MINIATURE EMPIRE: THE POLITICAL WEIGHT OF SOCOTRA JÚLIA PALIK
AJRC-Analyses 2014A05
AJRC-Analyses Series of the Antall József Knowledge Centre
Publisher: Antall József Knowledge Centre Publisher-in-Chief: Péter Antall Managing editor: Ádám Éva Editorial office: Antall József Knowledge Centre H-1093 Budapest, Közraktár utca 4-6.
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© Júlia Palik, 2014 © Antall József Knowledge Centre, 2014 ISSN 2416-1705
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MINIATURE EMPIRE: THE POLITICAL WEIGHT OF SOCOTRA
Júlia Palik
Small islands do matter in world affairs. The present paper will demonstrate this assumption through the detailed examination of Socotra. In order to gain a comprehensive overview of the political significance of a small and uninhabited territory, the analysis will be based on a three-level - local, regional and international - model.
Local-level stereotypes
analysis:
Beyond
The 250 km-long Socotra Archipelago lies in the northwest Indian Ocean near the Gulf of Aden. It comprises four islands - among which the largest is Socotra - and two rocky islets. The archipelago is often labeled as the ‘Galapagos of the Indian Ocean’, the ‘Treasure Island’ or the “the most alienlooking place on Earth’. This group of islands has one of the most unique flora and fauna system on Earth. The exceptional biodiversity was officially recognized by the UNESCO, which in 2008 enrolled the island to the list of World Natural Heritage. The total population of Socotra is 50,000 people. Regrettably, beside travel guides and biodiversity focused publications, only little information is available of the Socotri political affairs. The absence of historical data is the result of the unique Socotri language - spoken only here - , which does not have any written form. Therefore, information analyzed here was gathered from regional news reports and international NGO’s publications.
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The present paper argues that from a political and strategic perspective, these small and relatively uninhabited territories are not anymore only ideal laboratories for tourists or scientists. Small islands of the Indian Ocean indeed play a crucial geostrategic role in the Middle-East and North-African (MENA) region. This is the point where “Lilliputians” begin to enter to the world of great power politics. Now let’s look at naked truth: Socotra is small. Socotra lies in the crossroads of strategic waterways and it is surrounded by countries - Somalia and Yemen - which has been on a slippery slope towards becoming ungoverned ‘failed states’. As a consequence of its geographical location, Socotra tend to confront myriad of environmental, economic and political challenges. Despite these worrisome facts, Socotra is isolated enough to successfully avoid (so far) the repercussions of the political instability in neighboring Yemen and Somalia. Isolation however is a double-edged sword. On the positive side, isolation ensured the preservation of unique ecosystem, which was not plagued by the influx of foreign products, ideas and investments. On the negative side however - as Socotri people experience nowadays - remoteness resulted in underdevelopment both in terms of infrastructure and economy. This trend starts to change by the increasing influx of the so-called eco-tourists. Undoubtedly, managing the growing number of island visitors poses huge challenges both to local infrastructure and to the environment. From a historical point of view, Socotra, as a strategic-gem has always been under the protectorate of various foreign powers. First, the archipelago was ruled by the Mahra sultans of Yemen. After a small-episode of Portuguese occupation in the 16th century, the British Empire signed a treaty with the Sultan in 1876 and left the territory only in 1967 when the sultanate ended. Subsequently, former independent South Yemen became the guardian of the islands. Today, Socotra is the part of the unified Yemen. At the beginning of the Yemeni protectorate, Socotra was part of the remote Hadramaut province. In 2013 President Hadi declared Socotra the 22nd independent province of Yemen as part of the overall decentralization process in the mainland.1 This move undoubtedly gives greater room for manoeuvre for the Socotri policymakers. Regional-level challenges: We select our friends but not our neighbors As history has proven it several times, geography and geopolitics are key determinants in political bargaining processes. The island’s proximity to the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula grants to Socotra a central maritime and trade security role. Socotra is surrounded by unstable territories, as the sectarian conflict torn Yemen, just 340 kilometers away, and the piracy-haven Somalia, only 250 kilometers away.
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Al-Shorfa.com (20, December, 2013): Yemen’s Socotra Granted Province Status, accessed: http://alshorfa.com/en_GB/articles/meii/features/2013/12/20/feature-02?change_locale=true 25, November 2014
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It is safe to declare that as a consequence of close political and administrative ties to Yemen, Socotra’s internal politics are profoundly influenced by events in the mainland. After the unification of south and north Yemen, funding and development of Socotra was directed by the Sana’a. This meant that the Saleh regime favored its own enrichment and only negligible amount of resources were devoted to develop infrastructure, medical treatment or educational facilities in the islands. Therefore, until the 1999 opening of Socotra’s airport, health-care and higher education was far from reality in the island. Any progress in infrastructure or services had been initiated by international organizations. In some ways, it is more surprising that even in such a marginalized territory, region-wide political developments could be felt. In this sense, the 2011 political protest movement across the Arab world has been felt in Socotra at least in two ways. Political crisis in the mainland clearly had environmental impacts. Fears from instability scared many tourist off, thereby the eco-tourism dependent land experienced major financial losses. As a result, panic reactions emerged among locals. Overgrazing and harmful irrigation practices endangered the durability of existing international conservation programs. Moreover, for the first time in the islands’ history, local protest movements emerged in Socotra. Activists called for greater autonomy from the Yemeni hand. In 2012, Socotri people began to articulate their political visions in a poetry festival.2 Locals’ frustration is understandable, because political prospects are rather grim in Yemen. Lawlessness deter tourism not just to Yemen, but to Socotra as well. It is prudent to emphasize this peaceful domestic protest, because it had contributed to the shift in the political status of Socotra. More recently, in 2014, authorities in Hadibo, the capital of Socotra, banned qat trade in the city and closed qat retail shops. This anti-drug step clearly goes against the financial interests of Sana’a. Socotri authorities argue that qat markets and the associated health and environmental damage distort the unique landscape of the island. In a wider sense, this ban was the first manifestation of independent decision-making, as a province. On the other side of Socotra’s coastlines another troublesome neighbor shapes events in the island. In 2010, Somalia claimed Socotra as its own territory. It requested the UN to clarify the territorial status of the islands. As a response, Yemeni authorities also submitted a clear response to the UN, where they declared that - on the basis of historical facts - the archipelago is part of Yemen. 3 Evidentially, as a response, Somalia accused Yemen of providing false
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Peutz, Nathalie (2012): Revolution in Socotra, A Perspective from Yemen’s Periphery, published by: Middle East Research and Information Project MER263, Volume 42, SUmmer 2012, accessed: http://www.merip.org/mer/mer263/revolution-socotra, 24 November 2014 3
Yemenpost (27, Ocotber, 2010): For First Time in History, Somalia Claims Socotra as Its Own, accessed: http://yemenpost.net/Detail123456789.aspx?ID=3&SubID=2698&MainCat=3 25, November, 2014
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information thereby fueling mistrust between the two countries.4 This debate is somehow bizarre. At the time of the legal discord (2010), Somalia did not enjoy such a stable domestic situation, which would enable her to articulate territorial demands. Obviously, the Socotradebate was only an escape route to divert domestic attention from more pressuring issues, like terrorism or endemic corruption. For today, Somali pirates evolved to a serious concern to international maritime trade and security. For the hostis humani generis, the lucrative business of robbery and hostage-taking often seems the only financial alternative to survive. Socotra's proximity to Somalia means that the island is highly vulnerable to pirate attacks. Most recently, Socotra has been used by pirates as a fuel base. Some sources claim5 that Somali gangs utilize the island by the help of the tacit agreement of some Yemeni authorities. The central fear is that by exploiting the political vacuum in Yemen, sea bandits can use Socotra as a remote base for arm and food supply, thereby causing irreversible damage in the island. These negative developments shed light on the urgent need to develop an effective coastal patrolling system with the help of Yemen or more preferably with the UNDP. Guarding the coasts of Socotra would simultaneously mean safety for Socotri people and for international vessels and their crew. International-level relevance: explore, exploit, experience Beyond neighboring countries political influence, Socotra hosts a bunch of non-governmental organizations. Their agenda is predominantly occupied by small-scale environmental projects, sustainable management practices and conservation techniques. The Socotra Governance and Biodiversity Project (SGBP) was installed by the United Nations Development Program. 6 The politically relevant objective of the SGBP sounds as the following: The project is aimed at “establishing an island-wide local government and enhancing public administration structure at the district level�. This is an important goal, especially in the light of the recently gained independent provincial status. In a wider sense, autonomy of the island was also encouraged by external forces and not exclusively by local initiatives. The logic behind this international effort was to establish favorable bureaucratic circumstances in Socotra to conduct conservation programs. Projects were often delayed due to the lack of support - which was a prerequisite for any initiative to be realized - from the Sana’a administration. In addition to the multilateral
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Somalitalk.com (December 9, 2010): There is no deal and discussion to Socotra Island: it is part of Somali Territorial Islands, accessed: http://somalitalk.com/2010/12/09/there-is-no-deal-and-discussion-to-socotraisland-it-is-part-of-somali-territorial-islands/, 25, November, 2014 5
Reuters (Jul 5, 2011): Somali Pirates Use Yemen Island as Fuel Base, accessed: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/05/uk-yemen-somalia-pirates-idUSLNE76403M20110705 25, November 2014 6
The official website of the SGBP project can be accessed: http://www.socotraproject.org/
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presence, the United Kingdom based Socotra Conservation Fund, the France based Triangle or even The Socotra Beekeeping Project are penetrating into the daily lives of Socotri people. These heterogeneous initiatives often suffer from the basic disadvantages of international aid and development programs. That means, by neglecting the opinion and needs of locals, they often create more harm than benefit. Evidentially, islanders often see foreign workers as alien elements, who try to exploit the economic and natural benefits of the island. 7 The United States of America, since the very beginning of the Obama-era, is committed to close the infamous prison in Guantanamo Bay. As the process goes forward, remaining detainees most of whom are Yemenis - have to be reintegrated and relocated either to their country of origin, or - if it is due to security reasons, unmanageable - to other states that are ready to host them. Yemen, plagued by extremist insurgency is far from the ideal place to resettle former terrorists. On the other side, states are not eager to use their tax payers’ money to host once active bomb-makers. The Economist - citing local Yemeni sources - reported that Washington plans to construct a rehabilitation facility in Socotra.8 From a US perspective, Socotra would be a perfect location for ex-terrorists. Nevertheless, the transfer of current inmates would definitely bring serious harm not just to the reputation of the islands as a tourist destination, but it would also cause irreversible damage to the environment. These developments are clearly undesirable both by the inhabitants and by the NGO’s and without adequate compensations they will not be realized soon. Rumours of the militarization of Socotra are nothing new. Its strategic location presents an attractive reason to use it for various military purposes. It was a widely held belief during the Cold War that the Soviet Union maintained a military base there in order to secure its sphere of influence across the Arab world. There is still no evidence that this base actually existed. US navy has a sizeable presence in the Indian ocean either to guard international shipping against pirates or to support its military-strategic objectives in the MENA region. More recently, according to the Global Research website, Socotra - because of its location - “is of crucial importance to the US military.” 9 Certainly, Socotra can be seen as a place from where surveillance or even drone attacks can be ordered into volatile places like Yemen. Beside securing strategic waterways for uninterrupted trade, a military buildup would be a useful counter-terrorism tool in the hands of Washington, especially against such groups as the AlQaeda in Arabian-Peninsula. 7
United Nations Volunteers (14 January 2011): Fitting in on a remote Yemeni island, accessed: http://www.unv.org/en/what-we-do/thematic-areas/governance/doc/fitting-in-on-a.html 28 November 2014 8
The Economist (29 January 2014): Yemen and Guantanamo Prison in Paradise? accessed: http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/01/yemen-and-guant-namo 25 November 2014 9
Global Research (7 February, 2010): Yemen and The Militarization of Strategic Waterways, accessed: http://www.globalresearch.ca/yemen-and-the-militarization-of-strategic-waterways/17460 25 November 2014
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Bottom line: There is no such territory in our contemporary world that is neutral, regardless of its size and population. Every piece of land carries political significance, which is highly encouraged to explore.
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