Italy in the era of COVID-19 pandemic: Let’s put Europe’s Sick Man back on its Feet

ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE

ITALY IN THE ERA OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC: LET’S PUT EUROPE’S SICK MAN BACK ON ITS FEET

BIANKA RESTÁS – ALESSANDRO D’ONOFRIO

2 Czuczor Street, 1093 Budapest +36 20 310 8776 ajtk@ajtk.hu | www.ajtk.hu/en

ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE

AJRC-Analyses Series of the Antall József Knowledge Centre

Publisher-in-Chief: Péter Antall Managing editor: Péter Dobrowiecki Editorial office: Antall József Knowledge Centre H-1093 Budapest, Czuczor street 2

Contact: H-1093 Budapest, Czuczor street 2 Phone: +36 20 310-87-76 E-mail: ajtk@ajtk.hu Web: ajtk.hu/en

©Bianka Restás, Alessandro D’Onofrio, 2020 © Antall József Knowledge Centre, 2020 ISSN 2416-1705

2 Czuczor Street, 1093 Budapest +36 20 310 8776 ajtk@ajtk.hu | www.ajtk.hu/en

ITALY IN THE ERA OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC: LET’S PUT EUROPE’S SICK MAN BACK ON ITS FEET1 BIANKA RESTÁS — ALESSANDRO D’ONOFRIO

September marks the first year in office of the second Conte government. The frail Italian coalition executive, born out of necessity at the end of a very turbulent summer, although still including the Five Stars Movement (M5S) as its largest party, took a totally different political direction from the previous “green-yellow” governing experiment.2 In fact, Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, despite being once again at the head of a populist-led coalition, has succeeded in giving his executive a more moderate mark, marginalising the most radical elements inside the M5S and shifting the centre of gravity of the government more to the centre-left. However, the relationship between the two governing partners is being thoroughly debated. Once stated enemies, the two parties are currently being forced into a very uneasy cooperation which offers no assurance of a long-lasting executive.

Nonetheless, a very important and positive aspect of the current Italian government is represented by its “repositioning” towards the EU and its European partners. The first Conte government, pressed by Matteo Salvini’s bombastic sovereignist propaganda, managed in just a few months to erode the already little confidence the country enjoyed in Brussels by making enemies of Italy’s traditional allies—for example France—and repeatedly clashed with the European Commission over the question of budgetary discipline. Besides, at the European Parliament election in May 2019 Salvini’s League, with its hard Euroscepticism won the most seats in the newly elected assembly and the relative strength of sovereignist and anti-EU forces rose mostly thanks to the Italian politician’s alliance-building strategy.3 However, all this seems like a distant memory if we observe the approach of the current Italian government towards the EU. Since his appointment Conte made immediately clear that he was ready to work in order to find a compromise on such important issues, as the approval of the new 2021-2027 MFF with the bold European Recovery Fund, the change of the Dublin regulation and the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. To seal this change

Text submitted on 18 September 2020.

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Alessandro D’Onofrio: Matteo Salvini’s Big Game: Early Election and Full Powers. Antall József Knowledge Centre.

Blogpost. 13 August 2019. <https://archive.ajtk.hu/researchblog/406/matteo-salvini%E2%80%99s-big-game_-earlyelection-and-full-powers/ > Accessed: 29 July 2020; Alessandro D’Onofrio: The Long, Hot Italian Summer. Antall József Knowledge Centre. Blogpost. 26 August 2019. <https://archive.ajtk.hu/researchblog/412/the-long_-hot-italiansummer/ > Accessed: 29 July 2020; Alessandro D’Onofrio: The Red Takes the Place of the Green—the Yellow is Fading, and the Future is Grey. Antall József Knowledge Centre. Blogpost. 4 September 2019. <https://archive.ajtk. hu/researchblog/416/the-red-takes-the-place-of-the-green%E2%80%94the-yellow-is-fading_-and-the-future-is-grey/ > Accessed: 29 July 2020.

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3 Alessandro D’Onofrio: Nothing Left to Do but Cry—Italy in the Aftermath of the European Election. Antall József Knowledge Centre. Blogpost. 31 May 2020. <https://archive.ajtk.hu/researchblog/384/nothing-left-todo-but-cry%E2%80%94italy-in-the-aftermath-of-the-european-election/ > Accessed: 29 July 2020.

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of direction and the beginning of a new “season,” Prime Minister Conte decided, in a rather symbolic move, to meet the heads of the European institutions during his first official trip in September 2019. This decision was clearly aimed at demonstrating that Rome wished to shake off the reputation of Europe’s sick man and be again a reliable partner that is ready to sit at the table with its traditional partners.

However, while it is true that Italy’s new approach towards the EU helped the country to regain some lost trust in Brussels—and in this sense the nomination of the Italian David Sassoli as the president of the European Parliament was also important—it is an utter mistake to assume that Conte’s activism lays on a more secure political ground at home.

It must not be forgotten that the current coalition is made up of two—recently three since former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi decided to form a new party en cours—very dissimilar political forces whose unalike view on a host of issues has brought during this first year to several clashes. Often the differences between the coalition partners seemed to have the potential to bring the government on the verge of a break up and a rupture has been avoided only by Conte’s moderating efforts. No less problematic is the relationship of the governing majority with the opposition. As a matter of fact, the League-led “centreright” contests the legitimacy of the government and is constantly threating to bring down Conte’s executive. The problem with the League and the other opposition parties—Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (FI) and Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia (FdI)—must be traced back to the Prime Minister’s refusal to hold a new election following last August’s political crisis triggered by Salvini’s decision to withdraw its support for the former coalition government.

Since then the opposition is living in a continuous electoral campaign mood, and election polls are elevated to the rank of incontrovertible truth, so much that some people even started to talk about sondaggiocrazia (literally poll-ocracy).4 The opposition’s persistent un-cooperativeness has been particularly evident by their refusal to accept Prime Minister Conte’s invitation to attend an initiative, launched in July, called Stati generali dell'economia (General States of the Economy), which represented an attempt to gather ideas from social and economic interest groups and elaborate a plan to revive the Italian economy, modernise the country and try to eliminate its structural problems.5 All these aspects make Conte’s second premiership highly unsecure and for this reason instinctively the Prime Minister decided to divert the eye from domestic politics and started to put bigger efforts on the pursuing of a more determined foreign policy. From this perspective the coronavirus crisis, which hit Italy first and harder than the rest of Europe, offered the fragile Italian governing coalition an opportunity not only to remain afloat, but also shifted the public focus on a greater issue. In addition, it offered the executive the opportunity to exert greater political power—Italy declared the state of emergency on 31 January and it was recently extended

Rebecca Graziani: Sondaggiocrazia: come interpretare i numeri della politica. Universitá Bocconi. 8 February 2019. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rKp92hwlfV8 > Accessed: 24 August 2020.

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5 La Repubblica: Stati generali, il centrodestra; "Non parteciperemo". Ma Conte raddoppia: dureranno dieci giorni. La Repubblica. 10 June 2020. <https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2020/06/10/news/stati_generali_21_ giugno_giuseppe_conte-258842756/ > Accessed: 14 August 2020.

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until the 15 October.6 Immediately all the Italian political forces put aside their differences and agreed in criticizing the EU’s initial indecisions in managing the crisis and were vocal in asking for bigger help from Brussels to fight the spread of the pandemic.

Due to this most unexpected and unfortunate situation, in just a few months Italy gained new centrality within the EU, going from being the bloc’s weaker link to one of the most important and active actors. Eventually, the Italian government’s more cooperative approach brought the country at the helm of the so-called Southern European member states, made Italy a poster child for the health crisis containment, helped Rome to mend its damaged relationship with Paris and, most important, obtained Germany’s endorsement during the whole European Recovery Fund negotiation process.7 The Italian government’s activism in Europe showed its immediate effects also at home where the support for the “red-yellow” executive increased during the whole health crisis, especially to the League’s detriment and mostly as a result of the so-called “Recovery Fund effect.”8 As a matter of fact, the historical deal signed in Brussels strengthened Conte’s position who is currently enjoying the highest rates of approval of the last twelve months and some polls even rank the former university professor as the best Prime Minister of the last 25 years.9 However, as the health crisis recedes, and the focus shifts on the economic crisis, citizens are growing more disenchanted and attacks from the opposition became more insistent. It is in fact in the following months that the ability of the new executive will really be put to a test. The expectations of Italians are high and also Italy’s international partners keep their eyes fixed on the Rome’s executive. The chance that Italy will undergo a new political season which will foster a period of economic growth are high and it is up to Italians to don’t lose this opportunity. Moreover, even if is too early to talk about a new era of the relationship between Rome and Brussels, Italy’s new approach towards the EU represents undeniably a positive change. As already advocated in a previous paper the Italian government’s new attitude could not only be potentially of great benefit for the Mediterranean country itself but for the process of European integration as a whole.10 In fact, as the third largest economy in the bloc, the third biggest country among the EU27 and one of the founding members, Italy’s political and economic performances will be a guarantee for a stronger EU. Unfortunately,

6 Otto Lanzavecchia: PM Conte wields state of emergency and more debt to see Italy through pandemic.

Formiche.net. 29 July 2020. <https://formiche.net/2020/07/conte-emergency-debt/ > Accessed: 24 August 2020.

Jason Horowitz: How Italy Turned Around Its Coronavirus Calamity. The New York Times. 31 July 2020. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/world/europe/italy-coronavirus-reopening.html > Accessed: 24 August 2020.

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8 Simona Sotgiu: Effetto Recovery Fund? Cosa svelano i dati Swg. Formiche.net. 21 July 2020. <https://formiche.net/2020/07/recovery-fund-swg/ > Accessed: 24 August 2020.

Adnkronos: Il sondaggio: Recovery alza il gradimento di Conte e governo. Adnkronos. 25 July 2020. <https://www.adnkronos.com/fatti/politica/2020/07/25/sondaggio-recovery-alza-gradimento-contegoverno_Rv03As9oImVAXBteOZUyNN.html > Accessed: 24 August 2020; Federica Tofani: Conte il miglior premier degli ultimi 25 anni con il 30% secondo i sondaggi Demos. SkyTG24. 20 July 2020. <https://tg24.sky.it/ politica/2020/07/20/giuseppe-conte-miglior-premier-sondaggi-demos > Accessed: 24 August 2020.

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Alessandro D’Onofrio–Bianka Restás: Italian Foreign Policy: Priorities and Challenges after the General Elections. Antall József Knowledge Centre. AJRC-Analyses 2018A01. 2018. <https://archive.ajtk.hu/uploaded/ file/file_1533635239_2_AJRC-Analyses%202018A01%20Bianka%20REST%C3%81S%20%E2%80%93%20 Alessandro%20D%C2%83%E2%80%99ONOFRIO.pdf > Accessed: 30 July 2020.

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Italy has still to confront a lack of political credibility and has a very limited bargaining power, given its economic and financial troubles. Once again, the highly unstable Italian political landscape might hamper the country’s ambitions.

For obvious reasons, no discussion concerning Italy’s new centrality within the EU can start without considering the European Council’s decision, which in July gave the green light to an ambitious reform of the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) proposed by the European Commission which would see the introduction of a revolutionary EUR 750 billion recovery fund. The fact that France, Italy, Spain and other member states managed to convince Germany to shed some of its fiscal orthodoxies and previous vetoes towards enhanced forms of European solidarity and joint-financing in support of the European Recovery Fund is an achievement in itself. However, even if during the Council the Italian government’s pushed to include a consistently larger amount of grants and less strict “conditionality” in the allocation and in the use of the resources destined to each country the final structure of the European Recovery Find will include almost an equal amount of loans and grants. In fact the firm opposition of some Nordic member states, such as the Netherlands, resulted in a reduction of the total amount of grants, a more consistent part of loans and, especially, the inclusion of a “security break” clause which will give one or more member states the power to temporarily halt the funds directed to another member state believed of not comply to the disbursement requirements.11 Nevertheless, since the importance of the recovery fund does not lie merely in its size but in the revolutionary decision to empower the Commission to borrow money from the markets and create a common European debt, it is correct to assume that the Commission and those countries more prepared to enhance the EU integration—and among them obviously Italy—scored a major epochal result. As the biggest beneficiary, Rome would receive EUR 209 billion—EUR 82 billion in grants and EUR 127 billion in cheap loans. According to the new EU budget plans, the resources included in the “Next Generation EU”—this is the name given by the European Commission to the Recovery Fund—are subject to hard scrutiny, while also being connected to the implementation of structural reforms. Obviously this will mean that the attention of all the European institutions will be set on Italy in the next years. In fact, as the recovery fund represents an unprecedented measure and its impact could be potentially bigger than that of the Marshall Plan, its success will be measured on the extend of Italy’s recovery. Italian decision makers have just been handed a powerful instrument to outline the country’s future and reform its mechanisms after years of significantly suboptimal economic growth, currently the lowest in Europe. In other words, Italy will have to ensure that the European money is invested in value-creating activities, and not put to waste— something for which the country does not have the best track record, both in terms of EU money or its own money. Nevertheless, the first tranche of the funds will not be available before 2021 and to obtain them the Italian government will have to present its “National Recovery and Resilience Plan” which will detail the investment and reform plans for the Alessandro D’Onofrio: The 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework: Where are we now? Antall József Knowledge Centre. AJRC-Analyses 2020E25. July 2020. <https://ajtk.hu/en/research/ajrc-analyses/the-20212027-multiannual-financial-framework-where-are-we-now > Accessed: 24 August 2020.

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years 2021-2023. Adjustments to the plan may be brought forward also in the course of 2022 in view of the last allocation of the funds in 2023. As such they will be evaluated by the Commission within two months considering their adherence to the “Country Specific Recommendations,” which therefore will assume a higher significance than a simple recommendation. But there are many doubts, that this pot of money will be effectively used by the Italian governments to sustain systemic and structural reforms that would help modernise the country, reduce the competitiveness gap with its partners and to make the national economy more convergent with the European average.

The creation of the European Recovery Fund positioned the majority of EU countries on a completely different position compared to the previous disastrous one during the 2008 financial crisis. Differently from that time when the common idea was to stigmatise national debt and force member states to implement “tears and blood” measures to reduce it, this time the EU and the member satate’s efforts will be concentrated in improving the quality of the public expenditures and give a more positive meaning to the solidarity clause written in the treaties.12 In fact, the old economic rules of sustainable finance and budget constraints were not sustainable to face this new phase created by a symmetric shock like the coronavirus pandemic. Europe seems to have understood this and, as soon as some member states decided to commence with a country-wide lockdown, the Commission decided to suspend the Stability and Growth Pact, as well as the Fiscal Compact, while the ECB implemented another Quantitative Easing. Concretely these interventions have, for the first time, allowed member states to launch important measures to deal with the emergency—Italy implemented three budget revisions for a total of EUR 100 billion. In this way, the Italian government was able to guarantee layoffs for many workers and launch emergency income for families without credit access. From its side, the Italian government is a strong supporter of more solidarity between member states and a relaxation of the strict fiscal regulation in the bloc, while during the pandemic it was one of the chief parties to advocate for the creation of the so-called “coronabonds,” or a joint debt measure issued by the EU. Prime Minister Conte successfully convinced the majority of EU member states to support the idea that all the EU member states should help each other in financing the fight against COVID-19 and that the failure of the EU’s third largest economy would have had a domino effect on the whole Eurozone and led to the disruption of the common market. In this perspective, the European Recovery Fund represents an even bolder step than “coronabonds” however this should not be a one-off commercial intervention. Rather, it must allow the EU member states to start to work to a treaty change and take steps to ensure that the EU will not find itself in a similar situation in the future.

While waiting for the resources of “Next Generation EU” Italy might however find itself in a pressing liquidity problem, a fact that has once again reopened the national debate around the possibility that the country accesses the ESM credit line. As many already predicted, the recession in 2020 will hit a historic peak for Italy. The latest estimates (August 2020) presented

Jacques Keller-Noellet: The Solidarity Clause of the Lisbon’s Treaty. Institut Delors. January 2018. <http://www. institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/tgae20117fkellernoellet.pdf > Accessed: 25 August 2020.

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a decline in GDP of -12.8% in the second semester, with a relatively more intense impact in the North (almost 60% of the loss is concentrated in the 8 northern regions) compared to the centre and the South.13 In 2021 there will be the first signs of recovery(+5.9%) but Italy’s GDP might not be back to its pre-pandemic level before 2025.14 The well-timed, broad and innovative emergency measures introduced by the government (that with the addition of EUR 25 billion committed with the so-known August Decree-Law reached EUR 100 billion), are helping and will help to contain the costs of this crisis. However, in a country like Italy, already burdened by a very high public debt, these measures do little to prevent the decline of GDP, or to sustain a rebound capable of compensating a further recession and are not much if compared with the massive emergency resources activated by Germany during the pandemic.15 For this reason, the EUR 36 billion the ESM put at Italy’s disposal—which has the benefits of being available at once and in its current version will come with less string attached following the recent events—represent a necessary tool to help sustain the shaking Italian economy. Conversely from the last decade’s financial crisis, where countries that used the ESM were required to implement structural reforms and put in place austerity programs, the access criteria to the fund are changed this time. In fact, the only condition to access the credit line will be that money disbursed must be spent on matters related to health care. Italy, the first European country to bear the brunt of the coronavirus pandemic, could make good use of this cash influx—considering its debt could soon rise alarmingly.

Interestingly, the current interest rate for the ESM are far more convenient than standard Italian state bond yields, as economists have calculated that using the fund would save the country EUR 4.8 billion.16 The Italian government’s recent application to the SURE credit line— Italy might receive up to EUR 27.4 billion—was seen, as a first step towards the acceptance of a further borrowing from the ESM.17 Even if the current ESM is representing an appealing opportunity for Italy not all the Italian political parties seem to agree on its necessity. As it happens, populist and sovereignist parties, deeply entangled in their logic of opposing the EU at every cost, are refusing to accept this instrument without offering a clear explanation or engaging in a critical debate about the quality of the offered measure. As expected, this issue is contributing to exacerbate the relationship between the governing parties which hold diametrically different views on the matter. Currently, the M5S’ incomprehensible obstinacy

ISTAT: Conti Economici Trimestrali: II Semestre. ISTAT. 31 August 2020. <https://www.istat.it/it/ files//2020/08/CET_20q2.pdf > Accessed: 1 September 2020.

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Rapporto di Previsione luglio 2020 – Highlights. Prometeia. July 2020. <https://www.prometeia.it/news/ rapporto-di-previsione-luglio-2020-highlight > Accessed: 25 August 2020.

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Giorgia Ariosto: Approvato il dl Agosto. Conte: “Misure che valgono 100 miliardi”. AGI. 8 August 2020. <https://www.agi.it/economia/news/2020-08-07/decreto-agosto-cdm-via-libera-salvo-intese-9364245/?fbclid= IwAR2L2ELvDk5AHZwhXfxunKrYu2HF7I-3s_J-Y9KfI385LHT_GtcQkXBBUU0 > Accessed: 25 August 2020.

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Federico Fubini: Mes, quali sono le condizioni per incassare 40 miliardi dell’Europa? Corriere della Sera.

27 June 2020. <https://www.corriere.it/economia/tasse/20_giugno_27/mes-quali-sono-condizioni-incassare36-miliardi-dell-europa-cc04a872-b86a-11ea-b2d0-312cc6f9a902.shtml > Accessed: 25 August 2020.

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Il Sole 24 Ore: Sure, all’Italia la quota più alta della Cassa integrazione europea: 27,4 miliardi. Gualtieri: risparmi per 5,5 miliardi di interessi. Il Sole 24 Ore. 24 August 2020. <https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/ coronavirus-l-italia-274-miliardi-aiuti-ue-sure-ADl0Nok > Accessed: 26 August 2020.

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to stand against the ESM is dictated by the belief that this money will come at very painful conditions as it happened in the case of Greece. Nevertheless, the biggest party in the coalition is struggling to keep an unequivocal position. On the one side the party is trying not to undermine the Prime Minister’s achievements and his moderate approach towards the EU— despite not being a party member Conte has been chosen by the M5S leadership—but at the same time it is struggling to maintain at least a façade of timid Euroscepticism in order not to upset the most radical members of the party and core electorate. Almost all the opposition forces side with M5S in this matter with the exception of Berlusconi’s Forza Italia. The former Prime Minister’s enthusiastic reaction to the European Recovery Fund and openness towards the ESM showed that also the unity of the centre-right coalition rests on a very precarious basis and cannot be excluded that the octogenarian politician could leave the door open to a possible government reshuffle—the so-known “Ursula Coalition.”18 The other governing partners, the Democratic Party and Matteo Renzi’s Italia Viva, enjoy a much more comfortable position. The leaders of these forces welcomed the “Next Generation EU,” as the sign of a change of pace towards expansionary policies that have always been part of their agendas and according to them, the ESM represents a great opportunity that Italy cannot miss. Faced with this impasse, Prime Minister Conte’s position on the matter has not been very clear. In fact the head of the government has been deferring the decision for weeks and, in order to avoid putting painful pressures on the frail coalition, affirmed that the European Recovery Fund will probably make recurring to the ESM not a priority.19 Eventually, the introduction of the ESM—as well as the European Recovery Fund—should pass through a parliamentary vote. If Conte would eventually decide to support the access to the ESM credit line, he would oppose the party line of M5S, which put him at the head of the Italian executive and he would lose the support of its voters. On the contrary, if the Prime Minister would oppose or even avoid taking a position on the matter he would risk breaking the “alliance” with the Democratic Party with clear results on the continuity of the government. In this perspective it is easy to understand why Conte is trying to delay any decision about the ESM until when it will be presented to the parliament where most likely it will be merged together with the bill for the enaction of the Recovery Fund. In that case it is hard to imagine that the M5S will vote against, thereby risking the EUR 209 billion Italy is expected to receive from the “Next Generation EU”. If that would happen, it would be a political suicide for the populist party that will also have to cope with Berlusconi’s growing pressures to step in the government and giving birth to a more “fiscally responsible” majority.20

With the name “Ursula Coalition” the author wants to indicate the group of political parties which in the case of the new European Commission election endorsed the nomination of Ursula von der Leyen. These parties were from a wide political spectrum and included the centre-left Democratic Party (Partito Democratico—PD), Berlusconi’s Forza Italia and the populist 5 Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle—M5S). The sovereignist League (Lega) and the right-wing Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia—FdI) voted against the nomination.

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Nicoletta Pirozzi: Next Generation EU: il dibattito politico in Italia. ISPI (Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale). 18 June 2020. <https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/next-generation-eu-il-dibattitopolitico-italia-26575 > Accessed: 25 August 2020.

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Romano Prodi–Edoardo Reviglio: Patience needed over Rome’s ESM bid. OMFIF. 10 July 2020. <https://www. omfif.org/2020/07/patience-needed-over-romes-esm-bid/ > Accessed: 25 August 2020.

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Despite the political debate around the issue, in the course of the autumn, and once the budget plan for the next trimester will be unveiled, the Italian government will most probably face a consistent lack of liquidity that might make it difficult to wait until the resources of the European recovery fund will be available. The measures taken by the government to counter the epidemic will likely produce a budget deficit of 10.4% and Italy’s debt-to-GDP ratio will rise from about 135% today to 155% by the end of the year.21 If the government will fail to reach a decision over the ESM, there is the risk that some reforms introduced in the last years (namely the 80-euro-bonus, the citizenship income and Quota 100) would be withdrawn and that the aid measures to support families’ incomes and employment would come to an abrupt termination. In the worst scenario, the country might find itself forced to turn to the ESM in a few years but this time it is likely that any assistance will come at different conditions: draconian austerity and an economic management plan dictated by the troika (European Commission, European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund).22 As seen, raising growth potential, and achieving the broadest possible consensus between the political forces is as hard as crucial at this moment. The battle over the ESM will inflame the next weeks and Salvini together with other opposition forces is ready to use every mean to tear down the government. A clear signal of the mounting distance between the government and the opposition arrived when Prime Minister Conte established the General States of the Economy to plan—with the help of all the political forces—the recovery of the Italian economy and discuss the application of the European measures.

During the meeting between representatives of the government, national economic and financial lobby groups and the heads of the European institutions, the Prime Minister tried to draw a road-map for the recovery process. The way chosen by the Premier, involving the European and international institutions together with national social partners in the recovery strategy was met with criticism by all the opposition political parties which declined to take part in the negotiations. Some discontent was also voiced by members of the government who criticised Conte’s method to discuss the measures outside of the institutional offices. To quell the dissatisfaction of the ministers of his government and especially of the Democratic Party, Conte explained that a real economic recovery plan, including the projects that will have to be financed by the new instruments of the “Next Generation EU,” will be developed only in the coming months, and not following a few days gathering.23 The guide-lines exposed during the General States have been drawn following the six-points recovery plan presented by Vittorio Colao, the former CEO of the Vodafone Group, to restart the Italian economy. The 121-page report covered the period 2020-2022 but it also aimed to lay down the foundations for sustainable economic growth in the

21 European Commission: Report from the Commission: Italy. European Commission. 20 May 2020. <https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/30_edps/126-03_commission/com2020-535-it_en.pdf > Accessed: 25 August 2020.

22 Aitor Erce – Antonio Garcia Pascual – Ramon Marimon: The ESM can finance the COVID fight now. VOXEU.org.

6 April 2020. <https://voxeu.org/article/esm-can-finance-covid-fight-now > Accessed: 24 August 2020.

Il Post: E quindi questi “Stati generali”? Il Post. 16 June 2020. <https://www.ilpost.it/2020/06/16/contegoverno-stati-generali/ > Accessed: 25 August 2020.

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medium-to-long term. The focus of the plan was on digitalisation and innovation, gender equality and inclusion, and a new green revolution while the core areas were grouped according under the following groups: enterprises and the labour market; infrastructures and the environment; tourism, art and culture; public administration; education, research and skills; individuals and families.24 According to the plan, the provision of liquidity helping companies to survive, granting corporations a legal shield against possible complaints stemming from COVID-19 infections and facilitating increases in capital are among the immediate measures that would be endorsed in order to support Italian enterprises. The plan also presented broader measures to strengthen SMEs and support a more sustainable economic growth, which range from supporting innovative start-ups via tax incentives and increasing the ceiling for annual investments. When it comes to the labour market, the plan contained short-term measures such as postponing tax payments and supporting the renewal of fixed-term contracts that are about to expire. Longer-term measures are much broader and include incentivising the digital up-skilling of management and retraining the unemployed and furloughed by creating a “skills fund.” The plan also focused on smart working which should be encouraged and regulated. According to Colao, the way forward is a green revolution that will impact major infrastructures as well as the daily life of the population with a specific country-wide plan to improve transport links. While the Colao plan embodies a positive attempt, a series of structural limits and risks need to be overcome to relaunch the Italian economy. First, the willingness and ability of politicians to do what is necessary might be a sticking point. Historically Italy has been burdened with an inability to take tangible measures, which has widened the gap between Rome and its partners in the EU. The problem is that the country lacks a real industrial policy, as shown by the hundreds of antithetical and different projects presented in the last decade in Brussels to access strategic investment funds. Now that the European leaders agreed to open the purse’s strings as never before to pour a flow of resources onto the continental economy—and the Italian one in particular—Italy must not miss the occasion.

A VERY TENSE AUTUMN: REGIONAL ELECTIONS, REFERENDUM AND THE NEW ELECTORAL LAW The post-pandemic economic recovery is not the only issue which the frail Italian government will have to tackle during the Autumn. A plethora of questions awaits Conte’s executive, including regional elections in September—where the coalition partners are debating whether to run together—, the constitutional referendum to be held on the same day, the reform of the electoral law and other politically-charged issues such as the question of immigration and the justice reform. Finally, the election of the next President of the Republic, despite planned in 2022, has already put in motion an intense political debate over the selection of a figure suitable to the majority of MPs.

24 Comitato di esperti in materia economica e sociale: Iniziative per il rilancio “Italia 2020-2022”. Schede di Lavoro. Idealista. June 2020. <https://st3.idealista.it/news/archivie/2020-06/piano_colao_download.pdf > Accessed: 25 August 2020.

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The 2020 regional elections will prove being crucial for the fate of the government and are arising an intense public debate. For the first time in Italy’s republican history, the government announced an election without requiring the opposition’s approval, a decision that was eventually endorsed by the Constitutional Court which did not consider it a breach of the ground law. Salvini’s strategy to erode the support of the government by winning the elections in all the Italian regions seemed to be working at first but the important victory of the centre-left in Emilia Romagna last January temporarily halted the sovereignist wave.25 Since then the focus shifted from stemming the League’s success throughout the country to attempting to test the repeatability of the governing coalition at the regional level by the means of an organic alliance between PD and M5S. After an unflattering result in the small region of Umbria last October the yellow-red alliance is working again to field a common candidate in the seven regions which will be called to appoint new governors and local assemblies (Tuscany, Veneto, Marche, Liguria, Puglia, Campania and Valle d’Aosta). In the current situation, the profound ideological distance between the PD and the M5S will probably make it impossible for the two parties to field a common candidate in any of the voting regions—something they previously managed to do only in Umbria, and not without tensions. Now such important regions are at stake there as Puglia, Tuscany, which is a feud of the Left, and Veneto where the re-election of League’s Luca Zaia is almost taken for granted. However, differently from the last regional election in Emilia Romagna which was a turning point for the survival of the government, this time this seems not to be the case.

Despite all that the September vote could potentially help to reshape the equilibrium inside the government and within the opposition as well. If the crisis of the Democratic Party will lead to the loss of Marche and, most of all, Tuscany, which are historically left-leaning regions, the party will be forced to rethink its leadership and even its political programme.

For Matteo Renzi a defeat for his new party in Tuscany—his homeland—or even a suboptimal result might be the tangible proof that his time as policy-maker has come to the end. The situation for the other coalition partner—the 5Star Movement—is not less complicated.

Pro-government, moderate MPs are frequently clashing with their more orthodox, loyal-toorigins colleagues, and the Movement’s stability is jeopardised by the growth of internal factions. It goes without saying that the election of a new leadership, which is most likely to happen after the regional votes, will implicitly carry the M5S’ vision for the future of their party. Perhaps, in order to survive, the Movement could coalesce around the figure of Conte and accept to be “contaminated” with more traditional mainstream and less populist ideals. Regarding Conte, it is important to note that the Prime Minister, even keeping the distance from the political competition, did nothing to hide his support for the centre-left candidate in Puglia, the region where he was born. A defeat in this region might well open a crack within the coalition government and put in danger the position of Nicola Zingaretti, the Democratic Party’s leader. The governing parties’ hitches could give free hand to the opposition to increase its support across the country and offer another occasion for Salvini 25 Alessandro D’Onofrio: The Regional Election Which Risked to Bring Down the Government. Antall József Knowledge Centre. Blogpost. January 2020. <https://ajtk.hu/en/research/research-blog/the-regional-electionwhich-risked-to-bring-down-the-government > Accessed: 25 August 2020.

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and his allies to launch a final attack to the government. At first look this seems to be the most likely scenario, but when taking a closer look, the centre-right, despite enjoying a comfortable lead in the polls at the national level, is far from being a united front. In fact, while the League is suffering in the polls compared to just a few months ago, Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia—FDI) is experiencing a steady growth. This fact, together with Berlusconi’s resistance to hand over to Salvini the leadership within the coalition that was his in the last twenty years, fuels the growing divisions between the opposition parties and made the choice of a joint candidate in the voting regions not an easy task also. Eventually, the Meloni-Berlusconi axis forced Salvini to accept four candidates out of six regions, while the League obtained the nomination of one of its representatives only in Tuscany. Veneto constitutes a peculiar situation, where governor Luca Zaia, formally a League member and who in all likelihood will easily obtain a third mandate, is currently in a more or less open rupture with his party leader. As a matter of fact, the more moderate and less Eurosceptic politicians within the League are gathering around Zaia, a situation that makes Salvini’s leadership within the centre-right an open issue.

On the day of the 2020 regional elections Italians will also be called to cast their vote into a constitutional referendum where they can decide whether to cut by one third the number of representatives of both Chambers of the Parliament. Currently Italy, with 630 members in the Lower House and 315 in the Senate plus 6 life-long senators, has one of the highest number of policy makers among the most developed western democracies. One of the 5Star Movement’s flagships was the reduction of the costs of politics which includes MPs salaries, annuities and other benefits. In this sense this referendum represents a very strong visibility operation for the populist party and an opportunity to show their electorate they are still nurturing their anti-elitist sentiments. However, beyond its populist meaning, is not well clear in which way the reduction of MPs would benefit the Italian political system. In fact, it is ill-considered to link Italy’s governability problems merely to the number of policy-makers without considering the additional “social” costs a reform as such will cause. For instance, a lower number of representatives in a big and socially heterogeneous country like Italy would risk to diminish representability, weaken the connection of politicians with their respective territory and give even more power to parties’ chancelleries or other entities to push accurately selected candidates. A decrease of MPs is not a wrong option in itself, but it must be accompanied by a rationalised and far-reaching constitutional reform which would overcome the perfect bicameralism system, turn finally the Senate in the Chamber of the Regions, give a new range of powers to the Prime Minister and finally trying to re-establish the link of politics with the territory. However, the introduction of the reform as included in the referendum will at once open the issue of the reform of the electoral law. In fact, in the current situation a reduction of the number of MPs will require a different mechanism for the election of the members of the Parliament and the distribution of the reduced seats. The current parliament has a very limited time at disposal to agree on a new electoral law which will be compatible with a smaller assembly. Currently the opposition and majority parties, gathered in the Constitutional Affairs Commission, put forward a proposal—called Germanicum because it resembles the German electoral system—provided for a purely proportional system with a 5% threshold to cut out smaller parties (currently the threshold is set at 3%). Even if a reform on this line has been

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gradually accepted by most of the political forces—also by the opposition which previously backed a majoritarian system confident that the centre-right would have benefitted from it—Matteo Renzi and other smaller formations blocked its introduction in July, recognising that according to the most recent polls they would not be able to access the Parliament. A similar concern is shared also by Prime Minister Conte who many believe could launch his own political group at the end of this legislature. Eventually, the response from the polls in the voting regions will probably outline a new political balance which could serve as a context for reaching a new agreement on the electoral law. However, the risk that parties will end up keeping alive the current voting system that everyone would like to change and that will once more favour the ungovernability is very much alive.

In any case, the introduction of a new electoral law and the constitutional reform as encompassed in the referendum—that might in all likelihood be approved—will require several months of discussion and preparation. During this crucial time frame the government might enjoy a small but relative calm since it is very unlikely that during that period the opposition will push for a new election—as it is doing since August 2019—and assume the responsibility to take over a complicate and burdensome constitutional reform. Moreover, from August 2021 the Parliament will enter the so-called “White Semester,” namely the last six months of the presidential mandate where the Head of State does not have the power to dissolve the assembly. In this case the balance of power present at that time will remain frozen until spring 2022 and therefore in all likelihood until the end of the legislature. The election of the President of the Republic is a very important appointment for the Italian political landscape.

The President is elected every seven years by 2/3 of the Parliament in a joint sitting of the two houses and is the result of the compromise between all the most relevant political forces.

The Current President, Sergio Mattarella, differently from his predecessor, rejected the idea of a second mandate and tiresome negotiations have started between the political parties to present a new candidate accepted by the majority of the political forces. At the moment the candidates are only indicative but very important names were raised, such as Mario Draghi, Romano Prodi, Enrico Letta and Giuseppe Conte as well. As already mentioned, in all likelihood it will be the current majority in the Parliament that will put forward a candidate, but it is not sure whether the M5S, which did not present any candidate given the absence amongst their ranks of prestigious names, will support a candidate from the “establishment.” In this sense the opposition looks like a more compact front and it might not be excluded that for the first time in history the Head of State might be a representative from the centre-right. However, the President of the Republic must be a very prominent and respected personality and cannot be a divisive figure since it has the duty to represent the unity of the nation, therefore a compromise will be reached only around a moderate representative. In this scenario, once again, the votes of Silvio Berlusconi’s party members might be of crucial importance. In fact, the former Prime Minister is already preparing to trade his votes in exchange for some institutional position in the event of a government reshuffle.26

Ettore Maria Colombo: Inizia il gran ballo del Quirinale (ma senza Mattarella). Il diario di Colombo. Formiche.net.

25 June 2020. <https://formiche.net/2020/06/quirinale-m5s-pd-fi-mattarella/ > Accessed: 25 August 2020.

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ADDITIONAL PROBLEMATIC QUESTIONS The resumption of Parliament's work after the summer break promises to be of particular interest this time, with the coronavirus pandemic still lingering, the problem of the reopening of schools in September and a number of postponed and unresolved issues. The focus will be on the government that will have to tackle several thorny subjects which were postponed just to avoid fractures within the majority. Now, the Italian coalition executive will have to find a common ground over a set of important and politically charged issues, the management of which will tell how the political course of Italy will look in the following years. In detail, by the end of September, the government must present to the Parliament the “Updated Note of the Economy and Finance Document” (Nota di aggiornamento del Documento di Economia e Finanza—NADEF). In this note, the government will include the new economic and financial estimates formulated on the basis of updated data and following a more certain macroeconomic picture. In practice, the text re-elaborates and adjusts the forecasts formulated in the Economics and Finance Document (Documento di Economia e Finanza— DEF) issued in April. The NADEF is extremely important since, following its considerations, the government will have the arduous task of approving the new yearly budget and employing the national resources for the execution of public policies and administrative activities.

Obviously, this time the focus will be on the coronavirus recovery plan and deficit policies will be more relaxed considering also the large amount of funds Italy will receive from the EU in the next years. However, the new budget will be largely unknown given the lower finances at disposal of the government caused by the fall in GDP. Nevertheless, it must be expected that the focus of the executive will shift on considering the introduction of a long-awaited fiscal reform which could give a boost to the economic restart. The reform of the pension system—a very delicate topic at the moment since the coalition partners have different views in this respect—will be probably postponed to 2022 and the incomplete reform decree introduced by the previous government could even be cancelled.27 Following the wave of criticism, both from within the country and from international organisations and partners, the Democratic Party is putting more pressure on the Prime Minister to finally reach a decision on the amendment of the Security and Immigration Decree (Decreto Immigrazione e Sicurezza) introduced at the time when Salvini was the Interior Minister. In fact, in July Salvini’s decree has been declared incompatible with the Italian Constitution in some of its parts and according to this decision the government was called to elaborate a revised version. This is not going to be an easy task for the government since the security decree touches upon probably the most politically-charged issue: immigration. The task is particularly difficult as the executive must agree over the introduction of major revisions on the most controversial parts of the decree but at the same time it should give the signal that it will be engaged in tackling the immigration problem with effective tools. Already at the beginning of July, Interior Minister Luciana Lamorgese presented a draft of the new immigration decree temporarily agreed by the 27 Cristina D’Amicis: Legge di Bilancio 2021: cos’é, cosa prevede ed aspettarci ad ottobre. The Italian Times.

14 July 2020. <https://www.theitaliantimes.it/economia/legge-di-bilancio-2021-cosa-prevede-testo-misurenovita-ultime-notizie_140720/ > Accessed: 25 August 2020.

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governing coalition. The M5S and the Democratic Party, found a difficult compromise over some of the more controversial issues, such as the introduction of a type of humanitarian protection which will offer the residence permit for humanitarian reasons to those people fleeing from countries afflicted by conflicts, natural disasters and other serious events. Of major significance is the reintegration of the reception system for asylum seekers called SPRAR, composed of small structures spread over the whole national territory. The part concerning the detention system of foreigners awaiting repatriation has been repealed and brought back to its original form, which means that it cannot exceed the 90 days compared to the 180 days stated by Salvini’s decree. Obviously, the difficulty in agreeing on a total revision of the security decree is derived by the different position of the coalition partners in regard of immigration. In fact, the Democratic Party and Renzi’s Italia Viva are pushing for a solution that would give a strong signal of discontinuity with Salvini’s measures which not only threatened to fine (to up to EUR 1 million) NGO ships that enter Italian waters in violation of the law, but has also practically cancelled humanitarian protection and eliminated asylum seekers from the reception system promoted by the municipalities.28 On the other side the M5S is following a more ambiguous direction. In fact, since the political space on the left, which envisages a more moderate and tolerant approach towards immigration, is already occupied by the Democratic Party and Italia Viva, the populist party is trying to show a more rigid position on the issue. The fact is that, even if the M5S is not tendentially an anti-immigration party, it is endeavouring to buy up the support of the League’s and other far-right parties’ voters. In any case, the amended decree is expected to be presented in the Parliament at the end of the September, following the result of the regional elections. If the centre-right will be able to increase its support in the voting regions the government should expect and even fiercer opposition in the Parliament willing to prevent the watering down of a reform strongly supported by Salvini at the time of his mandate.

COVID-19’S CONSEQUENCES ON MIGRANT WORKERS: THE NEW REGULARISATION IN ITALY As a consequence of COVID-19 and its impacts on public health and economy, migration has once again become one of the most divisive issues in Italian domestic politics, fuelling anti-immigrant sentiments in the society. Following the devastation of the agricultural sector by the pandemic—resulting in serious labour shortages—the Italian agriculture minister, Teresa Bellanova announced in May the government’s intention to regularise the status of migrant agricultural workers. The regularisation of migrants currently or previously employed in the agriculture or care sectors or as domestic workers has quickly become a highly debated political question.29 Initiated by the centre-left forces in the governing

Annalisa Camilli: La consulta boccia i decreti sicurezza e il governo ne rimanda le modifiche. Internazionale.

10 July 2020. <https://www.internazionale.it/notizie/annalisa-camilli/2020/07/10/corte-costituzionale-decretisicurezza-modifiche > Accessed: 25 August 2020.

28

29 European Commission: Italian government adopts targeted regularisation for migrant workers. European Commission. 22 May 2020. <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/italian-government-adoptstargeted-regularisation-for-migrant-workers?lang=de > Accessed: 8 July 2020.

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coalition, the measure has also been approved by the populist Five Star Movement (M5S), despite its initial resistance.30 Salvini, expressed his parties disagreement with the plan, emphasising that regularisation can act as a pull factor for more illegal migrants to land in Italy.31 Considering however the limited time frame and strict conditions of the measure, such an effect does not seem realistic. It should be noted that the new proposal aiming at regularising migrant workers followed a period when the previous, League—Five Star Movement-led Italian government made migration a question of national security and moved the issue on the top of its political agenda. Defining the phenomenon as a potential threat for national security Salvini could shape Italian domestic politics and gain public support within Italian society. The question of migration has heavily been politicised by Salvini and the focus of attention has been mainly put on boat arrivals, limiting the activity of NGOs performing search and rescue activities in the Mediterranean, and the reception of asylum seekers. The result of the first Conte administration’s restrictive migration approach was an over-politicised migration management without providing effective long-term solutions to address the existing challenges associated with the phenomenon. One of the most important objectives of Salvini’s approach was to curb migration, and the Interior Minister’s famous anti-immigration “Security Decree” included measures that have led to an increase in the number of migrants in irregular status.32 The decree has been criticised by many, taking into account that it did not provide alternatives and solutions for many migrants already staying in Italy, making their situation even more difficult as a consequence of their irregular status.

The new provision (entitled “Emergence of Employment Relationships”) that aims to regulate the status of undocumented migrants, was included in the Decree approved by the current Italian government on 13 May 2020, for a post-pandemic economic relaunch.33 The main goals of the measure were to prevent the spread of the virus in the agricultural sector, address labour shortage as a consequence of the pandemic crisis and health emergency, and to avoid the collapse of the agricultural sector. The Italian agri-food production and distribution, which relies on the employment of seasonal migrant labour force (especially from Eastern Europe), has been heavily affected by the closure of European borders. As a consequence, the farmers union Coldiretti estimated a potential shortage of 200,000 seasonal workers.34 Regularisation could be a useful tool not only for tackling labour shortages, but also for addressing exploitative working conditions, social marginalisation and to protect the right of undocumented migrants in Italy. It is important to highlight that

30 Andrea Pettrachin: The Politics Of Regularisation Of Migrant Labour In Italy. Migration Policy Centre. 22 May 2020. <https://blogs.eui.eu/migrationpolicycentre/politics-regularisation-migrant-labour-italy/ > Accessed: 8 July 2020.

Gerardo Fortuna: Migrant workers regularisation puts strain on Italy’s ruling coalition. Euractive. 12 May 2020. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/migrant-workers-regularisation-puts-strain-on-italysruling-coalition/ > Accessed: 10 July 2020.

31

Matteo Villa: I nuovi irregolari in Italia. Istituto Affari Internazionali (ISPI). 18 December 2018. <https://www. ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/i-nuovi-irregolari-italia-21812 > Accessed: 8 July 2020.

32

33 Letizia Palumbo: The Italian Plan for Regularisation: Real progress for migrants’ rights? Migration Policy Centre. 8 June 2020. <https://blogs.eui.eu/migrationpolicycentre/italian-plan-regularisation-real-progressmigrants-rights/> Accessed: 8 July 2020.

Pettrachin, 2020.

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migrant workers are particularly vulnerable groups because in the absence of residence permits, legal status, and official documents they are not able to access neither basic health services nor medical treatment. This could have posed further, significant risks for the public health in Italy amidst the pandemic crisis.

The “caporalato” problem—a form of illegal intermediation and exploitation of migrant workers in the agricultural sector—and its effects on migrant workers have been on the political agenda in recent years, however despite some steps to address the question, the current system still has many victims. On 19 December 2018, Italy’s Chamber of Deputies' Joint Committees XI (Labour) and XIII (Agriculture) began an investigation of the “caporalato” phenomenon, a system that exploits migrant workers, violates minimum wage requirements, and imposes inhumane working conditions. Some well-known characteristics of the Italian agricultural sector might help to understand the development of the caporalato system.

Such characteristics are the “high demand for short-term, flexible labour; extensive labour outsourcing, contract operations and leased land and equipment; workplaces that are geographically isolated or present extremely harsh conditions (e.g., greenhouses); the inability of producer organisations to effectively represent local producers' interests; the presence of criminal organisations and lack of official recruitment services.”35 The poor living conditions and exploitation of the migrant agrarian field workers called “braccianti” in Italian have been well-presented by Dianna Ferrero and Carola Mamberto in their documentary entitled “The Invisibles: Inhumane Conditions of Italy's Migrant Farmworkers,” describing the phenomenon as modern slavery. Farmworkers in many cases live in ghettos without reaching access to basic health and medical services and drinkable water, while they work 14-15 hours per day for a EUR 3,5-5 hourly salary. Having personal experience in the agricultural sector,36 Teresa Bellanova called attention to the conditions of the agrarian field workers, emphasising that it is a common duty to take responsibility for those people. She highlighted that either the state takes care of them, or they will be the victims of organised crime in the form of illegal recruiting known as caporalato. In this context, Bellanova pointed out the role of the Mafia in the agricultural sector.37 According to a Romebased think tank, the Observatory of Crime in Agriculture and the Food Chain organised crime families in Italy have infiltrated the country’s entire food chain, having a crucial role in the agricultural sector. It is a well-known phenomenon that by buying cheap farmland, livestock, markets, and restaurants, the Mafia is laundering its illegally obtained money through the country’s leading industries. According to the Observatory, the value of the so-called agromafia business has almost doubled from EUR12.5bn in 2011 to more than

European Commission: Italian parliamentary investigation on the exploitation of migrant workers in agriculture. European Commission. 8 March 2019. <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/news/italianparliamentary-investigation-on-exploitation-of-migrant-workers-in-agriculture > Accessed: 11 August 2020.

35

Francesca Milano: Bellanova, il ministro che ha fatto (letteralmente) esperienza sul campo. Il Sole 24 Ore. 6 September 2019. <https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/bellanova-ministro-che-ha-fatto-letteralmenteesperienza-campo-ACFXeUi > Accessed: 9 July 2020.

36

37 Diana Ferrero: The Invisibles, il documentario sulla battaglia di Aboubakar Soumahoro contro i soprusi.

L’Espresso. 3 July 2020. <https://espresso.repubblica.it/attualita/2020/07/03/news/the-invisibles-ildocumentario-sulla-battaglia-di-aboubakar-soumahoro-contro-i-soprusi-1.350687 > Accessed: 9 July 2020.

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EUR22bn in 2018. In 2018 it accounted for 15% of total estimated Mafia turnover. Stefano Masini, a law professor at the Observatory pointed out that the sector is profitable (with profit margins as high as 2,000%), and it is as dangerous as the drug market. As reported by the police, all of Italy’s main mafia organisations—the Camorra in Naples, the Cosa Nostra in Sicily, and the ’Ndrangheta in Calabria—invest in farming.38 According to Coldiretti, “agromafia” has a finger in everything from production to transport and distribution.39 The new provision aims at regularising migrant workers in three areas: 1) agriculture, livestock and animal husbandry, fishing and aquaculture and related activities; 2) assistance to a person suffering from pathologies or handicaps; 3) domestic work to support family needs.40 The provision established two channels to apply for regularisation. The first channel allows employers to apply for concluding a fixed-term employment contract with foreign nationals present on the national territory or to declare the existence of an irregular employment relationship with Italian citizens or foreign nationals. Foreign citizens must have entered Italy before 8 March 2020 and must not have left the country after that date.

If they are undocumented migrants, they will receive a residence permit for work reasons.

The second channel allows foreign citizens with a residence permit that expired since 31 October 2019 to apply for a temporary, six-month residence permit to look for a job in the specified sectors. In order to apply, migrants must prove that they stayed in Italy on 8 March 2020 (and not later) and must prove that they worked in one of the eligible sectors before 31 October 2019. If within six months the person finds a job in one of these sectors, the temporary permit can be changed for a residence permit for work reasons. According to the original communication, the applications for both channels must be submitted between 1 June and 15 July 2020.41 However, this period has later been extended until 15 August.42 One of the main criticisms against the regularisation is that the system contains significant inadequacies and only a small proportion of migrants can take advantage of it. Measures exclude migrants working in certain key sectors, such as transport, tourism, construction, or people who are unable to work and may especially be vulnerable.43 According to a report published on 3 August, more than 160,000 requests have been registered to regularise

38 Hannah Roberts: How the mafia got to our food. Financial Times. 8 November 2018. <https://www.ft.com/ content/73de228c-e098-11e8-8e70-5e22a430c1ad > Accessed: 9 July 2020.

39 The Local: The perennial problem of Italy's agro-mafia. The Local. 15 September 2019. <https://www. thelocal.it/20190915/the-perennial-problem-of-italys-agro-mafia > Accessed: 9 July 2020.

Marina D’Odorico: The Italian regularization of migrants. Iniziative E Studi sulla Multietnicità (ISMU). 22 May 2020. <https://www.ismu.org/en/the-italian-regularization-of-migrants/ > Accessed: 8 July 2020.

40

Palumbo, 2020. 2

41

Governo Italiano: Integrazione Migranti: Regolarizzazione, c’è tempo fino al 15 agosto per la presentazione delle domande. 15 June 2020. <http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/Attualita/Notizie/Pagine/ Regolarizzazione-tempo-fino-al-15-agosto-per-la-presentazione-delle-domande.aspx > Accessed: 9 July 2020.

42

Interview with Olivia Sundberg-Diez, a Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre (Brussels). In: Vít Novotny: Should EU countries regularise undocumented migrants due to the COVID-19 pandemic? Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies. 4 June 2020. <https://martenscentre.eu/news/should-eu-countriesregularise-undocumented-migrants-due-covid-19-pandemic > Accessed: 8 July 2020.

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illegal migrants until 31 July.44 From the total number, 148,594 requests have already been forwarded to the relevant authorities, while 11,397 have been saved as a “draft request” waiting for completion. 87% of the already sent requests concerned domestic and care workers (128,719), and there have been 19,875 requests that concern agricultural workers.45 The total number of applications that have been presented until the deadline were 207 542, and 85 % of the requests concerned domestic and care workers.46 If we take a look at international migration in the context of the pandemic, data highlight that migratory flows have decreased during the COVID-19 lockdown. A report published by the European Migrant Smuggling Centre calls attention that the loosening of travel and movement restrictions is likely to increase the movement of irregular migrants.47 Despite migrant smuggling attempts appear to have been reduced due to stricter border controls, smugglers are adapting to the changed circumstances and both migrant smuggling activities and human trafficking continue. According to the report, illegal migrants are even more exposed to sexual exploitation as an impact of the pandemic.48 Considering the above, regularisation can be an important tool also to protect vulnerable migrant workers from exploitation, abuse, physical and sexual violence, inhumane conditions that have been reported by various organisations. Their extreme vulnerability often prevents the workers from going to the authorities to report abuse.49 While the current measure could be an important step in the development of Italian migration policies in the current circumstances, it is difficult to predict its future impacts and long-term consequences. At the same time, we should not forget that at the European Union level there are significant disagreements between member states on how to address migration in a more comprehensive, effective, and equal manner. The underlying reason for the existing challenges is that, in line with the “first country of entry” criterion of the current Dublin system, examining the asylum claim of new arrivals is predominantly falling under the responsibility of the frontline member states.50 Addressing the economic consequences of the pandemic is now a top priority for the EU to avoid a deeper economic recession. In the long run, however, the Union as a whole should find common answers to tackle the existing and future immigration related

44 Governo Italiano: Integrazione Migranti: Regolarizzazione, quasi 160 mila domande a 15 giorni dalla chiusura. 3 August 2020. <http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/Attualita/Notizie/Pagine/Regolarizzazione,quasi-160-mila-domande-a-15-giorni-dalla-chiusura.aspx > Accessed: 10 August 2020.

Governo Italiano.

45

Il Sole 24 Ore: Migranti, conclusa la regolarizzazione: 207mila domande. Netta prevalenza (85 %) di colf e badanti. Il Sole 24 Ore. 17 August 2020. <https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/migranti-conclusa-regolarizzazione207mila-domande-netta-prevalenza-85percento-colf-e-badanti-ADTZKqj > Accessed: 24 August 2020.

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47 European Migrant Smuggling Centre: 4th Annual Report. Europol. 15 May 2020. <https://www.europol.europa. eu/publications-documents/emsc-4th-annual-activity-report-%E2%80%93-2019 > Accessed: 8 July 2020.

European Migrant Smuggling Centre, 12-13.

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The Local, 2019.

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Bianka Restás: Towards a more sustainable and effective migration management? (Ursula von der Leyen's proposals to rethink migration and asylum policies in Europe). Antall József Knowledge Centre Analyses. 19 May 2020. <https://ajtk.hu/en/research/ajrc-analyses/towards-a-more-sustainable-and-effective-migration-management-ursulavon-der-leyens-proposals-to-rethink-migration-and-asylum-policies-in-europe > Accessed: 9 July 2020.

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challenges by rethinking the EU’s asylum and migration policies, rationalising the Dublin system, and creating legal migration pathways based on the logic of secure and human border and migration management.

THE IMPACTS OF THE PANDEMIC ON THE RELATIONS WITH THE EU, CHINA, AND RUSSIA—IS COVID-19 SHAPING INTERNATIONAL GEOPOLITICAL BALANCES? The emergency linked to the spread of the new coronavirus in Italy transformed the country into a scene of a geopolitical powerplay between different state actors. Amid the COVID-19 crisis, China and Russia have been testing their global repositioning strategies, trying to influence the current international geopolitical balances. We should remember that providing aid and humanitarian support are not only tools for expressing solidarity, but could also be effective instruments of soft power, supporting the states to enhance their strategic objectives and influencing capacities. Compared with the widespread media coverage of the aid provided by China and Russia at the beginning of the coronavirus emergency in Italy, the support offered by the historic allies of Rome received very limited attention, fuelling Euro-sceptical and anti-Atlanticist sentiments among Italian citizens.51 Many called attention to the fact that the active role of the external players (China and Russia) in Italy during the pandemic could be interpreted as a part of a geopolitical game, however, it is not easy to foresee to what extent this game could be harmful in the long run for the already fragile EU-Italian relations.

China, one of the first countries responding to the COVID-19 outbreak in Italy with medical equipment and with a team of Chinese medical staff from the Chinese Red Cross, magnified the importance of its support using tools such as public diplomacy, soft power, and social media, giving rise to a so-called “mask” or “health diplomacy.” The Chinese support has been accompanied by a huge flow of symbolic messages of solidarity and a very active Twitter feed depicting the meaningful friendship between the two countries.52 China’s above-mentioned activity could serve multiple purposes. On the one hand, they could help the country to distract attention away from the fact that the virus originated in Wuhan and that Chinese officials initially denied its existence. On the other hand, Beijing tried to take advantage of its own supposedly successful response to the outbreak in a period when the West was struggling to contain the virus. Last but not least, China used its mask diplomacy to boost its soft power profile and promote itself as a generous and responsible international actor. The combination of tools that China used can serve as instruments for improving the Communist Party's image both internationally and globally.53

51 Alessandra Giada Dibenedetto: Non solo Mosca e Pechino: il supporto europeo e statunitense all’Italia nell’emergenza coronavirus. Centro Studi Internazionali. 1 April 2020. <https://www.cesi-italia.org/articoli/1104/non-solo-mosca-epechino-il-supporto-europeo-e-statunitense-allitalia-nellemergenza-coronavirus > Accessed: 22 July 2020.

Valbona Zeneli–Federica Santoro: China’s Disinformation Campaign in Italy. The Diplomat. 9 June 2020. <https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/chinas-disinformation-campaign-in-italy/ > Accessed: 22 July 2020.

52

53 Erik Brattberg–Philippe Le Corre: No, COVID-19 Isn’t Turning Europe Pro-China (Yet). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 15 April 2020. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/15/no-covid-19-isn-t-turningeurope-pro-china-yet-pub-81571 > Accessed: 22 July 2020.

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Taking into consideration the EU’s initial confusion amidst the pandemic, as well as the absence of common solidarity and coordinated European response, we can conclude that China has well exploited these circumstances to present itself as a quick and responsible actor, assisting in Italy in times of crisis and health emergency. At the same time, we should not forget that in March 2019 Italy became the first G7 country to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)54 to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This can further explain the strategic relevance of China’s response to the pandemic: the Chinese strategy supposedly targeted the increase of Beijing’s economic and diplomatic footprint in Italy.55 It is important to note that Luigi Di Maio, Italy’s Foreign Minister, posted a video of the arrival of the Chinese aircraft on his Facebook page, linking China’s help to his China policy and his phone call with China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi on 10 March, two days before the delivery of supplies from China.56 This step has further strengthened the public narrative praising China for its immediate support and generosity.

Besides China, Russia’s quick reaction to the emergency in Italy has received ample attention too. The Russian aid included not only doctors but personal protective types of equipment (PPE), ventilators, and mobile disinfection machines on cargo planes. The aid, accompanied by the message “From Russia with love” has been interpreted by many as propaganda. Andrea Armaro, Italy's former defence spokesman told that Russia’s act “was the largest and most successful propaganda operation carried out in NATO territory at practically zero cost.”57 He added that he hopes that “someone in Washington and Brussels wakes up before it's too late.”58 Analysts pointed out that there were clear motivations for the foreign aid campaign, including not only diplomatic interests and the possibility of receiving return aid later, but also getting EU sanctions on Russia lifted.59 According to Elena Alekseenkova, a Senior Research Fellow and Head of the Centre for Italian Studies at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Science there were some expectations in Russia that the coronavirus may change the existing sanctions, however, those illusions are gone.60 In an interview she told that she does not think “that Russian politicians are so detached from reality as to expect the abolishment of sanctions in exchange for this aid,” Governo Italiano: Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Italian Republic and the Government of the People’s Republic of China. March 2019. <http://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/ Memorandum_Italia-Cina_EN.pdf > Accessed: 23 July 2020.

54

Zeneli–Santoro, 2020.

55

Theresa Fallon: China, Italy, and Coronavirus: Geopolitics and Propaganda. The Diplomat. 20 March 2020. <https:// thediplomat.com/2020/03/china-italy-and-coronavirus-geopolitics-and-propaganda/ > Accessed: 23 July 2020.

56

Dubbi sulle motivazioni di Mosca riguardo la spedizione di aiuti per il coronavirus in Italia. The Italian Post.

29 April 2020. <https://www.theitalianpost.it/29/04/2020/dubbi-sulle-motivazioni-di-mosca-riguardo-laspedizione-di-aiuti-per-il-coronavirus-in-italia/ > Accessed: 23 July 2020.

57

The Italian Post.

58

Angela Giuffrida–Andrew Roth: Moscow's motives questioned over coronavirus aid shipment to Italy.

The Guardian. 27 April 2020. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/27/moscow-motives-questionedover-coronavirus-aid-shipment-to-italy > Accessed: 23 July 2020.

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60 Giulia Isetti: From Russia with love: Is Covid-19 shaping the EU and Russia’s future relations? An interview with Elena Alekseenkova. Eurac Research. 21 May 2020. <https://blogs.eurac.edu/covid-19/from-russia-withlove-interview-with-elena-alekseenkova/ > Accessed: 8 August 2020.

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while she pointed out that it seems that “Russia’s leadership still hopes to enter the circle of problem-solvers, rather than of problem-makers.” She added too that she believes that the aim of Russia through providing humanitarian aid was to restore trust and improve its image in the West.61 The international insecurity and instability caused by COVID-19 has created a crucial moment in the competition between those who intend to defend the pre-pandemic status quo and those who, on the contrary, try to build a new order of power in the postpandemic era. Strategic communication activities and methods can play a fundamental role in achieving the objectives above. The quantity and quality of content published online in connection with the worldwide epidemic of COVID-19 is unprecedented. The World Health Organization (WHO) has used the term “infodemic” to describe the dynamics that resulted from the uncontrolled amount of updates, unverified news, official declarations, and exchanges of information between citizens. The WHO pointed out that the 2019nCoV outbreak and response has been accompanied by a massive “infodemic,” an overabundance of information—some accurate and some not—that made it hard for people to find trustworthy sources and reliable guidance.62 A sentiment analysis published in April by the Italian Centro Studi Internazionali think tank focused on the online activity (use of the internet and social media) and the reactions of the Italian citizens during the pandemic, with special regard to the public perception and interpretation of the Chinese and Russian support and its media coverage.63 The analysis provides a fairly clear picture of the Italian public’s perceptions about the Russian and Chinese aid and intends to evaluate the success and effectiveness of Beijing and Moscow’s actions. According to the results of the analysis, Beijing has undoubtedly attracted the attention of the Italian public through its communication that aimed at sending a message of empathy, solidarity, and collaboration.64 The arrival of the “hero doctors” from Wuhan and the Chinese medical equipment has been welcomed by many, also as a consequence of the targeted communication activity of China that aimed at spreading a message of closeness. The criticism of the Italian public towards the traditional foreign policy allies (European and Atlantic) also played a crucial role in the general (positive) interpretation of Chinese assistance.65 On the contrary, the public response to the Russian humanitarian campaign was certainly colder. The message “From Russia with love” did not warm the hearts of many Italians and was interpreted as a positive act mainly by the already convinced pro-Russians. The choice to send the military, a symbol of Russian power did not have widespread positive

Isetti.

61

World Health Organization (WHO): Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Situation Report-13. 2 February 2020. <https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200202-sitrep-13-ncov-v3.pdf > Accessed: 31 July 2020.

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63 DI Gabriele Iacovino–Marco Di Liddo–Filippo Tansin: Incertezza e supremazia informativa: L’ecosistema Italia di fronte alla pandemia. Centro Studi Internazionali. 27 April 2020. 11. <https://www.cesi-italia.org/articoli/1123/ incertezza-e-supremazia-informativa-lecosistema-italia-di-fronte-alla-pandemia > Accessed: 1 August 2020.

Iacovino–Liddo–Tansin, 11.

64

Iacovino–Liddo–Tansin, 11.

65

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effects. It seems that the presence of foreign military personnel in a country that is a NATO member created more suspicion than admiration and gratitude. The arrival of the Russians in Italy soon lost its humanitarian aid interpretation and it has been evaluated as a part of the Russian geopolitical game.66 However, the media coverage and communication of both Russia and China’s aid provision (even it is a real manifestation of solidarity or more a strategic step) influenced the Italians’ public opinion on the EU amid the pandemic. It seemed that the Union emerged as a partner unable to present a credible narrative and coordinated response to the crisis. It is important to note that this recent “solidarity crisis” happened in a period when the EU's general acceptance and support in Italy is already low. We should remember that while ten years ago Italy was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of European integration, during the 2010s it has become one of the most Eurosceptic Member States.67 To have a more accurate picture of the current opinion and views of the Italians on questions related to the EU, China, and Russia, it is worth taking a look at the survey carried out by the Istituto Affari Internazionali think tank and the Laboratory of Political and Social Analysis of the University of Siena.68 The opinion survey aimed at analysing the views of Italians on the main foreign policy issues affecting Italy and was conducted on a representative sample of the population residing in Italy. It is interesting to observe that the relative majority of those involved in the public opinion polls are sceptical about the idea of European unity.69 According to 64%, a higher proportion than in 2019 (52%), the countries are too different to achieve a successful European unity. 71% of the respondents believe that Italy has been treated unfairly by the EU and its member states in the context of the coronavirus, while 69% and 73% have the same opinion with regards to the question of the budget policy and immigration. Eurosceptic sentiments are visible in the results of the poll: if there would be a referendum on the exit from the European Union, 48% would vote for leaving the EU (compared with 31% in 2017), while 43% would leave the eurozone (compared with 36% in 2017). The results highlight that the proportion of those who would leave the EU and the eurozone is the highest among the voters of the far-right League (Lega) and the Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d'Italia, FdI), while the lowest among the supporters of the left-wing Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, PD). In the light of the experience of Brexit, 23% (11% in 2019) of the respondents believe that Italy would benefit from an Italexit scenario (leaving the EU), 27% said it would be inappropriate (33% in 2019), 34% thought it would be desirable but too complicated (28% in 2019), while 15% believe that it would be a mistake (28% in 2019).70

Iacovino–Liddo–Tansin, 11.

66

Rosa Balfour–Lorenzo Robustelli: Why Did Italy Fall Out of Love with Europe? Istituto Affari Internazionali. 23 July 2019. <https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/why-did-italy-fall-out-love-europe > Accessed: 1 August 2020.

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68 Gianluca Piccolino–Davide Angelucci–Pierangelo Isernia–Ettore Greco: Gli italiani e la politica estera 2020.

Istituto Affari Internazionali. 15 June 2020. 23-28 <https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/gli-italiani-e-la-politicaestera-2020 > Accessed: 2 August 2020.

Piccolino–Angelucci–Isernia–Greco, 23.

69

Piccolino–Angelucci–Isernia–Greco, 23-28.

70

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Regarding the Chinese influence in Italy, 48% of those involved in the poll believe that the country's political influence in Italy is excessive, while 51% have the same opinion on China's economic influence. In economic terms, the poll highlights that while some of the Italians see China as an opportunity for new markets and new investments, others interpret it as a threat to their jobs and the economic security of the country. While 72% and 63% of the PD and Five Star Movement’s (Movimento Cinque Stelle, M5S) voters see China's economic influence as an opportunity, a lower proportion of the respondents believe the same (58%, 48%, and 47%) among the voters of the Forza Italia party, the League and the Brothers of Italy.71 It is important to point out that 49% of those who participated in the poll would prefer to develop an autonomous bilateral relationship with Beijing, 10% would refuse any kind of relationship with China, and 41% would collaborate with the European allies. In the current international circumstances, 12% would strengthen the alliance with the United States to thwart China's rise, 14% would strengthen the relations with China to counter American influence, while 39% would focus on Europe as an alternative force to both China and the United States. At the same time the results of the survey highlight too that 35% would pursue a completely independent foreign policy of the great global powers. Concerning the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 49% see it as a precious opportunity for developing trade with an important country like China and 19% believe that it is a useful initiative to reduce Italy's dependence on other European countries and the United States.

It is interesting to note, however, that according to 20% China's objective with the initiative is a new kind of political and economic colonisation, therefore it must be rejected. Finally, 12% believe that it is a risky initiative that could compromise the political and commercial relations both with the traditional European allies of Italy and the United States.72 Last but not least, the participants were asked to rate seven important politicians and global leaders (Russian President Vladimir Putin, French President Emmanuel Macron, China's President Xi Jinping, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, US President Donald Trump, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan) on a scale of zero to ten. The results highlight that none of the above leaders is particularly popular among Italians (none of them reach 5 on the scale). The analysis also calls attention to the fact that from the mentioned leaders, Vladimir Putin is the most popular, who scores 4.8, 0.4 points more compared to 2019. This is certainly an interesting figure, and according to the same paper, the relative popularity of Putin could be the result of the penetrating media (and social media) campaigns promoted by the Kremlin.73

COMMENTARY September will be particularly decisive for Italy. The coronavirus pandemic, arrived as a shock for the EU’s third economy, hit the country in the imaginably most intense way, especially the northern region of Lombardy which is also the economic heart of the country.

Piccolino–Angelucci–Isernia–Greco, 32-33.

71

Piccolino–Angelucci–Isernia–Greco, 33-35.

72

Piccolino–Angelucci–Isernia–Greco, 37.

73

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Despite an initial hesitation the EU was able to field some powerful instruments to tackle the health crisis and the subsequent economic downturn. Eventually, Italy has been designed as the biggest beneficiary of a massive recovery fund which also represents a revolutionary step in the history of European integration. This once-in-a-lifetime opportunity provided by the EU to put back on track the member states economies has the potential to re-trigger the sluggish Italian economic growth and help the country to put forward a series of reforms which subsequent governments were not able—or rather not willing—to do. For Italy, this is a historical moment, but it is wrong to assume that the EUR 209 billion the country will receive from the “Next Generation EU” are a panacea to all of Rome’s problems. As a matter of fact, one must not underestimate the Italian political class’ unreliability when it comes to implement public policies the country needs but which do not pay well off in terms of popularity. It is therefore very much a good new that the European Recovery Fund will come with certain conditionalities attached making it possible for the Commission to take a vigilant eye on how the EU money is going to be spent by the member states’ executives.

This resources should in fact be destined for the sole implementation of much needed structural reforms which fulfil the EU’s greater objectives. However, this will be extremely challenging for the current coalition government whose durability is continuously under strain. This is due to the fact that the yellow-red government was born out of convenience and rests its legitimacy on a very precarious basis. Nevertheless, considering the healthcrisis management and the quite satisfactory result that Prime Minister Conte was able to obtain in Brussels, it might be assumed that it represents the least bad option for Italy at the moment. Despite the frail government, Conte’s ability to appease has so far been able to keep the coalition afloat, shield against the attacks of Salvini and the other opposition parties and offer a more reassuring picture of the country to the bureaucrats in Brussels. The emergency situation surely helped the government to gather support and despite the fact that more and more Italians are growing disillusioned about the postCOVID recovery scenario, Prime Minister Conte runs still high in the polls. If this will be enough to let the current executive conclude its mandate it is not yet known, but a series of political events might make a change of leadership an even more remote option. These events, as already discussed, include a very demanding constitutional reform subsequent to a problematic referendum, the design of the new electoral law and the opening of the “White Semester” period preceding the election of the new President of the Republic. As expected, immigration will be one of the most heated dossiers for the government. This issue has created not only political and social tensions domestically, but also opened deep divisions between the member states of the European Union in recent years. One of the reasons behind the existing challenges is that the European Union has not been able to provide a comprehensive solution so far that could effectively address the question of migration. As a result of its geopolitical position, Italy clearly belongs to the group of the “most responsible” countries when it comes to the addressment of this question. Although the rhetoric of the current government is far more moderate compared to the approach of the previous coalition, embracing a more equal and fair logic when it comes to the European asylum and migration policies is still a priority in the current government’s political agenda.

Regularisation could be an important step in Italian migration policies, but there are many

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other challenges that have to be overcome in the long run. At the national level the future of the controversial security decree is still a crucial issue, while at the EU level it is a clear priority for the country to elaborate a more sustainable, solidarity-based approach to tackle the question of migration in a more effective manner.

As discussed the survival of the second Conte executive rests on very frail basis. The government’s mandate is supposed to last until 2023 and, despite being hazardous, an earlier vote is not totally to be excluded. As things stand, Italy might arrive at this new nationwide vote with an even more fragmented political landscape than in 2018. At that time voters have enshrined the official end of bipolarity and the decline of traditional parties while the polarisation of the national political system is today even more evident. Currently, despite suffering a consistent decrease in support, the League is still considered the largest party. This apparent loss in support for Salvini is not anyway resulting in a larger support for more moderate parties, but has instead paved the way for the growth of the far-right Brothers of Italy. The leader of the party, Giorgia Meloni, might even attempt to search for a leading role within the centre-right coalition relishing also on Berlusconi’s blessing. As the competition within the opposition is growing, despite the parties agreed to run together in the regional elections, and the distance between its members increased, the apparent unity of the coalition is at risk. Interestingly, Matteo Salvini’s leadership is not only questioned by his coalition partners but also from within his own party. Currently, a more moderate and “north-centred” group inside the League is growing disappointed with the former Interior Minister. This faction is gathering around Veneto’s governor Luca Zaia and high-rank party member Giancarlo Giorgetti and represents a less Eurosceptic, pro-business elite who reject the idea of leaving the EU and argue that the League should once more become the party representing the sole interests of the rich North. A different story is Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia. Even if reduced to the role of the smallest party within the coalition, Berlusconi’s party remains a very influential group within the Parliament and it might still be king-maker in the next election. Berlusconi recently showed a more moderate and pro-European attitude which, together with the leverage of being a member of the EPP, might even launch the party at the helm of Italian politics as part of a renewed “Ursula Coalition.” Obviously, Berlusconi’s change of heart is mostly directed to reach voters from a vast moderate voting base which is currently without representation. In fact, the fast degradation of the Italian political offer which saw the rise of sovereigntist, populist and far-right forces has pushed away a large part of the electorate from the political participation. In order to fill this vacuum some new parties were created recently with the aim to fish in this large electoral basin. Next to Forza Italia, the new parties competing for entry to the next parliament are former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s Italia Viva and Sergio Calenda’s Azione (Action). These groups currently might reach the minimum threshold required to obtain a seat in the Parliament, but very much will depend on the new electoral law that could probably set a higher threshold— possibly 5%—in order to reduce the political fragmentation. The Italian moderates could also be the main target of Prime Minister Conte’s eventual new political grouping—should he decide to run in the next election. It is not the first time that a former “apolitical” Premier chooses to enter the field—Mario Monti did the same in 2013—maybe galvanized by the polls but with the serious risk that the attempt could fall well below its leader’s expectations. As

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for the main governing forces, the Democratic Party finds itself at a crossroad. On one side, it should decide whether to institutionalise the cooperation with the 5Star Movement and run together in the next election in a catch-all amorphous coalition, made up of populist and Left-leaning forces. This solution might well provide the Democratic Party another chance to govern but in the long term it is not sure that Italians would entrust their vote to a party which failed to push forward the liberal-progressive ideals on which it is based. The eventual agreement on a day-to-day issue alliance with the M5S and the lack of a strong leadership might increase the power of centrifugal forces within the party. The M5S finds itself in a slightly different position compared to its coalition partner. Since its origins the movement demonstrated that it is everything and its opposite and once being offered the chance to govern all these inconsistencies came to light. In the two and half years since the M5S joined the government it changed allies and political direction with embarrassing nonchalance.

With a great amount of political realism, M5S went from supporting the controversial Salvini’s security decrees and consequently realised to turn in a pro-European party which even tried to access the Green alliance in the European Parliament and supported the election of von der Leyen to the role of President of the Commission. A further ambiguity of the M5S is represented by its leadership since it is not really clear who is the leader of the “Yellows.” The party is supposed to be ruled by its voters who express their opinion on a day-to-day basis making use of an online platform, however the political leader of the party is the relatively unknown Vito Crimi. Luigi Di Maio, M5S’s former leader, is the highest ranking policymaker within the party, and is still nurturing the hope to return to the driving seat. However, the real power behind the throne is Davide Casaleggio, son of Gianroberto Casaleggio, who founded the Movement together with ex-comedian Beppe Grillo. Also continuing the alliance with the PD will have not negligible effects for the M5S. Since being in the government the party underwent deep transformation several times what previously would have been considered party dogmas. As a result, dissidents within the party grew in number and became more vocal. During the last months some of them were expelled from the party, some left willingly on their own and formed mixed parliamentary groups while others even joined the League. The astonishing loss in support—more than halved since the last general election—is a clear signal of the growing disaffection within the ranks of M5S’s voters who are unhappy about the party’s transformation. The referendum in September will represent a turning point for the M5S because the eventual victory of the “NO” camp will mean that Italians rejected definitely the populist rhetoric of the party. The reduction of the number of MPs, in the absence of an organic framework of constitutional reform, is only harming demagogy, a slogan that is deeply anti-political. In fact, since the early 90s Italians witnessed the weakening of political and party subjects and at the same time the strengthening of other powers, often totally disconnected from popular accountability. The growing de-legitimisation of politics has turned Italy weaker during the years and greatly hindered the completion of its transition to a modern and functional system. Today, more than ever it is vital that this process is reversed.

The pandemic has not only clearly influenced the domestic politics of Italy, but its foreign policy too: the relations with China, Russia and the EU have undergone a re-evaluation by the Italian society in the context of the foreign support received Italy amidst the crisis. Italy

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has become a scene of a geopolitical powerplay during the outbreak, and the coronavirus emergency has clearly shown that targeted social media campaigns, public diplomacy, and soft power could be useful tools for influencing public opinion and the perception of the citizens in general. While the positive perceptions of China were clearly visible in Italy, the support of Russia was less popular. It is hard to foresee the long-term impacts of the coronavirus on the country's foreign policy and its bilateral relations with China and Russia, also no one knows whether China's mask diplomacy could be a tool for the longlasting improvement of the country's general image. History has proven that the country’s membership in the European Union and in NATO are among the most important priorities in the country’s foreign policy, therefore it is hard to imagine that the country’s three “traditional” spheres (the Atlantic, the European, and the Mediterranean spheres) of interest could be significantly changed in the long run. However, one thing is clear: the EU’s popularity is currently on a record low in Italy and the absence of a quick initial reaction in the emergency has only exaggerated its already fragile general acceptance. Italy's strong affection for the Union seems to have reached a critical phase with many open questions remaining.

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