and identity; one that cannot be treated through the formalism of conventional leisure studies theory. Within cyberspace, not only are the spatial and temporal barriers collapsing, so too are inter-personal ones. Meanwhile, however, new social barriers emerge with unique issues relating to access, understanding, and meaning.

Notes 1. I am thinking here of the recently marketed website, Ron’s Angels (Harris, 1999), where infertile couples can bid for eggs belonging to female models.

The site’s appearance is frighteningly legitimate and well designed so as to disguise the moral questions arising from its function.

2. It is relevent to mention here that the terms virtual reality or arti cial reality may be regarded as oxymorons and that, as such, the term cyberspace is thought to be more suitable to describe these systems since it does not presume any distinction between cyberspace and non-cyberspace realities. This point is signi cant since the terms cyberspace and virtual reality are often used synonymously (Rheingold, 1991). However, it is considered here that their synonymous use con ates the varying degrees to which computer-mediated technologies can be used. Whilst it might be argued – and will be argued here – that any form of CMC is virtual to some degree, it is relevant to make VR distinct for it can be identi ed as characterizing a unique form of cyberspace experience.

3. This title refers to Rogerson (1999) who considers whether the Information Age is allowing the empowerment and removal of prejudice through stereotype. Interestingly, the paper concludes by acknowledging that, to enable the panacea, governments must be proactive in making it possible – presumably through regulation?

4. However, one might also question other methods of relationship development through computer-mediated technologies and it will be the intention of this paper to bring into question what kinds of pesonal relationships and persons, therefore, become manifest as the result of computermediated interactions. Is there anything that is lost (or gained) in human relationships through only communicating on-line? (More, 1997).

5. This one quotation does not do Markham’s text justice to any degree. The work offers an overwhelmingly rich ethnographic study of ‘life on-line’ that must be read to fully appreciate the degree to which identity can and does change as a result of this new communication technology.

6. To read more about the implications of authorship and electronic publishing, see Sewell (1992), Coniam (1992), Nunberg (1996) and an interesting take on Nunberg’s text in Franking (1997).

7. The issue of rape is a complex one and is suitably addressed by MacKinnon, recognizing that what constitutes rape is culturally sensitive.

Furthermore, MacKinnon questions whether conventional de nitions of

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rape, outside of cyberspace, ought to be applied within it, since cyberspace does not operate with similar social conventions.

8. Already, a number of reviews have sought to interpret The Matrix as a text heavily in uenced by the Christian Bible, referencing Neo as being ‘the chosen one’, the villain Cyper as ‘Judas’, and images of resurrection, prophecy and satanic forces (Rea, 1999). Indeed, one might also note the analogies to More’s (1997) ideas about uploading human consciousness as took place when Neo learnt the martial arts skills as preparation.

9. Whilst users are not necessarily convinced of their anonymity in cyberspace (Witmer, 1997), it can be argued that the ability to use anonymous e-mail addresses and networks that disguise individual identity, does provide a level of anonymity in cyberspace that allows one to interact as though one is unknown.

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