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WARSHIP 2011
Editor: John Jordan Assistant Editor: Stephen Dent
CONWAY
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Frontispiece: The French armoured cruiser Dupuy-de-L么me in dock during her rebuild at Brest Naval Dockyard. The after military mast and the funnels have been landed. Following her refit, which lasted from 1902 to 1906, the ship would retain only the forward military mast, and the fitting of new watertube boilers would require three funnels in place of the original two. (Courtesy of Luc Feron) Visit the brand new Conway website at www.conwaypublishing.com
漏 Conway 2011 First published in Great Britain in 2011 by Conway, an imprint of Anova Books, 10 Southcombe Street, London W14 0RA www.conwaypublishing.com All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A record of this title is available on request from the British Library. ISBN: 9781844861330 Printed and bound by Times Printers Ltd, Malaysia Reproduction by Rival Colour Ltd, UK
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CONTENTS Editorial
6
FEATURE ARTICLES High-Speed Thoroughbreds: The US Navy’s Lexington class Battle Cruiser Designs
8
Trent Hone outlines the rationale for one of the most controversial classes of ship ever designed for the US Navy.
The Cruiser Dupuy-de-Lôme
32
Luc Feron describes the origins of the world’s first armoured cruiser, and traces her subsequent career.
The Battle of Casablanca: The Marine Nationale versus the US Navy
48
Vincent P. O’Hara takes a new look at these actions during Operation ‘Torch’ in November 1942, which resulted in heavy losses for the French but also raised questions about the decision-making of US naval commanders.
The Croiseur de Bataille de 37 000 tonnes
64
John Jordan attempts to piece together the surviving plans of the French battlecruiser design of the late 1920s.
Modern European Amphibious Assault Ships
80
Conrad Waters looks at the new generation of multi-role amphibious assault ships being built for France and Spain.
Battle at Valparaíso
94
Colin Jones applies the principle of counterfactual speculation to an event during the war between Spain and the South American republics in 1866 to investigate the capabilities of the warships of that time.
Bussei’s Hydrofoil: History of a Secret Project, 1941-1963
102
Enrico Cernuschi investigates a little-known and revolutionary design submitted to the Italian High Command in 1942 by Commander Ettore Bussei, which influenced postwar hydrofoil development in the US Navy.
Russia’s First Ironclads: Pervenets, Ne tron menia and Kreml
112
Stephen McLaughlin describes the painful birth of Russia’s first ironclads during the early 1860s, along with the development of the industrial base that this new fleet required.
Damnable Folly? Small Cruiser Designs for the Royal Navy Between the Wars
130
David Murfin details the tortuous discussions that resulted from the Admiralty’s need to replace the ageing and obsolescent warbuilt ‘C’ and ‘D’ class cruisers in the early 1930s.
The Tomozuru Incident
148
Hans Lengerer looks at the design background of the Chidori class torpedo-boats and at the impact that the capsizing of the Tomozuru had on the IJN.
The Stranding, Grounding and Destruction of HMS Effingham, 1940
165
Richard N. J. Wright examines the loss of the British cruiser Effingham during the Norwegian Campaign of 1940, and the subsequent, hastily convened, official enquiry.
Warship Notes
175
A Cruiser for Chile; The French Fleet Programme of 1920 and the 45cm Gun; A’s & A’s.
Naval Books of the Year
181
Warship Gallery
197
A series of photographs with extended captions featuring the Royal Navy at home and abroad, 1929–1939.
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THE CRUISER DUPUY-DE-LÔME The Dupuy-de-Lôme was the world’s first armoured cruiser, and with her powerful armament and high speed attracted considerable attention abroad. Luc Feron describes the origins of this ship and traces her subsequent career.
B
uilt under the 1887 Programme, laid down in 1888 and launched in 1890, the Dupuy-de-Lôme created a sensation. Named after France’s most distinguished naval architect, Stanislas-Charles-Henri-Laurent Dupuy de Lôme (1816-1885), who had designed the first steampowered battleship, the Napoléon (launched 1850), and the world’s first seagoing ironclad, the armoured frigate Gloire (launched 1859), she was a great novelty: a cruiser displacing more than 6,000 tons, carrying a relatively powerful armament and, above all, with armour covering the entire length of the ship from upper-deck level to 1.38m below the waterline and a designed speed of 20 knots. In marked contrast to many armoured ships of the day, she triggered a wave of enthusiasm in France and abroad. The major navies followed France’s example, launching armoured cruisers of ever increasing tonnage – although with the benefit of hindsight it has to be admitted that these more often turned out to be disappointments than successes. A ship of this type could in theory put up a good
showing against a contemporary battleship such as the Hoche but its limitations were soon shown up by improvements in naval guns and projectiles. Dupuy-de-Lôme herself, far from being the spectacular success hailed enthusiastically by some, was a ship afflicted by defects whose rectification proved very troublesome. Her active career was short and she rendered very little useful service.
The Design In 1887 the influence of Admiral Aube and the Jeune Ecole was still widespread (the admiral had been Minister of Marine in the Freycinet administration from January 1886 to May 1887), and in order to offset criticism of the resumption of work on the battleship Brennus a programme of cruiser construction, considered to be more in accordance with the views of the Jeune Ecole’s supporters, was outlined by the Conseil des Travaux in its session of 20
Dupuy-de-Lôme on 1st August 1895 shortly after her return from Kiel. (Author’s collection) 32
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July 1887. Selected naval constructors were then requested to submit suitable design studies. Louis de Bussy (1822-1903) was an experienced and respected naval architect who had been responsible for the design of the first steel-framed battleship, Redoutable, launched in 1876. Appointed Director of Naval Construction in 1880 and Inspector-General of Naval Construction in 1885, he was ex officio a member of the Conseil des Travaux. Being well acquainted with the requirements of their cruiser programme, he lost no time in submitting a design which was examined by the Conseil during its session of 18 October. The proposed cruiser’s dimensions were: length between perpendiculars: 114m beam (max.): 15.70m draught: aft 7.87m, forward 6.27m, mean 7.07m The difference of 1.60m between the forward and after draughts does not seem to have been adhered to as the ship appears to have handled well during initial trials, and subsequent captains all agreed that a trim of 2.30m by the stern seemed to give the best results. As will be seen, the matter of the ship’s fore-and-aft trim was to arise again after her major refit in 1902-06. The main armament, two 19cm guns, was to be located in barbettes, one sponsoned out on each beam slightly forward of amidships, projecting 1.5m from the ship’s side and 5.5m above the waterline. Additionally three 16cm guns were to be mounted forward, one on each beam in an angled casemate with an arc of 110 degrees 5.50m above the waterline, and the third in a centre-line barbette on the forecastle deck 7.50m above the waterline. Three more 16cm guns were to be similarly disposed aft. The whole of the ship’s side from the edge of the pro-
The master frame section is of the Middle Boiler Room; there are coal bunkers (labelled ‘soûte à charbon’) to the sides and above, to port and to starboard.
tective deck 1.38m below the waterline to the edge of the weather deck was to be covered by 100mm armour plating in four strakes fitted directly to the 2 x 10mm hull plating. The vaulted protective deck curved upwards from the lower edge of the side armour to a height level with the waterline. It consisted of 10mm plating laid on the deck beams, overlaid with 20mm plating. An 8mm splinter-deck under the armoured deck covered the boiler rooms, machinery spaces and magazines. The space between the protective and splinter decks could be filled with coal for use only in the last resort. Outboard bunkers were located between the ship’s side and the machinery, pipework and boilers. A cofferdam extended the full length of the ship, rising from the protective deck to one metre above the waterline. Its internal bulkhead was between 0.70m and 0.80m from the side plating. The cofferdam was completely watertight. Inboard of the cofferdam a passageway 0.70m wide allowed inspection of its internal bulkhead. There were 13 transverse watertight bulkheads evenly spaced below the protective deck, and three above it. Further subdivision was provided by additional transverse bulkheads, generally in the same vertical plane as the main bulkheads and intersecting the passageway and the cofferdam. Steam was to be supplied by eleven ‘Admiralty type’ fire-tube boilers, each with two 1.30m diameter furnaces. The designed power of 14,000CV1 and the speed of 20 knots were to be provided by triple-expansion machinery powering three propellers.
The section view of the forms of the hull illustrates the pronounced tumble-home adopted in the interests of a stable gunnery platform. 33
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1896, Rear Admiral Chauvin, chief of the Naval General Staff, suggested that the ship should be fitted with bilgekeels in order to reduce her roll. In 1872, as a young man, the distinguished naval constructor Emile Bertin had carried out a series of practical experiments on a 60-tonne coal barge, the results of which he published in a memorandum entitled ‘On the resistance of hulls when rolling and on their sea-going qualities’, in which he stressed the advantages of what came to be known as bilge-keels in order to reduce rolling. Bertin’s ideas in this and many other respects were ahead of their time and were rejected by a conservativelyminded naval establishment, but by the time Admiral Chauvin penned his note Bertin had become director of the Service des Constructions Navales (Naval Construction Department) which had been created on his initiative in 1894. Within a few days he had approved the admiral’s proposal, although pointing out that it would mean putting the ship out of commission for a lengthy period. Despite negative opinions by Engineers Albaret and Huin at the Brest dockyard, who thought they would be ineffective and reduce the ship’s speed, preparations were put in hand to design suitable bilge-keels and fit them to the Dupuy-de-Lôme when a convenient opportunity arose. In the meantime the cruiser continued to lead a quiet existence at Brest, taking part in coastal movements and the occasional cruise as part of the 1st Division of the modestly constituted Northern Squadron (France’s naval strength was concentrated in the Mediterranean). In June 1896 the squadron visited Spanish ports to participate in the Franco-Spanish festivities. On 5 October the squadron went out to escort the Russian Imperial yachts into Cherbourg for the start of the Tsar’s state visit to France. The President of the Republic, Félix Faure, a former Navy Minister, returned the compliment in April 1897, sailing to Kronstadt on the armoured cruiser Pothuau, escorted by the Dupuy-de-Lôme (replacing the Bruix, which had suffered a breakdown) and the light cruiser Surcouf, for a courtesy visit to the Russian court.
DUPUY-DE-LÔME: TABLE Characteristics Displacement: Dimensions:
Propulsion:
Coal: Armament:
Protection:
Complement:
6301 tonnes Length 114m pp Beam 15.7m (max.) Draught 7.07m (mean) 11 Amirauté fire-tube boilers; three-shafts; one vertical/two horizontal triple-expansion engines; 14,000ihp = 20 knots (designed) 1080 tonnes 2 –19cm/45 Mle 1887, 6 – 16cm/45 Mle 1887; 4 – 65mm, 10 – 47mm, 4 – 37mm; 4 - 45cm single TT (all a/w) Belt 100mm Deck 20mm + 10mm Conning Tower 125mm: 521
In November 1896 CdeV Valéry replaced Captain Huguet in command. The latter’s further strictures on the failings of the ship’s anchors, propellers and boilers were soon to be echoed by Captain Valéry in an even more exhaustive catalogue of ‘modifications required to improve the ship’s fighting value’ dated 6 March 1897: – Anchor handling: the complicated and cumbersome anchor-handling arrangements which leave the anchor stocks obstructing the firing arcs of the outboard 16cm guns could be improved by adopting Marrel-pattern anchors. – Boilers: The existing boilers require a lot of water, and are slow to raise steam. Replacing them with water-tube units would result in a saving of about 400 tonnes in weight which, if used for additional bunkerage, would greatly extend the ship’s radius of action. – Propellers: Successive modifications to the propellers in
Dupuy-de-Lôme in the roadstead at Brest in 1898. (Author’s collection) 38
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an attempt to improve the power output have, in fact, resulted in the speed being reduced by about one knot. With new boilers and better propellers the ship would probably be capable of 20.5 knots on trials.
the ship’s main armament. Four would provide adequate illumination if appropriately situated. – Ventilation of working and living spaces needs to be improved in the interest of health and effective working.
– Ventilation of machinery spaces: Generally adequate, but the 22 ventilator cowls on the upper deck are of considerable weight, cause appreciable wind resistance and could act as scoops to divert shell splinters downwards where they could damage fans and machinery. If the cowls were removed the existing level of ventilation could be maintained by modifying the operation of their fans.
– Cofferdam: It is not possible to inspect many of the compartments as they have no access doors or drainage tubes. The side passages also lack any means of drainage in case of flooding which could affect the ship’s trim and interfere with the use of her armament. The captain went on to list a whole series of lesser matters which required improvement and subsequently commented in greater detail on the subject of the ship’s ventilation and habitability. Considering the extent of these shortcomings, it is difficult to escape the feeling that it would have been better to dispense entirely with the services of a warship having so many inadequacies rather than attempt a costly reconstruction which was unlikely to result in making a successful unit of her. The bilge keels, which had been ordered in February 1897, were fitted in Brest Naval Dockyard between October 1897 and January 1898 while the ship was refitting. Their effect was to reduce the amplitude of the roll by one-half, a major advantage for the use of the arma-
– Coal supply: As the stokehold bunkers are emptied the ship’s roll increases so they have to be constantly replenished with 40 to 60 men continuously moving coal. If Niclausse water-tube boilers were fitted, backing on to the centre-line, space for stokehold bunkers would be increased and the furnace doors would be opposite the bunkers, reducing the need to move coal. – Protection: The main problem here is that the conning tower is inadequately protected and too small to accommodate the necessary personnel and equipment under combat conditions. A satisfactory replacement would require weight savings elsewhere. – Armament: With all the three after turrets on the same level there is a danger that the barrels of two of the guns could foul one another. There should be some means of preventing such an occurrence. The four torpedo-tubes should be reduced to two. The space presently occupied by the after pair could be used to better advantage. – Stability: The proposed bilge-keels are essential in order to reduce rolling which easily attains 10 to 11 degrees, exposing the lower edge of the hull armour and the protective deck. When rolling 34 degrees in the North Sea (the maximum roll recorded), the unprotected part of the hull was exposed to a height of 3 metres. – Military masts: These are an unnecessary encumbrance and should be removed. Their weight is out of all proportion to their usefulness; they allow the ship to be identified from afar, they interfere with the visibility of signals and they certainly contribute to the amplitude of the ship’s roll. They are vulnerable to hostile gunfire, the fire of the guns in the tops is neither accurate nor effective and causes the masts to vibrate when they or the ship’s main armament are fired. The tops of the mainmast are cinder-traps, a hindrance to their gunlayers. The weight saved by the removal of both masts would be more than sufficient to allow for the installation of an effective conning tower. The loss of their 47mm and 37mm guns could be offset by three 65mm guns: one right forward (in place of the bow searchlight) and two on the foredeck. – Searchlights: The six fitted at present are poorly located for the circumstances in which they might be needed and, in some situations, could interfere with the use of
A section view of the conning tower (Blockhaus) with the navigation bridge above, together with one of the starboard 164.7mm turrets. 39
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MODERN EUROPEAN AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIPS Conrad Waters looks at the new generation of multi-role amphibious assault ships being built for France and Spain.
T
he end of the Cold War has seen significant reductions in naval force levels across Europe. Many of the roles that the existing fleets were configured to undertake, such as the British Royal Navy’s primary anti-submarine mission in the North Atlantic, lost much of their relevance. Unsurprisingly, the region’s politicians were quick to seize the resulting ‘peace dividend’. However, one area of naval expenditure that has tended to escape the general cull has been amphibious shipping. The ability to deploy and sustain an expeditionary force at distance – or even to respond flexibly to a humanitarian crisis – has become increasingly relevant in an age where stabilisation operations have become an important counter to a range of asymmetric threats. A number of interesting ships have been designed to respond to this need. At one end of the scale, there has been increased interest from Europe’s small and medium-sized navies in multirole support ships. Many of these have yet to progress beyond the drawing board and it is doubtful whether many will survive the financial retrenchment that has fol-
lowed the recent global credit and economic crisis. An exception is the Royal Netherlands Navy’s firm order for an innovative JSS joint support ship, which has already attracted considerable attention. This large, 28,000-tonne design combines amphibious and logistical support capabilities in a single hull. Able to support both low and high intensity operations, the JSS incorporates the substantial storage space required to undertake maritime sustainment, strategic sea lift and sea basing missions. However, whilst offering a seemingly attractive spectrum of capabilities at moderate cost, the JSS has only limited capacity to undertake an air or seaborne amphibious assault in comparison with a specialised design.1 It therefore risks being categorised as a jack of all trades but master of none. The larger European navies – enjoying deeper pockets – have tended to take a more traditional approach in developing and deploying specialised amphibious shipping. The most impressive results have been achieved by France and Spain. Both these countries have followed the example set by the US Navy and designed specialised LHDtype amphibious assault ships.2 Capable of deploying an embarked force of troops and vehicles by means either of landing craft accommodated in a well dock or by helicopters operating from a through-length flight deck, these vessels are equipped with suitable command and control facilities for leading an amphibious flotilla whilst retaining sufficient flexibility to carry out more limited operations independently. Both countries’ ships feature the latest thinking in warship design. This includes the incorpo-
A computer generated image of the Dutch multi-purpose JSS joint support ship, which has recently been ordered. The combination of amphibious and logistical support capabilities in one hull is an attractive option for many medium-sized European Navies. (Thales Nederland) 80
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The Royal Navy’s LPH type helicopter carrier Ocean pictured at the Battle of Trafalgar commemorations in 2005. Ordered from what was then VSEL (now part of BAE Systems) in 1993, her extensive use of commercial design practices has set a precedent for many subsequent amphibious designs. (Conrad Waters)
ration of mercantile standards – where appropriate – as well as modern propulsion concepts. However, both also feature interesting variations reflecting specific national requirements. These make the alternative designs particularly interesting to compare and contrast.
during the landing phase. The use of helicopters also brought a new dimension to the concept of vertical envelopment, supplementing the use of gliders and paratroops as means by which a force could avoid the need to overcome beach defences by being landed further inland. The first helicopter assault trials took place from the US escort carrier Palau (CVE-122) in May 1948. However, it was the British Royal Navy that first used the concept operationally: during the Suez landings in 1956. By that time, the US had recommissioned its first converted escort carrier, Thetis Bay (CVHA-1), to operate as a helicopter assault carrier. An order for the first of a class of new purpose-built LPH-type helicopter assault ships, Iwo Jima (LPH-2), followed in 1958. Although the new ships were a success, operational experience suggested that the LPH’s inability to deploy landing craft was a problem when an assault force required the support of heavy equipment or when poor weather hindered flying operations. The solution was to combine the LPH’s aircraft and troop-carrying capacity with the well dock found in the LSD. When combined with improved command and control functions, the result was the US Navy’s Tarawa (LHA-1) and Wasp (LHD-1) series of amphibious assault ships, which were ordered from from the late 1960s onwards. Although the Tarawa (LHA-1) marked a quantum leap in capability when she commissioned in May 1976, other fleets were slow to follow the US Navy’s lead. To a large extent, this reflected the fact that few navies had a requirement to deploy amphibious forces on the scale envisaged by the United States. Even fewer had the resources to build and operate ships of this cost and complexity.3 The major European naval powers, principally the United Kingdom and France, had, in any event, renewed their amphibious forces during the course of the 1960s and, consequently, did not have an immediate requirement for additional tonnage.4 The middle ranking fleets – managing even scarcer resources – tended to rely on the acquisition of surplus American tonnage, principally LSDs and LSTs, to provide amphibious capability. However, the US Navy’s LHA/LHD concept did have an
Background Before embarking on a specific consideration of the two European designs, a consideration of the background behind the development of modern amphibious assault ships has some relevance. Whilst the concept of amphibious operations dates back as far as the origins of naval warfare itself, modern amphibious strategy and tactics owe much to the experience of the Second World War. The development of specialised shipping, most notably tank and personnel landing craft but also LSD-type dock landing ships, facilitated the successful conclusion of massive opposed landings against fierce resistance and permitted the prosecution of amphibious operations across thousands of miles of ocean. Neither the Allied landings on D Day nor the United States’ ‘island-hopping’ campaign across the Pacific could have been mounted without the advances in equipment that took place during the wartime years. Despite the successes achieved by wartime amphibious operations, the concept faced an uncertain future in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. The reason for this was the arrival of the atomic bomb, which seemed to make the large offshore concentrations of shipping that were required to support a major landing impractical. This conclusion tended to assume that likely future opponents would be both equipped with and prepared to use nuclear weapons, a development that has – thankfully – not yet come to pass. However, it did lead to consideration of alternative amphibious doctrines, not least the use of the newly developed helicopter to carry out amphibious assaults. The deployment of helicopters allowed troops from widely dispersed ships to be concentrated rapidly 81
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Juan Carlos I during final outfitting. The prominent ski jump is fitted to support the ship’s operation as a secondary aircraft carrier to Príncipe de Asturias. (Conrad Waters)
the stealth technology used in the strategic projection ship design, which is more streamlined than the measures adopted in Mistral and her sisters. It is interesting to note, however, that overall flight deck dimensions are broadly similar due to Navantia continuing the practice adopted in previous Spanish-built carriers of truncating the flight deck forward of a stepped-down quarterdeck. In overall design terms, Juan Carlos I is conceptually similar to her French counterparts. However, there are significant differences in detail. It would seem that many
of these are driven by Spain’s desire to provide their ship with as much operational flexibility as possible, quite likely the result of being unable to field as many capital ships as the larger French fleet. The desire to give the strategic projection ship a secondary aircraft carrier type role certainly seems to have been a major factor, influencing both flight deck arrangements – including the incorporation of a ski jump – as well as the configuration of internal stowage spaces. This was also conceivably an influence in the choice of the propulsion plant, which features an integrated propulsion system that is somewhat more powerful – and more complex – than that fitted to the Mistral. In Juan Carlos I, two 7.7MW Man 16V32/40 diesel generators and a single 20MW GE LM2500 gas tur-
A cutaway illustration of a Juan Carlos I type strategic projection ship loaded out for the amphibious assault ship role. The long upper hangar is split between light vehicle and helicopter stowage, heavier armoured vehicles are stowed on the lower vehicle deck and the well dock has a full complement of landing craft. (Navantia) 88
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Flight Deck 201.9m
32m 12¡ ski jump ramp
after lift
Hangar with Typical Air Complement
Light Vehicle Hangar
Aircraft Hangar
fwd lift
Docking Well with Vehicle Deck Forward with 46 MBTs
vehicle ramps for RO-RO 69.3m
Docking Well with 4 LCM1E + 4 RIB 16.8m
Juan Carlos I has been designed with operational flexibility in mind. The drawings show some of the alternative load-outs possible. stern ramp 16.8m x 11.5m
ramp access to dock
(Drawings © John Jordan, 2010)
bine in split engine rooms forward and aft feed an electricity distribution system, providing sufficient energy for twin 11MW Schottel azimuth pods and all other electrical requirements. The additional power provides the larger Spanish ship with at least a two knot advantage over her French counterparts – useful for front line carrier operations – as well as a greater margin for internal services. Against this, the gas turbine has a greater hunger for fuel and range is slightly more restricted as a result. The emphasis on being able to carry out a flexible range of both aviation-focused and amphibious operations is, however, most evident in the flight deck and hangar arrangements. As well as being fitted with a prominent ski jump for STOVL aircraft, the flight deck of Juan Carlos I is structured to allow the operation of heavy lift helicopters along its entire length. It can therefore simultaneously deploy at least four heavy lift helicopters such as the CH-47 Chinook as an alternative to greater numbers of smaller helicopters, although the V-22 Osprey is limited to a single spot aft. Future-proofing has been achieved by ensuring that the two lifts – one forward of the island and one far aft – are capable of accommodating the next generation of aircraft, most notably the F-35B STOVL version of the Lightning II joint strike fighter. Below decks, the long upper hangar with a total usable area of c.2,050m2 is sub-divided into inter-changeable aircraft and light vehicle storage sections that allow an
emphasis on aviation or transportation capabilities dependent on mission.7 For example, while operating as an aircraft carrier, the whole of the upper hangar deck could be used to support embarked aircraft, allowing up to thirty helicopters and fixed wing aircraft to be stowed.8 For amphibious operations, this situation could be reversed, with much of this upper deck area being used for vehicle storage. Flexibility is also inherent in the lower, heavy cargo deck, which provides a further c.2,375m2 of usable space if the well dock is used as an additional garage. The dock is slightly larger than that seen in the Mistrals and has a broadly similar capacity, including the ability to operate US LCAC hovercraft. Around thirty main battle tanks such as the Spanish Army’s Leopard 2 type can be shipped if the dock is being used operationally. This increases to forty-six if the ship is employed in a pure transportation role. Non-combatant operations such as a disaster relief mission might see a different loading: containers, medical vehicles and space for evacuated civilians. The Spanish Navy quotes a capacity of 144 for the first-mentioned, of which seventy-seven would be stowed in the lower garage and a further sixty-seven in the upper garage adjacent to the hangar. Excellent access and cargo handling arrangements ensure these flexible spaces can be used to maximum effect. In addition to access by means of the well dock, 89
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tioned in literature, actually used air cushion technology and, what’s more, had practically been abandoned. Thanks to Forlanini’s studies, the Italian Regia Marina had, for its part, been aware since the second decade of the century of the nautical and operational limitations inherent to this particular kind of vessel and had not initiated a hydrofoil programme. They did show a moderate interest in hydroplanes during the Great War, thinking it might be possible to use them in the Lagoon of Venice, but even this idea was quickly abandoned.
and owner of one of Britain’s biggest boatyards, presented a design for a motor torpedo boat with a submerged foil. Immediately ordered by the Admiralty, the MTB 109, as it was called, had an estimated top speed of 60 knots in calm seas. It was also considered to be particularly economical, given that the project envisaged the use of just one Rolls Royce Merlin engine. Lacking an automatic control system and completed with no great hurry in September 1944, the MTB 109 turned out to be yet another fiasco in the long and troubled history of hydrofoil vessels. Highly unstable and incapable of exceeding 45.9 knots, it also had an additional problem: it could not launch its 18in torpedoes at a speed of over 25 mph due to problems of trim. Despite the testing, in 1946, of a small German TS class hydrofoil – renamed the Runabout – the Royal Navy decided to abandon hydrofoils entirely, preferring, if anything, to focus on hovercraft. The only exception was a fleeting interest in a couple of commercial models in 1977. But, by all accounts, this too had faded by 1982 without leading to anything.
The Second Generation All the hydrofoils described so far belonged to the socalled surface-piercing, fixed foil or spontaneous stability type. Attached to the hull with simple, robust struts, the foils stabilise the height, pitch and roll of the vessel once the power of the engine unit enables it to acquire the necessary lift. As has been seen, this kind of structure exposes such vessels to the effects of wave motion, which provokes significant variations in lift and vertical acceleration. In 1934 an American professor called Tietjens tried to resolve the problem by using fully submerged foils, the idea being that these would create only minimal interference with the surface of the sea, given that contact would be limited to the support structures or ‘legs’. The float surface would be very small, unless, that is, the waves reached a height (for example, in Force 4 conditions) such that they exerted dynamic stress on the hull or completely submerged the legs. However, this kind of hydrofoil, as it had no inherent stability, required constant jockeying with the foils as any error would result in violent hull slamming. The attempt to instinctively compensate for the hydrodynamic variations of a submerged-foil vessel proved, from the very outset, to be humanly impossible. In 1935, the German engineer Von Schertel devised a system intended to automatically control the incidence of the foils; this was based on a mechanism connected to air pressure sensors mounted on deck, which reduced, on a reaction basis via a system of valves controlled by a pendulum, the effort required to maintain the lift and adjust the height. The experiment in question proved, however, to be an immediate failure and Von Schertel subsequently abandoned it. In France a naval architect of Russian origin, Grunberg Vsevolode Grunberg, worked on a manual control system in the second half of the 1930s. He used three foils, one in the middle and two in the bow, testing several models in the naval basin of St. Cyr, but without any genuinely practical results. His experiments did, however, interest the Americans, prompting him to move across the Atlantic to the NACA6 in Langley in 1939, though his work there was only used in relation to new hydroplane models. Furthermore, in the same period, the American Christopher Hook explored mechanical control mechanisms, using wave detectors connected with a kinematic chain to the foils for regulating the height. However, this method was not deemed worthy of being pursued further, and Tietjens and Hook’s patents were sold, with the blessing of Washington, to Germany in 1940 for what was, all in all, a fairly modest price. In 1939, Sir Maurice Denny, an eminent ship designer
Bussei’s Experiments: Act One By the end of the winter of 1940-41, the Regia Marina had recognised that the prewar predictions regarding the operational difficulties of using her MAS boats in the Strait of Sicily had been all too accurate. Heavy seas prevented their full speed from being exploited and sometimes even forced them to return to or stay in harbour. With a view to solving this specific problem, which was inevitably destined to compromise the effectiveness of the defence system guarding what was a strategically vital stretch of sea (also given the ever diminishing number of modern Spica-class torpedo boats that could be assigned to patrolling those waters from August 1940 onwards), in 1941 Commander Ettore Bussei submitted a revolutionary project of his own to the Ministry of the Navy. Bussei had entered the Regia Accademia Navale in 1913, where he had immediately shown himself to be an exceptional mathematician and a brilliant inventor, with
Ettore Bussei, an exceptional mathematician and a brilliant inventor, had played a key role in the development of the Regia Marina’s fire control computers before turning his attention to the control systems essential to making the hydrofoil a practical proposition. (Courtesy of the author) 104
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Benito Mussolini inspecting the San Giorgio factory, Genoa, in 1937. Engineer Bussei is the third from the right in front of the Italian dictator. (Courtesy of the author)
a particular aptitude for problems associated with gyrostatic systems. He also had a cast-iron faith in his own abilities, as can be seen from the fact that in 1919, when he was still a cadet, he wrote a memoir to the High Command. It was devoted to the physical quantities of weight and power, with correlated characteristics, of what would become the Siluri a Lenta Corsa (‘slow-running torpedo’, otherwise known as ‘maiali’ – literally ‘pigs’). This was ten years before they were actually conceived, in the same dormitories and classrooms, by two later students, Teseo Tesei and Elios Toschi. In order to solve gunnery control problems, a dominant research theme for the Italian Navy since the early 1900s, in 1919 he quite independently designed the gimetro, a device that measured the lateral movements of the target with respect to the ship, calculating the speed of rotation of the target from the variations in the measurements. After being perfected and patented, the new device became, together with the inclinometer, the core of what was to be the Italian Navy’s electromechanical fire control system. In 1925 Bussei was posted to Central Artillery and Armaments Headquarters and then to the Naval Academy. After that, following a period of temporary leave, Bussei took over as head of the fire control systems factory of the San Giorgio company. The success, from the beginning of the 30s, of the ‘G’ fire control calculating machines, which became increasingly efficient and were adopted not only by the Italian Navy but also by various foreign clients such as the Soviet Union, Poland, Argentina and Spain, encouraged Bussei to pursue his studies, and he went on to produce a gyroscopic stabilisation system for the guns of the Regia Marina’s main battleships. Recalled in July 1939 to supervise the fine tuning of gunnery control on board the battleships Littorio and Vittorio Veneto, Bussei was officially assigned to the first of these units. In actual fact from June 1940 he was attached to the High Command in Rome. On 20 April 1942 he was
decorated on the personal initiative of the king, who conferred on him the title of Grande Ufficiale della Corona d’Italia for his scientific contributions. Bussei’s plan for a hydrofoil with a tandem configuration submitted to the High Command in August 1942 (a model of the vessel is on display at the Museo Storico Navale in Venice) was based on a powerful gyroscopic inertial stabilisation system. This governed, by means of rods, the flaps of the foils designed to regulate the ‘flight’ height through an interlocking and independent electrohydraulic servomechanism on the horizontal control planes, thereby controlling problems of equilibrium on the roll and pitch axes. It was essentially the same foil-based anti-roll stabilisation control system patented by Bussei shortly before the war (after the failure of the Sperry device fitted at the beginning of the 1930s on the liner Conte di Savoia) and still used today, for example, on ships built by Fincantieri. In theory the method was designed to ensure dynamic transverse stability (that is, on the roll axis) by varying the incidence of the two segments of the only central lifting surface, while on the ‘tail’ there was a single directional control rudder and an auxiliary flap with a variable incidence, the function of which was to control the longitudinal trim. The height stabilisation system was in turn based on a device sensitive to variations in pressure analogous to the one used for the torpedo guidance hydrostatic plate and which recalled the previously mentioned solution adopted by the Americans in 1939 and which was known in Italy through literature. The device consisted of a large-diameter tube with a hydrostatic diaphragm that had a very sensitive membrane, and a barometric capsule which, via two rods driven by a hydraulic pump controlled by the hydrostatic plate, regulated an equaliser. The latter was linked to the pump/gyroscope unit system by means of an action connected and mediated by the two systems, producing the movements required to trim the foil assembly. For its time the solution proposed by Bussei was 105
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A photo taken during early sea trials in December 1942. (Courtesy of the author)
Bussei on a dinghy performing tests in December 1942. (Courtesy of the author)
and correlated reaction times; furthermore, it had a good level of reliability by virtue of the redundancy of the systems utilised. It was also, like the electromechanical fire control systems of the age (to which it was distantly related), very heavy. The unit was powered by two Isotta Fraschini ASM 183 1,200hp engines of the kind fitted in the MAS boats, equipped with a synchronisation unit to ensure an equal number of propeller revolutions in traction and in thrust and vertical transmission, and double bevel gears that acted on two coaxial twin propellers. The Bussei project, immediately classified as ‘Secret’ and initially known only to Mussolini, Admiral Riccardi (Navy Chief of Staff), General Matteini (Director General of the Central Office of Naval Weapons and Armaments) and General Sigismondi (President of the Ship Projects Committee), was quickly judged to be worthy of evaluation. In the space of a week, the Ministry ordered a series of tests on the gyroscopic system. In the autumn of the same year a dinghy was fitted with a non-inclined (0°) forward foil and a leg-shaped twin foil in the stern. Trials started in December 1942 off the coast of Genoa and continued until March of the following year. The ves-
extremely advanced in comparison to the ones being explored in the same period in the United States, Germany, France and Great Britain. Indeed, as the naval architect and designer Franco Harrauer – who is well known to readers of military history – observed in a letter dated 9 July 2005, it was a ‘stabilisation system similar to the one on the Sparviero, which, however, had electronic sensors’.7 The Bussei design was based on a system of mechanical reaction, and it was precisely for this reason that it was characterised by a considerable distance between the lifting foil and the control foil as a result of the consequent
An artist’s impression of Bussei’s 30-tonne hydrofoil in torpedo-boat configuration. (Franco Harrauer)
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tion of Captain Giovanni Viansino,8 the Navy Chiefs of Staff began carefully to evaluate the entire programme. Finally, on 4 March 1943, they sent a specific memorandum to the Minister, that is to say, Mussolini. The document, uncovered in the archives of the Navy’s History Office and reproduced here in its entirety, outlines the operational philosophy of the new units, which, in truth, were seen more as a kind of assault craft than a torpedo boat as such. SUPERMARINA 4 March 1943 XXI Memorandum no. 8 BUS TORPEDO BOATS One of the characteristics of the BUS torpedo boats is that they can sail in rough seas when ordinary MAS vessels are forced to remain in port and larger torpedo boats, even if they are able to put to sea, have to maintain a very low speed. On the other hand, unlike the MASs and motor torpedo boats, they cannot move silently at low speeds for night-time operations.
The hydrofoil at Genoa in December 1942. (Courtesy of the author)
sel was towed at a speed of up to 12 knots and proved capable, right from the outset, of becoming foilborne. It was also little affected by sea conditions. These results were deemed sufficiently satisfactory to justify placing an immediate order with the OTO shipyards in Livorno, in early spring 1943, for a 3-tonne self-propelled prototype. This was denominated BUS, an acronym for Battello Ultra Sostentato or ‘Ultra Lift Boat’, though there was obviously a clear reference to the designer as well. The unit was basically a model, on a scale of 1:10, of the original BUS 25/A project drawn up in 1942. Designed to be controlled just by a sea pilot, it had a load displacement of 30 tons. The first, small BUS was to have served as a test run for further ‘BUS hydrofoil torpedo boats’. The unit had an anhedral forward surface foil that was proportionally smaller than that of the towed prototype and conceptually very advanced compared to the general state of knowledge regarding the principles of dynamic autostability. The vessel also had a rounded hull. In the meantime Bussei took out a patent for his system, and took out a 25% stake in a newly established company called C.A.P. (Costruzioni Armamenti Progetti). The other three partners, who were all on an equal footing, were San Giorgio, OTO and the Whitehead Torpedo Company in Fiume; the latter had in reality already been under the control of FIAT for some years. While the realisation of the BUS, which was based on apparatus and instruments that were already fully tested and readily available, proceeded apace with the collabora-
As experience has shown that ordinary MAS vessels can only be used on a very limited number of days in the year, and the period in which the motor torpedo boats can operate at peak efficiency is not very great, it might be useful to have a certain number of BUS torpedo boats, which could be used by day in certain areas and in particular circumstances. The BUS is a new vessel resulting from the truly brilliant and arduous solution of a mechanical problem. It is based on a principle already grasped by others, but which has not previously been resolved in practical terms. The new vessel can make a useful contribution in attacking enemy ships mounting operations against our coasts or attempting to force a passage through areas where we intend to deny access. The BUS motorboat does not revolutionise naval warfare, but can be counted on to achieve good results, benefiting in particular from an initial factor of surprise. It would therefore be advantageous to immediately order a certain number of such vessels, for instance 18 or even 24, all together, so that they could be deployed in sufficient numbers to obtain noteworthy results. In-depth examination of the project by technical personnel, who, as always, are rightly suspicious of innovations, offers the assurance that provision has been made for everything and that it is not necessary to go through the preliminary phase of producing an experimental unit, which would double the time required for construction. 2) If and when approved, I reserve the right to present proposals regarding the realisation of the plant (workshops, school) in a suitable place according to the study presented by Commander BUSSEI, conducted, however, on a reduced scale. At the same time, the contractual and economic implications of implementing the programme will be defined.
A model of a 1943 hydrofoil study. (Courtesy of the author) 107
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Outboard profile and plan of Kreml as she appeared in 1868. (Courtesy Yuri Apalkov)
TABLE 3: CHANGES IN ARMAMENT Pervenets Year Gun Deck 1864 24 x 60pdr smoothbores 1867 2 x 8in smoothbores 20 x 60pdr smoothbores 1869 22 x 60pdr smoothbores 1872 2 x 8in rifles 20 x 60pdr smoothbores 1874 12 x 8in rifles 1875 14 x 8in rifles 1877 10 x 8in rifles 2 x 6in rifles 1880 10 x 8in rifles 2 x 6in rifles
1881
10 x 8in rifles 2 x 6in rifles
Ne tron menia Year Gun Deck 1866 15 x 8in rifles 1868 14 x 8in rifles
Upper Deck 2 x 60pdr smoothbores 2 x 60pdr smoothbores 2 x 60pdr smoothbores 1 x 8in rifles 1 x 60pdr smoothbore 2 x 4pdr rifles 2 x 4pdr rifles 1 x 9pdr rifles 4 x 4pdr rifles 2 x 6in rifles 1 x 9in mortar 1 x Engstrem gun 1 x Baranov gun 1 x Palmkrants gun 2 x 6in rifles 1 x 9in mortar 1 x Engstrem gun 1 x Baranov gun 2 x Palmkrants guns 1 x Hotchkiss gun
1873 1874
120
1876 1877
16 x 8in rifles 16 x 8in rifles 1 x 60pdr smoothbore 16 x 8in rifles 12 x 8in rifles
1880
12 x 8in rifles
1881
12 x 8in rifles
1882
12 x 8in rifles 2 x 6in rifles
Upper Deck 2 x 8in rifles 2 x 8in rifles 1 x 60pdr smoothbore 1 x 60pdr smoothbore 2 x 4pdr rifles 4 x 4pdr rifles 4 x 8in rifles 6 x 4pdr rifles 2 x 8in rifles 1 x 9in mortar 6 x 4pdr rifles 1 x Engstrem gun 1 x Palmkrants 2 x 8in rifles 4 x 4pdr rifles 1 x Engstrem gun 2 x 8in rifles 4 x 4pdr rifles 2 x Engstrem guns
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RUSSIA’S FIRST IRONCLADS: PERVENETS, NE TRON MENIA AND KREML
Another photo of Pervenets, probably taken in the 1880s. Note that the mizzen top now seems to have a couple of light guns – probably five-barrelled 37mm Hotchkiss quick-firing guns. (Courtesy Sergei Vinogradov)
Armament
auxiliary boiler for high-pressure steam, which was fitted into an already cramped boiler compartment only with some difficulty. The new arrangements turned out to be more trouble than they were worth, and the steam steering gear and its boiler were removed in early 1883.
Kreml Year 1865 1867 1868
Gun Deck 15 x 60pdr smoothbores 14 x 60pdr smoothbores 2 x 8in rifles 16 x 60pdr smoothbores
1870
6 x 8in rifles
1872
6 x 8in rifles 10 x 60pdr smoothbores
1874
12 x 8in rifles 2 x 60pdr smoothbores 12 x 8in rifles 2 x 60pdr smoothbores
1877
1880
The designed armament of the Pervenets was twenty-six 60pdr (7.72in/196mm) smoothbores, with twenty-four on broadside mountings on the gun deck and two on the upper deck on pivot mountings. However, as was common in the era, the armament of all three ships underwent numerous changes during their careers; these are summarised in Table 3, and the characteristics of the guns are given in Table 4. Such alterations were made during the long winter lay-ups of the ships, while the eastern Baltic was frozen. The replacement of the 60pdr smoothbores by 8in rifles led to a reduction in the number of guns that could be carried on the gun deck because there was insufficient space to handle the bigger guns in the vicinity of the funnel and the engine room hatch. Nevertheless, after their conversion to the 8in guns Pervenets and Ne tron menia seem to have retained all twelve gunports on each side. Kreml, designed with the 8in guns in mind, was built with only eight gunports per side. Starting in the 1870s a variety of small-calibre anti-torpedo-boat guns were installed on the batteries. The 4pdr guns, first fitted in 1874, were mounted above the upper deck on platforms that gave them wide arcs of fire. The Palmkrants and Engstrem guns were of Swedish design, while the Baranov gun was a Russian design developed as a landing gun, but also had a shipboard mounting and could be used as an anti-torpedo-boat gun. Some of these guns were mounted on light platforms that extended over and beyond the ships’ bulwarks, while photographs indi-
Upper Deck 2 x 60pdr smoothbores
2 x 6in rifles 4 x 4pdr rifles 2 x 6in rifles 1 x 60pdr smoothbores 3 x 6in rifles 1 x 9pdr rifles 4 x 4pdr rifles 4 x 8in rifles 6 x 4pdr rifles 2 x 8in rifles 6 x 4pdr rifles 2 x Engstrem 1 x 11.37in mortar
12 x 8in rifles
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The gunports were much reduced in size compared to those of Warrior – 34in high as opposed to 42in, in order to reduce the chance of shot or splinters entering through the ports. This limited the maximum gun elevation to 5°, but this was considered unimportant, since armoured ships had to fight each other at close ranges to have any chance of damaging each other. In the first two ships the sills of the gun ports were 6ft 6in above the waterline at the designed draught of 14ft. In Kreml the height of the sills above the gun deck was raised by 6in compared to her sisters, to better accommodate the larger 8in guns. The ships were fitted with conning towers protected by 4.5in armour. These could communicate with the helm and the engineering spaces by means of voice tubes and an electric telegraph. In Pervenets and Ne tron menia the towers did not have roofs, but Kreml’s had a roof with two square hatches. In 1876-1877 the conning towers were removed from the first two ships (and possibly from Kreml as well), and the main steering position was moved to the wooden platform that also supported some of the light guns. The powder rooms and shell magazines were located in the forward and after holds; they were lined with 2in of teak and the floors were covered with lead. They were equipped for flooding in case of emergency. Ne tron menia and Kreml – but not Pervenets – had 1in plating on the lower deck above these spaces. In addition, on 24
November / 6 December 1865 it was decided to add 0.5in plate over the 0.25in iron deck in Kreml – although it isn’t clear which deck received the additional protection. This was probably in response to the experience of the Danish monitor Rolf Krake’s action with Prussian shore batteries in 1864, where that ship’s lack of protection against plunging fire forced her withdrawal.
Machinery and Trials All three ships had horizontal piston engines; these were less mechanically efficient than those with vertical cylinders, but they possessed one vital advantage: the machinery could be arranged entirely below the waterline, where it was protected from enemy fire. In ironclads, this was a less important consideration, since the ship’s armour provided the protection; but vertical cylinders would have projected up through the gun deck, where as much space as possible was needed to service the guns. The main difficulty with horizontal engines was fitting a reasonable piston stroke into the relatively narrow space afforded by the ship’s beam. The challenge of solving this problem led to a wide variety of configurations, and as a result each of the batteries had a different type of engine. For reasons of economy, refurbished engines from wooden warships were considered for all three of the
A rather moody study of Pervenets. Although difficult to make out against the light background, the ship has apparently just fired some of her port guns – the smoke from them can just be discerned, rolling away from the ship over the surface of the water. (Courtesy Sergei Vinogradov) 124
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RUSSIA’S FIRST IRONCLADS: PERVENETS, NE TRON MENIA AND KREML
A well known bow view of Pervenets, again probably dating from the 1880s. Her bluff hull form and sloped side are particularly evident in this photograph. (Courtesy Sergei Vinogradov)
batteries, but in the end only two of them received reconditioned engines. In all three ships steam was provided by four rectangular fire-tube boilers, those of Kreml originally being intended for the frigate Osliabia. For Pervenets, the use of the engine from the 74-gun ship-of-the-line Konstantin, which had been converted to steam in 1854-1856, was originally proposed. But the costs of the necessary modifications to the machinery and the need to ship it to Britain for installation eventually led the Naval Ministry to order new machinery from Maudslay, Sons and Field, one of the largest British engine-building firms. The new machinery cost 151,349 rubles; it consisted of a three-cylinder, 1,000ihp horizontal return-connecting-rod engine, in which each cylinder drove paired pistons; these passed over the propeller shaft, where a cross-head linked them to a connecting rod that ran back to the crank on the shaft – hence the designation ‘return connecting rod’. This configuration allowed for a relatively long piston stroke, but it was somewhat complex and heavy. The propeller was fourbladed and had a diameter of 10ft 5in. On trials in British waters on 16/28 July 1863 the engines produced 1,067ihp, for a mean speed of 8kts; later trials in the Baltic gave a speed of 8.5kts. Having been rejected for Pervenets, Konstantin’s machinery was installed in Ne tron menia. This engine had been built by Humphrys & Tennant, another of the great
British firms; although details are lacking, it was probably of the horizontal direct-acting type, the company’s speciality. This meant that it had a shorter stroke than the engine in Pervenets, and was subject to greater mechanical stresses; on the other hand, it was lighter and much simpler. Before installation in Ne tron menia, the engine was reconditioned at the Baird Works. On the ship’s first trials on 6/18 July 1865 the machinery generated 1,200ihp for speeds of 7.75 to 8kts on the measured mile. Under steam and sail, with the wind in a favourable quarter, she was able to make 10kts. Kreml’s was the only Russian-built engine installed in the three ships. Originally built for the wooden steam frigate Ilia Muromets by Carr & MacPherson of St. Petersburg, it was a horizontal trunk type constructed on the Penn system, in which the piston was cast with a large hollow trunk, inside of which the connecting rod was attached; the trunk thus carried the connecting rod back and forth along with the piston. Although this type of engine allowed a relatively long piston stroke, it required large cylinders – 83.6in in Kreml’s case. There were two such cylinders, with a piston stroke of 36in; output was 870ihp. The propeller had a diameter of 13ft 6in. Kreml began her acceptance trials on 6/18 October 1866. On the Kronshtadt measured mile the engines generated 913ihp at 70-78.5rpm. Draft was 14ft 5in forward and 15ft 9in aft, and speeds ranged from 8.08 to 8.95kts. Vibration set in at 125
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Tomozuru after conversion. The photo shows her in June 1935 off Maizuru running at full speed (official trial run after conversion). Note the replacement of the original large 12.7cm gunhouses by shielded single 12cm guns (the same type as fitted in the destroyers of the Mutsuki class); note also the reduction in the height of the bridge structure and the mounting of a third 12cm gun in place of the after set of torpedo tubes. (Author’s collection)
superstructure) were also fitted. These data are given by Fukui for the only surviving ship (Hatsukari) and it is not certain if other ships were likewise armed. No reliable data regarding the fitting of hydrophones (suichû chôonki) and sonar (suichû tanshingi) have been
found. In Kaigun Suirai-shi (p.369) it is stated that Otori, Hayabusa, Kiji, and Kari were ‘almost certainly’ fitted with one Type 93 hydrophone array and sonar while it is possible that the remaining four ships received one Type 93 sonar. The Chidori class is missing from table G-8 part B concerning antisubmarine ships, so it is almost certain that no underwater detection gear was fitted. As for radar (dentan tanshingi) the author has been unable to find any information in the Japanese sources consulted.
TABLE 14: WEIGHT DISTRIBUTION OF CHIDORI AFTER MODIFICATION After 1st Refit Official Trial % Condition Hull 215.9 27.6 Fittings 43.4 5.6 Fixed Equipment 20.0 2.6 Consumable Equipment 35.8 4.6 Artillery 74.3 9.5 Torpedoes 70.0 9.0 Electrical 31.5 4.0 Machinery 198.2 25.4 Fuel 78.1 10.0 Reserve feed water 10.4 1.3 Lubrication oil 2.9 0.4 Ballast – Total 780.6 100
After 4th Fleet Incident Official Trial % Condition 221 27.12 40 4.90 20 2.45 36 4.42 52 6.38 30 3.68 29 3.56 198 24.29 78 9.57 10 1.22 3 0.37 98 12.02 815 100
Stability Studies and Experiments As previously stated, the Committee had requested an indepth study using experiments with model ships, and proposed the establishment of particular experimental facilities for stability studies. Stability experiments had previously been performed in the NTRI using the large and small model basins according to need, but after the Tomozuru Incident practical experimentation was regarded as critical, and a model basin to be used full-time for stability tests required. The basin and its associated equipment were completed in 1937 and put into operation immediately. The principal focus was of course the pursuit of the cause of the Tomozuru Incident. The basin was equipped with a wave generator to create waves of various lengths and heights. Its principal dimensions were length 60m, width 12.5m and depth 7.3m. The length of the model ships was usually six to seven metres. They were made of paraffin for short-time experiments, while wooden or metal models were employed for longer-term experiments. Readers interested in this topic should refer to Target Report S-83 (N) ‘Japanese Model Basins’ of the US Naval Technical Mission to Japan.
Sources: Kaigun Zôsen Gijutsu Gaiyô, Vol. 5, p.1184; Toyama, Imai, Takahashi & Ogino: Weight and Centre of Gravity Data for Miscellaneous Warships, Second Correction, Oct 1941. Notes: The author has been unable to discover the existence of detailed documents about the improvement planning (design). As shown in the table the armament weight was reduced from the initial 22.6% to 13.6%. Note in particular the drastic reduction in the weight of the torpedoes and tubes. 164
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THE STRANDING, GROUNDING AND DESTRUCTION OF HMS EFFINGHAM, 1940 The loss of the British cruiser Effingham during the Norwegian Campaign of 1940 was the subject of an official enquiry. Hastily convened and executed under the pressures of war, the latter resulted in a verdict which disappointed the officers held responsible for the ship’s loss. Following extensive research into the event Richard N. J. Wright now feels able to set the record straight.
A
n Admiralty Official Communique of 21 May 1940 stated: ‘The Secretary of the Admiralty regrets to announce that as the result of damage sustained through striking an uncharted rock off the Norwegian coast, HMS Effingham (Captain JM Howson, RN), has become a total loss’. The statement was incorrect, and subsequent speculation about the end of this ship has been both contradictory and misleading. HMS Effingham was the last of the Cavendish class of large light cruisers to be completed for the Royal Navy. Commissioned in 1925 she spent the following years mainly as flagship of the East Indies Station. Eventually
superseded by the more modern 8in gunned ‘County’ class of heavy cruisers, Effingham joined her sisterships in reserve, and would have gone for scrap had it not been for the clouds of a new war looming on the horizon. Raleigh had already been lost, and Vindictive was in the end demilitarised and converted into a Cadet Training Ship, but the other three ships of the class were considered for elaborate reconstructions in order to prolong their active lives. In the event the reconstruction plans were modified and simplified, and only Effingham was so taken in hand before more important war priorities intervened. Effingham went into dockyard hands at Devonport in
HMS Effingham, in reserve, at the Silver Jubilee Review of 1935. (MPL 1226) 165
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HMS Coventry in 1937, one of the first ‘C’ class cruiser AA conversions. (MPL 1169)
least ten miles distant at that stage. ‘At about 1935 (as soon as Svartskj island was clearly defined), course was altered 10 degrees to port to bring the island on the correct bearing of 080 degrees…’ Svartskj would have been at about seven and a half miles at that stage. When Effingham turned back to 080 degrees at about 1942, running on the north (i.e. left hand) side of ‘Svartskj’ at 22 knots there would have been only about six minutes to steady up and check things before starting the turn to 097 degrees; and the left hand edge of Svartskj and its off-lying rocks could already have been overlapped by the right hand edge of St. Terranuken. It seems probable, therefore, that the real cause of the initial stranding was simply a mistaken identification of the left hand edge of Svartskj, St. Terranuken being used instead, coupled with the high speed at which the transit was attempted. Had the alteration of course to 097 degrees using a turning bearing of 97 degrees on the right centre of Sjursholmen Island been accurately executed, Matabele, stationed ahead, would have been about two cables short of Faksen, and all might have been well; but Sjursholmen Island was five miles distant and only 17 degrees on the bow, so that an error of only half a degree in the reading could easily have introduced an error of two cables along the original line of advance – and Matabele actually struck as she turned (see Map C). Of course, the fact that both Effingham and Coventry produced fixes which put them 11⁄2 cables south of Faksen needs to be explained. The details of Effigham’s fix are not known, but it almost certainly incorporated one position line from the left hand edge ahead. Had this been incor-
rectly identified, the resulting mis-plotted position line would have dominated and distorted her fix. Coventry’s fix used the right and left hand edges of Bliksvaer, with Effingham bearing 077 degrees, distance 5.25 cables. But it was only a two-position line fix, and therefore liable to be not too accurate, and in any case it was plotted on the small scale chart, which was all that Coventry had. The position where Effingham sank is usually misrepresented in print, being based on the Faksen shoal. Having been towed and drifted a further two and a half miles to the east, she grounded and was then sunk off Skjoldsh Island in position 67° 16.7’ N, 14° 03.5’ E. Her wreck can be pinpointed amongst the islands in photos taken by aircraft from USS Ranger in 1943. Note on Sources: The principal sources were: ADM 116-4121, ADM 199-485, ADM 53-111871 (Coventry’s Decklog), Captain Howson’s Memoirs, and Commander Spurgeon’s account.
Footnotes: 1.
2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
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Memoirs relating to Service in World War I and World War II of Captain John Montagu Howson, RN, courtesy the Liddell Hart Centre. ADM 199/485 Puffers were small inter-island freight carriers. Admiralty Battle Summary No.17 (1943) ADM 199/485, pp.94-5 Commander Spurgeon’s Account, courtesy the Imperial War Museum – 90/23/1
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WARSHIP NOTES This section comprises a number of short articles and notes, generally highlighting little known aspects of warship history.
A CRUISER FOR CHILE Kenneth Fraser offers a short note on a cruiser design for Chile prepared by John Brown & Co. in the late 1930s. The naval rivalry between Chile and Argentina is well known,1 and one result of it appears in the papers of shipbuilders John Brown & Co, today held at Glasgow University Archives. In March 1937, the company was informed that the Chief of the Chilean Naval Commission in Europe was hoping to order two cruisers to outmatch the Argentinian Almirante Brown class (6800 tons, with the unusual armament of 6 x 7.5in guns), and that he would like something comparable to HMS Exeter. Chile’s existing cruisers were between 39 and 44 years old! In June, the Chileans sent the following specification: – 6 x 8in guns in triple turrets fore and aft – 8 x 4.7in or 12 x 4.1in guns in twin shielded mounts – 8 x 40mm and 4 x 20mm guns in twin mountings – 12 x 7mm single MG – 8 x 21in torpedo tubes in quadruple mountings – catapult, with hangar for four aircraft
In a later supplement it was specified that two of the 4.7in mountings should be located in the superfiring position above the 8in turrets – presumably the rationale for triple main turrets – and that protection should comprise a 51⁄2in-1in belt with 8in-6in turrets, 6in barbettes and an 8in conning tower, all of which seems ambitious for a ship of the tonnage proposed. Deck armour was not mentioned, but the company assumed it to be 2in. A second supplement gives the proposed dimensions as 520ft pp x 58ft x 17ft (similar to Exeter but 20ft shorter, the reduction in length presumably being achieved by confining the main armament to only two turrets), and specifies 72,000shp for a speed of 32 knots. A note, probably supplied by Brown’s, predicted a standard displacement of 8900 tons. At this point in the file, around July 1937, two sketch plans are found. One appears to be Exeter; the other shows two variants of a new design, both employing three twin 8in turrets, with dimensions as stated above, except that the displacement is given as 8400 tons. Design A strongly resembles the Southamptons apart from the main armament: the antiaircraft armament is 8 x 4in guns and the main belt armour is much reduced from the Chilean specification, at 3in (turret armour is not mentioned).
The torpedo tubes are also reduced to triple mountings. Design B removes the transverse fixed catapult and hangar, substituting a trainable catapult abaft the funnels, which are now on the same level, the AA guns being moved forward in consequence. Shortly afterwards, Brown’s were nonplussed to be told by the Admiralty that the London Naval Agreement of 1936 forbade Britain to construct cruisers with an armament greater than 6.1in calibre. Not long after that, Chile was reported to be considering light cruisers, perhaps of the Southampton class. However, it quickly transpired that this design too was out of the question, because the same treaty limited cruisers to 8000 tons. Early in 1938 the Chileans still wanted 8in cruisers, and the file contains correspondence which focuses on the possibility of fulfilling their wish. A further complication was that Chile wished to pay not in hard currency, but in nitrates! Brown’s was naturally unenthusiastic about this proposal. By October, Chile was willing to settle for 8000-ton cruisers (presumably similar to the Fijis), but the following month the Chilean Naval Attaché in London reported that his Government was not yet in a position to ask for tenders for them. The reasons were probably financial, as in
Cruiser for Chile: Design B 1937 HA Fire Control D.C.T auxiliary director aft twin 8in turret
fwd twin 8in turrets crane& catapult twin 4in HA p&s triple 21in TT p&s redrawn by by Johnthe Jordan from (Redrawn by John Jordan from material supplied author) material supplied by the author
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indsight suggests that this period was when the Royal Navy was at perhaps the zenith of its power. It had seen off the challenge of Germany, and now was once more engaged in what it had carried out with such success for much of the previous hundred years: patrolling the seas of the world, keeping an eye on the interests of Britain, of her dominions and of the Commonwealth of Nations. At the same time this is also the fleet of the ‘treaty era’ – the Washington and London naval agreements. While many naval commentators of the time took every opportunity to bemoan the restrictions that the treaties had put in place, the fact of the matter was that the ships shown here – both the older vessels reconstructed or refitted and the new construction built under the treaty limitations – consistently proved themselves to be fit for purpose at the very least, and indeed often rather more so than their apparently superior foreign equivalents. One of the most striking things about many of these pictures is the sheer number of ships present. The 1937 Coronation Review shot is the most impressive in this respect – even this partly assembled (or disassembled) collection contains a similar number of warships to the whole of today’s Royal Navy. The view of Chatham during Navy Week is not dissimilar in this respect, especially when taking into account the ships present but out of view, either behind the camera or moored down river off Sheerness. Yet in the Foreword to the official programme for the event, ‘Bartimeus’ wrote of how even in the seven years
since the first of the Navy Weeks at Chatham the number of ships had noticeably decreased. He went on to suggest that since there had been no corresponding lessening in the Navy’s responsibilities, quality – in ships and men, equipment and training – was having to be improved to make up the shortfall. This all sounds remarkably familiar… Putting together the captions for these photographs has been achieved using a wide variety of sources. Nevertheless, as will become evident, quite a few areas of uncertainty remain. The identities of some ships are tentative only, though hopefully it has been made clear where this is the case. Others remain completely unidentified, as indeed does the location of one of the photographs. A number of dates are also problematical. In the case of the two fleet review photographs a number of the identifications are on the basis that ships occupied their allotted positions according to the official plans of the reviews. However since it is known that this was not always the case, the identities of some of the more distant vessels in particular remain open to question. Warship would therefore be very pleased to hear from any readers who can offer additional information on dates, locations or the identities of ships depicted. (The Assistant Editor would like to thank John Jordan, David Hobbs and the staff of the library at the Historic Dockyard, Chatham, for their help in compiling this feature.)
Chatham Navy Week, 1933 (opposite) Sunday 6 August 1933, a sunlit and busy scene around noon on the second day of Navy Week at Chatham Dockyard. This view is looking east across Basins nos.2 and 3, with the dockside thronged with naval personnel and visitors. The monitor prominent in the foreground is Marshal Soult, at that time Gunnery School and Turret Drill Ship attached to Nore Command, and also tender to HMS Pembroke, the naval barracks. Alongside, largely obscured from view, are the minesweeper Elgin and the fleet tugs St. Just and St. Cyrus. On board the monitor the public were treated, in batches of 35 at a time, to a demonstration, lasting eleven minutes, of loading the 15in guns. The six destroyers alongside the north wall of Basin no.3 are Vanquisher, Versatile, Whirlwind, Crescent, Velox and Comet (interestingly from a variety of different flotillas), while astern of the latter is the cruiser Vindictive, distinguishable by the aircraft hangar forward of the bridge, a left-over from her short period serving as an aircraft carrier and used for trials of the Carey catapult. Through the haze, further destroyers can be seen moored out in the Medway: these must be three out of Scott, Sturdy, Tetrarch, Thracian and Scimitar, all of which were in reserve at Chatham at the time. To the right in Basin no.3 can be seen the bow of the carrier Ark Royal, by that time in reserve. Of the submarines in the foreground, L.53, L.56 and L.69 can all be identified, while the boat inboard of L.56 is probably the brand new, Chatham-built, Swordfish. The official programme listed L.58 instead of L.56, so presumably the latter was a late substitution. All four submarines present were part of the Portsmouth-based 5th Submarine Flotilla. Other ships out of shot but present (and mostly, though not all, open to visitors), were the cruisers York, Curlew, Canterbury and Cardiff, the aircraft carrier Hermes, the destroyer Vesper, minesweepers Albury and Dundalk and, moored down river off Sheerness, the battleship Valiant and the battlecruiser Renown. Canterbury was another ship then in reserve, as was Vindictive. Teas were on sale to the public on board a number of the ships, and other displays included diving in Basin no.2 together with demonstrations of the Davis Submarine Escape Apparatus; 4in gun drill on board Whirlwind and ashore; torpedo and depth charge firing by Comet; a miniature re-enactment of the attack on Zeebrugge; and the exotically named ‘Santa Maria’, a display ‘illustrating Naval Activities in War and Peace’, performed by the officers and men of HMS York. It may well be this latter that is the centre of attention of so many people in this photograph. Navy Weeks were not only an excellent public relations and recruitment exercise, but also an important fund-raiser for the Royal Naval Benevolent Trust, which cared for the dependants of men who had lost their lives while serving. In a noteworthy sign of the times, in 1933 this help was extended to cover former personnel who found themselves unemployed as a result of the Depression. Navy Weeks at Chatham had started in August 1928, and became an annual event until the outbreak of the Second World War. With the return of peace they were reborn as Navy Days in 1948, and continued until 1981. There would have been a final Navy Days the following May, before the Dockyard was closed under the Thatcher government’s defence cuts, but in the event they were cancelled due to the sudden outbreak of the Falklands crisis. With the redevelopment of the dockyard as a commercial port and heritage attraction there was an attempt to resurrect the concept in the late 1990s, but this met with limited success and only lasted for a few years. (Leo van Ginderen collection) 199
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