German Federal Election 2021: What’s next for Europe? An Italian perspective by Antall József Tudásközpont

A J R C A N A LY S E S

ANTALL JÓZSEF RESEARCH CENTRE AJRC2021E25

Alessandro D'Onofrio

GERMAN FEDERAL ELECTION 2021: WHAT’S NEXT FOR EUROPE? AN ITALIAN PERSPECTIVE

d i g i t a l i s t u d a s t a r. a j t k . h u

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GERMAN FEDERAL ELECTION 2021: WHAT’S NEXT FOR EUROPE? AN ITALIAN PERSPECTIVE ALESSANDRO D’ONOFRIO

The German federal election is probably the most crucial electoral appointment in the EU. Germany is the Union’s largest member state and its leading economy as such a change of government here is expected to have an impact on all the other EU countries as well. The German Chancellor, the head of the government in Berlin, usually has a direct and strong influence on the EU policy-making process and can act as a guarantor of stability for the Union as a whole. While this is normal considering Germany’s central position, very much of this influence depends also on the personal charisma and skills of the Chancellor itself. The position of Germany in the international system has changed significantly during Angela Merkel’s sixteen years in office. However, this time Angela Merkel, the woman who occupied virtuously and honourably the highest seat in German and European politics, decided to retire from politics raising great expectations regarding her possible successor. This is the reason why, more than usual, the last federal election in Germany has been followed with much interest within and outside the country. After leading four governments, one of the longest-serving head of governments in the history of Germany, left to the next Chancellor the responsibility to lead the country in one of the most crucial moments of our times. As expected, the result of the election has not provided any of the political parties with a strong enough mandate to rule alone and the leaders of the main forces are now engaged in complicate coalition-building talks. With the coronavirus pandemic still ongoing and the economic reprise going slower than expected, the eyes of the European partners are set to see what kind of government will take office. In the meantime, Merkel offered to be at the head of a caretaker administration until the result of the Koalitionsvertrag will be revealed—probably by the end of the year. Surely, to build upon Merkel’s heritage will not be an easy task and a period of instability in Europe could follow as a consequence of the power transition in Germany. During this time, and in preparation for the French Presidential election in 2022, the Italian prime minister Mario Draghi, as the head of the EU’s third largest country with a clearly pro-European government, may be called to play the stabilising role which was Merkel’s for almost two decades.

THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION In the last twelve of Angela Merkel’s sixteen years in power, the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, CDU), and its Bavarian sister party the Christian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union, CSU), were the senior partners of governments comprising the left-wing Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD). These two parties, which dominated the German political landscape

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since the end of the Second World War,1 always accounted together for over the half of the votes. This proportion was dramatically shaken in the last election which showed also that traditional parties lost a consistent segment of their electorate in favour of alternative forces. As it usually happens in Germany, none of the parties gained the absolute majority and the creation of a new government will follow lengthy negotiations. Until the ‘90s, only the Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP) had some part in a few federal executives next to the CDU/CSU or the SPD, but in 1998 the Social Democrats opened the way into the government to the Green Party (Die Grüne) as well, forming the so-known red-green coalition. In the last election, five parties got more than 10% and the CDU/CSU and SPD will require the support of one or more of these forces to form a government. In fact, this time, rather unusually, the new German Chancellor will be most likely chosen from among an unprecedented three party coalition. The crucial question for the country’s future hinges on which parties will join together to form a government. Interestingly, the result of the last federal election reflected very much the estimates of the polls presented just few weeks before the vote.2 As expected, the CDU lost almost 10% of its votes and finished second with just 24.1% and 196 seats out of 735 in the Bundestag, the German Federal Parliament. The SPD, and partly the Greens, were the parties which gained the most from CDU’s decline. After obtaining the worst result ever in a general election in 2017, the Social Democrats became this time the most-voted party with 25.7% and 206 seats. A series of convincing media appearances of SPD leader, Olaf Scholz, and some bad missteps of its opponents, gave a crucial boost to the left-wing party in the last weeks before the vote. In fact, voters rewarded Angela Merkel’s Vice Chancellor and Minister of Finance, who has succeeded in presenting himself as a reliable and competent element of continuity following Merkel, while at the same promising a moderate reformist agenda. The SPD is now in the position to be the senior partner in almost all the possible formulas of government. Even if a two-party combination between CDU/CSU and SPD would be enough to form a majority, neither side is keen to continue the experience of the grosse Koalition. The SPD’s success is even more remarkable considering that earlier polls indicated that it would obtain less than 20% and the party leadership was divided over the choice of a “right-wing” candidate like Scholz. Eventually, the former Minister of Finance’s moderate and sober style, which resembled Merkel on many issues, was one of the main element which contributed to the success of the Social Democrats. However, the party is currently still more left-wing then its leader and the presence of many “traditionalist” MPs in the new parliament is likely to reduce the chances of a cooperation with the CDU/CSU. Based on the colours of the parties involved, the most likely outcome—as well as the most ideologically coherent—would be a so-called “traffic light” coalition where the Social Democrats will be in partnership with the Greens and the pro free-market FDP which obtained respectively 14.8% and 118 seats, and 11.5% and 92 seats. However, also a “Jamaica” solution—named

Before 1990 a multiparty system existed only in West Germany.

ZDF: ZDF-Politbarometer. Union und Laschet verlieren deutlich. ZDF. 30 July 2021. <https://www.zdf.de/ nachrichten/politik/politbarometer-laschet-union-verluste-sonntagsfrage-100.html > Accessed: 14 October 2021. 2

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after the colours of the country’s flag—is currently on the table, and would see a coalition between the FDP, the Greens and the CDU/CSU. Though a coalition partnership with the CDU/CSU, the FDP and the Greens is mathematically possible, to exclude the mostvoted party from government would raise a number of questions regarding legitimacy, while also considering voters preferences.3 As can be noted all the possible arrangements will include the Greens and the FDP which will be therefore crucial in the formation of the new government. The Greens are surely the most interesting case since they scored their best result ever, almost doubling the results of the last election. However, the final result is less remarkable than previously assumed since just few weeks before the vote the party was leading the polls. But several scandals and plagiarism allegations against its leader Annalena Baerbock alienated a large part of the voters and the party fell to the third place. On the other hand, the FDP made small gains from the last election and confirmed once again its role as king-maker. On the extremes, the far-right Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) suffered a consistent loss from the previous election (10.3%, 83 seats) but it is still a prominent element in the former East German states. However, since all the parties excluded the possibility of cooperation with them, they will be surely maintaining their position among the ranks of the opposition. On the other hand, the former communist the Left (Die Linke) fell even below the 5% threshold, but will nonetheless access the Bundestag as it won three direct constituencies (39 seats).4 Even if a coalition with the far-Left is highly unlikely, it should not be completely excluded yet. One of the most obvious reasons for the CDU/CSU’s disappointing performance can surely be attributed to the lack of a strong leadership. The selection of Armin Laschet, the CDU nominee and former Minister-President of North Rhine-Westphalia, as candidate for the conservatives was achieved not only later (compared to the choices of the opponents), but was also too much in continuity with Merkel’s political vision, without anyway being as convincing and charismatic. Also, just few weeks before the election Laschet was at the centre of criticism for some slip-ups which eventually costed the party a significative portion of votes. However, not all the responsibilities can be ascribed to the weakness and mistakes of the leadership. In fact, by choosing Laschet the conservatives failed to fully understand German voters’ new needs and priorities and demands for change. As a matter of fact, the coronavirus pandemic and the following economic crisis, shifted the attention from economic growth and fiscal stability—the mantras of “Merkelism”—to a more active social state and progressive policies which also take into account environmental issues. Overall, even if the name of the next German Chancellor is still unknown, the general impression is that the German electorate shifted slightly towards the left. In the last fifteen years, despite running budget surpluses, a lack of investments in public infrastructures, such as schools, roads, transports, and digitalisation brought to the forefront Germany’s problems

3 NTV: Große Mehrheit rät Union zum Gang in Opposition. NTV. 5 October 2021. <https://www.n-tv.de/politik/ Grosse-Mehrheit-raet-Union-zum-Gang-in-Opposition-article22847396.html > Accessed: 14 October 2021.

The German electoral system is a mix first-pass-the-post, where candidates run in uninominal constituencies, and a proportional one. The threshold to gain a seat in the Bundestag with the proportional system is set at 5%. However, a party can obtain seats by proportional representation, even if it wins at least three constituencies. 4

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in the area of competitiveness.5 Even if during her last mandate Chancellor Merkel managed to channel some of the SPD voters’ demands for more public investments and softened her party’s line against higher social spending and state intervention, the pandemic just exposed this weakness and forced the government to strongly intervene with substantial spending. In fact, the coronavirus emergency had a hard impact on Germany’s economy, especially on the automotive industry, caused the disruption of the global supply chains, and an uncontrollable rise in the prices of some special components like semiconductors. As a consequence, during this year the country’s budget deficit increased dramatically (+5.46%).6 In addition, climate change and green policies entered prominently in the political debate and are currently considered the main priorities by a very large part of the German electorate.7 However, their implementation will require the reassessment of the previous government’s budgetary policy further impacting public finances. This also means a possible end to Germany’s dogmatic attitude towards budget deficit. These elements offered a clear chance of success to the SPD and the Greens. In case they will govern together, public investments to support economic growth will likely receive a boost, and more efforts to fight climate change might be expected. At the same time, it will be interesting to see how the programmes of the Greens and the FDP, which have opposite economic views, may fit together in case they will be both included in the same governing coalition. Preparatory steps were taken by the leaders of the two parties to try to bridge their differences and find common positions just before the negotiations with the other forces started.

GERMANY AND THE EU AFTER THE ELECTION Significantly, foreign policy was the great absentee in the pre-election political debates. This is even the more curious considering Germany’s crucial position in the EU. Before the vote the parties’ candidates met three times in interesting televised debates but they barely offered their view in regard of their priorities and programmes in the sphere of foreign policy and the future of the EU. Now that the outcome is revealed the topic will no longer be overlooked and foreign policy will be one of the central elements in the coalition-building process. But, the risk is that this issue will eventually be used as a bargaining chip to reach an agreement towards the lowest common denominators. To form a coalition based on each party’s position on foreign policy is not an easy task and Germany’s European partners are looking with impatience at the next government’s position in regard of EU matters. In fact, in the last—almost—two decades, Merkel’s political realism has helped the EU to go through several frightening crises and placed Germany at the centre of many essential

Alexander Roth–Guntram B. Wolff–Bruegel: Understanding (the lack of) German public investment. Bruegel. 19 June 2018. <https://www.bruegel.org/2018/06/understanding-the-lack-of-german-public-investment/ > Accessed: 14 October 2021. 5

Aaron O’ Neill: Germany: Budget balance between 2016 to 2026 in relation to GDP. Statista. April 2021. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/624187/germany-budget-balance-in-relation-to-gdp/ > Accessed: 14 October 2021. 6

7 Prof. Dr. Renate Köcher: Mehrheit der Deutschen für Kurswechsel in der Klimapolitik. Frankfurter Allgemeine. 28 July 2021. <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/bundestagswahl/flutkatastrophe-mehrheit-fuer-kurswechselin-der-klimapolitik-17456877.html?printPagedArticle=true#pageIndex_2 > Accessed: 14 October 2021.

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political decisions. The German Chancellor has been an advocate for a moderate but progressive opening towards the consolidation of the EU. She was the European leader who inflexibly supported the controversial measures to bail-out Greece (and other EU countries) during the early 2000s debt crisis but she was also the person who made possible the adoption of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) in 2020. Surely, without her Germany and the EU will be weaker and less decisive. In fact, the complexities of the new German political landscape could probably hinder the chances of strengthening the EU and moving towards the so much needed reforms. Notwithstanding this, the next German government will surely be very pro-European, which is still a very positive element. Depending from the kind of government, Germany’s foreign policy agenda might assume different directions on several issues. For all the main parties the EU surely represents a primary issue, the FDP and the Greens even support the creation of a European federal state with a legally binding constitution (in the case of the FDP) or “European Federal Republic” (proposed by the Greens).8 The FDP, the Greens and Die Linke also back the strengthening of the democratic dimension of the EU by increasing the powers of the European Parliament. As said, the commitment to environmental protection and the fight against climate change currently constitutes a cross-partisan priority, reinforced also by the CDU/CSU’s commitments enshrined in the Sofortprogramm published before the election.9 But, the terms of the postpandemic green and digital recovery vary according to the parties: crucially, the centre-right parties (CDU/CSU and FDP) remain in principle committed to fiscal stability and oppose expansionary policies and a debt union, which is not a good indicator for those in Europe who wish to make the NGEU a permanent instrument. The position of the CDU/CSU on fiscal stability is slightly more flexible than the FDP’s but reinforcing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and completing the Banking Union are main goals for the conservatives. On the contrary, the SPD, the Greens and Die Linke support socio-ecological investments and are more open to fiscal deficits. However, apart from the FDP which would like to return to strict EU budget rules, for all the other parties might be easier to find a common view on fiscal policies as to be able to form a coalition. Also the future of the eurozone will directly depend on the positon of the next German government on fiscal issues. Since 2005, under Merkel, Germany has followed two different courses. First, at the time of the 2008 financial crisis, the Chancellor was considered the to be the one chiefly responsible for the stringent austerity measures, imposed not just at home but also at the EU level, which had awful effects on the eurozone, reduced investments, and increased disparities between northern and southern member states. The coronavirus pandemic forced a change of heart and convinced Merkel to assume the leadership of a debt-mutualisation project which helped the EU to get back on its feet after the worst crisis since the end of the Second World War. The main point for the EU now is to continue

Handelsblatt: Grüne: EU soll eine „föderale europäische Republik“ werden. Handelsblatt. 24 March 2019. <https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/europa-gruene-eu-soll-eine-foederale-europaeische-republikwerden/24139124.html?ticket=ST-633303-j3yXt1xKHrtSb4Fj1cbq-cas01.example.org > Accessed: 14 October 2021. 8

CDU: Umwelt, Natur und Klimaschutz. CDU Sofortprogramm. 13 September 2021. <https://www.cdu.de/ thema/umwelt-natur-und-klimaschutz > Accessed: 14 October 2021. 9

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on this way and hope for the next German government’s readiness to reform the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, which is due to come back into force at the end of 2022. Currently, some EU countries, often dubbed as “frugals,” are pushing for a return to the status quo ante bellum, by reintroducing the strict pre-pandemic fiscal rules. A less dogmatic government in Germany might be willing to allow for more flexibility and a less tight debt control, and even support a reform of the treaties and the completion of the fiscal union. However, in order to do so, the new government in Berlin will need to change the federal Constitution (Grundgesetz) and allow first the national and federal administrations to incur in additional debt to stimulate the economy. Basically, this consists in amending the so-called “debt brake,” (Schuldenbremse) introduced in 2009 that forbids German states (Länder) to run any structural deficit, and the federal government can only run a structural deficit of less than 0.35% of GDP. These very strict rules not only, as previously discussed, reduce the ability of the administrations to make investments, but it also impacts the rest of the EU. As the biggest and largely export oriented manufacturing country in the EU, Germany ran in the last years a large surplus. But an inadequate re-investment of all that extra capital, a strictly controlled national debt and a dislike for expansionary policies, accumulated the surplus at the expense of the other EU member states. This is why only with a German government willing to start reforms in this field, it will be possible to establish a centralised fiscal capacity at the European level, a budget for the entire EU, achievable consolidating the big step forward made with the creation of the temporary NGEU. Looking at the German parties’ official positions it is interesting to note that all of them also call for a strengthening of European sovereignty, while also increasing the role of the EU in protecting the international order. However, while the SPD, the Greens and the FDP are supporting the extension of the qualified majority votes within the Council in order to strengthen the effectiveness of the common foreign and defense policy, only the FDP and the Greens go so far as to support the establishment of a European army. In case the environmentalist party will obtain the Defence Ministry, that could help reopening the debate over the creation of a EU strategic autonomy. However, the change of government in Germany hardly means a big turn of the German foreign policy’s position in regard to Russia and China but, on the contrary, it could rather reduce the country’s decisiveness vis-à-vis the EU’s main external threats. Currently, the relations with Putin’s Russia are not an easy one and the five parties involved in the negotiations wish to have a more cooperative relationship with Moscow, in line with Germany’s tradition of Ostpolitik. However, all the parties are strongly in favour of maintaining sanctions against Russia because of its policies in Ukraine, its disinformation campaigns, its cyber-attacks and its support for dictatorial regimes (Belarus). The Greens and the FDP are even open to strengthening sanctions if necessary. The topic of Russia is particularly complex in Germany also considering the completion of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. The CDU/CSU, as well as the SPD have a positive attitude towards the recently completed project. However, while the FDP is in favour of using the gas pipeline, the CDU/ CSU is confident in its ability to control the geopolitical repercussions of a possible breach of Russian commitments towards Ukraine. On the other hand, the SPD would be in favor of stopping Nord Stream 2 if it was to be used by Russia for geopolitical purposes and considers that in the next twenty years, thanks to the phasing out of gas energy, the pipeline could be

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used for the transport of hydrogen. Confirming their opposition towards the Nord Stream 2, the Greens want to completely stop the project. As for China, all the parties recognise that it constitutes not only a partner but mostly a competitor, or even a “strategic rival” (as stated by the CDU/CSU). However, the Greens with the FDP, following the request of relocalise some parts of the production chain, wish to reduce trade dependence on China. While the CDU/CSU is strongly anchored in Merkel’s realpolitik approach, the SPD supports a policy of compromise with China. The United States remains, in the eyes of all the main parties, the best ally to counterbalance China. As for the establishment of common European defence capabilities, the FDP and the CDU/CSU are more active than the SPD on its development. The Greens, for their part, say they want to examine the interest of each production on a case-by-case basis, particularly in terms of industrial benefits. However, while the SPD and the Greens see broad European cooperation in the field of armaments as a way to reduce costs, the FDP merely supports “the establishment of joint capabilities between willing member states”. Such developments will require a reinforced cooperation with France, which at the moment is the most active member state in the field of creating a truly European autonomous defence. However, the upcoming French presidential elections, which might prolong the leadership vacuum in the EU, and the recent AUKUS episode, are all elements that make Europe vulnerable to face the challenges coming from a rapidly changing world order ore clear.

THE VIEW FROM ITALY The newly designated Chancellor of the EU’s leading economy will be required to show his leadership qualities to its European counterparts and pursue a very active European agenda. The need for a prestigious leader in Germany is made all the more necessary by the approaching French presidential election, where Emmanuel Macron is seeking, not without difficulties, a second mandate. In this scenario Italy’s position becomes crucial. In the political void that goes from the moment the new German government takes office and the French presidential election, Italian prime minister Mario Draghi, whose term expires in 2023, represents the most valuable and respected interlocutor for its European counterparts and a reliable partner for the German leadership since his time as the head of the European Central Bank. Italy and Germany certainly represent one of the strongest ties that characterises the EU and this tie can help strengthening the Union. Historically, the relations between the two countries has always been very robust, in economic, cultural and political terms. Both countries had a similar path from division to unification, they both experienced the catastrophic effects of nationalist regimes and both of them, aware of the results of pushing the idea of nation state to its excess, were among the first to accept the idea of sharing their sovereignty and founding the European communities in the ‘50s. Since then the economic links between the two countries became very strong and today Germany and Italy are strictly interdependent in many sectors. In fact, Germany is Italy’s largest

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trading partner by far since 16.3% of Italian exports are directed there.10 Italy, the EU’s third largest economy, equally is one of Germany’s most important partners worldwide, with some Italian regions (Lombardy) having even larger trade exchanges with Germany than a country like Japan.11 At the same time, Germans are the main beneficiaries of Italy’s tourism “outputs,” with almost 30% of all inbound tourists in the Mediterranean country coming from the Federal Republic in 2019, while Germany is the new home of hundreds of thousands of Italians who left the country.12 However, if the importance of these economics ties is undisputable, the political perspectives of the two countries are often not alike. It is necessary to underline that in some cases the reason of these divergences can be traced back to wrong perceptions and lack of trust in each other, elements that the unpredictability and instability of the Italian political landscape helped to reinforce. From Germany’s side the diffidence towards Italian politics started at the time of the collapse of the Christian Democratic Party (Democrazia Cristiana, DC) and the ascent of Silvio Berlusconi. In the last years the situation didn’t change much and the rise of the populist 5Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle, M5S) and the right-wing Salvini’s League (Lega), added new concerns regarding Italy’s economic stability and performance. The time of the 2008 financial crisis and the ensuing eurozone crisis, represented the lowest point in the Italian-German relations. For Germany, Italy with its low performing economy and high public debt was the weak link in the eurozone and the greatest danger to the stability of the common market. On the other hand, Germany’s intolerable austerity measures and “ordoliberalist” rhetoric, added to the poor management of the Greek crisis, alienated even the more moderate within Italy from looking with sympathy at the historical partner and offered excellent arguments to Eurosceptic and radical parties. Let’s not forget that just two years before the pandemic, Italy was ruled by a coalition of populist and Eurosceptic parties, the “green-yellow” government, that challenged Brussels fiscal rules and threatened to abandon the common currency. At that time, the diffidence of Berlin towards the Mediterranean country was at a historical high. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic added new problems to the already strained relations between Germany and Italy. When the coronavirus first hit the country in March 2020, a different coalition ran the country which tried to regain the trust of its European partners, and especially Germany, after the green-yellow interlude. But the initial decision of the German government to ban the export of face masks and medical equipment and, especially, to refuse to open a debate on “coronabonds” or similar financial instruments designed to mitigate the enormous economic and political consequences of the pandemic,

10 infoMercatiEsteri: Scambi Commerciali Italia-Germania. infoMercatiEsteri. September 2021. <https://www.infomercatiesteri.it/scambi_commerciali.php?id_paesi=69# > Accessed: 14 October 2021.

Italiaoggi: Vale 64 miliardi l'interscambio di Lombardia e Veneto con la Germania. Italiaoggi. 13 November 2019. <https://www.italiaoggi.it/news/vale-64-miliardi-l-interscambio-di-lombardia-e-veneto-con-lagermania-201911130853557996 >. Accessed: 14 October 2021. 11

Italia in Dati: Il settore del turismo in Italia . Italia in Dati. July 2021. <https://italiaindati.com/turismo-initalia/#:~:text=Nel%202019%2C%20il%20turismo%20in,6%25%20rispetto%20al%202018 > Accessed: 14 October 2021. 12

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reinforced in large segments of the Italian population the diffidence towards Germany and the EU. The adoption, at the European summit in July 2020, of the European “Next Generation EU” program, which would have never happened without Angela Merkel’s endorsement, set the basis of a new phase in the Italian-German relations. As a matter of fact, the decision to adopt a joint debt instrument on the EU level implied a complete reversal of the position Germany held in the last decade. In general, it can be assumed that the relationship between the two countries, respectively the first and third biggest in the EU, and the first and second European manufacturing power, has gained a lot from Angela Merkel’s decision to abandon once and for all her position in favour of austerity measures, which had nefarious effects on the EU as a whole. Following the COVID-19 pandemic, in fact, the German chancellor finally decided to assume the leadership of the union, break the economic paradigm which dominated the EU in the last decade and offer her legacy to the future generations of Europeans. All this brought the German leadership closer to its South European allies, Italy on the top of them, and entrusted to Merkel’s successor the responsibility to give the EU its new political direction. With Draghi’s premiership the Berlin-Rome partnership will assume a new dimension. As a matter of fact, the Italian Prime Minister gave the country a new image and new credibility. The historical instability of Italy’s domestic politics which have degraded its geopolitical ambitions seem to be relegated to the past. The stability of the current government together with the prestige of Draghi, make Rome a fundamental reference point at the European level. For Italy, four main issues will be at the heart of the German-Italian relationship. The first, as we have seen, is the recovery of Europe’s economies. The previous economic approach, which created strong division in the EU, has been temporarily replaced by a common solution agreed by all the member states. The make-up of the next government in Berlin will have a profound effect on Germany’s policy on such solidarity measures. The current Italian government will try to strengthen its relationship with the new German government also considering that in the next months it will be decided whether to reintroduce the Stability and Growth Pact financial rules. Germany’s endorsement in the upcoming battle to make these rules more flexible and deepen European integration at the fiscal level will influence the final result. In fact, the current Italian prime minister will make use of his experience of governing the ECB during economic crises and direct channels in Berlin to make sure that the next German government will ensure that EU’s economic priorities, and rules will be reformed. Following this, the second issue is convincing Berlin to assume the full leadership when it comes to European integration and strengthen the transatlantic alliance, which are the central pillars of Italian foreign policy. From the point of view of the European common foreign policy and defence, rather than trying to replace axes that have been consolidated for decades, such as the Franco-German one, Italy's objective should be to support further progress in the European integration process. Having a systematic and working relationship with Germany will place Italy closer to the Franco-German engine, act as a balance to the French impulses, and help construct a system in which all the EU member states work together on key multilateral issues, including climate, health security,

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defence and economic development.13 In fact, an “Italian-French-German” axis is in Rome’s best interest, as in this format the Italian balancing role will be increased, and could make the country an influential centre of gravity for other European states. It will be especially important for Rome and Berlin to work together in support of the transatlantic alliance and thereby determine the EU’s regional and global role. The second issue is migration. With member states gradually emerging from the COVID-19 crisis, now is the time to push migration back to the top of the EU’s agenda. In view of the European Summit at the end of the month, some member states already started to assume rigid positions against migration and even request funding to build fences and walls to protect the EU's external borders. Italy, like other Mediterranean countries, might be one of the entry points for migrants travelling to Europe, from Africa but also Afghanistan and therefore asks for more cooperation with third countries, repatriations and management of external borders, in parallel with the negotiation of the reform of Dublin. But in order to do so, Italy should join the next German government to push for a more coherent EU migration strategy. The last key issue is the strengthening of the EU as a community of values. As already discussed, the next German government will strongly be pro-European regardless of the final coalition and also the current Italian executive is deeply anchored to the European and transatlantic tradition of the country. Protecting Europe’s fundamental values and interests from internal political challenges, including the threats to the rule of law from some Eastern European governments. At the same time, the Italian-German tandem—waiting for the new French president top join—should focus and ensure the success of the EU’s main strategies. One good example is the European Green Deal, also considering the very good result the Green party obtained in Germany. To create a connection between all the environmentalist forces in the EU will surely help to achieve the EU’s ambitious goals. The first big forum for Italy for exerting its new “influence” was the G20. However, in Italy there are no prominent political forces with a clear and comprehensive strategy on this crucial topic discussed at the G20. The Italian political landscape still seemed disconnected from the green agenda, despite the fact that the Italian public is sensitive to climate issues and would welcome, as in the case of Germany, if they become a collective priority. Considering that it is with a high probability that the Greens will be part of the next government, it would be required for some of the Italian parties to bring forward the environmental issues in their programmes, especially considering the economic, political and cultural links connecting Italy with Germany. But it is very difficult to establish whether “the Green effect” will work also in Italy, where for decades there have been successive attempts to give political form to environmentalist sensibility without any particular success. Some efforts in this sense have been made by the M5S, which, in order to find new partners and to break its isolation in the European Parliament, returned somehow to its ecologist origins and supported the creation of the Ministry of Ecologic Transition with mediocre effects. At the same time, the function of the green party in Italy could be also played by the Democratic Party (Partito

Teresa Coratella: What they want: Rome’s views on the new German government. ECFR. 6 October 2021. <https://ecfr.eu/article/what-they-want-romes-views-on-the-new-german-government/ > Accesed: 14 October 2021. 13

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Democratico, PD), or even by Mario Draghi, both of them sensible to issues like ecological transition and sustainable developments (also because it is required to access NGEU funds). Therefore, the presence of the Greens in the next German government could give impetus to the alliance in Italy between the M5S and the PD. Paradoxically, the defeat of the CDU/CSU could also be a lesson for the Italian centre-right and facilitate the access of the League in the EPP. According to some in the Italian sovereignist party, the collapse of the CDU/ CSU in Germany after sixteen years of Merkel's chancellorship and the success of the SPD, are the direct consequences of building alliances with left-wing parties which eventually resulted in the watering down of the identity of the conservatives and in a loss of consensus. If the CDU/CSU would give space, even in Europe, to the more conservative positions and to Bavarian leader Markus Soeder, it would benefit also the right-wing alliance in Italy. As a matter of fact, also in the League, next to a national-sovereignist group represented by Matte Salvini, there is a faction which is more similar to the Bavarian party and it is more concentrated in defending the interests of the productive middle classes in the North. All these political developments apart, Italy’s chances of success are deeply connected to the correct implementation of the recovery plans included in the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) (as agreed with the European Commission). If the country succeeds in increasing its credibility, it will prove invaluable when the parameters for reintroducing the Stability and Growth Pact will be discussed again. And maybe this time Germany will be on Italy’s side.

Antall József Knowledge Centre of Political and Social Sciences