ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE
THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN POLICY PRESSURE ON THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP REGARDING THE HANDLING OF THE COVID-19 EPIDEMIC
VIKTÓRIA PAPP
2 Czuczor Street, 1093 Budapest +36 20 310 8776 ajtk@ajtk.hu | www.ajtk.hu/en
ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE
AJRC-Analyses Series of the Antall József Knowledge Centre
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© Viktória Papp 2020 © Antall József Knowledge Centre, 2020 ISSN 2416-1705
2 Czuczor Street, 1093 Budapest +36 20 310 8776 ajtk@ajtk.hu | www.ajtk.hu/en
THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN POLICY PRESSURE ON THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP REGARDING THE HANDLING OF THE COVID-19 EPIDEMIC VIKTÓRIA ANNA PAPP
The COVID-19 epidemic and the concurrent crisis has hit at the time when various debates concerning China, tensions between the United States and the East Asian power as well as the need to formulate a coherent strategy towards the country across Europe have been emerging. The novel coronavirus outbreak that started out as an epidemic concentrated in China then escalating to become a pandemic and bringing the world economy to a massive slowdown has put debates regarding relations with an increasingly influential China into a new perspective. Although, it might be too early to fully comprehend the consequences of the pandemic and how it will shape China’s relations with the rest of the world, there are a few apparent trends that are worth taking note of. The fact that the current epidemic started in Wuhan and that the Chinese leadership arguably shares responsibility was regarded as an enormous embarrassment and “loosing of face” for Beijing, not only at the international stage but domestically as well. Early responses have been called out for poor crisis management, as some officials had withheld information about the virus and downplayed the severity of the situation in Hebei. The Chinese leadership was anxious to redeem itself and has mobilised enormous resources in an effort to contain the virus—once the first case of infection was reported, it engaged with international organisations more actively, and has been more transparent about the latest developments, which shows that the country was more prepared for such a crisis than back in 2002–2003, during the SARS epidemic. The initial cover-up of or delayed response to the outbreak and the restriction on related information fuelled domestic criticism of the government as well, but the authorities—in line with the new internet censorship laws—removed unauthorised content on the government’s handling of the crisis and silenced their creators.1 To disprove the initial narrative, the Chinese leadership was eager to show results and underline its capacity to rapidly and effectively manage the epidemic, for instance, by building a hospital in six days, sending 42,000 doctors and nurses to Hebei in record-breaking time, almost tripling China’s production capacity of face masks in just nine days and so on. In the meantime, the Chinese leadership had admitted some “shortcomings” that had to be corrected, but officials in Hubei and Wuhan had taken the main brunt of the blame and were punished while Li Wenliang—the now deceased doctor and one of the early whistle-blowers— was cleared from earlier accusations of disturbing public order by the CCP and praised
1 Report says China internet firms censored coronavirus terms, criticism early in outbreak. Reuters. 3 March 2020. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-china-censorship/report-says-china-internet-firmscensored-coronavirus-terms-criticism-early-in-outbreak-idUSKBN20Q1VS> Accessed: 25 May 2020.
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for his work.2 China managed to turn the situation around and in the span of only a few weeks it has gone seemingly from the dire epicentre of the novel coronavirus epidemic to the experienced and charitable country that is seeking to stem a worldwide pandemic. The CCP’s efforts to control the epidemic as well as the domestic political narrative was crucial for maintaining social stability and the Party’s legitimacy, both of which could be affected by the subsequent economic decline, too. Whereas the Chinese government seemed to get the situation under control at home relatively quickly, the pandemic was sweeping through the world seriously affecting more and more countries and among them many were apparently unable to contain or cope with the spreading of the coronavirus— even five of the G7 states were among the most infected countries—which at the same time proved Beijing’s way of crisis management at home and its effort to change the initial narrative. In a manner of returning assistance it received earlier and giving a helping hand to countries fighting the COVID-19 outbreak by providing medical staff and supplies, for example, China also employed soft power tools aiming not only to restore its “face” and step up as a responsible country, but also to underline its leading position in the handling of the epidemic, which in some cases proved to be quite successful. For instance, Italy served as a good testing ground for China’s “mask diplomacy” in the EU: as the first and hardest hit country by the pandemic in Europe, Italy welcomed vital medical supplies from China while the EU’s response to the pandemic was slow and uncoordinated at the time. Of course, China presented its assistance to Italy as an amicable aid, but in reality, it was a subject of a commercial deal agreed by their respective foreign ministers. Likewise, other Eurosceptic governments have also taken a similar narrative and played up China’s medical assistance in the face of lacking solidarity from the EU, portraying it as the success of their foreign policy toward their East Asian partner. China’s “mask diplomacy” has its internal and external focus, which are equally important since it is aimed at a domestic as well as an foreign audience.3 In fact, most Chinese were ultimately satisfied with the effective measures at home and the responsible actions taken at the global stage by the Chinese government. Despite its soft power push, China has been continously facing criticism from the United States and other Western countries for its response to the outbreak and that it could have done more to prevent the spreading of the virus. Also, there is a growing international pressure to investigate how China handled the epidemic domestically. Although, European countries generally avoided a confrontational stance, Germany and France—among others— requested more transparency from China about the origin of the virus and the disclosure of information about the initial stages of the novel coronavirus outbreak.4 The US has even
2 Update: China releases investigation report on issues concerning Dr. Li Wenliang. Xinhuanet. 19 March 2020. <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-03/19/c_138896212.htm> Accessed: 25 May 2020.
John Seaman (ed.): COVID-19 and Europe-China Relations – A Country-Level Analysis. European Think-tank Network on China Special Report. 29 April 2020. <https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/etnc_ special_report_covid-19_china_europe_2020.pdf> Accessed: 18 May 2020. 3
Stuart Lau and Catherine Wong: Germany pushes China for answers to coronavirus origin. South China Morning Post. 21 April 2020. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3080918/germany-pushes-chinaanswers-coronaavirus-origin-adding> Accessed: 26 May 2020. 4
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gone to the extent of suing the Chinese government over its handling of the coronavirus outbreak.5 The conflict between the two powers has been a significant accompanying event of the pandemic, but it did not come as a surprise. The growing tensions and strategic confrontation that have been characterising the USChina relations in the past few years, have been pushed to new heights under the current pandemic and provided an opportunity for the Trump administration to put pressure on the Chinese leadership. Since taking office in 2017 President Trump has been harshly critical—with occasional cooperative intervals—towards China, launching a tariff and trade war, which was eased by a phase one deal signed by the parties in January this year. Regarding the epidemic, there seems to be a conflict of narratives between the two powers, which is present at the level of political communication too. The US has been blaming China for unleashing the deadly disease to the world, for which it has to be held responsible, while President Trump was branding COVID-19 as the “Chinese virus” playing to the growing antiChinese sentiment at home. Defending its position, Beijing was quick to return criticism and also resorting to the means of disinformation, through the appereance of the socalled Chinese “Wolf Warrior diplomats”, who publicly alleged that the virus originated actually from the US.6 Although China’s international messaging might be hindered by such a response, which had been backed by a relatively weak soft power globally, the belligerent comments of some US officials in the midst of a humanitarian crisis might have been used to win China some sympathy. Then again, Chinese diplomatic counterattacks are primarily addressed China’s political elite in Zhongnanhai, not the international community, while it is also clear that the Trump administration was acting with the upcoming presidential election and the belated and inadequate American response to the pandemic in mind. In the wake of the pandemic, China has become more forceful and high-profile in its public diplomacy, which is in line with the increasingly assertive foreign policy of the country and also an extension of the growing nationalism at home. According to the official Chinese narrative, China is just as much of a victim to the novel coronavirus as others, what is more, all countries are together in this dreadful situation, while Beijing acted in time and with full transparency and openness.7 China has been clearly rejecting the claims that the US brought about and is suggesting that some political forces in the US are pushing the two powers into a new cold war.8 Spurring nationalistic sentiments, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has gone as far as to even drew parallels between the current American demand for reparation from China and the reparation China had to pay to Western powers after
Jan Wolfe: In a first, Missouri sues China over coronavirus economic losses. Reuters. 21 April 2020. <https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-china-lawsuit/in-a-first-missouri-sues-china-over-coronaviruseconomic-losses-idUSKCN2232US> Accessed: 15 May 2020. 5
6 Zhiqun Zhu: Interpreting China’s ‘Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy.’ The Diplomat. 15 May, 2020. <https://thediplomat. com/2020/05/interpreting-chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomacy/> Accessed: 26 May, 2020.
Speech by President Xi Jinping at opening of 73rd World Health Assembly. Xinhuanet. 18 May 2020. <http:// www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-05/18/c_139067018.htm> Accessed: 20 May 2020.
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Ck Tan: China blames US hawks for risking ‘new Cold War.’ Nikkei Asian Review. 24 May 2020. <https:// asia.nikkei.com/Politics/China-People-s-Congress/China-blames-US-hawks-for-risking-new-Cold-War> Accessed: 24 May 2020. 8
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the Boxer Rebellion at the beginning of the 20th century. As for now it remains uncertain, whether China would continue with this kind of diplomatic communication when it is under less foreign political pressure. In the last months, the World Health Organisation (WHO) also got directly involved and serves as an extended platform for the current diplomatic war between China and the United States. Even though China is applauding the work of the WHO in order to show its support for multilateralism, it also successfully campaigned against the participation of Taiwan at the World Health Association (WHA) meeting this year—as it considers the “one country, two systems” to be the source of unquestionable national interest—despite the fact that the island state could have shared useful lessons about its successful handling of the pandemic. In contrary, the US has blamed the WHO for not responding quickly enough in the early days of the epidemic to contain its spread, while also being—according to Washington—too pro-China. President Trump even openly threatened the organisation with the withdrawing of US funding should reforms not be made within the organisation then announced to terminate the country’s relation with the organisation. This was also in line with how the United States’ has been pulling out of global governance under its “America First” policy and also with China’s increasing influence within the organisation. Ultimately, the resolution calling for an “impartial, independent and comprehensive evaluation” of the international response to the pandemic has been adopted by the WHA,9 which is a success for countries criticising China’s handling of the outbreak, however, as President Xi Jinping emphasized this will only be done once the virus is contained. In its global response to the pandemic and as a framework for its soft power projection mentioned above, the Chinese government attempted to utilise its Health Silk Road initiative,10 a platform for information sharing and aid distribution among countries fighting the novel coronavirus, which ab ovo had been a part of China’s flagship foreign policy strategy, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), yet was officially launched with the WHO in 2017.11 Even though the health dimension of the BRI has been receiving more attention recently, China’s BRI projects will likely be negatively affected by the current pandemic, as it has exposed the risks and weaknesses of global interconnectedness. The need for new infrastructure and the feasibility of the ongoing projects will considerably decrease as a result of the expected economic downturn in China as well as in global trade. Also, many planned projects will probably be halted or delayed, while in the case of some countries there might be difficulties with providing debt loads on existing BRI projects. This will probably have a negative impact on BRI, even if Beijing is willing to uphold the level of funding or provide
COVID-19 Response. Draft Resolution. World Health Organization. 18 May 2020. <https://apps.who.int/gb/ ebwha/pdf_files/WHA73/A73_CONF1Rev1-en.pdf> 9
Xi chairs leadership meeting on regular epidemic control, economic work. Xinhua. 20 April 2020. <http:// english.scio.gov.cn/topnews/2020-04/20/content_75952487.htm> Accessed: 27 May 2020.
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Zahra Beg: “The Health Silk Road”: Implications for the EU under Covid-19. European Institute of Asian Studies. 29 April 2020. <https://www.eias.org/news/the-health-silk-road-implications-for-the-eu-under-covid-19/> 11
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foreign aid for countries in need,12 as the Chinese leadership still faces challenges when it comes to the revitalization of the economy in the background of serious structural challenges and slowing economic growth that already existed before the pandemic. The BRI will certainly remain a crucial element of China’s foreign policy, but it is unsure how the Chinese leadership will frame it and continue with its implementation in the future. Since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Chinese leadership has managed to turn the crisis into a geopolitical opportunity and arguably shifted the attention from being the origin of the virus to the one offering solutions. It also employed soft power tools such as “mask diplomacy”, while the US has been abandoning its traditional role as global leader and the EU countries have been struggling to cooperate or come up with coordinated solutions. Nevertheless, the pandemic hit China hard and it will be difficult for the country to build the image of being a source of opportunities to all, whereas the WHO investigation could also produce interesting results. China’s global image will be impacted in particular as the pandemic has accentuated already existing tendencies regarding the integration of China into the international order and system of shared global norms. Therefore, growing distrust and concerns of many Western countries—due to political, ideological, and cultural differences—about the Chinese government and China’s rise will not disappear anytime soon. Moreover, China needs to face the economic consequences of the pandemic that presented a shock for the interconnected global supply chains, as well as for global demand, which has also prompted governments to rethink their dependence on China, and not only in the case of essential medical equipment. As for China’s relations with the United States, the subsequent trend of rivalry seems to be continuing with further tensions in the near future, especially with Hong Kong being now an additional source of conflict, as Beijing proposed a new national security law over the local government’s head provoking a strong condemnation from the US. Although economic relations may suffer as a result, the continuation of the trade war especially under the global economic slowdown would be in neither of the parties’ interest.
12 China Should Create Immense Foreign Aid Plan to Fight Covid-19, Advisor Says. Caixin Global. 28 April 2020. <https://www.caixinglobal.com/2020-04-28/china-should-create-immense-foreign-aid-plan-to-fight-covid-19advisor-says-101548254.html> Accessed: 26 May 2020.
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