MARKING THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT
We always knew that the 25th anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement would merit a special issue of An Phoblacht where we would have many of ‘the people in the room’ making a series of contributions about the years leading to the agreement, the negotiations themselves, and the aftermath.
What we publish here is a unique striking addition to contemporary Irish history. There are never before revealed details and analysis on the peace process. It is important for us to give such a wide-ranging Republican commentary as there are many others in political society including the Irish and British governments, as well as the wider for-profit media in Ireland and internationally, who have been sharpening pens and gathering comment for their own GFA events and publications.
It is important to recount here in a considered way the development of the peace process from a Republican viewpoint. It is clear for example that, from the 1980s onwards, it was Republicans who were the dynamic driving the process forward.
The British government had from the Prior Assembly to the futile Brooke/ Mayhew talks locked itself into a pathology of failure. Failure to address the full causes of the conflict in Ireland, and failure to enable a process that could accommodate all of the participants who could create a lasting peace in Ireland.
Political Unionism in Ireland, at times aided by the British Government, stalled and delayed the potential of the peace process to deliver a better future for Ireland, both before and after the GFA was endorsed not just by the majority of political groupings, but overwhelmingly in referenda North and South.
It was Republicans who built the needed cross society coalitions of shared purpose that ultimately delivered the peace process, and who have protected it ever since. This was and continues to be not an easy task.
As An Phoblacht goes to print, it is the anti-democratic destructive forces of political unionism that are once again trying to undermine not just the peace process, but the democratically expressed wishes of the majority of Six-County voters in both the Brexit referendum and last year’s Assembly elections.
We have contributions in this issue from Gerry Adams, Martina Anderson, Lucilita Breathnach, Pat Doherty, Gearóid Ó hEara, Gerry Kelly, Mitchel McLaughlin, Mary Lou McDonald, Mícheál Mac Donncha, Michelle O’Neill, Séanna Walsh, Peadar Whelan, and Pádraic Wilson. Collectively, they bring a message of the power of Republican struggle not just in delivering the Good Friday Agreement but protecting its principles over the last 25 years and building the platform for the next stages in building an Ireland for all. �
What we publish here is a unique striking addition to contemporary Irish history. There are never before revealed details and analysis on the peace process
GOOD FRIDAY 1998
BY GERRY ADAMSIn the 25 years since the Good Friday Agreement, over half a million people have been born in the North. Add to this those who were only children in 1998. So, perhaps a third of our population today has no experience of violence or recollection of the previous decades of conflict, unless their families were personally touched by it. The Good Friday Agreement is the basis for this new dispensation.
The negotiations, which led to the Agreement, started in June 1996. Sinn Féin was excluded. Castle Buildings, on the Stormont estate, was the main venue for these. Later, in September 1997 when Sinn Féin joined the negotiations, negotiators met in a number of locations in bi-lateral or multi-lateral sessions in Dublin Castle, Lancaster House in London, Downing St, Government Buildings in Dublin, and St. Luke’s in Drumcondra - Bertie Ahern’s Dublin Central constituency office.
I didn’t like Castle Buildings. No one did. It was a sick building – cramped, claustrophobic,
with no fresh air. This was especially true in the last week of talks which saw an exhausting round of protracted meetings that lasted all day and late into the evenings. Even when we left Castle Buildings, the conversations continued by phone or in safe houses in West Belfast away from the prying eyes and ears of British intelligence. We hoped.
Early in that last week, Sinn Féin pressed the two governments on how they intended defining consent for Irish unity. This had been a consistent theme for us alongside equality issues. There was no doubt – no equivocation – ‘a majority is always 50% plus one’ we were told. We were also given a commitment by the British Prime Minister that the new constitutional legislation contained in the Agreement would repeal the Government of Ireland Act. This was a key objective of ours.
Senator George Mitchell chaired the talks. His schedule called for a deal to be concluded by midnight on Holy Thursday, 9 April. But as the meetings began that morning, it soon became clear that the unionists were not yet prepared to agree on an Executive or Cabinet structure or to the safeguards nationalists were demanding. The discussions continued through the night.
None of this was made any easier by the refusal of the Ulster Unionist Party to speak to us. David Trimble, the Ulster Unionist Party leader, had entered the talks in September 1997 flanked by the UDA and UVF and declaring that he was not going to negotiate with Sinn Féin. The DUP had absented themselves.
Slowly in the course of the Thursday night, progress was made. Agreement was reached on ensuring that the North/South Ministerial Council would be established through legislation and with Executive powers.
It was also agreed that the Assembly, the North/South Ministerial Council, and the British/Irish Council would all come into effect at the same time in order to reduce any possibility that unionists might succeed in frustrating the birth of any one of the institutions. Gradually bits of the jigsaw came together. By 3am, unionists had agreed to the establishment of an Executive with many of the safeguards we had argued for.
However, the issue of prisoners, as well as the equality agenda, demilitarisation and decommissioning were still unresolved. Martin McGuinness and I spent a lot of time with the Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister.
Earlier on the Thursday evening, Gerry Kelly and several others were dispatched to meet the British Secretary of State Mo Mowlam and officials from the NIO. We wanted the prisoners out within a year. However, two years was our private fall-back position. The Brits wanted three years.
At one point, they presented Gerry with a new paper but refused to allow him to leave the room with it. Gerry told them that that wasn’t acceptable and left. A few minutes later, as he was telling us this, a breathless Mo Mowlam arrived with a copy of the document. She asked Gerry when we wanted the prisoners out. He said, immediately. She said that wasn’t possible. Gerry then remarked that it needed to be within a year. Mowlam went off to reflect on that.
A few hours later, around 1am, President Clinton’s first call came through. Blair had been talking to him, so he knew that we were stuck on the prisoners’ issue. I explained to the President that enormous progress had been made so far but that bringing people on board required early releases.
Gerry Kelly went off to meet with the smaller loyalist parties to see if they would come on board our efforts. He rapped their door and put his head in. The large crowd of men sitting around on chairs and tables were surprised to see him. Gary McMichael of the Ulster Democratic Party (UDA) and David Ervine of the Progressive Unionist Party (UVF) came out into the corridor. Gerry explained the situation. If we both pressed on this issue, we believed we could reduce the timeframe further.
Ervine later told Gerry that they had already agreed with David Trimble a three-year period for prisoners’ release, and they didn’t want to upset Trimble at such a delicate point in the process.
By now, like everyone else, we were all dead tired. Surrounded by sleeping comrades, Martin, myself, Gerry Kelly, and a few others discussed all this. We decided to have another go at Blair. He and Bertie were sitting quietly talking together. Blair told me that Bertie was concerned about winning any future referendum on the Irish constitutional matters. Bertie himself said that Articles 2 and 3 could be a difficult issue for Fianna Fáil. I agreed with him.
Martin asked Blair where he was on the prisoner releases. After a brief but intense discussion, he said he would do it in two years. At the same time, another negotiation, potentially more perilous, was going on. The unionists were trying to secure a procedural linkage
A third of our population today has no experience of violence or recollection of the previous decades of conflict, unless their families were personally touched by it. The Good Friday Agreement is the basis for this new dispensation
We were also given a commitment by the British Prime Minister that the new constitutional legislation contained in the Agreement would repeal the Government of Ireland Act. This was a key objective• David Ervine, Progressive Unionist Party (UVF) • Gary McMichael, Ulster Democratic Party (UDA)
within the agreement between actual decommissioning and holding office in an Executive.
We had consistently warned the governments that any preconditions on our participation in an Executive would be a serious mistake. Martin and I had three meetings with Blair and Ahern in the wee hours of Friday morning. They both knew that we weren’t negotiating for the IRA and that there was no possibility of us signing up to something we couldn’t deliver.
The British agreed that the Agreement should call on all parties to use their influence to achieve decommissioning in the context of the implementation of the overall agreement.
Around 2.30am, President Clinton had a long call with Senator Mitchell who briefed him on where he thought the talks were and how close a deal was. About 5am, President Clinton rang me again
Martin and I went up to see Senator Mitchell. His colleagues were now busy pulling together all the bits and pieces of paper that were to make up the agreement. We told him we were prepared to go to our party with a draft agreement but only if there were no further changes. We told the two governments the same thing.
David Trimble, who had left in the early hours of the morning, returned to learn that a final copy of the agreement would be ready for 11am. All the parties were told that a plenary was scheduled for noon.
In the UUP offices, a much-enlarged Unionist delegation was now going through the agreement clause-by-clause, line-by-line. It wasn’t going down well. The noon deadline came and passed.
Shortly after lunch, a unionist delegation, led by Trimble and Jeffrey Donaldson, went to see Tony Blair. He told them that he would not change the agreement. But we later learned that Blair provided Trimble with a side letter which breached the terms of the agreement. Blair wrote that in his view the effect of the decommissioning section of the agreement meant that the process of decommissioning should begin straight away.
Trimble was looking for a mechanism to exclude Sinn Féin Ministers from the Executive. While refusing to concede this, Blair said that he would keep it under review. This was no part of the agreement. It ran in the face of all our discussions. For some in Trimble’s party, this letter was not enough. Some wanted to walk away.
All this time, we, like everyone else, were sitting around waiting to learn the outcome of the unionists’ deliberations. Periodically, John Hume would drift in or some of us would wander into the Irish government’s rooms to get an update. Someone discovered the bar was open. Siobhán O’Hanlon went off for supplies of coke, bottled water and orange juice. Incidentally, thanks to the efforts of Siobhán and Sue Ramsey, our team was rarely without refreshments, including sandwiches from the kitchen in Government Buildings.
I spoke to Senator Mitchell. “The problem for David Trimble is that he didn’t think you were serious,” the Senator told me. “He expected Sinn Féin to blink first. He expected you to walk out. You haven’t. And he is running out of time.”
Not long after four o’clock, I called our core group together. By now, Jeffrey Donaldson, Arlene Foster, and several others had stormed out of the building.
I suggested to our group that we should press the Irish government to bring matters to a head. I met with senior officials and told them to tell the Taoiseach and British PM that “we are going home soon if
I met with senior officials and told them to tell the Taoiseach and British PM that “we are going home soon if things don’t shape up. Ask them to call the plenary. Otherwise, the Unionists will dither forever”
When it came to David Trimble’s turn, he seemed to hesitate for a split second when Senator Mitchell invited him to speak. He reddened slightly as he used a pencil to stab the microphone button on the table before him. “Yes,” he said• Bertie Ahern, George Mitchell and Tony Blair • US President Bill Clinton • Mo Mowlam, John Hume and Gerry Adams at the inauguration of President Mary McAleese, November 1997
things don’t shape up. Ask them to call the plenary. Otherwise, the unionists will dither forever.”
“Someone needs to put testicles on David Trimble,” another official agreed. The most senior person agreed to speak to Blair and Ahern. We waited. Minutes later, the messenger returned. “Message delivered,” he told us.
Shortly afterwards, we were told that a plenary was set for five. Apparently, David Trimble had phoned the Senator at 4.45pm to tell him the UUP was ready to sign up.
I went up to see the Senator with Martin and we thanked him and Martha Pope who had been a consistent and positive influence through all the deliberations.
When we returned to our office, I pulled our people together. I congratulated them all. A lot of people depended on us in these negotiations. I felt very proud to be part of our effort. Everyone had done their best.
By the time we got to the conference room, it was packed. Additional members of all the parties stood together behind their delegations. There was an air of quiet excitement. Television cameras were allowed in and the plenary was broadcast live. Senator Mitchell invited each of the parties to say whether they supported the Agreement. When it was my turn, I explained that we would have to bring it back to our party. But I said that our delegation would be urging support for the agreement.
When it came to David Trimble’s turn, he seemed to hesitate for a split second when Senator Mitchell invited him to speak. He reddened slightly as he used a pencil to stab the microphone button on the table before him. “Yes,” he said.
There were smiles all round. Even some of the unionists were smiling. When all the leaders had said their piece, the Senator closed the proceedings and there was sustained applause. For a few minutes, everyone milled around shaking hands. Some people were hugging each other. Then, it was outside to talk to the press.
That was 10 April 1998. It is hard to believe that was 25 years ago.
The Good Friday Agreement marked an historic and defining point of change in all our lives. However, George Mitchell got it exactly right when he said that getting the agreement was the easy bit, implementing it would be another matter.
Progress since then has been slow and torturous. There are key elements of the Agreement not yet implemented and currently
there are no functioning institutions as the unionists – now the DUP – try to delay change.
But progress has been made. Not least in the number of people who are alive today who might otherwise have died through conflict.
As its heart, the Good Friday Agreement is about change; political, social, economic, and constitutional. It emerged out of a hesitant cooperative effort by nationalist and republican Ireland to put in place a peace process.
Sinn Féin never pretended the Good Friday Agreement was a settlement. Neither did we pretend that it delivered the Proclamation of 1916. It did however establish, for the first time a peaceful way and a mechanism to end the Union with England. Our experience also reinforced for our leadership the merits (and risks) of negotiations as a means of struggle.
After the Agreement, British and Irish establishments presumed that the SDLP and the UUP would share the main political posts and that the Northern statelet would continue with minimum changes. Of course, that is not what happened. A process of change once started is difficult to stop.
It can be delayed and perhaps temporarily diluted but provided those of us who want maximum change can stay united and strategically focussed, while building our political strength and being resolute but generous, then what some thought to be impossible becomes possible.
So, despite the current difficulties the future looks bright. This is indeed a decade of opportunity.
The Good Friday Agreement has created a democratic and peaceful path to reunification. Our task is to make it happen. �
There are key elements of the Agreement not yet implemented and currently there are no functioning institutions as the unionists – now the DUP – try to delay change
Sinn Féin never pretended the Good Friday Agreement was a settlement. Neither did we pretend that it delivered the Proclamation of 1916. It did however establish, for the first time, a peaceful way and a mechanism to end the union with England• Ulster Unionist Party leader, David Trimble phoned George Mitchell at 4.45pm and told him the UUP was ready to sign up • Jeffrey Donaldson, along with Arlene Foster, and several others stormed out of Stormont before the Agreement had been signed
The ultimate triumph of peace is unity
BY MARY LOU McDONALDTwenty five years ago, an agreement was signed in Belfast that transcended the past and changed the future. The Good Friday Agreement brought an end to three decades of terrible conflict in Ireland. To this day, it stands as an historic, international success story in peace-making - a blueprint for the resolution of even the most intractable of conflicts. The agreement is a testament to what can be achieved when people come together in the spirit of hope to build a better tomorrow.
Resoundingly endorsed by people North and South, it is rightly described as the people’s Agreement. The Agreement and all the good that stems from it belongs to people. That can never be taken for granted. Nor can it be taken away by those who seek to undermine hard won progress for the sake of narrow political interests.
From our vantage point of nearly a quarter of a century of peace, we can say that The Good Friday Agreement transformed our country. The triumph of the agreement is that an entire generation in Ireland – ‘The Good Friday Agreement Generation’ – has grown-up and come of age in a time free of conflict. The Ireland of 2023 is a very different place. If we can agree that the purpose of leadership is always to make things better for our children, the achievement of the Good Friday Agreement shines brightly as the light on the hill.
The architects of the Agreement understood well that peace building is more than ending war but also making a concerted and unified effort to remove the underlying causes of conflict. That reconciliation must be at the very heart of progress. It was this realisation that ensured that the agreement would become a bedrock of and a pathway to a new Ireland for all our peo-
ple, from all communities, traditions, backgrounds, and identities.
Roger Casement once wrote, “A nation is a very complex thing. It never does consist; it never has consisted solely of men of one blood or one single race – it is like a river, rising in the hills with many sources, many converging streams, that become one great stream.”
The genius of the Good Friday Agreement is that it not only provides an authentic accommodation for the multiplicity of identities on our island, but this reality is woven deeply into the fabric of the accord. The right to be Irish, British or both is guaranteed. It is enshrined in the Agreement, but it is also a reality of our shared lives to be embraced and nurtured as a strength while we continue to work together for a better future. None of us have anything to fear from the identity of another. In fact, we have so much to gain. It is through such an embrace that we truly see each other and reach for the living, breathing essence of the Ireland that can be.
At its very core, the Good Friday Agreement is about equality for everyone who calls Ireland home. It has made the advancement of equality for all the driving goals for politics. Equality of opportunity. Equality of education. Equality of aspiration and ambition for every single citizen.
The Agreement has made progress possible. It has made real change possible. Today, a nationalist, republican woman stands elected as the First Minister in a state designed to ensure it could never happen. When Michelle O’Neill
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A nation is a very complex thing. It never does consist; it never has consisted solely of men of one blood or one single race – it is like a river, rising in the hills with many sources, many converging streams, that become one great stream
says she will be a First Minister for all, she means it. Respect for all. This is the only basis upon which power-sharing can truly work and deliver the good government to which people are entitled.
It is regrettable that, since the historic Assembly Election of May 2022, the DUP chose to use the Protocol as pretext to boycott the democratic institutions. We all know the Protocol is necessary to protect Ireland from the sharp edge of the Tory Brexit. We always knew, with good faith and political will, it would be possible to strike a deal. Above all else, the Executive must be up, running and working for all the people of the North. Martin McGuinness made it work. Ian Paisley made it work, and it is through partnership that we can make it work again. This momentum for progress captures the spirit of a generation determined to move on together.
We also know that equality cuts much wider than divisions of the past. Irish Republicans have no interest in simply stitching North to South and carrying on as normal. We are about building an Ireland for all our citizens in all their diversity, including our Traveller community and those who have made this land their home in recent years. Equality must always be the watchword of nation building, and Republicans are first and foremost about the work of building the Irish nation anew.
The ultimate triumph of peace is unity. The Good Friday Agreement provides for Referendums on Irish Unity. I believe that this will happen in the course of the next decade. We are living in the end days of partition. We are living in a time when history will be made by the people. The reunification of Ireland presents the single greatest opportunity to unlock all the potential of our island, to deliver prosperity for all.
The conversation is growing, and a Citizens Assembly is urgently required to prepare for planned, peaceful, and democratic constitutional change.
Changing and Uniting belongs to everyone. Unity referendums can be won and won well, but we will have to reach out, create space for others to come on board, and build alliances right across Irish society. We will have to push the boundaries, surpass expectations and extend ourselves even further. That is what republicans
have always done in the name of peace and progress.
The United Ireland we seek to build is an Ireland of equality and inclusion. An Ireland with strong public services, driven by opportunity and with balanced economic and social development where no region is ever left behind. A nation home that stands as a monument to this era of seismic generational change in Ireland.
The tides of history are with those who seek to unite. Our population is growing to levels not seen since An Gorta Mór. I have no doubt that the power of our young people, from all backgrounds and traditions, will play a special part in unifying Ireland. We also want those who have been forced to emigrate to have the opportunity to come back and build a good future at home, to live their lives in an Ireland changed for the better.
Twenty five years ago, a generation reached for hope and a new way forward. Through the Good Friday Agreement, they wrote a ground-breaking chapter in Ireland’s story. Today, it falls on our generation to write ours. We can be the generation that unites our country and our people. Here, in our time, we can build the nation home. We can realise the promise of a better tomorrow, together and for each other. It is an opportunity we must seize with both hands. �
A shared and better future
BY MICHELLE O’NEILLI was 20 years old and a young mother when the Good Friday Agreement was signed. I remember vividly the sense of hope and optimism that a brighter, more peaceful future was on the horizon.
And from that point I got in behind the politics to help build the peace and as a representative of the Good Friday Agreement generation, I have been working towards that ever since.
It is of course a political accommodation. Through the establishment of the political institutions, the power-sharing Assembly and Executive, and the North-South and East-West bodies, it has helped the process of bringing people together and provided a peaceful alternative to 30 years of conflict.
This was complemented by the demilitarisation of British Army security apparatus and checkpoints and free movement across the whole island which was within the European Union. This transformed the lives of those living and working in the border counties.
While we all remember the GFA and its huge achievements, it is worth reminding ourselves there have been six further political negotiations and agreements since then, all aimed at cementing peace and delivering on the key commitments from the Good Friday Agreement itself.
This has been painstaking work, but quite necessary to ensure commitments made were followed through on.
Fast forward to 2016 and the Tory Brexit was forced upon the people of the North without the consent of the majority who voted in the referendum to remain.
The outworking of that has damaged our power-sharing institutions and created huge political setbacks for our society here.
The hard Brexit pursued by the Tories and championed by the DUP ruptured British-Irish relations causing major political divergence between the governments.
This resulted in London and Dublin losing their ability to act jointly in their stewardship of the Agreement, and the north was
The 'Windsor Framework' deal struck between the EU and British government is a positive development and will help give certainty to local businesses and the economy• First Minister designate Michelle O’Neill and Mary Lou McDonald
then squeezed causing a destabilisation of politics and the economy.
The reliance of the British Tory government on the DUP to keep them in power through the Confidence and Supply arrangement removed any pretence of the ‘rigorous impartiality’ required of them under the Good Friday Agreement.
The fact is that the relationship from London to Dublin under Tory leaders David Cameron, Theresa May, Boris Johnson and Liz Truss became entirely self-serving and unpredictable.
They attempted to undermine the Protocol, which was put in place to prevent a hard border and protect the all-island economy, and in turn undermine the Good Friday Agreement itself.
Given the key role played by the United States in achieving the Good Friday Agreement, the Joe Biden Administration and wider Irish-America has been adamant that despite Brexit, the Good Friday Agreement and peace in Ireland must be preserved, and should it be damaged there is no prospect of a UK-US post-Brexit trade deal.
There is little doubt that the so-called ‘special relationship’ between Washington and London had become strained under successive dysfunctional and chaotic Tory governments.
However, what has fundamentally forced things to change now is the outbreak of war on Ukraine, the global energy crisis and rising cost of inflation and its economic impact, all of which has demanded that allies come together in their national interests.
The new British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak is desperate to undo the damage that his government has done to the British economy.
The reality for the DUP, who have fallen in and out of cosy relationships with the Tories before being quickly dropped, is that power-sharing with Sinn Féin and the other Executive parties is the only show in town.
Direct rule from London is no longer a viable option, and if Stormont was dissolved what would in fact emerge is a British-Irish partnership approach with real input from Dublin.
Brexit has caused a permanent cleavage and divided even British public opinion who see very little of the promised benefits coming through.
The 'Windsor Framework' deal struck between the EU and British government is a positive development and will help give certainty to local businesses and the economy.
Sinn Féin consistently made it clear to British Prime Ministers and the EU Commission President throughout this process that
The reality for the DUP, who have fell in and out of cosy relationships with the Tories before being quickly dropped, is that power-sharing with Sinn Féin and the other Executive parties is the only show in town• The new British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak is desperate to undo the damage that his government has done to the British economy
the fundamental principles we wanted to safeguard were no hard border on the island of Ireland, protecting the Good Friday Agreement, and safeguarding access to the EU single market for the whole island.
People rightly want to see parties working together around the Executive table, delivering for them, focusing on their future and unlocking economic opportunities that make a difference to the lives of everyone. Sinn Féin is committed to that.
Since the collapse of the Assembly in May 2022, the DUP embarked on a blockade of the Assembly and Executive that has only served to punish workers and families who are struggling with the cost-of-living.
It has blocked parties working together to fix the huge challenges in our health service, including tackling waiting lists and hiring more doctors and nurses to take the pressure off our exhausted health and social care workers.
People are now starting to look towards the
future, beyond Brexit. They want a good standard of living, more and better jobs, a firstclass health service and all the benefits of EU membership. The loss of these benefits can only be replaced through reunification.
An unstoppable conversation is taking place right now about the future, and more and more people from all backgrounds and none are starting to look at what that means, and they are helping to shape the conversation.
The debate on reunification has been reframed because of Brexit, and reunification is now seen as a part of a wider process of European integration. Having one par t of the island of Ireland inside the EU and the other outside is not a durable or realistic position.
And the EU have been clear that a reunified Ireland would have automatic entry into the European Union.
I see no contradiction in power-sharing and making politics work for everyone in a
genuine and practical way, and which also takes account of the substantial differences between our continuing, and equally legitimate, political aspirations.
While I am the first nationalist to become First Minister, I do not seek to serve only one section of society.
I intend to be a genuine First Minister for all, irrespective of what tradition you come from, or where your allegiances lie. I will work to reach people where they are with an open hand and I am hopeful that they will respond with an open mind.
A quarter century on from the Good Friday Agreement we must all settle for a shared future. We have spent a century apart. It’s time to work together for the benefit of everyone.
An Phoblacht selects some of the key moments and events that led to the Good Friday Agreement.
1987 TO 1992
THE CHALLENGING STEPS TO THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT
1993
The Hume/Adams talks marked the next substantial milestone in the Peace Process. Those talks and the resulting Irish Peace Initiative broke through the failure of the Brooke/Mayhew talks, which had begun in 1990 and collapsed a year later.
The publication of ‘A Scenario for Peace’ in May 1987, the 1988 Sinn Féin/SDLP talks from January to September, and the February 1992 launch of ‘Towards a Lasting Peace’ were all crucial steps taken by republicans.
In April 1993, Gerry Adams and John Hume said in a joint statement that, “As leaders of our respective parties, we accept that the most pressing issue facing the people of Ireland and Britain today is the question of lasting peace and how it can best be achieved” and that, “Everyone has a solemn duty to change the political climate away from conflict and towards a process of national reconciliation, which sees the peaceful accommodation of the differences between the people of Britain and Ireland and the Irish people themselves”.
In September 1993, the IRA issued a statement welcoming the Hume/Adams Initiative, stating that, “Our Volunteers, our supporters, have a vested interest in seeking a just and lasting peace in Ireland.”
By November 1993, the British Government admitted it had been involved in meetings with Sinn Féin between 1991 and 1993. On 18 December 1993,
On 31 August, the IRA released a statement announcing a cessation of all military operations from midnight. The statement said:
“Recognising the potential of the current situation and in order to enhance the democratic peace process and underline our definitive commitment to its success, the leadership of Óglaigh na hÉireann have decided that as of midnight, Wednesday, 31 August, there will a complete cessation of military operations. All our units have been instructed accordingly.
“At this historic crossroads, the leadership of Óglaigh na hÉireann salutes and commends our volunteers, other activists, our supporters and the political prisoners who have sustained this struggle against all odds for the past 25 years. Your courage, determination and sacrifices have demonstrated that the spirit of freedom and the desire for peace based on a just and lasting settlement cannot be crushed. We remember all those who have died for Irish
1994
freedom and we reiterate our commitment to our republican objectives.
“Our struggle has seen many gains and advances made by nationalists and for the democratic position. We believe that the opportunity to create a just and lasting settlement has been created. We are therefore entering into a new situation in a spirit of determination and confidence: determined that the injustices which created the conflict will be removed and confident in the strength and justice of our struggle to achieve this.
“We note that the Downing Street Declaration is not a solution, nor was it presented as such by its authors. A solution will only be found as a result of inclusive negotiations. Others, not least the British government, have a duty to face up to their responsibilities. It is our desire to significantly contribute to the creation of a climate which will encourage this. We urge everyone to approach this new situation with energy, determination and patience.”
Gerry Adams pledged in conjunction with John Hume and the then Taoiseach Albert Reynolds the party’s total commitment to democratic and peaceful methods of resolving political problems. The three leaders shared an historic handshake on 6 September 1994.
The British removed the broadcasting ban on Sinn Féin following a similar decision in the 26 Counties in February. Sinn Féin held an internal conference in Dublin to discuss developments. The Forum for Peace and Reconciliation opened in Dublin Castle. The Combined Loyalist Military Command announced a cessation in October.
The first official meeting was held between British Government officials and Sinn Féin in December 1994. The government claimed decommissioning was an obstacle to progress, but would not answer Sinn Féin’s questions about demilitarisation. Sinn Féin produced a demilitarisation map, detailing the massive number of British military posts in Ireland.
1995
John Major and John Bruton launched their ‘Framework’ document, which included plans for a Six-County Assembly in February.
In July 1995, Sinn Féin pulled out of talks with the British Government, after the British introduced the issue of decommissioning. The party said the subject had not been on the table when the IRA called their cessation.
Residents of the Lower Ormeau Road were hemmed into their area as the RUC forced an Orange Order march down the road.
The head of the International Body on Decommissioning, former US Senator George Mitchell, invited submissions on arms decommissioning from all parties.
1996
The Mitchell Report was published in January, laying down six principles of non-violence for entry into all-party talks.
Sinn Féin had engaged positively with the International Body on Decommissioning in 1995 and 1996 in an attempt to resolve the impasse. Despite the bad faith of the Major government, Sinn Féin had used all its influence to sustain the first cessation for a full 17 months, until the rejection by Major of the report of the International Body on Decommissioning.
The IRA ended its cessation with the bombing of Canary Wharf in London on 9 February. In a statement, they said, “The cessation presented an historic challenge for everyone, and the IRA commends the leaderships of nationalist Ireland at home and abroad. They rose to the challenge. The British Prime Minister did not.
“Instead of embracing the peace process, the British government acted in bad faith with Mr Major and the Unionist leaders squandering this unprecedented opportunity to resolve the conflict.
“Time and again, over the last 18 months, selfish party political and sectional interests
in the London parliament have been placed before the rights of the people of Ireland.”
In March, Sinn Féin was turned away from a consultative process organised by the two governments. Sinn Féin polled a record vote in May’s Six-County Forum elections. Sinn Féin was subsequently barred from the opening of inter-party talks.
• 1997: More violence on the Garvaghy Road after Orange Order parade brings renewed calls for a proper policing service
1997
May’s Westminster elections put Labour Party leader Tony Blair into 10 Downing Street and returned Gerry Adams and party colleague Martin McGuinness as MPs. In June, Caoimhghín Ó Caoláin was elected TD for Cavan-Monaghan. A Fianna Fáil Progressive Democrats government was formed in the 26 Counties, with Bertie Ahern taking over as Taoiseach.
Blair visited the North and gave the go ahead for exploratory contacts between government officials and Sinn Féin.
A third year of violence on the Garvaghy Road brought a renewed call for a proper policing service in the Six Counties and an end to Orange Order parades being forced through nationalist areas.
On 21 July, the IRA announced its second cessation in three years. Sinn Féin had undertaken a number of political initiatives to bring about this cessation. British Secretary of State Mo Mowlam said she would monitor activity over the following six weeks to decide if Sinn Féin would be admitted to all-party talks scheduled for 15 September.
The IRA statement said:
“After 17 months of cessation in which the British Government and the unionists blocked any possibility of real or inclusive negotiations, we reluctantly abandoned the cessation.
“The IRA is committed to ending British rule in Ireland. It is the root cause of divisions and conflict in our country. We want a permanent peace and therefore we are prepared to enhance the search for a democratic peace settlement through real and inclusive negotiations.”
In August, an international decommissioning body was set up to deal with the weapons issue. Sinn Féin signed up to the Mitchell Principles and entered all party-talks. The Ulster Unionists joined the talks, but the DUP stayed away.
In October, Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness met Blair for the first time at Stormont Castle buildings.
• 1998: Referenda North and South vote overwhelmingly for the Good Friday Agreement
1998
The Good Friday Agreement was signed on 10 April, with Sinn Féin members endorsing it at the party’s Ard Fheis in Dublin on 10 May 1998.
On 22 May, The people of Ireland, in referenda North and South, voted overwhelmingly in favour of the Good Friday Agreement. �
of Kerry
Telling the horrific brutality and murderous campaign against republicans carried out during the Civil War by the authorities of the British-founded state.
ONLY
POSTAGE
Dorothy Macardle’s tense, restrained and true story of how men and women, boys and girls, fought for the freedom and honour of Ireland and of how, despite almost incredible torture and brutality, they refused to admit defeat.
THE JANGLE OF THE KEYS
A STORY OF COURAGEOUS REPUBLICAN WOMEN
Margaret Buckley’s story of the hundreds of women Republican prisoners locked up by the Free State in 1922 and 1923.
Margaret Buckley was a Republican activist, prisoner of war, trade unionist and President of Sinn Féin 1937-1950, the first Irish woman to lead a political party.
MARGARET BUCKLEY'We always knew it would be a battle a day'
Reflecting over the quarter of a century since those momentous days of April 1998 and the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, PEADAR WHELAN, then An Phoblacht’s Northern Editor, wonders at the enormity of what was achieved.
In the North during those years leading up to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, the political landscape was dominated by the Orange Order and its bedfellows in Loyalist paramilitary groups and their demands to march over the rights of national ist citizens in Garvaghy Road, Derry, Ardoyne, and the Ormeau Road in Belfast.
Nationalists were still being targeted by these loyalist gangs, while the unionist political leadership turned a myopic eye to this violence and refused to engage with Sinn Féin, an attitude that was supported by the pro-Unionist governments in London and Dublin.
And while the IRA had reinstated its cessation of military operations in August 1997, in the months after general elections in Ireland and Britain that brought Bertie Ahern and Tony Blair to power, the mood music, as they say, wasn’t good.
Yet, as the parties, under the stewardship of US appointed George Mitchell, gathered in Stormont, there was a curious optimism seeping out from the negotiations.
And this optimism obviously whet the appetite of the international media as truckloads, and I mean truckloads, of journalists set up camp in the car park and forecourt area of Castle Buildings where the talks were being held.
Castle Buildings are the nondescript administration
blocks for the various ‘government’ departments, so these history making talks weren’t taking place in the splendour of Stormont Castle nor the opulent surroundings of Parliament buildings. No, they were filtered down into third class steerage.
On the one or two occasions that I, as Northern Editor, was required to go to Castle Buildings, I was struck by the darkness and functionality of the place. I was also surprised at the lack of any obvious or ‘in your face’ security.
As I drove to Stormont on Good Friday itself with some research material that the Sinn Féin negotiators needed, I was greeted by one of the Sinn Féin administration team and escorted through halls that were dimly lit and even though it was a bright spring day, there was this sense of depression in the soulless corridors.
At this point, the Agreement had actually been signed and photocopied editions were flying about like confetti and, in
time honoured fashion, those with an eye to the occasion and the historical significance of what they were part of were running about, cornering Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness, Bairbre de Brun, Joe Cahill, Francie Molloy, Dodie McGuinness, Gerry Kelly, and anyone else who had the energy to hold a pen for an autograph.
One of the things that struck me was the camp beds which were lying in a corner of one of the suite of rooms the party were using, evidence that people were literally burning the midnight oil in their efforts to thrash out some sort of consensus.
However, the big bizarre moment for me occurred when, out of the blue, Marjorie ‘Mo’ Mowlam strode into the room looking for “Gerry and Martin” who were ensconced with some colleagues working on some media points or whatever and just planked herself in the middle of it all.
Looking back on that time, and particularly remembering the occasion, there was an enormous sense that Sinn Féin
These history making talks weren’t taking place in the splendour of Stormont Castle nor the opulent surroundings of Parliament buildings. No, they were filtered down into third class steerage• An Phoblacht’s Northern Editor, Peadar Whelan on a white line picket calling for respect of Sinn Féin's vote, Andersontown, Belfast, June 1996
had achieved something of political significance, despite the array of anti-republican forces aligned against them, and this became clear in the series of briefings involving activists packed into halls and meetings places across the North.
An example of the opposition the party faced, which was reported during one briefing, was when Sinn Féin tried to solicit SDLP support for the release of prisoners, only for Seamus Mallon to retort snottily “We have no prisoners”!
And these gatherings seemed to underscore the contradiction at the heart of the Agreement, because even though it marked a positive move forward the spectre of Paisley hovering over the newly agreed accord told us that, at its heart, unionism was not for moving.
The 1974 Ulster Workers Council (UWC) strike, instigated by Paisley and other diehard unionists to destroy the Sunningdale Agreement, echoed through the memory banks of those of us old enough to have experienced it. Whatever opportunities for progress the Good Friday Agreement offered were still set against the activities of those who perpetrated the mass killings in Omagh, only months after the accord was agreed.
The Drumcree marching dispute led to the loyalist killing of at least 10 people, not least the Quinn brothers Richard (10), Mark (9) and Jason (8) burned to death in their Ballymoney in July, as well as the killing of solicitor Rosemary Nelson in March 1999.
Of course, underpinning all this was the refusal of David
Trimble’s unionist party to fully embrace the deal and effectively treating the Sinn Féin mandate as ‘second class’, so the assembly, voted for by the Northern electorate only met in fits and starts.
On reflection, there has been a sense of déjà vu with the DUP stonewalling over re-forming the Executive, but as Gerry Adams would say we always knew it would be “a battle a day”. �
Sinn Féin tried to solicit SDLP support for the release of prisoners, only for Seamus Mallon to retort snottily, “We have no prisoners”!• Drumcree marching dispute and the unionist parties refusal to fully embrace the deal lead to loyalist killings not least the three Quinn brothers burned to death in Ballymoney, as the killing of solicitor Rosemary Nelson
MAKING THE IMPOSSIBLE POSSIBLE
Sinn Féin’s MARTINA ANDERSON charts her journey from prison cell to Stormont office as part of the first Sinn Féin Assembly team in 1999.
In November 1998, I was released as a Good Friday Agreement (GFA) political prisoner. An election for members of the Assembly had taken place four months earlier in June ‘98 and Stormont only existed in “Shadow” form.
A few months after my release, in April 1999, I found myself on a journey from Derry to Belfast that had not been part of my post prison dream plan. I was in a car on my way to start my first post-prison job as a Sinn Féin researcher in Parliament Buildings, Stormont – “Stormont”! I shook my head more than once that morning and when I walked into that building, I shook it more!
Every day, Republicans working in Stormont would drive along the Prince of Wales Avenue, past the statue of Carson, park the car next to where Craig is buried, walk into Stormont Parliament Building with Britannia written on the roof on days when there was not one, but two union flags flying and walk past a statue of Craig at the top of the stairs on the way to our offices.
I comforted my resistance knowing that all Republicans who entered Stormont would work as I would, diligently to advance a political process that would lead to an Ireland of Equals. The Assembly was a transitional to something better.
However, initially one could not help but feel like we did not belong. It wasn’t long before I felt that Unionists certainly believed that I and my ilk were in ‘their’ traditional power base. We were once again made to feel unwanted and unwelcome. Unionists even refused to enter the same elevator that we were in and if one stopped and they were already in it, they turned and faced the wall!
In the canteen, Unionists eventually cornered themselves into an apartheid-type sitting area – a section of the canteen where they congregated and became physically, deeply uncomfortable when confident Republicans sat where we wanted, when we wanted.
The only thing that all of that ever did for me was to remove doubts and reinforce “that thought that says you’re right”. I knew Republicans were right to be there – there were no ‘no-go’ areas for us. The days of “a Protestant Parliament for a Protestant People” were well and truly over, done with, gone.
For the first Assembly team of Sinn Féin activists, it was without doubt a steep learning curve. We had to collectively deepen the party’s capacity for assuming government responsibility as we took opportunities to learn the trade of efficient governing arrangements.
Before the GFA, the Six Counties had only six depart-
ments. The new Assembly established ten, along with the GFA Strand-2 all-Ireland Implementation bodies and areas of co-operation.
Sinn Féin secured two ministers, Martin McGuinness was appointed Education Minister and Bairbre de Brún appointed Health Minister. Sinn Féin now needed to ensure cohesion and connect the Sinn Féin Stormont team with the wider party. I was moved from a research role to a new position to help do that.
Whilst our Ministers objected to positions at variance
We were once again made to feel unwanted and unwelcome. Unionists even refused to enter the same elevator that we were in and if one stopped and they were already in it, they turned and faced the wall• Carson statue, on Prince of Wales Avenue, Stormont • (front) Martin McGuinness and Bairbre de Brún; (back) Alex Maskey, Conor Murphy, Gerry Adams and Mitchel McLaughlin on the way to nominate ministers in the Assembly, November 1999
with party policy, our limited political strength at that time rendered it difficult for our ministers to overturn them.
MLAs Conor Murphy, Alex Maskey and I constituted the Sinn Féin Stormont management committee and I admit at times to having both of their heads fried. But we had to be mindful to protect the integrity of our party and protect our core ideas against being compromised by pragmatic realities of ‘realpolitik’.
All of us had to learn about Annual Budgets, Quarterly Monitoring Rounds, Bids, Standing Orders, Private Notice Questions, Legislation, First, Second, and Committee Stages, Amendments, the Assembly Business Committee, the Order Paper, Nil Returns, Written Procedures etc - bureaucratic details that at times challenged us to our outer limits.
Stormont bureaucrats bombarded us with paperwork, documents, rules, procedures, protocol – the details of which we had to know, but which are the yawning but necessary nuts and bolts to get around those who wanted to maintain the status quo which we were out to change. We had to be mindful of the dangers of institutionalisation. I told my husband that I was in more danger of being institutionalised in Stormont than I was in jail.
All Sinn Féin activists in the Assembly, elected and non-elected, had to learn the craft of civil service tactics. We had to remain mindful not to be blinded when civil servants created a row when we insisted on the Sinn Féin approach to issues.
There were senior civil servants who were incensed at Sinn Féin MLAs on scrutiny committees “flouting conventions” demanding earlier draft papers and access to documents; incensed at party MLAs doing their job diligently, scrutinising and ensuring democratic accountability – officialdom objected to questions on matters that they regarded as “the exclusive preserve of the civil service”.
Martin and Bairbre did sterling work. Martin for exam-
ple secured the purchase of the former St. Joseph’s Training Centre in Middletown Co. Armagh and established an all-Ireland Centre of Excellence in the education of children throughout Ireland with Autism.
Bairbre made advances on an all-Ireland Helicopter Emergency Medical Service and created a framework within which an all-Ireland infrastructure for joint programmes in Clinical Cancer Research was developed.
Those moves sowed the seeds of the debate for single issues strategies in Health, Education, Agriculture etc, as opposed to the cost incurred in having two separate health and other systems operating in this small island.
The argument for a planned and prepared process of reintegration towards reunification was accelerated on the back of the Assembly work done by MLAs like Martin, Bairbre, and indeed others, which ultimately resulted in the Sinn Féin Green Paper on Irish Unity.
MLAs in the Assembly linked with TDs and party representatives on the Implementation Bodies, to establish joint working mechanisms that ensured a strategic connection between their shared briefs, these links that have strengthened, deepened and became more joined up over preceding years.
The ‘reality sandwich’ is that without Republicans’ input, the change created and opportunities maximised through republican engagement in the Assembly, Executive, All-Ireland Ministerial Council, and Implementation Bodies, would not have happened and that cannot be underestimated.
The first Sinn Féin Assembly team 25 years ago opened previous untapped and new means by which republican politics were mainstreamed. That team was influential in creating the road map upon which more Republicans in the North and throughout Ireland walked and which ultimately lead to making the impossible, possible – Michele O’Neill, Sinn Féin First Minister in waiting, and the real potential of the first woman Taoiseach – Sinn Féin’s Mary Lou McDonald. �
I told my husband that I was in more danger of being institutionalised in Stormont than I was in jail• In the new Assembly Martin McGuinness was appointed Education Minister and Bairbre de Brún appointed Health Minister
THE LAST STEPS TO THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT
Former Sinn Féin vice president PAT DOHERTY was part of the Sinn Féin negotiating team that concluded the Good Friday Agreement. Here he takes us from the first meetings in Castle Buildings to the long Good Friday that culminated in the historic agreement.
In the aftermath of the restoration of the IRA cessation in 1997, the first meeting between the British Government and the Sinn Féin leadership took place in Castle Buildings, Stormont estate on 13 October 1997. It lasted less than 30 minutes.
On the British Government side were Prime Minister Tony Blair, Mo Mowlan, Paul Murphy, Jonathan Powell, Jonathan Stephens from the Northern Ireland Office, and two note takers. Present from Sinn Féin were Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness, myself, and Siobhan O’Hanlon. There was a table between the two delegations with some flowers and cakes on it.
The meeting opened with a short exchange and Gerry Adams introduced our delegation. Gerry presented Tony Blair with
Gerry presented Tony Blair with a Celtic cross made out of pressed Irish turf, and told Tony Blair that, “This was the last bit of Irish soil we wanted the British Government to own”
a Celtic cross made out of pressed Irish turf, and told Tony Blair that, “This was the last bit of Irish soil we wanted the British Government to own”.
Tony Blair thanked Gerry and said he has heard that, “You have the gift of saying the hard thing softly”, and so the tone was set for all of the numerous meetings that led to the Good Friday Agreement.
During the course of the discussions, Tony Blair told us that he “understood more about history than you think” and then said, “I have read about you guys, about your youth etc, and those from other communities, I will deal with you in good faith but I have to have that back”.
We did not directly respond to the comments, but we had done a bit of reading our-
selves and we were certainly committed to good faith negotiations.
Gerry Adams told the British delegation that, “There was a need for constitutional change and that the British Government have to be the engine for change”. Martin McGuinness told the British delegation that one of the issues was the mindset of the Unionist parties, summed up by the previous leader of the UUP, Jim Molyneaux, who said in relation to the last ceasefire, “That it was the most destabilising thing that had occurred”, adding, “The British Government need to recognize that this is a political problem that needs to be resolved”.
Martin continued stating that “We are sitting in a room with people who will not speak to us and some other parties”. Martin concluded that, “The people of Derry are not interested in an apology for Bloody Sunday, that they want an International Public Inquiry” I added that, “Partition can be ad-
dressed, there is nothing more that the people of Ireland want”.
Tony Blair concluded the meeting by saying, “The political will is there, the only thing I stress again, we would be in an impossible situation is violence began again, subject to that, there will be equality of treatment, we want a settlement which is lasting”.
The Irish Government under the Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, had appointed three senior civil servants to be his leading personnel in the negotiations that led to the Good Friday Agreement. They were Paddy Teahon, Secretary General of the Department of An Taoiseach; Dermot Gallagher, Secretary General of the Department of Foreign Affairs; and Tim Dalton, Secretary General of the Department of Justice. In a recent conversation with my colleague Rita O’Hare, we both agreed that we were blessed with having those able men to work with. Martin Mansergh was also involved as the Taoiseach’s Special Advisor.
It was clear right from the start of the negotiations that there were great tensions within and between the various Unionist parties. At the start of the negotiations under the American Senator George Mitchell, the DUP party walked out at the decision to include Sinn Féin. The UUP Party arrived at the talks flanked by various loyalist parties to bolster their credentials.
Castle Building Stormont estate was the venue for the negotiations, and it was not a
On the morning of Good Friday, all our delegation were given the latest updated draft of the Good Friday Agreement. We were all very tired. Some of us had tried to sleep on available chairs, others like Gerry Kelly had slept on the floor, others again got no sleep
well-constructed building for talks. There seemed to be double swinging doors every 10 yards in all the various corridors. I went through one of those double swing doors one late morning to see two Unionists having a big row at the other swing door. One of the Unionists, a tall man, was very clearly telling the other man that he was nothing but a “jumped up grocer”. He then took a swing at him but missed. Both were elected as MLAs to the first Assembly Election in June 1998.
On another occasion, Mo Mowlan came through the swing door next to the Sinn Féin office wearing an Easter Lily, well pinned on, only to meet Martin McGuinness who, without asking her, took Easter Lily from her asking her did she want a Unionist walk-out.
One of my responsibilities was around the release of republican prisoners and to this end, we were dealing with NIO Officials. These officials did not want prisoners released until they had finished their sentence. We wanted them all out the following
morning. At the end of the negotiations, the Good Friday Agreement set a release date of two years.
Another responsibility was the briefing of the media from time to time and doing many meetings with our base around the development of the negotiations. We also did as many meetings as possible with the other parties that would talk to us.
I found the SDLP particularly arrogant, although John Hume was always pleasant. Seamus Mallon told us on one occasion that the SDLP did not have any prisoners. They also did not have a clear ideological core, hence their current standing in the Six Counties.
Senator George Mitchell was very straightforward in any of the dealings we had with him, telling us on the afternoon of Good Friday, “When you have the numbers, take the vote”.
On the morning of Good Friday, all our delegation were given the latest updated draft of the Good Friday Agreement. We were all very tired. Some of us had tried to sleep on available chairs, others like Gerry Kelly had slept on the floor, others again got no sleep.
Gerry Adams told us all to read the section we were involved in negotiating and then read all of the document. I was sitting beside Francie Molly when he asked me, “How do we judge all of this document?”. I said that if we get if across a certain line, we can find energy and commitment to the many issues in order to push them on.
After an hour or more, we both finished reading and Francie said, “I think we have just crossed the line”. I replied saying, that I thought we had just landed on the line. Our delegation was told that there would be a plenary session of all parties at 12 noon. Of course, it did not happen until much later that evening.
The Agreement was announced that eve-
ning with the hand of history on everyone’s shoulders. Referendums were held North and South in May 1998, being carried in both jurisdictions and then the Assembly Elections were held in June 1998.
I was elected as an MLA for West Tyrone. Unfortunately, the horrendous Omagh bomb exploded on 15 August 1998, with the loss of 28 people and two unborn twins and many, many more were injured.
Even though we had secured an agreement, the Good Friday Agreement, for a new way forward, it was very clear that we had still a lot of political work to do. �
Pat Doherty was Sinn Féin vice-president from 1988 to 2009. He represented West Tyrone as an MP from 2001 to 2017, and as an MLA from 1998 to 2012.
British media must face realities of the Good Friday Agreement
BY ROY GREENSLADEShould anyone doubt that the ‘independent’ British press is willing and able to act on behalf of the British state, then its collective enthusiasm for the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) should surely quieten the doubters.
The London-based newspapers had plenty of form, of course, in supporting successive governments, of whatever stripe, during the 28-year war against Republicans in the north.
But that joint call for a referendum ‘yes’ vote in 1998, by Westminster and Fleet Street, has significant implications for the present. Firstly, it illustrates that the government can, if it sets its mind to it, successfully confront Unionist intransigence. Secondly, it shows how the British media, when properly motivated, can be persuaded to do its government’s bidding.
Before we take those lessons to heart in the current context, let’s consider how those newspapers dealt with the issue at the time. Despite having relatively small sales in Ireland, north and south of the border, most editors did not so much urge Irish people to support the GFA as order them to do so.
In parallel, they sought to convince their readers in England, Wales and Scotland –who were non-voters – that securing acceptance of the Agreement would benefit Britain as a whole. Peace was at hand.
The popularity of Prime Minister Tony Blair, then enjoying a honeymoon period after sweeping to power in a landslide less
than a year before, undoubtedly played a major part in the press’s attitude.
But editorial zeal for the GFA had a much more profound rationale, which the British media dare not admit, neither to themselves nor the public they purported to serve. Here, for once, that elephant-in-the-room cliché is relevant.
Over the course of the war, Britain’s security forces had failed to crush the IRA while Westminster’s attempts to enforce peace on its own terms had failed just as miserably.
Therefore, the Agreement represented what politicians of all parties, and journalists of all persuasions, regarded as the last, best hope for a lasting peace that their previous belligerence had helped to prevent.
Editors were aware that there was, to quote The Times’s apposite understatement, a “sense of distance” between the citizens of Britain and those identifying as British in Ireland’s northern counties. With that in mind, they recognised that they were on safe ground in disregarding loyalist antagonism.
They were also conscious that the buyers of their newspapers were eager for the conflict’s conclusion and there was no chance of them losing readers by taking the government’s side
So, in the days before the poll, in a remarkable sign of unity, papers of the political left, right, and centre, carried the same message. There was not a scintilla of difference between the Labour-supporting Daily Mirror and the Tory-cheerleading Daily Mail
The Daily Express warned: “Don’t reject this bid for peace.” The Sun agreed, running three successive leading articles supporting a ‘yes’ vote. It also devoted a front page to an exclusive article written by US President Bill Clinton, headlined: “Say YES to peace.” The Sunday Times was adamant: “Both sides should grasp this settlement with enthusiasm and move forward on behalf of Ireland, Britain and future generations.”
The Daily Express warned: “Don’t reject this bid for peace.” The Sun agreed, running three successive leading articles supporting a ‘yes’ vote. It also devoted a front page to an exclusive article written by US President Bill Clinton, headlined: “Say YES to peace.”
The Guardian pointed out that “wholly negative” Unionists who opposed the deal offered no “alternative solution to Ulster’s woes”. It cited Joe Cahill’s support for the GFA, “after more than 50 years of struggle”, as a welcome sign of “a genuine shift” by “the republican movement.”
The Times chose a very different revolutionary to make its case, by quoting Antonio Gramsci’s famous statement about the need for optimism, even if it was only “optimism of the will.” Italian Marxist philosophers do not figure too often in Britain’s venerable paper of record. The Daily Mail, without mentioning Gramsci, echoed the sentiment: “It is better to venture in hope than surrender to fear and despair.”
Only the Daily Telegraph registered its reluctance to endorse the Agreement, viewing it in less than positive terms. In its early risible misreading of the situation, it speculated that Gerry Adams would find it difficult to convince Sinn Féin to back the Agreement.
It found much to dislike, such as the early release of prisoners and the mooted disbandment of the RUC, saluting the force’s “loyalty to the United Kingdom”. It was also angry with the Tory opposition, led by William Hague, for supporting the Agreement. “Why”, it asked, “does he not listen to Mrs Thatcher?”
The paper, in contending that the IRA “has been unable to defeat the RUC operationally”, was frustrated that Sinn Féin was “doing well in the battle of the airwaves.” How dare that party succeed in articulating its case so well!
Indeed, one of the notable features of the Telegraph’s hostility to Irish republicanism, shared by several other papers, was that having long demanded that republicans should follow a political rather than a military path, it could not stomach the fact that Sinn Féin proved so adept at the task.
But, after days railing against both the concept and the reality of the Agreement, it grudgingly came into line. Its stablemate, the Sunday Telegraph, reluctantly concluded: “There may be occasions in future when it is right to say ‘No’; but Friday’s referendum is not one of them.”
That leading article, which expressed the views of high Tory right-wingers, carried the headline “faute de mieux”, meaning “for want of a better alternative”. It was, in other words, a lame admission that it, and the naysaying Unionists, had nothing to offer.
Perhaps the most revealing point made by the Telegraph was its statement about having “grave reservations about the peace process.” Quite so. What irked it most was the failure of the “war process”.
It was noticeable that the rest of the English press (for that is what it was, and is) gave short shrift to the Orange Order’s rejection of the Agreement, noting it only in passing. As for the DUP’s leader, Ian Paisley, several papers ignored him altogether.
Then again, they also turned a blind eye to Republicanism’s part in the 700 days of ne-
gotiations which led up to the Good Friday. Instead, papers chose to lionise David Trimble, with The Times referring to his “personal triumph” in persuading so many Unionists to back the Agreement. Fair enough, but personal triumphs from the republican side were entirely overlooked.
Re-reading the newspaper output in spring 1998 is a reminder of deep-seated British exceptionalism. There were several instances of the kind of blind ignorance that, from an Irish perspective, made for painful reading. For example, a Labour MP, and member of the Commons select committee on Northern Ireland, Martin Salter, offered his wisdom to readers of his local evening newspaper.
The people of Ireland, he told them, were “the prisoners of their troubled history”. This has become something of a British mantra since the plantation, if not before, in which the architect of that troubled history is eliminated from the scene.
On the same theme, The Sun told its readers that “a No vote will plunge the province
back into the Dark Ages.” If we obligingly overlook the misuse of “province” and ignore the hyperbole, we cannot disregard the message: unlike Britain, Ireland remains uncivilised, and that is no-one’s fault but its own. History is erased. Britain is not responsible for the creation of an unstable statelet based on religious division.
There were many similar examples, but let us turn away from the myth-making to consider the real import of that moment 25 years ago when a united British press acted as the propaganda arm of Westminster and, even more importantly, when Westminster briefly stopped playing the Orange card.
Ever since the DUP refused to comply with the democratic will of the Six Counties, firstly by scorning the people’s vote against Brexit, secondly by opposing the protocol, and thirdly by defying the people’s wish to see a Stormont assembly, Westminster has let the tail wag the dog.
Rather than act on behalf of the majority, it has allowed the minority to dictate events in the North. As for the press, it has returned to its traditional position – the one it has employed ever since Partition – of turning a blind eye to the political realities of life in a place it laughably insists is part of the United Kingdom.
But should Westminster and its compliant press set their mind to it, as they did over the Good Friday Agreement, they could take on loyalism, could they not? �
Roy Greenslade is a journalist, author and former Professor of Journalism at City, University of LondonThe Sunday Telegraph, reluctantly concluded: “There may be occasions in future when it is right to say ‘No’; but Friday’s referendum is not one of them.”• The agreement represented what politicians and journalists of all persuasions, regarded as the last, best hope for a lasting peace that their previous belligerence had helped to prevent
We have lived in the Good Friday Agreement era
Mícheál Mac Donncha argues that despite the challenges to the Good Friday Agreement over 25 years, it has opened the potential for a path way to a United Ireland.
An era is defined as a long and distinct period of history. Three such eras can be clearly discerned in the history of the Six-County state: from its foundation in 1921 to the outbreak of armed conflict in 1969; the years of armed conflict up to the mid-1990s; and the 25 years since the signing of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.
The last 25 years have been defined politically by that Agreement, the efforts to implement it, the progress, the successes and failures, the stalling, the advances. Underlying all are the principles of equality and inclusivity enshrined in the Agreement. While the Assembly and the Executive have stumbled from crisis to crisis the peace has held firm. Peace and the principles of the Agreement reached on 10 April 1998 have become deeply embedded in the social, economic and cultural life of Ireland.
That this is so, in spite of all efforts to thwart the implementation of the Agreement, is no small achievement. In An Phoblacht on 29 July 1999, Gerry Adams wrote:
“From the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in April 1998 until the UUP prevented the transfer of power and the establishment of the institutions two weeks ago - a period of almost 16 months - the peace process has limped from one unionist-induced crisis to another.”
Months became years and every step along the waythe establishment of an Executive that included Sinn Féin ministers, policing reform, demilitarisation, all-Ireland institutions, Irish language rights and more - Unionist road-blocks were set up, usually supported by the British government. But change happened.
David Trimble was leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, the majority party of unionism, when he endorsed the Agreement. He was rightly credited for doing so, but he failed to fully embrace it and to promote it to his followers
and he never ceased looking over his shoulder at his antiagreement DUP rivals.
The UUP was in continuing crisis and the process of implementing the Agreement paid the price. Then, when the DUP had overtaken the UUP as the main unionist party, they too realised that the Agreement was the only show in town, their only route to political office.
There was a decade of the Executive with DUP First Ministers, beginning with Ian Paisley, and Sinn Féin Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness. Peace was consolidated, the Agreement was firmly in place, but its implementation was slowed to a snail’s pace by the DUP.
The ‘cash for ash’ scandal involving DUP First Minister Arlene Foster was the last straw for Sinn Féin and, in January 2017, Martin McGuiness resigned as Deputy First Minister. His resignation letter is very instructive about how the DUP had behaved since they entered the Executive:
“Over ten difficult and testing years, in the role of Deputy First Minister, I have sought with all my energy and determination to serve all the people of the North and the island of Ireland by making the power-sharing government work.
“Throughout that time, I have worked with successive
Over ten difficult and testing years, in the role of Deputy First Minister, I have sought with all my energy and determination to serve all the people of the north and the island of Ireland by making the power-sharing government work
�
MARTIN McGUINNESS
anphoblacht
return to status quo at Stormont
DUP First Ministers and, while our parties are diametrically opposed ideologically and politically, I have always sought to exercise my responsibilities in good faith and to seek resolutions rather than recrimination. I have worked tirelessly to defend our peace process, to advance the reconciliation of our community and to build a better future for our young people.
“At times, I have stretched and challenged republicans and nationalists in my determination to reach out to our unionist neighbours. It is a source of deep personal frustration that those efforts have not always been reciprocated by unionist leaders. At times, they have been met with outright rejection.
“The equality, mutual respect and all-Ireland approaches enshrined in the Good Friday Agreement have never been fully embraced by the DUP. Apart from the negative attitude to nationalism and to the Irish identity and culture, there has been a shameful disrespect towards many other sections of our community. Women, the LGBT community, and ethnic minorities have all felt this prejudice. And for those who wish to live their lives through the medium of Irish, elements in the DUP have exhibited the most crude and crass bigotry.
“Over this period, successive British governments have undermined the process of change by refusing to honour agreements,
refusing to resolve the issues of the past while imposing austerity and Brexit against the wishes and best interests of people here.”
Just how far the DUP went in acting against the interests of the people they were supposed to represent and against the Agreement was revealed in the Brexit shambles. A majority in the Six Counties voted to remain in the EU. But the DUP had gladly provided its party funds to the Brexit campaign (already over its permitted spending limit in Britain) to lavish on a final advertising splurge in England that helped to get the vote to leave the EU over the line. This left Ireland potentially further divided by Brexit with one part in the EU and one part outside it.
While the Executive was restored in 2020, the DUP was wedded to Brexit and its relationship with the British Tory government. The Executive became a hostage to that fraught DUP-Tory, love-hate relationship.
The DUP thought that Brexit would trump the Good Friday Agreement and they would get their way. They thought the Tories’ love for ‘our precious Union’ would outweigh the British government’s need to get international trade deals and rebuild some form of relationship with the EU. The Protocol, which simply recognises the reality of the island of Ireland and the principles of the Good Friday Agreement, proved that the DUP were wrong. And so in February 2022, the DUP pulled the plug on the Executive yet again.
We now know the outcome of the negotiations between the British government and the EU on the Protocol. One thing is certain. It will not be setting aside the Good Friday Agreement. Under the Agreement, one party is set to have the position of First Minister and that party is Sinn Féin, as a result of its performance in the May 2022 Assembly elections. And under the Agreement also, there is the key provision for a referendum on Irish Unity. Yes, events have moved very slowly over the past 25 years, but the direction of travel is clear.
Will the next era be that of Irish Unity? It is up to us now to make centain that the answer is ‘Yes!’ �
Mícheál Mac Donncha is a Sinn Féin Dublin City Councillor.
The DUP thought that Brexit would trump the Good Friday Agreement and they would get their way
The extraordinary men and women who built the peace
In 2005, former republican prisoner SÉANNA WALSH’S reading of the IRA leadership statement announcing the end of their military campaign was broadcast around the world. Séanna recounts the key steps to that historic day.
How do you even start to try and condense the journey from early 1998 to April 2023 into these few short pages? Looking back now as a Sinn Féin Councillor in Belfast since 2015, I suppose it started in November 1990 with the British putting out feelers to the Republican leadership.
I was back in the H-Blocks of Long Kesh for the third time serving a 22-year sentence. A major topic in conversation among the prisoners was the Peter Brooke comment, "Britain has no selfish strategic or economic interest" in remaining in the six counties.
Until then, our community, our generation, were locked into a mind frame of prisons, of struggle and resistance. Today, we are the preeminent political force in the country, North and South, and it has been one hell of a ride!
During the darker days of the conflict as we struggled to see any light at the end of that very long tunnel, it seemed almost impossible to imagine a pathway that would move us into a new dispensation. We were deep in our trenches both inside and out, and focussed on winning, and emerging on the other side of Britain’s war in Ireland.
As the conflict ground to a stalemate and Thatcher was jettisoned by her Tory Cabinet colleagues, discussions in the prisons began to ask how do you end a war where neither of the protagonists can deliver the decisive blow to bring the enemy to their knees?
The same discussions were ongoing on the outside resulting in the IRA initiative taken in August 1994 to declare a ceasefire and hopefully allow a process of dialogue and communication to open up with the British Government.
As prisoners of the conflict, we expected to be released at some point as part of an
overall peace accord, but we were determined not to allow ourselves to be used as a bargaining chip in any process of negotiations and publicly stated the same. The fate of Republican prisoners has historically been a touchstone issue for our community, but we emphasised that we would not allow the British to play that particular emotional card.
Following the IRA ceasefire, the British Government, led by John Major, squandered the opportunity for progress by supporting unionists and their delaying tactics, which sought to undermine Republican morale. The collapse of the ceasefire in February
1996 and the corresponding response of the IRA did not catch too many of us by surprise. Yet, we understood that the British would come back to the negotiating table sooner rather than later. By that stage, they really didn’t have anywhere else to go.
With the Blair election and subsequent cessation, the gaols were brimming over with hope and expectation. The truce with the British in 1975 had been greeted in the prisons with the giddy enthusiasm of youth and the anticipation of an outright Republican victory, with a march to Belfast City Hall and the erection of the national flag! We expected the British Army and administration
• Republican POWs fate was always a touchstone issue for their community, but they would not allow the British to play that particular emotional card
Today, we are the preeminent political force in the country, north and south, and it has been one hell of a ride!
to withdraw from the north of Ireland within months. This time round, we were much more sanguine.
We initiated an intense period of discussions across the Blocks, the hopes and concerns for the future, the inevitable distrust of British Government bona fides when in any negotiations, our worries that what was deemed a ‘Peace Process’ would turn out to be none other than a ‘Pacification Process’ and much more were all discussed.
However, there was a general confidence and support that with the talks process we could take a massive stride forward towards our goal of an independent Ireland. We understood that the internationalisation of the process, with the involvement and influence of the US, the Irish American diaspora and Clinton administration, along with the new government of South Africa and support from Europe would create a dynamic that had been absent in previous peace process negotiations.
As prisoners, we were conscious of the level of trust and influence we had within the republican community. We understood that we had a role to play in reassuring our families and friends that the decision to move beyond armed struggle could see an end to British Government interference in Irish affairs, though it was not inevitable.
We also began to discuss something that had until now been almost a dirty word, ‘compromise.’ What did it mean? What would it mean for our struggle? The ‘absolutes’ that had ensured we remained steadfast in the
face of all the British could throw at us were teased out, stripped down and elements of what we could countenance, and more importantly what we couldn’t were all discussed.
A series of meetings were organised which would have been unimaginable just a few months previously. The Sinn Féin leadership team, including some of the senior negotiators, were given access to the gaols.
We were bussed down to the prison gymnasium, and we had the opportunity to listen to and debate with Martin McGuinness, Gerry Kelly, Dodie McGuinness, and Siobhán O’Hanlon as they recounted the various engagements with British and Irish Governments, unionists, and some of the international actors involved in the early days of the negotiations process.
I suppose the most mind-blowing event came in April 1998 when Nelson Mandela dispatched a team of his personal negotiating team, the activists who had helped tear down the apartheid regime in South Africa, to come into Long Kesh to relate how they had moved from armed struggle to government.
The team included Cyril Ramaphosa and Mathews Phosa. (I learned later that Mac Maharaj and others undertook a similar engagement with comrades on the outside.)
To describe these as ‘Confidence Building Measures’ was understatement. We were in no doubt that we were on the right road and that we could help build a political wave that
could sweep us into power, North and South, and hasten the end of Partition.
In May 1998, a team of Republican prisoners were released on parole from Long Kesh and Maghaberry Women’s Gaol, as well as the Balcombe Street men from Portlaoise, all with special dispensation to attend the Sinn Féin Ard Fheis in the RDS in Dublin.
As it turned out, this was a massive endorsement by the Republican activist family for the strategy as laid out by the Ard Chomhairle. There were also a whole series of international voices to add to the chorus of Rita O’Hare, Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness, and Joe Cahill.
Following the end of the negotiations at Castle Buildings, the resulting referendum was supported North and South, and the various institutions and all-Ireland bodies were put in place.
Then started the changes which witnessed the end of the RUC, despite their political allies’ vociferous opposition, the establishment of the Parades’ Commission, the release of prisoners and the reshaping of the judicial
The British Government, led by John Major, squandered the opportunity for progress by supporting unionists and their delaying tactics, which sought to undermine Republican morale• STRATEGY GETS MASSIVE ENDORSEMENT (clockwise from above) Martin McGuinness, Rita O’Hare and Gerry Adams; the Balcombe Street men Hugh Doherty, Harry Duggan, Eddie Butler and Joe O'Connell entering the 1998 Sinn Féin Ard Fheis; Joe Cahill
system all added to the sense of grievance at the passing of the Orange State. Each and every one of these major reforms and changes were opposed by political unionism, but were overseen by international actors and people of note.
With my own release from Long Kesh in September 1998, I determined to play my own very small part in the consolidation of the peace and to bring whatever reassurance I could to the wider Republican family. Along with a team of former prisoners and comrades, we were tasked with touring different parts of the country, engaging with activists and families, our wider membership and the families of our fallen comrades. There was a lot of challenging debate, of sometimes tearful encounters but all in all guarded support for the strategy.
One aspect of the strategy which proved particularly difficult for activists and families to grasp was in and around the various initiatives that the Republican leadership would take.
A lot of our people at times sought and expected a ‘quid pro quo’ scenario, that when an initiative was taken which stretched our base this would be reciprocated by the British and/or unionism. Of course, it wasn’t like that, and the decision to make a move was never predicated upon what the opposition would do in response, instead it was focussed on pushing the whole process forward. Otherwise, you would become a hostage to your opponents’ strategy.
It was on this basis that I was approached by a comrade and asked to consider putting myself in the public eye, to read a statement to the world from the IRA leadership. They had determined that the time was right to announce an end to the military campaign
against British interference in this part of Ireland and call for involvement in the various projects to help build the ‘New Republic’ and defend the integrity of the resistance struggle.
I have to admit to being gobsmacked by this request. I felt very honoured and humbled to be asked. I have a wife, Sinéad, a formidable Republican activist in her own right and three daughters so I decided that I would need to talk it over with them before agree-
ing to anything. I understood that they would have to live with the consequences of my actions, every bit as much as myself. They encouraged me to go ahead, and I agreed.
At the time, I was working with the party as the talks process and negotiations trundled along. But I excused myself that day and headed up to the Roddy McCorley gardens where I met with the cameraman and after several attempts (the occasion did get to me) managed to complete an acceptable
We also began to discuss something that had until now been almost a dirty word, ‘compromise.’ What did it mean? What would it mean for our struggle?• Peter Brooke • Margaret Thatcher • John Major • Séanna Walsh reading out the IRA statement in 2005
recording of the IRA leadership statement. I then went back to work.
There were negotiations ongoing at Hillsborough Castle the next day. The IRA leader-
ship statement was to be released at midday. While in Sinn Féin offices on the Falls Road, I received a phone call to access a certain negotiations document and to bring it to the
team in Hillsborough. “Are you sure you want me to deliver it at this time? You watching the news?” I queried. “Of course, catch yourself on, c’mon up, asap. We need that paper now, it’s crucial.”
So off I went, I drove into Hillsborough as the story was breaking about the video statement. I walked into our designated negotiations room, explained to the team about the news and left again hurriedly. I returned to the Falls Road where I kept a low profile for a few days.
I have to say that although from time to time at passport security I may experience a second glance and at times a short delay in processing, I have never encountered any extra hostility as I’ve visited countries across the world. More importantly to me, neither have any of my family.
One of the reasons that I felt that it was the right thing to do, to go on camera for the world to see, was the need to portray those of us who volunteered and were active in the IRA as ordinary men and women in a very extraordinary situation. It was also to emphasise that when a credible alternative to armed resistance presented itself, then we were up for that transition.
And so, it came to pass. �
Séanna Walsh is a Sinn Féin councillor and lifelong Republican activist
The time was right to announce an end to the military campaign against British interference in this part of Ireland and call for involvement in the various projects to help build the ‘New Republic’ and defend the integrity of the resistance struggle• Republican POWs were released as part of the Good Friday Agreement
SINN FÉIN BUILDING AN IRISH PEACE PROCESS
In 1998, MITCHEL McLAUGHLIN was Sinn Féin’s National Chairperson. Here he outlines the road map to the Good Friday Agreement
Prior to the joint referendums to ratify the Good Friday Agreement, the 1918 General Election was the last occasion when all Irish voters as one exercised their franchise, i.e. Self-Determination. Sinn Féin, with a political programme demanding complete independence, won that election with 69.5% of the vote. The democratically elected representatives of the Irish people formed Dáil Eireann and, on 21 January 1919, enacted the Declaration of Independence and Democratic Programme.
This democratic government mandated by the Irish electorate was subsequently supressed in September 1919 by the British Government and enforced by a British Army garrison of 30,000 troops.
The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1922, which created Partition of Ireland, was imposed on the Irish people under the threat of “immediate and terrible war”. The consequence of British policy in Ire-
land was sectarian conflict, social and economic discrimination, Unionist hegemony in the North, and complacent indifference in the South combining to create “a carnival of reaction, both North and South”, as forecast by James Connolly.
Today, the Good Friday Agreement is regarded globally as one of the most successful peace processes of the modern era. However, what is generally not recognised is that the momentum for a viable peace process and subsequent political developments emerged from the agonising sacrifice of the hunger strikes of 1980 and 1981 and the massive and widespread mobilisations which emerged in Ireland, England and internationally to support the prisoners and their families.
The hunger strikes were the culmination of five years of protest by republican prisoners in the North. The protest began in 1976, when the British government withdrew Special Category Status which recognised the political motivation of the prisoners.
The dispute intensified into a no-wash protest, because of savage beatings by prison officers as the prisoners attempted to use the showers and toilet blocks. The protest was dramatically
escalated when republican prisoners in Armagh Women’s Prison joined the protest.
Of particular significance, although rarely referred to in the media, this ‘broad front’ of mainly nationalist citizens were content to accept the leadership of Sinn Féin in these marches and protests.
The hunger strikes attracted widespread support in Ireland as well as raising international awareness of British policy in Ireland. When Bobby Sands was elected a Member of Parliament during the strike, it prompted media headlines from around the world. In addition, two other prisoners, Kieran Doherty and Paddy Agnew, were elected to Leinster House in the 1981 General Election.
Tragically, ten prisoners were to die on hunger strike which ended only after several families stated that they would request
What is generally not recognised is that the momentum for a viable peace process and subsequent political developments emerged from the agonising sacrifice of the hunger strikes of 1980 and 1981• Mitchel McLaughlin and Larry O'Toole speaking in UCD, Dublin, April 1994
medical intervention in the event of a hunger-striker lapsing into unconsciousness.
At a terrible cost, the prisoners had won their demands. The tactic of electoral intervention had dramatically exposed the cruelty of British policy in Ireland and had demolished the propaganda claim of little or no popular support for Irish Republicanism.
British intransigence had further radicalised Irish nationalist politics and ironically became a driving force that enabled Sinn Féin to become a mainstream political party.
Throughout the 1980s, Sinn Féin continued to expand and recruit new members. A long-standing policy was amended at the 1986 Ard Fheis to permit Sinn Féin candidates to take seats in Leinster House.
During this phase of growing influence and strength, the
leadership of Sinn Féin adopted the slogan “Freedom, Justice & Peace” in 1983 as a clear signal that a new chapter for politics in Ireland was about to emerge.
These developments were an early manifestation of the growing internal debate about a strategy for achieving national self-determination through a broad-based and inclusive process of building popular support for republican goals through electoral growth and campaigning on social and economic issues.
The Hillsborugh Treaty and several subsequent London and Dublin ‘Peace’ initiatives were deployed to attempt to frustrate this progress, but they all failed, primarily because they were designed by slow learners, who had no commitment to the concept of self-determination in Ireland.
This fault line was effectively challenged by Sinn Féin in elections, in direct face to face discussions and in the ‘Scenario for
Peace’ (1987) and ‘Towards A Lasting Peace in Ireland’ (1992) publications.
In briefing party activists and tasking them to deliver the agreed objectives of our peace strategy, Sinn Féin pointed out that our opponents could live with the status quo, but Republicans could not and must provide the dynamic for change. We
cannot do otherwise because our project is to re-establish a sovereign republic. We need a clear focus on our aims and objectives and on the strategies to succeed.
The people of Ireland are sovereign and their right to self-determine is now universally recognised. Even the British Govern-
ment has accepted this in the Downing Street Declaration (1993) and in the Good Friday Agreement (1998).
As the largest party in Ireland, Sinn Féin can speak with an authoritative mandate which demands constitutional change. However, there are many different opinions which must also be heard and to share the benefits of inclusivity and equality.
Sinn Féin has demanded the establishment of a Citizens Assembly, sufficiently resourced and supported by expert panels, which is tasked to examine those issues which must be reported to and debated by the people of Ireland, including those of the British tradition in Ireland.
Sinn Féin will need to build alliances with whomever we can, even with former opponents. And when a date is finally announced for a Referendum for an Agreed Ireland, we must be prepared for success. �
Mitchel McLaughlin is an honorary Professor in Peace Studies at Queens University Belfast. He was Speaker of the Northern Assembly, an MLA for Foyle and then South Antrim and Sinn Fein’s National Chairperson.
As the largest party in Ireland, Sinn Féin can speak with an authoritative mandate which demands constitutional change
•The
strategy for achieving national self-determination through a broad-based and inclusive process was brought about by elections, in direct face to face discussions and important publications• Mitchel McLaughlin giving Sinn Féin's view oustside the Stormont Buildings, April 1998
History in the Making
PÁDRAIC WILSON was the Officer Commanding Republican Prisoners in the H-Blocks from 1996 to 1999. Here he writes of the key events within the prisons in the months before and after the Good Friday Agreement.
Following the election of the Labour Government in May and the renewal of the IRA cessation of military operations in July 1997 there were indications that a more progressive approach in relation to prisoners was being rolled out.
This was in stark contrast to the response of the Tory Government to the cessation of August 1994, which had not given much cause for optimism overall never mind in relation to prisoners.
Requests to allow delegations into the prisons had been refused. Instead ‘special’ visits were offered in the general visiting area. On 24 July, just over a week after the IRA renewed its ceasefire, a Sinn Féin delegation was given clearance to go into Maghaberry and meet with the eight republican women POWs.
On 18 September a Sinn Féin delegation, led by Martin McGuinness, was allowed into the prison gym at the H Blocks to meet with 40 men from H3, H4 and H8. That afternoon the same delegation visited the eight women in Maghaberry.
Those engagements, although constrained by security and confidentiality concerns, still provided us prisoners with the opportunity to engage directly with
resolved as part of a wider agreement. We had our own concerns and at times doubts but we trusted those who had the responsibility to give leadership and to take decisions on our behalf.
We tried our bit to ensure that the issue of prisoners remained on the agenda. In March 1997 a planned mass escape from H7 had been thwarted when a tunnel was discovered. In December 1997, just before the first Sinn Féin delegation travelled to Downing Street to meet Tony Blair, a plan to achieve the escape of Liam Averill from the H Blocks was successfully executed.
In January 1998 it was announced that British Secretary of State, Mo Mowlam, was to meet with loyalist prisoners who were threatening to withdraw their support for the talks process. I was asked by the media, who had been given access to the prison in advance of her visit, if we would meet with her.
I explained that we had not received notification of a meeting and that in any case the meetings that really mattered were with those who represented our interests on the outside. Some of the journalists were almost incredulous of the suggestion that we might not meet her. I made it clear, that out of courtesy, we would meet her or anyone else who came in to the H Blocks. However, unlike loyalism, in the real world the tail did not wag the dog. As it turned out she did ask to meet us the next day.
When the GFA was finally signed on the afternoon of 10 April the issue of prisoner releases was part of the Agreement. There was an air of expectation and excitement amongst prisoners, families and supporters. There was also a caution, given previous experiences.
those at the heart of the negotiations and afforded leadership the chance to hear our views and concerns.
Listening to Martin and the other Sinn Féin representatives I think it’s fair to say that many of the prisoners were surprised at just how tuned in to events they themselves were. It was important for us to make it clear that as political prisoners we were not a bargaining tool. The issue of prisoners could only be
On 29 April arrangements were made for another delegation to come into the H Blocks. This delegation was to be different in a number of ways. 120 men from the H Blocks would be joined by our eight women comrades from Maghaberry. The delegation was to include Sinn Féin representatives and representatives from the ANC, the Government Party in South Africa. Gerry Kelly, Alex Maskey, Siobhán O’Hanlon, Sue Ramsey, Bik Mc Farlane and Mary Mc Ardle, made up the Sinn Féin delegation. They were accompanied by
It was important for us to make it clear that as political prisoners we were not a bargaining tool. The issue of prisoners could only be resolved as part of a wider agreement
•A tunnel escape from H7
was thwarted, but Liam Averill's escape was successfull• Protest calling for the release of Irish POWs; (left) British Secretary of State, Mo Mowlam
its chief negotiator along with his comrade Matthews Phosa, ANC Regional Premier of the Eastern Transvaal.
Both Cyril and Matthews spoke about the importance of engaging with their own people during the negotiations between the ANC and the apartheid regime in South Africa.
During their time in Ireland, they had engaged
with Republicans who had voiced concerns and reservations. Such doubts were natural. The pathway to making peace like waging struggle was paved with uncertainties.
Cyril spoke of the strong solidarity, comradeship and respect that existed between the ANC and Irish Republicans. Ramaphosa highlighted the role played by former prisoners in the South African context and urged us, upon release, to work within our communities to help people understand and become involved in the peace process. The most important negotiation would be with our own people.
Before departing the delegation shook hands and exchanged greetings with each of the POWs. There was a great feeling of comradeship and warmth in what was normally a cold and uninviting prison building. In the months ahead, many of the 128 prisoners
and the six Sinn Féin representatives gathered in the prison gym on that day went on to play key roles in the developing peace process and related negotiations.
Three of the women were elected as MLAs. One of them served as a junior minister and was later elected as an MEP. Four of the men were elected as MLAs. One of them served as a junior minister and as a member of the Policing Board. Another was elected Mayor of Belfast and later elected Speaker of the Assembly. Others were elected as Sinn Féin councillors to various Councils across the Six Counties.
Many others went on to give leadership, help develop party capacity and build political strength at local and national levels. We didn’t feel a hand on our shoulders but we did feel that we were a part of history in the making. �
Ramaphosa highlighted the role played by former prisoners in the South African context and urged us, upon release, to work within our communities to help people understand and become involved in the peace process• Sinn Féin representatives and representatives from the ANC before the 29 April 1998 meeting; (right) breifing prinsoners relatives and support groups • Matthews Phosa and Martin McGuinness • Gerry Kelly and Cyril Ramaphosa
na Poblachta: Ag fáil faoi réir do Chomhaontú Aoine an Chéasta
LE LUCILITA BHREATHNACH
I ndiaidh don pháirtí an polasaí i leith staonadh ón Oireachtas a thiontú ag Ard Fheis Shinn Féin i 1986 toghadh mé ó úrlár na hArd Fheise i 1987 mar Ard Rúnaí ar Shinn Féin.
Thosaigh an páirtí ag athrú le príosúnaigh ag teacht amach ó bheith faoi ghlas i ngéibheann agus díospóireacht dhifriúil ar an ngá a bheith bainteach le polaitíocht in sna 26 Chontae. Bhí an choimhlint fós ar siúl in sna Sé Chontae agus an páirtí faoi chois in Éirinn.
Theastaigh uaim tabhairt faoi níos mó a dhéanamh chun dul chun cinn i saol an phobail Thuaidh agus
Theas chomh maith le ceachtanna a d’fhoghlaim muid faoi phríomhshruthú le h-eagrais agus daoine aonair ar ábhair a chur i bhfeidhm mar a déanadh i gcaitheamh na mblianta crua sin i rith na stailce ocrais in Ard Mhacha agus sna Blocanna H. Go dtí sin bhí beirt Ard Rúnaí ann ach athraíodh an nós sin agus duine amháin a bhí ann as sin amach. Lonnaithe in Ard Oifig agus ag taisteal ó cheann ceann na tíre a bhí romham agus mé pósta le beirt pháiste óg i mBaile Breac i gContae Bhaile Átha Cliath.
Oibríonn muid mar mheitheal agus tá tú chomh maith leis na foirne ina bhfuil tú ag obair.
In 1987 d’fhoilsigh muid ‘Scenario for Peace’ ‘Building a Permanent Peace in Ireland.’ I lár an phróisis síochána seo bhí muid ag cur éileamh ón phobal le deireadh a chur leis an gcoimhlint, tús a chur le comhráití síochána polaitiúla agus féin-rialú náisiúnta a chur i gcrích.
Bhíos ar an Ard Comhairle ó 1987 go dtí 2002/3 nuair a sheas mé síos.
Bheinn ag oibriú le cinnirí rannóga an pháirtí go náisiúnta ag cabhrú nuair ab fhéidir. Bheinn ar an gCoiste Seasta a bhuail go seachtainiúil ag déanamh cinnidh ar ábhair an lae. Ní raibh na h-achmhainní atá againn anois ann an tráth sin; cúpla duine ag obair go deonach a bhíomar agus ní raibh ríomhairí ná fóin phóca le teagmháil a dhéanamh.
In sna hochtóidí scríobhadh cuid mhaith páipéir straitéise agus taicticí don todhchaí agus eagraíodh comhdháil i gCarraig Art i nDún na nGall le díospóireacht inmheánach a chothú idir cinnirí náisiúnta agus réigiúnacha.
Bhí daoine ag fáil bháis ó lá go lá agus ualach mhór ar iarrachtaí theacht ar réiteach. Ní raibh rialtas Shasana ná Aontachtóirí ná rialtas na hÉireann ag caint linn. Bhí cinnsireacht i bhfeidhm.
I dtreo• Martin McGuinness, Lucilita Bhreathnach agus Gerry Adams ag preas-ócáid i mBaile Átha Cliath, Meán Fómhair 1994
I 1992 d’fhoilsigh muid cáipéis a d’imigh chuig an Ard Fheis le plé a dhéanamh ar ‘I dTreo Síochán Buan' 'Towards a Lasting Peace’. Chuireamar an cháipéis seo chuig na páirtithe ar fad taobh seo tíre ag lorg seans len é a phlé leo agus cuireadh chuig leabharlanna is Ollscoileanna í freisin. Bhí an cháipéis ag iarraidh comhdhearcadh a thógáil in Éirinn i gcóir socrú a fháil ar choinníollacha síochána a neartú in Éirinn agus thar lear.
Chomh maith leis sin foilsíodh paimfléad ar Brian Nelson, dílseoir a bhí ag obair i gclaonpháirteachas le faisnéis na Breataine ag marú náisiúntóirí agus poblachtánaigh san Tuaisceart, ina measc comhairleoirí aitiúla tofa de chuid Shinn Féin le h-iarracht stad a chuir leis an bpolaitíocht toghchána.
Mar chuid de mo chúraimí bhí ag comh-eagrú cúpla comhdháil inmheánacha in aghaidh na bliana agus tuilleadh plé ag Ard Fheiseanna an pháirtí. Bhí an t-uafás oibre ag baint leis.
I gcaitheamh na gcainteanna ‘Hume Adams’ bhí feachtas againn i gcoinne na cinnsireachta. I 1994 d’eagraigh muid comhdháil náisiúnta darbh ainm an ‘Letterkenny Conference’ agus ina dhiaidh, ar an 31 Lúnasa, d’fhógair Óglaigh na hÉireann sos comhraic. Ón tráth seo amach bhí an saol lán de chruinnithe agus réamhchruinnithe ag an gceannaireacht leis an deis a thapú don tsíocháin.
Thárla na chéad ‘cainteanna faoi chainteanna’ poiblí le rialtas Shasana i gCnoc an Anfa mar chuid den toscaireacht le Seán MacManus, Martin McGuinness, Siobhán O'Hanlon (beirt atá ar shlí na fírinne) agus Gerry Kelly. Bhí mír chainte agam agus labhair mé go h-iomlán i nGaeilge ag an gcruinniú úd. Bhí cainteanna le rialtas Thaoisigh Albert Reynolds agus Bertie Ahern.
Tosaíodh ar an bhFóram um Shíochán agus Athmhuintearas i gCaisléan Bhaile Átha Cliath lena raibh gach páirtí as an Deisceart bainteach mar aon le foireann láidir as Sinn Féin. Bhíos bainteach le h-ionadaíocht an pháirtí ar chainteanna le rialtais éagsúla Bhaile Átha Cliath agus rialtas Tony Blair.
Bhí Martin McGuinness MP mar an phríomh-idirbheartaí agus Uachtarán Shinn Féin Gerry Adams MP i dtromlach na gcainteanna seo agus daoine ar nós Rita O’Hare, Dawn Doyle, Seán Crowe, Joe Reilly agus neart neart eile. Bhí orm foghlaim go tapaidh ar agallaimh leis na meáin chumarsáide i mBéarla, Gaeilge agus Spáinnis.
Bhíodh téarmaíocht ar leith a bhain leis na cainteanna uile agus bheadh ort a bheith an-chúramach nach ndéarfá rud eicínt a bhí as script mar bhí na cainteanna an-íogair. Bhí fo-choistí againn d’achan mhír chainte.
• Martin McGuinness, Pat Doherty, Lucilita Bhreathnach, Martin Ferris agus Rita O'Hare ag an Fóram um Síocháin agus Athmhuintearas, Deireadh Fómhair 1994
I 1994 d’eagraigh muid comhdháil náisiúnta darbh ainm an ‘Letterkenny Conference’ agus ina dhiaidh, ar an 31 Lúnasa, d’fhógair Óglaigh na hÉireann sos comhraic.• Comhdháil Shinn Féin, Leitir Ceanainn 1994
ann don Chonradh Angla Éireannach i 1921
feisirí de chuid Shinn Féin do Pharlaimint na Breataine in absentia. Toghadh Comhairleoirí áitiúla, Teachta Tionóil, Teachtaí Dála agus feisirí do Pharlaimint na hEorpa. Bhí guth na ndaoine le cloisint
Tar éis Cháisc 1998 ceapadh mé mar Stiúrthóir Náisiúnta Toghchána chomh maith le bheith i mo Ard Rúnaí ag ullmhú le neart foirne is baill i gcóir toghcháin áitiúla, na hEorpa, Teach Laighean, agus chuig an Tionól. Sheas mé síos mar Ard Rúnaí mar bhí an iomarca freagrachtaí orm agus ceapadh mé mar chomhordaitheoir ar an Roinn um Chomhionannas Inscne agus Cinnire Roinn an Chultúir go ceann bliain go leith.
Chaitheas níos mó ama i mBéal Feirste ná mar a chaitheas ag an mbaile agus thaisteal mé gan stad. Bhuaileamar in áiteacha rúnda chun plé a dhéanamh. Chuir an gnáth-phobal tithe ar fáil dúinn.
Is cuimhin liom i 1996 glaoch gutháin a fuair mé ó Gerry Adams ag tí mo thuistí chun scéala a thabhairt dom an teilfís a chur ar siúl go raibh buama tar éis pléascadh i Londain.
Bhí an chéad chruinniú againn le rialtas Blair, an chéad uair do Phoblachtánaithe Éireannacha a bheith i Sráid Downing ó bhí cainteanna ann don Chonradh Angla Éireannach i 1921. Dhá bhliain ina dhiaidh sin, ar Aoine an Chéasta, tháinig na páirtithe uile in éindí le cinnirí rialtais Bhaile Átha Cliath, an Bhreatain agus feisire síochána George Mitchell agus thángthas ar shocrú comhréitithe eatarthu in éagmais Aontachtóirí an DUP. Rinne mé beagán i láthair na cainteanna sin i measc foireann láidir a bhí ann ón bpáirtí. An tromlach ina n-iar phríosúnaigh. An tseachtain roimhe sin bhíos i mBéal Feirste is d’fhill ar Bhaile Átha Cliath mar gur rugadh mo chéad ghar iníon Aoife ag a máthar Lucilita san ospidéal.
D’fhilleas ar Bhéal Feirste. Ansin fuair máthair Bhertie Ahern – an Taoiseach ag an am – bás agus bhí orm filleadh ar Bháile Átha Cliath don tsochraid. Bhí Airí agus Oifigí rialtais ag freastal agus iad ag fáil eitleán thar n-ais chuig Foirgneamh an Chaisleáin chun leanúint leis na cainteanna. Lean mé ar aghaidh in san charr.
Tá sé doiligh cuimhniú ar gach a tharla in sna laethanta sin, lá agus oíche, seachtain i ndiaidh seachtaine, bliain i ndiaidh bliana. Aisdiúchiú nó ‘repatriation’ á dhéanamh ar na príosúnaigh pholaitiúla ó Shasana. Tháinig na príosúnaigh amach ó Phort Laoise agus an Cheis Fhada agus Machaire Bhéarra. D’fhás ár bpáistí uile. Tháinig gar-pháistí ar an saol an ghlúin nua ar nós na glúine seo mar atá an Chomhaontú féin - 25 bliana ar an bhfód.
Ach, cuireadh bunchlochanna. Toghadh baill Shinn Féin chun cumhacht a roinnt leis na páirtithe uile ar son an phobail uile. Bhí Airí i rialtas againn. Roinneamar cumhacht den chéad uair in 800 bliana. Cuireadh deireadh leis an gcoimhlint armtha. Toghadh níos mó
Bhí mo shláinte ag éirí níos measa agus tháinig ailse orm a fuaireadh in am. Go gearr ina dhiaidh sin bhí tionóisc gluaisteáin agam. Ag an am céanna bhí mo thuismitheoirí tinn agus fuaireadar beirt bás dhá lá i ndiaidh a chéile. An bhliain ina dhiaidh thosaigh mé post le SIPTU Ideas Institute ag oibriú le baill cheardchumainn. Tar éis dhá bhlian nó mar sin tháinig mé thar n-ais ag obair ar son an pháirtí mar comhordaitheoir Éire Aontaithe nó Ag Aontú Éireann ag obair le Mary Lou McDonald, Gerry Adams agus baill i dTeach Laighean agus ar an dtalamh agus ag bualadh le daoine in eagrais chultúrtha, ceardchumainn, eacnamaí, spórt, aisteoirí, srl.
D’eagraigh muid cúpla comhdháil timpeall na hÉireann chun plé a dhéanamh ar thodhchaí na hÉireann. An lá atá inniú ann níl mé chomh gníomhach is a bhíodh ach déanaim mo pháirt a h-imirt.
Dóibh siúd uile ar fhoghlaim mé uathu, a chabhraigh linn, na gníomhaithe a chuir a saol ar athló agus an camaraderie is cairdeas - mo bhuíochas libh agus go raibh maith agaibh. Tá neart ceachtanna le foghlaim ón dtréimhse úd ach ceann tábhachtach a luafainn ná go dtosaíonn rud eicínt uaireanta mar fheachtas beag ach caithfear a chothú agus caithfear daoine de gach aois ghrúpa agus scileanna difiriúla a dhaingniú.
Baintear níos mó amach ar son an phobail nuair a bhíonn ollghluaiseacht ag oibriú as láimh a chéile. �
Bhí an chéad chruinniú againn le rialtas Blair, an chéad uair do phoblachtánaithe Éireannacha a bheith i Sráid Downing ó bhí cainteanna• Sinn Féin ag Sráid Downing, Nollaig 1997. Martin Ferris, Michelle Gildernew, Martin McGuinness, Gerry Adams, Lucilita Bhreathnach, Siobhán O'Hanlon agus Richard McAuley • Lucilita ag Ard Fheis Shinn Féin 2003, RDS, Baile Átha Cliath
‘It always seems impossible until it’s done’
GERRY KELLY has been one of the central Sinn Féin negotiators over the last 30 years, from the secret talks with British Government representatives in 1993 to the present day. Here he highlights some key events in that journey.
There is a library of books and articles already in existence analysing every aspect of the Good Friday Agreement and the period before and after. Perhaps it has all been said, but I have been asked to write a few thoughts on my part in this negotiation process.
I think the first thing to be said for the record is that Sinn
the conflict. That needed ongoing political engagement with our opponents and Sinn Féin trying to build a consensus in Ireland for a negotiated settlement of the conflict.
A line of communication between Sinn Féin and the British government had existed over many years in the 1970s and 80s. It was sporadic in nature but was re-activated by the British government in the early 1990s.
All of this was happening as I was released from prison in 1989. I had joined Sinn Féin on release and was part of the discussions that were going on at that time. I was honoured to be asked to accompany Martin McGuinness to an exploratory meeting with a British government representative on 23 March 1993.
I took a note of the meeting in which the British representative stated, amongst other things, “The final solution is union. It is going to happen anyway…..Unionists will have to change. This island will be as one.”
Féin’s peace strategy evolved over a ten-year period. The first document produced was ‘Scenario for Peace’ (1987), followed by ‘Towards a Lasting Peace’ (1992). The essence of these documents, which Gerry Adams authored, was the need for a peace process which could deal with the actual causes of
I was surprised by this and by the fact that he said that only Prime Minister John Major, British Secretary of State Patrick Mayhew, Home Secretary Douglas Hurd, and the secretary to the Cabinet knew about this meeting and the possibility of Sinn Féin delegation meetings. When we went back to Gerry Adams and the rest of the Sinn Féin team and discussed the meeting, I’m not quite sure what each individual thought. I
I took a note of the meeting in which the British Representative stated, amongst other things, ‘The final solution is union. It is going to happen anyway….. Unionists will have to change. This island will be as one.’• British Secretary of State Patrick Mayhew, Home Secretary Douglas Hurd, Prime Minister John Major with Irish Taoiseach Albert Reynolds, Tánaiste Dick Spring and Máire Geoghegan-Quinn during an Anglo-Irish Summit in Dublin, December 1993
knew it was a meeting of significance, but wasn’t thinking of it as a seminal moment, though in hindsight perhaps it was.
The general Sinn Féin team’s view, as I remember it, was to engage but do so cautiously as the British representative could say these things in private but where was the guarantee that it was the actual view of the British Prime Minister and Cabinet. If there was to be a negotiation, then there had to be a public manifestation of this and that it had to involve more than just Sinn Féin and the Brits. It had to be representative of all the interested parties in Ireland.
It was agreed to push forward to talks. An IRA cessation of military activity was announced on 31 August 1994. The IRA had agreed to this to create a peaceful space and atmosphere for talks to take place.
A few months later, I was attending my niece’s wedding in the Devenish Arms Hotel in Belfast. I left it to stand on a platform outside the Sinn Féin office on the Falls Road to be introduced publicly, with others, alongside Martin McGuinness, as a member of Sinn Féin’s negotiating team. I was very honoured, but re-joined the wedding a short time later, and consumed a modicum of alcohol, thinking I had better make the best of it as we were going to be very busy. I wasn’t expecting it to be for decades!
It was on 9 December 1994 that Martin McGuinness, our Chief Negotiator, led myself, Lucilita Breathnach, Siobhán
O’Hanlon, and Seán MacManus up the steps of Stormont to face the British team led by the NIO’s permanent under-secretary, Quentin Thomas.
I remember that there was quite a substantial team of British civil servants across the table. The head of the civil service, John Chillcot, had decided not to come! These meetings under John Major’s Premiership, quickly appeared to be stalling mechanisms, to slow things down, presumably because he led a minority government and depended on Unionist votes to remain in power.
However, when Labour came to power with a huge majority under Tony Blair in May 1997, things changed. The negotiations which led to the GFA really began in September 1997. Many things had happened in the meantime, including Sinn Féin being excluded from talks.
Something that has stuck in my head from then is that the same civil servants who sat across the table in 1994, filibustering, now began to engage on the real issues and things started to show real signs of engagement.
One of the other extraordinary facts is that the Unionists led by David Trimble stubbornly refused to talk directly to Sinn Féin. In a way, the epitome of this manifested itself when the South African Government under Nelson Mandela invited all the parties to Arniston, South Africa to allow for relationship building away from the public eye.
When we arrived by commercial flight in Johannesburg, the South African Airforce were flying us on to our destination. The Unionist delegation refused to travel on the same transport, so they all piled on to a military Hercules jet while we were given a small and very comfortable Executive jet for the same journey.
This continued when a picnic was organised for the beach some distance away from the conference centre. While the
the South African hosts, which included a number of government ministers. Mandela, in his own inimitable way, acceded to the request but said to the Unionist delegations that they would not achieve anything by simply talking to their friends.
Despite, all of the difficulties, the Good Friday Agreement was signed, despite Jeffrey Donaldson, Arlene Foster, and others walking out. It was indeed an historical event which was massively endorsed across Ireland. For Irish republicans, it was not the resolution of all the causes of conflict, but it did achieve a political way forward to the goal of a united Ireland, a democratically agreed Ireland.
At the time, I certainly didn’t imagine that 25 years after the signing of the GFA that we would still be negotiating in an attempt to properly implement the GFA and subsequent agreements.
others travelled in a large coach, we travelled in a minibus with a couple of South African Ministers. The Women’s Coalition members came with us. We arrived first and sat about picnicking. The coach carrying everyone else passed by on the upper road a number of times because David Trimble refused to come down while we were there!
To cap it all, when it was announced that Nelson Mandela was coming to address us all, the Unionist delegation demanded a separate meeting with the President. This appalled
Nelson Mandela once stated that “It always seems impossible until it’s done”. Many things that seemed impossible beforehand were achieved in the Good Friday Agreement and other subsequent negotiations. We are closer to a United Ireland now than we have ever been in history. We still cannot do it on our own. We are in a phase of democratic persuasion, a negotiation on what is the best future for all who live in Ireland.
As I finish this short snapshot of that period, Jeffrey Donaldson, who walked out of the GFA negotiations in 1998, is now the leader of the DUP. He and his party have big decisions to make as the present negotiations between the EU and the British Government come to a close. �
We are closer to a United Ireland now than we have ever been in history. We still cannot do it on our own. We are in a phase of democratic persuasion, a negotiation on what is the best future for all who live in Ireland
�Gerry Kelly is a Sinn Féin MLA for North Belfast and the party’s Assembly spokesperson for policing • (back) Martin McGuinness, Nelson Mandela and Gerry Kelly; (front) Siobhán O'Hanlon and Rita O'Hare
Ré Nua don Ghaeilge
I 1998, bhí Gearóid Ó hEara ina Chathaoirleach Sé Chontae ar Shinn Féin, ina chomhairleoir i gCathair Dhoire agus ina ghníomhaí Gaeilge. Scríobhann sé faoi impleachtaí Chomhaontú Aoine an Chéasta do chúrsaí teanga in Éirinn.
Nuair a síníodh Comhaontú Aoine an Chéasta in 1998 dúradh gur rud stairiúil a bhí ann. Agus ba é.
Ach anois ag amharc siar thar 25 bliain tuigeann muid nach raibh ann ach tús phróisis. An rud staire is mó a bhí ann ná an spás a cruthaíodh chun an Ghaeilge a fhorbairt. Chuige sin bhí an-obair agus an-ionsparáid ann ó mhuintir Bhóthar Seoighe agus scéimeanna eile ach nuair a síníodh an comhaontú ar an 10 Aibrean 1998 tugadh aitheantas stáit don Ghaeilge don chéad uair ó bunaíodh an stát agus cuireadh eagraíochtaí ar bun chun déileáil leis na tosaíochtaí a bhí aitheanta thíos.
Dúirt an Comhaontú;
“Aithníonn na rannpháirtithe uile na hurraime, na tuisceana agus na comhfhulaingthe i ndáil le héagsúlacht teanga ar a n-áirítear i dTuaisceart Éireann, an Ghaeilge, Albainis Uladh agus teanga na bpobal eitneach éagsúil ar chuid de shaibhreas cultúrtha ar oileán Éireann iad uile.
I gcomhthéacs a bhreithnithe gníomhaigh atá á dhéanamh faoi láthair maidir leis an Ríocht Aontaithe do shíniú Chairt na hEorpa do Theangacha Réigúnacha nó Mionlaigh, déanfaidh Rialtas na Breataine, go háirithe i ndáil leis an Ghaeilge, más cuí agus más mian le daoine;
• Gníomh diongbháilte chun an teanga a chur chun cinn
• Úsáid na teanga a éascú agus a spreagadh sa chaint agus i scríbhneoireacht sa saol príobháideach agus sa saol poiblí mar a mbeidh éileamh cuí ann.
• Iarracht chun deireadh a chur, más féidir é, le srianta a chuirfeadh nó a d’oibreodh in aghaidh cothú nó forbairt na teanga
• Foráil maidir le idirchaidreamh le pobal na Gaeilge agus a gcuid tuairimí a leiriú d’údaráis phoiblí agus gearáin a imscrúdú
• Dualgas reachtúil a chur ar an Roinn Oideachais chun oideachas trí mheán na Gaeilge a spreagadh agus a éascú de réir na socraithe láithreacha don oideachas comhtháite
• An scóip atá ann chun Teilifís na Gaeilge a chur chun cinn ar bhonn níos leithne i dTuaisceart Éireann a scrúdú mar ábhar práinneach, in éineacht le húdarás iomchuí na Breataine agus i comhar le húdaráis craolacháin na hÉireann
• Bealaí níos éifeachtaí a lorg chun spreagadh agus tacaíocht airgeadais a thabhairt do léiriú scannán agus clár teilifíse trí Gaeilge i dTuaisceart Éireann”
Ag éirí as na coimitmintí sin ar an 9 Lúnasa 2000 bunaíodh Comhairle na Gaelscolaíochta mar ghrúpa ionadaíochta d’oideachas trí mheán na Gaeilge. Tá foireann, buiséad agus oifigí acu agus ról acu tumoideachas a bhrú, a éascú agus a sprea -
gadh. Faoi láthair tá níos mó ná 7,000 páiste ag foghlaim ar 70 suíomh.
Chomh maith leis sin, i mí Feabhra 2001 bunaíodh Iontaobhas na Gaelscolaíochta. Is é cuspóir foriomlán Iontaobhas na Gaelscolaíochta bun airgeadais a sholáthar, tríd an rialtas agus trí dhaonchairde, d’fhorbairt agus do thacaíocht Chiste Iontaobhais don Oideachas trí mheán na Gaeilge.
Socraíodh i gComhaontú Aoine an Chéasta go mbunófaí Bord
Tá foireann, buiséad agus oifigí acu agus ról acu tumoideachas a bhrú, a éascú agus a spreagadh. Faoi láthair tá níos mó ná 7,000 páiste ag foghlaim ar 70 suíomh
Uile Éireann chun an Gaeilge a chur chun agus ar an 2 Nollaig 1999 bunaíodh bord nua darbh ainm Foras na Gaeilge, ar a mbeadh 16 ball - 8 ón Tuaisceart agus 8 ón Deisceart.
Shínigh Rialtas na Breataine An Cairt Eorpach i Marta 2001 agus de réir Alt 17 den Chairt, tá dualgas ar an Ríocht Aontaithe tuairisc a chur ar fáil don Chomhairle Eorpach ar dhul chun cinn maidir leis an Ghaeilge sa tuaisceart
Síníodh Comhaontú Chill Rímhinn ar an 13 Deireadh Fómhair 2006 agus socraíodh go dtabharfadh Rialtas na Breataine Acht Gaeilge isteach chun an teanga a bheith cosanta sa dlí. Bhí sé le
bheith cosúil le Acht na Breatnaise agus bhí Rialtas na Breataine chun bheith ag obair leis an Tionól chun straitéis a fhorbairt chun an Ghaeilge a spreagadh agus a chosaint.
Síníodh Comhaontú Hillsborough ar an 5 Feabhra 2010 agus socraíodh go ndéanfadh Rialtas na Breataine athbhreithniú ar na gealltanais nár comhlíonadh ó Chill Rímhinn. Tógadh ceist na Gaeilge agus d’aontaigh Rialtas na Breataine £20m a chur ar fáil don Ghaeilge, £12m don Chiste Craoltóireachta agus £8m don Chiste Infheistíochta Gaeilge. Tugann an Ciste Craoltóireachta
Gaeilge maoiniú d’ábhar thar réimse seánraí agus é á léiriú ag comhlachtaí i dTuaisceart na hÉireann.
I ndiaidh blianta feachtasaíochta ag an Dream Dearg agus pobal na Gaeilge tugadh Acht isteach ar an 6 Nollaig 2022 agus den chéad uair riamh tá aitheantas oifigiúil ag an Ghaeilge i dTuaisceart Éireann.
Cuireann an ciste nua seo maoiniú ar fáil chun tacú le tionscadail chaipitil a chur ar fáil don earnáil Ghaeilge. Mar thoradh ar an chiste sin tá 35 cultúrlanna nó ionaid chultúrtha maoinithe ins an Tuaisceart. Chomh maith leis sin chuir an Ciste maoiniú ar fáil chun 8 Oifigeach Forbartha Ghnó a fhostú agus chun 15 a chur fríd máistreacht i gcúrsaí gnó a dhéanamh in DCU.
Faoi New Decade, New Approach (NDNA) fógraíodh ag an dá rialtas, ar an 9 Eanair 2020, go mbeadh socrú ar an Acht Teanga. I ndiaidh blianta feachtasaíochta ag an Dream Dearg agus pobal na Gaeilge tugadh Acht isteach ar an 6 Nollaig 2022 agus den
chéad uair riamh tá aitheantas oifigiúil ag an Ghaeilge i dTuaisceart Éireann.
Níl ann ach tús.
Ceapfar oifig nua Coimisinéir na Gaeilge a bheas freagrach as caighdéan ard de dhea-chleachtais d’údaráis áitiúla agus chun deireadh a chur le hAcht 1737 a chuir cosc ar Ghaeilge a úsáid sna cúirteanna. Chomh maith leis sin tugadh £4m. faoi choinne scéimeanna caipitil nua do Chiste Infheistiochta.
Tá saol na Gaeilge athraithe go radacach le 25 bliain anuas, na céadta oibrí Gaeilge lán-aimseartha, cultúrlanna, comharthaíocht, cosaint dlí, clubanna óige agus go leor eile.
Tá daoine ag caint faoi Fhóram na n-ionad Gaeilge a bhunú, feachtas chun an tAcht a láidriú cosúil leis na scéimeanna teanga sa Bhreatain Bheag, Institiúd Pleanála Teanga a bhunú, tuilleadh Líonraí Gaeilge. Tá dul chun cinn uafásach déanta againn. Níos mó le déanamh.
Is cinnte go bhfuil sé in am dúinn, pobal na Gaeilge, thuaidh agus theas, teacht le chéile agus spriocanna nua a aimsiú don chéad 25 bliain eile. �
‘How did they let you take Health and Education?’
BAIRBRE DE BRÚN and Martin McGuinness were the first two Sinn Féin ministers in the Assembly Executive. Here Bairbre tells of her journey from the classroom to ministerial office.
The period of the late 1990s was a whirlwind for me, going from being a local activist and member of the Sinn Fein Ard Chomhairle, who travelled abroad to promote the importance of the peace process, through the period of being a teacher in an Irish medium school who took a year out to join Martin McGuinness on the Business Committee of the negotiations, to joining Martin in the Executive that was set up after the Good Friday Agreement as the first Sinn Féin ministers in the Six Counties and, in my case, one of the first ever female ministers from any local party.
I still pinch myself when I think of sharing these experiences with Martin, Gerry, and other giants of that period of history.
This encompassed visits to South Africa and meeting with Nelson Mandela, as ANC members shared their experiences of negotiations with us, and here at home, seeing local democracy in action as community halls were packed with community activists pushing to include their needs and their demands on the negotiation’s agenda, and women marched to secure women’s place in what came out of the negotiations.
It brought the jolt of moving from a school which was lively, co-educational, Irish-speaking, and where the pupils called the teachers by their first name to a very formal, overwhelmingly male, and English-speaking atmosphere of negotiations at Stormont once Sinn Féin finally overcame our initial exclusion.
It included moments of great hope and pride. It also included
real lows such as hearing about the Omagh bomb and the tragic loss of life that day. There is always the danger that naming one event can appear to diminish others, but that was not the case. We were always aware throughout that period of the real suffering people were going through and the determination to lead everyone to a better place.
My memories of that time include the people who opened their homes to us so that we could discuss negotiating strategy with some measure of privacy and the painstaking work of preparing and refining papers and positions for our main negotiators on the whole range of issues that eventually became the Good Friday Agreement.
I have fond and proud memories of meeting and working with those in our communities who had expertise on that range of issues to tease out with them the possibilities and limitations of what we could hope to achieve.
I expect that becoming a minister is daunting even for a career politician who has had other ministers in their party or family before, and a parliament if not a government stretching back continuously for years. It was even more daunting without any of those.
Sinn Féin had announced months earlier who our ministers would be, but we had to wait for the evening of nominations to find out what portfolio we would get. This was decided by a formula called d’Hondt which allowed parties to choose according to size while also ensuring fair distribution of positions.
Martin McGuinness was nominated as Minister of Education, and I was second last in line to choose. The Health Service had huge challenges in its inbox and was still available. That was my choice. I knew I was ready. I was confident I could do it with help, but I was still almost overwhelmed by a sense of responsibility as well as opportunity.
Like all parties, Sinn Féin had spent the previous months looking at what our priorities might be for any department we
might take. The big picture items were all over the media and easy to spot, but we had had some briefing months previously where I had been struck by the question of public health and the things in wider society that can add to good health or ill health. That had struck a chord with me.
In the corridor later, I bumped into a British civil servant who had been heavily involved in the negotiations leading to the Good Friday Agreement. “How did they let you take Health and Education?” he asked. That was a good question. Health and Education were key portfolios for anyone who wanted to improve
life for the most vulnerable and for those less well off. We were going to make the most of those opportunities and to try and deliver for everyone across the board.
I got a lot of mail congratulating me on becoming Minister but one line in one letter always sticks in my mind. A former permanent secretary, the late Maurice Hayes, urged me to remember that I was “Minister for Health, not Minister for Sickness”. That resonated with me and with our approach that dealing with the social determinants of health was vital. This wasn’t just about treating people once they were ill, it was about trying to prevent people from becoming ill and dealing with factors that led to huge inequalities in health in the population.
In my first Ministerial visit to the Royal Victoria Hospital, a major Regional Hospital in Belfast, auxiliary nursing and cleaning
I still pinch myself when I think of sharing these experiences with Martin, Gerry, and other giants of that period of history �• FIRST EXECUTIVE MEETING (clockwise from front) SDLP's Seamus Mallon, Brid Rodgers, Mark Durkan and Seán Farren. Ulster Unionist's Sam Foster, Reg Empey and Michael McGimpsey. Sinn Féin's Bairbre de Brún and Martin McGuinness. John Semple (Civil Service Office) and Ulster Unionist, David Trimble. Missing are Nigel Dodds and Peter Robinson of the DUP, who refused to sit with Sinn Féin
staff were coming off shift as I arrived and all saying ‘hello Bairbre’ on the way past. I could hear officials behind me commenting on this. Although that might not be so unusual an occurrence in
under direct rule ministers, most of that time had also been under British Conservative ministers, so the experience of a local Executive and the ideas we brought to that was a totally new departure for them.
A few short weeks after taking office we were faced with the first budget settlement and had to decide on the allocations within our Department to the various priorities. My emphatic ‘No’ to a suggested cut to a programme for children in disadvantaged areas was reflected not only in that paper, but automatically referred to in every draft paper after that.
The Executive took office at the start of December and that winter saw the worst winter pressures in years which I needed to address as Minister for Health, Social Services and Public Safety.
Dublin, after years of direct rule from London in the North they clearly weren’t used to people here knowing their Minister. Months afterwards, a civil servant confided to me that not only had they spent most of their formative years as a civil servant
It was an enormous privilege as Minister to see how frontline workers across those services dealt with the pressures and a privilege to meet with them and with families caring for loved ones. They were and are the salt of the earth. I often think of that now when I see what frontline workers have had to do during the pandemic. And what they are trying to cope with now. �
Bairbre de Brún is a former Sinn Féin MEP, Assembly minister, MLA and party councillor.
The Health Service had huge challenges in its inbox and was still available. That was my choice. I knew I was ready. I was confident I could do it with help, but I was still almost overwhelmed by a sense of responsibility as well as opportunity• EARLY TALKS, JANUARY 1995: Sinn Féin delegation after talks with British government representatives in Stormont, Seán MacManus, Siobhán O'Hanlon, Martin McGuinness, Bairbre de Brún and Gerry Kelly
DEMILITARISING IRELAND
In the aftermath of the IRA’s 1994 cessation, many political and media commentators sought to focus exclusively on the need for the decommissioning of IRA weapons. In the same year staff in An Phoblacht and Sinn Féin began work on highlighting the scale of the British military garrison in Ireland and the systemic destruction of border crossings by the British Army along with the militarised fortification of the few border access points open.
The results were published in An Phoblacht and a free map, parts of which are reprinted here. The massive scale of the military occupation of the Six Counties was undeniable, as was the huge achievement of eventual British demilitarisation.
Liam Ly nch
A legacy that will endure and inspire
MÍCHEÁL Mac DONNCHA interviews author and historian GERARD SHANNON on his new biography of Republican leader Liam Lynch.
seven siblings, and was born in rural Limerick, very close to the border of Limerick county and north Cork. His father Jeremiah was a Fenian, and his mother Mary has been a member of the Ladies’ Land League, so he grew up influenced by a radical tradition. Accounts of his childhood mention his love for reading books on previous insurrections against British rule in Ireland.
He worked as a shop assistant in Mitchelstown and Fermoy in Cork, and it is there be first became active in the Gaelic League and the Irish Volunteers. He became truly radicalised into the republican cause during the aftermath of the Easter Rising when he witnessed the Cork Volunteer leader Thomas Kent and his brothers being brought through Fermoy town by the local RIC following their arrests.
To what do you attribute Liam Lynch’s leadership qualities?
Liam Lynch had an extraordinary belief in the righteousness of the fight for the Irish Republic, and this in turn gave him a powerful sense of self-belief and confidence how he could contribute to this fight. It is truly remarkable that he became such a gifted guerrilla commander despite no formal soldiering experience, he was in many ways the exemplary Irish Volunteer.
He was also often described as a somewhat socially awkward, serious man, but contemporaries noted again and again how Lynch went up and down his battalion and later, Brigade area, and got to know each Volunteer on the ground and held meetings where he listened to each of their suggestions.
General Liam Lynch. To me, that is incredible given his considerable contribution to the cause of Irish independence and the abundance of existing biographies for others from the period, like Michael Collins and Éamon de Valera, or even Arthur Griffith.
The first biography by Lynch’s comrade, Florence O’Donoghue, came out in 1954 and the second biography by Meda Ryan came out in 1986. Both books still have great value, but since Meda Ryan’s book, there has been a huge abundance of archival material that has become newly available, such as the personal papers of contemporaries of Lynch’s like Ernie O’Malley and Moss Twomey, or the release of the Bureau of Military History witness statements.
All of these sources help to give a more nuanced, detailed perspective of who Liam was and what motivated him in certain decisions he made and actions he took in the years of the Tan War and Civil War. With the centenary of his death on 10 April 2023, there is an irresistible opportunity now to try and understand Liam more and the impact he made on Irish history.
What was his background and why did he become involved in the struggle?
Liam Lynch was the second youngest of
Liam commented to others it was this scene and Thomas’s later execution that changed him. Lynch joins the reformed Volunteers in the Fermoy company in 1917 and becomes first lieutenant. It was in this year, he said to his brother Tom in one letter his most famous phrase, “We have declared for an Irish Republic and will not live under any other law”.
As he moved up the ranks, eventually becoming O/C of Cork No. 2 Brigade and later, the O/C of the First Southern Division, he had later cultivated a huge reputation amongst his comrades. He helped mastermind some of the important actions against the British during the Tan War - the Fermoy arms raid, the kidnap of General Lucas, the flying column attack on Mallow barracks. Lynch also took part in these operations, he
never asked his men to do anything he was not willing to do himself.
Much has been written about Lynch and the Treaty and Civil War. He seems to have wanted to reach an accommodation with Collins. Is that the case? What pushed him to war in the end?
Lynch was adamantly opposed to the Treaty, seeing it as a betrayal of the Irish Republic and his dead comrades. Yet, he did not wish to see a split with those he fought with against the British. At this time, he wrote: “I admire Mick [Collins] as a soldier and a man. Thank God all parties can agree to differ.”
In this spirit, he was central to efforts to reconcile the split in the IRA in early 1922, despite his anti-Treaty stance. He worked with Collins to determine some sort of formula that might be acceptable to both sides.
Lynch’s thinking was that the old bonds of comradeship in the Tan War would win through. Given the respect Lynch cultivated in the previous conflict, he was elected Chief of Staff of the anti-Treaty – and majority – section of the IRA in March 1922.
Ironically, despite his military prestige, he was regarded as a moderate by others on the IRA Executive such as Rory O’Connor and Liam Mellows, who even briefly replaced him as Chief of Staff with Joe McKelvey. Of course, both disputing factions within Republican ranks united against the Free State in the face of the outbreak of the Civil War. Unfortunately, Lynch and others in the leadership were little prepared for this conflict.
Some, such as Ernie O’Malley criticised Lynch’s tactics, such
as destruction of railways etc, as futile. What was his thinking as the war progressed?
Lynch’s decision-making during the Civil War was controversial to O’Malley and his peers for long after. Several days into the conflict, Lynch, in his capacity of IRA Chief of Staff, attempted to secure territory for the IRA south-west of a geographical line between Limerick and Waterford. This is sometimes referred to as ‘the Munster Republic’, a term Lynch never used. He attempted to broker a peace deal in Limerick city with Free State forces that collapsed due to the latter secretly attempting to move more soldiers in the city.
With the swift collapse of republican territory, he was no longer interested in peace. Lynch wanted to find means for the IRA to continue the fight and regain the initiative. His most effective tactic was for the IRA
Free State admitted had been effective by the end of 1922.
Lynch also spent much of the Civil War trying to get heavy artillery from contacts in Europe and America. Then of course, his response to the executions of Republican prisoners, in the form of orders for reprisals, most effectively seen in targeting the homes of high profile Free State supporters. Until Lynch was killed on 10 April, it is important to note he still commanded the respect of his officers, and was seen as a source of strength for them.
Privately however, Lynch’s heart was definitely not in the fight; he knew it was a very different conflict to the Tan War. He wrote to his brother Tom in September 1922, that he wished “English hounds tracked me down than old comrades false to their allegiance... who could have dreamt all our hopes could have been so blighted”.
What do you think is his legacy?
I think Irish Republicans long ago decided what Liam Lynch’s legacy should be, and it is one that will no doubt endure far beyond the centenary of his death this year. He made a substantial contribution to the cause of Irish independence, he was genuinely brave and physically courageous, and the circumstances of his death ensured he will remain a powerful symbol of devotion to the ideal of the Irish Republic.
For Republican activists, Liam Lynch is a heroic example to inspire into the future. My hope with my own book is to reveal a more rounded portrayal of the Liam Lynch, to understand the very human figure behind the icon. �
NEW LODGE SIX REMEMBERED
a candle light procession and vigil attended by hundreds of local residents, as well as family and relatives of the six people killed by the British Army on 3 February 1973.
The vigil visited each of the locations where James McCann, James Sloan, Anthony Campbell, Brendan Maguire, John Loughran, and Ambrose Hardy were shot.
A new documentary on the New Lodge Six by award winning film maker Seán Murray was projected onto the apartment block where the British soldiers carried out the killings in 1973. North Belfast Sinn Féin MLA Carál Ní Chuilín was among the speakers.
A photo exhibition, documentary screening, and panel discussion was held on Saturday 4 February in Duncairn Community centre. Photos: An Phoblacht
The 50th anniversary of the 1973 New Lodge killings was marked with a series of events including