Towards a more sustainable and effective migration management? by Antall József Tudásközpont

ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE

TOWARDS A MORE SUSTAINABLE AND EFFECTIVE MIGRATION MANAGEMENT? (URSULA VON DER LEYEN’S PROPOSALS TO RETHINK MIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICIES IN EUROPE) BIANKA RESTÁS

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE

AJRC-Analyses Series of the Antall József Knowledge Centre

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©Bianka Restás, 2020 © Antall József Knowledge Centre, 2020 ISSN 2416-1705

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TOWARDS A MORE SUSTAINABLE AND EFFECTIVE MIGRATION MANAGEMENT? (URSULA VON DER LEYEN’S PROPOSALS TO RETHINK MIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICIES IN EUROPE) “It must be our goal to become a model of how migration can be managed sustainably and with a human approach, but effectively.” (Ursula von der Leyen)1

INTRODUCTION Migration and refugee movements have gained increasing global attention in the last few years. According to the European Parliament, in recent years Europe has had to address the most serious migratory challenge since the end of the Second World War, 2 while in 2016 the United Nations described the migratory challenge as the “worst refugee crisis since the end of WWII.”3 The unprecedented arrival of refugees and irregular migrants in the EU, which peaked in 2015, has revealed a series of weaknesses and gaps in EU policies on asylum, external borders and migration, and consequently has generated various debates and deep divisions among the European Union’s Member States. One of the reasons behind the existing tensions is that the European Union has not been able to elaborate a comprehensive strategy so far that could effectively address the challenges associated with the question of immigration. The different attitudes and approaches of the Member States to tackle the issue, as well as the lack of solidarity and that of a real dialogue, have created serious confrontations that are still ongoing. The underlying reason for the existing challenges is that, in line with the “first country of entry” criterion of the current Dublin system, examining the asylum claim of new arrivals is predominantly falling under the responsibility of the frontline Member States. In practice, this means that a small number of Member States bear the responsibility of processing the majority of asylum claims. As a consequence, the countries of first arrival have repeatedly pointed out the disproportionate responsibilities that Dublin imposes on their domestic asylum system. As long as the current system remains the guiding principle for managing international migration, it primarily depends on the solidarity of the single Member States in what ways and to what extent contribute to the efforts of frontline countries. At the same time, the lack of significant progresses in “burden sharing” has given rise to attempts by the European Union to move towards a more visible externalisation of migration management through adopting emergency measures and various agreements and forms Florence Schulz: Von der Leyen promises new migration package in first half of 2020. Euractive.com. 8 November 2019. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/von-der-leyen-promises-new-migrationpackage-in-first-half-of-2020 > Accessed: 23 March 2020.

2 European Parliament: Europe’s migration crisis. European Parliament. 30 June 2017. <https://www.europarl. europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170629STO78631/europe-s-migration-crisis > Accessed: 28 April 2020.

Unitexd Nations: Europe and the Refugee Crisis: A Challenge to Our Civilization. 19 September 2016. <https:// academicimpact.un.org/content/europe-and-refugee-crisis-challenge-our-civilization > Accessed: 10 May 2020. 3

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of cooperation aimed to tackle immigration jointly with countries of origin and transit. Immediately after taking office, Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission committed herself to the presentation of a new migration package by the first half of 2020, while also putting forward a proposal to reform the current Dublin asylum system with the aim of establishing a new, comprehensive, sustainable European approach to manage international migration in a more effective manner. During a joint press conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin on 8 November 2019, von der Leyen emphasised that “it must be our goal to become a model of how migration can be managed sustainably and with a human approach, but effectively.”4 This analysis focuses on the most important challenges arising from the current logic of migration and asylum policies in the European Union, the root causes of the existing problems, as well as some positive and negative impacts and critical aspects of externalising migration management and migration control to neighbouring countries. Furthermore, the paper aims also to present the most important proposals and steps initiated by the President of the European Commission to rethink the EU migration and asylum system.

THE ROOTS: THE DUBLIN SYSTEM AND THE QUESTION OF SHARED RESPONSIBILTY AND SOLIDARITY Since 1999, the European Union has been working to create a Common European Asylum System (CEAS). In May 2015, the European Agenda on Migration was put forward to improve the CEAS and the reform of the Dublin Regulation constituted the core of these efforts.5 The Dublin Convention was signed in the Irish capital on 15 June 1990, and first came into force on 1 September 1997 for the first 12 signatories (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom). The Treaty was then extended to other EU Member States and to some countries outside the European Union like Norway and Iceland.6 In 2003, the first Dublin Convention was replaced by Council Regulation No 343/2003 (Dublin II regulation), and consequently, its validity ended on 16 March 2003.7 Ten years later the Dublin II regulation was replaced too by Regulation No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Florence Schulz: Von der Leyen promises new migration package in first half of 2020. Euractive. 8 November 2019. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/von-der-leyen-promises-new-migration-package-in-first-halfof-2020 > Accessed: 23 March 2020. 4

Luigi Achilli: Reforming Dublin: a priority for the EU. In: Building Trust: the Challenge of Peace and Stability in the Mediterranean. Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI). 22 November 2018. <https://www.ispionline. it/it/pubblicazione/building-trust-challenge-peace-and-stability-mediterranean-21624 > Accessed: 24 March 2020. 5

Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner: EU Dublin III Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 604/2013). Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner. June 2013. <http://www.orac.ie/website/orac/oracwebsite. nsf/page/eudublinIIIregulation-main-en# > Accessed: 12 May 2020. 6

European Commission: Migration and Home Affairs – Dublin Convention. European Commission. <https:// ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/dublinconvention_en > Accessed: 24 March 2020.

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(Dublin III regulation) which entered into force in July 2013.8 The regulation established the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining the application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a thirdcountry national or a stateless person.9 Currently, the Dublin III regulation is the fundamental base of the EU asylum system, defining the criteria to handle applications for international protection. As Achilli highlighted, this criterion goes back to a period when migratory pressure was not significant and that those circumstances have changed with the outbreak of the so-called “migrant crisis” in 2015 when higher numbers of asylum seekers sought refuge in the European Union. Most of those migrants arrived in Italy, Greece and, to a lesser extent, Malta and Spain.10 Under the current protocol, the migrants and refugees have to seek asylum in the first safe country they reach. Consequently, the reform of the Dublin system has been raised many times by Southern European countries, when they pointed out that the EU regulations must be modified taking into account the changed circumstances. Although there have been several initiatives to revise the current regulations, the European Union and the Member States have not yet found a sustainable solution to overcome current obstacles.

THE 2015 “REFUGEE CRISIS” AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: REFORM PROPOSALS AND THE RELOCATION SCHEME Following the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” uprisings across the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) region in 2011, an increasing number of people decided to move towards Europe. Illegal migration to the EU increased by 138 % in 2014 alone. In 2015, at the peak of migration, almost 1,822,337 illegal crossings were reported at the EU’s external borders according to the data of the Frontex.11 In response to the difficulties that the unprecedented number of arrivals induced, in 2015 the European Commission proposed several actions to address the evolving challenge. In May 2015, the European Agenda on Migration was adopted by the Commission which outlined priorities in migration, asylum and border policies for the following years. Reflecting the EU’s growing attention to the external dimension of migration control over the previous years, the Agenda aimed to combine the EU’s several internal and external policies and instruments to tackle the issue in the medium and long term. The document included a list of immediate policy actions and pointed out four medium- to longterm priorities: reducing the incentives for irregular migration, saving lives and securing the external borders, strengthening the common asylum policy, and developing a new policy

European Commission: Migration and Home Affairs – Country responsible for asylum application (Dublin). European Commission. <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/examination-ofapplicants_en > Accessed: 24 March 2020. 8

EUR-Lex: Document 32013R0604 (Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013). EUR-Lex. 29 June 2013. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32013R0604 > Accessed: 24 March 2020. 9

Luigi Achilli. 116.

Frontex: Frontex Risk Analysis Quarterly Report. Frontex. Quarter 4. October–December 2015. 8. <https:// reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/FRAN_Q4_2015.pdf > Accessed: 28 April 2020.

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on legal migration. A naval mission—EUNAVFOR MED—was established too with the aim of neutralising smuggling routes in the Mediterranean. In order to assist EU border states, the EU agreed on the establishment of so-called “hotspots:” migrant processing centres situated on the EU’s external borders in Greece and Italy. Frontex effectively took the lead in coordinating the work of other EU agencies, such as EASO and Europol, collaborating in this way in identifying the nationality and identity of migrants, searching for profiled criminals and terrorists and persuading individuals.12 The measures also aimed at fighting against the activity of human smugglers. The core of the reform was the introduction of a temporary relocation scheme, which in practice means the transfer of persons who are in need of international protection from one EU Member State to another. According to the definition of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), “relocation is an intra-EU process through which EU Member State help one another to cope with the pressure on their asylum systems resulting from sudden influxes by relocating persons in need of international protection who have requested asylum. Relocation is a manifestation of internal EU solidarity and responsibility sharing, particularly with those countries at the external borders of the European Union that are most affected by sudden increases in the arrival of asylum seekers.”13 The organisation provided pre-departure support such as health assessments and pre-departure orientation sessions as well as movement assistance to more than 34,500 persons relocated from Italy and Greece to 25 EU Member and Associated States through the EU-wide emergency relocation scheme. According to the organisation, “the experiences of this scheme can serve as guidance for the establishment of a future solidarity mechanism, preferably materializing under the new Dublin Regulation and as part of the CEAS reform.”14 It should be noted, however that the effective implementation of the scheme was hampered by a requirement that allowed to relocate persons belonging to nationalities whose rate of recognition for refugee or subsidiary protection status was higher than 75% within that particular group.15 Villa, Villafranca and Corradi pointed out that according to this criterion, the relocation was possible mainly for Eritrean, Iraqi, Somali, and Syrian refugees. In the case of Italy, for example, arrivals who belonged to these nationalities represented only 7% of the asylum claims presented in the country from 2015 until June 2018.16

Roderick Parkes – Annelies Pauwels: Impact of the Migration Challenges on the EU Policy Framework. In: Erzsébet N. Rózsa (Ed.) – Maja Bučar – Gunilla Herolf – András Hettyey – Annelies Pauwels–Roderick Parkes: Mapping Migration Challenges in the EU Transit and Destination Countries. European Institute of the Mediterranean. March 2017. <https://www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/201703EuroMeSCo-Joint-Policy-Study-6.pdf > Accessed: 16 April 2020 12

International Organisation for Migration (IOM) – Regional Office for the European Economic Area, the European Union and NATO: Relocation. <https://eea.iom.int/relocation > Accessed: 24 March 2020.

International Organisation for Migration (IOM).

María-Teresa Gil-Bazo: Refugee status, subsidiary protection, and the right to be granted asylum under EC law. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). November 2006. <https://www.unhcr.org/research/ working/455993882/refugee-status-subsidiary-protection-right-granted-asylum-under-ec-law.html > Accessed: 7 May 2019. 15

16 Matteo Villa–Antonio Villafranca–Elena Corradi: Migranti: una bussola per il Consiglio europeo. Istituto Affari Internazionali (ISPI). 28 June 2018 <https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/migranti-una-bussola-ilconsiglio-europeo-20890 > Accessed: 7 May 2020.

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As we have already noted, the temporary relocation scheme was adopted to mitigate the pressure faced by the frontline countries. Although only a minority of asylum seekers were relocated, the programme has generated significant bitterness among some Member States. In September 2017, the programme abruptly stopped with the relocation of less than 30% of the originally intended number, including only 2% of unauthorised arrivals to Italy and Greece.17 It should be underlined too that “loopholes” in the current asylum system have largely nullified the Dublin Regulation in general. For instance, a migrant can submit a refugee claim with a different EU Member State if she or he has lived (even irregularly) in this country for at least five consecutive months (legally termed as “tolerated illegal presence”) before filing an asylum claim. Achilli points out that as a consequence countries like Germany have received more asylum applications than frontline Member States like Greece and Italy.18 In May 2016, as part of its proposed reform of the Common European Asylum System, the Commission presented a draft proposal too, in order to make the Dublin system more transparent and enhance its effectiveness, while providing a mechanism to deal with situations of disproportionate pressure on the Member States’ asylum systems, the Dublin IV Regulation.19 It should be noted, however, that despite various proposals and initiatives to reform the current system, the European Union has not yet found a common agreement on the long-needed reform of the Dublin Regulation. Villa points out that this has given rise to attempts by European policymakers to “externalise” migration management to non EU-countries, which resulted in various actions, “such as delegating border control measures, asking for stronger domestic efforts against migrant smuggling and trafficking, or increasing the return of undocumented migrants from Europe to their countries of origin.”20

THE EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS OF EU MIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICIES: NEW TOOLS IN A NEW ERA? As already mentioned, the unexpected rise in the number of migrants coming by sea highlighted the weaknesses of the European Union’s policies in the field of migration, and placed unprecedented pressure on the mechanisms that the Union had established in this field. As a consequence, the EU initiated a process of reform of its main tools—notably, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and the Dublin Regulation. The crisis also revealed that any sustainable solution would need to involve the EU, as no Member State

Luigi Achilli: Why are we not reforming the Dublin Regulation yet? Euractiv. 25 October 2018. <https://www. euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/opinion/why-are-we-not-reforming-the-dublin-regulation-yet/ > Accessed: 7 May 2020. 17

Luigi Achilli. 116.

European Commission: Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliamant and of the Council. European Commission. 4 May 2016. <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/ european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160504/dublin_reform_proposal_ en.pdf > Accessed: 24 March 2020. 19

20 Matteo Villa: The EU and sub-Saharan Africa: a new path to effective cooperation. In: Building Trust: the Challenge of Peace and Stability in the Mediterranean. Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI). 22 November 2018. 112. <https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/building-trust-challenge-peace-and-stabilitymediterranean-21624 > Accessed: 1 April 2020.

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would be able to solve the problem by itself due to the highly complex and interconnected drivers of migration (the so-called “push and pull” factors) which no single state can tackle. However, the interests of the destination, transit and unaffected Member States diverged in such a way that no clear, sustainable EU-wide solution was able to materialise.21 Therefore, the European Union decided to shift the management of migration and asylum towards a more visible (compared to previous years) externalisation approach through adopting several measures in order to stop the influx of people heading to the Continent before they reach European shores. This approach has also been referred by Katz22 as “a system of off-shoring the migration process” or “shifting the burdens associated with migration, such as border controls and migration management outside of the country’s jurisdiction,”23 or by Strik as “outsourcing its responsibility” to third countries.24 Üstün points out that externalisation has two main components: “The first is the use of classical migration control instruments such as border control; measures to combat irregular migration, smuggling and trafficking; asylum systems’ capacity-building; and migration management in transit countries. The second component is a series of provisions to facilitate the return of asylum seekers and irregular migrants to third countries.”25 Vít Novotný emphasises that the main elements in externalising immigration might be: • • • • • • •

significantly improved EU external border management in cooperation with third countries; determining asylum status of migrants as close to the country of origin as possible; this could be done at EU consulates or at reception centres set up by the EU; guaranteeing safety, security and basic welfare in the reception centres; encouraging voluntary returns to countries of origin; offering (positive and negative) incentives to governments of non-EU countries, especially for accepting their own nationals; potential resettlement of the most vulnerable individuals into the EU (resettlement means accepting selected refugees after security screening); decoupling of life-saving operations in the sea from bringing refugees into the EU.26

N. Rózsa (Ed.)–Bučar–Herolf–Hettyey–Pauwels–Parkes.

Sarah Katz: A More Acceptable Solutuion: The Proposed European Union Agency of Asylum and Refugees. Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law. 2017. 310. <https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=2513&context=jil > Accessed: 11 May 2020 22

23 Çiğdem Üstün: The Impact of Migration Policies on the EU’s Image as a Value-Driven Normative Actor. PapersIEMed (EuroMeSCo Series). European Institute of the Mediterranean. December 2019. <https://www. euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/EuroMeSCo46_Cigdem-Ustun.pdf > Accessed: 9 April 2020.

Sergio Carrera–Juan Santos Vara–Tineke Strik: Constitutionalising the External Dimensions of EU Migration Policies in Times of Crisis. Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS). 5 July 2019. 13. <https://www.ceps.eu/download/public ation/?id=23429&pdf=9781788972475-Constitutionalising-the-External-Dimensions-of-EU-Migration-Policies-in-Timesof-Crisis-The-external-dimensions-of-EU-migration-and-asylum-policies-in-times-of-crisis.pdf > Accessed: 3 April 2020. 24

Üstün. 13.

Vít Novotný: Externalising Migration Controls? Think Big, Start Small. Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies. 29 June 2018. <https://www.martenscentre.eu/blog/externalising-migration-controls-think-big-startsmall > Accessed: 3 April 2020. 26

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It should be noted that the externalising approach to asylum and immigration which became a more visible priority after the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” uprisings, can even traces its roots back to the late 90s: as the path towards an externalising implementation of asylum and immigration began with the Tampere European Council of 1999, followed by a number of initiatives that aimed to expand this element.27 The limitations of the current analysis do not allow us to concentrate on the development of externalisation and previous significant steps (e.g. the political guidelines of Jean-Claude Juncker in 2014 when the President of the European Commission emphasised the necessity of focusing on an externalising approach), therefore we will focus on impacts of the migration crisis, that from 2014 and 2015 pushed the issue to the top of the European Commission’s political agenda.28 The European Agenda on Migration has already included elements/proposals that emphasised the role of origin and transit countries in Africa. In November 2015, the leaders of EU and African countries met at the Valletta Summit on Migration to discuss the migrant crisis. As a result of the Summit, an Action Plan was adopted that—taking account the common interests of the EU and African states—, focused on addressing the root causes of migration, strengthening cooperation on tackling irregular migration, human trafficking and smuggling, and increasing the development benefits of migration. The EUR 1.8 billion Emergency EU Trust Fund for Africa was agreed to implement the Action Plan.29 Another significant step that clearly shows the shift towards prioritising the external or foreign policy dimension of migration policies was the creation of the EU–Turkey Statement, which was presented as an emergency solution to the situation that was developing in Europe.30 After the adoption of the European Agenda on Migration in May 2015 and the signing of the EU–Turkey Statement on 18 March 2016 (or as it is referred by various authors and in many case by the media EU–Turkey agreement or EU–Turkey deal), the European Union continued its path towards externalisation, adopting the New Partnership Framework in 2016, which focused on five priority countries in Africa (namely Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal).31 The EU–Turkey Statement, now considered as an effort to establish “new ways to bring order into migration flows,” created a precedent for the EU and raised expectations about the

Alberto Tagliapietra: The European Migration Crisis: A Pendulum between the Internal and External Dimensions. Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). June 2019. <https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaip1912.pdf > Accessed: 3 April 2020. 27

Jean-Claude Juncker: A new start for Europe: My agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change. European Commission. Political Guidelines for the next European Commission. 15 July 2014. <https://ec.europa. eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/juncker-political-guidelines-speech_en.pdf > Accessed: 9 April 2020. 28

Parkes–Pauwels.

European Council: EU-Turkey statement. 18 March 2016. European Council. Press release. <https://www. consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/ > Accessed: 3 April 2020. 30

31 European Commission, Establishing a New Partnership Framework with Third Countries under the European Agenda on Migration (COM/2016/385), 7 June 2016. <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/ files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160607/ communication_external_aspects_eam_towards_new_migration_ompact_en.pdf> Accessed: 12 May 2020.

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design of new agreements of this kind.32 Carrara, Vara and Strik note in their publication that the increase in the number of entries by asylum seekers in 2015 provoked not only a political, but also a legitimation crisis in the Union.33 The experts point out too that the crisis, “despite having its deepest roots in the incapacity or lack of political willingness by many EU Member States to secure solidarity-based responses and safe reception conditions for those seeking international protection, hit back at the EU and its added value in these policy domains as a whole.” 34 Despite some practical results and advancements that the EU could achieve through the implementation of the EU–Turkey Statement and the Migration Partnership Framework, it is important to highlight some sensitive elements and weak points of the two abovementioned initiatives, as well as some critical aspects in general of the external dimension of migration and asylum policies. As we have already pointed out, the external dimensions of EU migration policy have a long history. During the last decades, the EU has developed various forms of policy, legal and financial instruments with the aim of strengthening collaboration with third countries in the management of migration, borders and asylum as part of the so called Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). “These include, for instance, readmission agreements, visa facilitation agreements, mobility partnerships and common agendas on migration and mobility, high level dialogues, consultative processes, joint declarations and several financial frameworks.”35 According to Tagliapietra the EU–Turkey Statement represented a crucial moment in the Union’s response to the migration crisis, making the point at which European leaders openly started to operate “abroad.”36 By signing the EU–Turkey Statement in 2016, Turkey agreed to act as Europe’s “migration buffer zone” by contributing to the EU’s efforts to tackle migration in various ways: hosting migrants and refugees; preventing departures; intercepting boats in exchange for the EU’s financial support under the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey.37 Tagliapietra highlights that the agreement has clearly achieved its goal of reducing the entry of irregular migrants from Turkey into Greece and then into the European Union. However, it has not provided a structural solution to the migration crisis and has raised several concerns regarding the conditions that refugees have to face in Turkey and the agreement’s compliance with EU and international law. One of these questions is related to the principle of non-refoulement which constitutes the cornerstone of international refugee protection. The Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention underlines that “no Contracting State shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of

Enzo Cannizzaro: Denialism as the Supreme Expression of Realism. A Quick Comment on NF v. European Council. European Papers. Vol. 2, No. 1. 15 March 2017. 251-257. In: Tagliapietra 2019. 11. 32

Carrera–Santos Vara–Strik.

Carrera–Santos Vara–Strik. 1.

Carrera–Santos Vara–Strik. 8.

Tagliapietra. 8.

Vít Novotný: The EU and the Prospect of a New Migration Wave from Turkey. Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies. 22 January 2020. <https://www.martenscentre.eu/sites/default/files/publication-files/ euturkey_and_migration.pdf > Accessed: 8 April 2020. 37

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territories where his [or her] life or freedom would be threatened on account of his [or her] race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”38 The European Commission points out that “the principle of non-refoulement is a part of customary international law and is therefore binding on all States, whether or not they are parties to the Geneva Refugee Convention Protocol.”39 This issue has been discussed in the context of the EU–Turkey agreement due to the wording about returning “all new irregular migrants” to Turkey, that has raised doubts about the compliance with the principle of nonrefoulement, and the perception of Turkey as a safe third country to which migrants are returned. As a matter of fact, Amnesty International stressed that “contrary to what is required under EU and international law—Turkey does not provide effective protection to the asylum-seekers and refugees on its territory.”40 Even the European Ombudsman criticised the EU–Turkey Statement calling on the Commission “to include in its future progress reports on the implementation of the Agreement—agreed by the European Council—a separate section focusing on human rights risks and on measures to reduce them.”41 Besides the mentioned concerns, the EU-Turkey Statement has been criticised for other aspects, too. Carrera and Cortinovis pointed out that the selective mobility approach included in the “one-for-one resettlement scheme”—which only covers certain Syrians—is not respecting established principles of international refugee law which lie at the basis of the UN Global Compact on Refugees (UN GCR). “In particular, the scheme violates the prohibition of non-discrimination based on country of origin as laid down in Art. 3 of the 1951 Geneva Convention.”42 Carrera, Vera and Strik point out that the new approaches of the EU external migration policies “do not help in advancing European integration, but rather the opposite, bring a tangible risk of disintegrating areas of intervention where the EU already counts with exclusive or at least shared legal competence,” and argue on the fact that “as more intergovernmental elements are brought in, not only the institutional interests and effectiveness, but also its

38 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. UNHCR. 26 January 2007 <https://www.unhcr.org/4d9486929.pdf > Accessed: 10 May 2020. 39 European Commission Migration and Home Affairs: Non-refoulement definition. European Commission. <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/nonrefoulement_en > Accessed: 10 May 2020. 40 Amnesty International: No Safe Refuge – Asylum-seekers and refugees denied effective protection in Tukey. Amnesty International. 2016. <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR4438252016ENGLISH.pdf > Accessed: 10 May 2020.

European Ombudsman: Ombudsman: EU must continue to assess human rights impact of EU-Turkey deal. 19 January 2017. <https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/hu/press-release/en/75136 > Accessed: 10 May 2020. 41

42 Sergio Carrera–Elspeth Guild: EU-Turkey plan for handling refugees is fraught with legal and procedural challenges. CEPS. 10 March 2016. <https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/eu-turkey-plan-handling-refugeesfraught-legal-and-procedural-challenges/els > Accessed: 14 April 2020. In: Sergio Carrera–Roberto Cortinovis: The EU’s Role in Implementing the UN Global Compact on Refugees Contained Mobility vs. International Protection. Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS). April 2019. 5. <https://www.ceps.eu/wp-content/ uploads/2019/04/LSE-04_ReSOMA_ImplementingGCR.pdf > Accessed: 14 April 2020

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checks and balances may be trampled underfoot by (diverging) national interests.”43 The same experts emphasise that “the first victims of this disintegration will most probably be the fundamental rights which the EU needs to comply with while going abroad.”44 Carrera, Vera and Strik underline too that the EU–Turkey Statement and EU readmission arrangements constitute policy tools which stand far away form the original shapes of international agreements in the EU legal system, and their compatibility with the rule of law and the check and balances principle is also very questionable.45 In the same work Strik examines how the “EU is working towards outsourcing its responsibility for refugees by, on the one hand, amending its internal standards on the safe third-country concept and, on the other hand, through formal and informal agreements with third countries”46 Strik concludes that the consequences of readmission agreements, bilateral border cooperation, as well as the prioritisation of preventing irregular migration in its foreign policies undermine the GAMM’s objective of enhancing the protection for refugees, in fact “this shifting out policy not only enhances the risk of weakening the rights of refugees, but also reduces their mobility chances by impeding regional free movement arrangements.”47 Analysing the EU’s third country arrangements in the context of the UN GCR, Carrera and Cortinovis point out that “during recent decades, the EU has developed a complex and diversified matrix of policy, legal and financial instruments to involve third countries in the management of migration, borders and asylum.”48 The authors highlight that in the name of the 2015 European Refugee Humanitarian Crisis the “EU cooperation with third countries on asylum and migration has been re-prioritised, leading to the adoption of a number of non-legally binding political arrangements.”49 It is important to note that a shift in the EU policy has been revealed in recent years: “from an approach emphasising formal cooperation through legal acts and international agreements towards another calling for informal channels and political tools or non-legally binding/technical arrangements of cooperation often linked to emergency-driven EU financial tools.”50 In another research paper Carrera and Cortinovis highlight that the “closed ports policy” declared by the former Italian Ministry of Interior in June 2018 and the refusal to let NGO ships conducting Search and Rescue (SAR) criticised the EU for the idea of creating an “agreement” similar to the so called EU-Turkish Statement. The Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF) for instance underlined that “the EU is misrepresenting the reality on the ground. Libya

Carrera–Santos Vara–Strik. 11.

Carrera–Santos Vara–Strik. 13.

Sergio Carrera–Roberto Cortinovis: The EU’s Role in Implementing the UN Global Compact on Refugees Contained Mobility vs. International Protection. Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS). April 2019. 4. <https://www.ceps.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/LSE-04_ReSOMA_ImplementingGCR.pdf > Accessed: 14 April 2020. 48

Carrera–Roberto Cortinovis. 2019. 4.

Carrera–Cortinovis. 2019. 4.

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is not a safe place and blocking people in the country or returning them to Libya makes a mockery of the EU's so-called fundamental values of human dignity and rule of law.”51 With regard to the development dimensions of the EU policies, it is worth noting that the Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries have been one of the most important recipients of the EU development funds in previous years. Villa points out that “despite some efforts to the contrary, the EU and its Member States have paid a little attention to domestic political, social, and economic developments in SSA countries, or to the effects of their own policies on those countries.”52 In the framework of the externalisation attempts, the EU has tried to link cooperation on migration from non-EU countries to development topics by focusing on the “root causes.” It should be noted that while the analysis of the problem is appropriate (certain economic, demographic and social factors could motivate people to move), the logic behind the proposed solution and policy responses were based on misconception. “The idea was that, by helping low-income countries to develop economically, emigration would decrease.”53 Many researchers examined the relationship between migration and development, calling attention that the lack of profound analysis could lead to simplified policy recommendations and responses when it comes to reduce migration through development in the origin countries. For instance, Haas defines the relationship between migration and development as “reciprocal, but asymmetric.”54 The expert calls attention that economic and human development in low-income societies typically increases migration. “Only when countries achieve high-income status and rural-to-urban transitions have been largely completed do emigration levels tend to go down. This typically yields a non-linear, inverted-U-shaped relationship between development and emigration levels.”55

Figure 1. The non-linear relation between development and migration according to Haas

51 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF): MSF Warns of Inhumane Detention Conditions in Libya as EU discusses Migration. 2 February 2017. <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/news-stories/news/msfwarns-inhumane-detention-conditions-libya-eu-discusses-migration > Accessed: 15 May 2020.

Villa. 112.

Hein de Haas: Paradoxes of Migration and Development. International Migration Institute. December 2019. 15. <https://www.migrationinstitute.org/publications/paradoxes-of-migration-and-development > Accessed: 11 May 2020. 54

de Haas. 4.

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Haas highlights that those narratives that explain development—without considering various relevant circumstances—as a solution for perceived migration problems are logically misleading: development in certain cases could lead to opposite effects rather than the “desired” decrease in migration. Haas explains that “low-income societies generally have lower emigration levels because poverty tends to constrain people’s movement. Economic development typically increases people’s ability to use migration as a (family) resource to increase their long-term wellbeing, while education and cultural change typically increase people’s aspirations to migrate as a way of achieving ‘modern’ lifestyles.”56 Discussing the complex relationship between migration and development, Villa pointed out that the EU and its Member States turned to a straightforward shift of funds from development aid towards short-term migration control measures and strategies. These can include different instruments, such as awareness-raising campaigns with the aim of highlighting the risks of migrating irregularly in origin countries or projects that directly finance a SSA country’s security apparatus in exchange for stricter border control measures. According to Villa the Migration Partnership Framework (MPF), launched by the EU in 2016, went in this direction: “the Partnership Framework faces several challenges, but one of the most widely emphasised is that it is based on negative conditionality.”57 When we talk about “negative conditionality” we refer to an approach already adopted by the Union in order to enforce a respect of fundamental rights and good governance in third countries. The idea is that a country involved in EU programmes should ensure respect for human rights in order to obtain European funds. With the MPF, this arrangement was changed in a “less for less” approach which in this context means that “if a country is not collaborating sufficiently on the reduction of migration flows, the Union should move the money where there is greater cooperation.”58 Castillejo points out that the MPF is explicitly founded on a conditional approach as “it promises benefits from the EU across a whole range of areas—primarily development cooperation, but also research, trade, education and other areas—in return for cooperation on the EU’s migration goals, as well as threatening negative incentives in response to non-cooperation.”59 According to Tagliapietra, adopting the current approach, mainly based on conditionality and on the outsourcing of the EU’s obligations, the EU “risks undermining its development and human-rights principles, endangering both its role as a human rights enforcer and its international credibility.”60 Reflecting to the current state of migration management in Europe in 2019, Anna Knoll points out that “political stand-offs and ad hoc solutions for

de Haas. 19.

Villa. 113.

Clare Castillejo: The EU Migration Partnership Framework – Time for Rethink? German Development Institute. 2017. 13. <https://www.die-gdi.de/discussion-paper/article/the-eu-migration-partnership-framework-time-fora-rethink/ > Accessed: 11 May 2020. 58

Clare Castillejo. 13.

Tagliapietra.

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disembarkation of refugees rescued in the Mediterranean were continuing in 2019.”61 She also emphasises that previous year’s attempts to find an adequate agreement on the reform of the Dublin principle all failed. Finding a more fair and sustainable responsibilitysharing system for asylum applicants in Europe thus remained one of the most challenging priorities for the EU in 2019.62 As we have already noted, the European Union’s approach to migration has created a crisis of solidarity in recent years. The cooperation and the responsibility sharing have both clearly declined, and resulted in ad hoc initiatives and national solutions. Luigi Crema points out that since the 2011 Arab Spring, “solidarity in integration (i.e. Schengen), solidarity of the institutions helping states (i.e. the control of external borders, Frontex), solidarity among equal Member States (i.e. the system of quotas for asylum seekers), and solidarity as expressed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (in terms of standards of human rights in the EU-Turkey Agreement of 2016) have all been questioned.”63 Regarding the response of Europe to the crisis Paolo Magri emphasised too, that the question of migration had drawn the attention to the fragility of Europe: no type of consensus has been designed on how to manage the crisis and the priority has become to ‘close’ everything, as soon as possible.64 It should be underlined that the joint declaration of intent signed at the informal summit between the interior ministers of Italy, Malta, France and Germany in La Valletta on 23 September 2019 (the Malta declaration) has been presented as a milestone in addressing controversies over SAR and disembarkation of asylum seekers and migrants in the Mediterranean. The declaration aimed at breaking up the set of criteria currently envisaged in the much criticised EU Dublin Regulation and to develop a more predictable solidarity mechanism. According to Carrera and Cortinovis however, “the Malta declaration does not provide a basis for a predictable EU solidarity mechanism” and “a common EU response based on equal solidarity and clear legally binding commitments for all EU Member States in line with Treaty-decision making procedures should be prioritised instead.”65 They emphasise that “this is the key recipe for strengthening the Union’s legitimacy and credibility

Anna Knoll: Europe and migration in 2019: Tough choices, conflicting priorities and existential questions. European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). 4 February 2019. <https://ecdpm.org/ talking-points/europe-and-migration-in-2019-tough-choices-conflicting-priorities-and-existential-questions/ > Accessed: 6 April 2020. 61

Knoll.

Luigi Crema: Solidarity Today: The Test of The Migrant Crisis. In: Unity in Adversity (Immigration, Minorities and Religion in Europe). Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies. Edited by Vít Novotný. Brussels, 2017 <https://www.martenscentre.eu/sites/default/files/publication-files/unity-adversity-immigration-minoritiesreligion-europe.pdf > Accessed: 28 April 2020. 134. 63

64 Paolo Magri–Francesco Rocchetti–Matteo Villa–Valentina Furlanetto: ISPI Express: le migrazioni ai tempi del coronavirus. Podcast. Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI). 24 March 2020. <https://www. ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/ispi-express-le-migrazioni-ai-tempi-del-coronavirus-25467 > Accessed: 6 April 2020. 65 Sergio Carrera–Roberto Cortinovis: The Malta declaration on SAR and relocation: A predictable EU solidarity mechanism? Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS). October 2018. 7. <https://www.ceps.eu/download/ publication/?id=24980&pdf=PI2019_14_SCRC_Malta-Declaration-1.pdf >

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in asylum and migration policies, both internally and in its relations with third countries.”66 In fact, it seems evident that the long-term lack of a sustainable, effective, solidarity-based and credible approach in order to manage international migration could further undermine European cohesion, the credibility of the EU, and create further tensions between the Member States. In the light of these circumstances, in 2019 European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced her intention to initiate a “fresh start on migration.”67 In order to give a more accurate picture of von der Leyen’s vision on the future of migration and border management, we will summarise the main elements of her proposal, as well as some of their potential future impacts.

URSULA VON DER LEYEN’S PROPOSALS TO INITIATE A “FRESH START ON MIGRATION” AND THE NEW PACT ON MIGRATION AND ASYLUM Following the new European Commission’s coming into office on 1 December, all eyes were on the impending New Pact on Migration and Asylum, a plan that was announced by President von der Leyen in order to create a more effective migration management in the long run. One of the President’s first trips following her nomination in July led to Poland where the ruling Eurosceptic government has repeatedly clashed with the EU’s political hub, Brussels, over migration and climate. “Everyone understands we may have different interests, we may want to go different in different directions, but it helps to understand that we have to tackle a problem together,” von der Leyen told Reuters.68 In an interview with the German weekly news magazine, Der Spiegel, von der Leyen said: “I have spoken with many heads of state and government in recent months and my impression is that all of them are eager to leave behind this period of paralysis. I intend to present a comprehensive migration package this spring. The focus will be on reforming the Dublin Regulation and on organising asylum proceedings at EU level. The Dublin system, according to which the country where an asylum seeker first arrives is solely responsible for asylum proceedings and accommodation, is simply unfair for countries like Italy, Spain or Greece that are particularly exposed.”69 On 16 July 2019, Ursula von der Leyen, the designated Candidate for President of the European Commission at that time presented her political guidelines for the upcoming five years to the Members of European Parliament. As a candidate, von der Leyen has already outlined her views on the future of a more sustainable management of migration. Under

Carrera–Cortinovis. 2018. 7.

Ursula von der Leyen: Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2019-2024. European Commission. 16 July 2019. 15. <https://ec.europa.eu/info/election-european-commission-2019-2024_hu > Accessed: 6 April 2020. 67

68 Gabriela Baczynska–Sabine Siebold: EU's new boss signals pragmatic approach in tackling Europe's big challenges. Reuters. 27 November 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-european-commission-presidentnewsmak/eus-new-boss-signals-pragmatic-approach-in-tackling-europes-big-challenges-idUSKBN1Y11PT > Accessed: 6 April 2020. 69 Markus Becker–Peter Müller–Martin Knobbe: 'The Brexit Drama Is a Bitter Lesson for Populists'. Der Spiegel. 7 January 2020. <https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/interview-with-eu-commission-president-ursulavon-der-leyen-a-1303392.html >Accessed: 6 April 2020.

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the heading “Promoting our European way of life” (initially called “Protecting our European way of life” but later modified following discussions with the European Parliament), she outlined her views and proposals with regards to the New Pact on Migration and Asylum and the reform of the Dublin system and asylum rules.70 To have a better understanding of von der Leyen’s conception on a more sustainable approach for migration management, it is worth mentioning all relevant points of the President’s proposed ideas. Primarily, von der Leyen explained in her Political Guidelines her awareness about how this issue raised difficult and divisive discussions: “we need to allay the legitimate concerns of many and look at how we can overcome our differences. We need to look at it in a comprehensive way.”71 At the same time, she highlighted that the European Union needs “strong external borders.” A centrepiece in this ambition is a reinforced European Border and Coast Guard Agency: “agreeing the next Multiannual Financial Framework on time will allow us to reach a standing corps of 10,000 Frontex border guards earlier than the current target of 2027. I want to see these guards with the ability to act at the EU’s external borders in place by 2024.” The President emphasised too that the Union has to “modernise its asylum system.” “A Common European Asylum System must be exactly that—common. We can only have stable external borders if we give enough help to Member States facing the most pressure because of their place on the map. We all need to help each other and contribute.” As stated by von der Leyen, “the above mentioned steps will allow the European Union to return to a fully functioning Schengen Area of free movement, a key driver of our prosperity, security and freedom. However, the Union needs to improve the way it works and pave the way for a potential further enlargement of the area.” Furthermore, “the Union needs a new way of burden sharing and a fresh start.” The President pointed out as well, “that the responsibility of the EU starts in the home countries of those who come to Europe. People do not choose lightly to leave their homes and take a perilous journey. They do so because they feel they have no alternative. We need to put the clear focus of our development cooperation on improving the perspectives of young women and men in their countries of origin. We need to invest in their health, in their education and skills, in infrastructure, sustainable growth and security.” Referring to the activity of human smugglers, von der Leyen underlined that “those who leave put their destiny in the hands of unscrupulous traffickers who leave the most vulnerable behind.” She added that “criminals should never decide the fate of any human being or dictate who comes into our Union. We must disrupt and dismantle their business models with every tool at our disposal.” Concerning the role of origin or transit countries the President stressed too that “a stronger cooperation enablement with third countries is essential. Europe has a responsibility to help the countries hosting refugees to offer them decent and humanitarian conditions. To this end, I support the establishment of humanitarian corridors.” At the same time, she called attention to “the importance of Ursula Von der Leyen.

The following statements by Von der Leyen are from: Ursula von der Leyen: Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2019-2024. European Commission. 16 July 2019 <https://ec.europa.eu/info/electioneuropean-commission-2019-2024_hu > Accessed: 6 April 2020.

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diplomacy, economic development, stability and security,” highlighting that “this would help stop smugglers and bring a stronger commitment to resettlement, as well as pathways for legal migration to help us bring in the people with the skills and talents we need.” In the same document von der Leyen reminded that “extending a helping hand to refugees fleeing persecution or conflict is our moral duty, as well as saving lives at sea. For that, we need a more sustainable approach to search and rescue. We need to move from case-bycase solutions to a more permanent answer,” she added. Finally, she concluded that “this comprehensive approach should also be accompanied by a clear understanding of how to deal with those who are not eligible for protection and need to be returned. Updating our rules on return needs to be part of the solution. Everything is linked.” In line with the above mentioned priorities, von der Leyen tasked Vice-President Schinas, inter alia, with “creating pathways to legal migration as well as ensuring coherence between the external and internal dimensions of migration.” During his hearing in the Parliament, Schinas expressed his intention to promote modern and targeted legal migration schemes, mentioning a possible review of the “blue card” proposal. He also expressed his willingness to launching a new wave of readmission agreements and to taking a fresh look at the EU-Turkey Joint Statement. In addition, Commissioner Ylva Johansson stated during her hearing that “the solidarity mechanism is not voluntary in the European Union and should not be” and announced that she will address the need to “increase resettlement and to develop humanitarian corridors.” Furthermore, she pointed out that “she would be ready to discuss humanitarian visas and to consider new legislative proposals to better combat trafficking in order to destroy the business model of smugglers.”72 In response to the situation at the Turkish-Greek land border in March, von der Leyen stated on 9 March that when she started, there were many different questions and many difficult issues on the agenda, but “the EU-Turkey Statement was not under question.”73 In reference to Greece’s decision to suspend all new asylum applications for a month von der Leyen also said she had reminded Greece that the EU “expects fundamental rights to be respected and implemented, including the right to asylum.”74 At the same time EU Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson called on Greece to lift its suspension, describing the right to asylum as a “fundamental right.”75 The background of Greece’s action was the announcement of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan according to which “Turkey would no longer prevent Syrian refugees from entering Europe.”76 As a consequence of the

Étienne Bassot: The von der Leyen Commission's priorities for 2019-2024. European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS). January 2020. 8. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/646148/EPRS_ BRI(2020)646148_EN.pdf > Accessed: 7 April 2020.

European Commission: Remarks by President von der Leyen at the press conference on the first 100 days of her mandate. European Commission. 9 March 2020. <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ STATEMENT_20_422 > Accessed: 7 April 2020

European Commission. 9 March 2020.

Kristy Siegfried: The Refugee Brief – 10 March 2020. UNHCR. 10 March 2020. <https://www.unhcr.org/ refugeebrief/the-refugee-brief-10-march-2020/ > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

Zia Weis: Turkey says it will no longer stop refugees from entering Europe. Politico. 27 February 2020. < https:// www.politico.eu/article/turkey-says-it-will-no-longer-stop-refugees-from-entering-europe/ > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

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closure of the Greek border, violent clashes erupted at the border and reports also stated that Greek security forces used tear gas and smoke grenades to repel migrants trying to bring down a border fence.77 In the light of the tensions between Greece and Turkey Ursula von der Leyen said that the EU wanted to “develop a workable agreement” with Ankara on refugees and migrants.78 At the same time, von der Leyen stressed that “the events at the Greek-Turkish border clearly point to a politically motivated pressure on the EU’s external border. The migrants who have been brought to the border are in a situation where they need help. Greece needs help, too. Finding a solution to this situation will require relieving the pressure that is put on the border. And ensuring that the individual right to ask for asylum is respected. And it will require supporting both Greece and Turkey to deal with the pressure they are under. Among others, the President drawn attention too to the very urgent need to care for the unattended minors on these Greek islands, as they are the most vulnerable victims of the issue under discussion.” With regards to the New Pact on Migration she emphasised: “we are almost done with it now, we are going in-depth now in the preliminary consultations, and then, after Easter, we will put it forward.”79 The abovementioned case points out not only the fragility of the EU–Turkey agreement and its critical elements, but also some human rights aspects and the possibility of their potential disrespect, as we have already noted it before. The reactions and observations of President von der Leyen suggest that the EU–Turkey collaboration will be a key element of the New Pact on Migration, as well as the further application of the externalisation approach with its all positive and negative impacts. With regards to the EU–Turkey Statement it should be noted too that the above mentioned case was not the first occasion that has drawn attention to the fragility the EU–Turkey Statement: since September 2019, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and ministers of the Turkish government have been repeating their threat to “open the floodgates” holding back the refugees from their mass influx to Europe. However, despite increasing Turkish hostility towards the EU in recent months, institutional cooperation seemed to be continuing. Turkish officials in charge of infrastructure, health and education have made it clear that European financial support is necessary for the country to be able to look after the Syrian refugees within its borders. At the same time, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially expressed the desire to continue hosting refugees in return for EU financial support.80 “As long as the crisis is there we have to work together. The 6 billion euros will not solve the problem when it is finally all spent,” Faruk Kaymakci,

DW News: Greek police fire tear gas at migrants on Turkish border. DW News. 29 February 2020. <https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=NGqBSTZBkUo > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

Hans von der Burchard–David M. Herszenhorn: Von der Leyen wants ‘workable agreement’ with Erdoğan on migration. Politico. 9 March 2020. <https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-turkey-greece-migration-ursula-vonder-leyen-wants-workable-agreement-with-erdogan/ > Accessed: 7 April 2020.

Vít Novotný.

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a deputy Turkish minister of foreign affairs told reporters in Istanbul.81 However, in the light of previous statements made by Erdoğan and leading Turkish politicians, as well as tensions at the Turkish-Greek border in March, it would be reasonable to “develop a workable agreement” as von der Leyen stressed it, or at least reconsider those elements of the agreement that can further undermine its long-term stability. Among these, it must not be forgotten that Turkey received EUR 6 billion of financial support from the European Union until August 2019 to tackle the question of Syrian refugees in the country and there is no commitment from the part of the EU to provide further financial support to the Turkish government. At the same time, other delicate elements of the deal, such as the promise of “visa liberalisation” for Turkish citizens, has remained a never implemented part of the agreement so far.82 There is no doubt that the previously mentioned proposals of von der Leyen and the objectives of the New Pact on Migration are very ambitious, and the “new logic” presumes significant changes with regards to many aspects of the current asylum system. Neidhardt, Maganza, Diez, and De Somer emphasise in their policy paper published by the European Policy Centre in March that the central question on everyone’s mind with regards to the Pact is whether it will be able to forge a new consensus on concrete proposals while also promoting a sustainable and progressive migration and asylum policy. Considering the complexity of the question and previous experiences, the authors pointed out potential difficulties in this regard. Official statements and leaked non-papers from Germany, France, Greece and Italy highlighted continued national divisions which may push the Commission to take a conservative and restrictive approach. The most heated discussions among Member States are centred on the Dublin system and, more specifically, on how to allocate responsibility for refugees. As indicated by the German non-paper, the current rules lead to “clear imbalances” due to the excessive use of the principle of first country of arrival. The experts presume that, in light of the sharp contrasts between national preferences, the Commission may not be able to put forward an ambitious and progressive agenda after all and, consequently, “there is a risk that the Commission will need to water down its reformative spirit, and focus instead on the least controversial and more restrictive policies.”83 Indeed, previous experiences showed that creating a system based on more solidarity and burden sharing is one of the most significant challenges inside the Union when it comes to migration and asylum policies. Tackling migration across the EU’s external border requires a comprehensive and systematic policy response. It would be necessary that Member States collaborate and share responsibility in various policy areas, including

Jonathan Spicer: Turkish official says EU should boost funding of Syrian refugees. Reuters. 14 December 2019. < https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-turkey-refugees-funds/turkish-official-says-eu-should-boostfunding-of-syrian-refugees-idUSKBN1YI0D0 > Accessed: 12 May 2020. 81

Matteo Villa–Valeria Talbot–Teodoro Dalavecuras–Galip Dalay–Valentina Furlanetto: Migranti tra Grecia e Turchia: che succede? ISPI. Online event. 11 March 2020. <https://www.ispionline.it/it/eventi/evento/migrantitra-grecia-e-turchia-che-succede > Accessed: 7 April 2020. 82

83 Alberto Neidhardt–Nicolò Maganza–Olivia Sundberg Diez–Marie De Somer: Policy Update March 2020. European Policy Centre (EPC). March 2020. 2. <https://wms.flexious.be/editor/plugins/imagemanager/ content/2140/publications/EPIM_March_2020_Edition.pdf > Accessed: 7 April 2020.

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asylum policies, refugee resettlement, border management, policies on legal migration. Furthermore, cooperation with non-EU countries hosting refugees would be an essential prerequisite in elaborating long-term, more sustainable solutions. Mattia Di Salvo and Mikkel Barslund pointed out in their policy brief that to make sure that Member States share responsibilities in a more equal manner, their contributions must be compared considering their capacities in the different areas of asylum and migration-related policies. They underlined that in order to measure Member States’s contribution and capacities more effectively, data collection needs to be harmonised, unified and up-to-date. Moreover, efficient assessment and monitoring of Member States’ contributions requires an “institutionalised monitoring system at the EU level.”84 Due to their differences in initial conditions, Member States may prefer to share more responsibility in certain areas than others. Even not all Member States may need to be involved in all areas of asylum and migration policy, however it would be required in the long run that all of them need to be engaged at least in some elements. Currently there is a lack of accurate data on many aspects of migration. Limited, out-of-date and insufficiently disaggregated information hamper the creation of detailed analysis for any policy issue, and consequently risk undermining the efficiency of decision-making process. Furthermore, it might threaten the quality of the policy response itself. For the above mentioned reasons, the experts emphasise the need of a monitoring mechanism with regular reporting that would use present and historical data to monitor and evaluate Member States’ contributions to all areas of migration and asylum policy. “Specifically, the monitoring mechanism would be a practical tool in the design of measures to strengthen the solidarity principle in the policy area of asylum and migration, as stated in Article 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”85

CONCLUSION The current analysis focused on different challenges and questions arising from the current logic of the EU migration and asylum system and the root causes of the existing problems. Among others, the author highlighted that in recent years, the EU has been active in strengthening cooperation with third countries to tackle immigration and border control, therefore focusing on the “external dimension” of EU migration and asylum policy. The analysis called attention to the fact that the absence of strong political will and long-term cooperation perspective in burden sharing among EU Member States to tackle migration has played an important role in prompting the EU to find answers based on externalisation. The research pointed out some critical aspects of the externalisation approach of migration management and intended to present European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s current proposals to elaborate a more sustainable and effective approach for migration management. 84 Mattia Di Salvo–Mikkel Barslund: Migration Policy Scoreboard: A Monitoring Mechanism for EU Asylum and Migration Policy. European University Institute. March 2020. 1. <https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/ handle/1814/66528/PB_2020_11_MPC.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y > Accessed: 22 April 2020.

Mattia Di Salvo–Mikkel Barslund. 4.

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As we have already noted, von der Leyen’s proposals and the New Pact on Migration are very ambitious, and this new approach supposes significant changes with regards to various aspects of the current migration and asylum system. However, it should be noted that Member States are bound to play different roles in asylum and migration policy as a consequence of their differences in geography, history, cultural links with origin and transit countries, and diverse priorities in tackling migration. This could pose significant difficulties to the Commission to realise these current, ambitious goals. It would be already an important progress and step towards a more sustainable migration and asylum system if the Commission could achieve only some of the designated goals. The defined proposals of Ursula von der Leyen—such as stronger cooperation enablement with third countries, developing humanitarian corridors, or creating pathways to legal migration—are crucial prerequisites to create a more effective and sustainable system. The EU should focus on a protection and human-rights sensitive approach and, as the UN GCR emphasises too, on additional complementary pathways to protection, by making flexible use of existing immigration policy tools, such as family reunification, or study and mobility channels. Additional pathways to guarantee the safe arrival and long-term stay of refugees could also be created through enhanced opportunities in the framework of study or education programmes. As Carrera and Cortinovis pointed out “channelling EU development funds into the framework of extra treaty arrangements with third countries that are driven by such an approach is not in line with UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) or UN GCR principles and is not conducive to durable protection-driven solutions for refugees and other forced migrants.” Development cooperation should not be ‘Euro-centric’ but instead focus predominantly on the needs of developing countries.86 Through the current security-driven logic, and in some cases the disregard of development goals and human rights principles and certain legal consequences, the EU risks undermining its own international credibility, as well as its image as a global actor. Regarding the human rights aspect of the question the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights in her letter addressed to European Commission Vice-President Schinas and Commissioner Johansson also highlighted that the “new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum should be firmly underpinned by human rights, effective solidarity and responsibility sharing.”87 It seems evident that current disagreements and in some cases clashes on migration are already impacting and could further weaken the stability and cohesion of the European Union, and furthermore, could put at risk the achievements of European integration, such as the Schengen Agreement. Effective and humane border and migration management require close cooperation between the EU Member States, including also the origin and transit countries. An effective and sustainable European approach cannot exclude the profound examination of the so-called “push factors” of irregular and forced migration. Consequently,

Carrera–Cortinovis. 2019. 17.

Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights: New EU Pact on Migration and Asylum should be firmly underpinned by human rights, effective solidarity and responsibility sharing. Council of Europe. 17 March 2020. <https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/new-eu-pact-on-migration-and-asylum-should-be-firmlyunderpinned-by-human-rights-effective-solidarity-and-responsibility-sharing > Accessed: 22 April 2020 87

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the European Union should concentrate on possibilities to elaborate effective, targeted cooperation agreements with its neighbourhood, rather than focusing predominantly on securitisation and in many cases setting the achievement of migration-management results as a prerequisite for the provision of development funds. These agreements should include several elements that intend to analyse precisely and address the underlying causes of migration such as underdevelopment, unemployment, poverty, lack of perspectives, and political instability. The multi-level (micro-meso-macro) determinants88 or drivers of migration are highly complex, therefore the policy responses of the EU should be properlydesigned, detail-oriented and comprehensive too, taking into account the potential short-, middle-, and long-term effects of such responses.

88 â&#x20AC;&#x2030; Jana Kuhnt: Literature Review: Drivers of Migration Jana Kuhnt Why Do People Leave Their Homes? Is There an Easy Answer? A Structured Overview of Migratory Determinants. German Development Institute. 9/2019. <https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/DP_9.2019.pdf > Accessed: 12 May 2020.

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