A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E
A FORMING NEW POLITICAL IDENTITY FOR JAPAN
EMESE SCHWARCZ
COMMENTARY AJRC-Analyses 2019A02
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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E
AJRC-Analyses Series of the Antall József Knowledge Centre
Publisher-in-Chief: Péter Antall Managing editor: Tamás Péter Baranyi Editorial office: Antall József Knowledge Centre H-1093 Budapest, Czuczor Street 2
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© Emese Schwarcz, 2019 © Antall József Knowledge Centre, 2019 ISSN 2416-1705
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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E A FORMING NEW POLITICAL IDENTITY FOR JAPAN EMESE SCHWARCZ Nationalism and revisionism has been growingly a part of international discussions about Japan in the past 15-or-so years, and it does not seem to simmer down anytime soon. On the contrary, the Abe administration seems to accelerate not only the public debate about the phenomena, but the movement itself too. During these debates, much of the calculations are about the relevance of nationalism and how much influence does it – really – have. However, it is not easy to measure such thing even for Japanese experts, because although nationalists represent themselves in the civic society and on the political level also, their reputation differs greatly. Therefore, it is hard to say how successful they are with their agenda. This duality in their reputation however is easier to explain. It all comes back to the contest of two strong political identities in the Heisei-era (1989–). One identity is already given and it is the pacifist. This mindset was developed after WWII, and highly influenced by the atomic bomb droppings on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. The horrors of the war and the utter destruction drove the society towards a deep and unwavering faith in pacifism. Of course this sentiment was reinforced by the most prized product of the American Occupation (1945-1952): the pacifist clause of the new constitution, the Article 9.1 This article ensures that Japan is demilitarized, as it prohibits the country to maintain ground, air and maritime troops, as well as waging wars as a method of solving international disputes. The first post-war cabinet acted thusly: Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru established a political framework to facilitate pacifism by enacting the Yoshida Doctrine. The Doctrine stated, that Japan’s foreign policy should concentrate on rebuilding the country both economically and physically, limiting any involvement in international disputes and issues. To solve the question of security, the nation relied heavily on the newfound U.S. presence, allowing troops to build and populate military bases on the territory of Japan.2 Lifting the burden of security from the shoulders of the Japanese leadership in a highly
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1 Occupation (of Japan). Encyclopaedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/event/occupationof-Japan > Accessed: 20 November 2018. 2 Kenneth B. Pyle, (n.d.): Changing Conceptions of Japan’s International Role. In: Herbert J. Ellison, Japan and the Pacific Quadrille. The Major Powers in East Asia, Boulder, London, 1987. <https://stacks. stanford.edu/file/druid:zr080tb5416/zr080tb5416.pdf > Accessed 20 December 2018.
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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E unstable atmosphere such as the Cold War, has built a comfortable enclosure for the Japanese society to foster the idea that even without army or waging war, the country can prosper and develop all the same. Of course the American leadership did not intend to be so altruistic in this scheme. Setting up military bases at the heart of the East Asian region gave tremendous leverage for gaining power and influence, and these installations functioned also as watchtowers over Russia during the years of the Cold War. Regarding the security-for-free aspect, the U.S. came to regret the demilitarization of Japan pretty soon. Come the Korean War in 1950, the U.S. leadership had called Yoshida to make preparations for a constitutional revision, for the Americans were in dire need of military backup in Korea. Yoshida – embracing the pacifist course line – had managed to pull out of this situation by emphasizing to the Americans that due to the casualties in WWII, Japan has no resource or capacity for an armed conflict.3 Thus the pacifist system was established on the political level too. Of course that does not mean that the Japanese authorities were not aware of the shortcomings of depending on the U.S. regarding defense. The Korean War relocated a significant amount of troops from the territory of Japan, which triggered the government to reconsider the question, especially due to the fears from the Soviet proximity. This led to the birth of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in 1954, that soon became a major breaking point with regards to the question of Japan’s political identity.4 Although the SDF first started as a relatively insignificant policing authority on clearly volunteer bases, its numbers and capacity has been growing ever since. In international interpretation, the SDF is considered Japan’s military force, although both by the constitution and by its own regulation the SDF can only perform and take part in peacekeeping and defense activities, such as disaster relief. Even its diversification into ground, air and maritime forces reminds the Japanese to a full-fledged army, but the leadership has been very careful not to employ offensive capabilities both in arms and scope of action. Nevertheless, the SDF received little to no support from the society. By setting the annual defense budget to 1% of the GDP, a symbolic move was put forward, but by the exceptional increase in overall GDP, the defense budget has increased as well. By a lot. The birth of the Self-Defense Forces was not the only dividing line in
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3 Japanese Military During World War II, Asia Perspectives, translation: Suzanne O’Brien. Columbia University Press, New York, 2000. 4 Jeff Kingston: Contemporary Japan. History, Politics, and Social Change Since the 1980s, 2nd edition. John Wiley & Sons Inc, New York, 2012.
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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E the society, as the Yasukuni Shrine, historical re-interpretations, the comfort women issue5, and changes in societal sentiments due to the rapidly aging society, all play major role in dividing the Japanese into two camps. The 1978 enshrinement of 14 A-class war criminals in Yasukuni Shrine created the first boost to the emergence of nationalism, that can be regarded as an answer to the pacifist culture, to the American influence, and the changing regional power balance. These nationalists applauded the enshrinement, and stood forward with a differing historical interpretation, that lifts the blame from Imperial Japan, and puts the wartime leadership into the victim’s position. This stance justifies the occupation of Manchukuo and the Korean Peninsula – among many other Pacific territory – and completely denies the existence of the aforementioned comfort women system, the human experiments, and the forced labor. Because of the broad aspect of this historical re-interpretation, nationalists and ultranationalists are often grouped together and hard to tell apart, but nevertheless they are widely frowned upon and condemned by the average Japanese. And this is easily understandable for many reasons, especially because the movement created quite a lot of tangible concerns for the country as a whole. The most prominent consequence is the weakening of political ties with China and South Korea. The population of both of these countries – as well as North Korea’s – suffered a lot under the Japanese oppression, therefore it is only predictable that these nations would not tolerate any action from the Japanese government that would resemble the thoughts of the nationalist movement. But what actions are we talking about? First of all, the two main questions are: who and what. It is important to emphasize that from the beginning of the new millennium, identifying members of nationalist groups has been easier and easier. In an international point of view, this became relevant when the number of such identified cabinet ministers had started to grow. PM Junichiro Koizumi chose more than five members of such groups to serve as cabinet minister. To name a few, Shinzo Abe, Taro Aso, Yuriko Koike, and Fumio Kishida all served in the Koizumi cabinet before, each of them now being a prominent figure in politics. As for the question of what most of the disputes between the nations escalated, when such political leaders and cabinet members had decided on various
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5 Comfort women are girls and women forced into prostitution during the Japanese occupation in Korea and the World War II. The issue stems from South Korea accusing Japan of not taking enough responsibility for these women, and Japan insisting that they already did. See for example: Yoshiaki Yoshimi: Comfort Women. Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military During World War II, Asia Perspectives, translation: Suzanne O’Brien. Columbia University Press, New York, 2000.
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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E commemorative occasions to pay their respects to the enshrined souls of Yasukuni. Even though these politicians defended themselves by saying that their respect targeted all those who lost their lives for the country, this gesture seemed like they revere the war criminals all the same. This, along with the outspoken faith of the far-right that Japan carried out a war of liberation during WWII, gave the impression to the neighbours that Japan is not repentant, is not willing to take responsibility for the destruction, and can become dangerous and hostile in the future if this ideology prevails. This “victim ideology” of the ultranationalists can be interpreted as a counter to the pacifist course line, that gave birth to the apology diplomacy, which was used as a foreign policy strategy towards those countries that were devastated by Japan during the war.6 According to ultranationalists, the apology diplomacy created a weak image of Japan, burdened by a sense of inferiority and bowing down to the world.7 The new constitution edited by the Americans served the same goal in this sense. Supposedly, this new humiliating image is aimed at demonizing the Japanese civilization, with all of its heritage and characteristics. This imaginary oppression of the Japanese culture inflicted a movement to restore the cultural and political values of the Meiji (1868-1912) and the early Shōwa-era (1926–1989), which was a period of development, prosperity and territorial expansion. Not to mention woman oppression, stronger discrimination against races and minorities, and the statesponsored ideology. The representatives of this widely condemned philosophy formed a notable amount of groups, called the uyoku dantai.8 The expression uyoku dantai includes over 1000 far-right, more specifically ultranationalist groups, that gather members with specified aims:
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1. To revise the constitution, so Article 9 becomes obsolete and establish an army with offensive capabilities. 2. To revise history textbooks used in educational facilities, so the current “masochist” view of the history is corrected, and Japan’s role in WWII is justified. 3. To restore Meiji-era values of patriarchy, family, and patriotism. 4. To restore the Emperor’s role as the effective head of the nation. 5. To restate Japanese authority on disputed territories, such as Takeshima island, Senkaku islands, and the Kuriles. 6 Japan and the Power of an Apology. Journal of Diplomacy. 15 September 2015. <http://blogs.shu. edu/diplomacy/2015/09/japan-and-the-power-of-an-apology/ > Accessed: 13 March 2019. 7 Right side up. The Economist. 4 June 2015. <https://www.economist.com/asia/2015/06/04/rightside-up > Accessed: 7 July 2016. 8 Japan’s Abe Sends Offering to Yasukuni Imperial War Shrine. Telesur. 20 April 2017. <https:// www.telesurenglish.net/news/Japans-Abe-Sends-Offering-to-Yasukuni-Imperial-WarShrine-20170420-0044.html >. Accessed: 6 March 2019.
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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E The uyoku groups are diverse in number and association. Some are activist groups, political parties, or movements. The groups have a tendency to be associated with the yakuza, and there is a reason for that. The Japanese constitution protects freedom of ideology, therefore the police forces are powerless against them. The yakuza utilizes this advantage and sometimes operates under the uyoku flag to reach a wider audience for the sake of recruiting.9 While most uyoku groups are mostly marginalized, there are some notable exceptions that are highly active, gaining more and more international attention. These are the Japan First Party, the Zaitokukai, and the most prominent group, the Nippon Kaigi. The Japan First Party is gaining more and more attention since 2016 – which is the year of its founding – due to their controversial behavior. Such was the October 14 rally, dubbed Anti-Immigrants Day in Tokyo in 2018, that resulted in an unlikely amount of counter-demonstration by the locals.10 The rally was organized as a reaction to the governmentproposed bill on the immigration law, introducing two new visa types to let more foreign labor into the country. The main concern of theirs is that the increased number of foreigners will boost the crime rate, thus draining the tax payers’ money in order to control the situation. The locals reacted fast by obstructing the rally with signs saying “Ginza against racism” and “Stop the hate and go home racists”.11 The Anti-Immigrants Day was not the first in line for the Japan First Party. In 2017, the party organized another “hate” rally, but this time it was against Korean nationals, which induced the same kind of counter from the locals in Kawasaki. As a result, Kawasaki became the first city to introduce hate-speech banning measures in public spaces. The notion to rally against specifically Koreans is not by chance, because the leader of the party, Sakurai Makoto is in fact also the ex-leader of the ultranationalist group targeting mainly Koreans, the Zaitokukai. The Zaitokukai, or the Citizens’ League to Deny Foreigners Special Rights, was established in 2006, right at the end of the Koizumi-era (2001-2006), who was famous for heating up tensions with China and the two Koreas by visiting the Yasukuni Shrine quite regularly. These tensions gave a relatively safe ground to the uyoku dantai to breed and expand, hence
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9 Old Habits Die Hard. The Economist. 17 May 2007. <https://www.economist.com/asia/2007/05/17/ old-habits-die-hard >. Accessed: 5 December 2018. 10 Anti-racism Protests Held to Counteract Far-right Marches. Civicus. 5 December 2018. https:// monitor.civicus.org/newsfeed/2018/12/05/anti-racism-protests-held-counteract-far-rightmarches/ >. Accessed: 11 December 2018. 11 Far Right Group Staging a Nationwide “Anti Immigrant” Day. Gaijin Pot. 14 October 2018. Retrieved: December 11, 2018, https://blog.gaijinpot.com/far-right-group-staging-a-nationwide-antiimmigrant-day/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=facebook
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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E the Zaitokukai was born. It is important to note, that the Zaitokukai has a very distinct target group rather than Koreans in general, and that is the Korean minority residing in Japan since the WWII, better known as Zainichi Koreans. These Koreans were either brought to Japan as cheap labor from the occupied territories, or they moved there by free will. The Japanese state did not provide them Japanese nationality after the war, but a permanent residency, leaving them in an ambiguous legal state.12 Aside from historical differences, the rise of racial discrimination in the Japanese society was mainly an effect of the changes in the international situation. The rise of China as a global economic power, the strengthening North Korean threat, and the voices of the South Korean comfort women gave the impression to the members of the Zaitokukai, that Japan became an easy target, and a weak and powerless member of the international community. Weak, because starting from the 1990s – up until Abe Shinzō – the once stable Japan’s political machinery has been victim to the revolving-door prime ministers, having a new prime minister almost each year, thus unable to represent Japan effectively on the global stage. And also powerless, because above the political disadvantages, Japan has been also without “legally” sufficient military capacities, thus being liable to the rising North Korean threat. These perceptions have morphed into xenophobia, where the easiest target are the already present minorities. However, the Zaitokukai currently houses around 12,000 members out of a population of 126 million, but usually their protests and events can only pull in around 50 people. Even if this number is low, it is hard to measure the influence of the Zaitokukai, because their activity is mainly present in the online space. The third group worth mentioning is a little bit different from all the other uyoku dantai, for the Nippon Kaigi – often translated as Japan Conference – is a well-established grassroots association, that has penetrated not only Japan’s bureaucracy, but its highest tier of politics too. Nippon Kaigi serves as the core of the far-right movement, attracting roughly 38,000 fee-paying members with the ultimate goal of abolishing Article 9, reestablishing patriotism in the education, and with often xenophobic and patriarchal tendencies. Well-known members are presidents and CEOs of corporations, members of religious groups (notably the Association of Shinto Shrines) and several members of the leading political party, the Liberal Democratic Party. Out of the currently 20 cabinet members, 14 are member of the Nippon Kaigi, including the
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12 Discrimination Against Koreans in Japan: Japan’s Violation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Lawyers Association of Zainichi Koreans. 24 July 2014. <https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/JPN/INT_CERD_ NGO_JPN_17768_E.pdf >. Accessed: 12 December 2018.
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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E prime minister, Abe Shinzō himself too. These developments did not go unnoticed in the neighbouring countries, which started to express concern for the future of Japan. But while many identify a rightist conservative turn in Japanese politics, the society seems to disapprove of the Kaigi-esque policies of the government, namely the constitutional amendment. This poses a great challenge to the right-wing politicians, because the amendment can only be delivered if there is a referendum with a positive outcome. To achieve this goal and expand their circles, these right-wing groups have several tools at hand, utilizing both traditional and social media. By traditional media, Culture Channel Sakura is the most prominent, not only eluding traditional values and nationalist agenda on satellite television, but maintaining a fairly active YouTube channel and its Japanese counterpart, Niconico Douga channel.13 Ultranationalists has been effectively utilizing the anonymous aspect of the cyberspace using the forum 2-chan, so much so that a new slang term has been used for these internet trolls and pundits: netto-uyo (internet right-wingers), an abbreviation for netto-uyoku. But not only online commenters are expressing nationalist views effectively. There is an interesting English language website reporting political news powered by the pro-government news outlet Sankei Shimbun, called Japan Forward. The alleged goal of Japan Forward is to exhibit the “real Japan” that bypasses stereotypes and generalization often displayed in international media. What the About Page is not listing is that the articles and analyses often represent the government’s rightleaning ideas and orientation, creating a more professional circle in the online space.14 Yasuda Kōichi, a well-known freelance journalist specializing in internet nationalism, connected the birth of the netto-uyo and the Zaitokukai’s racist views to the economic and social isolation of the growing numbers of the working poor.15 Jeff Kingston applied a similar theory in saying that the lack of transition between the era of “economic miracle” and the deepening recession at the beginning of the Heisei-era pushed many people into a hopeless situation, where lifetime employment and financial gratification was no longer an option.16 The economic troubles
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13 Rumi Sakamoto: ‚Koreans, Go Home!’ Internet Nationalism in Contemporary Japan as a Digitally Mediated Subculture「コリアンズ ゴーホーム」現代日本におけるデジタル方式下位文化としてのインターネット・ナショ ナリズム. The Asia-Pacific Journal. 7 March 2011. <https://apjjf.org/2011/9/10/Rumi-SAKAMOTO/3497/ article.html >. Accessed: 17 December 2018. 14 David McNeill: When „Forward” Means „Right”. The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan. 31 March 2017. <http://www.fccj.or.jp/number-1-shimbun/item/927-when-forward-means-right/927-whenforward-means-right.html >. Accessed: 17 December 2018. 15
Sakamoto, 2011
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Kingston, 2012
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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E of the country have drove a lot of young people into the arms of the yakuza, that uses at least half of the uyoku daintai as a front for its activity, triggering the National Police Agency to closely monitor these groups. Probably this is a reason for the occasional violent manifestation of these nationalist views, such as setting fire to a liberal politician’s family home in 2006, or the assassination of the (leftist) mayor of Nagasaki. 17 It is apparent, that this emerging ultranationalism is a multi-layered phenomenon, creeping into not only the social sphere, but increasingly into politics too. The internet vandalism that a marginalized group started on social media is hand-in-hand with the more and more right-leaning politics and the Nippon Kaigi occupying the Abe cabinet. Nationalism seems to be coming from the political, economic, and social insecurities caused by the sudden punch of the recession in the 1990s, and the lack of strong statesman to manage it. Without strong and stable governments, the political identity is ambiguous, leaving it to the society to decide. In this sense, the remnants of pacifism got challenged by a slowly growing group, that questions liberal thoughts, and lean more to the era before the WWII, imagining it as a once stable and strong nation. Denying war crimes and revering the Meiji-era social values is undeniably a way to battle insecurities regarding the Japanese identity, and rather than accepting and developing a new one that is compatible with the 21st century, these people seem to rely on an old concept, that they know has worked for a long time. It is difficult to tell what might change their world view but it is imperative that a strong and modern minded leader defines a political identity that might stabilize the country’s position in the international order, especially with China and the Koreas. As much as the international media is prone to deem PM Abe Shinzō as an ultranationalist politician due to his ties with the Nippon Kaigi, it is important to distinguish his current term from his first one in 2007. While the first time in office he sought to gain influence and stability through relying on the new nationalist wave by advocating patriotic education and highly edited history textbooks, his second term in 2012 proved to be built on stabilizing the economy and friendlier engagement with the neighbouring countries. And thus in the past 6 years he was not keen on promoting Kaigi-esque goals until he was reelected last year for the last possible time. Although he was always vocal of his ambition to amend the constitution, he waited till his last term to really set it as a policy goal. This again triggered many experts to emphasize his nationalist orientation, for he wants to legalize the Self-Defense Forces to defend
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17 Facing down the Yakuza. The Economist. 25 April 2007. https://www.economist.com/ asia/2007/04/25/facing-down-the-yakuza >. Accessed: 6 March 2019.
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A N TA L L J Ó Z S E F K N OW L E D G E C E N T R E against a possible North Korean attack. This again comes partially from the uncomfortable reliance on the U.S. forces in Japan. Currently, Abe seems to develop a confident identity, that gains power by maintaining defensive capabilities while keeping friendly relations with the countries in the region (as well). Of course the biggest obstacle in this latter one is the Nippon Kaigi and the uyoku dantai itself. China and the Koreas are very well-aware of these groups, and pay significant attention to them while conversing with Japan. It might be a very much possible scenario, that the neighbours will not be ready to be a true ally to Japan until these ultranationalist voices are silenced, even though many politicians rely on them for pulling in additional voter base. And the aging society does not help in this, considering that the older generations are more keen to vote for post-war Japan’s most successful political party, the LDP, which happens to employ conservative and often nationalist policies and politicians.18 So what is to come? Plenty more can be discussed about this topic, such as the comfort women issue, the history textbook controversy, and the occasional racist expressions of some of the ruling party politicians, and many other platforms has done so.19 But Abe Shinzo’s term ends in 2021, which does not bode well for political stability. Already a couple of possible successors have shown their faces briefly in the 2017 upper house elections, two of them affiliated with the Nippon Kaigi (Shigeru Ishiba and Fumio Kishida), but it is not yet apparent who will have a strong enough base and principle to solidify a new and modern political identity for Japan.
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18 Teen Voters and Politics in Japan. Nippon.com. 19 August 2016. <https://www.nippon.com/en/ currents/d00231/teen-voters-and-politics-in-japan.html >. Accessed: 7 March 2019 19 Rob Fahey: Koike’s Korean Problem. Tokyo Review. 1 September 2017. <http://www.tokyoreview. net/2017/09/koike-korean-problem/ >. Accessed: 19 December 2018.
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