Strengthening the Indo-Pacific Order An Assessment of India’s Act East Policy by Antall József Tudásközpont

ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE

STRENGTHENING THE INDO-PACIFIC ORDER AN ASSESSMENT OF INDIA’S ACT EAST POLICY RAHUL MISHRA

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STRENGTHENING THE INDO-PACIFIC ORDER AN ASSESSMENT OF INDIA’S ACT EAST POLICY RAHUL MISHRA1

INTRODUCTION When the Act East Policy was launched six years ago, it was considered a major foreign policy initiative by India’s newly elected National Democratic Alliance government led by Narendra Modi. It was expected to bolster India’s engagement with the East, building on the success of the Look East Policy—its earlier avatar. Since 2014, India’s eastward-bound Indo-Pacific commitments have grown and facilitated its comprehensive institutional engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its several multilateral mechanisms. Their contributions to strengthening India’s diplomatic footwork in the region have been numerous—at bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral levels.2 Over the past six years of the Modi government, India’s eastward engagement has acquired a greater role with bigger responsibilities. A critical aspect of the expansion of the Act East Policy has been the drafting of a vision for the Indo-Pacific order, which places the ASEAN at its core. India’s eastward engagement is characterised by an exchange of high-level visits, the elevation of relations, the signing of several key agreements, and the deepening of strategic and infrastructure cooperation partnerships with friends in the region and engaging them in institutionalised dialogues on issues of mutual interest and shared concerns. The emerging Indo-Pacific construct has given an opportunity to India and its friends to cooperate in the Southeast Asian region and beyond on maintaining the strategic equilibrium and preserving a rules-based order. Amidst China’s growing territorial assertions and the ongoing India–China border stand-off, India is beginning to pay greater attention to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and other such minilateral mechanisms of strategic nature. The trilateral dialogues involving India, Indonesia, and Australia; Japan, the US, and India; India, Japan, and Australia; and India, France, and Australia are some of the important trilateral/minilateral dialogues in that respect. In this context, this paper attempts to explore the central tenets of India’s eastward engagement in the emerging Indo-Pacific order, manifested in the Act East Policy and complemented by the Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) initiative and several minilateral/ trilateral arrangements with key Indo-Pacific powers.

Dr Rahul Mishra is a Senior Lecturer at the Asia–Europe Institute, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur.

This paper draws from several previously published papers on the subject by the author.

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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND One of the popular myths about India’s relations with the East and Southeast Asian countries is that it had only had sporadic exchanges with them before the British colonisation, and India’s engagement was not very strong even after it had achieved independence, except for the times when Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru was at the helm. However, the truth is that India’s relations with countries of the Southeast Asian region are deeply rooted in history. This multilayered engagement has taken different shapes and foci over centuries. In addition to the systemic factors that have shaped India’s ties with the region, geographical location, civilizational and cultural moorings, economic aspirations, and strategic concerns and interests have also shaped this engagement.3 India’s imprint on almost all countries of the Southeast Asian region has been indelible and cuts across art forms, architecture, literature and language, mythology, along with culinary and other cultural aspects.4 Until the onset of the colonialism in Asia, and even during the British colonial period, India had wide and deep trade and commerce linkages with the Southeast Asian region and beyond. Later, the British Empire became the controller and direct beneficiary of these linkages, thereby disrupting some of India’s key direct engagements in the region. During their freedom struggle, India’s freedom fighters, such as Jawaharlal Nehru, Mahatma Gandhi, and Charles Freer Andrews, and revolutionaries, such as Rash Behari Bose and Subhash Chandra Bose, kept India’s engagement with the region alive. In modern times, the Southeast Asian region has been important to the Indian leadership since the time of Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of India. The idea of Afro-Asian solidarity, promoted and cemented by Nehru through the Asian Relations Conferences and the Bandung Conference, is a case in point. Even outside of the Non-Aligned Bloc, he maintained cordial ties with key commonwealth member countries which were not a part of the Non-Aligned Movement or Afro-Asian solidarity. India’s strong ties with Malaysia and Nehru’s personal rapport with Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first prime minister of Malaysia, are significant in that regard. The development of India–Southeast Asia ties slowed down as the Cold War began to reach its peak. International systemic constraints played a predominant role in drifting the region away from India, and vice versa. Having said that, India did have a strong opinion on all major events in the region—ranging from the Vietnam War to the coup d’état and, later, the suppression of the democratic movement (led by Aung San Suu Kyi) in Myanmar, the Cambodian crisis, and even the Chinese attack on Vietnam. With the end of the Cold War, India’s ties with Southeast Asia received a new impetus. The end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the advent of the globalisation, and the economic rise of the region motivated India to officially formulate a policy towards the region. The post–Cold War world led to the formulation of

India’s eastward engagement may be divided into seven waves: the Hindu–Buddhist, the Islamic, the British colonial period and the Indian freedom struggle, the Nehru wave, the post-Nehru period, the Look East policy, and the Act East policy. For details, please see S. D. Muni–Rahul Mishra: India’s Eastward Engagement. From Antiquity to Act East. Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2019. 3

Rahul Mishra: Twenty-five years of India–ASEAN ties: An Assessment. AEI Insights. 2018/1. 89–106.

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India’s landmark Look East Policy, which facilitated and institutionalised its proactive rereengagement with ASEAN and the wider Southeast Asian region.

THE ORIGINS OF THE LOOK EAST POLICY As mentioned earlier, the end of the Cold War, the advent of globalisation, the disintegration of the USSR, and its own economic reforms and opening-up motivated India to look harder for new friends and partners. In 1992, then–prime minister of India Pamulaparthi Venkata Narasimha Rao launched the Look East Policy with the objective of engaging and reaching out to ASEAN in a more comprehensive manner. The idea was to systematise the initiatives taken by the Rajiv Gandhi government to engage the Southeast Asian countries. It was emphasised that “the policy is not merely an external economic policy, it was also a strategic shift in India’s vision of the world and its place in the evolving global economy. Most of all, it was about reaching out to our civilizational Asian neighbours in Southeast Asia and East Asia.”5 India graduated from a Sectoral Dialogue Partner in 1992 to a full Dialogue Partner in December 1995, which was implemented in 1996. In 2002, the relationship was further elevated with convening the first India–ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. In 2005, India joined the East Asia Summit (EAS) despite Chinese reservations. Later, in 2012, while commemorating the tenth anniversary of the India–ASEAN Summit, the two sides signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement, which strengthened the relationship further.6 When India joined ASEAN as one of its sectoral dialogue partners in 1992, the association had only six members, as Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia were yet to become its members. By institutionalising its relations with ASEAN, it was easier for India to reach out to its member countries through the Look East policy. This was crucial, especially with respect to engaging Myanmar, which had been through a long period of self-isolation. Moreover, each country played its part for India’s greater presence in the region. Singapore and Malaysia (and, later, Vietnam) have been its main proponents, while Indonesia and Thailand have emerged as an important maritime partner to India over the years. In the post–Cold War era, the Look East and Act East Policies have shaped India’s engagement with the East and Southeast Asian region. Generally, the Look East Policy (1992–2014), is considered the precursor to the Act East Policy (announced in 2014), which is an action-oriented and upgraded version of its former counterpart. The Look East Policy was primarily about India’s attempts to restrengthen its place in the region and, particularly, its ties with ASEAN and its member countries at economic and strategic levels. Their relations began institutionalising in the 1990s with India’s becoming a dialogue partner first and, later, joining the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996. The Southeast Asian response to India’s nuclear tests in 1998 was not as harsh as that of countries such as Australia and

5 ‘Make 21st Century truly an Asian Century’: PM. Keynote address at special leaders’ dialogue of ASEAN Business Advisory Council. Press Information Bureau, Government of India. 12 December 2005. <http://pib.nic. in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=14102 > Accessed: 4 June 2020.

For details, please see <https://asean.org/vision-statement-asean-india-commemorative-summit/ > Accessed: 7 October 2020. 6

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Japan, which indicates that they understood India’s national security concerns and some even cautiously welcomed it. Initial successes in engaging the ASEAN led to the further institutionalisation of relations. The first India–ASEAN Summit took place in 2002, and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation was signed in 2003, followed by India’s membership of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005. Negotiations for finalising the free trade agreement (FTA) began in the 2000s with signing the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation in 2003. India and ASEAN also signed a free trade agreement on trade in goods in 2009 and on trade in services and investment in 2014. India’s membership of other ASEAN-led mechanisms includes ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) from 2010 and Expanded ASEAN Maritime Security Forum (EAMSF) from 2012. During this phase, India also started to expand the scope of its policy to pay greater attention to the strategic dimension. The Look East Policy was not confined to trade and security relations exclusively. During this period, India took steps to advance cultural ties with the countries of the region, as well. Cultural exchange programmes were signed with countries such as Cambodia, and India has been involved in the restoration of archaeological sites such as the Ananda Temple in Myanmar, Angkor Vat in Cambodia, and MySon sanctuary in Vietnam. At bilateral level, India has cultivated strong economic, defence, and strategic ties with Southeast Asian countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam. It has signed several agreements with ASEAN member states on a number of fields. In the economic domain, India signed comprehensive economic cooperation agreements with Singapore in 2005 and Malaysia in 2010, and an early harvest agreement with Thailand in 2004, while a second protocol to amend the framework agreement for establishing a free trade area was also signed between the two countries in January 2012. India has also engaged with the ASEAN member countries to review the terms of the FTA agreement on goods and services. A ministerial-level consultation involving India and the ASEAN economic ministers was held on 29 August 2020 in that regard. According to sources, India and its ASEAN counterparts have agreed to work together in determining the scope of the review of the existent FTA.7 This was felt necessary in view of the fact that India has pulled out of the 16-nation Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations due to its concerns over rules of origin and other related concerns. Defence agreements are also a common feature: India signed a defence cooperation agreement with Malaysia in 1993 and with Singapore in 2003, while a memorandum of understanding on defence cooperation with Thailand was signed on 25 January 2012. India has annual military exercises with countries such as Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, China, Vietnam, Australia, and Japan. During the two decades of the Look East Policy, India gradually gave its engagement an overt strategic dimension while carefully laying the foundations of stronger bilateral strategic ties. Contrary to popular belief, the strategic element at the policy level was present

India engaging with ASEAN to review FTA: Piyush Goyal. Financial Express. 18 September 2020. <https:// www.financialexpress.com/economy/india-engaging-with-asean-to-review-fta-piyush-goyal/2086647/ > Accessed: 5 October 2020. 7

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at the very outset of the Look East Policy.8 The quiet diplomacy practiced in the initial years paid huge dividends in India’s eastward engagement. The country’s primary focus was on establishing itself in Southeast Asia, institutionalise relations with the countries of the region, and concentrate on regional integration. The idea was not to compete for influence in the region but to establish the country’s place for mutual growth and greater regional integration. Contrary to the popular perception that it was initiated in response to China’s increasing influence in Southeast Asia, the Look East Policy was formulated to realise India’s aspiration to reach out to the countries of the region. It is true, however, that, as India’s engagement gained momentum, China started to figure in the strategic calculus of both India and its partners in the region. As a precursor to the Act East Policy, the Look East Policy must be given the credit for being the point of origin of a formal, systematic, and sustained scheme to engage ASEAN and other ASEAN-led mechanisms. With the Act East Policy, the geographical horizon of India’s eastward engagement has expanded to include countries in its extended neighbourhood, even though Southeast Asia remains at the core of India’s stronger engagement with the East.

UPGRADATION TO THE ACT EAST POLICY In 2014, the Look East Policy was revised and upgraded to become the Act East Policy. When the Modi-led NDA coalition assumed power, the first official announcement in this regard was by former External Affairs Minister late Sushma Swaraj during her visit to Vietnam in August 2014. She stated, “Now it is time to not just look but act. Under the [Narendra] Modi government, we will have an Act East policy.”9 Modi spoke of the Act East Policy during his participation in the ninth EAS held in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, in November 2014. He stated, “Since entering office six months ago my government has moved with a great sense of priority and speed to turn our ‘Look East policy’ into ‘Act East policy.’”10 When Modi came to power in 2014, he announced the Neighbourhood First Policy to reset ties in its vicinity and prioritise relations with countries in the South Asian region. The transition from the Look East to the Act East Policy was also about reinvigorating ties with the ASEAN region and beyond. The Act East Policy’s focus has certainly been on the ASEAN countries, but another important dimension has also been added. Not just the ASEAN countries but also those in the wider Indo-Pacific region have fallen within the ambit of the Act East Policy. Southeast Asia, East Asia, Oceania, and the Pacific Island countries comprise the geographical canvas of the Act East Policy today, while the Indo-Pacific approach is wider in scope, including even the United States as a part of its vision. The areas of cooperation now include political, economic, defence, security, cultural, people-to-

For details, please see Muni–Mishra.

Time for ‘Act East Policy’ and Not Just ‘Look East’: Swaraj. Business Standard. 24 August 2014. <https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/time-for-act-east-policy-and-not-just-look-eastswaraj-114082400624_1.html > Accessed: 7 June 2020. 9

10 Prime Minister’s Remarks at the 9st East Asia Summit, Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 13 November 2014. <https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/24238/ Prime+Ministers+remarks+at+the+9th+Eas > Accessed: 4 June 2020.

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people, and other linkages. The key aspect of the Act East Policy is that India is projecting itself as a major and responsible stakeholder in shaping the Indo-Pacific regional order. Rising bonhomie with the US, Japan, and Australia is an essential element of this vision. Highlighting the key aspects of the Act East Policy, India’s Ministry of External Affairs states, The key principles and objectives of “Act East Policy” is [sic!] to promote economic cooperation, cultural ties and develop a strategic relationship with countries in the Asia-Pacific region through continuous engagement at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels thereby providing enhanced connectivity to the States of North Eastern Region with other countries in our neighbourhood.11 The Indian Ministry of External Affairs’ description of the key objectives of the Act East Policy showcases three elements: First, strengthening and exploring different aspects of bilateral relations with the countries of the region. Second, enhancing multilateral, subregional, and regional cooperation efforts with ASEAN—this is pivotal to having ties with not only ASEAN but also other dialogue partners and participants through other ASEAN-driven mechanisms and meetings. Finally, the third component has strong domestic underpinnings, as building infrastructure and connectivity within the eight North Eastern states of India and linking them with the ASEAN region is a key aspect of the Act East Policy. In 2018, Sushma Swaraj held a meeting with the chief ministers of the eight North Eastern provinces of India to emphasise the importance of the region in the Act East Policy. She stated, Greater connectivity and economic integration of India’s northeast with its eastern neighbours was considered a key focus area for growth and development of the region... Continued development of relevant infrastructure both within the state and at international borders was also discussed with a view to enhancing trade, investment, tourism and people-to-people ties.”12 Connectivity has become an important objective of India’s regional engagement and is considered a key component of Modi’s foreign policy. This is also important in the context of the China-initiated Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), of which India is not a partner. One of the key additions in the Act East Policy was a further emphasis on ensuring intraregional connectivity within India’s North Eastern states and linking them with the ASEAN region. Today, some of the remote state capitals in the North Eastern region of India have direct flights to the Southeast Asian capitals such as Bangkok.

Question No. 3121. Look East and Act East Policy. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 16 March 2016. <https://mea.gov.in/lok-sabha.htm?dtl/26554/QUESTION_NO_3121_LOOK_EAST_AND_ACT_ EAST_POLICY > Accessed: 10 June 2020.

12 Northeastern States Active Stakeholders in India’s Act East Policy, says Sushma Swaraj. The Indian Express. 5 May 2018. <https://indianexpress.com/article/north-east-india/ne-states-active-stakeholders-in-indias-acteast-policy-sushma-swaraj-5164003/ > Accessed: 3 June 2020.

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A major change from Look East to Act East Policy is that, true to Modi’s style, Act East has turned out to be more overt, direct, and vocal about India’s interests and concerns than the quieter and subtle Look East Policy.

RESTRUCTURING THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENT THE ACT EAST POLICY At the institutional foreign policy–making level, four divisions of India’s Ministry of External Affairs directly deal with the issues related to the Act East Policy and its practical implications. The bilateral relations are dealt by the Southern Division, which is responsible for nine ASEAN countries (since Myanmar is handled by another division), Australia, New Zealand, TimorLeste, whereas the Oceania Division deals with Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Island countries. The multilateral arm (relations with ASEAN) of the relationship is dealt with by the Indo-Pacific Division (formerly ASEAN Multilateral Division). Another division of the ministry, the Bangladesh–Myanmar Division, deals with India’s two important neighbours. Both Bangladesh and Myanmar function as a gateway to regional engagement and connectivity, and the latter is also a key country to India’s Act East Policy priorities. It is important to note that several other divisions of the ministry which deal with a specific set of issues and important countries, e. g., the US (Americas Division), Japan, the two Koreas, and China (East Asia division), Comoros, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, and other countries in the Indian Ocean Region (Indian Ocean Division), or multilateral economic relations states also contribute to shaping and implementing India’s Act East Policy objectives. What is also important to note is that, with the upgradation to the Act East Policy, the geographical span of the policy was expanded to include countries in India’s extended neighbourhood, as well. East Asian countries such as China, Japan, South Korea, and Mongolia also became an integral part of the policy, while the ASEAN region still remains its focus. In an unprecedented move, ten ASEAN leaders were invited as chief guests for the Republic Day celebration in 2018.

STRENGTHENING THE STRATEGIC DIMENSION Over the past three decades, strategic factors in India’s eastward engagement have acquired considerable strength. Though strategic elements have always been present in India’s eastward engagement, the post–Cold War situation opened up new vistas for India’s strategic engagement. With the transition from the Look East to the Act East Policy, the strategic component has gained further momentum. Some of the major steps taken under the Act East Policy include the upgradation of relations in the strategic realm. Enhanced maritime cooperation with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam has become a focal point. India is trying to rope the Philippines in to be one of its defence partners, while Manila is considering the acquisition of defence equipment and warships from India. To encourage swift defence acquisitions, India could consider replicating the Indo-Vietnam model and open a line of credit to the Philippines for

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defence acquisitions, which would also be cost-effective.13 The first steps in that direction are being tested by New Delhi in the form of an offer providing a USD 100 million line of credit to the Philippines, replicating its “Vietnam model.”14 Former Indian ambassador to the Philippines Jaideep Mazumdar stated, “There are discussions going on a range of weapons systems between India and the Philippines including the BrahMos. Once travel becomes possible, the joint committee that looks at defence logistics will meet discuss these things.”15 India is also working closely with Indonesia in developing the latter’s Sabang Port. It is believed that “[t]he port will give India better access to the South East Asian markets and provide a strategic hedge at a time China is increasing its presence in the Strait of Malacca (as also the larger Indian Ocean).”16 To boost naval cooperation with Singapore, India finalised the Implementation Agreement between Indian Navy and Republic of Singapore Navy Concerning Mutual Coordination, Logistics and Services Support for Naval Ships’, Submarines and Naval Aircraft (including Ship-borne Aviation Assets) visits in 2018. The maritime component has constituted an important part in the Act East Policy. India has even issued two maritime joint statements with Indonesia, and they signed a defence cooperation agreement during Modi’s visit to the archipelagic nation in 2018. On 4 June 2020, India and Australia upgraded their partnership to comprehensive strategic partnership. It was formally announced during the virtual summit meeting between Modi and Australian prime minister Scott Morison. The decision to realise military interoperability through defence exercises by way of a bilateral mechanism concerning mutual logistics support is a major boost to India’s strategic ties with Australia. India has a similar pact with the US in the form of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Understanding, which was signed in 2016. India has also concluded agreements with France, the Philippines, Singapore, and Oman, while negotiations with Japan and Russia are at the final stage. In 2018, as a minister, Sushma Swaraj also announced the 3C (culture, commerce, and connectivity) formula to advance ties with the ASEAN region. During her visit to Thailand in 2018, she advocated for enhancing maritime security, trade, investment, education, and cultural heritage, and she stated, “These are important markers in our engagement with Southeast Asia, in enhancing our strategic ties with ASEAN across 3Cs. These 3Cs are commerce, connectivity and culture.”17 Rahul Mishra’s post. Twitter. 10 January 2020, 9:20 a.m. <https://twitter.com/rahulmishr_/ status/1215564134718197760 > Accessed: 8 June 2020.

This was recommended earlier by this author in a RSIS policy brief published in August 2018. For details, please see Rahul Mishra: India and the Philippines. Time to Go Beyond The ASEAN Framework. RSIS Policy Brief. August 2019. <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/PR190801_India-and-Philippines.pdf > Accessed: 8 June 2020. 14

Elizabeth Roche: Philippines explores options to buy BrahMos missile from India. LiveMint. 18 May 2020. <https://www.livemint.com/news/india/philippines-explores-options-to-buy-brahmos-missile-fromindia-11589823975582.html > Accessed: 8 June 2020. 15

Why India is Developing its Maiden Deep-Sea Port in Indonesia. The Times of India. 21 March 2019. <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/68511228.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_ medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst > Accessed: 10 June 2020. 16

17 Swaraj’s 3-C formula for ties with ASEAN: culture, commerce, connectivity. Business Standard. 6 January 2018. <https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/swaraj-s-3-c-formula-for-ties-with-asean-culturecommerce-connectivity-118010600452_1.html > Accessed: 16 June 2020.

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INTEGRATING NORTHEAST STATES WITH THE ACT EAST POLICY As mentioned earlier, boosting connectivity through the greater development of infrastructural facilities is an important component of the Act East Policy. This is particularly true of India’s connecting its northeastern states with countries of the Southeast Asian region. Some of the projects in that context include the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway Project, the Rhi-Tiddim Road Project, Border Haats, etc. Myanmar is the only Southeast Asian country that has a land border with India: they share a border of more than 1,600 km, so Myanmar is considered India’s land gateway to Southeast Asia. It is the only country which is at the intersection of the Neighbourhood First Policy and the Act East Policy. Therefore, it also plays an important role in India’s intraregional and regional connectivity plans.

THE RELEVANCE OF ACT EAST POLICY The Look East/Act East Policy is one of India’s most successful foreign policy initiatives. Though India factors China in its eastward engagement, it has been cautious of not making it a policy which revolves around its neighbour; it has more to do with India’s aspirations to establish stronger ties with regional countries. India has never been far behind China in the region and occupied an important place there on its own merit. While China has ethnic affinities with some of the southeast countries, India shares strong age-old cultural and civilisational linkages with them. Under the Act East Policy, it tried to further revive these. India supports and facilitates the growth of the lesser developed countries in the region through its capacity-building programmes. It has provided lines of credit and has been involved in quick-impact projects. Capacity-building is done through its ITEC programmes, as well.

INDIA AND THE EMERGING INDO-PACIFIC ORDER India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific is anchored to its Act East Policy, as it is through this policy that New Delhi has been able to reach out to capitals that are part of the Indo-Pacific landscape. In 2018, Modi delivered a keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue—the annual flagship conference of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS)—where he illustrated India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific. It was the first time that India’s approach had been officially disclosed. The choice of place for the announcement is noteworthy here. Singapore has been important for both India’s Act East Policy and Indo-Pacific vision. India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific is inclusive, open, rules-based, and not directed against any country. Modi chose Singapore to articulate his government’s policy and reassure Singapore and other ASEAN countries that ASEAN was and would always remain at the core of India’s Act East Policy and its vision and actions for the realisation of the IndoPacific order. He remarked, The ten countries of South East Asia connect the two great oceans in both the geographical and civilizational sense. Inclusiveness, openness and ASEAN centrality and unity, therefore, lie at the heart of the new Indo-Pacific. India does not see the Indo-Pacific Region as a strategy or as a club of limited members... [India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific region] stands for a free, open,

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inclusive region, which embraces us all in a common pursuit of progress and prosperity. It includes all nations in this geography as also others beyond who have a stake in it. Southeast Asia is at its centre. And, ASEAN has been and will be central to its future. That is the vision that will always guide India, as we seek to cooperate for an architecture for peace and security in this region.18 Clearly, inclusivity, openness, and adherence to a rules-based order are the key foundational pillars of India’s Indo-Pacific vision. These are issues that not only distinguish its approach from the US’s but also find support in the Southeast Asian capitals. As their major maritime neighbour, India has been mindful of the concerns that its Southeast Asian partners have vis-à-vis the changing dynamics of the international and regional order. It is important to mention here that, contrary to popular perception, India has more maritime Southeast Asian neighbours than territorial ones—the latter category actually comprises only Myanmar. Indonesia, which is less than ninety miles away from India’s southernmost tip, is often missed when a list of India’s neighbours is made. Likewise, Thailand and Myanmar are also India’s maritime neighbours, yet they have not been able to find their due place in the official discourse on India’s immediate neighbours. The Bay of Bengal is a natural geographic space that houses India and its three Southeast Asian neighbours—Indonesia, Thailand, and Myanmar—in addition to its Southern Asian neighbours—Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)—a subregional initiative that includes the above-mentioned countries (except Indonesia), along with Bhutan and Nepal—aims to harness the collective potential of the Bay of Bengal subregion. To ensure greater maritime connectivity for trade and commerce, India has been working with Myanmar to develop the Sittwe Port in the latter country. The Kaladan multimodal project is also an important component of India’s maritime connectivity efforts. It is hoped that it will be completed in 2021, boosting India’s regional connectivity plans. Finally, the SAGAR project, launched by Modi in 2015, is yet another ambitious initiative under which India is working with its neighbours and friends in the Indian Ocean region to create better maritime trade linkages and connectivity.

INDIA AND ASEAN’S INDO-PACIFIC APPROACHES After countries such as Japan, Australia, and India disclosed their Indo-Pacific approaches, the ten-membered ASEAN also came up with its vision by issuing its outlook on the region. With emphasis on ASEAN centrality, it mentioned, This Outlook is not aimed at creating new mechanisms or replacing existing ones; rather, it is an Outlook intended to enhance ASEAN’s Community building process and to strengthen and give new momentum for existing ASEAN-led

18 “Prime Minister’s Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue (June 01, 2018). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 1 June 2018. <https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/ Prime+Ministers+Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018 > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

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mechanisms to better face challenges and seize opportunities arising from the current and future regional and global environments. Moreover, the Outlook is intended to be inclusive in terms of ideas and proposals. ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific envisages ASEAN Centrality as the underlying principle for promoting cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, with ASEAN-led mechanisms, such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), as platforms for dialogue and implementation of the Indo-Pacific cooperation, while preserving their formats. Furthermore, ASEAN may also seek to develop, where appropriate, cooperation with other regional and sub-regional mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions on specific areas of common interests to complement the relevant initiatives.”19 The ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific has remarkable elements of commonality with India’s (and Japan’s) vision. Unlike the US, both India and ASEAN highlight the “inclusive” nature of their conceptions of the region. It is also underscored that their policies are not aimed at any third country to make sure that China does not get the impression that India and ASEAN are ganging up against it. The ASEAN document highlights it as follows: ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific is based on the principles of strengthening ASEAN Centrality, openness, transparency, inclusivity, a rules-based framework, good governance, respect for sovereignty, non-intervention, complementarity with existing cooperation frameworks, equality, mutual respect, mutual trust, mutual benefit and respect for international law, such as UN Charter, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and other relevant UN treaties and conventions, the ASEAN Charter and various ASEAN treaties and agreements and the EAS Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations (2011).20 Both India and ASEAN have shown their inclination to include as many stakeholders as possible in ensuring a peaceful and stable Indo-Pacific order and that they do not want to have a coalition against any country including China. India’s attempts to convince Russia about the virtues of the Indo-Pacific construct and motivate it to endorse the same are driven by that objective. The Indo-Pacific construct is still evolving and is making a steady progress. With ASEAN’s embracing the concept, the Indo-Pacific will likely take a concrete shape sooner rather than later. However, whether China would show inclination to be an active contributor to the Indo-Pacific is still not clear. From statements coming from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chinese media, it seems that China has so far been cautious about this construct and perceives it as an anti-China stratagem of the US and its allies and friends. Nevertheless, ASEAN and countries such as Japan, India, and the US have shown requisite rationality to shape the common aspects of their Indo-Pacific visions as per their own perceptions of emerging challenges and opportunities at regional and international levels. China’s rising assertiveness at the South China Sea and the Seas of East Asia, especially “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.” Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 22 June 2019. <https://asean. org/storage/2019/06/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

“ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.”

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with India along its borders, is increasingly putting the regional security equilibrium in danger, leading only to the increased military presence of the US. China’s recent border stand-off with India and its growing disputes with Japan and the countries of Southeast Asia have pushed the latter countries closer to the US to effectively deal with the China challenge.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND THE ROAD AHEAD Despite hampering trade, people-to-people linkages, and tourist movements, the COVID-19’s impact on India’s Act East Policy has so far been positive, helping the country’s cooperation with Southeast Asia. This was particularly true in the case of India’s ties with Malaysia. In the past four months, Prime Minister Modi has spoken to leaders from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam. In April, India also approved to sell hydroxychloroquine tablets to Malaysia for the treatment of COVID-19 patients.21 Temasek Foundation Singapore donated 30,000 COVID-19 test kits to India.22 India got its people back from Southeast Asia under the Vande Bharat Mission, during which seamless connectivity between India and Southeast Asia has got manifested. The sheer number of people stranded in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines tells us how strong the people-to-people linkages have become over the past three decades. In the case of Malaysia, the “Government of India has, from 9 May till date, operated 27 flights under Vande Bharat Mission from Kuala Lumpur to various destinations in India to enable stranded Indians to return to India, and 4,679 Indians have returned to India on Vande Bharat flights so far.”23 Under the phase 4 of the Vande Bharat Mission, a total of 1,083 flights (849 international flights and 234 feeder flights) have been scheduled so far. These flights are operated by the Air India Group, IndiGo, SpiceJet, and GoAir from twenty-nine countries to thirty-one airports in India. More than 5,878,000 Indian nationals have returned until 29 July 2020. India has already announced the phase 5 of the Vande Bharat Mission, which started on 1 August 2020. A total of 792 flights (692 international and 100 domestic feeders) have been scheduled to repatriate Indians from twenty-three countries, viz., the GCC countries, the USA, Canada, the UK, Germany, France, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, China, Israel, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. The flights would arrive at twenty-one different airports across India and repatriate an estimated 130,000 Indians stranded abroad.24

N. Arora–Krishan S. Das: Exclusive: India Agrees to Sell Hydroxychloroquine to Malaysia to Help Fight COVID-19. Reuters. 15 April 2020. <https://reut.rs/2Xlaezs > Accessed: 5 June 2020. 21

22 Dipanjan Roy Chudhury: Singapore, South Korea, Key Suppliers of Covid-19 Gear. The Economic Times. 1 April 2020. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/singapore-southkorea-key-suppliers-of-covid-19-gear/articleshow/74922481.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_ medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst > Accessed: 5 June 2020. 23 DeportationofIndiansHeldinMalaysianImmigrationDetentionCentres.NewStraitTimes.11July2020.<https://www.nst.com.my/ opinion/letters/2020/s07/607765/deportation-indians-held-malaysian-immigration-detention-centres > Accessed: 2 June 2020.

The statements of the following paragraph are based on the author’s conversation with Dr Varun Jeph, an Indian diplomat currently posted in Malaysia, and the statement of the spokesperson for India’s Ministry of External Affairs. 24

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China has become more assertive and aggressive during the COVID-19 pandemic. This has led to further cooperation between India and the Indo-Pacific countries. The attempts to revive the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue are increasingly giving it a China angle. The quadrilateral dialogue was revived amid China’s rising assertiveness. The Doklam standoff took place in 2017, and, at that point, India’s approach was firm enough. One of India’s first steps was to show interest in the Quad. This move caused uneasiness in China, and it agreed to launch a new bilateral mechanism—the “informal summit.” Until now, two “informal summits” have taken place. The first was the Wuhan Summit in April 2018, while the second was organised in Mammallapuram, India, in October 2019. India agreed to participate in these informal summits, and its somewhat conciliatory approach towards China shows that it wants to coexist peacefully and resolve differences. Over the years, India’s eastward engagement has also been shaped by factors such as the US rebalancing to Asia, the Indo-Pacific strategies, and China’s Belt and Road initiative. Under Xi Jinping, China has become more assertive, and the India–China relations have reached their all-time low in recent years, especially amidst the ongoing border standoff between the two countries. A huge trade imbalance, China’s opposition to India’s membership of the Nuclear Supplier Group, frequent border stand-offs and recent violent clashes, and, of course, China’s equation with Pakistan are major reasons for India to revive its interest in the quadrilateral mechanism. The year 2020 has been unprecedented in several ways. One of the important developments has been the recent violent face-off between Indian and Chinese soldiers. That had been the first time in forty-five years that events took a violent turn. Twenty Indian soldiers has lost their lives in the conflict, which led to intensified tensions between India and China. Since a full-fledged conflict is not an option for the two countries, India resorts to other measures. The next logical step is to ramp up ties with like-minded countries by seeking closer cooperation to tackle the China challenge. Japan, Australia, and the US are India’s key partners in this regard. The February 2020 visit of President Donald Trump to India was also a significant move to deepen the two country’s partnership in the IndoPacific region. The visit resulted in the deal that India would purchase USD 3 billion worth of military helicopters for its navy and additional Apaches from the US. India and Australia held a virtual summit on 4 June 2020. During the virtual summit, India– Australia bilateral relations were upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The two parties also issued the Joint Declaration on a Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, where they advocated for a “free, open, inclusive and rules-based IndoPacific region.”25 In a bid to revive the quad and form a coalition against China, India is mulling over the possibility of inviting Australia to the Malabar exercise, which already has Japan and the US as core participants. India was earlier reluctant to include Australia in the

Joint Declaration on a Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Between the Republic of India and the Government of Australia. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. 4 June 2020. <https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/32730/Joint+Declaration+on+a+Shared+Vision+for+Maritime+Cooperation+in+the+IndoPacific+Between+the+Republic+of+India+and+the+Government+of+Australia >Accessed: 4 June 2020. 25

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exercise primarily to avoid turning it into an anti-China exercise. Moreover, almost a decade ago, Australia had turned down India’s offer to be a part of this joint exercise. However, the 2020 stand-off in the Galwan Valley has pushed India closer to the US and its allies. Australia’s inclusion should not just be seen as a move to irk China by having Australia as an important defence partner to India, for this move will further deepen the two countries’ partnership and bolster India’s Indo-Pacific engagement. Over the past six years, India’s Act East Policy has contributed to furthering India’s engagement with the countries of Southeast Asia and the Pacific Island countries, as well as countries such as Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, and others in the wider Indo-Pacific region. Growing partnership with the US has, of course, been a major driving factor in this. A sharper focus on strategic dimensions and efforts to realise a rules-based and inclusive Indo-Pacific order has given additional impetus to the Act East Policy. That said, the Act East Policy still has lot of scope to improve both in terms of conceptualisation and working towards meeting short- and long-term objectives.

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