The Grand Too Ole Party by Antall József Tudásközpont

ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE

THE GRAND TOO OLE PARTY

ZSOLT PÁLMAI

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ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE

AJRC-Analyses Series of the Antall József Knowledge Centre

Publisher-in-Chief: Péter Antall Managing editor: Péter Dobrowiecki Editorial office: Antall József Knowledge Centre H-1093 Budapest, Czuczor street 2

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THE GRAND TOO OLE PARTY ZSOLT PÁLMAI

It has become somewhat of an axiom in US political discourse that the Republican Party has a young people problem. With young generations seemingly much more liberal and left-leaning than their predecessors, American conservativism and the party that has acted as its standard-bearer are faced with a historical challenge and dilemma. The question is: with demographic and cultural changes slowly eroding their electoral base, does it maintain the ideological course that it has been associated with and attempt to convert enough Millennials and Gen Z-ers to allow it to maintain its relevance and political competitiveness, or does it abandon elements of its existing platform—or at least some prevalent ways in which it has promoted them—to embrace goals currently more commonly associated with the Democrats, while offering alternative paths to them that might help bring aboard young people displeased with the efficacy of the rival party’s establishment in promoting their interests. The present essay offers an examination of the origins and dynamics of this challenge, as well as why they suggest that the latter strategy is the more viable one. We must begin by acknowledging that the challenge is in fact very real. The two youngest age cohorts with voting-age members, Generations Y (those born between 1981 and 1996, also known as Millennials) and Z (those born after 1997, according to the Pew Research Center’s widely-accepted definition)1 are consistently measured to be more liberal, left-leaning, and sympathetic to the Democratic Party than Generation X (1965-1980), Baby Boomers (1946-1964), and the Silent Generation (1928-1945). Millennials are also the most populous age group in the United States today, and thereby possess the largest potential (an important qualifier for reasons discussed below) political force among the various generations.2 That political force, along with that represented by the even younger Gen Z-ers, has overwhelmingly favoured and voted for Democrats, with no sign of that trend reversing: in 2014, the share of Millennial voters who were Democrats or Democrat-leaning independents was 53%, compared with 37% who favoured Republicans, and by the 2018 Congressional elections that gap had grown to 27 points (59-32). This article is concerned primarily with young voters, but for the sake of comparison, it will be noted that the Democratic advantage also exists, albeit with a significantly smaller gap, for Generation X (48-43), and Baby Boomers (48-46), while Silents stand alone as the sole age cohort with an overall tilt

Michael Dimock: Defining generations: Where Millennials end and Generation Z begins. Pew Research Center. 17 January, 2019. <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/17/where-millennials-end-and-generation-zbegins/> Accessed: 8 May 2020. 1

2 Richard Fry: Millennials overtake Baby Boomers as America’s largest generation. Pew Research Center. 28 April 2020. <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/28/millennials-overtake-baby-boomers-as-americaslargest-generation/> Accessed: 8 May 2020.

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toward the GOP (52-43, with the gap having widened over the last decade).3 This 27-point lead among an age group is already impressive in and of itself, but compared to the differences among other cohorts, it may appear downright daunting to Republicans with an eye on the future. Meanwhile, although only the oldest members of Generation Z have had an opportunity to cast votes at the 2016 and 2018 elections, giving us limited data on their voting behaviour, that data suggests that they represent a continuation of the political tendencies associated with Millennials, while other research indicates that the liberal and leftward leanings mentioned above (and discussed below) are even more prominent among that cohort. Cutoff points for age groups in polling vary, but both Pew’s analysis of 18-29-year olds showed a 62-37 tilt towards Democrats in 2018,4 while CIRCLE found that 35% of 18-24-year olds were affiliated with that party, compared with 21% Republicans, in addition to 40% of young independents who said they would vote Democrat versus 25% percent who said they favoured the GOP,5 in both cases representing a much wider gap than in the case of older generations. The available data on party switching does little to paint a rosier picture for Republicans. At first glance, the numbers almost make party-hopping look like a non-issue, as research has shown that, between 2011 and 2017, the rate of Democrats and Republicans who left their party was nearly identical at 14% and 13% respectively, with the majority of switchers becoming independents, and the rest moving to the other major party. More revealing, however, is a look at who switched. According to the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group, Democrats were deserted mainly by older voters, and Republicans by younger ones. Moreover, Democrats did best at retaining the 18-29 age cohort, keeping their rate among deserters at just over 10% (with less than 5% of those switching to Republican), while the same rate for Republicans was nearly 20% (with over 10% of them becoming Democrats).6 Further details about who these Republican party-hoppers were and why they left the party will offer a valuable look at the demographic and attitudinal challenges the GOP faces, as the basic factors that have catalysed these departures remain unchanged. Moving on to a more detailed analysis of values, perhaps the most controversial (as far as American media is concerned) development regarding young Americans is their uniquely intense attraction to socialism—or, more accurately, their disillusionment with capitalism and big business, as, according to Gallup, socialism has not really made any noteworthy net gains

Wide Gender Gap, Growing Educational Divide in Voters’ Party Identification – Trends in party affiliation among demographic groups. Pew Research Center. 20 March 2018. <https://www.people-press.org/2018/03/20/1trends-in-party-affiliation-among-demographic-groups/> Accessed: 6 May 2020. 3

Alec Tyson: The 2018 midterm vote: Divisions by race, gender, education. Pew Research Center. 8 November 2018. <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/11/08/the-2018-midterm-vote-divisions-by-race-gender-education/> Accessed: 7 May 2020. 4

Young People's Ambivalent Relationship with Political Parties. Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning & Engagement. 24 October 2018. <https://circle.tufts.edu/latest-research/young-peoples-ambivalentrelationship-political-parties> Accessed: 8 May 2020. 5

6 Robert Griffin: Party Hoppers – Understanding Voters Who Switched Partisan Affiliation. Democracy Fund Voter Study Group. December 2017. <https://www.voterstudygroup.org/publication/party-hoppers> Accessed: 6 May 2020.

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in popularity over the past decade within the 18-39 age group (or any significant gross gains in any other, for that matter). Instead, young American adults are in the midst of a major falling-out with capitalism, whose favourability rating took a 15-point hit between 2010 and 2019 (from 66% to 51%, with socialism measured at 49% in the same study), and generations Y and Z are in fact the only age cohort where this tendency has played out over this time period.7 Clearly, this is a net loss for a party that has embraced small-state capitalism and a general pro-business attitude as fundamental elements of its modern-day platform. A less partisanship-focused analysis of generational values only reinforces the image that young Americans are becoming an increasingly difficult target for the GOP. With data on the youngest voters’ behaviour in the voting booth understandably more limited than in the case of other cohorts, their political leanings can be further illuminated through the investigation of their background and attitudes on various issues, which show a continuity of attitudes that have shaped Millennials’, and later Generation Z’s political allegiances, continually pushing them further from mainstream Republicanism. This is immediately apparent on a cursory look at the importance they assign to key policy areas: for Americans aged 18-29, the environment and healthcare stand out as the top priorities, followed by education, with the economy in fourth place, and with immigration—a top issue for all 45+ cohorts—scoring remarkably low.8 With the GOP’s recent messaging focused largely on immigration, security issues, and tax policy, this divide should call into question the sustainability of these priorities. We have already touched upon Millennials’ increasingly liberal general outlook, with a 2018 study identifying the generation as the only one where the majority (57%) holds such positions, while the percentage of those who are “consistently” or “mostly” conservative is the lowest among them at 12%.9 However, this in itself does little to outline the individual attitudes and values that put this cohort at odds with the GOP. A big part of the Republican Party’s identity is derived from Judeo-Christian values, and indeed, Evangelical Christians (especially whites, who comprise 76% of this group)10 have been a reliable pillar of the party’s constituency: in the 2016 election, exit polls indicated that 79% of them supported Donald Trump, with white Evangelicals making up as much as 46% of his winning coalition.11 Meanwhile, it appears that religion is experiencing a drawn-out decline in the United States, with young people markedly less likely to be religious or to identify with organized religion. From Silents to the youngest Millennials, a gradual shrinking is observable in the share of

Lydia Saad: Socialism as Popular as Capitalism Among Young Adults in U.S. Gallup. 25 November 2019. <https:// news.gallup.com/poll/268766/socialism-popular-capitalism-among-young-adults.aspx> Accessed: 5 May 2020.

8 The Economist/YouGov Poll. May 2019. <https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/ document/fs1r87zj1f/econTabReport.pdf> Accessed: 6 May 2020.

The Generation Gap in American Politics. Pew Research Center. 1 March 2018. <https://www.people-press. org/2018/03/01/the-generation-gap-in-american-politics/> Accessed: 6 May 2020. 9

Religious Landscape Study – Evangelical Protestants. Pew Research Center. 2014. <https://www.pewforum. org/religious-landscape-study/religious-tradition/evangelical-protestant/> Accessed: 12 May 2020.

Jason Husser: Why Trump is reliant on white evangelicals. The Brookings Institution. 6 April 2020. <https://www. brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/04/06/why-trump-is-reliant-on-white-evangelicals/> Accessed: 7 May 2020.

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those who believe in a god with self-described absolute certainty (from 71% to 50)12, while young believers are three times as likely to be unaffiliated with a church (this being true for 11% of Silents and 36% of Millennials). At this point it should come as no surprise that social issues represent another area where the GOP is increasingly out of touch with young Americans. It should—and does— follow from the above paragraph that on abortion, young Americans are the most likely to say that it should be legal in all or most cases (with 62% in agreement with the statement, followed by Gen X at 59%, Boomers at 53%, and Silents at 48%). They are also the age cohort most supportive of various minorities, being more likely than older Americans to identify discrimination as the primary challenge facing African-Americans (at 52%, with Silents on the other end of the scale at 28%), see immigration as a positive for the country (79%, with Silents at 47%), and favor gay marriage (73%).13 In each of these areas, singling out Gen Z once again reveals a continuation of these trends, with certain specifics highlighted below with a closer focus on Republican-leaning Gen Z-ers, who embody the very same tendencies within their political camp. Finally, the same pattern emerges in the different age cohorts’ attitudes on the role of government and foreign policy. In stark contrast with Republicans’ insistence on a general small-state approach (e.g. through a preference for less regulation and lower taxes), younger generations of Americans consistently prefer increased government involvement in solving problems and providing services: while only 30% of Silents agree with this approach, Millennials do so with a 57% majority, with Boomers at 43%, and Gen X-ers at 50%. The same gradual increase in support can be observed with regard to government-provided healthcare for all (with the scale ranging from 52% to 67%) and the idea that the country’s current economic system “unfairly favors powerful interests” (with 50% of Silents and 66% of Millennials saying this). Meanwhile, the insistence on a strong military and ensuring peace and the promotion of democracy via military means—the most recent major example of which, the Bush Administration’s Iraq War, came during the formative years of many Millennials—is also more likely to be rejected by young Americans in favor of a diplomatic approach: 77% of them agree with this (compared with 59% of Gen X-ers, 52% of Boomers, and 43% of Silents), and they are also favor working with allies instead of unilateral action more than older age cohorts (66%, with a gradual drop to 48% for Silents).14 Distilling the above into a very succinct conclusion, Kori Schake of the conservative-leaning American Enterprise Institute writes: “The fact is that young Americans are less interested in the traditional GOP pairing: a strong military and low taxes.”15 For the Republican Party to be able to seek a path forward, it is important to understand why younger Americans think the way they do. While these attitudes are obviously Religious Landscape Study – Generational cohort by religious group. Pew Research Center. 2014. <https:// www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/generational-cohort/> Accessed: 12 May 2020.

Pew 1 March 2018

Kori Schake: The Republican Party Needs Millennials to Survive. The Atlantic. 17 July 2019. <https://www. theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/07/gop-needs-millennial-voters/594034/> Accessed: 8 May 2020.

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motivated by a multitude of factors, many of them highly subjective, formative generational experiences such as the one referenced above, in addition to major demographic changes, offer two useful areas of investigation for understanding the youngest age cohorts. We shall begin with the latter. It is small wonder that young Americans are more socially liberal and tolerant when they are increasingly more diverse than their forebears, and it is at this point that we refer back to party-hoppers. In addition to people under 45, the voters most likely to recently leave the GOP were people of color.16 This is one of the clearest warning signs for the party, as only a very narrow majority (52%) of Generation Z is estimated to be non-Hispanic white—and people from this cohort are also expected to be even better-educated (across all ethnicities) and more likely to live in cities than Millennials, all of which have traditionally contributed to a Democratic tilt.17 Race is especially relevant in this instance, as it has consistently had a strong correlation with political preferences (at the 2018 midterm elections, for example, 70% of Asians, 69% of Hispanics, and 90% of African-Americans voted for a Democratic House candidate, while only 44% of whites did so).18 Meanwhile, the shared experiences of these younger generations have also primed them for political reflexes to which the Republican Party has heretofore failed to adapt. For people born in the 1980s and later, the Reagan economy and victory in the Cold War, which still gets referenced in Republican circles as a golden age for the party, may hold precious childhood memories at best, but it was too early in the life of even the oldest Millennials to coincide with their politically formative years, which research has shown mostly occur between age 14 and 24 (with the model showing that events at 18 are up to three times as consequential as those at 40), sending repercussions that continue to strongly affect a person’s politics and partisan leanings for life.19 This means that, especially for Millennials, events such as the 2001 September 11 attacks, the ensuing unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the mismanagement of Hurricane Katrina, and the Great Recession and its adverse implications on their personal finances—which all happen to be closely associated with the GOP—were defining generational experiences, which do little to evoke an image of American greatness that should be returned to. As a consequence, in 2016, voters aged 18-29 represented the most pro-Clinton—or anti-Trump—age group (at a 55-32 split for Clinton), and remain deeply unimpressed by Trumpism, with only a quarter of 18-34-year-olds approving

Griffin 2017.

Richard Fry—Kim Parker: Early Benchmarks Show ‘Post-Millennials’ on Track to Be Most Diverse, BestEducated Generation Yet. Pew Research Center. 15 November 2018. <https://www.pewsocialtrends. org/2018/11/15/early-benchmarks-show-post-millennials-on-track-to-be-most-diverse-best-educatedgeneration-yet/> Accessed: 11 May 2020.

18 Jens Manuel Krogstad et al.: Key takeaways about Latino voters in the 2018 midterm elections. Pew Research Center. 9 November 2018. <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/11/09/how-latinos-voted-in-2018midterms/> Accessed: 13 April 2020.

Amanda Cox: How Birth Year Influences Political Views. The New York Times. 7 July 2014. <https://www. nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/08/upshot/how-the-year-you-were-born-influences-your-politics.html> Accessed: 6 May 2020. 19

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his job performance.20 One researcher has even suggested that the fallout from the Great Recession, including the 2008 bailouts, effectively “pitted” young Americans against older age groups—and their more Republican-leaning, capitalist attitudes—due to their vastly different financial circumstances, which appears to be a valid observation, considering how young people’s frustration with older generations’ alleged responsibility for, among others, their crushing student loan debt and difficulties regarding homeownership achieved memetic status21 in late 2019.22 At this point, it is worth addressing the idea that the Republican Party should hold its current course, because today’s young American leftists and liberals will eventually age into the current definition of conservativism. Unfortunately for the GOP, there is much to suggest that this is not a realistic scenario, at least not to any significant degree. While it is true, that today’s oldest Americans, the majority of whom are Republicans, used to be mostly Democrats: according to Gallup, 51% of the 45-79 age cohort preferred that party in 1993 (compared with 39% who preferred the GOP), but over the course of 20 years their political allegiance flipped, and Democratic support was down to 45%, while preference for the GOP was 48%. However, to extrapolate the trajectory of their politics to the youngest generations would ignore the already-discussed factors behind the latter groups’ attitudes. The same study concludes that this shift had a fair bit to do with race: 85% of the aforementioned age cohort are non-Hispanic whites, which is barely comparable to the 52% we have seen in the case of Gen Z. Whites in general became gradually more Republican in the early 2010s—and since seniors are very white, their cohort was highly affected by this change, which Gallup suggests was motivated at least in part “by recent events that have more closely linked race and political party than was the case in the past, including the mid-2000s debate over immigration, and the election and presidency of Barack Obama.”23 Meanwhile, young people have been consistent in their Democratic tilt, with both their party affiliation and underlying liberalism only becoming more pronounced—with the same being true for Gen X, further undermining the theory that younger age cohorts are on track to turn more Republican. A similar long-term survey by Pew shows Millennials— both whites and non-whites—over a 15-year period becoming more Democratic (whites by a remarkable 10 points, from 42% to 52%),24 while another piece of research showed that, over 13 years, the share of Millennials with consistently or mostly liberal values

David Byler: Millennials could push American politics to the left — or totally upend them. The Washington Post. 22 May 2019. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/05/22/millennials-could-push-american-politicsleft-or-totally-upend-them> Accessed: 6 May 2020. 20

21 Zsolt Pálmai: OK [Insert Generation]. Antall József Knowledge Centre. November 2019. <https://ajtk.hu/en/ research/research-blog/ok-insert-generation> Accessed: 21 May 2020. 22 Malcolm Harris: Why Did Millennials Turn Left? Mother Jones. 12 July 2019. <https://www.motherjones.com/ politics/2019/07/millennials-generation-left-keir-milburn/> Accessed: 8 May 2020.

Jeffrey M. Jones: U.S. Seniors Have Realigned With the Republican Party. Gallup. 26 March 2014. <https:// news.gallup.com/poll/168083/seniors-realigned-republican-party.aspx> Accessed: 5 May 2020. 23

Pew 20 March 2018

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had gone up from 41% to 57%.25 Finally, Pew also cites a relevant long-term study that further underscores the findings mentioned earlier that, following early adulthood, people’s attitudes “tend to be increasingly persistent as [they] age”, and thus it appears safe to conclude that unique generational experiences during formative years are much more likely to define the trajectory of one’s political leanings than some universal human inclination to become more conservative as we get older.26 Everything we have discussed up to this point suggests the conclusion that a major ideological realignment for the GOP is inevitable in the long run in the party wants to remain competitive on a national level. In fact, there are signs that it is already changing, only that change is being driven by its youngest members and sympathisers, not its current high-profile opinion-leaders and decision-makers. Gen Z Americans who identify as Republican represent a notable departure from the GOP that older generations—even their Millennial Republican counterparts—have built. Looking at some of the issues discussed earlier, in general, they are much more tolerant and appreciative of diversity: for example, compared with older Republicans, they are more likely to be sensitive to systemic racism against African-Americans, with 43% of them saying that black people are treated less fairly than whites (which even Millennial Republicans agree with at a rate of only 30%, and with just 20% Gen X-ers, Boomers, and Silents sharing the same view), and they are the only age cohort where the majority of Republicans (51%) say that the country benefits from increased racial and ethnic diversity. Gen Z Republicans are also the least likely within their political camp, at 18%, to believe that humankind does not contribute to climate change and it is just the result of “natural patterns” (this is true for 30% of Millennials, and considerably higher percentages of older cohorts), and a majority of them (52%) would prefer the government stepping in more to solve such problems, in stark contrast with older Republicans, who largely continue to align with the GOP’s traditional shunning of big-government practices (Millennials Republicans are behind Gen Z by 14 points already in this regard, Gen X by 23, Boomers by 29, and only a mere 12% of Silents want to see more government intervention. Finally, while within the field of gender issues Gen Z Republicans are still mostly in line with the GOP mainstream, they represent the furthest departure from it—and, again, the continuation of the apparent tendency of younger generations becoming more liberal than their forebears—, with 28% saying that society should be more accepting of people who do not identify as a man or woman (compared with 20% of Millennial Republicans, 15% of Gen X-ers, 13% of Boomers and 11% of Silents), and 41% saying that further gender options should be recognised on official forms (with Millennials at 27%, Gen X-ers and Boomers at 17%, and Silents at 16%).27 In light of these numbers, it appears inevitable that the Republican

Pew 1 March 2018.

Drew Desilver: The politics of American generations: How age affects attitudes and voting behavior. Pew Research Center. July 9 2014. <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/09/the-politics-of-americangenerations-how-age-affects-attitudes-and-voting-behavior/> Accessed: 8 May 2020. 26

27 Kim Parker et. al.: Generation Z Looks a Lot Like Millennials on Key Social and Political Issues. Pew Research Center. 17 January 2019. <https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2019/01/17/generation-z-looks-a-lot-like-millennialson-key-social-and-political-issues/> Accessed: May 5 2020.

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Party will eventually have to revise its official line with regard to a number of issues—and the relevant policies it promotes—if it wants to appeal to younger generations. This will require the acknowledgement and prioritising of issues that have tended to take a backseat on the party’s agenda and offering solutions that represent a substantial alternative to Democratic proposals. Again, there are smaller-scale examples of this already happening. In July 2019, Republican Senators and Congressmen announced the Roosevelt Conservation Caucus to “embrace and promote constructive efforts to address environmental problems, responsibly plan for all market factors, and base policy decisions on science and quantifiable facts.” The caucus platform rejects the antiscientific stances that have plagued much of the discourse on the issue in Republican circles, while maintaining the market-oriented approach that has traditionally been associated with the party.28 There have been calls for the same principle to be applied across a variety of policy areas to better align the party with the priorities of younger people by using free-market strategies to fight income inequality (an issue almost entirely appropriated by the left) and elp bring down the price of housing, higher education, and healthcare.29 How feasible and effective these policy proposals would work is beside the point—but at least it would help the GOP put up a policy-level fight that goes beyond denying fundamental problems and, in the case of the Affordable Care Act, for example, “repeal and replace” efforts that tend to focus mostly on the former. There is good reason to believe that such efforts would not be in vain. For one, that the youngest voters are also the least likely to actually turn out to vote (30% of eligible Gen Z and 42% of Millennials voted in the 2018 midterms, compared with 55% of Gen X and 64% of Boomers and Silents, which, along with the Electoral College system, has helped Republicans offset their demographic disadvantage in recent elections)30 and affiliate with parties represents a silver lining for today’s GOP, and a potential opportunity for the future. These voters’ reluctance to vote suggests that, while they may have a strong Democratic lean, they do not feel that the party represents their interests to a sufficient degree and/ or with enough efficiency. Indeed, research shows that only 36% of young voters believe that party membership “makes their voice more powerful.”31 Of course, this cuts both ways, but the fact that Republicans can undertake the work of reforming their party to be more ideologically appealing to new generations without having to also fight entrenched party allegiances makes their job at least that much easier. And lastly, there is immense potential for the GOP in Hispanic voters, who, by the November 2020 election, will have become

Kayla Bartsch: Republicans Take an Important Step Back into the Environmental Debate. National Review. 15 July 2019. <https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/07/republicans-take-an-important-step-back-into-the-environmentaldebate/> Accessed: 8 May 2020. 28

29 Alex Muresinau: To Win Over Millennials, Conservatives Must Fight Income Inequality. The American Conservative. <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/to-win-over-millennials-conservatives-must-fight-incomeinequality/> Accessed: 11 May 2020. 30 Anthony Cilluffo—Richard Fry: Gen Z, Millennials and Gen X outvoted older generations in 2018 midterms. Pew Research Center. 29 May 2019. <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/29/gen-z-millennialsand-gen-x-outvoted-older-generations-in-2018-midterms/> Accessed: 12 May 2020.

Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning & Engagement 24 October 2018

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the largest minority voting bloc (making up 13.3% of the electorate, with Blacks is second place at 12.5%) and are already less united in their party preference than African-Americans (at the 2018 midterms 69% of them voted Democrat, compared with 90% of Blacks).32 But beyond their less Democratic-leaning ideological makeup, what makes Hispanics good candidates for future Republicans is that there is evidence that, over time, they begin to place less emphasis on their Hispanic ethnicity and identify with mainstream (white) American society, defining themselves more along country of origin—like Irish and Italian immigrants have done: after the first generation, Hispanic Americans become more likely to identify as “Americans”, and claim to experience less discrimination than their first-generation counterparts.33 If and when the GOP begins to adopt positions more in tune with the priorities of ethnic minorities, Hispanics might end up being the first such group to be receptive to the message. Still, the task appears to be an uphill battle of historical proportions. The above findings suggest that it would be a mistake to broadly explain the left-liberal/Democratic tilt so clearly seen in younger Americans as the result of the political instincts and inclinations so often associated with youth in general. Instead, the ideological leanings of Millennials and Generation Z are largely defined by an ethnic makeup and a set of shared experiences that set them apart from older Americans in major ways, which will most likely result in equally major changes in US politics and policy when they inevitably become the predominant electoral and policymaking force. At present, the Republican Party is ideologically ill-equipped to ensure that it will be able to maintain its current relevance throughout this process, having defined itself in opposition to many of the ideas that young Americans have embraced, often with no regard to party lines. Therefore, it appears most likely that the GOP will have to make significant concessions from its current platform and practices to remain competitive on a national level and provide a political outlet for conservative principles to provide alternative solutions to the country’s future challenges.

32 Jens Manuel Krogstad et al.: Key takeaways about Latino voters in the 2018 midterm elections. Pew Research Center. 9 November 2018. <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/11/09/how-latinos-voted-in-2018midterms/> Accessed: 13 April 2020.

Byler 6 May 2020.

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