A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E
ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY: PRIORITIES AND CHALLENGES AFTER THE GENERAL ELECTIONS
ALESSANDRO D’ONOFRIO — BIANKA RESTÁS
AJRC-Analyses 2018A01
H-1093 Budapest, 2 Czuczor Street | +3620 310 8776 | ajtk@ajtk.hu | www.ajtk.hu
A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E
AJRC-Analyses Series of the Antall József Knowledge Centre
Publisher: Antall József Knowledge Centre Publisher-in-Chief: Péter Antall Managing editor: Tamás Péter Baranyi Editorial office: Antall József Knowledge Centre H-1093 Budapest, Czuczor utca 2.
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© Alessandro D’Onofrio and Bianka Restás, 2018 © Antall József Knowledge Centre, 2018 ISSN 2416-1705
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY: PRIORITIES AND CHALLENGES AFTER THE GENERAL ELECTIONS ALESSANDRO D’ONOFRIO AND BIANKA RESTÁS1
Shortly after the Italian general elections, many analysts predicted that the country should be prepared for a long negotiation process that could even take few months. After the negotiations, a new, unprecedented governing-coalition took the responsibility to lead Italy for the next five years. In fact, the two most voted parties, the Five Stars Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle, M5S) and the League (Lega), which expressed a strong anti-establishment and Eurosceptic rhetoric, merged their programmes and made an agreement for “changing the country.” The political direction in which the new yellow-green government is going to change the country is still unknown, but the viewpoints of some ministers with clear anti-European sentiments started to ring world markets’ and Brussel’s alarm bell.2 Even if the country is fully incorporated within the Euro-Atlantic institutions, it is striking to note that foreign policy was almost completely absent from the Italian electoral campaign. With the notable exception of Emma Bonino’s More Europe (Più Europa), all other political forces have expressed incoherent, ill-informed, or no foreign policy strategies at all.3 This is a distressing sign, especially in a country that is struggling to find its place on the international stage, always condemned to chase its European partners due to its political uncertainty, and disadvantaged by a too timid economic recovery. It is obvious, however, that beside the traditionally important priorities of the Italian foreign policy, there are some significant challenges and urgent issues that the new administration should take into consideration and tackle in the future.
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Italy participates on the global stage as a political actor, an economic and commercial player, as well as a cultural protagonist. The country is The authors are fellows of the EU–V4 office of the Antall József Knowledge Centre. Andreas Baumer: Verso il voto. Visti dagli altri: per i tedeschi il 4 marzo potrebbe essere l’inizio di un incubo per l’Europa. Business Insider Italia. March 1, 2018. <https://it.businessinsider.com/ verso-il-voto-visti-dagli-altri-per-i-tedeschi-il-4-marzo-potrebbe-essere-linizio-di-unincubo-per-leuropa/ > Accessed: June 20, 2018. 3 Nathalie Tocci: Italian Foreign Policy: A Message in the Bottle to the Next Italian Government. Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). February 23, 2018. <http://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/ italian-foreign-policy-message-bottle-next-italian-government > Accessed: July 8, 2018. 1
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E represented abroad not only by its institutions — including the diplomatic corps, representatives of the government, ministries, and local authorities — but also by international companies, corporations and organisations contributing to global economic processes. It is no longer possible to interpret foreign policy solely in terms of political-diplomatic relations. It is, therefore, necessary to take into account new instruments that are capable of representing Italy’s interests and strengthening its role in the international sphere. Italy’s foreign policy has always been characterised by inconsistency due to the strong influence of its, often chaotic, domestic policy. For a long period, the country’s status was uncertain and ambivalent as it has been wavering between the categories of “the least important state of the great powers” and the “largest of the smaller powers.”4 In the last three decades, the country has experienced a challenging reconstruction of its role within the international arena, and since the 60s, through NATO and European Community (EC) membership, the country managed to regain sovereignty and a more significant role at an international level. Italy’s geopolitical positioning can be best described through the so-called “Three Circles Approach,” a theory according to which Italian foreign policy is shaped by its involvement in three different spheres of interest: the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, and the European. The country has traditionally articulated its foreign policy priorities around these three pillars.5 A balance was sought among the three circles or pillars of international relations, which gradually promoted the construction of a generalised consensus in which Italy’s close relationship with the United States was balanced by its equally substantial relations with European partners and increasingly, with various Northern African and Middle East countries. Today, all three pillars remain relevant, but considering the changing nature of international relations and different challenges, a revision or reinterpretation of traditional Italian foreign policy would be needed. In parallel with the mentioned three pillars, Italy has built up a significant bilateral relationship with Russia, which has become even more important in the light of the election outcome, as both the Five Star Movement (the single largest party and winner of the elections), and the League of Matteo Salvini had proposed to improve the relations with Russia.6
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Carlo Maria Santoro: La politica estera di una media potenza: l’Italia dall’Unità ad oggi. Il Mulino, Bologna, 1991. 5 Maria Elena Amadori: Italy: The Three Circles Approach of Foreign Policy. Mediterranean Affairs (MA). July 19, 2016. <http://mediterraneanaffairs.com/italy-three-circle-approachforeign-policy/ > Accessed: June 18, 2018. 6 Jon Henley: Italy’s Election: Who Will Win and Why Does It Matter? Guardian. March 4, 2018. 4
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E Italy and the EU: Priorities for the new yellow-green government The last Italian election, maybe unsurprisingly, saw populist and Eurosceptic parties gaining a large share of votes. This resulted, after very long and hard consultations, in the creation of an unprecedented governing-coalition, composed of the apparently incompatible Five Star Movement and the League. Even more surprising, is the person who has been chosen to lead the government. In fact, Giuseppe Conte, a formerly unknown professor of law, close to Five Star Movement but functional to the interest of Salvini’s League, will be the leading figure of the Italian executive for the next — supposed — five-year term. Like other populist and sovereignist forces in Europe, the parties who gained the largest share of votes in this election showed, with different degrees, anti-immigration rhetoric and dissatisfaction towards European institutions and policies. Even though the positions of these groups, mostly the Five Star Movement’s, softened during the heated electoral campaign, it is not clear yet which direction the new yellow-green government will follow with respect to foreign policy and the relationship with the EU. However, it seems to be difficult to answer the question whether this new government could depart from its predecessors’ path, or it is more likely that it will be ready to carry on the old Italian tradition of strong committment to the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Thus, after the heated electoral campaign, the sovereignist and isolationist claims have to be shelved since the new executive will be obliged to honour its international commitments and to show its readiness to cooperate on the manifold of international issues where Italy’s role is crucial. In fact, it seems to be imprudent today to live under the illusion that any country, especially a medium-size local power such as Italy, could rely only on its own strengths while facing the challenges of a globalized world. Migratory flows, terrorism, international trade, energy security, and climate change, are only the most important ones of these challenges and, as the 8th biggest economy in the world, Italy has a special obligation towards its partners.7
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It should be emphasized that the rise of the Mediterranean country next to the most developed economies would not have been possible without the involvement in projects like the EU and the Atlantic Alliance. In fact, after the disastrous experience of WWII, Italy’s deep incorporation <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/07/italys-election-everything-you-need-toknow > Accessed: July 2, 2018. 7 Rob Smith: The World’s Biggest Economies in 2018. World Economic Forum. April 18, 2018. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/the-worlds-biggest-economies-in-2018/ > Accessed: July 12, 2018.
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E within Europe’s economic and political process of integration has been a useful tool which facilitated the country’s recovery. In this regard, it is obvious that the resurgence of isolationist and sovereignist forces will adversely affect Italy more so than other western countries, also due to its peculiar geographical position. Moreover, despite the political instability, the Italian desire to play a major role within EU’s integration process has been a major catalyst of every executive’s policy, mostly as the international stage always provided a place where domestic shortcomings could be blurred. Thus, the continuity of the relationship with the other European countries will remain a key and undisputed point of every government agenda.8 After realising these essential points, it is therefore time for the parties to overcome the sterile polemic against Brussels and EU institutions that corrupted the electoral campaign and give the new government the possibility to work in order to keep abreast with recent developments within the Union. The first important test for the new government will be the creation of the DEF (Documento di Economia e Finanza, Document of Economy and Finance) which represents the main economic and financial programming tool that the government proposes to the parliament in order to showcase its strategy regarding public expenditure. In this document, the government shall describe how the funds coming from the new 2021–2027 EU budget will be used in the next years. It is in this sense very important that the new executive submits a balanced and serious programme in order to reconcile the national interest with EU’s priorities, mostly in view of the promise of the redistribution of EU-funds from Eastern Europe to Southern Europe.9
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Furthermore, to be credible, the first step of the EU’s fourth economy10 should be the introduction of somewhat brave measures designed to reduce — or at least to contain — the enormous public debt. During the electoral campaign, the country’s debt, which amounted to 133% of the GDP in 201711 (only Greece has worse performance figures) was one of the main missing elements that the parties failed to address. Although no party mentioned how it wants to manage and solve the country’s biggest financial problem, such a debt will represent a huge constraint to Ferdinando Nelli Feroci: Politica estera: Italia, banchi di prova del prossimo governo. Affari Internazionali (AI). March 7, 2018. <http://www.affarinternazionali.it/2018/03/ politica-estera-italia-banchi-prova/ > Accessed: July 5, 2018. 9 Tocci 2018. 10 Which Member States Have the Largest Share of EU’s GDP? Eurostat. May 11, 2018. <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-201805111?inheritRedirect=true > Accessed: July 20, 2018. 11 Fmi sull’Italia: picco al 133% per debito/Pil. Adnkronos. October 11, 2017. <http://www.adnkronos.com/soldi/economia/2017/10/11/fmi-sull-italia-picco-per-debitopil_EiecCaSWb2igFeVxCUDEvN.html > Accessed: July 12, 2018. 8
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E next government’s fiscal policy. Probably, the rumbling electoral promises of the parties — such as the basic income, or the flat-tax — will prob ably remain unattainable if not at the cost of further destroying public accounts and citizen’s savings. The reduction of its debt, although perceived as Brussels’ and Frankfurt’s imposition, is in fact in Italy’s primary interest, and it represents the only way the country could gain the faith of the markets back and give a new boost to its economy. Thus, in the current situation, Italy is obliged to implement some budget-careful fiscal policies, the primary goal of which should not only be a containment of public expenditures, but rather the designation of a specific form of quality-focused spending reform. Moreover, a containment of the debt should be associated with the launching of wider reform plans concerning those matters abundantly discussed with Brussels, such as the reform of the tax-composition, the justice, the public administration, the competition law, the strengthening of the bank system, a new collective job-bargaining, the fight against corruption and tax evasion, and a reform of the welfare system.12 The mere fact to announce such all-embracing reforms would surely please Italy’s partners and allow the country to gain back some credibility. In addition, Italy should also deal with the renewed understanding between France and Germany, which is giving new momentum to EU’s integration process. In fact, in the last months, France’s President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel started to enable the EU’s deeper common defence integration and the strengthening of the Eurozone. The plan to strengthen the Eurozone is a three-level reform, the first step of which consists of the finalisation of the capital market’s union and requires greater discipline on the part of the member states.13 Even if Merkel seems to agree with Macron’s idea, at least in words, there is a lot of resistance among German economists in supporting such a plan.14 Berlin is in fact reluctant to share the risks of a common budget or to jeopardize its financial plans to assist an irresponsible Italian government. For this reason, Italy’s government should not lose time if it wishes to play a fundamental role next to its
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Ferdinando Nelli Feroci — Nathalie Tocci: Politica estera italiana: appello al prossimo governo. AI. March 26, 2018. <http://www.affarinternazionali.it/2018/03/politica-estera-appello-governo/ > Accessed: July 7, 2018. 13 Riccardo Sorrentino: Macron e Merkel provano a rilanciare l’Europa: bilancio comune e più investimenti. Il Sole24Ore. June 16, 2018. <http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/mondo/2018-06-19/ macron-e-merkel-provano-rilanciare-l-ue-ok-un-bilancio-eurolandia-182556. shtml?uuid=AEAif08E > Accessed: July 12, 2018. 14 Sergio Fabbrini: Eurozona da riformare. Quale ruolo per l’Italia. Il Sole24Ore. June 9, 2018. <http:// www.ilsole24ore.com/art/commenti-e-idee/2018-06-09/eurozona-riformare-quale-ruolo-litalia-210012.shtml?uuid=AEVNhT2E > Accessed: July 12, 2018. 12
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E partners. Having eventually put aside the German-initiated austerity plans, the Italian government should act as a mediator between the two continental powers. In fact, it is in Italian interest to try to persuade Merkel to follow Macron’s idea of a European Monetary Fund that would help invest in the Eurozone’s less rich economies. Additionally, Italy’s role as a leader of those countries that can only lose as a consequence of the renewed cooperation between France and Germany is also symbolic. Being the first of the lasts is surely more useful for Italy than to be the last of the firsts. In fact, together with the other P.I.G.S. (Portugal, Greece and Spain), Italy should form a block big enough to push forward some proposals which also take into account the structural weaknesses of these countries. Obviously, a prolonged political instability and an executive unwilling to discuss more cooperation with its European partners would be dangerous for the Italian position in the EU. In fact, a refusal from Italy to take this opportunity will leave to others the possibility to decide about the future of the Union and of the country itself. This outcome should be avoided, and Italy should finally be able to gain back an active role within the EU.15 Furthermore, 2019 is expected to be a decisive year for the EU, with the European Parliament elections scheduled for June and the following renewal of the Commission, the ECB, and the European Council’s leading roles. These events could be seen as great opportunities where Italy could — and should — confront the points it intends to pursue in the future and networking in order to encourage the appointment of “friendly” figures for key EU positions. A government which continues to advocate Eurosceptical positions and takes an outsider attitude could at the end face the risk of being marginalised from the most important decisions.16
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Additionally, recent events such as Brexit, Trump’s unpredictable presidency, immigration, and Islamic terrorist attacks have reignited EU citizens’ demand for greater security and prompted the EU to review its own defence policy. The most recent outcome is the launch of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), a French–German-drawn project of differentiated cooperation on investments on defence, the development of new capacities, and the preparation for joint-military operations. PESCO is going to take place on two levels. The first is the political one, Lucia Tajoli: Europa: credibili per contare /2, Sì alla globalizzazione, ma… Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI). February 26, 2018. <https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/ si-alla-globalizzazione-ma-19713 > Accessed: July 10, 2018. 16 Franco Bruni — Antonio Villafranca: Europa: Credibili per Contare 1, Riforme Coraggiose, in Italia e in Europa. ISPI. February 26, 2018. <https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/ riforme-coraggiose-italia-e-europa-19715 > Accessed: July 10, 2018. 15
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E and will be carried out by the Council, in charge of taking the most important decisions. Only PESCO’s member states have the right to vote and decisions are taken unanimously. The second level concerns single technical projects and will involve only participant countries.17 Even if the EU is moving towards a closer integration in the defence sector, NATO will not lose its importance as the most important form of military cooperation in Europe. In this context, PESCO shall only give European countries an instrument that can help them to protect their interests when a possible crisis of cooperation affecting the United States or the UN unfolds.18 On a political, diplomatic, and military level, Italy, partially due to its deep-rooted experience, competence, and advanced technological level in spatial, cybernetic, and missile programmes, is a fundamental partner in the common defence project. Once again, Italy shall play its historical role of a medium local power, the main purpose of which shall be to act as a bridge between smaller countries and the leading powers. In this context, Italy has to be able to encourage marginal states to pool their resources to strengthen a fully European defence project in order to contribute to the development of a more inclusive security cooperation. Moreover, Italian participation within PESCO could be reassuring for other EU’s and PESCO’s member states which could be worried by a defence policy entirely controlled by Germany and France.19 However, the country’s only chances to play such a brokering part in this process are placed in the ability of the new government to make coherent choices. In this sense, the role of the President of the Republic, Sergio Mattarella, as chairman of the Supreme Council for Defence and constitutionally the chief of the armed forces, could be crucial. The president, through the Council, could make the government more aware of the most important issues and choices regarding the field of defence and security.20
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EEAS Press Team: Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) — Factsheet. European External Action System (EEAS). June 28, 2018. <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/ headquarters-homepage/34226/permanent-structured-cooperation-pesco-factsheet_en > Accessed: July 8, 2018. 18 Agenzia Nazionale Stampa Associata: Difesa Ue: cos’è la Pesco, 25 Paesi uniti per politica comune e cooperazione industriale. EdnHub. April 23, 2018. <https://www.ednh.news/it/ difesa-ue-cose-la-pesco-25-paesi-uniti-per-politica-comune-e-cooperazione-industriale/ > Accessed: July 12, 2018. 19 Michele Nones: L’Italia e le sfide dell’Europa della Difesa. AI. April 4, 2018. <http:// www.affarinternazionali.it/2018/04/litalia-sfide-europa-difesa/ > Accessed: July 8, 2018. 20 Andrea Aversano Stabile — Alessandro Marrone — Carolina Polito: Europa della difesa: quali prospettive? IAI. November 22, 2017. <http://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/ europa-della-difesa-quali-prospettive > Accessed: July 10, 2018; Alessandro Marrone: Ue: difesa, parte Pesco, cooperazione strutturata permanente. AI. November 14, 2017. <http:// www.affarinternazionali.it/?p=67191 > Accessed: July 5, 2018. 17
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E Still from the security point of view, Italy, with 650,000 people landed on its shores, is the EU’s most affected country when it comes to migration via the Mediterranean Sea. Surely, the flow of migrants contributed to the shaping of the public debate and the electoral campaign. The Dublin Regulation imposes a real burden on Italians by applying the “first country” principle, according to which accepting new arrivals and conducting asylum applications is the responsibility of Italy in most of the cases. The lack of solidarity from the EU member states boosted anti-immigration and anti-EU feelings that resulted in the upsurge of populist parties in Italy.21 The outcome of the election could be regarded in this way, and despite the fact that the number of irregular migrants in Italy has fallen by 25% in 2018 compared with last year’s data,22 the more moderate Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, PD) has not been able to gain the sympathy of Italian voters, and the more radical ideas of the League and M5S have proved successful. It is undeniable that unconstrained migrations towards Europe represent a serious problem nowadays, and, in this sense, the EU has not always been ready to give a satisfactory answer. Despite the rise of xenophobia and isolationist ideas, there is no way Italy could physically isolate itself. In fact, the Boot’s (how Italy is affectively called) geographic position makes the country a natural crossroad of peoples and cultures. But only a credible government could push for a reform of the Dublin Agreement or, at least, could be able to obtain some financial concessions from other EU member states for covering immigration-related costs. In fact, in return of the 4 billion euros Italy has spent in 2017 in order to manage the immigration emergency, the EU has only allocated 240 million euros for the country.23 Moreover, the lack of solidarity within EU member states regarding the management of the migration crisis has also been recognized by German Chancellor Angela Merkel in an interview given on 4 June 2018.24 Merkel stated that the Italian people had not felt sufficiently supported by the rest of the European Union in facing the Mediterranean migrant crisis. In this regard, it is of paramount importance that the Italian government lets its voice be heard in order to obtain greater solidarity and make sure
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Luigi Zingales: Italy’s Populists Can Beat Europe’s Establishment. Foreign Policy (FP). April 3, 2018. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/03/italys-populists-can-beat-europes-establishment > Accessed: May 22, 2018. 22 Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals Reach 40,944 in 2018; Deaths Reach 960. International Organization for Migration (IOM). June 22, 2018. <https://www.iom.int/news/ mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reach-40944-2018-deaths-reach-960 > Accessed: July 1, 2018. 23 Paolo Magri — Matteo Villa: Politica estera dell’Italia: 6 priorità per il prossimo governo. ISPI. February 26, 2018. <https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/politica-estera-dellitalia-6priorita-il-prossimo-governo-19717 > Accessed: May 23, 2018. 24 Italy felt left alone on migrants — Merkel. ANSA. June 4, 2018. <http://www.ansa.it/english/news/ politics/2018/06/04/italy-felt-left-alone-on-migrants-merkel_5bd3d9f b-f8e5-49c0-be25 4fd592d3e171.html > Accessed: June 6, 2018.
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E that those countries whose contribution is inadequate, will be brought to cooperate even using the tool of conditionality.25
The role of Italy in the Central Mediterranean: Migration, security and further challenges The Mediterranean pillar of the Italian foreign policy includes many ways of bilateral and multilateral relations, in addition to the large scale of cooperation with the Northern African and Middle Eastern countries with the aim of focusing on different issues, handling challenges in the region, as well as promoting economic development. Despite the general presumption that the Atlantic and European pillars of the Italian foreign policy had a dominant influence, the country’s historical heritage, the ongoing needs of the country, as well as the current tensions in the region never let the Mediterranean drift away. The region has acquired much more importance because of the increasing number of conflicts taking place in its bordering countries, as well as for economic reasons. Italy perceived possible partners in some of the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries with whom it is promoting cooperation and developing fruitful businesses.26 The growing number of illegal migrants and refugee seekers coming from the Mediterranean region (and from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel countries) has made this collaboration more desirable over the last few years. North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa are deeply connected through the areas of limited statehood across the Sahelian belt, accelerating their regular flows of humans, arms, and goods. Nowhere is it clearer than in the structural phenomenon of migration. The increasing linkages between the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa is just one of the examples that indicate the absence of hard lines separating the Middle East from Africa. This also clearly shows that dealing with the Mediterranean requires the necessity of investing far more attention and resources into both the Middle East
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and Africa.27 The events of the Arab Spring have concluded in an unmanageable confusion which has made the region an unstable ground. In the light of the geostrategic importance of the MENA region, as well as the security challenges and threats coming from this area, Italy would have been irresponsible if it had ignored its proximity to the region. The Mediterranean has acquired new significance, positioning itself at the forefront of Italy’s interests. As a result of the mentioned factors, Italy plays an increasingly Paolo Magri – Matteo Villa: Gestire le migrazioni. ISPI. February 26, 2018. <https:// www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/gestire-le-migrazioni-19735 > Accessed: June 20, 2018. 26 Amadori 2018. 27 Tocci 2018. 25
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E dominant role in the Mediterranean through political and economic cooperation, as well as through its membership in international organisations such as the United Nations or the NATO. Italy needs the Mediterranean to promote its prosperity but, at the same time, it is in Italy’s interest to try to preserve its involvement both in the European and the Atlantic circles, principally because they serve as a key support for the country’s diplomatic activity in the Mediterranean.28 In 2016, with a unanimous decision of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) Participating States, Italy was elected to hold the OSCE’s rotating Chairmanship in 2018. Therefore, from 1 January to 31 December 2018, the country coordinates the decision-making process and sets priorities for the Organization’s activities in the field of security and cooperation. Through this Chairmanship, Italy intends to focus greater attention on challenges and opportunities arising in the Mediterranean, including the issue of immigration. It aims to take a more pro-active approach to the organization’s three security “dimensions” (politico-military, economic and environmental, as well as human rights), and on the new transnational threats, like terrorism, cybersecurity, illegal drug and human trafficking, as well trafficking of cultural property. The OSCE Mediterranean Conference (held in Palermo between 24–25 October 2017) was focusing on the topic of large movements of migrants and refugees across the Mediterranean, as well as diverse challenges, security-related issues, and opportunities arising in the region. The three sessions of the conference concentrated on three different aspects: the increased risks for smuggling and trafficking of human beings arising from large movements of refugees and migrants; opportunities emerging from migration; the role of integration policies in achieving growth, sustainable development, peace, and stability, as well as examining the importance of successful integration. There was a special focus on the demand for combating all forms of intolerance, racism, xenophobia, and discrimination, also based on religious grounds.29
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Immigration and Italian society: Foreign policy “has come home” Xenophobic rhetoric and anti-immigrant sentiments were increasingly dominant issues during the Italian election campaign, and the question had an undoubtedly strong impact on the outcome of the Italian general elections. The argument divided the country’s political life, as well as the Amadori 2018. Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation: Italy’s 2018 OSCE Chairmanship: Priorities and Programme. <https://www.esteri.it/mae/en/politica_estera/osce/ la-presidenza-italiana-dell-osce.html > Accessed: June 18, 2018. 28
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E public discourse and the Italian society. Despite the lower number of arrivals in Italy over the last year, which can partly be attributed to the centre-left’s efforts to handle the issue, a remarkable part of the Italian citizens still considers the management of the immigration in a negative way.30 The background of this tendency is that the country’s politicians failed to come up with a viable and sustainable solution for the problems associated with irregular migration and integration. None of the larger political forces has emerged as a credible and consistent actor on the issue.31 The electoral programmes of the anti-establishment M5S and the right-wing coalition were characterised by a more radical approach with regards to stopping migratory flows, highlighting the unrealistic objective of “zero landings,” to be achieved through the pushback of migrants and forced returns. Some examples of the increasingly xenophobic attitude include electoral manifestations of the right-wing League party with slogans such as “Italians first” or “stop the invasion.” Yet, in Italy, tensions reached a boiling point, manifesting themselves in various occasions of physical attacks and acts against migrants and refugees.32 After the racially motivated shooting attack against six African immigrants carried out by a far-right extremist, Italian citizen in the town of Macerata, Silvio Berlusconi called the issue a “social bomb ready to explode” and promised to deport 600,000 illegal immigrants from the country.33 The phenomenon — which should be examined together with the unsolved question of immigration and integration — requires a more intense dialogue in the country, as well as a stronger cooperation and capacity building to be able to tackle the issue in the long run.
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Italy’s immigration management and cooperation with Libya When it comes to discuss the argument “how to mitigate the effects and results of immigration,” it should be mentioned that a more intense collaboration with origin and transit countries is not an option anymore, but a necessity. Many have described the last year as a turning point for Italy’s external migration management. A huge responsibility has been assigned to Marco Minniti, former Minister of the Interior in the centre-left coalition led by the Democratic Party. During the course of Anja Palm: Leading the Way? Italy’s External Migration Policies and the 2018 Elections: An Uncertain Future. IAI. March 1, 2018. <http://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/ leading-way-italys-external-migration-policies-and-2018-elections > Accessed: June 19, 2018. 31 Ferruccio Pastore: The Election of Fear — The Italians Are More Afraid of Far Right Backlash than Immigrants. Politico. July 2, 2018. <https://www.politico.eu/article/ italy-election-fear-macerata-shooting-migrants-far-right/ > Accessed: July 19, 2018. 32 Palm 2018. 33 Bianka Restás: Silvio Berlusconi — Politically Immortal. Antall József Knowledge Centre Research Blog. January 25, 2017. <http://www.ajtk.hu/researchblog/180/silvio-berlusconi/ > Accessed: June 15, 2018. 30
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E April 2016, it has become quite obvious that as a result of the closure of the Western Balkans migration route and the refugee agreement between the European Union and Turkey (concluded on 18 March), Italy, as a frontline country, will play a key role in the management of the refugee crisis again.34 As it was previously expected, the agreement changed the dynamics of migration routes with an increasing number of migrants and potential asylum seekers attempting to reach Europe through the Libyan route. In May and June, the Italian migrant reception system was facing a significant pressure, and its management was becoming more and more challenging for the responsible bodies. The humanitarian aspect has also been put on the agenda due to those tragic incidents when ships carrying refugees were not able to reach the Italian coasts, and a large number of people on board drowned. In the background of the decreasing numbers, the code of conduct adopted by the Italian gov ernment in July played a crucial role. It aimed to control and make the activity of those various non-governmental organisations (NGOs) more transparent that are carrying out humanitarian and rescue operations on the Mediterranean Sea.35 The logic behind the approval of the code of conduct was that many accused NGOs of being a “pull factor” for those seeking to leave, encouraging them to proceed to the sea. In parallel, the Italian government has become increasingly committed to the cooperation with Libya’s GNA (Government of National Accord). In February 2017, an agreement between the two countries has been elaborated with the aim to intensify their cooperation for the further stabilization of Libya, as well as to fight against smuggling networks and irregular migration.36 In the agreement, the two countries made commitments in several areas, highlighting the intention to strengthen the Libyan institutional structure and the Libyan Coast Guard as well. In accordance with the agreement, then Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni emphasized that beside the Italian and Libyan commitment, the role of the European Union is also indispensable with its financial contribution and technical, logistical, and institutional support. Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj added that strengthening the stability in Libya is crucial to overcome the challenges, while the country
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Elizabeth Collett: The Paradox of the EU–Turkey Refugee Deal. Migration Policy Institute (MPI). March, 2016. <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/paradox-eu-turkey-refugee-deal > Accessed: May 19, 2018. 35 Bianka Restás: Has Mediterranean migration been diminishing? — Impacts and Prospects of Italy’s New Code of Conduct and the Libyan Restrictions. Antall József Knowledge Centre Research Blog. October 3, 2017. <http://www.ajtk.hu/researchblog/129/has-mediterranean-migration-been diminishing?/ > Accessed: June 19, 2018. 36 Gentiloni: l’Italia lavora per la stabilità della Libia. Rai News. February 2, 2018. <http:// www.rainews.it/dl/rainews/media/Gentiloni-e-premier-Libia-7f620651-cafd-4105-9860b7ebea1498c6.html > Accessed: May 20, 2018. 34
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E also needs a proactive engagement and support from Italy.37 At the end of July, it was announced by the Italian government that Italy would support the Libyan Coast Guard with two military ships (providing logistical and technical assistance) in an effort to deter illegal migration and human smuggling into Europe. The complementary and mutually reinforcing effects of the Italian regulation and the Libyan provisions clearly contributed to the decline in the number of migrants arriving to the Italian coasts. It is, of course, not the only reason for the changing tendency, as there are many other circumstances, factors, and challenges in the Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa that could influence the number of arrivals. According to the data of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), between 1 January and 31 August 2017, 99,127 migrants and potential asylum seekers arrived to the South-Italian coasts on the Mediterranean Sea.38 This figure represented a 14% decrease compared to the previous year’s data (115,068). Taking a closer look at the figures of July 2016, a major decline could be observed: 23,600 migrants arrived to Italian coasts in 2016, while 11,500 in the same month last year. At the same time, UNHCR reported that 25,675 people arrived through the Mediterranean route in August 2016, while 10,610 people reached Italian coasts during the same period in 2017, which was a significant decrease.39 To illustrate the long-term trends: during the first four months of 2018, 9,300 people reached the Southern Italian coasts: 75% less than in the same period of 2017. Comparing the last six months of 2017 with the same period of the previous year, a similar decrease could be observed. It is also worth pointing out that the decreasing tendency first could be experienced from the second half of last July, as in the previous period, until 15 July 2017, the number of arrivals to the Southern Italian coasts was 30% more compared with the previous year’s data.40
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Despite the decreasing number of arrivals last year, the question of immigration is still one of the biggest challenges for Italy: more than 650,000 people have arrived to the South-Italian coasts on the Mediterranean Sea in the last five years.41
Restás 2017. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): Italy Sea Arrivals. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/59029 > Accessed: May 19, 2018. 39 UNHCR: Mediterranean Situation. <http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean > Accessed: May 19, 2018. 40 Matteo Villa — Elena Corradi — Antonio Villafranca: Fact checking: migrazioni 2018. ISPI. May 7, 2018. <https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/fact-checking-migrazioni-2018-20415 > Accessed: June 15, 2018. 41 Magri — Villa, February 26, 2018. 37
38
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E Priorities in handling immigration: Internal and external challenges Considering the root causes of the question, the heterogeneous nature of the pull factors in the origin countries, as well as other aggravating circum stances (for instance the unstable political situation in Libya), handling the issue still requires further initiatives for cooperation and dialogue. One of the most important changes that cause a big challenge for Italy is the changing nature of the phenomenon, and the fast-growing number of irregular migrants and refugee seekers. While in 2007 90% of the migrants arrived to Italy through regular channels, in the period of 2014–2017, the rate of irregular migrants was almost 40%.42 There is no other alternative to enter Italy than using irregular channels that influences the public discourse (through using the term “illegal”), as well as increases the mistrust and hostility of the Italian citizens against illegal migrants. As a consequence, it should be a fundamental priority for the new Italian government to guarantee and reopen alternative, legal channels for immigrants43 and rethink the whole logic of the system which would make it possible to create a more consistent structure of immigration policy, as well as a new framework of rules and regulations. The second challenge for the country will be seeking solutions for the lack of economic, cultural, and social integration of the immigrants, promoting interreligious dialogue and language education, as well as supporting a more widespread access to social and education systems. It is highly demanded to prevent the marginalization of the foreign communities which can be identified as a fundamental root cause of radicalization, as well as a reason for turning to alternative ways of earning money through criminality and black market. The expulsion of migrants is another signi ficant issue considering the fact that between the period of 2013–2016, from 110,000 foreign nationals, who have already received an expulsion decree (with the aim of sending back illegal migrants to origin countries), only 22,000 were successfully repatriated.44
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The lack of a well-functioning European return policy for those migrants who do not qualify for asylum and/or have no valid residency permit represents a crucial obstacle. The background of this is the fact that it is not always easy to establish the identity and nationality of migrants and refugee seekers, as a large number of the arrivals come to Europe without passports and other means of identification. In most of the cases, the origin countries are reluctant to collaborate with Italy in a sufficient Magri – Villa, February 26, 2018. Magri – Villa, February 26, 2018. 44 Magri – Villa, February 26, 2018. 42
43
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E way, and the unsuccessful repatriation is also the result of the lack of bilateral agreements with the sending countries. For the mentioned reason, it is necessary to reinforce “migration partnership” and bilateral relations with transit and origin countries. In the long term, a credible European return policy could pave the way to a fully fledged European relocation system, as well as reduce the number of Africans risking their lives and paying multiples or regular costs when seeking to cross the Sahara and the Central Mediterranean.45 In parallel, it would be required to re-evaluate the structure of the development funds as well, as a significant part of the projects implemented under the IFA (Italian Fund for Africa), and EUTF (Emergency Trust Fund for Africa) aim to handle migration, thus, reinforce the capacity of border controls and reducing migratory flows.46 In this way, it is not possible to handle the real root causes of the problem in an efficient way and reduce underdevelopment; it is only pushing back the problem to where it comes from. To be able to handle the phenomenon, solidarity would be necessary from other EU member states: in 2017, Italy had to invest more than 4 billion euros in immigration management, while only 240 million euro financial contribution arrived to the country from other EU member states, which was less than 8% of Italy’s budget.47 Italy is still waiting for a practical answer to its legitimate request for an effective EU-wide solution. This would require some kind of financial compensation and additional human resources supporting Italian migration and asylum services. The refusal to accept the Aquarius rescue vessel both by Italy and Malta, and as a consequence, the tension between the two countries was the first major anti-migrant move since Interior Minister Matteo Salvini took office in June.48 This event clearly forecasts the new direction that the yellow-green coalition intends to follow and its desire for a broader solidarity from the part of other EU member states. It is important to mention Italy’s significant role in the EUNAVFOR MED operation Sophia too, which aims to undertake systematic efforts in order to identify, capture, and seize vessels and assets suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers, thereby contributing to wider EU efforts that focus on the disruption of the business model of human smuggling
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European Political Strategy Centre: Irregular Migration via the Central Mediterranean — From Emergency Responses to Systemic Solutions. February 2, 2017. <https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/ publications/strategic-notes/irregular-migration-central-mediterranean_en > Accessed: May 24, 2018. 46 Palm 2018. 47 Magri — Villa, February 26, 2018. 48 Melanie Fink — Kristof Gombeer — Jorrit Rijpma: In Search of a Safe Harbour for the Aquarius: The Troubled Waters of International and EU Law. EUMigrationLawblog.eu. July 9, 2018. <http:// eumigrationlawblog.eu/in-search-of-a-safe-harbour-for-the-aquarius-the-troubled-waters-ofinternational-and-eu-law/ > Accessed: May 12, 2018. 45
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean and on the prevention of further loss of life at sea.49 On 1 February, Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, launched its new operation, the Joint Operation Themis (which replaces operation Triton which was launched in 2014) in the Central Mediterranean to assist Italy in border control activities.50 Operation Themis intends to reflect the changing patterns of migration better and assist Italy in tracking down criminal activities, such as drug smuggling, across the Adriatic. The security component of Operation Themis includes the collection of intelligence and other steps aimed at detecting foreign fighters and other terrorist threats at the external borders. Its operational area spreads to the Central Mediterranean controlling sea areas close to Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Turkey, and Albania.51 From Libya to Niger: A new strategic and geopolitical direction in the management of migration, organised crime, and terrorism While political debates have mainly concentrated on Libya and the Mediterranean over the last period, the Italian government moved its focus further South, towards origin and transit countries in the Sahel. Niger, the prime passageway for the majority of Sub-Saharan migrants bound to Libya and then to Italy, was identified as a key partner for migration management. As a consequence, the country has recently become the main recipient of Italian aid, mainly through a budget support scheme for the development of local border management capacities.52 At the same time, Italy approved a military mission to Niger, with the intention to deploy 470 soldiers, 130 land vehicles, 2 military aircrafts and additional logistical equipment. Italy has described the mission as a “Security Force Assistance” operation, with the aim of training local forces (with its intention to make those forces capable of controlling the country’s borders in the long run), providing the security forces in Niger with technical and logistical support, as well as a direct engagement in border surveillance and control activities. Italy’s intention through its mission is the capacity building of the local forces in order to help their struggle against terrorism, organised crime, and human trafficking which have
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EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. <https://www.operationsophia.eu/about-us/ > Accessed: July 12, 2018. 50 European Political Strategy Centre: Irregular Migration via the Central Mediterranean — From Emergency Responses to Systemic Solutions. February 2, 2017. <https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/ publications/strategic-notes/irregular-migration-central-mediterranean_en > Accessed: May 24, 2018. 51 Frontex: Frontex Launching New Operation in Central Med. February 1, 2018. <https:// frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/frontex-launching-new-operationin-central-med-yKqSc7 > Accessed: June 24, 2018. 52 Palm 2018. 49
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E become increasingly popular businesses in the region.53 But the main strategic objectives of the mission are, undoubtedly, controlling the flow of illegal migrants from the region, stabilising Libya, as well as the surveillance of the Libya–Niger border.54 The fragmentation of power in Libya and the current fragile political situation have pushed Italy to try to support the country in all possible ways, not just from the Mediterranean but also from the southern part of the country. In the implementation of this objective, the military mission in Niger plays a prominent role. Niger, the prime passageway for the majority of Sub-Saharan migrants bound to Libya and then to Italy, was identified as a key partner for migration management. As a consequence, the country has recently become the main recipient of Italian aid, mainly through a budget support scheme for the development of local border management capacities. The fact that Italy moved its attention in an increasing way to the Sahel has an important message. After the country has been facing serious consequences of immigration (with strong impact on domestic politics as well), Italy is currently trying to move its geopolitical focus from the Libyan border further to the South. It has become clear that when trying to work out viable solutions for tackling illegal immigration, it is not enough anymore to concentrate on internal solutions, but it is highly demanded to examine the root causes of the problem. At the same time, it is worth considering other circumstances and factors as well, like the current fertility rates in the origin countries. According to current surveys, the population of Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to double by 2050 (reaching 2.2 billion people), while it might reach 4 billion by 2100.55 This population growth may certainly increase future migration trends, and at the same time, due to the complexity of problems existing in Africa and the various threatening factors, the number of migrants who can potentially leave their homes in the future can be significantly higher.56 Given the political and economic realities faced by many migrants, as well as the demographic pressures on the African continent, it remains clear than only a long-term solution could proactively address the situ ation in the countries of origin. Controlling irregular migrant flows is a political priority. However, any measures taken to channel and stem the
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Claudio Bertolotti: Rischi e opportunità della missione militare in Niger. January 18, 2018. ISPI. <https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/rischi-e-opportunita-della-missione-militareniger-19471 > Accessed: May 21, 2018. 54 Arturo Varvelli: Missione in Niger, ma per l’Italia l’obiettivo è la Libia. ISPI. January 18, 2018. <https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/missione-niger-ma-litalia-lobiettivoe-la-libia-19469 > Accessed: May 21, 2018. 55 Giovanni Carbore: Out Of Africa. Why People Migrate: Between a Rock and a Hard Place — Why Africans Migrate. ISPI. 2017. <https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/ out_of_africa_web.pdf > Accessed: May 24, 2018. 56 Carbore 2018. 53
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E flows must be taken in full respect of human rights, European values, and humanitarian obligations towards people in need of protection. Given the complexity and scale of the problem, the current situation can properly be addressed through a systemic, holistic solution that incorporates origin and transit countries, as well as all relevant European actors.
The Transatlantic partnership: The role of Italy The latest events in Syria showed once again the Italian political class’ difficulty in finding a clear and balanced position vis-à-vis international alliances. As expected, NATO’s April raids against Assad, in which Italy did not take part, resulted divisively for Italian parties. Although Italy has traditionally been one of the US’s most loyal allies, M5S and the League have repeatedly shown — even before March’s ballot — their sympathy for Putin’s Russia and their willingness to reduce Italian commitment in NATO’s missions. In the aftermath of the attack, Matteo Salvini’s League condemned the US decision as a mere pretext to punish Assad and claimed that reports of the Syrian chemical attack were basically “fake news.”57 Only after the intervention of the head of state, Sergio Mattarella, did party leaders all voice their support for Italy’s Western partners and rallied behind NATO. Also M5S leader Luigi Di Maio cautiously stated that Italian intentions are to stay close to their allies even if the end of the fighting in Syria will not be brought by a military victory but only by diplomacy. Similarly, Salvini moderated his attitude and expressed his party’s loyalty to NATO through condemning unilateral actions in Syria. Also, on the other side of the political continuum, the centre-left, represented by the former PM Paolo Gentiloni, echoed that Italy’s place is always next the United States, and for this reason, the country will provide logistical support for future NATO’s operations.58
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A latent unreliability in foreign politics has always been one of Italy’s main features and in all likelihood the new legislature will not diverge from its predecessors’ footsteps. The inconsistency of the country on the international stage is due to the strong influence of its peculiar domestic politics. The repeated and continuous turnover between left and right and the unpredictability and inadequacy of its political class, has often left Italy Salvini si schiera con la propaganda russa, “Fake news per sganciare altre bombe? Basta guerre, grazie.” Huffington Post. April 11, 2018. <https://www.huffingtonpost.it/2018/04/11/ salvini-si-schiera-con-la-propaganda-russa-fake-news-per-sganciare-altre-bombe-basta-guerregrazie_a_23408527/ > Accessed: July 10, 2018. 58 Massimiliano Di Giorgio — Steve Scherer: Italian Parties Pledge Backing for NATO amid Syrian Uncertainties. Reuters. April 12, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-politics/ italian-parties-pledge-backing-for-nato-amid-syrian-uncertainties-idUSKBN1HJ1ST > Accessed: July 8, 2018. 57
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E without a clear foreign politics strategy, and made it harder for the country to take full responsibility for its role as strategic power.59 In the aftermath of WWII, Italy was able to break out from its international political isolation by joining the projects of integration among western European countries, namely NATO and the EC. Placed in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea, a natural bridge towards North Africa and the Balkans, Italy’s “economic miracle” was only possible due to the American strategic interests that since then had been able to attract the country into Washington’s orbit. Already in 1949, Italy was the only defeated country which became one of the 12 founding members of NATO. The accession to the Atlantic Alliance made it possible for Italy to enjoy the benefits of the tight and peaceful relations with the major global powers, anchoring the country more firmly in the Western security and economic community. Furthermore, the integration within the Atlantic Alliance was also needed to Italy to regain its credibility as one of the main world powers, so that it was able to avoid the failure of the newborn system under the blows of an unstable and divided domestic political environment. At the same time, Italy also experienced the rise of the strongest Communist party in the non-Soviet Europe which was for decades Moscow’s favourite contact into the West.60 Clearly embedded in Cold War mechanisms, Italy has constantly played a dynamic role inside the Alliance, especially during the many crises that characterized this period, making the country one of the most loyal American allies. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union, Italy has also fully supported the enlargement process that has led to the current Alliance membership. Moreover, recent developments in the Middle East, North Africa, and Sahel (NATO’s so-called Southern flank), and the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, with the consequent demands for greater security from former Soviet countries (NATO’S Eastern flank), have given back a strategic centrality to Italy.
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But despite the central role that the country could play in this renewed geopolitical scenario, the repeated turnover of governments made it dif ficult for Italy to build a good international reputation. In fact, traditionally, left parties always advocated a closer European integration and a limi ted commitment within the NATO. On the other side, the centre-right, Le priorità dell’Italia prima, durante e dopo le elezioni. Limesonline. March 2, 2018. <http://www.limesonline.com/italia-elezioni-4-marzo-priorita-interesse-nazionalegeopolitica/105096 > Accessed: July 10, 2018. 60 Amadori 2018. 59
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E especially after 2001, offered to support Atlantic Alliance’s efforts mostly in the Middle East and in Iraq. Also, the new government, regardless of its political inclination, is expected to move within these two contrasting positions, even if Italy should keep in mind that the strongest warranties to its security come from NATO.61 As already mentioned, the most urgent crisis in Europe is in Ukraine, where Italy’s interests are at stake, and where the country is called to play an uneasy but fundamental role. The traditionally good Italian relations with Moscow made Rome sensitive and resulted in talks about the need to soften the excessive intransigent stances against the Russian Federation. Giuseppe Conte has stated that strengthening ties with Russia, as well as ending the EU’s sanctions against the country will be top priorities for the new government.62 In this context, Italy’s role is very delicate, as the country could find itself stuck between two conflicting parties’ interests. On the one side, Italy has the duty to pursue NATO’s strategic agenda, the members of which are still not considering to repeal the current sanctions policy. On the other side, Russia represents one of the main trade partners of Italy and a policy of long-lasting and hard sanctions will affect the country’s — already fragile — economy negatively.63 Taking these elements into account, it is important to note that today Italy enjoys a certain level of credibility within NATO again, thanks to its constant and valid contribution, via both international missions and exercises/deployment of military assets in the territory of member states. With particular reference to the Eastern flank, Italy made its commitment clear, regarding both the reassurance measures decided at the Wales Summit, where the leaders of NATO’s member states reaffirmed their pledge to spend the equivalent of at least 2% of their GDP on defence and 20% of that on new equipment, and in Warsaw in 2016, namely to deploy an Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) of four international battalions in the three Baltic States and Poland on a rotational basis.64 In fact, Italy is effectively contributing to the framework of the EFP with 140 units to the
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Alessandro Marrone: The White Paper: A Strategy for Italy’s Defence Policy. IAI. May 30, 2015. <http://www.iai.it/en/node/4239 > Accessed: July 20, 2018. 62 Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte’s Inaugural Speech. Reuters. June 5, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-politics-speech-highlights/highlights-italian-prime minister-giuseppe-contes-inaugural-speech-idUSKCN1J118M > Accessed: June 5, 2018. 63 Aldo Ferrari — Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti: Europa: credibili per contare /3: Rilancio del dialogo con la Russia. ISPI. February 26, 2018. <https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/ rilancio-del-dialogo-con-la-russia-19716 > Accessed: July 6, 2018. 64 NATO: Boosting NATO’s Presence in the East and Southeast. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. March 2, 2018. <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm > Accessed: July 25, 2018. 61
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E Canadian-led battalion, however, is not clear yet if the next government will be able to improve Italy’s expenditure share still blocked at 1.15% of the GDP.65 Moreover, in 2018 Italy will be the leading nation of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF).66 However, according to recent declarations of the former Defence Minister Roberta Pinotti, Italy expressed its willingness to limit the size of its commitment and the deployment of its forces in order to avoid exacerbations of confrontational tones with Moscow. In this perspective, Italy should demonstrate its ability in maintaining the channel for political dialogue, while making attempts to soften the position of those Central Eastern European countries that, for historical reasons, are wary of a resurgence of the Russian power.67 Moreover, next to the crucial situation in Ukraine, Russia’s strong political and military involvement in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean area has heightened concerns also in reference to NATO’s Southern flank. Therefore, from the Italian point of view, in order to maintain the delicate balance, it became even more vital to continue promoting an approach based on dialogue with Moscow, by exploiting the full potential of its diplomacy.68 In fact, even if in the last months the main attention was on issues related to the Eastern flank, Italy, together with other South-European NATO members, has been able to point out the growing challenges and threats emanating from the South. Following this approach, it was possible to devise a first line of intervention in the South through the introduction of new threat categories, such as “non-state actors that have state-like aspirations, capabilities, and resources.” Despite this small success for Italy, the initiation of NATO missions in the Mediterranean area and in the Middle East is expected to be very delicate, and in some circumstances their effects on the stabilization of the area are unpredictable and maybe counterproductive for the security of its member states. Also, in this sense Italy has an important political role to play, since the country could become the biggest advocate of new dialogues
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La Stampa: Scheda: spese per la difesa, i 21 Paesi Nato lontani dal target del 2 per cento. La Stampa. July 12, 2018. <http://www.lastampa.it/2018/07/12/esteri/ scheda-spese-per-la-difesa-i-paesi-nato-lontani-dal-target-del-per-centoMGJiw4QYqmEfAusS4iOVwN/pagina.html > Accessed: July 12, 2018. 66 Ministero della Difesa: NATO: a Italia il comando della componente terrestre della NRF. Difesa.it. January 10, 2018. <https://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Pagine/nato-a-Italia-comandocomponente-terrestre-nrf.aspx > Accessed: July 12, 2018. 67 Francesca Bitondo — Alessandro Marrone — Paola Sartori: Challenges to NATO and Italy’s Role: Trump, Brexit, Collective Defence and Neighborhood Stability. IAI. January, 2017. <http:// www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai1618e.pdf > Accessed: July 8, 2018. 68 NATO: Warsaw Summit Communiqué, cit., para. 42. The full text of the Summit is available at <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm > Accessed: July 10, 2018. 65
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E and new institutional and military cooperation in the region. The revitalization of NATO partnerships, namely the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, should represent an imperative priority for the new Italian government.69 A further crucial point in the Italian agenda regarding the stability on the Southern flank is the activation of defence capacity building missions in order to empower the regional actors to stand firmly against terrorism and those actors which represent a threat to stability. These kinds of activities shall also involve partner countries that are currently stable but are also more vulnerable to the activities of extremist and terrorist groups, such as Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco. Another main partner is Libya, where NATO countries, besides giving support in countering arms trafficking activities, are contributing to the development of a defence capacity-building domain. The member states recognised the current government in Tripoli as the sole legitimate Libyan interlocutor and paved the way to the possibility to start assistance initiatives for the formation of its military institutions, to complement the EU efforts in training and build-up of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy.70 Thus, NATO’s operational support to the legitimate Libyan government largely depends on the achievement of an agreement among the main regional actors and major member states of the Alliance. Furthermore, another main objective for the new Italian government and for its European partners should be to ensure the commitment of US and of the whole international community to the fight against ISIS. In fact, with the election of Donald Trump, the Alliance is dealing with a president who has less faith in the international institutions and alliances that the US has built up over decades than his predecessors. President Trump considers these institutions mere tools at the service of the immediate American national interest, to be abandoned or modified if they no longer serve this purpose.71 Undoubtedly, the Italian government will have to consider every one of these variables in the light of the uncertainty about Trump’s foreign and defence policy, and also considering the impact of Brexit on the Euro-Atlantic security environment. For example, last year,
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Paola Sartori — Alessandro Marrone: Italian Defence Policy between NATO and the White Paper. IAI. December 10, 2015. <http://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/italian-defence-policy-betweennato-and-white-paper > Accessed: July 8, 2018. 70 EEAS Press Team: EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia starts training of Libyan Navy Coast Guard and Libyan Navy. EEAS. October 27, 2016. <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/ headquarters-homepage/13195/eunavfor-med-operation-sophia-starts-training-of-libyan-navycoast-guard-and-libyan-navy_en > Accessed: July 10, 2018. 71 James Goldgeier: President Trump Goes to Europe This Week. Its Leaders Are Bracing for the Impact. The Washington Post. July 9, 2018. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ monkey-cage/wp/2018/07/09/president-trump-goes-to-europe-this-week-its-leadersare-bracing-for-the-impact/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6eceea6e30d1 > Accessed: July 12, 2018. 69
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E Italian Defence Minister Roberta Pinotti announced that, after ISIS suffered huge losses in Iraq and Syria, Italy intends to reduce its military commitment in Iraq and Afghanistan. Pinotti justified this stance, arguing that, considering the close proximity of the Mediterranean region, Italy’s strategic interest has to be mainly concentrated on that region, while its presence in the Middle East should diminish. The Italian mission in Niger is a good example for this new approach in Italian foreign policy: investing more sources and paying far more attention to the Sahel region with the intention to try to stem criminal activities and terrorism as well as reducing migratory pressures.72 Lastly, Italy was designated to hold OSCE’s rotating Chairmanship in 2018, which is expected to give the country a major opportunity to increase the visibility of its diplomacy. The chance to coordinate the decision-making process and the priorities for the Organization’s activities in the field of security and cooperation in Europe is expected to be very relevant today, particularly after the re-emerging of the cleavage between East and West. In this context, Italy’s main purposes are, on the one hand, to facilitate the political management of the crisis at the intergovernmental level (namely among Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France), while on the other hand, to make possible the application of the ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia following the Minsk protocol within the OSCE.73
Prospects for the future: How will the new yellow-green government shape the foreign policy of Italy?
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After a long period of negotiations and uncertainty, the political deadlock in Italy has finally reached an endpoint. Since 1 June 2018, the country has a new government supported by the M5S and the League. Although the new leadership has already expressed some ideas and plans regarding the foreign policy goals, it is still hard to foresee the future of relations with NATO, the United States, the European Union, and countries within the Mediterranean region. The previous Eurosceptic attitude, emphasized by the M5S and the League, had created many doubts and uncertainty. The criticism voiced by Brussels and the single currency still belong to the most popular and most discussed topics of the new, populist and anti-establishment yellow-green coalition. The future rhetoric towards the European Union, as well as the Redazione Analisi Difesa, Pinotti: Missione in Niger e meno truppe in Iraq e Afghanistan. Analisi Difesa. December 18, 2017. <http://www.analisidifesa.it/2017/12/pinotti-missione-in-niger-e meno-truppe-in-iraq-e-afghanistan/ > Accessed: May 15, 2018. 73 Giancarlo Aragona: Salvaguardare il Legame Transatlantico. ISPI. February 26, 2018. <https:// www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/salvaguardare-il-legame-transatlantico-19712 > Accessed: June 11, 2018. 72
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E communication with regards to questions such as immigration could have serious impacts on future relations. Italy’s new interior minister, Matteo Salvini’s comment about migration, for example, has already created tensions with Tunisia, as the minister said “Tunisia is a free and democratic country that isn’t exporting gentlemen, it seems more often they’re exporting convicts.”74 And yet, he added, it does not seem that Tunisia experiences “wars, pestilence, or famines.” Undoubtedly, it would be essential for Italy to care about the relations with all three areas of the “Three Circles Approach” to be able to tackle complex and heterogeneous problems and challenges, as well as to satisfy its own political and economic interests. Italy’s presence within each of the three spheres has proven itself both self-reinforcing and mutually reinforcing, making it impossible for the country to survive without the simultaneous activity in each field. Undoubtedly, to become a credible and serious actor in the international sphere, it must be a priority for the country to tackle its own issues first. Xenophobic and anti-immigrant rhetoric during the electoral campaign generated fear and anger in the society, as well as in the political life. High unemployment rate and public debt, emigration of young citizens and the issue of immigration, as well as the need of structural reforms are just a few of the most serious challenges that the new government should handle in the long run. To be able to effectively handle these serious challenges, it is not enough to have a new government; Italy would need a stable and durable administration too. Despite the previous efforts, the country was not able to achieve that goal in the last few years. There are many challenges in foreign affairs that would require the attention of the new Italian government: a transforming Europe, an unpredictable United States, a fragile political situation in Libya, a still unending war in Syria, and the increasing number of unstable states in Africa and in the Middle East. The growing number of transnational and global challenges, e.g. terrorism, human trafficking, energy security, migration, or global warming are still such issues that require a common, harmonized action by the international community. The Mediterranean region is no longer what it used to be once: migration, organized crime, terrorism, and the question of energy security have made the region a far more pressing priority. Considering the geopolitical importance and the proximity of the
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Salvini: Tunisia democratica ma spesso esporta galeotti. ANSA. June 4, 2018. <http://www.ansa.it/ sito/notizie/politica/2018/06/03/salvinitunisia-democratica-ma-spesso-esporta-galeotti-_ cf77b99d-fff9-47f9-88d8-930e4ddf0550.html > Accessed: July 12, 2018. 74
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A N TA L L J ÓZ S E F K N O W L E D G E C E N T R E region, a peaceful and prosperous Mare Nostrum is critically important to guarantee a secure future for both the country and Europe. There is no doubt that in a complex and conflictual multipolar world, Italy, as a mid-sized power, is simply too small to effectively deal with the challenges of the Mediterranean region. As a consequence, its membership in the European Union and NATO, as well as maintaining strong bilateral relations with the traditional partners are crucial elements of the foreign policy and a guarantee for staying involved in important decision-making processes. At the same time, it should repeatedly be emphasized that in order to be a credible and effective actor in international relations, Italy firstly needs to solve its own, complex internal affairs and challenges.
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