Outlook 2020

A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E

OUTLOOK 2020: PERSPECTIVES FOR THE NEXT YEAR FROM THE ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE RESEARCH TEAM

TAMÁS PÉTER BARANYI – ALESSANDRO D’ONOFRIO – DALMA BODOLAY – BIANKA RESTÁS – PÉTER DOBROWIECKI – ÁGNES VASS – TÜNDE DARKÓ – PÉTER STEPPER – ZSOMBOR SZABOLCS PÁL – TAMÁS KOZMA – ÁDÁM ÉVA – ZSOLT CSEPREGI– ORSOLYA TALÁROVICH – EMESE SCHWARCZ – VIKTÓRIA ANNA PAPP

COMMENTARY AJRC-Analyses 2019A05

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E

AJRC-Analyses Series of the Antall József Knowledge Centre

Publisher-in-Chief: Péter Antall Managing editor: Tamás Péter Baranyi Editorial office: Antall József Knowledge Centre H-1093 Budapest, Czuczor Street 2

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© Tamás Péter Baranyi– Alessandro D’Onofrio – Dalma Bodolay – Bianka Restás – Péter Dobrowieczki – Ágnes Vass – Tünde Darkó – Péter Stepper – Zsombor Szabolcs Pál – Tamás Kozma – Ádám Éva– Zsolt Csepregi – Orsolya Talárovich– Emese Schwarcz – Viktória Anna Papp, 2019 © Antall József Knowledge Centre, 2019 ISSN 2416-1705

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E OUTLOOK 2020: PERSPECTIVES FOR THE NEXT YEAR FROM THE ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE RESEARCH TEAM

TAMÁS PÉTER BARANYI – ALESSANDRO D’ONOFRIO – DALMA BODOLAY – BIANKA RESTÁS – PÉTER DOBROWIECKI – ÁGNES VASS – TÜNDE DARKÓ – PÉTER STEPPER – ZSOMBOR SZABOLCS PÁL – TAMÁS KOZMA – ÁDÁM ÉVA – ZSOLT CSEPREGI – ORSOLYA TALÁROVICH – EMESE SCHWARCZ – VIKTÓRIA ANNA PAPP

Closing the 2010s This year, New Years’ Eve will not only see a regular new year coming but the closing of a whole decade. The aggregate analysis of the AJRC research group points toward specific likely conclusions about the world which suggest 2020 to be a concluding year of the problems of the 2010s.

Many of those issues that characterised international relations for quite some time have now reached a point of rest—though not resulted in a definitive outcome. Some of those issues are particularly rooted in the 2010s—the war in Syria, Yemen, and Ukraine; the rise of ISIS; the divergence of European and US strategic interests—while others have been around for even more, like the Iraq War and tackling the financial crisis and slowdown.

This year will most likely see a precarious balance in those matters but not a conclusion. It is as though the 2020s would not yet begin for real, though the 2010s would definitely end. As in all transitory eras when obvious features are not yet showing, the term “post” lends itself for use.

It is pretty safe to say that 2020 is to be the “post-2010s.”

As the saying goes, it is difficult to make predictions, especially when it comes to the future; still, a strategic outlook is worthless without bets on what is expected to happen. Obviously, global trends can be tipped at any place and any time, though fortunately there are a couple of factors that stay remarkably constant (like geography, strategic culture, etc.). When we try to reach beyond a simple analysis of what happened in 2019, without stumbling in the territory of auguring, we may discern three important global trends for the year 2020. In a nutshell, those are a gradual lowering of tensions in some of the crisis areas (détente), a

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E cautious period of inward turn in the major countries due to domestic issues (transition), and a tough but silent global race for technological advancement, trade, and energy (scramble).

Détente. The volatile years of 2014 to 2019 are coming to a pause, if not an end, in many regions. The outstanding issues did not fade away, but the contours are now visible, arguments chilled down, and ways for resolution were already charted. In Britain, the landslide conservative election gets down Brexit from the pole position of the political agenda— though not its precise implementation. France is finally beyond its 2015 shocks with a strong and visionary leadership (and with many of its discontents). In Italy, the volatile saga of the Lega giving control back to the people is temporarily over, and a government more of the brand of the traditional Italian political class took shape. Municipal and national elections are not likely to generate huge waves in 2020, either. A period of reorganisation is awaiting Germany. The V4 countries generally have political stability that has been unseen for decades. Russia–Eastern Europe tensions were continuously receding: with the prisoner exchange, the willingness to negotiate, and the cessation of actual hostilities there is a fertile ground for a future settlement.

It is not only Europe where thing have eased recently. The absurd death cult of ISIS has been defeated, most likely forever. The North Syrian Kurdish issue seems to have reached a point of rest which satisfies none but eschew bloodshed. Failed and dysfunctional states still exist in the Mediterranean—most importantly Libya—but great powers are now content with the status quo. The United States—for so long the one who wanted to tip all kinds of balances—is now happy to concentrate on domestic issues without major deployments in the Middle East or elsewhere. With US allies understanding the need to pay more on defence, American alliances are safe. China and the US even concluded a “trade truce” in the early days of December that bodes well for the whole of 2020 with regards to trade wars. Throughout these conflicts and issues, there seems to be a need for a bit more stability, a bit more status quo, and relaxation for most players. This détente is of course not an endgame—as most issues have not yet really settled. All that could be expected is this freeze in tensions for 2020, due to the domestic problems those players are actually about to face.

Transition. One of the reasons behind this relaxation of tensions is that the year 2020 will be more focused on domestic issues and power transition problems. That is especially true for the United States and Europe at large, but some other parts as well. In the US, 2020 is a year of an impending impeachment and multiple elections, including the

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E presidential one. These events may redraw the whole electoral map of the US and possibly change the course of US actions around the globe—though this latter is a bit unlikely. In Europe, Britain and the EU have to figure out what to do with Brexit, while France—amid its domestic discontent— proves itself yet again the visionary country of Europe. In Germany, preparations for the retirement of Chancellor Angela Merkel and the set-up of the new European (mostly German-inspired) leadership is on the top of the agenda. Important elections in minor countries—North Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, etc.—may have some reverberations locally. With the recent refusal from France, Balkan countries may face a major reshaping of policy with a further emphasis on German rather than French relations.

In Asia, the Chinese power stands still, but the fringes of this giant will experience power transitions as well: peoples of Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore will cast their vote at the ballot in 2020. All of this affects China to the very core, as its international image has been shattered by the Hong Kong protests and the Uighur question. Japan will see the opening of the Reiwa period with expected changes in imperial issues but no shift in government policies, due to the stability of the Shinzo government. In the Middle East, Israel will have another election—which is not expected to yield any clearer results than the previous ones. The one in Iran, in turn, may have serious consequence in international life as well.

Scramble. There is an obvious scramble unfolding in many of the powerful countries of the globe, a scramble which aims at securing the best technology, the most advantageous trade relations, and the safest, cheapest, and possibly most sustainable energy sources. The discourse according to which future advantages would rely on adapting to new technologies, access to markets and safe energy, have been deeply embedded in most advanced societies in the past years (that is again a development of the 2010s). This discourse has reached government circles, policymakers, and analysts alike, thus becoming conventional wisdom. The introduction of 5G networks all around the world and the possible requirements for each company to participate in it, the ever-evolving race for technologies of automation and machine learning (often dubbed as artificial intelligence), the scramble for securing richly yielding infrastructural and energy projects, and the competition about who makes free trade pacts with whom and how fast are something that is to define the coming years.

The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia embarked on state reforms revolving around these issues (as well as some liberalisation), the United States wishes to cement its primacy in cutting edge technologies, postBrexit Britain dreams about adopting “Asian type” of business and

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E development, France expressed its welcome for climate and energy experts who feel uncomfortable at home because of populism, Australia longs to be involved in major American weapons development, etc. On the other half of the globe, China has visions about making itself greener, industrially more advanced, and taking a leading role in exporting technology for the following decades. As for the year 2020, some agreements about making 5G networks are especially to be carefully watched, such as post-Brexit Britain and its efforts to rearrange trade with other parts of the globe.

Turkey’s role as an energy hub, the safety of oil transports around the Gulf, and the satisfaction of China’s and India’s ever-growing energy demands are also of particular importance. Scramble, a very peaceful and quiet way of relentless competition, is thus the third key feature to define the year 2020.

There will, of course, be countervailing tendencies. Not every place will be safer or more balanced: long-oppressed tensions may come to the surface in places like Iraq, Lebanon, or Egypt, and the aforementioned careful balance is not expected to set in in Libya, either. In Latin America, Chile, and Bolivia continue to stir, while Argentina, Ecuador, and Colombia would not be unlikely to follow. Impulsive American presidential policy will possibly cause some further tensions with Europe, Canada, or Japan, and South Korea. How things in Hong Kong or Taiwan will evolve is not clear, either, and they can take very dangerous turns. European politics will definitely not be boring, as some kind of reorientation will take place in many countries: discontent and a loss of consensus in France, Germany, or Spain are unlikely to cease.

Still, the general picture of 2020 is now seemingly that most of the conflicts will reach a temporary rest or pause, and many countries will undergo an inward turn and concentrate on domestic, rather than foreign issues. In the meantime, the international arena will be a place of constant, quiet, and relentless competition over technology, energy, and trade. This set-up may not be the paradise itself, but considering the previous years of relative upheaval, economic uncertainty, unmasked power plays, and sometimes deadly, open conflicts, this year is likely to become a little calmer than before. This calmer, and essentially more cordial, less confrontational, phase will allow different states to set their courses straight, redefine their foreign policies, and redouble efforts to reach them.

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Tamás Péter Baranyi

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E EUROPE Edging Towards a New Decade: Hopes and Challenges for the European Union Alessandro D’Onofrio The upcoming years are expected to be very challenging for the European Union, both domestically and internationally. Internally, the focus continues to be mostly on Brexit. The recent British election equipped Boris Johnson with the mandate to put his plan forward. If the deal is passed before the January deadline, a transition phase will start, and the parts have to devise a plan for the future UK–EU relationship until 31 December 2020. It very unlikely that a comprehensive deal will be reached to that date, and a new extension is again the only way out of the impasse.

Nevertheless, a Brexit extension will surely be a cause of frustration for both the British people, which cannot wait to have Brexit done, and the EU, eager to break free of this headache. In addition, the British government’ failure to appoint a commissioner is expected to raise the possibility that some Commission decisions could face legal challenges; that is the reason why the European executive asked the Court of Justice to start an infringement procedure against London. Anyway, once the United Kingdom ceases to be part of the EU, the Union will lose one of its main net contributors and for this reason it will have a lower budget at its disposal. Also, it is very unlikely, given northern member states’ opposition, that the proposal of a budget increase will be accepted next year. Equally complicated may be discussing a redistribution of the actual resources, for example, from agriculture to more innovative ones, such as digitalisation, or a 30% increase in development funds as indicated by Ursula von der Leyen.

However, the definition of the 2021–2027 budget will not be the only divisive topic the new Commission has to struggle with. In fact, the von der Leyen’s team will have the responsibility for relaunching the process of European integration, which endures a period of stagnation. Clear support for the head of the Commission came at the end of 2019 from the German and French governments which put forward an initiative calling for the start of a two-year Conference on the Future of Europe aimed at making the bloc “more united and sovereign.” 1

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1 Conference on the Future of Europe Franco-German non-paper on key questions and guidelines.

Politico. <https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Conference-on-the-Future-ofEurope.pdf > Accessed: 2 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E In this perspective, immigration will play a key role. The EU has been divided for years over the reform of the current Dublin agreement on asylum procedures, and the problem of rising migratory flows has been exploited by political forces in search of reaching easy political consensus.

Nevertheless, the EU needs to define a more effective common migratory policy. Germany has already proposed an automatic relocation scheme for asylum seekers in which their applications would be examined at the EU’s external borders. The Commission’s own proposal on this subject is already expected in February. In the meantime, the German plan has been welcomed by both Mediterranean and northern states. However, its call for automatic relocation, along with the lack of alternative solidarity measures for countries that do not want to take part, could upset Eastern European countries.

Von der Leyen also signalled that climate protection would be a priority for her Commission. Announcing an ambitious Green Deal, the head of the Commission has promised to make fighting climate change a core component of her presidency. The Green Deal is part of the Commission’s strategy to implement the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals and the policy package that was presented will work as the EU’s initial roadmap for the key policies and measures that are needed to achieve the European Green Deal, which will enshrine climate neutrality by 2050. Once the law comes into force, the transition to a climate-neutral continent will be binding for all the EU member states. Von der Leyen suggested increasing carbon taxes, investing more heavily in sustainable businesses, reducing pollution, and increasing the protection of Europe’s wilderness, national parks, and green spaces. Von der Leyen’s participation at the Global Climate Summit in Madrid can be considered a highly symbolic gesture, similar to that of the European Parliament, which, in November, declared global climate emergency to raise pressure on EU countries and the Commission and force them to do more for the environment. It is conspicuous that the final evaluation of the new European executive’s work will revolve around its ability to tackle the issue of climate change.

As already mentioned, the newly appointed EU Commission will have to work its way through a highly challenging international system.

The EU will have to deal with both trade conflicts that are increasing worldwide and harsher opposition to global free trade agreements. The EU will continue to face a difficult and controversial relationship with the United States, traditionally its strongest and most reliable ally and foremost economic partner. Trump is a declared adversary of the process of unification in the Old Continent, and his dislike for multilateralism

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E has mostly been addressed to EU’s policies on trade, climate change, arms control and disarmament, and its relations with Iran and Syria. The likelihood of seeing the American president obtaining a second mandate could really be challenging for the Union as a whole.

The EU will also continue to experience difficult relations with Russia—a country still considered a threat, at least by some European countries—because of its expansionism in Ukraine, its rearmament programmes, and its interference in European domestic politics. In the last years, the Kremlin’s activities have been spreading fake news and pro-Russian propaganda and financing sovereignist and anti-democratic parties across the EU, which put a strain on the European liberal democratic institutions’ capacity for resistance.

The third major global player, China, has evolved over the last five years from the EU’s cooperative trading partner to a potential rival with global ambitions. China is an important economic partner to Europe, but it has yet to deliver on a number of its commitments: more open access to its domestic market, full respect for the rule of law, a level playing field for foreign investment, the protection of intellectual property rights, and guarantees for technology transfers. China is not directly threatening the EU’s security, but its expanding political and trading influence worldwide (such as the Belt and Road Initiative), along with its growing investments mainly in the Eastern member states and the Western Balkans, is worrying Brussels. In the future, the main risk to Europe is being trapped in the middle of the US–China strategic competition and having to choose between the traditional ally and the rising global power.2

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Germany on the Eve of the 2020s: Challenges and Perspectives Dalma Bodolay There is probably no country in the EU which will face a more challenging 2020 than Germany. Europe’s driving economy and most populated country is likely to encounter several difficulties in the first part of the new decade, both from a political and an economic point of view. First of all, it seems that the disease of political instability has also reached Berlin, and it is likely to hit hard Germany, jeopardising the future of Merkel’s government and the credibility of the grand coalition. At the end of the 2 Ferdinando Nelli Feroci: The Future of the European Union: Scenarios for the Start of the New Legislature. IAI Commentaries, 19/65. 2019/November. 1–5.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E year, the German Social Democratic Party’s (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) convention confirmed Norbert Walter-Borjans and Saskia Esken as heads of Germany’s oldest party. The two left-leaning SPD leaders expressed grave doubts over the party’s participation in Merkel’s coalition government, which has continuously been challenged by internal divisions on issues such as taxes, welfare spending, and defence since its establishment. Although, during their leadership campaign, Walter-Borjans and Esken pledged to bring the party back to its core values, putting an end to their predecessors’ loveless enthusiasm about ruling with Merkel’s Christian Democrats (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, CDU), their statements became more careful after their appointment.

Furthermore, already in December, aware that a collapse of the current government would likely lead to a CDU–CSU minority government or a new election, the SPD leadership opted to keep the coalition on track.

However, social democrats are expected to call on Merkel to renegotiate the political program of their coalition for increasing public spending to improve the already agreed climate package. Although the political climate in Germany seems to return to normality, the spectre of the political instability is still alive, mostly because of the recent electoral results in Saxony, Thuringia, Brandenburg, and at the EP election, where mainstream parties suffered substantial losses. In this sense, on the road to the 2021 general election, profound misgivings about the future of the country are likely to progress, mostly considering that, in July, Germany is due to take over the presidency of the Council of the EU. Another important question regards Germany’s leverage in the EU and the new Commission. Even if Angela Merkel might have reason to be happy with the elevation of former German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen—actually the first woman—to the head of the European executive, this appointment left Berlin without an active commissioner and with a reduced ability to influence Brussels’ operations. The head of Commission promised to act clear of national influences and try to not seem like a “pushy German” as Judy Dempsey, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Europe think tank stated.3 This pledge is obviously a reason for concerns for Merkel, who fears that von der Leyen will not be able to represent her country’s interests strong enough, especially considering the renewed activism of confident state leaders like French President Emmanuel Macron.

The most important item on the German agenda for 2020 is the country’s

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3 Hans von der Burchard: Germany’s von der Leyen problem. Politico. 25 November 2019. <https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-ursula-von-der-leyen-problem/?f bclid=IwAR3KYZvxYxegm3Ct1fI36HNLAElOdDmMrEjvvakKQRwKKvKzQrHoDC2gHwg > Accessed: 4 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E presidency in the Council of the EU. Pro-European governments are hoping that, with Germany having a leading role, there will be a stronger integration within the Union. As the country’s officials communicated, Berlin is striving for stronger cooperation within Europe but, at the same time, avoiding all the initiatives that concentrate on Mr Macron’s “France first” agenda. Unlikely his predecessor, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas spoke about the importance of “holding Europe’s middle ground together,” and has stressed the urgency of moving towards a more social Europe.4 Maas also emphasised the proactive role Germany was ready to take to bridge differences between east and west within the context of the Three Seas Initiative. Moreover, in order to tackle the immigration issue, Germany has already proposed an automatic relocation scheme for asylum seekers in which applications would be examined at the EU’s external borders. The Commission’s own proposal on this subject is expected in February, but the German plan has been welcomed by both Mediterranean and northern states. However, its call for automatic relocation could precisely upset those Central and Eastern European countries where Germany is planning to act as a natural intermediary.

The role Germany would like to undertake once the United Kingdom has finally left the EU is also an important issue to look at in the future.

After Brexit, each European Union member state will have bigger responsibilities and the need to consult more for successful cooperation.

Even though many observers expect—or even hope—a Germany leading the EU, it remains to be seen whether the coalition government, which has committed itself to contributing more to the EU budget to carry through economic stabilisation and structural reforms within the Eurozone, will be able to receive its voters’ support for implementing these plans. However, getting the blessing of the electorate might be an arduous task given that the upcoming economic crisis could reinforce traditional German scepticism about loosening the purse strings.5 As the German Presidency is going to be followed by countries with proEuropean governments, there is highly likely that Portugal, Slovenia, and France will readily back German proposals for more integration. This “continuity” could help to build a stronger Europe even if it is imaginable that—even in case of some EU-friendly governments—the mere national interest could eventually prevail over joint European initiatives.

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4 Speech by Foreign Minister Heiko Maas at the opening of the 17th Ambassadors Conference.

Federal Foreign Office. 26 August 2019. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/ maas-ambassadors-conference/2241538 > Accessed: 4 December 2019.

5 André Hein: Germany at the helm: Can it bring Europe together in 2020? European Council on Foreign Relations. 15 October 2019. <https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_germany_at_the_helm_can_it_bring_europe_ together_in_2020 > Accessed: 4 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E France Is Ready to Take the Lead in Europe. What to Expect from Macron’s Activism in 2020?

Alessandro D’Onofrio While the following month are expected to be extremely challenging for many EU countries—Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom, just to name a few—the new decade could offer a lot of opportunities for France. In the second part of the last year, Emmanuel Macron’s restless activism in foreign politics succeeded—however, not without potential hazards—and he could officially take the helm of the EU, gaining advantage from the political vacuum opened by Brexit and Germany’s decaying leadership.

In a world of growing great-power rivalry, Macron is right to intervene, defending multilateralism, and reiterate that Europe must either act more like a great power or witness its political decline. Just surviving, not unscathed, a hard 2019, Macron will try to forget French people’s discontent with his particularly liberal policies and his troubles with the Yellow Vest protesters by throwing all his weight behind what really matters to his ambitions: le grandeur. Since his election as President, Macron has laid out an agenda of reform to overhaul the EU and put France in the lead of this process. Even if, at first, his attempts were encountered with many European leaders’ institutional and diplomatic reluctance and suspicion, at the eve of the new year, Macron can be rightly described as the beating heart of the European integration process and a beacon for those who make the construction of a “stronger Europe” a priority.

By making the liberals of Renew Europe the third-largest political group in the European Parliament, Macron gained enough clout to break the Popular–Socialist dominance in Strasbourg, restoring France’s political leverage within the European institutions. Suffice it to say that it was the French President who put forward the name of Ursula von der Leyen as the President the new Commission, and, again, it was Macron’s aim to appoint Christine Lagarde as the head of the BCE. In fact, even if choosing von der Leyen, a German bureaucrat close to Merkel, could look like a clear victory for the Chancellor at first sight, her appointment de facto neutralises Berlin’s chances to influence the decisions taken in Brussels, deprives Germany of access to any Directorate-General, and places a candidate with an idea of European integration closer to Monsieur Macron than to Frau Merkel at the EU’s top job.

Macron’s protagonism has no limits, and a series of recent proposals and statements were clearly made to symbolically remind the world that

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E the gaulliste dream of a powerful France in a powerful Europe had found its champion. Macron’s statements regarding NATO’s “brain death,” his disputes with Trump, and his veto on North Macedonia’s and Albania’s accession talks are meaningful, as they were made with the clear purpose of showing that the heart of Europe is not in Berlin or Brussels, but in Paris. Probably Macron’s hazardous attempt at a rapprochement with Moscow, which causes widespread concerns within the American Administration and in many European countries, could also be included in this logic. On top of these issues, Macron has also emerged as the firmest European leader when it comes to dealing with China.

Anyway, putting aside the sometimes annoying overconfidence and idealism of the French President, Macron’s political nose is not totally wrong. Nowadays, none of the EU’s “big” countries can offer a clearer and more ambitious vision than France. More importantly, apart from criticising Macron’s bluntness, what does Germany stand for with regard to the direction Europe should take or when it comes to defending its interests? By now, it seems that Europe’s largest economy is going through a leadership crisis, clearly neglecting its responsibilities as a big power. At the end of 2019, still by initiative of the French President, Germany agreed to present the European Commission with a plan for a two-year Conference on the Future of Europe aimed at overhauling nearly all aspects of how the EU functions, including possible treaty changes, if needed, and a goal of making the bloc “more united and sovereign.”6 This initiative is likely to enjoy some success, mostly following the appointment of the federalist Guy Verhofstadt as its head and a fortunate—but maybe also calculated—alternation of pro-European governments at the presidency of the Council of the EU (Croatia, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia and, at the conclusive stage of the Conference, France).

Speaking of France’s renewed dynamism in the EU, another important point to stress is the idea of a common European defence. In his famous “brain death” speech, Macron reiterated the need for Europe to “wake up” and build up its own defence and security apparat, following what he sees as a collapse of the US–EU strategic cooperation within NATO.7 These ideas have exacerbated tensions with Germany and other European partners, as many believe that the French President wants to replace Germany’s economic leadership with the foreign and security policy leadership of France. Ironically for Merkel, Ursula von der Leyen

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6 Rym Momtaz – David M. Herszenhorn: Berlin and Paris outline plan for EU makeover. Politico.

26 November 2019. <https://www.politico.eu/article/berlin-and-paris-outline-plan-for-eumakeover/ > Accessed: 5 December 2019.

7 Emmanuel Macron in his own words (French). The Economist. 7 November 2019. <https://www. economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-in-his-own-words-french > Accessed: 5 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E seemed to share Paris’ priorities and, during her inaugural speech, stated that she would lead a “geopolitical” Commission. However, in order to be successful, Macron needs to be more inclusive with other European partners, act less imperiously, and number the EU institutions among his partners in his diplomacy.8 On the economic side, in a context of sluggish expansion in the global economy, French growth could nudge its potential in 2020. The US– China trade war, slowing growth in China, and the ongoing uncertainty over the EU’s trade relationship with the US are expected to hit hard the EU countries. However, in France, things could look slightly different, and the country is expected to grow at a faster pace than all the other advanced economies of the area. This economic climate will, of course, benefit the President on the home front, where, given his unstable popularity, every misstep could run the risk of undermining his personal international agenda.

2020: The Year of Brexit. The Hard Days for The United Kingdom Have Just Begun Alessandro D’Onofrio No other country in Europe has experienced a most exciting end of 2019 than the United Kingdom. Holding an unusual election in December—the last time when Britons went to the polls in this month was in 1923—British voters confirmed Boris Johnson at 10 Downing Street and gave the green light to the Prime Minister to proceed with his Brexit plan. Unlike at the last elections, pre-election polls were correct this time, and, on 13 December, the UK woke up to the biggest Tory victory since 1987. Now that Johnson has secured a strong overall majority—364 seats—the UK is one step closer to leaving the EU at the end of January. Even though Johnson assured that, from this moment, delivering the legislation for Brexit will be a very straightforward process, negotiations during the transition phase—which will last until 31 December 2020—are anything but a foregone conclusion. In fact, until that deadline, Johnson must be able to communicate to Brussels what kind of post-Brexit relationship he wants with the European Union, regarding everything from trade to science, security, defence, and fishing.

However, it might be soon clear that a comprehensive Brexit deal cannot “get done” over the next few months, and it is rather going to take years.

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8 Judy Dempsey: Judy Asks: Is Macron Europe’s New Foreign Policy Leader? Carnegie Europe. 10 October 2019. <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/80042 > Accessed: 6 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E In the next months, the now euphoric Prime Minister will come to terms with the reality that any post-Brexit British foreign policy cannot escape the evidence that, contrary to what “Brexiteers” think, “the English Channel is not wider than the Atlantic Ocean.” In fact, in terms of a trading relationship, even if the USA remains the UK’s largest trading partner, the link with Europe is much stronger than any other connections. In 2018, the UK’s trade in goods and services with the EU, even if on a declining trend, accounted for 45% of its exports and 53% of its imports.9 It is obvious that talks between London and Brussels will be dominated by the future economic relationship, and it is unrealistic that a comprehensive agreement on all the matters could be reached

by December. That will create a big problem for Johnson, who, in the party’s manifesto, promised to his voters that, in any case, the British government would seek for an extension, and, if no arrangement is reached before the deadline, the UK will leave the EU without a deal, while the relationship between the two parties will be decided on World Trade Organization terms. This scenario terrifies British economic élites, which believe that the Prime Minister should eventually start to talk to his voters about the real cost of a “hard-Brexit.” However, the size of the Conservative victory might lead to a more cooperative approach by the United Kingdom at the negotiating tables, given that Johnson no longer depends on the support of the “hard Brexiteers’” fringe, which was very influential in May’s government.

However, if Britain is almost entirely focused on Brexit negotiations in its foreign policy in 2020, domestically, the country is going to face a very particular challenge. Since 2016, Brexit has reignited old cleavages between the constituent parts of the United Kingdom, and the last election made them even more visible. Following the Brexit stalemate, in pro-European Scotland, independentist sentiments exploded, and, the Scottish National Party gained 48 of 59 seats now—13 more than in 2017, when the party became the third-biggest party in Westminster. North of the border, the vote fuelled a fresh push for independence, which will enable Scotland to remain in the EU—or rejoin it. However, a new legal referendum would require a consent from the British Prime Minister, while it seems unlikely that Johnson would ever grant the SNP this chance. In all probability, the Prime Minister will wait until 2021, when the Scottish will elect their parliament, to see the intensity of SNP’s pressure.

If Sturgeon’s party were to obtain another landslide victory, tensions between Edinburgh and London could become unsustainable and the risk

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9 Matthew Ward: Statistics on UK–EU trade. House of Commons Briefing Paper. No 7851. 1 November 2019. <http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP7851/CBP-7851.pdf > Accessed: 13 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E to see in Scotland a Catalan-like path would become very strong.

Calls for a united Ireland will become surely stronger as Johnson’s Brexit deal, which would create a customs border in the Irish Sea, is poised to be accepted in Brussels. The Democratic Unionist Party, which held the balance in Westminster in the last two years, was punished by its voters for helping to bring forward a Brexit resolution that actually creates a barrier—at least a psychological one at the moment—between the Six Counties and Britain. For the first time in the history of the small Northern Irish state, Nationalist parties outnumbered Unionists at Westminster. In the time to come, the unionist–loyalist population could face a twofold challenge. On the one hand, the rise of nationalist and non-sectarian parties put on the table the issue of Irish unity as a means to remain part of the EU. Therefore, a border poll is a much likely outcome now. On the other hand, Scottish independence would create an existential crisis for northern Unionists. Were the United Kingdom to fall, which Union would parties such as the DUP defend?

As seen, the next months will raise many questions in the United Kingdom, perhaps leading to its break-up. Ironically, leaving the EU could go against the story sold in the last three years by the Farages, Johnsons, Rees-Moggs, and others. On the eve of the new decade, the United Kingdom, chasing the dream of its own perceived sovereignty and power, will wake up to the fact that, by refusing its leadership role within the world’s largest trade bloc, it will only be an easy prey for the most aggressive world powers.

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Italy: Future Perspectives after the Political Turmoil and the Change of Government Bianka Restás The government crisis that has erupted in Italy in the middle of the summer break has reached a new phase on 28 August, when two political forces, the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle, M5S) and the centre-left Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, PD), expressed their willingness to collaborate and form a new coalition. After taking office, the new government pledged to rebuild trust in the relationship between the EU and Rome, leaving behind the previous yellow-green coalition’s EU-critical stance. At the same time,

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E the coalition had made its intention clear to address the financial and economic difficulties of the country, such as its huge public debt, its weak economy, and the unsolved question of immigration. Right after the establishment of the new administration, experts emphasised the significant differences between the two political forces, not just in their ideology and political views, but also in their vision and goals for the future, which could, in turn, lead to political uncertainty in the upcoming months. Therefore, realising the government’s political program is not an easy task at all.

One of the main priorities of the new government is to improve its international image after a year of continuous confrontations with the European Union over the country’s big-spending budget plans and the EU’s proposal to launch an excessive deficit procedure against the country.

However, when it comes to Italy’s budget, the new government may be different, but the root of the problem is very much the same. In order to be a credible partner, Rome has to implement an efficient economic strategy to be able to cut its enormous public debt and to revitalise its stagnating economy. With respect to the country’s economic problems, it is worth noting that the EU’s proposal for reforming the Eurozone’s bailout fund, the so-called European Stability Mechanism (ESM), has raised further doubts about the long-term stability of Italy’s new government. The reform would give the bloc’s fund more powers to handle financial crises, strengthen the Eurozone’s monitoring powers over countries with economic imbalances and, if required, facilitate the restructuring of government debt. Critics say the changes could make it more likely that Italy will have to restructure—or even default on—its debt, assertions that EU officials dismiss as unfounded and misleading. In the light of the above, the expected reform left Rome very apprehensive: the ruling M5S is against signing off on the reform until plans for a wider European banking union became clearer, the co-ruling PD supports the plan, while former Interior Minister Matteo Salvini is a strong opponent of the proposal.10 After weeks of continuous negotiations and debates, the chairman of the Eurogroup Mario Centeno announced on 4 December that changes to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) would be adopted early next year. This delay will provide room for further negotiations with Italy.11 In the case of immigration, it is undeniable that the management of new arrivals will still be at the centre of the political debate in Italy, contributing

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10 Giuseppe Fonte–Gavin Jones: Italy PM defends reform of euro zone bailout fund but seeks concessions. Reuters. 2 December 2019. <https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/ idAFKBN1Y60OC > Accessed: 3 December 2019.

11 Mes: Centeno, firma a inizio prossimo anno. ANSA. 6 December 2019. <http://www.ansa.it/ europa/notizie/rubriche/altrenews/2019/12/04/mes-gentiloni-momento-giusto-per-farepassi-avanti-_7e829cbd-87c4-49ff-81d2-4dcb00f1c2ad.html > Accessed: 6 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E to the polarisation of public opinion.12 The EU’s Mediterranean countries, including Italy, are facing not just the complex initial emergency phase of the problem (such as the protection of lives at sea and the reception of the arrivals) but other urgent challenges too, for instance, the creation of reception centres, or the integration of those migrants who stay in their country of destination. In view of the above, it is not surprising that the tension between the countries of first arrival and the rest of the EU Member States has increased over the last few years. Italy’s new government pledged to address this question through a common, systematic, solidarity-based European approach, moving away from the rigorous “closed ports” logic of Matteo Salvini. It should be underlined, however, that even though the country assured to move away from Salvini’s hard-line immigration policies, it will not be able to do so alone.

At the same time, Europe cannot expect that a change of heart in Rome will be enough to solve the continent’s difficulties regarding the question of migration. Considering the complex dynamics of global migration and the challenges associated with it, it is not an issue that the EU as a bloc can leave out of consideration: the number of new arrivals may be down, but the drivers of forced displacement—including climate change, conflict, and poverty—are still there.13 European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen’s promise to realise a new migration package in the first half of 2020,14 and her support for a more solidarity-based approach in the future management of migration, can be interpreted as a positive sign. From an optimistic point of view, this could be a first promising step towards a more effective European cooperation framework for tackling existing challenges. In the light of the above-mentioned circumstances, it is hard to predict whether the two political parties could collaborate effectively to govern the country in the long run. Considering the shaky foundations on which the government has been built and the existing disagreements between the coalition partners, a minor affair, such as the upcoming regional election in Emilia-Romagna, can also potentially tear down the Italian executive.15 Addressing Italy’s most urgent domestic

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12 Alessandra Giada Dibenedetto: La salvaguardia della sicurezza del mediterraneo e la proroga del mandato di operazione Sophia. CESI Analisi. September 2019. <https://www.cesi-italia.org/ contents/Analisi/operazione%20sophia.pdf > Accessed: 14 November 2019.

13 Imogen Subdery: Italy needs EU help to break with Salvini on migration. Politico. 23 September 2019. <https://www.politico.eu/article/italy-needs-eu-help-to-break-with-salvini-onmigration/ > Accessed: 15 November 2019.

14 Florence Schulz: Von der Leyen promises new migration package in first half of 2020. Euractive. 8 November 2019. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/von-der-leyen-promisesnew-migration-package-in-first-half-of-2020/ > Accessed: 27 November 2019.

15 The next big test for the PD–5Stars alliance will be the regional vote in Emilia-Romagna in January. After the League’s victory in a regional election in Umbria, questions have already been raised over the future of the coalition, but losing the region that contains Bologna—Italy’s most symbolic left-wing stronghold—could be absolutely harmful for the PD–M5S alliance.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E challenges is of crucial importance, just as becoming a credible and reliable actor in Europe again. However, all things considered, the new administration’s mission is not simple at all.

Poland 2020—A Domestic and Foreign Policy Outlook Péter Dobrowiecki In October 2019, with 43.59% of the votes, Poland’s Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) retained its position as the country’s leading political party. This victory enabled it to create a majority government on its own. While PiS managed to retain its share of electorate and have a comfortable majority in the Sejm, it lost—somewhat surprisingly—the Upper House of Parliament, where the opposition currently maintains a slim advantage over the governing party. Attempts by PiS to undermine the opposition majority were rebuffed until now; however, it remains to be seen whether this fragile unity can be steadily maintained in the political debates to come. The loss of control over the Senate might be a painful, but not critical blow to PiS, since with its limited constitutional powers, the Senate is not able to block the introduction of new laws, if they are accepted by the Lower House, where PiS has a large majority. Nevertheless, the Upper House, in the opposition’s hands, could successfully slow down the legislative process, while also nominate its candidates as the heads of a number of state bodies. Even if Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki’s recently appointed second cabinet did not witness major changes in ministerial positions (differently from the Polish press’ predictions), significant swaps might take place during the next parliamentary term, as it also happened during the previous one, when Prime Minister Beata Szydło was replaced in December 2017

by Mateusz Morawiecki, who then made significant transformations in ministerial positions.

The radical right Confederation’s (Konfederacja) presence in the Sejm with its elven seats will also constitute a new challenge for the ruling party, as during the last four years, it meticulously tried to avoid the rising of a new political force to its right by frequently appealing to radical voters. It is very likely that PiS’s strategy in the coming months will focus on curbing its right-wing rival’s popularity by reinforcing its socially conservative political agenda. However, by “radicalising” his agenda, Morawiecki risks to further alienate the more moderate electorate. One

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E such example is the new proposed law on sexual education, which sparked strong criticism among EU officials. While “protecting traditional Polish values” will undoubtedly provoke heated political debates domestically, “defending Polish historical memory” will remain a priority on the government’s foreign policy agenda. As recent public statements by some leading Polish governmental figures show, PiS will continue to openly criticise private or public entities that—according to the official Polish position—misrepresent Poland’s 20th-century historical past.16 Also from a foreign policy point of view, the Polish government is expected to primarily pursue security policy issues, as it has been doing since 2014. Deepening bilateral and intra-NATO partnerships with the United States, strengthening Poland’s position in the European Union, and developing regional, North–South cooperation formats will all be important elements of Poland’s foreign policy agenda. The modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces with up-to-date American military equipment, the development of a permanent US contingent, and the steady supply of liquid natural gas (LNG) from the United States through the LNG terminal in Świnoujście—all equally important to Warsaw—will be at the centre of the Polish–American relations in the coming year. Likewise, through parallel support for traditional and recent regional cooperation formats (V4, Three Seas Initiative) and projects (Via Carpatia) Polish foreign policy will continue to work on its declared goal of bolstering Poland’s leading position in Central Europe, while becoming a stronger participant in EU decision-making processes.

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Last-Minute Decisions—Who Will Define the Next (and Upcoming) Year in Slovakia? Ágnes Vass The year of 2019 in Slovakia has politically been defined by two very significant votes: the presidential election in March and the European The recent example was when Prime Minister Morawiecki posted an open letter to Twitter, calling on Netflix’s executives to amend maps in their new documentary series The Devil Next Door, which depicted Nazi concentration camps within the borders of an existing Polish state during the Second World War. For more, see Rick Noack: Netflix says it will amend ‘The Devil Next Door’ series, following Polish prime minister’s complaint. The Washington Post. 15 November 2019. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/11/15/ netflix-says-it-will-amend-the-devil-next-door-series-following-polishprime-ministers-complaint/ > Accessed: 6 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E Parliament election in May. These two had substantial repercussions throughout the country, and they are also likely to have a serious impact on its medium- and long-term political and social development.

Next year, Slovakia will have its most outstanding political moment at the parliamentary election on 29 February. Although the electoral campaign has already started, the next seventy days are expected to be rich in interesting happenings. The campaign has already been deeply influenced by what happened over the last one and a half years. Last March, more than one year after an investigative journalist and his fiancée were murdered in their home because of his articles outlining corrupt deals and frauds among Slovakia’s most important businessman, state actors, and prosecutors, the candidate of the non-parliamentary progressive party (Progresívne Slovensko, PS) won the presidential elections. Although the country’s most prominent businessman was charged with ordering the murder of the journalist, the investigation shed light on the fact that several members of the current government (mainly members of the Smer–sociálna demokracia, SMER) had close connections with organised crime and were involved in cases connected to corruption and fraud. The results of the EP elections later this year also showed a growing dissatisfaction and a general anger among voters at the current political leadership, which become manifest in their decision to vote for alternative parties.

The electoral campaign is also deeply influenced by more recent developments. At the beginning of December, former Prime Minister Robert Fico was charged with defamation of nations, races, and beliefs, and the incitement of hatred towards the same. Just one day later, Andrej Kiska, former president and leader of the non-parliamentary party For the People (Za l’udí), was also charged with tax fraud after several media outlets had received an e-mail with documents proving how his company cheated on taxes during the 2014 presidential elections by unlawfully adding the electoral campaign’s expenses to its books and asking for a tax return from the State. The National Criminal Agency already brought charges against Kiska’s company, KTAG, this year, but the former president believes it is part of a “dirty political campaign” directed against him.

However, according to the latest polls, the attacks directed against his company had no effect on his popularity: although he only announced his political plans in April and his party was established in September, Za l’udí is the strongest political force among “non-parliamentary” parties and the second strongest right after SMER today.17

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17 Prieskum AKO: Za ľudí tesne predbehlo PS/Spolu, je lídrom opozície. SME Domov. 26 November 2019. <https://domov.sme.sk/c/22269098/prieskum-ako-za-ludi-tesne-predbehlo-ps-spolu-jelidrom-opozicie.html >Accessed: 11 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E Despite the fact that, according to figures, SMER is still the strongest political force in Slovakia, the party has seen its support plummeting. It is trying hard to gain back its voters’ trust and, after the shortest discussion on a budget in the country’s history, the government approved a plan incorporating many social measures but running a massive deficit. The idea was to communicate it as a budget whose “winners are primarily the people.” Recently, the party has slightly changed its name and has started the campaign with fresh visuals and a new slogan. The party’s new logo is a red-blue arrow pointing upwards, and the slogan reads Responsible Change, while the official name of the party was changed to “New Smer” (which means new direction in Slovak).

The second-largest party of the current coalition, the Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana, SNS) is also going through a rough patch. In fact, following the recent political scandals which involve the party’s leader, Andrej Danko, and the strengthening of far-right political competitors, SNP is facing serious difficulties in finding its own identity and defining clearly its political aims.18 The party’s identity crisis is also evident from its billboards, where no names or faces are shown but the party’s slogan: “For a Family, for a Nation.” It is also interesting that albeit a Slovak nationalist political party, SNP uses Moravian folk patterns as the main visual elements of its campaign.19 The junior coalition party, Most–Híd, is also trying to redefine its mission, find its place in the Slovak political scene, and have appeal to the Hungarian minority. In the last period, the party has been struggling with falling support and the loss of significant personalities from its ranks. Although there were negotiations with other Hungarian parties about presenting a joint list of candidates, after unsuccessful meetings, the leadership of the Party of the Hungarian Community, Hungarian Christian Democratic Alliance, Hungarian Forum, and Most–Híd were not able to agree on a pre-election cooperation agreement. After these failed initiatives, a new Hungarian political movement, Togetherness (Összefogás – Spolupatricnost), was officially registered in October. Later this year, József Nagy, Most–Híd’s only MEP, decided to leave the party and join Togetherness because of his party’s failing negotiations with other Hungarian minority forces.

Not only Hungarian minority political parties have failed in creating party coalitions. Five opposition parties also considered joining forces

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18 Prieskumy a volebné preferencie politických strán. SME Vol’by. 12 December 2019. <https://volby. sme.sk/parlamentne-volby/2020/i/preferencie-volby-2020 > Accessed: 13 December 2019.

19 Veronika Folentová: SNS má na bilborde slogan Za národ, ornament je z Moravy. Denníkn.sk. 4 November 2019. <https://dennikn.sk/1640024/sns-na-bilborde-kampanuju-sloganom-za-narodornament-je-z-moravy/ > Accessed: 9 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E to prevent SMER’s possible victory in the next election. However, in the end, they were not able to agree on a shared electoral programme. The second largest “non-parliamentary” party, after the already mentioned Za ludí, is the coalition of two smaller political forces: Progressive Slovakia and Together (Spolu). These two parties supported Zuzana Caputová’s successful race in the presidential election and also achieved an unexpected success in the EP election. However, after drug-related allegations against its leader, Michal Truban, the support for the party is stagnating nowadays, according to the polls.

Even if there are big question marks over the eventual winners of the elections next year, the strengthening of progressive and centrist political parties such as Za lud’í, Spolu, and Progressive Slovakia is easy to predict.

Most probably some of the “older” parties will not reach the threshold and will not gain seats in the next parliament (e.g., Most–Híd’s success from this perspective is very unlikely, while the Christian Democratic Party is expected to repeat its 2016 poor performance). The success of Hungarian minority political actors is also at risk. In the last few years, Most–Híd’s MPs were representing the Hungarian minority in the Slovak parliament as the Party of Hungarian Community was not able to get there. Although the new political actor Togetherness has launched its programme, it is not easy to predict how successful it will be in collecting Hungarian voters or whether the existence of several political actors will contribute to the fragmentation of this small electorate (even Spolu presented a Hungarian platform, aiming at attracting ethnic Hungarian voters who share centrist or liberal ideals).

However, it is also important to add at this point, that the far-right People’s Party Our Slovakia (Ľudová strana – Naše Slovensko, SNS) is now the most popular political party among young voters, according to a survey conducted by Focus poll agency at the end of October 2019.

The party’s messages in this campaign are simple: in case of a victory, it promised to take money from the oligarchs, give it to families, and provide cheap electricity and gas for its voters.20 Surely, it is hard to be a voter in Slovakia in these days, given the multitude of competing smaller or bigger political parties. The turbulent changes of the last one and a half years on the Slovak political scene are also making the decision more puzzling. However, one thing is certain: last-minute decisions will have a big impact on the final result, unlike ever before during the post-communist history of the country.

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20 Ria Gehrerová: Ak by vo voľbách volili len mladí ľudia do 30 rokov, vyhral by Kotleba. Denníkn.sk.

28 November 2019. <https://dennikn.sk/1667913/ak-by-vo-volbach-volili-len-mladi-ludia-do-30rokov-vyhral-by-kotleba/?ref=mwat > Accessed: 9 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E North Macedonia—the Black Sheep of Europe?

Tünde Darkó North Macedonia was born at the very beginning of 2019 through the signing of an agreement with the Greek Parliament that included the name change and Athens’ formal support for Skopje’s possible NATO and EU membership—a compromise that had been in the making for twenty-six years. As Prime Minister Zoran Zaev stated in January, the two countries reached a historic victory that signified eternal peace and progress in the Balkans and Europe. Ratifying the agreement has been enormously important for both sides, as it strengthened the political will to leave the past behind and transform the region politically and economically.

Starting 2019 hopefully, North Macedonia kept going forward to reach EU standards in order to start accession negotiations with the European Union.

These efforts, besides the Prespa Agreement on the political level, included delivering tangible results for the state of democracy in the judiciary system, fight against corruption and organised crime, and reform in intelligence services and public administration. Steps that were generally recognised as important achievements in the European Commission’s North Macedonia 2019 Report in May. Furthermore, the Commission officially recommended opening accession talks with North Macedonia and confirmed that the country had already embraced the opportunity to deliver reforms and that this should be acknowledged by EU member states as a sufficient level of progress that could pave the way for the further implementation of reforms during the accession process.

During the EU leaders’ meeting in June, Federica Mogherini also argued that time had come for the EU to deliver on North Macedonia’s hopes on opening accession talks.However, while the European Council strongly welcomed the historic Prespa Agreement as a significant achievement and a positive example for the region, the ministerial meeting ended with a major disappointment and without the opening of accession negotiations. On 3 October, a joint declaration was published by the then President of the European Council Donald Tusk, the President of the EP David Sassoli, the then President of the European Commission JeanClaude Juncker, and President-elect of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen. The joint letter, showcasing a strong belief in opening accession talks, intended to draw attention to the importance of EU cooperation, as it is not only about deepening but also widening, which should not only be important as a mutual interest of all member states, but should also

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E serve all the citizens across Europe. Besides stressing the importance of the European perspective, the EU’s ability to deliver on its promises and its credibility was also mentioned.

However, despite big hopes, there was no progress announced on enlargement during the 17–18 October European Council meeting. The issue of opening accession talks with North Macedonia was once again postponed with the statement: “The European Council will revert to the issue of enlargement before the EU–Western Balkans summit in Zagreb in May 2020.” The effects of these seemingly never-ending postponements were immediately visible on North Macedonia’s political will and motivation: Macedonian Parties agreed on early elections and on the creation of an interim government, as PM Zoran Zaev announced his official resignation on 3 January 2020. Following this, a French non-paper was published one month later, proclaiming that North Macedonia will have to deliver reforms in another way than expected before. Parallel to it, the German-led Berlin Process—as the initiative supporting the implementation of the common enlargement policy—appointed the Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of North Macedonia to a joint Presidency in 2020, symbolising greater ownership of the process in the region. This step clearly signals a German foreign political stance in favour of opening the accession talks with North Macedonia, underlining Germany’s acknowledgement of North Macedonia’s political developments. In fact, both the French non-paper and the Berlin Process aims at gradually integrating North Macedonia and its neighbours into the European Union, although with a clear difference in how institutions should be set up. Instead of the current thirty-five chapters, the proposal calls for seven policy blocks. The first and most important stage would address the rule of law, fundamental rights, justice, and security as a cross-cutting stage remaining relevant for all the following sections underlying the “fundamentals first” principle. Stages from two to five would tackle groups of policies that are part of the common enlargement policy. Finally, stage six and seven would cover foreign affairs and Chapter 35. 21 What seems to determine the French evaluation of North Macedonia’s preparedness for accession talks lies in the fact that it was compared with Montenegro’s supposed

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21 Seven stages of EU accession: This is how France would reform the process. The European Western Balkans. 18 November 2019. <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2019/11/18/seven-stages-ofeu-accession-this-is-how-france-would-reform-the-process/ > Accessed: 6 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E immatureness for accession because of uneven wealth accumulation. 22 Eventually, North Macedonia’s motivation for getting into the European political stream is going to be challenged in 2020 by the actions of Europe’s two founding fathers. The recently announced political changes may strengthen bilateral relations with Germany, as the key field of cooperation focuses on the promotion of the rule of law.

Also, being the most important trading partner of the country striving for integration, Germany might take further steps to reach a consensus on opening accession talks. It seems that, from the French perspective, the EU should rather not be enlarged because of the paradoxical fact that there are major problems with other official candidate countries.

However, postponing the accession can also be seen as a fear of the possible bigger flow of immigration. The current situation is especially unpleasant for North Macedonia and Albania, as the present practice is not only influenced by their own achievements but also by the old EU member state’s interests and the level and quality of their neighbour’s performance on delivering reforms needed for EU accession. As for the migration, the Balkan Barometer 2019 shows that Macedonians are the most active in the region in searching for information on the possibilities of leaving their country and working abroad (the proportion is 7%, more than that of the Montenegrin citizens).23 These figures indicate that the problem is already there, even if EU membership still means economic prosperity, as well as the freedom to travel, for nearly the same percentage of respondents in both countries.24 That leads us to assume that potential development through getting into the European project and freedom of travel are real priorities that can still drive North Macedonia’s efforts from 2020 forward. At the same time, we should not forget that the EU does not only consist of superpowers like Germany and France, and other member states have the same right to vote and take part in forming the enlargement agenda. Therefore, other member state’s more intensive contribution to the issue might also be possible—just as in the case of nine medium-size member states, which also drafted their own proposal

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22 French Ambassador to North Macedonia stated: “Expansion is reaching its limits. Do we really implement the same processes for accession? Do we really share the same values, or has the time come to start introducing additional steps?” “Does the accumulation of wealth in Montenegro indicate European values? Is that someone we want to share our sovereignty with? Wealth in Montenegro is concentrated within 10 or 12 families. That is why we would like to readdress and revisit enlargement rules. It has become about box-ticking rather than substantial progress,” he added. French Ambassador to North Macedonia: Reforms must be substantial, not formal. The European Western Balkans, 5 December 2019. <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2019/12/04/ french-ambassador-to-north-macedonia-reforms-must-be-substantial-not-formal/ > Accessed: 6 December 2019.

23 Regional Cooperation Council: Balkan Barometer 2019. May 2019. Nr. 2303–2594, Year V, No. 5. 65–71. <https://www.rcc.int/seeds/files/RCC_BalkanBarometer_PublicOpinion_2019.pdf > Accessed: 6 December 2019.

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Balkan Barometer, 40–51.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E on how to make the process more efficient. More precisely, they would prefer a negotiating process within the groups of chapters and that they be achieved in parallel not consecutively.25

NATO 70/20: Hungary’s Twenty Years in the Transatlantic Alliance Péter Stepper This year marks a double anniversary for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: it has been seventy years since the alliance was founded and twenty years since the first round of accession of Central and Eastern European countries. NATO’s founding in 1949 proved to be a turning point for the political and military history of the entire world, while 1999 was decisive for the CEE region in terms of rejoining the West in a political sense.

János Martonyi, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, signed NATO accession documents on 12 March 1999, which is a significant milestone, considering that Hungary returned to the community of democratic counties only in 1989, when it could decide which kind of alliances it would like to join freely. The aim of the Antall government was to cut most of the ties with the Soviets, at least in terms of military matters, and quit the Warsaw Pact (WP) as soon as possible. It can be considered a successful diplomatic effort, taking into account the dissolution of the WP in February 1991. NATO meant that Hungary would become a close ally of the United States for the first time in its history.

Not surprisingly, Hungary’s orientation was, and has since been, more pro-American than that of many other Western allies within NATO, and Hungary has supported the American out-of-area military missions in spite of harsh criticism by Western European nations.

The last decades have brought several significant changes in international relations, and it became clear that the security architecture that was designed after the Second World War according to the realities of the early Cold War is outdated. All security organisations needed to adapt to the changes, especially after those of the former Soviet bloc ceased to exist. Consequently, the history of the post-socialist countries, such as Hungary, has been characterised by a constant need for change.

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25 Nine EU Members release a new proposal for the reform of enlargement process. The European Western Balkans. 11 December 2019. <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2019/12/11/nineeu-members-release-a-new-proposal-for-the-reform-of-enlargement-process/ > Accessed: 12 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E After the end of the bipolar world, new security challenges emerged, and old tensions came to the surface, which all threatened stability and peace in Central and Eastern Europe. The dissolution of the multinational entities in the case of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union forced the West to realise that history, in reality, has not ended.

Hungary has faced several parallel challenges and security threats, which needed to be managed simultaneously, while its political institutions, economy, and society have also undergone significant transformation.

Hungary, similarly to other countries in the region, inherited a massive and relatively large, outdated, and ineffective army, which was prepared to stop NATO’s advance on the Western border, or, as plans at the time suggested, to participate in offensive manoeuvres against it. From the 1990s, Hungary intended to join this very organisation, and Hungarian politicians saw Hungary’s security best guaranteed by anchoring the country to the Western institutions. According to this, Hungary needed to build better cooperation in Central Europe, and, for the protection of Hungarians abroad, it had to work closely with its neighbours.

These serious challenges had to be met in the context of economic difficulties. The Hungarian defence sector suffered from very low resources and financial support. The necessary transformation and the planned modernisation of the security sector have been slower than the expectations derived from the level of ambitions designated by the several security and strategic documents adopted during the 1990s and 2000s. NATO’s anticipation that all members share the financial burdens and spend at least 2% of their GDP on defence became a distant reality in Hungary, as the defence spending decreased in the 2000s.

Beyond the serious economic and financial problems, Hungary has struggled with many conflicts in the political sphere, too. Hungary’s main political aim in the last decades has been to join NATO, the EU, and become an equal member in the Euro-Atlantic organisations. However, global challenges have changed these institutions, too, and have created friction among the members. After the Cold War, NATO sought a new identity, and the US influence became even stronger. In the last few years, the United States has criticised even its closest allies for not spending enough on defence. Hungary has also been heavily criticised about being too close to Russia. Washington has not been open to listening to Hungarian arguments in this regard, while, in the meantime, history has proved that the East–West conflict brings only bad consequences for the region.

The modernisation of the Hungarian Defence Forces, the security sector, and the security policy decision-making processes have been slow due to permanent financial problems, shrinking defence spending,

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E and outdated equipment. The situation is grave if we look at the volatility of the political elite’s interests, or the uninterested Hungarian public.

Despite many unfortunate trends and the above-mentioned challenges, in recent years, the Hungarian government’s new programmes have intended to initiate change, and there have been some positive signs: the Hungarian government’s goal to reach the desired 2% of GDP with its defence spending is signed into law. The government has also introduced the “Zrínyi 2026 defence and military development programme” to further modernise the defence forces and the education and training of military personnel. The “Irinyi programme,” in the meantime, intends to develop the military technology, aiming at revitalising the Hungarian military industry and, along with it, independent arms production.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E THE AMERICAS The US in the World in 2020 Tamás Péter Baranyi In an analytical outlook for the upcoming year in international relations, the most decisive factor is where and how the United States would position itself. Auguring odds for 2020 thus should have a strong focus on the US, and the possible turns it might take during the following twelve months. The variables are, again, many: it is not only the US Presidential Election of 2020 but a complete renewal of the House of Representatives, the one-third of the Senate, as well as the Democratic bid to remove President Trump from office well before the election cascade of 3 November. This section goes from the structural background through the national domestic level to a global arena to see what changes might be expected in the year 2020.

The background against which every US elections are being held is three dimensional with demographic trends, economic performance, and general public mood being the three. In terms of demographics, many experts pointed to the seemingly irreversible trend that the white population in the US is to become a minority soon. Already, under the age of 15, less than 50% are white.26 In states that could be proven essential for winning, there has been a demographic uptick in non-White residents. This change is something the Democrats could generally build on.27 Others have, however, pointed out that the strict division of the 1990s—namely, white Anglo-Americans voting Republican, minorities for Democrats—is no longer that obvious. A recent poll shows that while only 1% of those polled Black Americans identified themselves as Republicans, 59% said they were Democrats. The surprising thing here is how the Democratic outreach had faded among Black communities.28

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The Hispanic vote could be even harder to predict. On the one hand, the current Republican attitude of gaining a majority in the mostly white areas is not expected to change, as is not the Democrats’ clinging on the 26 William H. Frey: Less than half of US children under 15 are white, census shows. Brookings. 24 June 2019. <https://www.brookings.edu/research/less-than-half-of-us-children-under-15-arewhite-census-shows/ > Accessed: 15 December 2019.

27 Chris Wilson: The America That Votes in 2020 Will Look Radically Different Than it Did in 2016.

Time. 11 September 2019. <https://time.com/5674850/2020-election-demographics/ > Accessed: 15 December 2019.

28 Perry Bacon Jr.–Dhrumil Mehta: The Diversity Of Black Political Views. FiveThirtyEight. 6 April 2018. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-diversity-of-black-political-views/ >Accessed: 15 December 2018.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E “rainbow coalition”—there is no recipe for victory for either party. Putting together the data shows slightly better chances for Democrats, but it is all too uncertain to tell.

In terms of economics, most reliable sources predict hopeful stagnation and moderate growth for 2020 and an economy to take off from 2021 on. This environment, combined with probable positive effects from the “ceasefire” in the US–China trade war, might result in a healthy economic condition for the election year.29 The positive atmosphere is obviously something the Republicans are longing for. As for the people’s perception of their own well-being, numbers are also reassuring. While the years from 2016 to 2018 were a time of facing uncertainty and decline, those trends actually slowed down and started to swing back in 2019.30 The latter two thus predicts a good background for Republicans to campaign.

In the meantime, the Ukraine-related scandal and lingering impeachment have not, so far, resulted in a serious setback in Trump’s approval rate.31 Democrats are now trying to dominate next year’s discourse with the impeachment process even if completing the impeachment seems unlikely. In the meantime, many suggest that a “failed” impeachment would likely to reinforce Trump’s campaign and supporters as was the case with Bill Clinton’s impeachment process. The situation is different in many ways, but the results just may well turn out to be the same.32 The Democrats are not in an easy position to pick the best candidate because the leading ones are representing different constituencies and are sometimes incompatible. The Democratic Party may even lose votes in the process of picking a candidate.33 The race is thus absolutely open now for the 2020 US elections which might entail serious changes in US foreign policy as well.

What would the different possible outcomes mean for the global geopolitical landscape? We do not know who is going to win the elections of 2020, but it is pretty certain that he or she would be able to reverse some of Trump’s signature policies—while definitely uphold some others. In case of a Democratic victory, a new enthusiasm for free

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29 Bill Conerly: Economic Forecast 2020-2021: Moderate And Then Improving Growth. Forbes. 13 December 2019. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/billconerly/2019/12/13/economic-forecast-20202021-moderate-and-then-improving-growth/#7d1de31a6827 > Accessed: 15 December 2019.

Dan Witters: U.S. Wellbeing Declines Halted in 2019. Gallup. 25 September 2019. <https://news. gallup.com/poll/266978/wellbeing-declines-halted-2019.aspx > Accessed: 15 September 2019.

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31 Presidential Approval Ratings – Donald Trump. Gallup. <https://news.gallup.com/poll/203198/ presidential-approval-ratings-donald-trump.aspx > Accessed: 15 December 2019.

32 Amber Phillips: Will impeachment help Trump in 2020? 12 December 2019. The Washington Post. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/12/11/will-impeachment-help-trump/ > Accessed: 15 December 2019.

33 Thomas B. Edsall: The Democratic Party Is Actually Three Parties. The New York Times. 24 July 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/24/opinion/2020-progressive-candidates.html > Accessed: 15 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E trade negotiations, liberalisation of immigration policies, and renewed support for human rights regimes can be expected. What is not likely to change any time soon is the new US approach to China. As Michael Pettis explains in his superb analysis of trade imbalances, high-saving countries are able to “export” their distortion onto other nations, the manifest result of which is a trade deficit. As Chinese consumption is not expected to reach a par with Chinese production, trade deficits area nowhere to go in the coming years. This problem is something the next president of the United States should tackle as soon as possible—be it Donald Trump or any other.34 Still, trade wars are not short and not “easy to win,” as President Trump once put it. Quite the contrary: we can expect a protracted conflict in trade matters with different phases of serious confrontation and truces.

The last among the many truces was signed on 5 December 2019, in which a gradual lowering of US tariffs and a serious increase in Chinese purchase of agricultural goods were promised. This settlement, however, does not alter the major trend of confrontation, only signals a new phase with relatively less tension for the upcoming year.35 For the Trump Administration, China is a pivotal point: good results would help the US maintain its positions in Asia, while economic benefits brought home could help win re-election for the President. With the Belt and Road Initiative and other Chinese designs looming large, the US finally seems to embrace a geoeconomic strategy for the broader region. The “Indo-Pacific” as a concept is now what the US advocates instead of “Asia” or “Asia-Pacific”—both of them are narrower frameworks where China’s relative weight is more felt. The Indo-Pacific, which includes India, Australia, or even the Arabian Peninsula, might be a more apt framework to rebalance China. Again, the rhetoric is wholly different from those of previous US administrations, while the similarities are striking with Obama’s concept of the “pivot to Asia.” This makes it very unlikely that an American attempt at broadening the framework, involving India, Australia, and Arabian states, to rebalance China, would change whatever results may come in on 3 November.36 The success of such a rebalancing is wholly questionable, though. While India seems like a natural counterbalance

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34 Michael Pettis: Why Trade Wars Are Inevitable. Foreign Policy. 19 October 2019. <https:// foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/19/trade-wars-inevitable-us-china-economic-imbalances/ > Accessed: 15 December 2019.

35 Anthony Rowley: There is a ceasefire in the US–China trade war. So who waved the white flag first? South China Morning Post. 16 December 2018. <https://www.scmp.com/business/bankingfinance/article/2178063/there-ceasefire-us-china-trade-war-so-who-waved-white-flag > 15 December 2019.

36 Jamie Fly: Trump’s Asia Policy and the Concept of the “Indo-Pacific.” SWP Working Paper.

2018/October. <https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/projekt_papiere/ Fly_BCAS_2018_Indo-Pacific_10.pdf > Accessed: 15 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E to China, the rapid development of the subcontinent is indeed strongly based on Chinese growth.37 Other elements in the Indo-Pacific framework face similar problems. It is unquestionable now that the US decided this destination to be the cornerstone of its foreign policy. If Donald Trump leaves office in 2020, the rhetoric may change overnight to the extreme, though the content is likely to remain the same.

The China (or Pacific) issue is essential for all the rest of the relationships the US maintains. It could not be truer of the transatlantic relations between Europe and America. In fact, the alliance itself is considering the adoption of a newer, more bellicose policy vis-à-vis China. In an era when the US is increasingly more focused on China and the Pacific, while Europe struggles with Russian influence and multiple crises deriving from North African stability, the strategic calculus is no longer the same on the two sides of the Atlantic. As the US prompts European allies to spend more on defence, the question becomes: Why do European countries spend more on an alliance with a global outreach rather than tailor it to European needs? Some argue that in order to maintain transatlantic cooperation, European countries are the ones who should change tracks and become more concerned with the Indo-Pacific region.38 The London summit of representatives of NATO countries in early December showed clearly yet another spectacular novelty in transatlantic relations: the Americans are not only talking to the alliance as a whole but have their own specific bilateral messages as well. In London, President Trump raised the questions of trade, digital security, Iran, and many others alongside the multilateral interests of the organisation. Tensions have their ups and downs, but they have shifted from a US–European tension over NATO to that of tensions between the US and individual countries.39 This is good from the alliance’s point of view, as it seems that most outstanding points of divisions have been solved during the dense years of 2017–2018.

Yet another region the US pays a lot of attention is the Middle East.

From Libya to Afghanistan, the Americans have interests that had evolved in the decades of the 20s century. Now, the previously cemented views and concepts are fermenting. First, the Cold War imperative of keeping Russia away from the warm waters of the Mediterranean seems to be

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37 Mapping the Global Future. Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020. National Intelligence Council, NIC 2004-13. 2004/December. <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ Global%20Trends_Mapping%20the%20Global%20Future%202020%20Project.pdf > Accessed: 15 December 2019.

38 Helena Legarda–Meia Nouwens: NATO Needs a China Policy. The Diplomat. 18 July 2019. <https:// thediplomat.com/2019/07/nato-needs-a-china-policy/ > Accessed: 15 December 2019.

39 Ryan Heath: Breaking down Trump’s post-NATO hot spots. Politico. 5 December 2019. <https://www. politico.com/news/2019/12/05/trump-nato-break-down-075688 > Accessed: 15 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E over with Turkey—by the way, a major NATO ally—insisting on Russian rocket systems to be deployed in its territory.40 Second, the US seems to abandon the so-called Carter Doctrine, which put energy supplies and connected private property to the forefront of US security concerns in the Gulf region. The Trump Administration has been using “maximum pressure” against Iran in the nuclear issue and the sanction, while it has repeatedly proved lukewarm to make countermeasures against illegitimate Iranian actions on oil tankers in the course of the summer.

Moreover, the American government expressly said it would not take action until American citizens or property was harmed. This attitude, in fact, is the abandonment of the Carter Doctrine that ignites legitimate fear in many of the US’s key allies.41 In the meantime, those US allies— having realised the lack of American resolve in the region—are now eying Israel and individual American weapons acquisitions to anchor US presence in the region.42 Similar conclusions can be drawn from the Saudi and Emirates backing of Trump’s Middle East peace plan, the “deal of the century.” Though it is still not seen where the money would come from for that plan, it is now widely accepted in the Gulf region— albeit not in Palestine itself.43 In sum, political allegiances show minor shifts due to American policies: the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel close up, powerful Arab countries are increasingly out of touch with the Palestine issue, and the US is unwilling to commit itself to the region militarily—though not economically.

One of the key changes in American foreign policy in 2019 was President Trump’s complete takeover of it. The concurrent lobbying groups, factions, think tanks, power groups still exist, but there is now one-door decision-making that is President Trump.44 With its curious contradictions, sudden volte-face movements, and radical ruptures with earlier practices, this new American foreign policy is now evolved and is not likely to show signs of major changes for 2020. In fact, the Americans

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40 Ayla Jean Yackley: Turkey remains determined to keep Russian missiles. Al-Monitor. 18 November 2019. <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/11/turkey-determined-keep-russian-missiles.html > Accessed: 15 December 2019.

41 Hal Brands, Steven A. Cook, and Kenneth M. Pollack: RIP the Carter Doctrine, 1980–2019. Foreign Policy. 13 December 2019. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/15/carter-doctrine-rip-donaldtrump-mideast-oil-big-think/ > Accessed: 15 December 2019.

42 Alexander Griffing: On Trump and Iran, the UAE Shifts Strategy — and Israel Should Take Heed. Haaretz. 21 August 2019. <https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/.premium-israel-uae-trump-iran-1.7724525 > Accessed: 15 December 2019.

43 UAE proposes to host next ‘deal of century’ meeting. Middle East Monitor. 29 July 2019. <https:// www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190729-usae-proposes-to-host-next-deal-of-centurymeeting/ > Accessed: 15 December 2019.

44 Mark Leonard–Jeremy Shapiro: Top ten foreign policy trends in 2019. European Council on Foreign Relations. 3 January 2019. <https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_top_ten_foreign_ policy_trends_in_2019 > Accessed: 15 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E are now content with how things are in most of the conflicted zones.

They do not have to deploy a large number of troops in the Middle East, though they did not leave Iraq or Northern Syria, either. The de facto delineation of spheres of influence between them and the Russians will last for the year unless local players tip the balance. Old allies—Japan, Korea, Gulf states, NATO, Australia—are expected to pay more for their defence, while their political commitment is pretty much secured. Russia has gained benefits in the Mediterranean but not expected to go any further beyond and is now making compromises in the Ukraine crisis as well. Remaining regions like Latin America and Africa do not draw too much attention in Washington D.C. It is obvious, for virtually no countermeasure was taken against Chinese influence in Africa and the fact that the US has so far been unable to take down the hated Maduro regime in Venezuela. Being unable here means a lack of attention.

This outlook, starting from US demographics and elections to US policies in the different regions, point to the very same conclusions everywhere. 2020 is expected to be a calmer year than the previous one, with some of the outstanding issues reaching a rest, though not a dénouement. Most involved parties are content with those situations, especially that major powers face domestic issues—protests in China, energy security in the Gulf, economic struggles in Russia, elections in the US, forming of a new leadership in Europe. These temporary balances are, however, fragile and nations who are not happy with this mini-status quo (such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Korea, the Kurds, etc.) may plan something for 2020 to upend the balance and draw the US once again decisively to their own side.

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Latin America Wave upon wave, but who is riding the next one?

Zsombor Szabolcs Pál The year of 2019 defied anyone who might have thought that Latin America is an unexciting backyard with no great surprises and left many questions unanswered for 2020.

Politically, one of the most covered events worldwide was probably the lingering issue of Venezuela. Although this January, many thought that the regime’s days were numbered, Maduro appeared ready to prove

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E them wrong, once again showing Chavizmo’s hardiness to the world.

Now, the posers for next year are many, but maybe the most important is whether Maduro can ride out yet another year in his office. An interesting interlude might be the 2020 parliamentary election, which can give Juan Guaidó, Maduro’s main contender and the internationally recognised leader of the opposition, a new chance to break the stalemate. However, it may also create an opportunity for the government to reoccupy the congress it lost in 2015. Venezuela can also be crucial for Trump during its re-election campaign because of the Latino votes,45 so power games between the US, China, and Russia are likely to keep going in and around the country. Part of the regional changes may also work in favour of the present executive, as, now, after Mexico, Argentina may also want to tone down his country’s posture towards Venezuela.46 Meanwhile, with Evo Morales, another (ex-)old guard of the Latin American Left, ousted, Maduro can stand to lose a valuable ally.

Another high-profile matter was the somewhat controversial Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s first year in office. Much as he was promising “a conservative revolution,”47 he is yet to realise the most essential points of his programme, since he is notoriously bad—or unwilling—to build support or forge a viable platform in the congress. Recent polls show that 50% of respondents disapprove the way the President governs the country, up from 40% in April, and 37% has a positive outlook for the rest of the present government.48 Although these figures show negative tendencies for the President, they also reveal that Bolsonaro still has a considerable hardcore base. Now, through that prism, the question is whether he is choosing to tame his rhetoric next year to open up or decide in favour of a different strategy and continues to play to its own camp. It will be equally intriguing to see whether the freshly released Lula da Silva, who was the favourite during the campaign last year until its incarceration, can lend some dynamism to the Brazilian politics in 2020.

Speaking of dynamism, it is the last thing that avoided the region towards the end of this year. As it is usual to talk about long-term Latin American political processes calling them waves, many people try to forecast the

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45 Carlos Alberto Montaner: Venezuela es clave para Trump en las elecciones 2020. El Nuevo Herald.

13 September 2019. <https://www.elnuevoherald.com/opinion-es/opin-col-blogs/carlos-albertomontaner/article235065077.html > Accessed: 30 November 2019.

46 Benjamín Tripier: Alberto Fernández, Venezuela y el fiel de la balanza. Infobae. 27 Noviembre 2019. <https://www.infobae.com/opinion/2019/11/27/alberto-fernandez-venezuela-y-el-fiel-de-labalanza/ > Accessed: 30 November 2019.

47 Jorge Almeida Fernandez: Bolsonaro ensaia a sua “revolução conservadora.” Público. 31 December 2018. <https://www.publico.pt/2018/12/31/mundo/noticia/bolsonaro-ensaia-revolucaoconservadora-1856272 > Accessed: 30 November 2019.

48 CNI IBOPE: Aprovação da maneira de governar do Presidente. Twitter. 25 September 2019. <https://twitter.com/CNI_br/status/1176934181382832128 > Accessed: 30 November 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E nature of the tide the subcontinent has to weather nowadays and during the months to come. Until last year, the narrative gaining ground was that, after the so-called Leftish pink tide, there was a new, conservative tide emerging—a process topped off by the election of Jair Bolsonaro.49 It is hard to decide whether or not this year corroborates this conjecture. On the one hand, Evo Morales’ dethronement can be classified as a part of this process—although there have been no elections until this point, so we are yet to know where these processes will culminate—while, on the other hand, Alberto Fernández’s victory in Argentina, or, for that matter, Claudia Lopez’s victory in Bogotá, may usher in a slightly reversed trend. Some of the protests that this autumn saw, e.g., the one in Chile, might also indicate the slowly evaporating allure of the Right. Anyway, these are all questions analysts are likely to chew on in 2020, along with a number of other matters, such as whether the heavy involvement of national armies in resolving political problems and social convulsions means the remilitarisation of Latin American politics,50 or if recent political events can be seen as harbingers of a relatively new regional idiosyncrasy: evangelicals making their inroads into (Latin) American politics,51 a phenomenon that could also be observed during the Bolivian turmoil.52 Economically, prognoses say that recuperation might continue but only inchmeal, beset by several external and internal problems.53 In Brazil, as the final version of the pension reform was finally passed, other reform plans, such as tax cuts and privatisations, are likely to bear upon next year’s expectations and future economic figures. In Argentina, the direction the new President and its government takes will probably influence the country’s economic output, just as in Mexico, where the President has already introduced several controversial reforms.54

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49 Jose Ospina-Valencia: Is there a right-wing surge in South America? Deutsche Welle. 28 October 2018. <https://www.dw.com/en/is-there-a-right-wing-surge-in-south-america/a-45874897 > Accessed: 1 December 2019.

Javier Corrales: Latin America Risks Becoming the Land of Militarized Democracies. Americas Quarterly. 24 October 2019. <https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/latin-america-risksbecoming-land-militarized-democracies > Accessed: 1 December 2019.

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51 Jean-Jacques Kourliandsky: Democracia, evangelismo y reacción conservadora. Nueva Sociedad.

2019/April–March. 139–147.

Claudia Zilla: Evangelicals and Politics in Latin America. Religious Switching and Its Growing Political Relevance. SWP Comment. 2018/October. <https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/ contents/products/comments/2018C46_Zll.pdf > Accessed: 1 November 2019.

52 Nathalia Passarinho: Por que igrejas evangélicas ganharam tanto peso na política da América Latina? Especialista aponta 5 fatores. BBC. 22 November 2019. <https://www.bbc.com/ portuguese/brasil-50462031 > Accessed: 1 December 2019.

53 Alejandro Werner: Perspectivas para América Latina y el Caribe: Una recuperación atascada.

Diálogo a fondo. 29 July 2019. <https://blog-dialogoafondo.imf.org/?p=11686 > Accessed: 1 December 2019.

54 Soledad Loaeza: El proyecto de AMLO es muy ambicioso. Por eso es inquietante. The Washington Post. 27 August 2019. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/es/post-opinion/2019/08/28/amlo-yla-promesa-de-la-transformacin/?arc404=true > Accessed: 3 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E In the meantime, this year saw two significant trade agreements concluded. One between Mercosur and the European Union, which is the second greatest trade agreement in terms of GDP, and might have serious repercussions in Latin America. Still, we are yet to see whether these will be negative or positive, as the ratification process can take even years. Next year, however, it will turn out how fast and seamlessly enactment is advancing in the different member states involved on both sides of the Atlantic, especially as Brazil comes under extensive criticism from some European actors.55 There are also odds that the Mercosur itself can become paralysed, undermining the viability of the project, as President Bolsonaro expressed his strong disapproval of the new Argentine President, threatening to either isolate his Eastern neighbour within the trade block56 or exit the common market.57 Besides the Mercosur–EU deal, there is another significant trade agreement waiting for ratification, the so-called USMCA between the US, Mexico, and Canada, which can fall prey to political wrestling, especially in the US: it is going to be increasingly difficult to pass it during the presidential campaign if ratification does not occur this year.58 Mexico, in fact, has already formalised the agreement and calls for a fast ratification in its northern neighbours,59 probably because this deal is essential to bring stability to the country’s economy and have revenues to carry on with the President’s blueprint for reforms.

What the US does, of course, has yet another way to hit hard the region’s economy. It has become a trite comment in recent times, but the trade war raging between the country and China can impact every corner of the globe, and, thus, the subcontinent, too. In the short term, Latin American states can profit from redoubled demand from China for agricultural products, but, in the long run, they can easily find themselves trapped between their two top trade and investment partners. Overall, a global recession in the wake of a dragging trade fight

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55 Rym Momtaz – Jakob Hanke: Macron opposes Mercosur deal over Bolsonaro forest ‘lie’. Politico. eu. 23 August 2019. <https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-opposes-mercosur-deal-overbolsonaro-forest-lie/ > Accessed: 2 December 2019.

56 Assis Moreira: Bolsonaro ameaça isolar a Argentina do Mercosul se peronismo ganhar no domingo.

O Globo. 12 October 2019. <https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/bolsonaro-ameaca-isolar-argentinado-mercosul-se-peronismo-ganhar-no-domingo-24036020 > Accessed: 2 December 2019.

57 ‘Tudo pode acontecer’, diz Bolsonaro sobre saída do Mercosul. Veja. 25 November 2019. <https:// veja.abril.com.br/politica/tudo-pode-acontecer-diz-bolsonaro-sobre-saida-do-mercosul/ > Accessed: 2 December 2019.

58 Jacob Pramuk – Kayla Tausche: The window to pass Trump’s USMCA trade deal is getting smaller as 2020 approaches. CNBC. 13 November 2019. <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/13/house-considersusmca-trumps-nafta-replacement-ahead-of-2020-election.html > Accessed: 2 December 2019.

59 AMLO urges U.S. approval of USMCA. El Universal. 11 October 2019. <https://www.eluniversal. com.mx/english/amlo-urges-us-approval-usmca > Accessed: 3 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E might upset the commodity price–sensitive Latin American markets.60 The duel between the two great powers can also infiltrate the region geopolitically. As the US appears to have lost its interest in Latin America, or, at least, the region is not high on its political agenda,61 and principally concentrates on migration- and drug-related issues, China—and, partly, Russia as well—is making inroads into Latin America.62 While the US always asks for reforms and sets out conditions, China does not have too many prerequisites, if any, and pulls into its orbit a growing number of regional actors even through its Belt and Road Initiative.63 From this perspective, it will be important to see whether the present or a future US administration will have plans to roll back Chinese advance in its vicinity and resuscitate the good old Monroe Doctrine. Latin American nations have the opportunity to turn this contest and the coming years to their good advantage and profit from it—but they can also easily blow this chance and lose out.

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60 Otaviano Anuto: Latin America Is Not Benefiting from the U.S.–China Trade War. Americas Quarterly. 16 September 2019. <https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/latin-america-notbenefiting-us-china-trade-war > Accessed: 2 December 2019.

61 Detlef Nolte: Trump und Lateinamerika: Zwischen Monroe-Doktrin und Nichtbeachtung. GIGA Focus, Lateinamerika. 2018/May. <https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/ gf_lateinamerika_1803_de.pdf > Accessed: 2 December 2019.

62 Alex Horton: Trump soured relations in Latin America. China and Russia have welcomed the chaos. The Washington Post. 20 April 2019. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/2019/04/20/trump-soured-relations-latin-america-china-russia-have-welcomedchaaos/ > Accessed: 2 December 2019.

63 Andrés Bermúdez Liévano: China’s Belt and Road advances in Latin America’s Andean region.

Diálogo Chino. 18 June 2019. <https://dialogochino.net/28021-chinas-belt-and-road-advances-inlatin-americas-andean-region/ > Accessed: 2 December 2019.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E THE MIDDLE EAST The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Ádám Éva In 2019, the MENA remained to be the most dynamic region of the world in terms of the growing number of political upheavals and the escalation of military conflicts. The events at hand all do have serious implications for the other regions of the world but primarily for the European security environment.

The bloody civil war in Yemen—in which the US and EU member states got into a controversial position due to their arms sales to the warring parties, while they condemned humanitarian effects of the war—has been going on for fifth consecutive years now. However, contrary to the previous ones, this year, the involved parties have exhibited more willingness to find a political solution to the conflict, which has been manifested in an agreement between the Hadi government and Southern separatists on the one hand, and the release of hundreds of Houthi prisoners from Saudi detention on the other. The United Nations is trying to restart political negotiations that might end the conflict next year at the earliest. The breakthrough in Yemen came after a year of heavy military pressure put

by Iran and its proxies on Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. First, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) navy seized oil tankers at the Strait of Hormuz, effectively blocking the oil trade route between the Arab Gulf states and export destinations. Second, Iranian proxies in Yemen launched multiple successful air strikes against Saudi oil industry facilities. These blows severely injured both the infrastructure and economies of the Gulf states. Qatar, on the other hand, has remained resilient, due to its partnership with Turkey and Iran, and, eventually, the Saudi-led coalition seems to backtrack from their firm position on Qatar.

A détente might be reached between Saudi Arabia and Qatar that might end the three-year-long economic blockade against the tiny monarchy.

In the Syrian conflicts, we also have witnessed some turning points this year. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led coalition of multi-ethnic militias, has waged a final and decisive battle against Daesh forces in Baghuz. The terrorist organisation thus lost most of its territories, and, then, it was also decapitated when US forces eliminated Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the head of the organisation, in his hideout at the Syrian–Turkish border. Next year, we shall see whether Daesh’s new leadership will be able to revitalise the movement and regain territories

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E in Syria, Iraq, or in other parts of the MENA region. On the other hand, we need to expect retaliation from the movement’s European networks and followers. As the Syrian regime is waging its final war in a very limited area in the Idlib province against the last remnants of opposition forces, and the Russian and Turkish militaries are patrolling much of Syria’s territories, a military and political solution of the Syrian conflicts is approaching. We need to see whether the US will have a role in defining the future of regional trajectories, or it will be solely Russia, Turkey, and Iran that will define the situation on the ground. It is a matter of fact now that the US lost its hegemonic position in the region and was swiftly replaced by Russia.

While the US struggled to take the right position in the Yemeni and Syrian conflicts, it took a firm position on the Palestinian issue. The US administration put pressure on the Palestinians by cutting all aid to them in the occupied West Bank and Gaza, and, at the same time, the administration invented a peace initiative, which offered financial opportunities in place of territorial losses, practically ignoring previous UN resolutions in the issue. Not surprisingly, the “deal of the century” did not enjoy wide popularity in the Arab countries, and it was also widely criticised by European states. The US-propagated Warsaw and Manama summits failed to assemble the right political groups that have the real stakes in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict.

2019 was also the year of a second wave of political upheavals in Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran. The popular movements in these countries, except in Iran, have mostly protested the old political regimes and their corrupt practices that hinder positive economic progress.

While the Algerian president resigned, Soudan’s leader was detained by the army and will face trials. Lebanon’s and Iraq’s governments addressed the issues by essentially offering new elections and a cabinet reshuffle, which might fail to deliver the anticipated reforms. The exception is Iran, where riots erupted in the countryside against a radical raise in oil prices, which had been planned by the government for a long time. The Iranian government has answered with mass detentions, shutting down the internet in the country, eventually dispersing the riots.

While it is early to predict the outcome of these political upheavals, it is easy to see how volatile the whole region has become this year. The MENA is a region where domestic discontent always immediately has its transnational and regional effects, as we saw it clearly after the Arab Spring. In the Gulf, we experienced the transborder effect of the Yemeni Civil War and Iran’s assertiveness in the Strait of Hormuz. In the Levant, the Daesh’s transborder activities in Iraq and Syria could only be halted

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E through international effort. Last but not least, the ongoing Libyan military conflict between the parallel governments has both international causes and effects, affecting Maghreb countries as well. The growing volatility of the MENA region does not only raise the number of security risks facing Europe, but it also requires more assertiveness and a firm position on the many issues ahead of our continent. The outcome of the problems facing the MENA will be greatly affected by what position the EU, NATO, and the United Nations will dare to take.

Turkey Tamás Kozma It is without a doubt that the year 2019 has been considerably eventful from a Turkish foreign policy perspective. Due to length constraints, this summary cannot provide a fully inclusive picture about all significant events facing Turkey in 2019; however, it seeks to point out three selected topics of key relevance, such as Turkey’s Syria policy, Turkey– NATO relations, and, given the AJKC’s institutional background, recent developments in Turkish–Hungarian bilateral ties.

In accordance with the trends of the past couple of years, Turkey’s leadership continued to keep Syria a top priority on the country’s foreign policy agenda in 2019. One should not lose sight of the very fact that, from a Turkish perspective, the Syrian conflict is strongly intertwined with Turkey’s most pressing domestic security issue, the Kurdish insurgency, which clearly marks the importance of Syria for Turkey. 2019 was an important turning point in this regard, since US President Donald Trump’s decision in early October to withdrew US troops from northeastern Syria gave de facto green light to Turkey’s military intervention, called Peace Spring Operation. The main objective of the operation that commenced on 9 October 2019 was to push the Kurdish forces considered as terrorist by Ankara back from the border region deeper inside Syria, and, thus, to create a security zone that physically divides the Kurds and their militias on the two sides of the Turkish–Syrian border. This goal has practically been achieved, with the sole exception that Turkey’s original plan was to free a wider territory from the forces that are viewed as a direct threat from a Turkish perspective. Ankara has received sharp criticism from many countries for launching the short-lived operation, which was closed by ceasefire agreements between Turkey and the

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E US and between Turkey and Russia a bit more than one week after the operation started. The operation unquestionably signalised that Turkey was strongly determined to prevent Kurdish militias on both sides of the border from being too close to each other, since this could obviously increase the chances of their interactions and significantly affect the security of the border regions. In a broader context, Turkey’s 2019 intervention in Syria—which was not the first one—was yet another major step that confirmed that the settlement of the Syrian conflict cannot be imagined without Turkey as a key player, especially in the light of the power vacuum that follows the US troops’ withdrawal.

With regard to Turkey’s relations with NATO, Turkey is inevitably a strategic actor in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, but, besides keeping its role in NATO, Ankara is aiming to increase its elbow room continuously. As an example, one can think about Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 air missile defence system from Russia, which was based on a contract signed back in 2017, with actual deliveries starting in 2019.

Since this Turkish–Russian defence cooperation is widely considered as a worrisome development that can undermine the unity of NATO, the US suspended Turkey’s partnership in the F-35 development programme as a reaction. Although the latter step was meant to put Turkey under pressure, official communication of Turkey’s leadership has repeatedly confirmed that Ankara is not willing to step back from putting its recently purchased Russian missile technology into operation. This strategic decision is further polarising NATO, and, if both of the parties refuse to yield, and Turkey will be left out of the F-35 development programme, the countries increasing alliance-seeking endeavours outside NATO can gain additional momentum, which could further widen the existing fault lines between Turkey and its traditional partners in the West. In addition to the above, Turkey previously warned NATO that it would block the alliance’s defence plans for the Baltic region and Poland in case NATO would not designate Kurdish YPG as a terrorist organisation. According to the latest news reports from the recent NATO Summit in Watford, Turkey back down from imposing conditions for backing the plan but asked for support for its fight against terrorist organisations. This matter underlines again that Turkey will not miss any single opportunity to improve or benefit from its bargaining position.

In spite of the fact that there are non-negligible tensions in Turkey’s relations with the Euro-Atlantic community, bilateral relations between Turkey and Hungary are exceptionally cordial, and cooperation has continued in multiple fields throughout 2019. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Budapest on 7 November 2019 provided the parties

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E with the opportunity to discuss the most important points of common interests. These included issues related to security and migration, energy security cooperation, as well as a common understanding on the necessity of increasing trade volumes. During the visit, altogether ten agreements were inked by the parties on various fields. Besides, it is also worthwhile to mention that Hungary’s observer status in the Turkic Council since 2018 and the inauguration of the Council’s representative office in Budapest in September 2019 can create another permanent platform for structured dialogue and further grounds for cooperation between the two countries, and also between Hungary and the broader Turkic world. Amid the country’s uncertain and rather fading EU integration chances and the burdensome issues in its overall EU relations, it is of vital importance for Turkey to maintain substantial relations with the individual member states. And Hungary is definitely a country that can offer cooperation in a positive atmosphere in political, economic, and cultural terms.

Israel Zsolt Csepregi

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In 2019, Israel underwent an unprecedented domestic political crisis, as two parliamentary elections (in April and September) were incapable of providing a viable governing coalition for the country. Both Benjamin Netanyahu, the Incumbent Prime Minister heading a narrow alliance of right-wing and religious parties, and his contender, Benny Gantz, leading the centrist-leftist bloc, lack sufficient support to form a government. The two major parties did also not manage to form a national unity government, which seemed to be the only viable option to stabilise the political situation.

Israeli citizens are expected to head to the polls again on 2 March 2020.

The next elections will be complicated by the fact that Netanyahu was indicted on three separate corruption cases in December, which shook his leadership position in Likud, currently the largest party in the Israeli Parliament. Electoral machinations aside, the current political turbulence is a peaceful and democratic manifestation of greater societal crossroads Israel is facing, as it is growing into a mature middle-sized power, affecting the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond. While the country has a largely successful and healthy economy, demographic structure, and military prowess, it has to cope with redefining itself as a Jewish and democratic

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E country. The two political blocs give widely different answers to what this shift would mean in practice. Netanyahu is leading a coalition which sides with a more orthodox interpretation of what the Jewish character of the state means, while Gantz’s group, which is led by five of Israel’s former highest-ranking army generals, is naturally promoting a more secular, inclusive, and civic-based understanding of “Israeliness.” The outcome of the political struggle for the nature of Israel will define it as an established middle power in the world for the decades to come.

The three major developments for Israeli foreign and security policy were its proxy war with Iran in Lebanon and Syria, which, this year, is also extending over Iraq, the Gaza front, and the US–Israeli relationship.

Against Iranian forces, Israel is conducting a long and, compared to previous years, a more visible and publicised air campaign, aiming to roll back its military presence in Syria and Lebanon and focusing on advanced ballistic missiles and elite troops potentially threatening Israel’s hold over the Golan Heights.

In 2020, Israel is expected to continue its campaign against Iranian and allied military assets, but it will leave the handling of the more complex issue of the Iranian nuclear programme to its US and European allies—at least until the last minute Israel believes the development of an Iranian nuclear warhead can be stopped through force. Instead, it will concentrate on the immediate threat in Syria and Lebanon. We expect further disagreements arising between the Israeli political elite and the military leadership, as the former uses the armed struggle against Iranian ambitions as an electoral campaign message, while the army publicly argues for a more ambiguous stance regarding these attacks.

Vis-à-vis Gaza, Israel and Hamas are in the process of reaching an understanding with Egyptian mediation on a five-year truce, while the recent missile attacks by the more radical Gazan terrorist group, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, are spoiler moves. Reaching an understanding is in the interest of both parties; however, both the Israeli and the Hamas leadership will remain vigilant during the negotiations, which means spoiling attempts by other actors will potentially cause further escalation, potentially an all-out war before the elections in March 2020.

Finally, the overall Israeli position in the international arena has never been stronger since the Oslo process in the 1990s, as it has stable and developing relations with the US, the European nations, Russia, China, India, and the Sunni Arab states. Due to the elections in Israel and the US, we expect further debates on the necessity of a mutual defence treaty with the US, which is used as a campaign tool by Netanyahu, while opposed by the Israeli armed forces, because it supports maximum

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A N TA L L J Ă&#x201C; Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E flexibility in Israeli war-making capability and decision-making.

On the US side, the outcome of the presidential elections may result in an anti-Israel Democratic candidate, which alarms Israeli strategic thinkers.

Furthermore, the rift is widening between the liberal-leaning US Jewish community and the current Israeli leadership, with debates focusing on the Jewish nature of the state. The continued rule of Netanyahu projects a deteriorating relationship between the two strongest bastions of world Jewry, while the election of the centrist camp led by Gantz would lead to a broader alignment between the home country and the most populous and powerful group in the Jewish diaspora.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E ASIA China Orsolya Talárovich By 2019, China became a superpower, mainly because of its massive population, prosperous economy, and powerful military. Since 2010, China has been the world’s second-largest economy by nominal GDP and, since 2014, the largest economy in the world by purchasing power parity (PPP). The country is also the world’s largest exporter and second-largest importer of goods. China is a recognised nuclear weapons state and has the world’s largest standing army, the People’s Liberation Army, and the second-largest defence budget.

The year 2019 was of special significance for the country. 4 June marked the 30th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests.

Internationally and domestically, several organisations remembered the protests with different events. The 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, as well as the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and seven Central and Eastern European countries, including Hungary, was on 1 October.

This occasion was celebrated with a series of ceremonial events, including a grand military parade. In addition to these two meaningful historical anniversaries, many negative and positive events took place, which will have an impact on the country’s future.

At the beginning of January, China’s Chang’e-4 probe touched down on the far side of the Moon, becoming the first spacecraft soft-landing on its uncharted side never visible from Earth. During spring, the country suffered from several disasters. On 21 March, 78 people reportedly died and more than 600 people injured in an explosion at the Jiangsu Tianjiayi Chemical plant in Xiangshui county, Eastern China. A few days later, in Muli County, in the Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture, a forest fire caused 31 deaths.

2019’s annual plenary sessions were relatively unexciting. Premier Li Keqiang announced that foreign businesses would be treated equally to domestic competitors and GDP growth target for 2019 would be decreased to 6%-6.5%. He had a lot to say on the state of the domestic economy, which is slowing. The two key policy changes introduced were the reduction of China’s VAT rates and the approval of the new Foreign Investment Law. From an economic point of view, the most crucial issue concerning China is still the ongoing economic conflict, the so-called trade war, with

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E the United States. Since 2018, the world’s two largest economies have imposed tariffs on billions of dollars’ worth of one another’s goods. So far, the US has slapped tariffs on USD 550 billion worth of Chinese products.

China, in turn, has set tariffs on USD 185 billion worth of US goods.

US President Donald Trump has long accused China of unfair trading practices and intellectual property theft. Conversely, China claims that the US is trying to curb its rise.

On 7 January, official delegations from the US and China began trade talks in Beijing—the first face-to-face meeting since agreeing to a 90-day truce. On May 5, Donald Trump said that the US would increase tariffs on USD 200 billion worth of Chinese products from 10% to 25%, effective on 10 May. In response to this, China announced that it would increase tariffs on USD 60 billion worth of US goods from 1 June. On 20 May, as a very harsh consequence of this trade conflict, Alphabet Inc.’s Google suspended business with Huawei that requires the transfer of hardware, software, and technical services, except those publicly available via open source licensing. The move can hobble Huawei’s smartphone business outside China, as soon as the tech giant lose access to updates to Google’s Android operating system. In summary, the US–China trade negotiations are still ongoing and have proven difficult. The two sides remain far apart on issues including how to roll back tariffs and enforce a deal.

From a political point of view, the most significant issue is the 2019 Hong Kong protests, also known as the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill movement, which have started on 15 March and turned into a largescale walkout on 9 June. Those early protests have since evolved into calls for broader political freedom and a demand that Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam resign. The latest in a series of anti-government protests was on 8 December. This action effectively took place on the six-month anniversary of the public protest.

There is no doubt that China has never looked as strong as it does today, and its economic influence is massive. Nevertheless, to be a true superpower, it must wield global influence in many varied spheres: economics, science and technology, military matters, and soft power.

Moreover, the country has to solve a number of emerging problems, such as the mass protests in Hong Kong, the rising pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan, the escalating rivalry and trade war between China and the US, because each of these issues holds the threat of derailing China’s development.

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E Japan Emese Schwarcz 2019 was a turbulent year for Japan in several different policy areas.

Essential domestic events took place, such as the abdication of Emperor Akihito, the enthronement of his son, Crown Prince Naruhito, and, thus, the start of a new era for Japan, as well as the Upper House elections in the summer, all of which influenced the perception of the country in the East Asian region.

In foreign policy, however, there were two important regional happenings that were surprisingly all related to the Republic of Korea (ROK) in multiple aspects. Firstly, the Government of Japan announced on 1 July that it would remove the ROK from its trade “white list” of three chemical materials essential for making semiconductors, which are indispensable for the Korean high-tech industry. The most important material out of the three is hydrogen fluoride, as it is a dual-use chemical, otherwise used for uranium enrichment and producing deathly sarin gas. This latter one is especially sensitive for Japan, since the sarin gas attacks in the Tōkyō metro in the 1990s left a considerable scar in the collective memory of the Japanese. For this reason, and because of data from Korean export statistics suggesting that these materials have been smuggled into North Korea on multiple occasions, the Japanese government cited a national security risk as a reason for tightening export control. Due to this decision, the Korean government retaliated by removing Japan from its own trade white list in general while the Korean society introduced an all-inclusive boycott of Japanese import products, let it be beer, clothing, or cosmetics, and many cancelled their trip to Japan as well. The Korean side assumed that the Japanese leadership was unhappy about the Korean Supreme Court rulings against Japanese corporations (such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Nippon Steel) on the case of Korean citizens forced into wartime slave forced labour during WWII. The Abe government gainsaid the assumption, but, alas, relations between the two countries have deteriorated considerably, and unfortunately not only trade-wise.

The second retaliation came on 22 August, when the ROK handed in its three months’ notice of withdrawal from the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), a trilateral military intelligence–sharing system set up by the United States, Japan, and the ROK. The grounds for opting out is that, if Japan lost trust in the Moon

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E administration in trade matters, a military alliance is completely pointless.

The feedback from the US leadership was serious. General Mark Milley, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, was dispatched immediately to hold high-level consultations with Tōkyō and Seoul, throughout which he reportedly mostly tried to discourage Seoul from departing from the GSOMIA. To maximise pressure on the ROK, three other key officials— among them the State Department diplomat responsible for Japan and the ROK—also set out to negotiate with the South Korean leadership. The discussions were successful, as President Moon withdrew his resolution and decided to uphold the agreement under the criterion that he can withdraw the ROK’s membership at any point.

The possibility of a deteriorated military alliance between Japan, the ROK, and the US shaken up other regional actors as well, for a weakened US presence would surely strengthen China and North Korea. The prospects of an escalating conflict between an already problematic couple is worrying, especially if we consider that the GSOMIA came to existence exactly because of anxieties about North Korea and its growing military capacities. The fact that the alliance was spared does not ensure that it is stable though. Even if the ROK intended the withdrawal as a bluff, the US will not be lenient to allow risking a crucial military intelligence pact for the sake of bilateral disputes. That is why it is unlikely that the US will mediate between Japan and the ROK, for the core problem seems to be an issue of sovereignty. Therefore, the two countries have to work the problem out themselves—even if the road seems bumpy at this point, the daunting geopolitical and trade consequences might inspire the two leaderships to seek a compromise.

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Southeast Asia Viktória Anna Papp Southeast Asia is not only a part of, but it is at the heart of the Indo-Pacific.

It is home to almost 650 million people representing a huge market, and its contribution to the global economy is growing faster than that of any other regions. 2019 has definitely brought some interesting developments for the region and its primary IGO, the ASEAN. In the wider context of calls for managing climate change internationally, the return of the annual Southeast Asian haze was bitter as ever, demonstrating the domestic reluctance to find effective solutions and the difficulty of ASEAN countries tackling crucial issues

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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E together. It was put in a very special, ironic perspective by the fact that the organisation’s theme this year was “Advancing Partnership for Sustainability” under the chairmanship of Thailand. Such challenges might be higher on the agenda of next year’s chair, Vietnam, which will also hold a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council in 2020.

In terms of great power engagement, the biannual ASEAN Summit held in Bangkok brought anything but diplomatic success for the member states, as two of their key allies, the US and India, failed to participate in the summit on the highest level. For the organisation, it was a clear sign of fading US interest, which certainly undermines previous diplomatic efforts, as well as a commitment to regional multilateralism, while providing more strategic space for China. Also, participating countries at the Summit failed to come to the end of RCEP negotiations; however, all states except India will continue with the legal processes necessary to sign a deal next year. On the other hand, the Moon Jae-in administration has stepped up its diplomacy with the region under the New Southern Policy and hosted the 2019 ASEAN–ROC Commemorative Summit— marking the 30th anniversary of the ASEAN–ROK relationship—and the first-ever Mekong–ROK Summit, signalling South Korean foreign policy priorities and the greater focus President Moon wishes to put on ASEAN and Southeast Asia.

On the sideline of the summit, during the Japan–ASEAN Defence Ministers meeting, the Japanese Defence Minister launched the Vientiane 2.0, which aims to strengthen ASEAN–Japan defence collaboration by ensuring the rule of law, enhancing maritime security, and offering cooperation in response to disasters. Updating the initiative clearly shows the increasingly important role Japan continues to play in the Asian security landscape.

As for the countries’ relations with China, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) continued to be the focal point this year as well. Although the region is in need of infrastructure development, given historic tensions—in some cases—and different foreign policy considerations, there is no united and common position on China’s initiative. Southeast Asian countries now find themselves in the midst of competing infrastructure and connectivity initiatives, such as the BRI, Japan’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure, or the United States’ International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC). In an effort to diversify funding sources, Indonesia, for example, decided to pick Japan over China as its partner to carry out a major infrastructure project, a rail link connecting Jakarta and Surabaya, as the BRI flagship project, the Jakarta–Bandung high-speed train line, has been facing difficulties. It is still an open-ended question

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H-1093 Budapest, 2 Czuczor Street | +3620 310 8776 | ajtk@ajtk.hu | www.ajtk.hu

A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E for the countries of Southeast Asia, how to utilise the resources offered by these initiatives whilst managing the geopolitical risks and balance between Tokyo, Beijing, and Washington, which remain top trading partners for most of them.As a result of the ongoing US–China trade conflict, regional economic growth reached its lowest level in the last five years, but, according to the OECD’s economic forecast, the GDP of ASEAN countries will continue to grow but at a slightly slower pace in the cases of Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Cambodia, Lao DPR, and Viet Nam. Despite the “synchronised slowdown” of the global economy, Southeast Asia will remain economically dynamic, but it will probably be a challenge to navigate the trade tensions between their key partners, China and the United States.

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H-1093 Budapest, 2 Czuczor Street | +3620 310 8776 | ajtk@ajtk.hu | www.ajtk.hu