CHALLENGES OF THE NEW MIDDLE EAST: US FOREIGN POLICY AFTER OBAMA DÁNIEL BÓZSA
AJRC-Analyses 2014A04
AJRC-Analyses Series of the Antall József Knowledge Centre
Publisher: Antall József Knowledge Centre Publisher-in-Chief: Péter Antall Managing editor: Ádám Éva Editorial office: Antall József Knowledge Centre H-1093 Budapest, Közraktár utca 4-6.
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© Dániel Bózsa, 2014 © Antall József Knowledge Centre, 2014 ISSN 2416-1705
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CHALLENGES OF THE NEW MIDDLE EAST: US FOREIGN POLICY AFTER OBAMA
Dániel Bózsa
Two years from now the United States of America will elect a new leader, who will be left with a Middle East not less problematic than the one Obama inherited when he entered office. Terrorism, civil-war, internal displacement, hundreds of thousands of refugees, the “biggest humanitarian crisis of our times” and the fragility of the entire region, are just few keywords that will still very much define the agenda. The core of Obama’s foreign policy towards the Middle East applied the principle of “less involvement” – which successfully achieved winding down American leadership and military presence, but failed to establish a more stable political environment in the region. Although the war in Iraq officially ended and the military presence in Afghanistan is about to conclude, it is still unclear whether, apart from reducing troop levels, Obama’s goals have been accomplished or not. Restoring peace in the region seems to be as far away as it was throughout the last decade, and the inability of current policies to offer a resolution leaves much to be desired. There are a growing number of voices in US politics demanding a withdrawal from the region, but they presumably will not be compelling enough - at least for this election - to facilitate an international approach that is even less involved, especially when fear of a new wave of terror attacks is prominent throughout the West. A government initiating neo-isolationism would face grossly different challenges throughout the world, assuming there will be one in the foreseeable future which is doubtful. All the same, the lack of progress, and the general disagreement with the effects of current policies both on the left and the right – not to mention the international community’s dissatisfaction – will most likely end up forcing the new government to adopt a more interventionist approach in the Middle East, regardless of how the Obama administration handles the situation in the remaining two years. The Islamic State The issue that most likely requires greater military involvement is the case of ISIS/ISIL. With increasing number of military advisors in Iraq, the idea of “no boots on the ground” cannot realistically be a basis for policy anymore, yet it is still the main rhetoric of government officials when assessing the success of preventive measures against the Islamic State. According to top military advisors, the complete elimination of the Terrorist State may require a ground offensive of 80,000 US troops with corresponding military funding, but the Obama administration cannot afford a commitment like that when the public’s opinion back home is still largely against 3
another war. More involvement is inevitable, however, even if the current idea of containing ISIS’ expansion with Iraqi and Kurdish ground troops with assistance from air succeeds, these ground troops will most likely be insufficient to retake the presently conquered parts of Iraq, let alone Syria. The air-campaign is already in need of additional personnel for a more effective target designation, so the slow trickling of troops back to Iraq is well underway. Depending on how the hostilities unfold and when the new administration takes over, it might not be such a controversial issue anymore to swell up the troop count – an option Obama does not have now. With the current rate, there will be thousands of operatives on the field by 2016. Unless US allies in the region – Saudi-Arabia and Turkey – can be persuaded to invest more in the conflict, the current war strategy – or the lack thereof – only provides the Iraqi army with the means of self-defense. It is something that might prevent ISIS’ further expansion but will most likely result in an entrenched fight that could last for years to come – much like in Syria. Some leaders of the terrorist state are already using the “blending in” method: assets have been withdrawn from the open and set up in high density civilian areas along with leadership. If ISIS is only fought back to the point of Guerilla warfare, it could mean another year-long extension of the Global War on Terror – which in the long run might be financially less desirable than an immediate expenditure, not to mention the moral consequences of letting yet another prolonged conflict holding back progress in a region and threatening international security. This administration’s noble cause of fixing the mistakes made by the previous one, by not committing themselves militarily in any case – other than air-support and aid – led to the proliferation of violence and the birth of a terrorist organization far worse than its predecessors were in the post 9/11 period. Despite the efforts, the country is being drawn into conflict anyway. Considering the military strengths of affected nations, it should be clear: if the US insists on staying a foreign policy oriented nation, the mistakes made in Iraq during the Bush era cannot be redeemed by anyone else. The long-term effects of the existence of ISIS and the actual threat it represents for the future are up for debate, but considering the response it precipitated from the allies of US as well as the society of the Middle East as a whole, taking appropriate action to hasten its defeat will be one of the key responsibilities of the next administration. Civil war in Syria Syria as the focal point of conflict and instability in the region is a more complex issue, one that is most likely impossible to solve with increased unilateral involvement. Tackling the fight between Al-Assad’s government and close to a thousand rival groups will be the characteristic “Middle Eastern” issue of the next administration’s foreign policy. Whereas ISIS, for the time being, is a mostly clear entity, its assets and infrastructure, which make it different from other terrorist organizations in that it can be located and destroyed, its command line severed, its economic gains thwarted, and its quasi-state demolished. Their interweaving system of the government, freedom fighters, terrorist organizations, and their relationship with other countries simply does not present a “removable object” to take care of. 4
These circumstances resulted in the only time Obama tried to give up on the non-interventionist policy of his, but the cold domestic reception led to a cessation of pushing for a military intervention and the effort concluded in a reported destruction of the country’s illegal chemical weapons. As it was no small feat, it hardly improved the situation. For many it is clear, in light of the genocidal events that have occurred and are occurring right now, that Assad’s regime cannot stay in power for long. If ISIS can be destroyed from Iraq and fought back to Syria, the next president should consider a path that offers a legitimate international option to enforce peace in the war-torn state. The answer could be the promotion of the current UN humanitarian mission into a military one. Firstly, the UN mission in Syria has considerable experience as a result of being present in the civil war for the last 3 years. Expertise in the difficult relations between the many fighting groups and nationalities as well as geographical knowledge and social familiarity are keys to facilitate an enduring stability, if peace were to be achieved. Secondly, while ISIS is not supported by an internationally substantial country the Assad government has close ties with Russia1, and his struggle is at the heart of sectarian conflict in Islam concerning many neighboring states. The clash of interests of many countries, some of which the US has difficult relations with, makes it nigh impossible to solve the crisis as a sole actor. Forming a coalition approved by the Security Council could mean that those states that have heavily invested in the conflict could get the most out of the situation, as they might have a say in the peace building process compared to a “conventional” US/NATO led intervention. That also means losing the least of those investments if they happen to end up supporting the side that eventually gets supplanted. Pressing an international agreement in the UN could also serve as a testing ground for the recently improved US–China relations as the latter state voiced its disapproval of ISIS on many occasions. If the US could get China to support a stabilization process outside of its sphere of interest, it could send a message to Russia, and might force it to break from the constant obstructionism it emanates, which, in this case, it does mainly for the financial gains from weapon exports to Syria. Lastly, a mission approved by the Security Council could offer less American involvement, although it most likely will still heavily depend on US military while still retaining great oversight, and partly relieve policymakers from two stress factors: 1. The increasing voices of disapproval with interventionism both domestically and overseas As mentioned before it is unlikely that this movement will have enough political credit to promote a complete turnaround of US foreign policy in two years, but if dramatic improvement of the image of the internationally responsible United States is not achieved, six or ten years from now it might. Many on the left (and some on the right) would feel an internationally led 1
http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2013/files/sipri-yearbook-2013-chapter-5-section-3
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mission a relief from “imperialism” and in turn could make them more supportive in cases where intervention is unavoidable, such as against ISIS.
2. The criticism of dishonest conduct the US employed in Syria in the first days of the Arab spring
The initial fumbling and amateur treatment of Assad and his government could make the US on the international stage appear as a beneficiary of the crisis, therefore a profiteer from its illconditioned settlement, if it were to do it alone – a notion that is prevalent in the rhetoric of both political and civilian disparagers of US power, despite the fact that the Obama administration tried to reconcile the early mistakes by cutting ties with the dictator Assad since. At a time when Russia is trying to justify its aggression in Ukraine by drawing parallels to US foreign involvement, taking the edge of these allegations is crucial if an international support capable of pacifying Syria is to be established - and with a UN approved coalition, this might have a higher chance to be accomplished. It should be unmistakable that Syria cannot be left at its current state much longer, as the humanitarian crisis it fuels is spreading further; most recently to Libya , and the chaos of the civil war’s destruction provides a safe haven for terrorist groups ready to take the place of those being fought today. At its current state a UN resolution is unlikely, but should the next administration choose the option to reinvigorate the institution from its 15 year-long hibernation; it may acquire integrity it never had during the second Iraqi war – something a successful US foreign policy is in need of when a new Cold War looms over Europe. Handling this issue correctly will set the tone of America’s role on the world stage for the next decade. Iran after the nuclear agreement Although, reacting to the emerging conflicts will always be the most essential part of Middle Eastern foreign policy for the foreseeable future, the next administration should also continue to be proactive in diplomatic approach to opportunities like the Iran nuclear deal. Undoubtedly, the Obama administration’s greatest international achievement was transforming the question of Iran’s nuclear power from the prevention of building a bomb by covert operations, to a treaty solution that aim to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thus, providing relief from sanctions, and making peaceful usage of nuclear energy Iran’s interest as well. Whether the current nuclear talks end in an agreement or not, the dialogue must continue as the chance for normalizing relations between the two nations has never been greater. The new leadership in Iran did an extraordinary job stabilizing the country and facilitating a change in the ranks of the Islamic hardliners for better governance and transparency. Under the presidency of Hassan Rouhani, there has been a great development in education, economy, and 6
secularization of the state. The willingness for limiting the country’s nuclear capabilities alone is a big message to the international community: Iran wants to be a partner, not a threat. The country could be a major stabilizing force in the Middle East provided the US is willing to go some lengths on giving up sanctions tailored for a much more oppressive regime. If connected back to world commerce, Iran can offer a potentially booming market as it is a domestically stable country like few in the region. Through its military and intelligence capabilities, it could be a strong ally in fight against terrorism throughout the Islam world which it already contributes to by taking on many fundamentalist groups in its neighborhood, albeit limitedly. By all means, the two sides still have plenty of obstacles to overcome. The steps Iran made in the early part of this decade to repair its international relations should be honored from the US side by not making the mistake of writing these reforms off as insignificant or insufficient, or letting some of its most influential allies like Israel or Saudi-Arabia be convinced of the same. If the dialogue continues and the two sides approach each other, these steps might turn out to be only the first ones in a broader reform. The upcoming president’s greatest achievement could be if he or she manages to connect Iran back to the circulation of world commerce and security, by holding onto and expanding the ongoing conversation. A solid relation’s dependence on overcoming prejudices and dividend factors currently defining the affiliation of the two nations makes it require a conscious and well-constructed policy. With careful advance, that has a chance of becoming a reality within the next decade, and if realized, it might change the future of the Middle East, and curb terrorism by diminishing one of the overarching factors of its existence.
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