In_Focus_2020_03_A Regime Change(d)_Web by Antall József Tudásközpont

I N F O C US

2020. 3rd Issue ISSN 2677-111X

Global context

National narratives

Commentaries and assessments

A Regime Change(d), 1987â&#x20AC;&#x201C;1993

IN FOCUS

2020. 3rd Issue ISSN 2677-111X

A Regime Change(d), 1987â&#x20AC;&#x201C;1993

All rights reserved. Articles found in this publication are the intellectual property of the Antall JĂłzsef Knowledge Centre. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher. The views and opinions expressed in this issue are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of AJKC.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Welcoming Words

2 Introduction 6 Turning Points 8 The Long Preparation for Day X— In Conversation with Péter Antall, Director of The Antall József Knowledge Centre 12 Interview with Gergely Gulyás, Minister of the Prime Minister’s Office 32 Interview with Frank Spengler, the Resident Representative of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Hungary 35

3 A Wide-Angle Landscape The Third Wave—The End of Communism and Anti-communism in the 1980s The End of Communism and the Political Transformation of the Visegrad Four (V4) Countries Portugal: The Beginning of the 20th Century’s Last Wave of Democratisation An Important Point in the Third Wave of Global Democratisation: Athens, 1974 The Croatian and Slovenian Way of Independence and Regime Change Between Regime Change and Democratic Consolidation: Serbia, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina

38 40

150 156

6 József Antall The Goals and Steps of József Antall’s Foreign Policy József Antall’s Christian Democratic Political Thoughts Expectations about the Rule of Law around the Regime Change—Formal and Material Constitutional State and Questions Preceding the Law

164 166 173

184

7 Antall József Knowledge Centre

190

8 Authors Guest of Authors Authors of AJKC

Narratives 84 Regime Change and Revolution 86 Regime Change or Revolution? 93 Well, You Should Have Directed It—Hungarian Film and the Regime Change 98 A Conversation with Károly Grósz in Gödöllő 104

192 192 194

9 References of Pictures and Used Data

TABLE OF CONTENTS

126 128 131 144

A Change of Direction Perestroika and Regime Change in Hungary Constitutionality and Legal Transition The Newborn Multiparty System Freedom—Freiheit—Szabadság: The Effect of the Regime Change on Everyday Life The Short History of the Economic Regime Change

196

10 Next Issue

202

WELCOMING WORDS

Dear Readers, Thirty years have passed since the countries of Central and Eastern Europe could ﬁnally turn their backs on the communist regimes that had been forced on them after World War II and separated them from the rest of Europe with an Iron Curtain. The fall of the regime and the return of democracy after forty years of oppression surprised many in Hungary, since it did not come after years of brutally disbanded strikes and workers’ demonstrations, as in Poland, or after overwhelming mass movements, as in Czechoslovakia. Behind the everyday mask of János Kádár’s communist state “with a human face,” most people did not perceive the signs showing the decline of the system, among them the probing negotiations between the opposition groups that were turning into new parties and the state party’s reformers who were busy trying to cling to some power. The high point of these negotiations, as it seems now in the public eye, was the emergence of the National Round Table. It was in its talks that the whole country got to know József Antall, one of the delegates from the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the ﬁrst prime minister of Hungary after the regime.

Maybe because of the high expectations of society, judgement on the first years has been ambiguous: most people probably trusted and believed that their newly independent Central European states were only a stone’s throw from the West. Despite the occasional bitter experience, thirty years on, we now have enough of a historical distance to claim that the overall account of the changes has been positive. To commemorate the anniversary, this year we put together the Hungarian issue of Fókuszban and also one of the English issues of In Focus to evaluate the changes and to highlight the most important lessons they had for the present and the future. While our publication would like to help those who witnessed the changes to remember and those who were not there to understand them, we would also like to honour József Antall and his work. Péter Dobrowiecki Head of Research József Antall Knowledge Centre

WELCOMING WORDS

INTRODUCTION

TURNING POINTS 19 85

19 87

11 March

27 September

19 88

30 March THE FORMATION OF FIDESZ

GORBACHEV IS APPOINTED GENERAL SECRETARY The appointment of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev initiated the process leading to the dissolution of the Soviet Union despite the general secretary’s attempted reforms which inadvertently speeded up the process.

19 August

THE FIRST LAKITELEK MEETING AND THE FOUNDING OF THE HUNGARIAN DEMOCRATIC FORUM (MDF) The Lakitelek meeting was a consultation forum organised by democratic opposition members critical of the regime of the day. The forum aimed to discuss the problems posed by a singleparty state.

A youth organisation at Bibó István College for Advanced Studies decided to form the Alliance of Young Democrats to engage in public matters and politics and to be able to inﬂuence decisions on the youth.

16 June

13 June

THE REINTERMENT OF IMRE NAGY AND ASSOCIATES

THE HUNGARIAN ROUND TABLE TALKS BEGIN

The reinterment of Imre Nagy and his associates meant an open recognition of their martyrdom, another symbolic milestone on the journey towards democracy.

The Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party and the previously formed Opposition Round Table initiated talks on the political transition, involving various social organisations.

4 June THE FIRST PARTIALLY FREE ELECTION IN POLAND With Solidarity winning 99% of the votes, Poland made a huge step towards establishing a republic.

THE PAN-EUROPEAN PICNIC During the event under Otto von Habsburg’s patronage near Sopronpuszta, numerous GDR citizens with no valid passport were allowed to cross the border. The picnic aimed at promoting the vision of Europe without borders.

6–10 October

24 August TADEUSZ MAZOWIECKI IS ELECTED PRIME MINISTER OF POLAND After an agreement between the opposition and the communist party, for the first time in forty years, a noncommunist prime minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, was elected prime minister in Poland.

10 September THE OPENING OF THE HUNGARIAN BORDER Hungarian foreign minister Gyula Horn announced that, on 11 September, Hungary would open its borders with Austria.

THE FORMATION OF THE HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST PARTY (MSZP) At the 14th congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, the State Party, the MSZMP, was effectively dissolved, followed by the formation of the Hungarian Socialist Party.

20 May

27 June

THE NATIONAL PARTY CONFERENCE OF THE HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS’ PARTY (MSZMP)

DEMONSTRATION AGAINST THE ORGANISED DESTRUCTION OF VILLAGES IN ROMANIA

János Kádár submitted his resignation and was replaced by Károly Grósz as the new general secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party and the chairman of the council of ministers.

The reason for the biggest civil demonstration since 1956 was to protest against the atrocities committed against Hungarian minorities in Romania, where entire Hungarian villages were destroyed on Nicolae Ceaușescu’s orders. The minority policies of the Romanian politician were raising serious concerns among Hungarians.

6 February–9 April

13 November

18 November

THE FORMATION OF THE ALLIANCE OF FREE DEMOCRATS (SZDSZ)

THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT SMALLHOLDERS’ PARTY (FKgP)

The Alliance of Free Democrats positioned itself as a successor to the Hungarian Reform Era’s great generation, representing European and Hungarian liberalism and focussing primarily on fundamental freedoms.

24 November

ROUND TABLE TALKS IN POLAND

MIKLÓS NÉMETH IS APPOINTED PRIME MINISTER

The round table talks in Poland resulted in the social movement Solidarity’s being acknowledged as a free trade union and the creation of a new, democratic election system.

Once the position of the prime minister and the general secretary had been separated, Károly Grósz remained the head of the party while Miklós Németh became prime minister.

19 89 23 October THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN REPUBLIC At noon, Interim President Mátyás Szűrös proclaimed Hungary’s new, democratic system of government.

In 1988, the historical Independent Smallholders’ Party was re-established as the Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers, and Civic Party in the Pilvax Café.

9 November THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL With the dissolution of the Iron Curtain splitting Europe into two parts, the fall of the wall was seen as a symbolic event marking the end of the Cold War.

1 July

28 June THE DISBANDING OF THE COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (COMECON)

25 June THE RATIFICATION OF SLOVENIA’S AND CROATIA’S DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE Once the two countries’ parliaments voted in favour of their respective declaration of independence, soon Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia declared independence, as well, igniting the conﬂict behind the Yugoslav Wars.

19 June

At a ﬁnal session in Budapest, members of the organisation decided to disband the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, an economic cooperation organisation for the countries of the former Eastern Bloc.

THE END OF THE WARSAW PACT At a session in Budapest, members of the military alliance decided to dissolve the military–political organisation originally intended to unite the countries under Soviet inﬂuence.

19 91

THE DEPARTURE OF THE LAST SOVIET SOLDIER STATIONED IN HUNGARY Lieutenant General Viktor Shilov left Hungarian territory on foot at Záhony.

9 December LECH WAŁĘSA BECOMES POLAND’S FIRST FREELY ELECTED PRESIDENT After a two-round election, Polish voters elected the leader of Solidarity as the country’s president.

8 June

3 October GERMANY REUNITED With the uniﬁcation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, Germany was whole again after its 45-year-long split.

THE FIRST FREE ELECTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA Václav Havel’s Civic Forum won a landslide victory at the country’s ﬁrst free election after the end of communism.

26 November THE FIRST NATIONAL REFERENDUM IN HUNGARY 17 November–29 December THE VELVET REVOLUTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA In Czechoslovakia, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia passed the power in a relatively peaceful manner to Civic Forum, a human rights movement comprised of opposition groups.

This was the ﬁrst national referendum in Hungary since 1949. Commonly referred to as the ‘Four Yeses’ Referendum, the event was the ﬁrst real test of Hungary’s new democracy.

15 December THE OUTBREAK OF THE ROMANIAN REVOLUTION Protests against poverty and the oppressive regime of communist dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu were met by violence and fusillades on the authorities’ side, turning them into a popular uprising.

27 October THE FIRST FREE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION IN POLAND The ﬁrst free parliamentary election in Poland was won by the Democratic Union, with 62 seats taken.

22 May

25 December

31 December THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SOVIET UNION The Cold War came to an end with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Countries of the former Eastern Bloc could advance in their journey towards having a democratic system in place.

22 April

8 April

THE FORMATION OF THE FIRST DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT IN HUNGARY

THE FIRST FREE ELECTION IN CROATIA

THE FIRST FREE ELECTION IN SLOVENIA

The ﬁrst democratically elected Hungarian government was a coalition between the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), the Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers, and Civic Party (FKgP), and the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) held together by Prime Minister József Antall.

The desire for a sovereign Croatia gained momentum simultaneously with the similar steps Slovenia took. The first free election was won by the Croatian Democratic Union, a centre-right opposition party.

The Slovenian parliament declared the country’s sovereignty in 1989. The ﬁrst free election held in 1990 was won by the opposition coalition that acquired 55% of the votes. The proclaimed independence of Slovenia soon resulted in the outbreak of the Yugoslav Wars.

28 December

THE EXECUTION OF CEAUȘESCU AND HIS WIFE IN ROMANIA

VÁCLAV HAVEL BECOMES PRESIDENT OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The execution of Nicolae and Elena Ceaușescu brought a symbolic end to the Romanian revolution.

Under the leadership of Havel, Czechoslovakia became a stronger democracy, while the political monopoly of the communist party also came to an end.

19 90

25 March PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN HUNGARY By claiming 42% of the seats as a result of winning the second round of the ﬁrst Hungarian parliamentary election since the regime change (held on 8 April), the Hungarian Democratic Forum became the majority party of the ﬁrst democratically elected government of Hungary after the end of communism.

THE LONG PREPARATION FOR DAY X IN CONVERSATION WITH PÉTER ANTALL, DIRECTOR OF THE ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE Kálmán Soós, spring 2020, Budapest

Let us travel back in time to 1989 for a single image. Soon before becoming the ﬁrst freely elected prime minister of Hungary, József Antall is having a debate with the communists in the Parliament’s famous Hunters’ Hall during the National Round Table while his younger son—an aspiring photojournalist—keeps snapping pictures of him with his trusty Nikon camera for the images to be published in a news magazine run by the state party the next day. Things like this happened quite often during the period of the regime change. The entirety of Hungary’s regime change may be condensed into József Antall’s fateful personal tragedy, including the forty years leading up to it and the three decades that came after, consolidating his legacy. 12

INTRODUCTION

He spent most of his life waiting for a proper election just like the one after World War II, an election where free citizens could vote freely. When the time finally came, he could even formulate the rules of the election, but, once in office, he found a ransacked treasury and an enormous amount of debt. What is more, medical science ultimately failed to save his life despite the decades he involuntarily spent with researching its history instead of pursuing his true calling to politics—a fatal outcome partly due to Antall’s decision to place serving his country rather than getting proper medical treatment. At 56, József Antall’s younger son, Péter Antall, is now director of the Knowledge Centre named after his father. This interview is a rare opportunity to examine the regime change through the stories and thoughts of a young man born into the Antall family of politicians. You grew up in a family of politicians despite the fact that your father was barred from politics in those years. How did you connect to a world focussing primarily on the fatherland and on serving one’s nation? When did you first feel that the atmosphere in your home was different from other homes? Politics was a permanent topic in the Antall family. I often say there are two things coded right into our genes: cancer and politics. My grandparents—all four of them—died of cancer, just like my father. I was very little when I first noticed my folks all regularly watching the news on TV, but I could not figure out why it was so

interesting to them. There were eleven of us at the time living in a central flat at Ferenciek’s Square. The Vietnam War was a constant topic on the news at the time and the repeated Hungarian phrase for “fighting is going on near Saigon” really stuck in my head. I kept asking what fighting meant, what Saigon stood for, and where Vietnam was. I also have another early and rather mysterious memory concerning my grandfather.1 I was told he had been a minister, which I knew meant something important. He also had Polish people visiting him a lot, to whom he talked quite excitedly sometimes—I never understood what they were doing in our home. Then a Polish TV crew showed up one day to film in our flat. I wanted to find out what might have made my grandfather so interesting to them. He was a gloomy man sitting in an armchair reading a lot and teaching languages. They said they would tell me when I got a little older. Of course, they could not explain to a six-year-old that he had been Government Commissioner for Refugees. At home, the family was constantly berating the socialist system, which I thought quite funny for a while. I was already going to school when we moved to Sas-hegy around 1971–1972. A classmate of mine once exclaimed, “How cute comrade Kádár was!”, while I was quite used to him being called an “old idiot” and a “bastard” at home. So which one was he? It was not easy. At first, they did not want to admit me to the pioneer movement as a young drummer because of my bad grades. I felt left out and separated from my peers, but, ultimately, I, too, became a pioneer. This kind of double speech at home and at school was a general experience for a lot of children during socialism. Questions were mostly unanswered. These seemingly obscure and cautious adult conversations must have been more common in the Antall family. Your father was banned from teaching in secondary schools back in 1959, which pains his former students who are still alive. As a true teacher, when did he explain this political duality to you?

At home, the radio was always switched to Radio Free Europe,2 the BBC,3 or the Voice of America.4 Only my mother listened to Hungarian stations. In those days, Radio Free Europe played an essential part in spreading information about the events of the world, which we tend to forget today. The ﬁrst thing that really shocked us was the outbreak of the strikes in Poland. I have a very vivid memory of a family vacation at Lake Balaton, which we spent listening to news from Gdańsk and Warsaw on Radio Free Europe instead of taking a dip in the lake. My father asked us not to speak at school about what we heard on Radio Free Europe. By that time, I had become a student at Szilágyi Erzsébet Secondary School, and sometimes there was a policeman in the classroom chatting with the kids, asking us what we listened to. Of course, we did not say anything. The policeman then spoke of hostile, agitating Westerners and of political news items interrupting the music programmes on Radio Free Europe. A classmate of mine stood up and said no, the news came on every full hour, with the music starting ten minutes later... Be careful, said my father, and do not fall into the trap of such provocateurs. Once in 1981, a classmate of mine left a flower at the Petőfi Statue with her boyfriend, a student at the Budapest University of Technology. They were immediately taken away. On the 25th anniversary of the Revolution of 1956, the city was simply swarming with detectives. They even attempted to rope the boy in by having him sign some documents—it was the Youth Protection Agency, the one that was supposed to protect the youth from itself. They went after my classmate quite aggressively, as well. Once we graduated from secondary school, our headmistress admitted to us that she had to beg the Agency to leave her alone, as she had thoughts of suicide. She had tried it before, finished school in 1984, but did commit suicide later. Today we know that, at the time of the introduction of martial law in Poland (1981), the state security service placed your father INTRODUCTION

under strict surveillance. Did he talk to you about that? As teenagers, my brother and I used to take it with irony when he told us about being followed or even pointed people out in the street. We said it must have been some sort of delusion of grandeur or paranoia. After 1990, we, of course, found out that he was absolutely right. Actually, he even understated the situation. He told us a lot of stories about 1956, but, as a teenager, I used to doubt them. I thought he injected too much importance into his own role in the revolution. I still feel the same way. In 1989, Tivadar Pátray5 said they had been sitting at my grandfather’s place in October when Jóska’s ofﬁcious son had walked in. Because my grandfather served as a minister of the Independent Smallholders’ Party, my father had the opportunity to sit and talk with his peers like Béla Kovács6 and others, compared to whom he was obviously much better educated. My father was a young teacher at that time, which is how they regarded him. As a history teacher, he was a natural master of creating family legends, too, always with a speciﬁc moral. In politics, creating your own legend and mythology is also quite important. My grandfather often tried to calm my father down and talk him out of being so radical. He was very cautious, since he had experienced Gestapo’s7 prisons. He once told my father that, as a Government Commissioner, he had been absolutely sure about the Gestapo spying on him through somebody. It turned out to be his secretary, so my grandfather always made sure to leave something on his desk he could report about. In fact, my father was very cautious about this matter. We were living a modest life and he only started earning more in the mid-1970s, when he became deputy director at the Museum. We owe a lot to Emil Schultheisz,8 a friend who was minister of health back then. He warned us at the time of the Polish strikes9 that we were being surveilled, something he heard from Szilveszter Harangozó.10 He asked us not to give in to provocation and to watch a Bud Spencer movie on 15 March instead of celebrating the national 14

INTRODUCTION

HE TOLD US TO BE ALWAYS PREPARING FOR DAY X, FOR WHEN IT FINALLY COMES, THE SYSTEM WILL CHANGE AND WE SHOULD BE READY FOR HIS ROLE IN IT. holiday. Had we given in to provocation, he would have had to suffer the retribution. He did not want to become easy to manipulate, and he did not want anybody to get him through his children. He explained all this to us when I was 15-16 years old. When we later travelled to the West, we read the works of Hungarian writers in emigration, but we did not try to smuggle them back to Hungary because of this. In 1980, one of my father’s friends was immediately retired from the university for the attempt to bring copies of the Nemzetőr11 magazine into the country. When did you ﬁrst encounter samizdat literature? We could get them at home. My father did not keep contact with the so-called democratic opposition,12 with Demszky13 and his peers. He asked us not to frequent such circles either. My older brother once visited the infamous Rajk Boutique14 in Galamb Street, but I never went there. My father said if we were interested in anything, Orwell or others, even Hungarians, he could get them all via his contacts. He did not want to get in personal contact with a group whose members—as Maoists15—had criticized the Kádár regime from the left. An antiquities trader visited my father in the museum quite often, and he used to buy something from this man sometimes just to help him, but, at the same

time, he suspected that the man was a spy. He later turned out to be a III/III16 operative, who became a Member of Parliament of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) after 1990. For the most of his life, József Antall had been preparing for his time on the political stage, but, mostly, he had only been allowed to work in the museum and within academic circles. My father was in a rather rotten mood during the 1980s. He feared he was running out of time and that he would never have the opportunity to be an active politician. He was in his sixties. He was always saying that working at the museum was only his hobby. From morning to dusk, he was all about politics. During these years, he occupied himself by determining who he would have chosen for his government in the place of the German chancellor. A couple of years later, he actually met Kohl,17 and they discussed German politics. The chancellor was surprised that Antall knew so much about German domestic politics and its main “players.” To be honest, we all considered this fantasy politics to be a compensation for my father, which, in fact, it was. He told us to be always preparing for day X, for when it finally comes, the system will change and we should be ready for his role in it. He was rather sceptical about Gorbachev’s reforms, as well; he said the military would overthrow him like it did to Khruschev. Interestingly, János Kádár had the same opinion. Do you remember an event or a moment when you felt day X was approaching? In the early 1980s, a new Soviet General Secretary was buried each year, and we had the impression—definitely at home, but in my secondary school, class as well—that nothing was working anymore. As to how long this crumbling phase or morass would last, nobody had any idea. I was 18 years old when I first felt I would live to see the day when Hungary would not be a communist country any more. My father cautiously started to dip his toe into politics. The museum served as a meeting place, many foreigners visited him, as well, and he was

discovered by the embassies. He received a lot of invitations. He worked less and less at the museum. He thought the Soviet Union would be brought down by a huge Muslim influx which would be impossible to control. In other words, he thought the communist experiment would fail due to demographic reasons. At school, you obviously did not receive a Christian or national education. What did you pick up from home? My father’s way of giving us a patriotic education was interesting. He took us to Upper Hungary (Felvidék), but not to Transylvania. He had a firm character, and he was afraid of getting emotional if he ever visited Transylvania—he did not want us to see that. But, later, he did encourage me to go over there to take photos, and he was glad I went quite often. Our family was rather on the patriotic than on the Christian side in a religious sense. My grandfather went to church and so did my mother in most of the cases, as well. My older brother had been an altar boy, but I had not. My father did not force it, he asked me if I wanted to go. I said no, and he accepted it. Getting to know the world of the Bible would have been interesting and useful, too, but I rather spent my Sunday mornings playing football. That was how I felt at that age. I have never really fitted into my family well, my critics always said I was a vagabond. Whatever that may mean, there was some truth in it. With a great deal of effort, I finally took my school-leaving exam, but I was not accepted to the faculty of humanities. I could not complete the grammar test as quickly as I should have. This kind of dysgraphia had been with me throughout my school years, although, most of the time, it was only considered naughtiness. My teacher complained to my father that I could not write properly, to which he simply replied, “No problem, he will dictate then.” I had to go and work: I worked at a library, I had a job as a bellboy at a hotel for a short while, and, then, I ended up at the National Museum, where I worked at excavations during the summer and in file storage during the winter. Later, I became a photojournalist. INTRODUCTION

This profession falls really far from the family’s civic, highly intellectual atmosphere. Was it exactly this difference that attracted you to it? It falls quite far from the world of lawyers, that is true. In the early days, my father once asked me, “So are they really paying you for just running around with a camera bag?” Although I was interested in politics, I failed to get into the faculty of humanities. The prospect of being a photojournalist just came along naturally. I was going over to Transylvania a lot to take pictures. At home, we were constantly reading magazines, ÉS,18 Új Tükör,19 Valóság,20 Tiszatáj,21 and Mozgó Világ.22 Afterwards, we had conversations about them, which my father called our rural reading club. Once, I took my photos shot in Transylvania to show to Éva Keleti.23 Without a single question, she looked at the photos, said they were good and they would be published six weeks later. Without any formal training, I became a photojournalist then and there. I have never had any regrets about this. By the time the general atmosphere of the regime change hit in 1987, I was already a photographer. Wherever there was something happening in those years, I was there. During the restructuring period of the social system, both you and your father found yourselves in the thick of politics. Photojournalists are always in a strange situation as they are never fully inside but never fully outside either. When I majored in photo-reportage, Ferenc Rédei, the editor of the photo section at Népszabadság, said that one’s attitude should be to be present at the event he or she was photographing, but, at the same time, one also needed to view it as an outsider. I had been taking photos for five years at that point, but I needed an official qualification. Rédei said my report on the reunification of Germany was the best he had seen in the Hungarian press. Then, at my exam, he told me I would not make a living out of photography after my father’s term as prime minister ended. He turned out to be right: the press cut ties with me but not due to 16

INTRODUCTION

professional reasons. I had a meeting with Péter Németh in 1997 in order to get some work. At the time, he was the head of the Posta Bank Média Holding. During our conversation, I offered to show him a few photos, but he cut me off very quickly, “There is no need to do that. Everyone knows you are a good photographer, you know, too, that it is not about that.” At the Hungarian Telegraphic Office (MTI), it was an essential rule for photographers to capture the essence of any given event in one picture. This approach has its clichés. I ended up there due to one of my father’s former students, Géza Szebellédy, who, in those days, was working as chief photo editor at MTI. At first, they took me on as a contributor, then I got to be a contracted photographer. I was not very happy with the job at the Telegraphic Office, although I learnt so much about the craft itself— I would have preferred to work for a newspaper. Ferenc Németh, deputy editor-in-chief at Élet és Tudomány mentioned this new magazine called Reform24 to me in the autumn of 1988. They were looking for a young photographer who did not mind working hard all day. I was 24, so I said I would be happy to do that. I did not even have a salary in the first couple of weeks—I was just sitting around in the editorial office waiting for a journalist to say, “Come along now, Péter.” I then ran with them, and I worked. Those days were quite pleasant for the press and especially for the photographers. Today we might say they were having a good life . . . The press was very progressive and respected around the time of the regime change. The media thought it was actually dictating the regime change when, in reality, it was only one of the major players. I think the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) was the main engine of change in Central Europe. The true extent of the economic and political crisis of the communist bloc was seen most clearly by the KGB. It is no wonder we talk very little today about Andropov,25 the man responsible for initiating certain reforms and for recruiting new people from the Komsomol26—this is how

Péter Antall in action as a photographer during a Hungarian Formula 1 race

Gorbachev got into the picture.27 They had the most comprehensive information about the crisis of the Soviet empire. There were three main power groups within the Soviet Union: the KGB, the party, and the military. At certain times, one of them was more powerful than the other two. It is no wonder that only the KGB survived the dissolution of the Soviet Union in an institutional sense, although not in its full glory. As an empire, it had and still has access to worldwide, global intelligence. During my MTI days, I once went to the Jurta Theatre28 and took a bunch of photos at the event, which were never got published. I later learnt they went straight to counterintelligence, of course, not just mine but everybody’s. Department III/III even recruited once from among the photographers—my colleagues told me about the cutting-edge technology they were offering; however, they never approached me. They obviously knew who I was. Reform was an innovative magazine where editor-in-chief Péter Tőke let people get on with their job. He also had a good eye for news items. They did not know my father at all until the round

table talks, then they realised who I was. Tőke and his circle bet on the reform communists, not expecting the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) to do so well at all. They had already wanted to ﬁre me from the magazine during the summer, but the journalists saved me. In the autumn, I decided to leave on my own accord before the unfair photo editor could sack me. At that point, Tőke got attacked, “How could you let Antall’s son go? His father is going to be prime minister pretty soon,” the critics said. I ran into Péter after the election; he offered to take me back as a full-time colleague. I said, “No thanks, maybe in four years’ time . . .” Four years later, I did go back, but Tőke was not there any more. I got hired by Ferenc L. Gazsó,29 who was a fair employer throughout our entire working relationship. I stayed until István Veres, a “businessman” with a rather shady past, purchased Reform. It was clear neither of us wanted to work with the other. You were a successful photographer bringing home well-received portfolios from your international assignments, as well. Did INTRODUCTION

that change your father’s judgement of your profession at all? Taking photos at the Opposition Round Table was a weird feeling for me: I saw my father sitting there at the table, then, later, the same evening, he was sitting at home by the kitchen table. I think by that time he felt I had found my calling. During my father’s term as prime minister, I compiled a photo album of Egypt. When I came home, I told him about the exhibition I was about to have in the Buda Castle, hoping he would come to the opening. “I am not going to come,” he replied, “it should be about you.” Then I asked whether he would really skip his own son’s exhibition. “It is supposed to be your day. If I am there, people will focus on me instead of you. I will come out and see it early on Saturday,” he said. Eventually, he did see my exhibition with great interest. I was 29 at that time, and my father did not want to steal the show from me. Our African expedition with László Almásy30 was a similar situation... His book series was basically my bible. After we had returned, I was petriﬁed to ﬁnd out during a family breakfast how much my father knew about Almásy. During his illness, he could no longer sleep without sleeping pills. Sometimes even the pills could not help; on those nights, he lay awake and read Almásy’s book called The Unknown Sahara. He was quite interested in his son’s work... He once came into my room after walking down the corridor in the house on Művész Street, which was packed with the items I had brought back from Egypt (water bowls, granges, various swords and daggers from nomadic tribes, etc.). “You really made your childhood dream come true with this Sahara expedition,” he told me. “That is about right,” I replied. Apparently, he used to take some of my Transylvanian photos to cabinet meetings sometimes to show them to people, which I only found out about after his death. He never mentioned it to me. It is well known that your father and mostly his entire government failed to form a real 18

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connection with the press. They were not very successful in creating their own media outlets either. Did you have any “domestic” conflicts about this at home? My father liked to overmysticise his early writings. I remember him once telling me excitedly about an old paper of his finally being published (he had written it at 16). “If I was an opposition journalist, I would write we will probably soon see Mr. Prime Minister’s old colouring book as well,” I warned him. He accused me of attacking him, but I explained I was only thinking with a journalist’s brain, “It is time to understand the media is not your friend. There is no way you could win them over with anything.” They once organised a meeting with liberal leftist journalists. They listened to his explications with open mouths then they smeared him big time in their articles. Kurír,31 for example, wrote that Antall was in such a bad state that he could not even concentrate any more. I tried to tell him that, once these journalists set foot in the pagoda (meaning the Hungarian Radio) or their editorial offices, they simply have to write and speak against him to avoid the accusation that they had joined his ranks. Maybe his experiences made your father distrustful. During a recess at an MDF assembly, he told someone to be careful with liberal leftist reporters; he said those people can flip a single lie over twice in one sentence. This is true, and a catchy way of putting it. Has my father written all over it. However, the media war32 is raging on to this day and the adversaries are irreconcilable. During Gyula Horn’s administration, I also went through a rough period. The magazines I worked for started to disappear. I had to move back to my mother’s place. I thought it was time to study. With a scholarship I went to America, after that I started a media and then a political science major at the university. Along came the first Orbán administration; I worked for the Duna TV channel, then for the Ministry of Justice. Ibolya Dávid33 hired me, so I worked at the minister’s cabinet. How different everything was back then

compared to our present days! I told the minister that I needed a laptop, but they were only giving those automatically to deputy undersecretaries and above. “Péter, here is mine, I do not use it anyway,” replied the minister. I thanked her but could not accept; imagine how everybody would have hated me on the corridor if they found out! Later, I bought one for myself. We came up with the idea of party foundations (following the German blueprint) in Zoltán Márki’s office one evening. We thought, if the bill goes through, the MDF’s party foundation could be called the József Antall Foundation.34 This could be a good place to educate the new generation of politicians. We came to this conclusion after one of the main lessons of the first term: the process of political recruitment was not working well in Hungary. In those days, there were news about you having political ambitions, as well. I was loyal to Ibolya Dávid for a long time. She was basically put in charge of the MDF by Péter Boross,35 who found her a talented politician. Back in 2001, Ibolya asked me whether I was truly interested in becoming a member of parliament. I told her I had studied the subject, that I was interested in it, and that I would have been the fourth generation of my family in the Hungarian Parliament. By January, her offer did not stand any more. She claimed László Kövér had told her the surname Antall no longer had any political significance in Hungary. I knew she was lying about that, I even verified it with people who had actually been present at the negotiations between the two parties. All of them confirmed independently that my name had not come up at all. I ran for office in 2005, but, since we could not reach a consensus with Fidesz, I stood down. You cannot start a political career by getting only 6% of the votes. Not because of me personally, but because you cannot afford to play like an amateur with a name like Antall. Due to my personal connections, I could finance my own campaign for the most part. Later, when Lajos Bokros36 came more and more to the spotlight, I no longer wanted anything to do with those people. Szabolcs

Kerék-Bárczy37 came to me later; I told him they had been doing for years the exact opposite of what I think of the world, they had better reap what they had sown. Before that I would have liked MDF to remain an independent party, but by 2005 I would have made a pact with Fidesz. Once they even considered me for the party board. Ibolya Dávid dictated the requirements herself, then she supported others instead of me. But where are they now? They succeeded in relegating MDF to the history books... In your opinion, what led to the breakup of the MDF? I think it was very wrong for the Hungarian Democratic People’s Party (MDNP)38 to leave the MDF. Iván Szabó39 and György Szabad40 once sat at my mother’s kitchen table at lunchtime. I told them they would not reach 5% at the election. They howled me down, then they got 1.5%. My brother took part in the preparations for the split, he even met them a couple of times at the Aranymókus Restaurant. My father was of the opinion that the already existing infrastructure should always be utilised, and it should not be let go for any reason. He was not one of the “founding fathers” of the MDF but basically a newcomer; yet he saw potential to transform it into a modern party. If Iván Szabó and his peers had been good tacticians, they would have let Sándor Lezsák41 make a mistake as the head of the party. In my opinion, he would have made a serious mistake on his own in six months or a year. But Sándor Lezsák was right in thinking that the party had no chance at the upcoming election with the rather weathered members of my father’s government. However, getting rid of the “Antall inﬂuence” within the MDF went even further: my father and his statue was—in a physical and a metaphorical sense, too—taken down to the basement. What I really blame the MDF for is how they neglected the international relationships that my father had secured. I mentioned to Ibolya Dávid on multiple occasions that, while we were in opposition, we had time to build up the party’s infrastructure and to revive its international connections. Sadly, she did not follow up on these. INTRODUCTION

According to Political Capital’s42 advice, the MDF was a “media party,” so it did not need to worry about memberships and about building up the party. The MDF did not have a single national paper, television, or radio. You cannot really make it like that... Fidesz had a reverse trajectory with Gábor Kubatov, upgrading the party to a nationwide organisation. They simply realised that nobody could last very long in politics without decent party infrastructure. Ultimately, Viktor Orbán had the winning force to integrate the Hungarian right wing and mould the voters of the Hungarian Justice and Life party (MIÉP), the MDF, the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), and the Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKGP) into one, with the exception of hardliner intellectuals in the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). With this, he basically achieved what my father had been aiming for in 1991. I would like to ask about a couple of names directly. What memories do you have of the relationship between your father and Sándor Lezsák? He was a political opponent, but my father never confronted him. He was the brains behind most anti-Antall rebellions. Naturally, it was pretty rough for my father to deal with internal attacks while trying to save the country from a crisis. On the other hand, it is a natural part of politics to have rivals within a party. But time was not on my father’s side. Sándor never told him, but he actually wanted to be the minister overseeing the secret service (referred to as “secret minister” in colloquial Hungarian); however, my father did not want someone who really desired that position, and he wanted maniacs there even less. He was looking for a pragmatic person for that job. Since it was a very sensitive task, he wanted to give it to a suitable, trustworthy person. There has been a lot thought and said about Péter Boross. Was he similar to a person you have just described? My father wanted to make him a minister from the start, but, due to inner negotiations within the MDF, the job was given to the very civil Balázs 20

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Horváth43 instead of him. Balázs was loved by everybody; our last conversation at Balatonfüred ailed me very much. “I am very sick, Péter,” he told me. I never saw him again . . . Whenever an external or internal problem arose, Péter Boross would ring us up: “Boross here. Is your father at home?” He was ready to make decisions, he was determined, and he had a lot of leadership experience at the South Pest Catering Company. That was the place he retired from. He had a serious role in conducting the party’s defeat in 1994. Later, in the MDF, Ibolya Dávid listened to his advice for quite a long time. He was a stranger to party politics, he did not know the MDF, and he evaluated people incorrectly. He was rather annoyed by party politics. Even on the party board he advised self-moderation to other members with a more nervous nature. Sometimes, they would come running out of a session; he would just be standing there with a cigarette and say, “Calm down, son, go back in, it’s not as bad as it looks!” Boross still represents civic, national values. Géza Jeszenszky, on the other hand, is now on a completely different trajectory, although he even got to be Foreign Minister, as he is a relative of yours, of a sort. Yes, he is married to my older cousin. I respect him for a lot of things including his commitment to Atlantic relations and his professional knowledge. He played a very important and difﬁcult part. He had to put up with a lot of unworthy attacks as Foreign Minister,44 and he took a lot of hits for Antall. I cannot really comprehend his current work. Sometimes, I still get angry over politics and rant about the general ignorance of politicians. György Nógrádi once directed my attention to the fact that I was basically living in an information vortex at home, something they did not teach at the university, neither at the media nor at the political science major. In fact, I consider myself more an analyst than a front line person, and the mentioned information vortex comes in handy in leading the Knowledge Centre.

MY FATHER HAD A STRONG BOND TO THE NATION AND HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO ORIENT HUNGARY TOWARDS THE WEST. HE FAVOURED A FAIR RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA BUT ALSO WANTED TO KEEP THEM AT ARM’S LENGTH. Circling back to the ﬁrst period of the Eastern European transition, which major power’s role would you highlight? I think Reagan,45 Pope John Paul II,46 and Gorbachev had immense merit in all that. Reagan realised that the Soviet Union was no longer able to keep up with the arms race America had forced it into. Gorbachev was not a great politician in my opinion, in many respects reminiscent of Imre Pozsgay47 (always taking a step with the worst timing), but, at least, he did not hinder the process. It is interesting that, in Russia, he is disliked to this day and is considered a traitor for breaking up the Soviet Union. My father had a strong bond to the nation, and he thought it important to orient Hungary towards the West. He favoured a fair relationship with Russia but also wanted to keep them at arm’s length with a stable Ukraine as a buffer state between us. I think the West acted pretty lazily on this last point and, ultimately, failed to keep

Ukraine on its feet. They lacked the political and economic will to do it. The Americans felt too comfortable about winning the Cold War, and so they reacted late. A note on the USA: what they win in the theatre of war, they lose on the political ground. It was the same with Vietnam, too. You have met a lot of politicians. Who had the biggest effect on you? The awakening of my political consciousness was linked to Ronald Reagan, Pope John Paul II, and Lech Wałęsa.48 Sadly, I never met Reagan. John Paul II will always remain the Pope to me. I had the pleasure of meeting the Holy Father on multiple occasions. The time we met him in his personal study in 1994 probably had the most profound effect on me. We were escorted through immense halls by an entourage, the Swiss Guard were standing at the door. We had to wait outside a small room. My mother and my brother went in, and the Pope lauded my father’s achievements. His body was broken, but his spirit was still going strong. The political and social transition in Hungary has been called many things throughout the years. Which description do you ﬁnd the most suitable thirty years after? To refer to the regime change, my father used to use rendszerváltoztatás, a word implying active agency, which differs slightly in meaning from the more commonly used and more neutral rendszerváltás. It was a negotiated revolution with revolutionary changes taking place at a desk peacefully, preventing a very real revolution. The left is still sticking with the word rendszerváltozás, which hints at an organic process. They would prefer the narrative to go like this: once there was a party state, then suddenly— thanks to them—democracy took over. They had seen the signs of a crumbling system back in the mid-1980s. When the Lybians took their money out of the Hungarian National Bank (MNB), the state almost went bankrupt. János Fekete,49 deputy president and, coincidentally, the Hungarian head of the International Monetary Fund, had already stated at a closed meeting in 1984 that we were heading towards huge INTRODUCTION

changes in Hungary, too. This was obvious to the MNB and to the country’s leadership. They took out loans, the secret service created a bunch of Western style companies, so Western capital could come ﬂooding in. When the restrictions on buying foreign currencies were lifted, and Hungarians started going over to Austria to buy things, they were buying their Gorenje fridges and tape decks from shops belonging to the interest group of the Hungarian state security services. Of course, at this point, only the state party’s elite knew about this. They were interested in a peaceful transition. Two billion dollars’ worth of money (50 billion Austrian schillings) were sucked out of the country thanks to the so-called “Gorenje tourism.”50 This in itself is enough to ﬁnish off a country. People liked to say that Antall had been “sent in from the outside,” especially Zoltán Bíró51 and company, who liked to state that he had been sent into MDF by György Aczél.52 In fact, he did not even know Aczél. Schultheisz kept people about to compromise my father away. He did not know much more about the inner dealings than what was leaked, but he had an enormous social network, and he evaluated every single event isolated and in context, as well. We only received Western magazines irregularly, Der Spiegel being a prominent one my father could usually get. It is immensely interesting to read the secret service’s reports on him that support the fact that he evaluated every single international event through his unique personal viewpoint. When he became president of the MDF, things started to change; he got along well with prime minister Miklós Németh.53 He became more well-informed and they started to listen to his opinion before major decisions. I remember when news of resistance within the Workers’ Militia started circulating. Németh called my father at home after 10 p.m., saying that, although the military had occupied the barracks of the Workers’ Militia, there was nothing to worry about. It is important to the story that the Workers’ Militia54 counted 60,000 people and, in fact, possessed tens of thousands of carbines (exactly 68,000). During the Romanian revolution, György Jenei, 22

INTRODUCTION

a colleague of Miklós Németh, came over to the MDF headquarters in Ó Street. Interesting story: at the time of Ceaușescu’s55 capture, I was at home when the phone rang in the morning. It was a woman (I forget her name now), an antique shop owner in Szentendre. She warned us that his son was about to smuggle weapons over to Romania with his friends. She was worried about him and asked whether we could help in any way. He had been a well-known ﬁgure working for the intelligence agency, so we could not decide whether the call was a provocation or real information. Anyway, we forwarded the information to the relevant authority. Did József Antall actually have anything to fear? The situation was not without risk, many things were not decided in advance. The Romanian transition was an armed revolution with truly dangerous situations. I personally experienced some of these with György Csóti56 and Gyula Zacsek57 when we were delivering MDF’s aid to Transylvania after Christmas. We saw some light signals up ahead at night and asked ourselves whether we should stop or not. Csóti ﬁnally stopped—he made the right call, as there were two machine guns staring right at us from near the bridge. It was the military; they wanted us to identify ourselves. In the autumn of 1989, Genscher58 told my father the regime change was going too fast and it should probably be slowed down a bit with regards to Moscow’s potential reaction. In January 1990, Mitterrand59 said the same thing. The Soviets did not want to pull out their troops from Hungary. Seeing the predictions for the election, they swiftly pulled out their non-existent nuclear weapons between the two election rounds. They expected something similar to the Polish results, where the communist party could actually stay in power. Then they saw that Antall did not want to cooperate with the post-communists. When the Németh government left, one of the ministers actually bade farewell to his colleagues by saying they would meet back there in six months. That is how long they thought the Antall government would last. Passing the

budgetary law required a qualified majority, that is why it was necessary to make a pact60 with SZDSZ. I personally do not like the word pact as it was a legitimate agreement between two parties, signed by their respective leaders in order to maintain governability. The six-month prediction actually sounds about right if we think of the taxi drivers’ blockade, which was organised by the so-called “redundant legion” with serious military knowledge. A thing like that could not be pulled off without such experience. SZDSZ simply sat on this wave, hoping it would destabilise the Antall government, forcing a “grand coalition.” But my father did not want to govern with the free democrats. “Putting together a government where the ministers are throwing ink bottles at each other is probably not a good idea,” he once told me. He believed an effective government should come from a similar political background. Do you think there really was a so-called “Rózsadomb plan,” where prominent state party figures agreed in advance on what the regime change could alter and what it could not? That was made up by American far right groups. In hindsight, quite a number of their predictions turned out to be right. Of course, we do not know who was holding the hand of these “arrow cross” people when they wrote such things. We cannot avoid the issue of state security operatives, as it is still a debated subject of the regime change. What stopped your father from completing the lustration? My father’s opinion was that Hungary should regain its independence that was taken from it on 19 March 1944. There should be no excuse left for the Russians to stay. Even the troops pulled out of Hungary were living in barracks and railway carriages with their families, and the Hungarian reparation was calculated into the Russian budget for the upcoming year. A real lustration61 would have left almost no journalists, foreign traders, bankers, and so many other professionals—the list goes on.

Pozsgay once held a lecture about the opening of the Hungarian border. He told the audience what he had told Antall. According to Pozsgay’s interpretation, he was the one encouraging lustration. Then he quoted József Antall, who apparently said the time and place was not suitable for that. Of course, in my humble opinion, after a lustration Pozsgay would not have been allowed to teach at the University of Debrecen. The price for a democratic and peaceful transition was the communist nomenclature bailing itself out into economic life. It was a realistic price but a severe one, as well, from the point of view of the country’s social development. Many cases of corruption could be traced through late secret personnel. Graduates of the MGIMO62 became the biggest “capitalists.” We know that the MGIMO trained intelligence professionals, as well, let us talk now about the question of operatives. I am not avoiding the question of operatives. The contents of the American–Soviet Malta Summit are still not known or were made secret. My father’s theory was—maybe he even knew it to be true—that lawsuits about state party crimes were not to take place according to the agreement. And that the dictatorship in Romania should be brought down rapidly. Do not be naive, the Romanian revolution was a coup. Once in office, my father was well-informed partly thanks to Miklós Németh and partly due to the fact that, as prime minister, the different agencies had no choice but to provide him with whatever data he wanted. He was deeply hurt by learning that—among others—one of his childhood friends had been recruited to report on him. My father took him along to the parliament, and, when his involvement was brought to light, he made sure he faced no existential problems, transferring him to another ministry. He was most hurt by the fact that his friend had not spoken to him about the whole situation. He could have told my father on Margaret Island and come clear of the conspiracy. Instead, he reported very zealously, even asking for extra assignments according to the documentation. INTRODUCTION

He had an intellectual minority complex beside my father, and, for the first time in his life, he felt himself an important person. The security agency was making use of this. Personally, I liked him. He was kind and entertaining. Antall had both moral and practical reasons not to go through with solving the problem of operatives. He summarised the moral reason like this: “When Gyula Horn63 and Zoltán Gál64 can sit opposite to me in the parliament, I am not going to drag beaten-down, tortured, and humiliated people to the pillory. If Gábor Péter,65 head of the State Protection Authority (ÁVH), is left alone to die peacefully in his bed, we should not pester people on the lowest levels of state security. Not if the ones giving the commands and the responsible political figures are left to escape unharmed.” Of course, there were pragmatic reasons too. Antall knew that the thread would ultimately lead back to Moscow and he did not want this to distract him from more important government issues. “Please understand, I either deal with this or I govern,” he said to me once. He chose the latter. On top of all this, due to the funny business around the Smallholders’ fraction, even a flu epidemic would have been enough for the government coalition to lose their majority in the parliament. Various, politically motivated operative lists were compiled by state security partly to just create confusion. The list that my father received from Miklós Németh had been compiled by Lajos Nagy66 and company. Having to figure out what to do with the contributors of the now dissolved Department III/III was a serious dilemma. I personally agree with the model that leaned more towards integrating people into the new system rather than letting them all go. Even with a model like that, many of them ended up in organised crime just like a lot of KGB people after the fall of the Soviet Union. There were a number of organised crime groups with roots in the KGB; just think of Semion Mogilevich, better known in Hungary as Uncle Szeva. A reporter once contacted me about his project to write a book on the KGB’s activities in Hungary. I asked whether he had any children. When he 24

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THE ANTALL FAMILY REMAINS ATLANTIST, NO QUESTION ABOUT IT. HUNGARY IS ON THE RIGHT TRACK. DESPITE OUR FREQUENT CRITICISM, OUR EU MEMBERSHIP IS VERY IMPORTANT. THE STABILITY OF THE COUNTRY DEPENDS ON IT. said yes, I advised him to ﬁnd a different topic. He asked me what I meant by that. “You can take it literally,” I replied. You simply cannot write down the truth, but distorting it is not worth it either. Who suggested me to the guy is also an interesting question. It was a guy working for a Ukrainian–Hungarian company smuggling weapons to Asia and Africa with a Hungarian communist party background. The Soviet Union was an empire, 22 million square kilometres, 260 million people. Every post-communist country carries the signs of these years on itself. The Russians have always had their independent information networks. Freedom movements in Hungary could check their wish lists: Hungary became a constitutional country. Culture, education, and travel were liberated. International recognition followed very soon, but the swift success of privatisation was accompanied by a huge spike in unemployment numbers. The life of the majority of the population did

not improve, so they started berating the new era. Then they voted to bring back the past. The Hungarian democratic transition, in my opinion, is a success story and something to be valued. My father did not want to accept the Polish model (providing an automatic quota for the state party with regards to parliamentary seats), instead, he wanted to follow the German example just like Péter Tölgyessy.67 Naturally, they were not happy at all about the nomenclature transferring itself into the economic sphere, but that had already been done by Tamás Sárközy and company68 by means of the 1988 law. Privatisation was necessary to remedy the acute shortage of capital and the lack of technology. Of course, the West bought markets for itself this way, and investors found it easier to negotiate with the once powerful state party official, as he had been the head of the company even before the wave of privatisation. They had a social network the new guys simply did not have. In 1994, former party state people felt like order was restored and the pragmatic elite had shed its old ideology as a serpent sheds its skin and became capitalist. SZDSZ reached an agreement with the socialists because the big shots who had been financing them did not want to finance an intellectual club for four more years. My father only realised how bad the economic state of the country was after he had put together the government in 1990. It was way worse than he had thought. State assets were worth less than they had thought, and the Soviets were still here. My father could not find suitable people, especially for the economy. There was no political recruitment, while people on the state party’s side had an enormous advantage due to their professionals. My father always said that Hungary needed a Ludwig Erhard.69 He left home at 8:30 in the morning and came back at around 11 p.m. if he had no medical treatment scheduled. He used to hold a meeting with the core of the cabinet at 9:30 p.m., but that was really to teach them what politics meant... The Antall government went down a road that was completely unprecedented: they were

converting a completely state-owned country into a market economy. Today, it is easy to say that they should have done it differently. Maybe there is even some truth in it. There were strong conﬂicts of interest within the agricultural sphere, and the government had to make a choice. Should there be a lot of smallholders or a few people with a lot of land? They were forced to make decisions. Should they follow the Czech example with coupon privatisation or the Romanian one with partial reprivatisation? Today, people often confuse the privatisation dealings of the Antall and the Horn governments, although the two operated according to hugely different economic policies, philosophies, and interests. Margaret Thatcher70 told my father he should not rush too hastily into privatisation. Some people were putting their trust into the Polish “shock therapy” method, but my father feared it would have caused an immediate, unsustainable, and unmanageable wave of unemployment, which would have endangered the democratic state. George Soros and the economic lobby behind him suggested a “debt takeover”—they would have paid the national debt of the country in exchange for a chance to handpick the marketable companies prior to the process of privatisation. Viktor Orbán took these conclusions to heart and made political trainings continuous. He also made alliances instead of forced coalitions. In one of his speeches, he referred to the legacy of Antall as a starting point. My father had a great respect for Orbán, he was the one recommending him to Helmut Kohl. When we were scolding Orbán at home in front of the TV about the nasty things he was saying about the government in Parliament in the early 1990s, my father would always say it was ﬁne. He tried to calm us saying this was all opposition logic and that we should not expect anything else from him. I have mixed feelings about my brother György’s (within the family: András’s) recent INTRODUCTION

interview published on the válasz.hu website. In it, he mentions that he once overheard a telephone conversation between our father and Orbán. He mentioned that Orbán should look after his party, as the so-called Charter intellectuals had already tried to conquer them before.71 This was the Trojan horse of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and a precursor to the planned coalition with the Free Democrats (SZDSZ). János Kis72 had already said things to this effect earlier. My brother was interested in privatisation and economic policy, so the conversation moved on to legal matters. It is a fact that my father was greatly interested in his sons’ opinions, he asked me about the media on numerous occasions, but I would not say I was in any way his “counsellor.” I was mostly interested in communication, cabinet work, logistics, the selection of new colleagues, and the way background workers provided information for the leader in a variety of situations where a decision is supposed to be made. It is rather an unhistorical question, but what if József Antall were still alive in 1994? In 1992, he said, “The country has to make a decision about this pragmatic elite, they must decide whether they want them back or not. I am not saying they want a dictatorship, but they deﬁnitely want to rule.” There were so many negative images circulating about the “Kamikaze government” that the Left would have won in 1994 no matter what. The Hungarian Democratic Forum might have remained a uniﬁed party with a different strategy on my father’s part. In a healthy state, he would have led a tough, savage and, witty opposition. In a sickly state, we would have buried him quietly after a barrage of unworthy attacks. When Ferenc Mádl was elected president of Hungary in 2000, many people congratulated him in the Parliament. “Had my father survived, he would be president now,” I thought to myself. In my head, I contemplated the list of people I could share this thought with: only my mother. I stood behind her and told her. “How funny,” she replied, “you would not believe it, but about two minutes ago Feri [Ferenc Mádl] told me the same thing. He said he knew it 26

INTRODUCTION

should not be him standing in his position right now.” Do we have any idea how intelligent a person has to be to say something like that? I had always respected him, but, from that point on, my admiration reached a new level. Let us close the conversation with your opinion on the current state of the world. The Antall family remains Atlantist, no question. Hungary is on the right track. Despite our frequent criticism, our EU membership is very important. The stability of the country depends on it. Many people believe and say that our recent prosperity is due to EU sources. This is nothing but a legend, only 4% of our yearly GDP comes from EU sources. In a political sense, it is very hard to calculate for long-term future events in such a swiftly changing world. Here is an example: in 2008, I went to a number of conferences where people from the government made claims about a 4% increase in the GDP, provided the agricultural sector performed well. They ended up with a 6% decrease. The error margin was a solid 10%, but the economic crisis simply overwrote everything. Just like the coronavirus situation and the related emergency state will overwrite all the numbers this year and next year, as well. We are living in the age of uncertainty. Every doctrine we have had before, every worldview is becoming relative. However, it is still important to transfer our 20th-century values into the 21st century. In our lifetime, America will cling on to its position as the number-one power in the world; therefore, we have to remain allies with it (as our NATO membership determines). Having said that, I deeply agree with the notion that the 21st century is going to be Asia’s time to shine. China, India, even Africa are developing rapidly. We are preparing for such a future with a consistency inspired by József Antall and we are constantly researching these countries. My 45 colleagues are working on excellent analyses and books, they are organising events. Young, freshly graduated people can gain political and practical experience at our institution, and they also get a chance to realise their ideas. Although we do have an ofﬁce in Brussels, we are not

lobbyists (of which they have 22,000 over there) but rather a think tank. Through the work we do at the Knowledge Centre, we are trying to be loyal to the intellectual legacy of József Antall, the legacy that carries the essence of the regime change to this day.

7 The secret political police of Nazi Germany shortened from the original German Geheime Staatspolizei. 8 Emil Schultheisz (1923–2014): doctor, politician, science historian. He was head director of the Semmelweis Museum for Medical History between 1968 and 1974, Minister of Health between 1974 and 1984, and director of the State Hospital in Kútvölgyi Street from 1970. We owed a lot to him as a family, since he had helped secure four passports for us

ENDNOTES

in 1976, when he personally vouched for our return to György

1 József Antall Sr (1896–1974): lawyer, politician, government

Aczél.

commissioner for refugees between 1939 and 1944. He was

9 Solidarity emerged from the wave of discontent and related

arrested by the Gestapo. After World War II, he was a member

protests in 1979–1980. The strikes started in the Lenin

of parliament representing the Independent Smallholders’

Shipyard in Gdańsk. For more information, see our other

Party from 1945 to 1953 and Minister for Reconstruction in

article titled “The End of Communism and the Political

1945–1946.

Transformation of the V4 Countries”.

2 Founded in 1949, Radio Free Europe was a radio station

10 Szilveszter Harangozó (1929–2011): an associate of the

run by the US government during the Cold War in order to

State Security Agency with a classic career in internal affairs.

oppose Soviet expansion and to soften socialism in the

A Dzerzhinsky Academy graduate, he was secretary to Gábor

Eastern Bloc. Radio Liberty was the name of the station

Péter from 1951. He was made a colonel of Department III/III

broadcasting to the Soviet Union. Radio Free Europe stopped

in 1968, from which point, he cultivated a close relationship

broadcasting in 1993.

with György Aczél. Between 1977 and 1985, he worked as

3 The BBC’s Hungarian department with a Hungarian

deputy division leader at Department III/III before becoming

editorial staff broadcast news in Hungarian from 1939 to

Deputy Minister of State Protection in 1985. He retired on 30

2005. It was often hard to hear due to constant radio jamming.

April 1989.

4 The Voice of America station broadcast news in forty

11 Nemzetőr (Militiaman) was a periodical published in

different languages in the direction of Eastern Europe and the

Munich, founded by a couple of Hungarian emigrants after

Soviet Union after World War II. The Hungarian broadcast was

1956. Its most notable personality was editor-in-chief Tibor

ended in 2004.

Tollas. It was a patriotic, popular magazine in its time.

5 Tivadar Pártay (1908–1999): politician, member of

12 The term “democratic opposition” was a self-definition of

parliament representing the Independent Smallholders’ Party

a portion of the intellectual opposition in the 1980s. It later

from 1945 to 1948. He was interned at Kistarcsa and Recsk

became the Network of Free Initiatives, which, in turn,

and, later, worked for state-owned companies. Under the

transformed into a political party called the Alliance of Free

alias Buday, he was a State Security informant.

Democrats.

6 Béla Kovács (1908–1959): Independent Smallholders’

13 Gábor Demszky (1952–): social scientist, politician. He was

Party politician. He joined the party in 1933 to become its

a member of the democratic opposition and the Alliance of

National Deputy Secretary General by 1939. After World War

Free Democrats before the regime change. He was mayor of

II, he became Political Undersecretary in the Ministry of Home

Budapest between 1990 and 2010.

Affairs. His Party secured 57% of the votes at the 1945

14 The Rajk Boutique was architect László Rajk’s (1949–2019)

election. On 25 February 1947, Kovács (working as the Party’s

flat under 3 Galamb Street, where illegal magazines,

General Secretary since 1945) was arrested in Budapest on

opposition literature, and books were being distributed. Such

false charges by the Soviet authorities. He was taken to the

items were all called samizdat, a word derived from a Russian

Soviet Union and sentenced to twenty years. From 1955, he

portmanteau.

was held by the State Security Agency in Hungary. In 1956,

15 Maoism is a branch of Marxism, founded by Chinese

he ﬁ rst became Minister for Agriculture, then State Minister in

communist politician and leader Mao Zedong.

Imre Nagy’s government. He worked as a member of

16 Department III/III was a subagency of the State Security

Parliament between 1958 and 1959. In 2000, the day of his

Agency within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, specialising in

original arrest, 25 February, became the ofﬁ cial memorial day

domestic counterintelligence. Its task was to map hostile

for the victims of communist dictatorships in Hungary.

opposition forces on a domestic scale, which basically made

INTRODUCTION

it a political police coordinated by the Hungarian Socialist

his death. Before becoming general secretary, he had been

Workers’ Party (MSZMP). The previously mentioned Szilveszter

the head of the Soviet Committee for State Security from

Harangozó was one of its division leaders.

1967. He was the Soviet Union’s ambassador to Budapest at

17 Helmut Kohl (1930–2017): German politician, member of

the time of the 1956 revolution.

the Christian Democratic Union. He was the chancellor of

26 Komsomol was a youth organisation founded by the Soviet

Germany between 1982 and 1998.

Communist Party in 1918. Its membership reached 36 million

18 Founded in 1957, Élet és Irodalom (Life and literature) is a

people by 1977. With the fall of the Soviet Union, it dissolved,

Hungarian magazine dealing with public issues and featuring

as well.

literary works.

27 Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev (1931–): Soviet politician,

19 Existing between 1964 and 1989, Új Tükör (New mirror)

the last general secretary of the Soviet Union in office from

was a political and social weekly magazine with editors-in-

1985 to 1990, then its first president until 1991.

chief Imre Csanádi and Sándor Fekete. It was a publication

28 The Jurta Theater was run as a business venture in

platform for numerous respected writers and poets.

Népliget between 1985 and 1987 by László Romhányi (1944–

20 Launched in 1958, Valóság (Reality) was a sociological

2005). It housed theatrical productions and alternative political

periodical, the magazine of the Society for Dissemination of

events with ties to the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF),

Scientific Knowledge. During the 1970s and 1980s, it provided

the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), and the Alliance of

a platform for more free-spirited intellectual debate, as well.

Young Democrats (Fidesz). Romhányi became radicalised

21 Tiszatáj magazine (The Tisza region) started in 1947 in

after the regime change and spent years in prison for criminal

Szeged. As a periodical, it fell into the category of barely

charges. Romhányi’s magazine was the highly radical Szent

tolerated publications. Arguably, the greatest Hungarian poets

Korona (Holy crown).

of the time, Gyula Illyés, Sándor Csoóri, and Gáspár Nagy all

29 Ferenc L. Gazsó (1953–): writer awarded the Táncsics

published works on its pages. It was banned for six months in

Mihály Prize, lawyer, honorary associate professor. Chief

1986 because of a Gáspár Nagy poem titled A fiú naplójából

contributor, then editor-in-chief of Magyar Hírlap. He was CEO

(From the diary of a boy). The ban was initiated by János

of Mai Nap publishing company, and editor-in-chief of the

Kádár himself.

paper Mai Nap (Today). He was CEO of the Hungarian

22 Mozgó Világ (Moving world) was a monthly literary and

Telegraphic Office until his retirement.

public education periodical from 1975. Throughout its

30 László Almásy (1895–1951): explorer, Africa expert. He was

existence, it fell into all three categories of the ”promote–

the descendant of the gentry side of the family and not of the

tolerate–ban” policy. Numerous well-known writers, poets,

one holding the countship. His father was one of the founders

and publicists worked for the magazine. After the dismissal of

of the Hungarian Geographical Society in 1872. He fought in

its editor-in-chief, Ferenc Kulin, the entire editorial staff

World War I as a pilot. Africa had interested him since his

resigned in 1983. The reason: György Aczél did not allow

younger days, so, later, he led numerous expeditions to Egypt

István Bibó’s article, a piece criticising Marxism titled “The

and Sudan. He even visited a previously uncharted part of the

development of European society”, to be published.

Libyan Desert. He was drafted into the German army during

23 Éva Keleti (1931–): photo artist, editor, recipient of the

World War II, where his task was to deploy German intelligence

Balázs Béla and the Kossuth Prizes as a photographer. She

agents behind English lines.

worked for the Hungarian Telegraphic Office (MTI) and Új

31 A part of the Posta Bank Média Portfolio, Kurír, was a

Tükör, among others. She has contributed immensely to the

nationwide tabloid between 1990 and 1998 under editor-in

international recognition of Hungarian photography in part as

chief Gábor Szűcs.

a member of the Word Press Photo’s judging panel.

32 In 1990, the press mostly expected the Alliance of Free

24 Reform was an illustrated weekly magazine that run from

Democrats to win the election instead of the Hungarian

1988 to 1998, with Péter Tőkés as its founder and first editor-

Democratic Forum. The latter had very little media presence,

in-chief. It was hugely popular around the time of the regime

they were working in a rather hostile media environment.

change, which warranted an enormous number of copies

There had been attempts to balance the situation out in the

(370,000) to be published weekly, a number quite

form of magazines like Új Magyarország (New Hungary) or

unimaginable today.

Pesti Hírlap (Newspaper of Pest). Regardless, all the main

25 Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov (1914–1984): Soviet politician,

opinion forming media platforms were in the hands of the

general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party from 1982 to

political left.

INTRODUCTION

33 Ibolya Dávid (1954–): lawyer, politician, member of

Tourism in 1991, to later replace Mihály Kupa as Finance

parliament between 1990 and 2010. She was head of the

Minister, a position he held until the change of government in

Hungarian Democratic Forum between 1990 and 2010 and

1994. He secured a mandate from the Budapest party list and

Minister for Justice between 1998 and 2002.

became ﬂoor leader of the MDF. In 1996, he lost the presidency

34 The József Antall Foundation was the party foundation of

of the party to Sándor Lezsák and subsequently left the MDF

the MDF between 2003 and 2010. The Antall family eventually

with other MDNP politicians loyal to József Antall’s legacy.

cut ties with it and entered into legal debate with the MDF’s

40 György Szabad (1924–2015): historian, the first Speaker of

successor party, JESZ (Democratic Community of Welfare and

the democratically elected National Assembly of Hungary. He

Freedom), where the State Audit Office uncovered some illegal

later became the founder of the MDNP. His application to

dealings.

university in 1942 was rejected due to the law numerus

35 Péter Boross (1928–): lawyer, politician, prime minister of

clausus that limited number of minority students studying at

Hungary between 1993 and 1994. During the 1956 revolution,

university. He went to labour service and even served in a

he contributed to the activities of the Revolution Committee of

Russian labour camp for a short while. He was admitted to the

Budapest and the Revolution Council of Hungarian

Budapest University as a history major in 1945, where he

Intellectuals, for which he was later arrested and sent to

earned his degree as a teacher and archivist. He became a

internment. From 1971, he became director of the South-Pest

candidate in 1955, then wrote his academic dissertation in

Catering Company. As a minister without portfolio, he directed

1969. He was a corresponding member of the Hungarian

the secret service under the Antall administration, then

Academy of Sciences from 1982 then became a full member

became minister of interior in 1990.

in 1998. He taught my father at the university’s history major—

36 Lajos Bokros (1954–): banker, politician. He was elected

my father liked his special, colourful personality very much. My

member of parliament of the Hungarian Socialist Party but,

father once quoted Lajos Kossuth inaccurately in the

later, resigned. He was president and chief executive of

parliament in the presence of György Szabad, who actually

Budapest Bank between 1991 and 1995, then Finance

walked up and corrected him. I had absolute respect for him.

Minister in Horn Gyula’s government between 1995 and 1996.

41 Sándor Lezsák (1949–): literary man, teacher, politician. He

He is known for his famous “Bokros Package,” a set of

was one of the MDF’s founders, with the political movement

financial measures still debated with regards to their necessity

originating in 1987 from the garden of his house in Lakitelek.

and lasting effects. He later became a professor at CEU, then

He was elected president of the MDF in 1996, which led to the

secured a mandate for the European Parliament in 2009 as a

secession of MDNP.

candidate of the Hungarian Democratic Forum. He went on to

42 The research and analyst company Political Capital was

become the party’s candidate for prime minister at the 2010

founded by Krisztián Szabados and Zoltán Somogyi. They

elections but ended up not securing a seat in parliament due

conducted analyses and research for the MDF and SZDSZ,

to his party’s low popular support (2.6%).

but they received assignments from the Office for National

37 Szabolcs Kerék-Bárczy (1971–): as a young man, he

Security, as well. On orders from Ibolya Dávid, they were to be

worked in the prime minister’s cabinet during the Antall

employed for assignments originating from the József Antall

administration, and, then, at the prime minister’s office and at

Foundation. Their intention was to unite the MDF and SZDSZ

the Foreign Ministry during the first Orbán government. He

into a single party, which might have seemed a good idea in

was later appointed Hungarian consul to Los Angeles, before

theory, but, in practice, proved to be impossible due to the

becoming the spokesman for the MDF and the leader of the

extreme differences between the two parties.

foreign cabinet. He was a member of the national board

43 Balázs Horváth (1942–2006): lawyer, politician. He got his

between 2008 and 2010. He became advisor to Bokros Lajos,

mandate in 1990 as an individual candidate, then went on to

then entered the Democratic Coalition in 2013, a party he left

become minister of interior from May and minister without

in the autumn of 2016.

portfolio from December. He was the deputy floor leader of the

38 The Hungarian Democratic People’s Party seceded from

MDF between 1998 and 2004, before his expulsion from the

the MDF in 1996.

party due to his opposition to Ibolya Dávid’s policies. He

39 Iván Szabó (1934–2005): member of parliament (1990–

secured a mandate again in 2006 as a member of Fidesz.

1998), member of the Antall government, minister. He was the

44 Géza Jeszenszky (1941–): historian, university professor,

founding president of MDNP, securing an individual mandate in

diplomat and Foreign Minister of the Antall government

1990. He was appointed Minister of Industry, Trade, and

between 1990 and 1994.

INTRODUCTION

45 Ronald Reagan (1911–2004): actor, politician, and

52 György Aczél (1917–1991): one of the most indispensable

president of the USA from 1981 to 1989. He played a huge

politicians of the Kádár era. As a young man, he was a

role in bringing the Cold War to an end.

member of the Zionist movement and also worked as an actor.

46 John Paul II (born Karol Wojtyła, 1920–2005): head of the

He was a member of the MSZMP’s Central Committee from

Catholic church from 1978 until his death. As a Polish national,

1956, then also a member of its Political Committee from

he paid extra attention to the Soviet satellite states of Eastern

1970. He was vice chair of the Council of Ministers from 1974,

Europe.

and chief director of the Social Sciences Institute between

47 Imre Pozsgay (1933–2016): an iconic figure of the Kádár

1985 and 1989. During the Kádár era, he was responsible for

era. He was minister of culture and education (1976–1982)

ideological, educational, and cultural policies. He had strong

and minister of state (1988–1989). He was a member of the

connections to the state security service (mostly in an informal

Political Committee of the MSZMP and also of the national

manner), and he had a good relationship with Szilveszter

board of the Patriotic People’s Front, of which he was

Harangozó from Department III/III. He blackmailed a lot of

secretary general between 1982 and 1988. In 1990, he

writers and artists with classified information.

became a member of parliament for the Hungarian Socialist

53 Miklós Németh (1948–): economist, politician. He was the

Party, then created the National Democratic Alliance with

last prime minister before the regime change, between 1988

Zoltán Bíró in 1991. The party did not reach the 5% threshold

and 1989. He was temporary prime minister of the Republic

at the 1994 election, then dissolved itself in 1996. Pozsgay

of Hungary between 1989 and 1990.

continued as a university professor. He played a historical role

54 The Workers’ Militia was a paramilitary organisation existing

supporting the intellectual Left. On 28 January 1989, he was

under state party control between 1957 and 1989, with up to

the first to publicly declare 1956 a popular uprising as

60,000 members.

opposed to a counterrevolution. His statement caused

55 Nicolae Ceaușescu (1918–1989): Romanian communist

immense confusion within the MSZMP and foreshadowed the

politician, leader of the Romanian Communist Party from 1965

upcoming political disunion of the Kádár system.

until his execution.

48 Lech Wałęsa (1943–): Polish workers’ union leader,

56 György Csóti (1940–): electrical engineer, politician. He was

politician, and president of the Polish Republic between 1990

member of parliament between 1990 and 1998 (MDF), then

and 1995. A leader of the workers of the Gdańsk shipyard, he

between 2011 and 2014 (Fidesz). He served as the Hungarian

later contributed to the Polish transition at the end of the

ambassador to Zagreb between 1999 and 2003 and as head

1980s. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1983.

secretary of MDF’s presidential office until József Antall’s

49 János Fekete (1918–2009): vice president of the Hungarian

election as prime minister.

National Bank. From a young age, he worked in various

57 Gyula Zacsek (1947–): member of parliament in MDF

positions at the bank until 1988. He was first its vice president

colours. He organised the so-called “MDF marketplaces”

from 1980, then, from 1982, a Hungarian delegate to the

between 1990 and 1994. He was expelled from the party in

International Monetary Fund. Generations of bankers were

the summer of 1993, then founded the Hungarian Market

trained under his guidance.

Party, which failed to achieve 5% at the 1994 election.

50 “Gorenje tourism” started with the introduction of the

58 Hans-Dietrich Genscher (1927--2016): German politician.

“world passport” in January 1988, a document that made it

He became a member of the Nazi party not long before the

easier to travel to Western Europe. Everyone in possession of

end of World War II, during which he served at the German Air

such a document could buy American dollars. With the

Force (the Luftwaffe). He spent time both in American and

document and the money in hand, Hungarians spent

British captivity. He was a member of the Bundestag from

approximately USD 2 billion (HUF 50 billion) worth of money

1965 delegated by the Free Democratic Party (FDP), served

in Austria, buying (among other things) an immense amount

as interior minister under Willy Brandt, as foreign minister

of Gorenje fridges (a fridge manufactured in Yugoslavia).

under Helmut Schmidt, then as vice chancellor (1974–1982).

51 Zoltán Bíró (1941–): writer, literary historian, politician. He

Under Helmut Kohl, he became foreign minister, then vice

was the first managing president of the Hungarian Democratic

chancellor again (1982–1992). He played an important role in

Forum between 1987 and 1989. He quit the party in 1991 to

the reunification of Germany and in the democratic transition

found the National Democratic Alliance with Imre Pozsgay. He

in Central Europe.

was director of the Research Institute and Archives for the

59 François Mitterrand (1916–1996): French politician who

History of Regime Change between 2013 and 2020.

was president of France between 1981 and 1995.

INTRODUCTION

60 According to the framework of the MDF–SZDSZ Pact,

moved to the private sector and worked as a private detective

signed in April 1990, József Antall made a strategic agreement

and director at various security companies where he could

with the Free Democrats that guaranteed a stable government

utilise his previous experiences.

after the first free election. Up until this point, even passing the

67 Péter Tölgyessy (1957–): lawyer, political scientist,

national budget required a qualified majority. The pact was

politician. As a member of SZDSZ at the time of the regime

signed by the head of the two parties. According to Antall’s

change, he was one of the negotiators at the National Round

wishes, the pact was not a secret, behind-the-scenes one but

Table talks.

rather a fully legal and detailed agreement serving the

68 Tamás Sárközy (1940–2020): lawyer, university professor.

governability of the country.

He was deputy Justice Minister at the time of the regime

61 Lustration would have meant the investigation and potential

change, between 1988 and 1990, then he became

prosecution of former communist party and state security

deregulational commissioner in 1989–1990. Due to his

officials.

positions, he played a role in creating the frameworks of a

62 The MGIMO (Moscow State Institute of International

market economy in Hungary.

Relations) provided high level university training to the best

69 Ludwig Wilhelm Erhard (1897–1977): German politician,

part of Russian and Soviet diplomats. The KGB was

economist. As minister for economics under Konrad Adenauer

intertwined with Soviet diplomacy. The institution provides

(1949–1963), he had a great role in getting the German

high level training to this day.

economy back on its feet after World War II. He moved on to

63 Gyula Horn (1932–2013): economist, politician, Foreign

become chancellor of Germany between 1963 and 1966.

Minister of Hungary in 1989–1990, and prime minister

70 Margaret Thatcher (1925–2013): British conservative

between 1994 and 1998. In 1956–1957, he was member of

politician, the prime minister of the United Kingdom between

the armed authorities responsible for putting down the

1979 and 1990.

revolution (called “quilted coats”). In 1989, he was the one to

71 Charter 77 was a declaration published by the

symbolically open the Iron Curtain in the presence of the press

Czechoslovakian opposition in 1977. Its signatories were

with Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock at the border of

mostly intellectuals protesting against human rights violations.

Hungary and Austria.

Two years later, the leaders of the movement were prosecuted

64 Zoltán Gál (1940–): member of parliament, politician. He

and sentenced to prison. Due to the court sentence, many

had taught at the MSZMP’s political college from 1970. He

Hungarians also signed the Charter (now quite well-known

was deputy interior minister, then was appointed interior

internationally as well), asking other socialist countries not to

minister in Miklós Németh’s government. He was Speaker of

push for new politically motivated legal proceedings. A group

the National Assembly between 1994 and 1998.

of the signatories played an important part in the political

65 Gábor Péter (1906–1993): high-ranking state security

debates of the 1980s.

official. Coming from a poor Jewish family, he joined the

72 János Kis (1943–): liberal philosopher, founding member

workers’ movement at an early age. He was a tailor’s

and first chair of SZDSZ. As a pupil of Marxist philosopher

apprentice (which is even referred to in the Hungarian movie

György Lukács, he was first committed to Marxism before

Tanú or The Witness). He worked in the leadership of the so-

turning to more liberal views. He then started criticising

called Red Support, an organisation working to help

Marxism from a philosophical standpoint. In the 1980s he took

persecuted communists. He was a board member of the Party

part in organising a number of opposition events.

of Hungarian Communists (KMP), then head of several incarnations of the political police (mostly known by their acronyms and initialisms, PRO, ÁVO, and ÁVH). He was arrested in 1953. As a leader of the political police, he took part in setting up the show trials of people like László Rajk and József Mindszenty. Gábor Péter considered the ÁVH the communist party’s fist and wanted to impress the Soviet Union and Stalin more than Mátyás Rákosi. 66 Lajos Nagy (1938–2006): major general, first director of the Office for National Security in 1990. Previously, he worked as an intelligence officer in multiple countries. After retirement, he

INTRODUCTION

INTERVIEW WITH GERGELY GULYÁS, MINISTER OF THE PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE Zsombor Szabolcs Pál, 20 February 2020, Budapest

You were still quite young at the time of the transition that happened thirty years ago. What do you remember about it? How did you view it at the time? Did the momentum of the change and the general enthusiasm at the time have an effect on you? As a child it is easy to be enthusiastic. I was lucky, as my father took me along with him to many protests that are now considered symbolic events of the regime change. I still remember the chants echoed by tens of thousands of people at the Transylvania protest: “We will go all the way, let Ceaușescu be destroyed!” I remember the reinterment of Imre Nagy and the period of the first free election. Due to my age, I could not grasp the full significance of the regime change, but, nevertheless, I could already see that we were living in truly important and historic times. How do you view these changes now? What do you think their signiﬁcance is? How did 32

INTRODUCTION

its “negotiated” nature affect the system change? In all the historical and life-changing moments of the 20th century, Hungary always ended up on the losing side. The country and the nation suffered more from the First World War, the Treaty of Trianon, the Second World War, and, then, the bloody suppression of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 than from any other event since the Ottoman occupation. The regime change arguably was the only positive turning point for Hungary in the 20th century, and, as contradictory as it may seem in certain aspects, in general, it meant the liberation of an enslaved nation. It meant democracy in place of dictatorship and constitutionality instead of a corrupt and totalitarian single-party system. The negotiated change served as a political academy for the elite that made it happen. Three decades have passed since then, but the influence of the public figures who were actively involved in shaping the regime change is still felt today. This peaceful transition brought about a sort of lawful revolution, which also held positive values for a nation of lawyers such as the people of Hungary. We might also add that Romania, a country where the change was not a peaceful one, did not manage to create a new elite; in fact, it was arguably Romania where the most substantial part of the old regime managed to hold on to its power even after the change had happened. Hungary was the only country where the first freely elected government actually remained in office until the end of its parliamentary term. Why do you think this happened? There is a legal and a political reason behind this. The political one was József Antall, the

prime minister who could create a cohesive government during his short, three-and-ahalf-year long term. The legal factor was partly the notorious pact between the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats, namely, the so called “constructive vote of no conﬁdence,” which only allows the dismissal of any given government if a new prime minister has already been elected, thus creating an important pillar for the stability of Hungarian governments in general. Hungary is the only country in the region—probably in the whole of Europe as well—with no snap election in thirty years. What do you think, what is the opinion of the Hungarian society about these events and the developements that has been since achieved? Do Hungarians see them as a triumph or are they disappointed because they expected more? Have there been any shifts regarding this in the past thirty years? There have been serious shifts of thought about the regime change in the past thirty years. This is probably the first milestone anniversary when the majority of voters look back on the change as an undoubtedly positive event. At the same time, it is also clear that the assessment of a historical event is always a snapshot of the time when the assessment is made: our judgement of the regime change represents our current times just as much as it does the time it refers back to. At the time, the economy was nearly bankrupt, as the transition to market economy proved extremely painful and brought about an inevitable increase in unemployment— during such hard times the majority of voters could obviously not focus on the historical horizon of the future instead of their daily hardships. However, the still short, yet already historical distance we have today allows us to conclude that the regime change ultimately produced many more winners than losers. Although Hungary still ranks among the poorer countries of the European Union, it is improving exponentially faster in all fields of life. The majority of the population now has a higher

THIS IS PROBABLY THE FIRST MILESTONE ANNIVERSARY WHEN THE MAJORITY OF VOTERS LOOK BACK ON THE CHANGE AS AN UNDOUBTEDLY POSITIVE EVENT. standard of living than in 1989–1990. The fruits of talent, knowledge, and diligence are no longer limited by restrictions posed by a dictatorship. What are your views on the political role of József Antall Jnr in the regime change? What do you think the prime minister’s strengths and weaknesses were in connection with the transition process? József Antall took on an immensely difficult role in 1989. As a true compromise maker during the negotiated regime change, he worked hard at keeping the opposition forces united against the state party until this was necessary in order for the legal framework of the free election to be constructed, making a democratic transition possible. An even more demanding role Antall took on was the office of prime minister in a bankrupt country just after a change which people expected to miraculously bring a steep increase in the quality of life. He faced a dysfunctional economy with collapsing markets on one side in stark contrast with the more ambitious demands of Hungarian society inspired by its newly acquired freedom and the influence of the life standards of Austria to the West. The role of “mediator” between these two sides was delegated to a media clearly hostile and resentful towards József Antall and conservative Christian democrats in general. It is safe to say that filling such a position required INTRODUCTION

an almost superhuman determination from him. The sickness he had threatening to take away not only his political power but also his very life just added to the pressure. Although some policies of Antall’s government may and should be criticised, in general, the government undeniably set Hungary on the right path in foreign and economic policy, just like in its historical views and in defining a new social and political value system after the moral destruction of forty years of communist dictatorship. Antall’s trend-setting views on national policy were especially important: he considered the Hungarian nation to be one consistent entity, making this a guideline in all his communications with Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries. József Antall’s attitude towards public service should be an eternal example in Hungary to all public officers. As political scientist Ralf Dahrendorf said, “It takes six months to replace a political system, six years to transform an economic system, and sixty years to change a society.” In your opinion, have these processes already finished in Hungary or— as Dahrendorf claims— do they still need some time? Dahrendorf was most likely right when he wrote this, but he did not factor in the incredible rate of acceleration in the world today. This means that things that used to take sixty years to complete now may well be finished in only thirty years’ time. By now, the vast majority of Hungarian society has become accustomed to the democratic, legal, and market-related transformations that were brought about by the regime change. They voice criticism if these already accepted fundamental values, the values they live their lives by, are violated. Because of this, we can confidently claim that the regime change in Hungary is now a fully completed process. When thinking about the future, people today do not see the period of communist dictatorship as a point of reference in any way—instead, they are basing their personal predictions on their present situations. 34

INTRODUCTION

JÓZSEF ANTALL’S ATTITUDE TOWARDS PUBLIC SERVICE SHOULD BE AN ETERNAL EXAMPLE IN HUNGARY TO ALL PUBLIC OFFICERS. Do you think that the experiences and feelings Hungarians shared with the region’s other nations have strengthened the bond between them since the change? Do you think we can build on these common experiences? The most tangible and still remaining result of the communist dictatorship is the East versus West division of Europe. Today this is not manifested in continents being split in two by barbed wire but in ideological differences invoking different value systems and world views which resonate strongly in everyday politics and trigger different reactions to important processes from the two parts of the continent. For this very reason the necessity of cooperation between Central European countries originates from these historical experiences. The countries of the Visegrad Group share similar opinions about the most important issues of the present and the future: they feel the importance of a national identity and the essential nature of national diversity for a united Europe. They want to remain Hungarians, Czechs, Poles, and Slovakians along with, and in spite of, the European central institutions exercising many a shared authority. We will not forget for a second about the Antall government as the founder of the Visegrad Group, an alliance that the current government maintains in an exemplary manner.

INTERVIEW WITH FRANK SPENGLER, THE RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE KONRADADENAUER STIFTUNG IN HUNGARY Zsombor Szabolcs Pál, 27 February 2020, Budapest

At the time of the changes in Hungary, you were stationed in Africa. Looking back at our region from another part of the globe, what was your evaluation of the regime change and the democratisation process? Did local communities in Africa have any opinion about the political shift happening in Central Europe? The “wind of change,” the fall of the Berlin Wall, and all the epochal changes that came about in 1989, the annus mirabilis, have naturally affected the neighbouring continent, Africa, as well. On 2 February 1990, the president of South Africa proclaimed in front of the parliament that previously banned opposition parties would be allowed to be formed again and political prisoners would be released. On 11 February, Nelson Mandela, leader of the African National

Congress, was released after twenty-seven years in prison. On 21 March 1990, Namibia formally achieved its independence from South Africa. In May 1991, the last Cuban soldiers and civilians finally left Angola after a thirteenyear period of being stationed in the country in numbers as high as 430,000. Tensions between the two major powers of the Cold War manifested themselves in many African countries, as well, with socialist countries providing significant political support and military aid for various African freedom movements. For this very reason, the majority of Africans simply could not conceive of the collapse of Europe’s socialist states. Many Africans had known these countries from personal experience, they remembered them from their days of exile and considered the direction of their social development very favourably. These “socialist sister countries” were clear examples in the eyes of many African countries for their own developing social models. It took some time until the changes happening in Europe finally brought about a new political direction to Africa, as well. As a German citizen, how significant do you think these years really were? Were people already expecting a change at the time? Did you think there was a fundamental transformation behind certain individual shifts? Although I had always believed in a peaceful reunification of Germany, the collapse of the GDR took me by surprise—it might have been because the news that reached us abroad were quite confusing. In spite of all that, it was rather clear to us after some private conversations INTRODUCTION

HUNGARIANS ARE FAMOUS FOR THEIR LOVE OF FREEDOM. THE REVOLUTION OF 1956 IS AN ETERNAL PROOF OF THIS. HUNGARY COULD ALWAYS SECURE MORE FREEDOM FOR ITSELF THAN OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. FURTHERMORE, AS A RESULT OF THEIR THOUSANDYEAR HISTORY, HUNGARIANS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN MORE PATRIOTIC AND HAVE FORMED A MORE TENACIOUS SOCIETY THAN OTHER NATIONS IN THE REGION. 36

INTRODUCTION

with representatives of socialist countries that a serious political change was inevitable. In the summer of 1989, I visited some relatives in the GDR and was told unambiguously and clearly that the GDR would dissolve very soon with the goal of a quick reunification. Thus, I was well informed about the possibility of a shift, but I did not think it would actually occur in the near future. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, I finally realised there was no turning back and that the concept of a two-state Germany— Zweistaatentheorie in German—was simply unacceptable to the people of East Germany. At this point, I knew that it was only a matter of time until Germany was finally reunited. I even spoke out about my views at various public events in Zimbabwe, where I was stationed during November 1989—I was also strongly criticised, even by a couple of West Germans. As a representative of the KonradAdenauer-Stiftung, you later moved to this region, which means you must have a deep understanding of the way Central Europeans experienced the years following the regime change. Do you see any differences in the way certain nations look back on the events of thirty years ago? Each country has its own story of regime change and they all had their own vision of a liberated future. The conditions at the time were quite different though, with certain transitioning countries receiving a proportionately different amount of support from friendly countries than others. For example, the GDR requested to join the Federal Republic of Germany in accordance with Article 23 of the Basic Law, thus its trajectory was rather different compared to that of other transitioning countries. There was no example or precedent for a transition like that. Nobody knew how to integrate an ex-socialist country into another society. Pragmatism and bravery were the key with each country trying to find its own path regarding its reforms. For most of them, a common goal materialised very quickly: “Let’s get back to Europe, let’s join the European Union!”

You have been serving here in Hungary for years now. As a foreigner deeply familiar with Hungarians, how do you view the regime change in the context of the bigger national narrative? Do you think Hungarians are proud of what they achieved or they are disappointed because they expected more? Hungarians are famous for their love of freedom. The Revolution of 1956 is an eternal proof of this. Hungary could always secure more freedom for itself than other socialist countries. Furthermore, as a result of their thousand-year history, Hungarians have always been more patriotic and have formed a more tenacious society than other nations in the region. Thanks to this, the regime change in Hungary was more like a series of negotiations than a number of revolutionary changes. It is also worth noting that Hungary managed to complete the regime change without sacrificing its political stability. Hungarians should be very proud of their regime change, even if it has not (yet) fulfilled all their expectations. At the very beginning of the transition process, we failed to estimate its depth and speed correctly. Some time is still needed for complete acclimatisation, but, most importantly, the situation is constantly improving. After all, people always build their plans on hope. What is the current state of affairs in Germany? Are the changes of 1989 and 1990 considered unequivocally positive in German society, or are there still some remaining obstacles? How can the heritage of Adenauer help in handling this rather complex situation? Does this issue still have an influence on the general direction of Germany’s national destiny today? Germany is in a better state than the current public morale among Germans would lead you to believe. Although the transition clearly had winners and losers, too, the German nation agrees that the regime change and the reunification was a great blessing for the country. The foundations of this were laid down by Konrad Adenauer’s chancellorship. His most

prominent political goals are still considered important guidelines for the CDU. They include the close cooperation with France, Germany’s accession to the European and Atlantic value system, and, most importantly, the adaption of a social market economy. However, some of today’s most urgent issues such as climate change, demographic challenges, and digitalisation were not yet on the agenda in Konrad Adenauer’s day. It is fascinating to speculate what his potential opinion about these questions would be. Many believe that a real regime change only occurs years after the actual political events. When do you think this process will be truly finished in Central Europe? I cannot give you a definitive answer to this question, as it concerns two overlapping processes. The transition in question is occurring within a constantly and swiftly changing society with key terms such as globalisation, digitalisation, and a geopolitical shift. This means that people today must adapt to their constantly changing environments much more quickly and thoroughly than before. As an official representative of a German foundation in Hungary, you have a twofold relation to the anniversaries of the regime changes of the 1990s. What sort of events are you planning to commemorate this important anniversary for both Germans and Hungarians? The people who protested on the streets all over the world demanding change thirty years ago had something in common: they wanted to have the opportunity to live in freedom and prosperity. This is why we are focussing on freedom at our commemorative events. We already organised a very successful commemoration last year in Sopron for the 30th anniversary of the PanEuropean Picnic, and we are looking forward to the other events, as well.

INTRODUCTION

A WIDE-ANGLE LANDSCAPE

THE THIRD WAVETHE END OF COMMUNISM AND ANTICOMMUNISM IN THE 1980S Tamás Péter Baranyi

On 21 September 1976, at Sheridan Circle in Washington, Orlando Letelier, former left-wing minister of Chilean president Salvador Allende and then Chilean ambassador to America, was killed by a bomb planted in a car. One of Letelier’s American colleagues, Ronni Moffitt was also killed by the explosion. The hit had been ordered by the secret police of the reigning Chilean regime. Although identifying and finally bringing the murderers to justice took more than a decade, the assassination set huge changes in motion in the American capital: the already increasingly popular human rights discourse was complemented by the protection of national sovereignty, since the murder—carried out by citizens of an “allied” country in the Cold War—had been committed on American soil. By the early 1980s, a clear consensus had emerged that despite its anticommunist commitment, the United States of America should keep its allies in line regarding human rights and sovereignty issues, as well.1 In addition to being a military and economic race between two world-dominating superpowers, the Cold War, for the entirety of its history, was also a struggle to win the public sympathy of the world. The peace

Orlando Letelier in 1976, the year of his death

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congresses, the intricate web of foreign aids, and the spreading of American pop culture were all designed to recruit the rapidly forming new independent countries as new allies, backing either the United States or the Soviet Union. This process did not come without obstacles: the Soviet Union had its fair share of trouble with “progressive” Arabian leaders, just like the United States, whose supported anti-communist regimes were often just as hated in the eyes of the American population as their communist alternatives. In addition, the pro-communist or “capitalist” regimes of the Third World did not always prove to be trustworthy allies, quickly realising how they could manipulate their respective superpowers to their own benefit.2 Vietnam provided some very important lessons for both sides. For a long time, the communist rebels of South Vietnam had been swinging back and forth between China and the Soviet Union (already in conflict with each other), thus ensuring the most military and economic aid for themselves from both countries.3 The state of South Vietnam was created with American support to counterbalance the communist North Vietnam, but the Americans soon became so dissatisfied with the corrupt leadership of the Diệm brothers that they themselves helped remove them.4 After the human rights-based foreign policy shift of the Carter administration, a shift that made a number of long-time American allies somewhat uneasy, the Reagan administration once again put a greater emphasis on supporting right-wing powers and rebels in developing parts of the world. The worldwide demand for democratisation was not unprecedented: the rule of generals in Greece ended in 1974 while the Carnation Revolution in Portugal swept away the remains of the Salazar regime. In

Spain, Franco’s dictatorship was brought to an end by democratic trials in 1975. All these transformations carried within them the possible strengthening of communist influence, which ultimately never really materialised, largely due to the political and economic gravity of the European Economic Community.5 There were two prominent foreign policy doctrines among American political leaders around this time. The first is connected to Jeane Kirkpatrick, the first female UN Ambassador of the USA. According to the so-called Kirkpatrick Doctrine, totalitarian communist dictatorships are more stable and can perpetuate their own power more effectively than authoritarian systems, which are less stable and less resistant to reform. As a result, authoritarian regimes are reformable, while communist ones are not. Pursuant to this logic, the United States may support authoritarian systems in order to contain the victory of totalitarian communism through them.6 Focussing on the other side of the same coin, the Reagan Doctrine claimed it was imperative to support all anti-communist rebellions against communist regimes everywhere in the world. The Reagan administration thought this especially important primarily when it came to developing countries like Afghanistan or the region of Central Africa, and not necessarily in connection with Eastern Europe and other systems within the Soviet Union itself. This is what made supporting the anti-Soviet Afghan Mujahideen, a cornerstone of Reagan’s foreign policy, and also the reason for the bizarre political pact later known as Iran–Contra Gate, where American officials sold weapons to Iran (at the time considered an enemy state) without the consent of the US Congress in order to illegally support the Contras, Nicaragua’s anticommunist rebels with the proceeds. Thus, while the Kirkpatrick Doctrine considered some right-wing regimes worthy of support due to their reformability, the Reagan Doctrine declared all groups rebelling against unreformable and totalitarian communist regimes worthy of American aid. Once Reagan was elected, he was astonished by the paper authored by Kirkpatrick, at the

US president Lyndon B. Johnson with Ferdinand Marcos from the Philippines in 1966

time a university professor working in relative obscurity, and quickly made her the UN Ambassador. In February 1981, shortly after taking office, Reagan met the president of South Korea, General Chun Doo-Hwan in the White House, followed shortly by a meeting in March with General Roberto Viola, the president of Argentina. Despite all this, dark clouds were gathering over the authoritarian alliance: the Falklands War triggered by Argentina in 1982, along with the increasingly clear oppressive nature of Salvador’s right-wing regime in Chile, undermined Reagan’s policy. America could simply not afford not to support Great Britain in the Falklands War, while Salvador’s crimes could only be put right politically by a democratic general election.7 Reagan’s Westminster speech at this point made it clear that supporting democracy was a cornerstone of American policymaking. After this, it became increasingly difficult for Washington to explain the aids it was still providing to oppressive systems solely because of their anti-communist stance. In the 1980s, democratisation in the world was focussed on four countries: the Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, and Chile. All four seemed stable enough to have a government worthy of support, yet none was confident enough to resist reforms. However, a heterogeneous and pro-democracy opposition was emerging in all four countries, with occasional communist members too—these parties had enough popular support to validate concern. In the Philippines, the dictatorship of Ferdinand A WIDE-ANGLE LANDSCAPE

Marcos tarnished its international credibility in 1983 by having the country’s security forces murder the leader of the opposition, Benigno Aquino at the Manila Airport as he was returning home. Although the US supported Marcos in the face of the opposition movement erupting in response to the murder, it became clear that reforms were desperately needed in order for the Philippines’ regime to survive. Counting on his own popularity along with the divisions within the opposition, Marcos finally organised an election, which was won by the widow of the murdered opposition leader, Corazon “Cory” Aquino.8 In the meantime, American politics was changing too: once Letelier’s murder exposed the unreliable nature of right-wing regimes, other issues slowly started to emerge, as well. Even pro-Reagan right-wing voters started to realise that without democratic tendencies, stable right-wing governments were prone to become radical in the long run. According to a 1985 analysis by the renowned Cato Institute, it was time for the US to implement a benign detachment from right-wing systems.9 America’s relationship with South Africa was similarly problematic: the isolated African country upheld its apartheid system with its internal legitimacy in ruins, yet it still played an important role in keeping the region’s Marxists

in Angola and Mozambique in check. In addition to human rights issues, South Africa’s conduct raised serious racial concerns, as well, with the US keen to condemn all racist practices. Reagan thought for a long time that, since the country was an important anti-communist ally, using economic sanctions against it was simply out of the question with the possible retorts ultimately strengthening the country’s radicals instead of its moderates. Reagan chose his policy of constructive engagement in the case of South Africa as well, although opposition archbishop Desmond Tutu declared the policy an advocacy of the apartheid at his official visit to Washington in 1984. From this date, American policymaking concerning South Africa took a significant turn: President Reagan appointed a black ambassador to the country and made it very clear that the apartheid system had to end.10 Overriding the presidential veto, the Congress passed the Comprehensive AntiApartheid Act with enormous support from the Republican Party. The South Korean strongman Chun Doo-Hwan had been on very good terms with Reagan on a personal level, although, right around that time, a strong democratic movement was gaining momentum in his country. By that point, holding general elections at least in some form was

US president Ronald Reagan and South African archbishop Desmond Tutu during their meeting in 1984

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necessary for the international legitimisation of a regime, and, although the military government managed to hold on to its power at the 1985 legislative election by manipulating the mandate system, it was clear that two-thirds of the country’s population was on the opposition’s side. Even though the American government was rather worried about a radical change partly because of (among other reasons) the American troops stationed in the region, the US ultimately chose to support a direct presidential election, since the democratic transition of the Philippines was already being considered a triumph of Reagan’s policies. The South Korean leadership had another serious reason for not backing off from a direct election: doing so could have endangered the 1988 Olympics already scheduled to take place in Seoul. However, the military junta in South Korea ultimately managed to pull off what Marcos could not and successfully divided the opposition, winning the 1987 election in a truly democratic environment. Opposition leaders such as Kim Young-Sam (president between 1993 and 1998) and the later Nobel laureate Catholic Kim Jong-Nam (leading the country from 1998 to 2003) had to wait until the next election year to finally triumph over the junta.11 Probably nothing exposed the shady nature of American foreign policy more during the Cold War than the US’s support for right-wing military juntas in Latin America. Argentina, as already mentioned, shifted towards democracy after losing the Falklands War in 1983, while another important ally, Brazil, was only forced to organise direct elections for the first time in 1985. At this point, the cooperation between various Chilean right- and left-wing groups had already been underway in the United States for quite some time. By the mid-1980s, there had been a clear consensus about Chile no longer being reformable under Pinochet’s leadership, so the general had to be removed from power in order to create a “protected democracy.” Such a system could keep the communists at bay, leaving no obstacles in the way of introducing neoliberal reforms. The goal at this time was to create a pinochetismo without Pinochet

South Korean president Chun Doo-Hwan and his wife during their visit to Washington in 1981

himself.12 The new direction of the US foreign policy on Chile after 1984 was devised by a very colourful coalition, as well: Secretary of State George Shultz, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliot Abrams, and Tom Harkin, Iowa’s Democrat senator all worked on the new policies. Although the military and financial support provided for Chile had already been decreased under the Carter administration, by this point, America clearly wanted Pinochet to give up some of his powers voluntarily. Pinochet agreed to hold a national referendum in 1988 about his own power, but hugely overestimated his own popularity. Shultz, Abrams, and Harkin played a key role in uniting the divided opposition under the banner of the no campaign.13 In the end, the referendum was won by the nos, and Pinochet did leave his office, which even the left-wing American media attributed to the Reagan administration’s commitment to democracy and to the outstanding bipartisan consensus.14 By 1988, it had been clear that non-democratic regimes were considered drawbacks and not advantages with regards to American foreign policy. This was of course aided by the steeply decreasing charm of communism in the world, with neoliberal economic policies spreading more widely all over the globe, including Latin America and Southeast Asia. It seemed that democratic systems were not risking any strategic American interests at all; in fact, they seemed to provide more reliable protection for them. This is why George Bush could decide to discipline a couple of dictators previously A WIDE-ANGLE LANDSCAPE

connected to the US with tighter or looser ties, which led to the displacement of Noriega in Panama or the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation under Saddam Hussein. By George Bush’s presidency, the new slogan of American politics, first uttered thirty years before, was becoming very clear: “Freedom works.”15 The budding democratisation processes of the 1980s continued in the 1990s, as well. In the new international order, the active support of anti-communist regimes was unnecessary, since the true communist systems these regimes could have been used against were no longer around. The concepts of economic welfare, political pluralism, and a capitalist market economy became intertwined with each other in the new American political paradigm.16 The discussed democratic transitions are often put in parallel with Eastern Europe’s changes of regime, moreover, Samuel P. Huntington did not hesitate to unite the two processes, calling them “the third wave of democratisation.”17 Although Huntington addresses the important distinction himself, it is crucial to point out that the transition of authoritarian anti-communist systems was more a result of their own interior forces (with some outside aid) in contrast to the Eastern European regime changes, where a communist system was basically upheld by an outside power (through Soviet occupation). Once this outside power ceased to exist, the previously occupied countries all completed their democratic transitions almost without delay.

ENDNOTES 1 Alan McPherson: Strange bedfellows at the end of the Cold War: the Letelier assassination, human rights, and state sovereignty. Cold War History. Published online: 1 April 2019. <https://bit.ly/3ipA4et > 2 John Lewis Gaddis: Most már tudjuk. Európa Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 2006. 531–533. 3 Liên-Hang T. Nguyen: The War Politburo. North Vietnam’s Diplomatic and Political Road to the Têt Offensive. Journal of Vietnamese Studies. 2006/February–August. 4–58. 4 Balogh András: Délkelet-Ázsia történelme. Eötvös Kiadó, Budapest, 2018. 362–366.

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5 Samuel P. Huntington: Democracy’s Third Wave. Journal of Democracy. 1991/spring. 14. 6 Jeane Kirkpatrick: Dictatorships and Double Standards. Commentary Magazine. 1979/November. 34–45. 7 David Adesnik–Michael McFaul: Engaging Autocratic Allies to Promote Democracy. The Washington Quarterly. 2006/spring. 9–11. 8 David F. Schmitz: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1965–1989. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006. 232–240. 9 Ted Galen Carpenter: The United States and Third World Dictatorships: A Case for Benign Detachment. Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 58. 15 August 1985. <https://bit. ly/2WyhiaU > 10 Christopher Coker: The United States and South Africa, 1968–1985. Constructive Engagement and Its Critics. Duke University Press, Durham, 1986. 266. 11 Adesnik–McFaul, 15–17. 12 McPherson, 14. 13 Adesnik–McFaul, 17–19. 14 Abraham F. Lowenthal: Chile and the No Vote—a Bravo for U.S. Role. Los Angeles Times. 13 October 1988. <https://lat. ms/2W8Dut5 > 15 George H. W. Bush: Remarks at a White House Brieﬁ ng for Conservative Leaders, 26 April, 1990. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. U.S. Government Printing Ofﬁ ce, Washington DC, 1991. 573. 16 Baranyi Tamás Péter: Geoeconomics: The Democratic blueprint in historical perspective. COJOURN. 2016/2. 45–66. 17 Huntington, 12–13.

THE END OF COMMUNISM AND THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE VISEGRAD FOUR V4 COUNTRIES Tamás Péter Baranyi and Péter Dobrowiecki

INTRODUCTION From afar it may seem that the fall of communism happened quite similarly in the countries of the Central European region (especially in the V4 states): the increasingly severe economic uneasiness of the 1980s gradually turned into massive protests that local communist regimes could not handle in the long run, so party leaderships were eventually forced to sit down at the negotiating table with the opposition. All this finally led to the bloodless collapse of communist regimes and the election of the first democratically supported governments. If one cares to take a closer look at the events themselves along with the political, social, and historical factors of each country, their specific characteristics become quite apparent. The global economic crisis at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s left its mark on the economies of the Eastern Bloc that had already been doing badly. Due to increasing international prices and the improper financial decisions of the previous decades, local communist regimes (after brutally stamping out popular movements in 1956 and 1968) had increasingly harder time maintaining the illusion of the constant economic growth that was meant to guarantee the quiet contentment of Czechoslovakian, Hungarian, and Polish populations. At the same time, local hardliner leaders in 1985 harboured rather unsure feelings about Gorbachev, the Soviet Union’s newly selected leader, his new foreign policy goals, and his political reforms under the slogans glasnost and perestroika.1 After actively defending the Eastern Bloc’s political status quo for decades, Moscow suddenly became hesitant to meddle directly with the inner political processes of the countries of the Eastern Bloc, even suggesting

the introduction of some political concessions to opposition movements. As a result, the positions of the Party’s reformist branch in Hungary got stronger, while in Czechoslovakia and Poland the opposition got heartened up a bit. The series of events leading to the fall of communism and the predominantly peaceful democratic transition of the above-mentioned three countries were ready to be set in motion. GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS The communist regimes of Eastern Europe were brought about by external forces: the Red Army occupied the region in 1944–1945, which made the spread of communism inevitable. Although the Yalta Agreement stated that free and democratic elections should be organised in Eastern European countries, the winning side could not exactly agree on what this was actually supposed to mean. The composition of the occupying army and that of the Allied

Mikhail Gorbachev on top of the Berlin Wall in 1986—the initiator of the fall of the Iron Curtain A WIDE-ANGLE LANDSCAPE

Control Commission proved to be key factors for the political future of each country. Italy was occupied by the Allies with almost no Soviets in the Allied Control Commission, which was evoked as a precedent in later cases, too.2 Communist parties produced catastrophic results at the first democratic elections in Eastern European countries. The only exception was Czechoslovakia, but it was not long until the communists lost their relative popularity there, as well. The Sovietisation of Eastern Europe between 1944 and 1948 was conducted according to a well-constructed strategy which included the slow paralysis of democratic institutions, the infiltration into the secret services and the police, and the silencing of political opponents through legal means, political intimidation, or violent attacks. The emerging communist dictatorship maintained the disguise of a popular democracy, but it got rid of all plurality within it.3 The de-Stalinisation process coming out of the Soviet Union definitely had roots in the Eastern European experience and proved to be an obvious challenge to the communist elite of Eastern European countries. The East German uprising and the Poznań riots were— without a clearly defined political aim—preludes to the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the Prague Spring of 1968 bringing political chaos to Czechoslovakia, and the Polish Solidarity movement of the 1980s. Despite their obvious differences, these three events did have something in common: all of them questioned the communist rule, the very foundation of the connection to the Soviet Union. However, the international climate did not favour the independence of these countries or their political transformations. In 1956, the Soviet army stamped out the Hungarian Revolution. In 1968, five countries of the Warsaw Pact sent troops to Czechoslovakia to put an end to the “Prague Spring.” In 1981, Polish leaders declared a state of war in order to stop Solidarity and also to prevent the Soviet army from invading Poland.4 The clear difference between the above listed events and the critical year of 1989 was the international reaction they triggered. The 46

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general easing between the superpowers, the exhaustion of the Soviets due to the Soviet– Afghan War, and the arms race along with the increasingly stronger role of America in European politics created a completely new type of atmosphere. Gorbachev’s attempted reforms were accepted in the region, making it clear that communist regimes could not operate any longer the way they had until that point. The political system was ready for change, and the people were ready to make it happen as the Soviet army, along with the national armies, no longer wanted to intervene in the processes (except for a few exceptions).5 CZECHOSLOVAKIA The history of communist Czechoslovakia was defined by three main factors. The first was the country’s relatively well-preserved economy, which was due to its advanced industry and infrastructure that had not sustained significant damage during World War II.6 The second important factor was the country’s double nature with Czech and Slovakian ethnic groups living closely together. The third and final factor was the especially strong stagnation and political oppression (even compared to other Eastern European countries) that was brought about as a response to the invasion by members of the Warsaw Pact (hereinafter: WP) after the country’s attempt at reforms in 1968.7 As a sign of “renewal,” Gustáv Husák, the leader of the post-1968 “normalisation” era, resigned from the position of general secretary of the party in 1987 to be replaced by the younger Miloš Jakeš. However, Husák continued to have a massive influence on Czechoslovakian politics. At first, Jakeš had promised to keep in line with Gorbachev’s initiatives and introduce systemic reforms in harmony with the Soviet Union; however, it soon became clear that the leadership change was not going to bring about any serious reforms, not even delivering on its promises about minor social changes. Environmental destruction also played an important role in the Czechoslovakian situation: pollution levels were so high that water from a third of the country’s rivers became unsuitable

even for industrial use, while a third of its forests were eradicated by the 1980s.8 The role of white-collar intellectuals was also a special aspect of the processes leading to the communist regime’s fall in Czechoslovakia. As the country boasted the highest standards of living among the countries of the Eastern Bloc, more of its citizens were actually satisfied with the system than in other communist countries in Europe, making Czechoslovakian civil society underdeveloped and tardy.9 Interestingly, though, there was a group of intellectuals developing a close relationship with Western Europe, a group whose members were often relatively unknown at home but were often considered stars abroad. In his influential work titled The Power of the Powerless, playwright Václav Havel criticised totalitarian societies in a way that was comprehensible for Western readers, as well. He drew attention to the system’s weaknesses, its severe self-censorship, and the fact that people could achieve virtually anything if they started to behave as citizens of a free country.10 Although the Helsinki Accords, signed in 1975, consolidated the newly acquired Eastern European territories of the Soviet Union after the end of World War II, they also stated that basic human rights should be regarded as fundamental even in the Eastern Bloc. Pursuant to this, citizens of Eastern European countries were also entitled to basic human rights. In theory, this had already been the case before, but the internationally ratified agreement and the compulsive drive of communists to earn respect for themselves finally made them truly accountable based on these basic principles. The expressed goal of the Charter 77 movement, founded in Czechoslovakia in 1977, was also to make sure that basic human rights were observed. At the same time, there were only a few officers open to reform among the ranks of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. As Gorbachev wanted to avoid a direct confrontation with Gustáv Husák, the man truly in charge of Czechoslovakia, the only real reformer from the party’s leadership, Ladislav Adamec, was not supported by the Soviet leader.11 From

Signing the Helsinki Accords at the end of the Helsinki Conference on 1 August 1975 (from left to right: Chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany [West Germany] Helmut Schmidt, Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic [East Germany] Erich Honecker, US president Gerald Ford, and Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky)

March 1988, smaller demonstrations started to occur in the country, joined by a few hundred or a few thousand people. These were often broken up by riot police or the secret service in a violent manner with mass arrests. Having been released from prison in 1984, Havel became an internationally recognised ﬁgure by 1988, which was made even clearer by François Mitterrand’s visit to Czechoslovakia in December 1988. The French president even made Husák wait because of his meeting with Havel and other opposition leaders.12 On 19 January 1989, there was an anti-regime demonstration in Prague on the twentieth anniversary of Jan Palach’s selfimmolation, which the police quickly dispersed. Altogether 519 people were arrested by internal security services in the process, including Havel and thirteen other Charter 77 members. Havel was sentenced again, this time to nine months in prison, though he was released early due to international pressure. Charter 77 released an open letter titled A Few Sentences on 29 June, in which they demanded major reforms in the political system. Similarly to their reaction to the demonstration organised in memory of the Prague Spring in August 1989, the communist leadership did not respond. On the other hand, the police brutally attacked a group of people gathered on 17 November to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the death of Jan Opletal, a young medical student killed by the Nazis during A WIDE-ANGLE LANDSCAPE

World War II. Such demonstrations of police violence gave new momentum to the opposition movement, with university students organising mass marches in Prague and taking the political initiative in their own hands. At first, the communist leadership simply did not recognise the significance of the events. Havel returned to the capital from house arrest, and, together with other opposition leaders, on 19 November, he founded the Civil Forum, a movement that significantly amplified the political character of the demonstrations.13 Parallel to this, the Slovakian movement Public Against Violence was founded. On 21 November, Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec stated that he was willing to negotiate with the Civil Forum, while the communist leadership prepared to “rethink the leading position of the party.”14 On 26 November, negotiations began between the representatives of the government and the opposition. It quickly became apparent that the communists misunderstood the situation completely: taking the Polish agreement in April 1989 as an example, they proposed the idea of a coalition government with twentyone ministers, five of whom would have been delegated by non-communist parties. However, by this time, the party had no longer been in the position of dictating the terms. As a last resort, Adamec asked for Gorbachev’s support at a conference organised for the member states of the Warsaw Pact but was unsuccessful. On his return to Prague, he received the opposition’s offer: he could remain the head of the new government, but the communists would become a minority. Adamec refused the offer and resigned on 7 December 1989, along with his whole government. Three days later the new government was already in place led by Marián Čalfa, who became the first prime minister in forty years to lead a government not appointed by the communists. The regime change in Czechoslovakia reached its peak on 29 December, when members of the Federal Assembly (elected back in 1986) voted unanimously, without a single no vote or abstention, for Václav Havel to be the president of Czechoslovakia.15 48

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The first completely free election was held on 8–9 June 1990. The Civil Forum secured a victory by getting 36.2% of the votes, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia came in second with 13.6%, while the Public Against Violence movement finished third with 10.4%. The Christian Democratic Party secured 6% of the votes, while the Democratic Union became the fifth biggest political power with 5.9%. Behind the so far mentioned parties came the Moravian and Silesian Autonomous Democracy Party with 5.4%, and the Slovakian Nationalist Party with 3.5%. The opposition clearly triumphed with Marián Čalfa keeping his position as prime minister. The 1992 election was won by one of the Civil Forum’s successor parties called the Civil Democratic Party, which later formed a coalition government with the Christian Democratic Party led by former finance minister Václav Klaus. From late 1992, tensions started to appear between Klaus and a group of Slovakian nationalists united by Vladimir Mečiar as a final chapter of the regime change in Czechoslovakia. While Klaus wanted to create an “operable federation” out of the country’s Slovakian and Czech regions, Mečiar saw Slovakia seceding from the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic. On 17 July, the Slovakian parliament passed the Declaration of Independence of the Slovak Nation. After a series of negotiations, Czechoslovakia finally dissolved peacefully on 1 January 1991. Since he did not agree with this development, Václav Havel decided to resign in order to avoid having to sign the final resolution as president.16 HUNGARY Due to the economic difficulties stemming from the oil crises of the 1970s, the Hungarian Communist Party could not maintain the continuous improvement of the standard of living in the country, the exact policy that János Kádár had been relying heavily on during the consolidation era following the events of 1956. Bad economic decisions soon led to a major debt crisis, with the country descending more and more into a debt spiral17—the state only avoided bankruptcy by joining the International Monetary Fund in 1981. On top of the palpably

Protest against the Transylvanian village demolitions held at the Heroes’ Square in Budapest

sparking discontent among the population that led to the founding of opposition groups mostly made up of white-collar intellectuals, the apparent economic hardships also enabled the formation of the reigning party’s reformist faction. In fact, a group of Hungarian intellectuals had already supported the Czechoslovakian Charter 77 movement’s ideas in 1977. Although these intellectual opposition groups only represented a narrow layer of society as a whole, their activities grew more and more unpleasant to Kádár and the communist leadership in general, since, from time to time, they managed to achieve victories that would have been inconceivable even just a few years before. For example, they successfully forced the loyal communist directors of the Hungarian Writers’ Association to resign in 1986. The oppression and persecution of opposition leaders and activists continued until the late 1980s, although communist leaders in Hungary intended to handle the issue by less violent means than their Czechoslovakian and Polish counterparts (apart from a few cases of police brutality).

As a response to increasing discontent, party leaders approved a number of changes in high-ranking positions in June 1987. New Prime Minister Károly Grósz agreed to the introduction of reforms leading to a limited market economy but imagined their completion within the framework of the existing socialist system. Meanwhile, the opposition groups got some minor concessions as well, leading to the creation of the ﬁrst political opposition movement, the Hungarian Democratic Forum on 27 September 1987. The limited economic and political reforms introduced by the Grósz cabinet ultimately failed to satisfy the growing demands of the population. The masses that had been largely passive politically until a short while before started to make their voices heard more and more loudly in support of political change, thanks to the threatening economic prospects. However, their calls for change were not primarily motivated by the desire for human and democratic rights but by the need for market economy and the improvement of their own economic situation. A WIDE-ANGLE LANDSCAPE

Although the police violently broke up the protests organised by various opposition groups on 15 March 1988, due to its own inner divisions, the party was powerless to prevent the consolidation of the opposition forces. New parties and movements were created, such as the Alliance of Young Democrats and the Alliance of Free Democrats.18 On 27 June 1987, a major demonstration began in protest against Ceaușescu’s plans to forcefully demolish a number of small Romanian villages also inhabited by Hungarians. The Hungarian party leadership—already in conflict with their Romanian counterparts—permitted a protest in Budapest as a response to the Romanian situation which ultimately became the largest civil demonstration since 1956. With the strengthening of their positions in the Communist Party, reformists such as Rezső Nyers and Imre Pozsgay clearly signalled the need for change within the party. The process became completely obvious when the reformists finally took over from the seriously ill Kádár and his allies. Károly Grósz became the new general secretary and prime minister, while Kádár himself had to accept the formal title of party president. Similarly to Kádár, Grósz was not willing to offer a real compromise to the opposition either, and his uncertain leadership style did not benefit from the rapidly shifting political environment and the country’s severe economic situation. His popularity was not increased by his remarks about potentially countering the opposition by force either. Grósz finally resigned as prime minister in November 1988, appointing the

The last Hungarian prime minister of the communist era, Miklós Németh (right)

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economist Miklós Németh in his place. In the coming months, Németh gradually distanced himself from Grósz and other party hardliners, bringing pro-reform ministers into his cabinet. On 28 January 1989, State Minister Imre Pozsgay called the events of 1956 a popular uprising as opposed to the party’s official stance on the matter as a “fascist counter-revolution.” By spring 1989, the radical reformists had taken over the party completely, and talks concerning the country’s democratic transition could begin with the opposition. The reinterment of Imre Nagy, Hungary’s pro-reform communist prime minister executed for treason after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, was also an important and symbolic gesture. Held on 16 June 1989, on the 31st anniversary of his death, the event drew a crowd of a hundred thousand people, including communist and opposition leaders, a turnout that made the need for a change in domestic policy even clearer.19 The Round-table Talks of 1989 were organised by various opposition movements in order to represent a more or less consistent position during the imminent negotiations and to prevent the communists from dividing them up in order to keep power. From 13 June 1989, the then three-sided negotiations (called the National Round Table) between the communist party, the opposition, and the supposedly independent but in reality mostly communist trade unions and NGOs began to accelerate. The talks continued until mid-September, by which time a clear compromise had been made about the new constitution, the transitional period, and the next free election. In August, during the negotiations, Hungary became the first socialist country to open its border with Austria, allowing tens of thousands of East German citizens to flee to West Germany. Once the Communist Party had been dissolved and split into two successor parties (a communist and a socialist one) and the Parliament had passed all the necessary laws for the transition, the last legal obstacles of the regime change were finally overcome. The new Hungarian Republic was declared on 23 October 1989, and the country became a parliamentary democracy once again.

Another step towards a functioning parliamentary democracy was the so-called “Four Yeses Referendum” held on 26 November 1989. Voters were asked (among other things) whether the president of the country should be elected before or after the general election. The other three questions concerned the banning of professional organisations with ties to the communist party, the accountability of the party’s own properties, and the dissolution of the paramilitaristic Workers’ Militia.20 The population voted yes for all four questions. The very first completely free election was held in March 1990. At the end of the tworound process, the Hungarian Democratic Forum won the election by securing 24.7% of the votes, followed closely by the Alliance of Free Democrats with 21.4%. The third and fourth places were secured by the Independent Smallholders’ Party (11.7%) and the Hungarian Socialist Party (10.9%). After the coalition negotiations, a centre-right government emerged with József Antall, the Hungarian Democratic Forum’s leader as the first freely elected Hungarian prime minister since 1947. POLAND The most important historical characteristic of the regime change in Poland was the emergence of a new political force, the “working class.”21 Although the communist government had supposedly been ruling on behalf of the working class since 1945, it was specifically this social group that was voicing the loudest anti-regime demands. The sudden increase in food and other basic commodity prices in 1970 resulted in clashes with an actual death toll in Gdańsk. Although the government could quickly regain control over the situation, deploying brutal police force, the events of the following months and the 1976 strike projected the emergence of a new social force. John Paul II, the first nonItalian pope in 445 years, provided further moral support to the oppressed nations of Eastern Europe. More than 12 million people listened to his speech during his visit to Poland in June 1979, in which he openly encouraged the opening of the borders between East and West.

People waiting outside a shop in Poland

In July 1980, an unprecedented wave of strikes began at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk. The protesting workers were led by one of the shipyard’s electrical engineers, Lech Wałęsa. Due to massive popular support, the communist leadership eventually yielded to the demands of the workers with the two sides coming to an agreement in August. Trade unions independent of the communist party’s control were now allowed to operate, the right of free speech and the right to strike were established, while the party promised to improve working and living conditions. The government even agreed to erect a memorial for the victims of the 1970 Gdańsk uprising, which meant the open acceptance of at least partial responsibility in this rather tragic event on the communist leadership’s side. At the time of the agreement’s signing in August, a new social—and later increasingly political— force emerged: the trade union called Solidarity (Solidarność) would come to play a key role in Polish politics in the coming decades. Wałęsa knew that the previously mentioned events had only been a prelude to the ﬁght to come, saying: “We now have an independent, self-governing trade union. The rest we will achieve later.”22 The sudden popularity of the now legalised Solidarity shocked the communist state. Party leaders had to face the stern reality that they were no longer in charge of the unfolding events. In autumn 1981, Soviet leaders and Polish communists together concluded that the further escalation of events in Poland could be prevented not by a direct Soviet military intervention but, instead, by declaring a state of war. On 13 December 1981, the secretary general of the Polish United Workers’ Party, General Wojciech A WIDE-ANGLE LANDSCAPE

Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa

Jaruzelski, therefore, declared the state of war in Poland. Under his leadership, the Military Council of National Salvation was founded, Solidarity was banned along with other opposition organisations, martial law was proclaimed, and the sevenday workweek was restored. Thousands of prominent opposition personalities including Lech Wałęsa were arrested to be sentenced by a military court of justice. The paramilitaristic police force resorted to live ammunition and extremely violent means on multiple occasions in order to disperse the protests, which resulted in hundreds of deaths during the state of war period. Although martial law was lifted in 1983, many political prisoners were not released until a general amnesty in 1986.23 Poland’s communist leadership introduced serious measures against members of the opposition; however, it still had to face bothersome strikes that were indicative of general economic and social tensions. The immense wave of demonstrations unfolding in August 1988 made it clear that, ultimately, not much had changed since the brutal clean-up of the 1981 protests.24 Once they realised the crisis of the system and the desperate need for social reconciliation after the amnesty, the party leadership gradually initiated a dialogue with Solidarity (now operating in illegality) in order to save at least some of its demising power.25 During his visit to Poland, Gorbachev did not object to the notion of allowing Solidarity to operate; in fact, one of his advisors openly stated: “We must not consider the coexistence of different trade unions a heretical idea.”26 The round table negotiations lasted from 6 February to 9 April 1989. During the talks, party 52

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leaders not only acknowledged once again the independence of Solidarity as a trade union but also recognised it as a political force. A new, partially democratic election system was created. In accordance with the new system, the opposition could nominate people for 35% of the seats in the Sejm (the lower house of the Polish parliament with 460 seats altogether) with the remaining 65% still under the control of the ruling communists and their allies. The Senate (the upper house of the parliament) was politically less vital, but the distribution of its one hundred seats was proposed to be determined through a free election. In accordance with the agreement, the country’s president was to be elected jointly by the two houses of parliament.27 The first round of the elections on 4 June 1989 ended with the complete victory of Solidarity with 160 out of the Sejm’s 161 “freely claimable” seats won by them, while the opposition also claimed 92 seats out of a hundred in the upper house. The communists even had trouble securing all the seats that had been “reserved” for them.28 The reason for this was that, in the case of the mandates exclusively reserved for communist candidates, only five constituencies produced a high enough turnout (above 50%) for a winner to be determined after the first election round.29 The triumph of Solidarity in the face of the mentioned restrictions could thus be attributed to a not exactly representative election.30 After seeing the results, the party leadership chose to make an arrangement with the opposition: Solidarity did not impede Jaruzelski’s presidency, and, in turn, the trade union could delegate the prime minister. On 19 July, the parliament elected Jaruzelski president, with the new government led by Catholic journalist Tadeusz Mazowiecki inaugurated on 24 August. The key ministries of the new “coalition” government remained in the hands of the communists and their allies, so the party leadership could ultimately still hold on to its political power. The newly elected parliament and the new government clearly did not represent the country’s real political preferences. This was quite apparent to Polish people, as well, as they referred to the creation of the new government (a result of

vehement bargaining between the communist party and the opposition) as the “pact Sejm.” The prime objective of the party was to save their power, which was why they agreed to having an election in the first place. Looking at membership data from 1981, the communists wrongly assumed that Solidarity’s popular support had dropped by 80%, an assumption that made the election results even more shocking for them. Ultimately, the communists could still prevent a swift political transition, and they were hoping to prevent any further democratic changes, as well.31 Although the opposition succeeded in securing real social involvement in government, only after the fall of the Berlin Wall could Poland regain its independence from the Soviet Union and the communist party. On 25 October 1990, Lech Wałęsa became the first democratically elected Polish president since World War II, with more than 10.5 million votes (74.3% of all votes cast). In October 1991, the country’s first truly democratic and free general election was finally held, ending the prolonged process of the Polish regime change. CONCLUSION As demonstrated by the unsuccessful attempts in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Poland (1980), Eastern European societies had been entertaining the possibility of political change for a long time. However, the right international climate for these movements to truly change the political system only came around after the end of the 1980s.

Protest against the Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Dams— environmental protection was also an important factor in Hungary during the regime change

The individual transition processes of these countries had both similarities and differences. One of the general similarities was the obvious and complete moral failure of the communist elite, along with extensive and inevitable economic and financial crises, the disillusionment of intellectuals, the antagonism towards internationality, the return of patriotism, and the almost instantaneous fragmentation of the political sphere. On the other hand, numerous significant differences could be observed in the case of specific countries. In Czechoslovakia, the regime was overthrown by intellectuals and the urban elite, but the national differences of Czechs and Slovaks that had started to become apparent in the 1960s came to the surface with such vehemence that the “Velvet Revolution” ultimately split the country in two. In Poland, the government’s downfall was pioneered from the very first strikes until 1989 by the powerful workers’ movement called Solidarity. Mobilisation in Hungary gained momentum from the anti-Hungarian acts of neighbouring Romania. Environmental concerns played an important role in the Czechoslovakian process, Polish demands were motivated by workers’ rights, while, in Hungary, the catalyst was the concern for Hungarian ethnic minorities (although the role of environmental protection was also relevant as shown by the example of the Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Dams). In all later V4 countries, preparing for the transition was a huge challenge. As soon as the international climate was right, overall legal, political, and economic reforms were needed to be put in place. Czechoslovakia (later splitting into the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Poland, and Hungary all performed well during the difficult time of transition. A new legal framework was put in place in all four countries, while their new political systems slowly matured and subdued the emerging challenges. In retrospect, however, the general assessment of the completed political transition is not at all inspiring. A significant democratic deficit could be felt in the years following the transition, the desired catching up of the East to the West did not come to pass, and the process A WIDE-ANGLE LANDSCAPE

of European integration often stopped and restarted. Local industries collapsed and the four countries were flooded by cheap Western goods and Western capital. Because of this, the assessment of the process in the discussed countries has been rather ambivalent: the obvious positives are usually undebated as the communist regimes in these countries were successfully overthrown without bloodshed, but general welfare and social peace did not increase significantly, especially compared to our Western neighbours. Even after launching the Visegrad Group in 1991, the citizens of these countries still strongly support national independence, political pluralism, European integration, and market economy.

Transformation: Lessons for Korean Peninsula? Prague Centre for Transatlantic Relations, Prague, 2015. 33–35. 9

Ritter, 15.

10 Jan-Werner Müller: The Cold War and the intellectual history of the late twentieth century. In: The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Endings, vol. 3, edited by Melvyn P. Lefﬂer–Odd Arne Westad. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010. 19. 11 Jacques Lévesque: The East European Revolutions of 1989. In: Lefﬂer–Westad, eds., vol. 3, 325. 12 Ukielski, 202. 13 Bottoni, 234. 14 Lévesque (2010), 326. 15 Ukielski, 222–223. 16 Henry Kamm: At Fork in Road, Czechoslovaks Fret. The New York Times. 9 October 1992. <https://nyti.ms/2uWpuYg > 17 Rainer M. János: A Kádár-rendszer válsága. In: Rainer M. János: Ötvenhat után. 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 2003. 173–186.

ENDNOTES

18 Romsics Ignác: Volt egyszer egy rendszerváltás. Rubicon-

Ház Kft., Budapest, 2003. 79–87.

Which meant “opening up” and “transforming” Soviet

political life.

19 Ripp Zoltán: Rendszerváltás Magyarországon, 1987–1990.

Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 2006. 371–376.

Fischer Ferenc: A megosztott világ. A Kelet–Nyugat, Észak–

Dél nemzetközi kapcsolatok fő vonásai (1941–1991). Dialóg

20 The organisation was created by the party leadership after

Campus Kiadó, Budapest–Pécs, 2001. 122.

the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 as a tool to guarantee the

survival of the communist regime.

Norman Naimark: The Sovietization of Eastern Europe. In:

The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Origins, vol. 1, edited

21 Anthony Kemp-Welch: Eastern Europe: Stalinism to

by Melvyn P. Lefﬂer–Odd Arne Westad. Cambridge University

Solidarity. In: Lefﬂer–Westad, vol. 3, 228.

Press, Cambridge, 2010. 180–182.

22 Mitrovits Miklós: A remény hónapjai... A lengyel Szolidaritás

és a szovjet politika. Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 2010. 124.

For a detailed history of Eastern Europe under communist

rule, see, for example, Stefano Bottoni: A várva várt Nyugat.

23 Mitrovits Miklós: Az önigazgatás bukása – A neoliberális

Kelet-Európa

MTA

rendszerváltás Lengyelországban. Eszmélet. 2009/autumn. 37.

Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont, Budapest, 2015.; Csaba

24 Jacques Lévesque: The Enigma of 1989. The USSR and

Békés: East Central Europe, 1953–1956. In: Leffner–Westad,

the Liberation of Eastern Europe. University of California Press,

vol. 1, 334–352.; The Cambridge History of Communism. The

Berkeley–Los Angeles–Oxford, 1997. 111.

Socialist Camp and World Power, 1941–1960s, vol. 2, edited

25 Jacques Lévesque: The East European Revolutions of

by Norman Naimark–Silvio Pons–Sophie Quinn-Judge.

1989. 386.

Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017.

26 Lévesque (1997), 112.

27 Klaus Bachmann: Poland. In: Political and Economic

története

1944-től

napjainkig.

Békés Csaba: Magyar külpolitika a bipoláris világban, 1945–

1991. Külügyi Szemle, 2011/4. 95–127.

Transformation in East Central Europe, edited by Hanspeter

Neuhold–Peter Havlik–Arnold Suppan. Routledge, New York,

Daniel P. Ritter: Civil Society and the Velvet Revolution:

Mobilizing for Democracy in Czechoslovakia. COSMOS Working

2019. 39.

Papers, 2012/4. 8.

28 Mitrovits (2010), 298.

29 Mitrovits (2009), 38, and Lévesque (2010), 317–318.

Pavel Ukielski: Csehszlovákia. A rendszer összeomlása. In:

Adam Burakowski–Aleksander Gubrynowicz–Pawel Ukielski:

30 David Ost: Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics.

1989. A kommunista diktatúra végnapjai Közép- és Kelet-

Opposition and Reform in Poland since 1968. Temple University

Európában. Rézbong Kiadó, Budapest, 2014. 190–191.

Press, Philadelphia, 1990. 206.

31 Lévesque (1997), 110.

Stanislav Balík: Democratisation in Czechoslovakia. In:

Helsinki Process, Velvet Revolution of 1989 and the Czech

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PORTUGAL: THE BEGINNING OF THE 20 TH CENTURY’S LAST WAVE OF DEMOCRATISATION Zsombor Szabolcs Pál

It had only been a year since the satellite states of the Soviet Union completed their political transitions (and the situation was continuing to unfold in the then still existing Soviet Union and Bulgaria) when one of the most influential and debated political thinkers of the post–Cold War era, Samuel P. Huntington, proposed his theoretical framework for the completed changes. His hypothesis dividing the political history of the previous two hundred years into waves of democratisation and anti-democratisation was looking to answer why more than thirty countries had completed a democratic transition between 1974 and 1990.1 “The third wave of democratization in the modern world began, implausibly and unwittingly, at twenty-five minutes after midnight, Thursday, April 25, 1974, in Lisbon, Portugal,”2 he writes, detailing his theory in the very first chapter of his book. He was convinced that the process spread to the other two Mediterranean dictatorships, Greece and Spain, from this moment, before moving on to Latin America and Asia and finally circling back to Europe by the time of the book’s genesis to bring about the fall of the communist–socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe.3 Huntington’s idea hinted at shared elements in the democratic transitions of the Mediterranean region and Central and Eastern Europe, which made it clear that, despite the numerous differences between these political processes, there had been some deep connections, as well. Regardless of this, it is undeniable that the events taking place in the Mediterranean countries that ultimately started a new wave of changes originated from very different sources than those that sparked political transition in countries stuck on the other side of the Iron Curtain fifteen year later. Although all three countries—Portugal, Spain, and Greece—

transitioned from an authoritarian regime to a democratic system, the case of Portugal and Spain fall in their own special category even within this group; therefore, we will discuss the Greek transition in a separate article.4 In 1974, Portugal could be considered one of the longest-standing right-wing dictatorships of 20th-century Europe. Although the military played an important role in its creation, it ultimately fell short of being a purely military-led dictatorship,5 even considering the fact that, in 1926, the military ended the Portuguese Republic that had originally overthrown the kingdom in 1910 but then was plagued by political and economic instability. This marked the beginning of a military (or according to alternative terminologies: “national”) dictatorship. However, after consolidating his power in 1928 by becoming the president, António Óscar Fragoso Carmona quickly realised that, in order to prevent the country from descending into chaos, besides military leaders, he once again needed to invite professionals into the realm of political decisionmaking.6 As a result of his epiphany, civilians were soon making their way into the government in increasing numbers.7 It was thanks to this policy that António de Oliveira Salazar, a widely known professor from the University of Coimbra, could become the country’s finance minister in 1928. Salazar swiftly fixed Portugal’s disastrous finances that took the country very close to bankruptcy and used his freshly earned respect to make Carmona appoint him prime minister in 1932. Making use of his new position, Salazar transformed the constitutional framework of the country in one single year, laying down the foundations of the New Portuguese State (Estado Novo). Since the constitution still placed President Carmona at the top of the military hierarchy in a military dictatorship, in theory, A WIDE-ANGLE LANDSCAPE

The aging Portuguese dictator Oliveira Salazar

Salazar still recognised his rule; however, in practice, he was transforming his scope of authority to make himself more and more indispensable.8 In theory, the new system was supposed to organise Portuguese society in accordance with the teachings of the papal social encyclicals, meaning that, after setting up their own professional organisations, professional groups could have directly influenced political decisionmaking as a part of one of the parliamentary houses.9 In a wider sense, this system fit well into the series of the great right-wing political experiments in the 1930s, borrowing from them (and especially from fascist Italy) directly; Salazar, however, drew a line between them and his own system on multiple occasions, voicing his rejection of this new, idolatrous caesarism and stressing strongly that the limits of his system were defined by law and morality.10 But all this merely served as a fig leaf covering up the New State, as, now, the power on every level concentrated in the hands of Salazar himself, making his system more of a traditional rightwing authoritarian regime. Salazar’s operations brought real results, especially during their initial years. He managed 56

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to put the ﬁnances of the indebted country back on track, delivered some much needed political stability, consolidated the country’s colonies, and even managed to stay out of World War II by swinging back and forth between the two sides with impressive diplomatic bravado. At the same time, he did ﬁnally let the United States and Great Britain use the Portuguese air bases on the Azores in 1943 without giving up the country’s neutrality, so, at the end of the war, he could, in fact, join the winning side.11 Allowing the Allies to use the Portuguese air base on the Azores (a strategically valuable location right in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean) proved to be an advantageous move in the long term for both Salazar and his system. The United States extended the agreement to use the facility immediately after the war had ended, then, in order to be able to continue using the base in the face of the budding Cold War, America invited Portugal to be among the founding countries of NATO in 1949 despite the disapproval the move received from a great number of other member states.12 Thanks to this, although the end of the war also seemed to bring about the downfall of systems similar to Salazar’s, Portugal could even secure a certain level of international legitimation13 in stark contrast with Spain, the biggest country of the Iberian Peninsula that was only allowed to join the mentioned military alliance in 1982, well after the fall of the Franco regime. The countries of the Eastern Bloc naturally rejected Salazar’s system and deemed it fascist,14 which was not particularly surprising given the fact that the Portuguese politician was categorically against communism and communist ideology, considering it one of the greatest threats to Europe.15 At the same time this belligerent anticommunism was another gold star for Salazar in the eyes of his Western allies.16 The stability of Portugal’s international relations proved to be an important support factor for the conservation of the country’s inner power relations, although there were multiple attempts to overthrow the system after the end of World War II. When the system’s future became uncertain with the fall of the Axis powers in 1945,

Salazar introduced some seemingly progressive reforms in order to reassure his Western allies. Thanks to these reforms, opposition forces could organise themselves and enter the general election as a uniﬁed political movement, but, even with signiﬁcant popular support, they could not achieve a major breakthrough because of the Salazar regime’s rigging the election. Feeling his consolidating power, Salazar later chose to ban the movement in 1948. The opposition continued with its efforts to change the system, primarily at the next three presidential elections. Although all three attempts were ultimately unsuccessful, the victory of the opposition candidate was such a realistic outcome at the last one in 1958 that, not wanting to leave anything to chance, Salazar reformed the whole election system.17 Besides the previously mentioned favourable international climate, the stability of the system until this point hinged heavily on relatively stable economic indicators, on national pride fuelled by colonial and imperialistic sentiments, and on the loyalty of the military and the ecclesiastical leadership. However, gradually, all four of these

A B C

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Portugal (A: Portugal, B: Azores, C: Madeira) Portugal's African colonies (1. Cape Verde, 2, Bissau-Guinea, 3. São Tomé and Príncipe, 4. Cabinda, 5. Angola, 6. Mozambique) Portugal’s overseas territories during the Portuguese Colonial War

pillars started to show cracks from 1961, the outbreak of the Portuguese Colonial War. The conflict lasted for more than a decade and found Portugal facing the nationalist movements of its three most important African colonies, Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. In the same year—as a clear sign of changing times—armed forces of the newly independent Indian state attacked the three small Portuguese colonies within the country, Goa, Daman, and Diu, in order to annex them soon after. Salazar asked for the support of his allies in vain; in the age of decolonisation, they only aided him half-heartedly and did not provide effective assistance.18 The allies also failed to help in a definitive way during the African conflict—in fact, by desperately trying to hang on to its colonies fighting for their independence, the Portuguese “empire” became more and more anachronistic and embarrassing for Western countries, as well. The country’s admission to the UN in 1955 added another forum for the barrage of criticisms regarding the status of its “overseas territories,” as the colonies were officially called.19 As a result, although it had accomplished significant advances on the military front by 1974, Portugal clearly lost the “battle for hearts” unfolding before the eyes of the general international public. As much as the country would have wanted to delay it, the dilemma of holding on to its colonies or joining the increasingly unified Europe had to be addressed, as well—it was becoming clear that the two would not be possible at the same time.20 The economic situation showed a similarly uneven picture, since, although Portugal had outstanding growth indicators compared to the European average in this period,21 a significant amount of the return was funnelled into the fights in the colonies (see the Chart 1). All this made the country already lagging greatly behind European indicators even more futureless for its population. It is no surprise that workers started pouring out of the country not only in the hope of better opportunities but for fear of being drafted in the army.22 The chances of the system’s survival decreased further when Salazar suffered a brain A WIDE-ANGLE LANDSCAPE

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haemorrhage in 1968, rendering him incapable of leading the country. His place was taken by his old mentee, Marcello Caetano. Although Caetano intended to open up the system he inherited, his often too cautious steps were blocked time and again by the hardliner political elite. He also did not command the same level of respect as Salazar did, and people did not fear him as much as his predecessor. As early as Salazar’s rise to power, and countless times before that, the military had proven to be a force to be reckoned with in the Portuguese political arena. As previously mentioned, the Portuguese politician did everything he could in order to show respect towards military leaders, at the very least in symbolic ways,23 while, in fact, he was working hard to keep them away from real power at the same time. However, because of the country’s NATO membership, a number of high-ranking military leaders could travel abroad where, faced with fresh experiences, many of them re-evaluated the processes taking place back in Portugal.24 It is no surprise that the military was in some form involved in all of the most notable regime change attempts of the 1950s we already mentioned before. 58

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It was also the military that took the first step towards finally ending the system because of the still unfinished Colonial War, an increasingly pointless conflict taking a heavy and growing financial and human toll on the country. In his book published in early 1974, titled Portugal e o Futuro (Portugal and the Future),25 the Portuguese deputy chief of staff, António de Spínola (former governor of Guinea-Bissau) pointed out that the colonial conflict simply could not be solved by further military efforts. He suggested negotiations in order to give autonomy to Portugal’s African provinces.26 Although his book made a huge public impression, Spínola was dismissed from his position soon after its publication. In the meantime, the feeling of revulsion against the system started to strengthen and spread among lower-ranking military officers, as well. Many of them were outraged by the government’s 1973 decree making the promotion process of non-professional officers quicker.27 During their African missions, many lower-ranking officers had been touched by the local liberation movements and their leftist ideological views.28 Out of the common dissatisfaction of senior and junior officers came the Movimento das Forças

Armadas (MFA, meaning the Armed Forces Movement); this movement was responsible for the organisation and successful completion of the military coup on 25 April 1974, more commonly known as the Carnation Revolution (Revolução dos Cravos). Overthrowing the system in place was relatively quick and did not require grand sacrifices because of the government’s rather sluggish resistance and the fact that the mostly discontented population also fell in line behind the imminent changes. Although the system had fallen among relatively peaceful and calm circumstances, the following years brought much more violent political shifts, so it took some time for Portuguese politics to finally find its balance once again. António de Spínola, a military leader from the conservative faction of the revolutionaries, became the first temporary president. Naturally, there was a clear understanding among all factions about the abolishment of the most prominent dictatorial symbols such as the censorship or the political police; however, visions for the country’s future including its colonies were hard to reconcile. Spínola soon ended up in a conflict with the MFA’s radical left-wing faction. In order to stop left-wing aspirations, he attempted to seize the political initiative and the power both in autumn 1974 and in spring 1975, but, after failing to

Revolutionaries hauling down the Portuguese ﬂ ag to replace it with their own in Guinea-Bissau at the end of the Colonial War

succeed on both occasions, he was forced to go into exile. Meanwhile the radical left-wing faction of officers along with the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP, Partido Comunista Portugês) that had been operating in illegality for a time and was, therefore, more organised than other political forces, managed to seize the initiative. The leftwing leadership started a wave of nationalisation and collectivisation; for a while, it seemed that, although still a NATO member, Portugal was exhibiting a foreign policy interest in socialist countries. Naturally, it would have been a great feat of arms for countries on the other side of the Iron Curtain to successfully seduce a country from the Western alliance system into their ranks—therefore, it is no surprise that Hungarian diplomatic files from this era often refer to Portugal as a “flagship relation.”29 By 1975, all former Portuguese colonies had achieved their independence, putting a final end to a more than six-hundred-year-long period of the country’s imperialistic and colonial aspirations. From an economic standpoint, however, the country was in a critical condition worsened by the hundreds of thousands of immigrants fleeing from former colonies, fearing retribution at home. By the end of 1975, the forces steering Portugal in an increasingly radical direction were finally stopped. At the legislative election held on the first anniversary of the revolution, the Socialist Party (PS, Partido Socialista) managed to secure the majority of the votes. Although the communists were hopeful about possibly being included in a unified left-wing front, they themselves were apparently more interested in Western-style social democratic parties. After an unsuccessful coup attempted by the radical branch of the military in the autumn of the same year, moderate forces could ultimately drive back the radical elements within the military, too.30 By the second anniversary of the Carnation Revolution, the third constitution of the country was completed. As its most important characteristic, the constitution openly committed the country to socialism,31 while also perpetuating the military’s political influence through a constitutional court–like institution. A WIDE-ANGLE LANDSCAPE

The Socialist Party could secure another victory at the general election held on 25 April 1976, naming General António Ramalho Eanes, an important personality partly responsible for subduing the leftist coup attempt in 1975, as president. For a while, the Socialists had been forced to lead the country from a minority position before having to resign their governmental roles altogether. Then, until 1980, there came a time of governmental uncertainty. In contrast to this, on the foreign policy front, Portugal returned to its traditional Western allies partly because that was where it expected the economic and political support necessary to stabilise its economic situation. In this spirit, Portugal took the first steps required to join the European Community (EC).32 Partly because of the unstable socialist leadership, the 1980 election was won by a centre-right coalition. The new government’s first priority was a constitutional reform: they wanted to decrease the president’s legal authority, block the military’s political influence, and, as a response to a clear expectation of the EC and other Western allies, they wished to roll back the constitution’s socialistic overtones and all previous nationalisation activities. This government, however, could not last longer than two years either. After its crisis, the Socialists managed to come into power once again, this time in coalition with the Democratic Peoples’ Party/Social Democratic Party cluster (PPD/PSD, Partido Popular Democrático/ Partido Social-Democrata). The PS–PPD/ PSD government continued with the required steps towards joining the EC and despite its inner tensions, remained in office until 1985. The election held after the disintegration of the government was won by the PPD/PSD; the following period brought a turning point for the country, as the coalition managed to remain in office until 1995, providing the long-needed political stability for Portugal and, in 1987, even securing absolute majority as a government for the first time since the revolution. In the meantime, Mário Soares, former leader of the Socialist Party, became president in 1986

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after Eanes, putting a symbolic end to the era of military control over politics. Portugal’s admission to the European Community at the beginning of the same year was a similarly symbolic event, which has deﬁned the country’s foreign policy development ever since. The three above-detailed events technically concluded Portugal’s political transition. Although the political change had in the strictest sense been a revolution and, thus, had happened in a violent way, it was not followed up by any sort of retribution later, unlike it usually happens with such transitions. The sudden, revolutionary nature of the changes might have been the reason for the time that was needed for the normalisation of political life, as the new system clearly lacked a previously negotiated framework. The overheated situation never escalated to a civil war due largely to the lack of retributions—political life could gradually normalise while the majority of the population gravitated towards centrist parties. Thanks to these peaceful processes, Portugal could join the common European project as a full member merely a decade after its major political transition. Portugal’s European integration and the road leading up to it soon became very valuable lessons to Hungary, too,33 as the new wave of democratisation triggered by the Carnation Revolution ﬁnally reached Eastern and Central Europe still under Soviet rule at the beginning of the 1990s.

Mário Soares, leader of the Socialist Party and Portugal’s ﬁ rst democratically elected prime minister

ENDNOTES

19 Fernando Martins: A Política Externa do Estado Novo, o

1 Samuel P. Huntington: The Third Wave. Democratization in

Ultramar e a ONU. Uma Doutrina Histórico-Jurídica (1955–68).

the Late Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma Press,

Penélope. 1998/18. 189–206.

Norman–London, 1991. xiii.

20 António José Telo: Portugal e la integración europea

2 Huntington, 3.

(1945–1974). Ayer. 2000/37. 287–318.

3 Huntington, 21–26.

21 George Brauges: Portugal’s Plight. The Role of Social

4 See Csepregi Zsolt: An Important Point in the Third Wave

Democracy. The Independent Review. 2012/spring.

of Global Democratisation: Athens, 1974.

328–329.

5 Tom

Twentieth-Centur y

22 Michèle Koven: Selves in Two Languages. Bilinguals’ verbal

Interpretation. Manchester University Press, Manchester,

enactments of identity in French and Portuguese. John

1983. 93.

Benjamins Publishing, Amsterdam, 2007. 37–38, and Report

6 Szilágyi István: António de Oliveira Salazar – minden idők

on Portuguese Community in France. Institute de coopération

legnagyobb portugálja, avagy egy jobb sorsra érdemes ország

internationale (ICOSI), Paris, 2011. 8.

nem tipikus diktátora? Mediterrán Világ. 2008/7. 31.

23 Braga Da Cruz, 59–60.

7 José Carvalho: A Formação de Salazar e o Seu Tempo. Via

24 José Medeiro Ferreira: Forças Armadas e o Regime

Occidentalis Editora, Lisbon, 2008. 103.

Autoritário. Nação e Defesa. 2000/summer. 116.

8 Manuel Braga da Cruz: O Partido e o Estado no

25 For the English translation, see António de Spínola:

Salazarismo. Editorial Presença, Lisbon, 1988. 353.

Portugal and the Future. Perskor Publishers, Midrand, 1974.

9 Zachar Péter Krisztián: Gazdasági válságok, társadalmi

26 António de Spínola: Portugal e o Futuro. Editora Arcádia,

feszültségek, modern válaszkíséreletek Európában a két

Lisbon, 1974.

világháború között. L’Harmattan, Budapest, 2014. 184–190.

27 Vasco Rato: As Forças Armadas e a Democracia

10 Braga Da Cruz, 49, and Salazar e o Salazarismo, edited by

Portuguesa, 1974–1982. Nação e Defesa. 2000/summer. 132.

A. E. Duarte Silva. Publicações Dom Quixote, Lisbon, 1989.

28 Jacques Georgel: O Salazarismo. Publicações Dom

62.

Quixote, Lisbon, 1985. 273.

11 In more detail, see Bernardo Futscher Pereira: A Diplomacia

29 Directives (for 3–5 years) for the development of

de Salazar (1932–1949). Publicações Dom Quixote, 2013.

Hungarian–Portuguese relationships. Hungarian National

Kindle e-book.

Archives, Ministry of Exterior XIX-J-1-j, 1977, Portugal, box

12 Nuno Severiano Teixeira: Portugal e o NATO. Análise

109, item 125-1, 29 June 1977, 7.

Social. 1995/133. 803–804.

30 For a more detailed analysis of the issue, see István

13 Teixeira, 808.

Szilágyi: Portugália a huszadik században. L’Harmattan,

14 As József Révai put it: “We do not want any of the so-

Budapest, 2015. 118–133.

called ‘Western civilisation’ and democracy that accepts the

31 António José Telo: História Contemporânea de Portugal.

dictatorship in Portugal just like Franco’s fascist murder

Do 25 Abrial à Actualidade, vol. 1. Editorial Presença, Lisbon,

regime.” [Anonymous]: There is nothing more important than

2007. 181–182.

the cause of peace. József Révai’s speech at a Hungarian

32 Telo, 201–211.

peace rally. Pápai Néplap. 3 April 1949. 1–2.

33 Szilágyi István: A portugál modell. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest,

15 Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro: Salazar e la sua idea

2000.

Gallagher:

Portugal.

d’Europa: anticomunista e antidemocratica. In: Memoria d’Europa. Riflessioni su dittature, autoritarismo, bonapartismo e svolte democratiche, edited by Giuliana Laschi. Franco Angeli, Milan, 2012. 39–41. 16 José Freire Antunes: Kennedy e Salazar – O Leão e a Raposa. Publicações Dom Quixote, Lisbon, 2013. Google e-book. 17 Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses: Salazar. Uma Biografia Política. Publicações Dom Quixote, Lisbon, 2009. 401–475. 18 Antunes.

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AN IMPORTANT POINT IN THE THIRD WAVE OF GLOBAL DEMOCRATISATION: ATHENS, 1974 Zsolt Csepregi

The period of regime changes on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain, the anni mirabiles, changed the order of the world that had prevailed since World War II and brought about the overwhelming victory of Western democracy and market economy in its struggle against the Soviet–communist system. It also opened the way to the unipolar world order that had been developing for three decades. The fast pace of democratisation in 1990 and its concentration in the Eastern and Central European area (especially as seen from Budapest) covers up the fact that the so-called third wave of democratisation (as Samuel P. Huntington called it in his 1991 article Democracy’s Third Wave, published in the Journal of Democracy) did not start with us—it started in Southern Europe about a decade and a half earlier. While Central European dictatorships were kept alive by the occupying troops of a very much alive and virile imperial centre, the extreme right regimes in Southern European authoritarian systems were the rudimentary remains of a militaristic, fascist ideology rooted in mostly Italian models from before World War II. These regimes had no real ideological allies and no organic ties to each other: they were held up by the polarised logic of the Cold War, and their collapse, which started the third wave in the 1970s, happened just as fast as the later changes in the countries of the Eastern Bloc. The moral crises of militaristic or extreme right–leaning regimes started almost at the same time on the Iberian Peninsula, with the Portuguese and Spanish political changes, and the Eastern Mediterranean, in Greece. The events of 1974 rocked the world, especially the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. While the Portuguese political changes were underway, the Greek military junta was also 62

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ousted from power, the Third Hellenic Republic was declared, and the democratic Greece was reborn. The fact that the Greek people managed to regain their political freedomhad an advantageous effect on the situation of European democracies, and cleared the way for the successful changes of regime in the Eastern and Central European countries. Like in the case of the Portuguese, whose transition was happening at the same time, the Greek also managed to work out the most important legal elements of the changes through elections, and the country entered the European Economic Community in 1981. This last development was an indication of what perspectives opened up for political communities joining the ranks of Western democracies. When examining the Greek regime change and its effect on the European order—and, therefore, on Hungary— it is worth taking a look at the individual steps of the process. The Greek people, like the Hungarian, won their independence at the beginning of the 19th century, after a long period of foreign rule: unlike Central Europe, the Greek could free themselves from Turkish occupation only at this time. The final borders of modern Greece were fixed after World War I and the second Turkish peace treaty (except for the Dodecanese, for these came to Greece only after the peace treaty with Italy at the end of World War II). One of the three classic European diaspora people, the Hellenes had lived for centuries scattered in the Mediterranean basin; east of modern Greece, their most important basis was the island of Cyprus, off the coast of Asia Minor. From Asia Minor, they had already been deported in the strict population exchange approved after World War I by Kemal Atatürk. The problem of Greek sovereignty was thus embodied not only

NORTHERN EPIRUS (OCCUPIED BY GREECE, 1912–1914 AND 1914–1916)

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in the nation state that exists today but also in the question of the so-called megali idea (Greek for “big thought,” “big idea”). This would have meant a Greek political community that would have unified all Greek-inhabited territories and would have led to the unification of Greece and Cyprus in the course of the 20th century. With this complex heritage, Greek political life could understandably not come to a resting point during the Cold War, since the intention to claim territory for the nation was shared, in different forms, even by the parties accepting

the parliamentary system. After World War II, the plan of Greater Greece was accepted and supported not only by the rebutted extremists and antidemocratic movements (the Metaxists) but also the dominant liberal (Venizelist) side of the nationalistic, right-wing Greek political life. The only difference of opinion concerned the actual arrangement of such a political community. After World War II, Greece was rid of joint German–Italian–Bulgarian occupation, as well as its own earlier collaborating fascist A WIDE-ANGLE LANDSCAPE

government. The Soviets winning some ground on the Balkans and the rule of Marshall Tito in Yugoslavia meant that, apart from Turkey, the land and sea area controlled by Athens also became important bases for Western European countries in the Eastern Mediterranean. The fledgling Greek democracy was continually seeking balance between opposed political ideologies, but this was made more difficult by the civil war, which was perpetuated by the Soviet-supported communists up to 1949. The Greek political system remained unstable even after the military victory, since the right-wing militarist groups exhibited distrust towards any political movement leaning towards the left, in whom they saw (whether justifiedly or not) a Soviet Trojan horse. From the democratic elections of 1963, which brought a comfortable majority for the Greek centre right, the more and more fragmented conservative governments managed to stay in office for ever shorter cycles: first, for two years, then, for a single year, and, finally, they only held on for a few months while the population’s dissatisfaction grew, and the Greek king and the military engaged in continual political intrigue. The continual government crisis, distrust, and instability led to the military coup of 1967 because King Constantine II and the Greek army did not want to risk the Left’s winning an election over the Right, which was damaged considerably by the serial political crises of the previous four years. After the action of the mid-level officers of the Hellenic military (hence the later, wide-spread name, “the Regime of the Colonels”), the military junta led by Georgios Papadopoulos ruled the country until 1974, and this meant close to a decade of dictatorship within NATO. Through the military, the nationalistic, militaristic, and antidemocratic political ideology of Metaxism returned into Greek political life. The main goal of the Greek military junta was to revive the Greek people, lead them back to their “original” Western and Christian heritage and the classical, manly, military values. The phoenix, rising from the flames and featured in the country’s coat of arms that the junta 64

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instituted, was also to communicate this ideological message. The leaders of the country often said they were engaged in a pedagogical mission, and Papadopoulos himself believed that, when his mission was done, Greece can return to parliamentary democracy; but only after the Greek soul has successfully cast off its “decadence.” This belief led to the dictator’s demise. There were three reasons why the military regime was not dislodged for eight years: the development of the economy, the dynamics of the Cold War situation, and the undeveloped Greek political institutions. It is a fact that the dictatorship profited from the global prosperity that raised Greece from an impoverished, almost Third World country to the vicinity of the Western standard of living. Infrastructural development and, especially, foreign investments in tourism benefitted a great part of the population and provided such basic services for them as continual and stable electric power. The World Bank’s data show that, in the economic expansion, lasting until the mid-1970s, the country’s gross national product, which was only USD 9.2 billion in 1967, grew to more than USD 25 billion by 1974. OECD statistics show net personal income also growing dynamically (except in the year of the dictatorship’s crisis, that is, 1973–1974): Greece overtook Portugal and Spain in this respect and produced only 20% less than the richest European country, the Netherlands. The second reason, the Cold War situation, meant that, as a trustworthy anticommunist regime, the military junta posed less risk for the United States than, say, a Sovietfriendly social democratic government would have. The Western allies thus did not take any serious steps in 1967 to stop the abolishment of democracy. In time, however, the junta became isolated in the international scene and got relieved within NATO, too. However, these steps in themselves would not have led to the restoration of constitutional order. It also has to be taken into consideration that, while Athens is the place where democracy originated, modern Greek democracy was only a couple of decades old in the 1960s. The situation was further complicated until 1973 by the fact that Greece

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10000–15000 15000–20000 20000–25000 25000–30000 Over 30000

Changes in the population density in Athens during the 20 century

had returned to the constitutional monarchy in the first half of the 19th century, and, according to a pact between powerful European countries, a Bavarian aristocratic family was installed on its throne. However, at the time of the military coup, the king did not side resolutely with the constitutional order, and only on 13 December 1967 did he attempt to arrange a countercoup with those from the military who were still loyal to him. His plan was to start from the Northern town of Kavala and force the colonels to resign by taking Thessaloniki. The junta easily neutralised the king’s campaign, and, one day later, the dictatorship’s forces set out to arrest him. The king, his family, and their retinue fled to Rome, and, while nominally, he remained the ruler of Greece, Papadopoulos named General Georgios Zoitakis as regent. In the period of the dictatorship, following the countercoup, the king could not be recalled from exile to support the junta, and so his symbolic role was gradually devolved. Finally, in the summer of 1973, the monarchy was abolished altogether. The fall of the Greek military dictatorship in 1974 and the regime change also had three reasons which can actually be seen as the opposite of those enabling the survival of the dictatorship earlier. By 1973, economic growth was slowing down, the standard of

living stayed the same, and, at the time of the collapse, people had to deal with an inflation of 33%. It is a paradox of right-wing, militaristic, authoritarian regimes that, in time, swelled by economic prosperity, the educated, evermore well-to-do middle class and university students became the most important opposition of the system. The explosive rate of the Greek economic growth lasted for a quarter of a century after the end of the civil war and produced a yearly average of over 7% increase in GDP. Compared to this, the 6% decrease in the last, crisis-ridden year of the dictatorship was a serious setback, and it is no wonder it undercut the regime’s stability, too. Somewhat similarly to the nostalgic sentiments for János Kádár’s rule in Hungary, the opinion that the fast urbanisation was due to the junta is still rather current in Greece: the military, they say, tried to bring young men together so that, if war breaks out with Turkey, they could be mobilised more easily. In reality, it was only the earlier trends of urbanisation that continued between 1967 and 1974, and the achievements of the junta were the result of a natural growth following World War II and rather escalated the unsustainable distribution of the population within the country. This led to great difficulties already in the 1980s, and it has stayed problematic to this day: oneA WIDE-ANGLE LANDSCAPE

third of the country’s fourteen million inhabitants live in Athens, another million in Thessaloniki. The military leadership wanted to reform the political institutions just as people’s attitudes, but the new system did not enjoy the Greek people’s trust. On 1 June 1973, Papadopoulos abolished the monarchy. The de jure republic that he established in its place was, however, shaken to its foundations by the peaceful student demonstration that started in November 1973 at the National Technical University in Athens. Law enforcement finally put an end to this violently, with some loss of life. Papadopoulos’s republican attempt, in which he still had a leading role, nominally as president but actually continuing to rule as a dictator, was naturally not satisfactory for most people, but it did manage to scare members of the junta fearing for their power. The failure of half-hearted liberalisation attempts resulted in Papadopoulos’s being arrested by his earlier comrades, and the military dictatorship became harder again for a few months. The leader of the 25 November 1973 coup, one that started from within the regime itself, was Dimitrios Ioannidis,

Makarios III Greek Cypriot Archbishop, the ﬁ rst president of the independent country of Cyprus (left) 66

A WIDE-ANGLE LANDSCAPE

head of the Greek military police, and he brought the most radical side of the military junta back into positions of power. This also contributed to the fast collapse in 1974, brought on by political events abroad. The military junta actually failed exactly because of the irredentist–militarist ideas that served as its ideological backbone after Athens had sparked off but, then, shamefully mishandled the Cyprus crisis. Within megali idea, the most important target of unifying the territory that was not under Greek sovereignty but was inhabited by Greeks was the island of Cyprus. Cyprus spent centuries under foreign rule: Italian, Egyptian, Turkish, and, finally, British. The island won its independence from Britain in 1960, and, after that, uniting it with Greece (which is called enosis in Greek) became the ambition of the Hellenic inhabitants of both countries. Naturally, it was opposed by the Turkish living in Cyprus. Greek Orthodox Archbishop Makarios III, the first head of state of independent Cyprus who maintained a delicate balance, was removed from power on 15 July 1974, by an extremist military cabal called EOKA-B with the support of the military junta in Athens. They intended to achieve unification this way. Reacting to the coup, Turkey occupied the northern part of the island, nominally in defence of the Turkish people in Cyprus. In a month, the island was partitioned into Greek and Turkish zones, with a population exchange between them, while the two NATO member states who intervened nearly got involved in war—the Soviet Union would have profited enormously if an armed conflict had broken out. Even though Resolution 360, accepted by the UN Security Council on 16 August, condemned the unilateral Turkish intervention, and the Turkish advance stopped, it was indeed the Greek military junta and the extremists in Cyprus who initiated the crisis. The big dream of the Greek, the enosis, instigated a serious conflict that still lasts to this day: this step, which the junta wanted to use for strengthening its legitimacy, ended up as the direct reason for the system’s failure, among other negative results. During its eight years in power, the Greek army failed to establish a New

Hellas, a Greece dreamt of in Christianâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;national thinking; economic growth first stopped, then plummeted. However, all of this seemed insignificant in the face of the fact that the military defence of the Cypriot Greek brothers against the Turkish invasion also failed. Still, the bloodless regime change in 1974, labelled with the Greek term metapolitefsi, could not have happened if the leaders of the army had not behaved constructively. After the invasion, the leaders of the branches of the army turned their back on Ioannidis, who had become dictator, and on his immediate circle, and they created a unified national government headed by the party politicians of the old regime. With this, they brought the country back from the edge of a catastrophic war. The leader of the new temporary government was Konstantinos Karamanlis, a right-centre politician who had already led the country, with a brief pause, between 1958 and 1963. As a compromise candidate called back from his voluntary exile, he won an overwhelming victory at the first free elections on 17 November 1974 with his party New Democracy (the party that also governs Greece today). The new government had to solve a series of crises and, doing so, they could certainly not afford to get engaged in acts of revenge against a wide variety of persons connected to the junta. Twenty leaders of the military regime were accused of conspiracy against the state in 1975, and the first four of them (including Papadopoulos and Ioannidis) were sentenced to death, which was later, for humane reasons, changed to life imprisonment. The issue of real, in-depth accountability was never addressed, since that would have tipped the delicate balance between the still powerful army, the influential Greek Orthodox church, which had extensively cooperated with the junta, and the representatives of the revived but still fragile democratic political system. Still, the results of the Greek regime change speak for themselves even without such indepth reckoning. The elections held not long after the Portuguese events are counted among the starting points that set off the third wave of democratisation. With the restart of

Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis (left)

fast economic development and a successful European integration, Greece became a member of the European Communities by 1981, five years before the Iberian states. While, in the 1980s, the institutions of European integration offered models of democratic transition for the three ex-dictatorships (Greece, Portugal, and Spain), their political path later functioned as an example for the Euro-Atlantic integration of the countries in Eastern and Central Europe, freshly free of communist rule. New Democracy was defeated by the Panhellenic Socialist Movement in a peaceful, democratic election in 1981, and this signalled that the parliamentary system was working sustainably. The successfully completed Greek regime change, at the same time, prevented the military junta from involving Athens in a war, and, thus, from opening a gap for the Soviets on the south-eastern flank of NATO, which would have rendered the Western allies defenceless against the resurging Soviet aggression of escaping forwards. The eightyear tribulation of the birthplace of democracy between 1967 and 1974, fit for Greek tragedies, and the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s self-rediscovery in a free political system, became one of the influential turning points of world history, and, in several aspects, they helped, even if indirectly, the changes of regime in Hungary and other countries in Eastern and Central Europe.

A WIDE-ANGLE LANDSCAPE

THE CROATIAN AND SLOVENIAN WAY OF INDEPENDENCE AND REGIME CHANGE György Lukács B.

With the fall of state socialist systems and the disappearance of the bipolar world order, the survival of Yugoslavia, which had had a special role in this world order and stood outside the Eastern Bloc, became problematic. The events leading to the dissolution of the multinational Yugoslav federation were shaped, as had been generally the case in the history of the two Yugoslav state formations, by Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana. The elites of other member states (and autonomous areas) were mere extras in the process and only suffered the consequences. In reality, the script familiar from the period before 1941 and after 1945 simply repeated itself: the struggle for more autonomy by the Slovene and Croatian elite was hampered by Serb attempts at centralisation and their determination to keep all Serbs in one state, in a more tightly knit community. The reasons for the country’s dissolution are complex, but two need to be highlighted. Firstly, since it was home to many nationalities, Yugoslavia would really have been difﬁcult to keep

The establishment of the Ljublana University in 1919 was an important step in the further development of Slovene culture

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together in any case. Secondly, the Yugoslav communist system sank into agony in the 1980s, and the consequences were felt by every inhabitant. It is difficult to say when exactly the dissolution process started; however, the crisis of state and society was practically constant through the nearly seventy years while the two common Yugoslav states existed.1 The internal policies of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia were conditioned by the continual internal tensions, and, after World War II, the constant changes to the constitution initiated by the communist leadership signalled the attempts to find the real formula needed for long-term functioning. The Serb attempts at centralisation in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had negative effects on both Slovenes and Croats, but having become part of a common Yugoslav state, both managed to avoid that neighbouring powers share out Slovene- and Croat-inhabited territories. What is more, the Slovenes made a great step forward culturally: in 1919, the first Slovene university was founded, and Slovenian became the language of the public discourse. However, after Hitler and his allies conquered the kingdom, it was the Slovene who found themselves in a more desperate situation, compared to the Croatian Ustasha puppet state that came into existence then. The territories inhabited by the Slovene were shared out by the three neighbouring powers. This explains why the victory of the partisan movement, led by the communists, was viewed as bringing freedom more by the Slovenes than by Croats. After the horrors of World War II and the showdowns in its wake, the communists created a Croat and a Slovene constituent republic within the newly reorganised Yugoslavia. Later, the borders of these became the outer borders of the two independent states. Becoming an

GERMAN EMPIRE HUNGARY

ROMANIA

BANAT INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA

ALBANIA (Italian protectorate)

Adriatic Sea

BULGARIA

MONTENEGRO

SERBIA

ITALY

GREECE

annexed by Germany annexed by Bulgaria

occupied by Germany

annexed by Italy borders of Yugoslavia

occupied by Bulgaria

annexed by Hungary

occupied by Italy

new borders during WWII

Territories gained by the Axis powers in Yugoslavia in World War II AUSTRIA

AUSTRIA HUNGARY

HUNGARY SLOVENIA

ROMANIA

CROATIA

VOJVODINA Belgrade

Belgrade

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Adriatic Sea

MONTENEGRO KOSOVO

ITALY GREECE

Inner and outer boundaries of Yugoslavia after 1919

BULGARIA

SERBIA

Adriatic Sea

ALBANIA

ITALY

ALBANIA

KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS, AND SLOVENES (Kingdom of Yugoslavia from 1929)

MACEDONIA GREECE

Inner and outer boundaries of Yugoslavia after 1946

A WIDE-ANGLE LANDSCAPE

administrative unit that had certain features of statehood again meant a greater step forward for the Slovene nation, which had previously not constituted a state of its own. The second Yugoslavia got significant Croat- and Sloveneinhabited territories from Italy. The greatest gain for the Croat constituent republic was most of the area of the Istrian Peninsula and the territories in Dalmatia that had previously come under Italian rule. The Slovene constituent state had more than a quarter of the whole territory inhabited by Slovenes and about one third of that population;2 they also gained an exit to the sea. Croat and Slovene relations with the Yugoslav state(s) were also determined by the fact that the latter were always less threatened by the “Serbisation” of their language and culture, while it meant a graver danger for Croats, linguistically closer to the Serbs anyway. Though representatives of the Croat and Slovene elites have always been dissatisfied with their situation, it was not until the end of the 1980s that a possible attempt to secede from Yugoslavia was seriously considered, even if there were some suggestions concerning this from the local intelligentsia and some from exile, too. The reform communists who had come to power in Yugoslavia during the reform period at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s struggled for more autonomy for the constituent republics. The demands of the movement known as the Croatian Spring were found by the highest communist leadership to be dangerous to the very foundations of the common state, and so they removed the local communist leaders in Croatia by force, who they considered unable to deal with the situation in the constituent state. By 1972, central leadership had managed to remove all the reformers in all constituent republics (including Slovenia) who took a stand in favour of increasing autonomy. However, after this forceful reaction, President Tito actually met some of the constituent states’ demands in the Federal Constitution of 1974 and increased their autonomy. As internal conflicts grew more pronounced in the common state, Serbs started to attack this constitution (which declared the primacy of national sovereignty and 70

A WIDE-ANGLE LANDSCAPE

constructed the federal state on this principle), while the Slovene and Croat elites defended it resolutely. By the second half of the 1980s, figures demanding further increases in autonomy within the federation became dominant in Croatia and Slovenia. The removal of the communist reformers in the early 1970s was followed by more repression in the Croat constituent republic than in Slovenia, and the Slovene communist leadership and the opposition had more room to manoeuver than the Croats, due to the greater ethnic homogeneity of the Slovene republic. Thus, it was them who could become the primary initiators of changes. The ethnic make-up of the Croatian constituent republic made another approach necessary, and it was clear from the beginning that, because of the Serbs that constituted 12.2% of the population in Croatia, the outcome would be very different than in Slovenia. The Croat and Slovene intelligentsia of the opposition played an important role in the preparation of the political changes. In Slovenia, the first issue of the influential periodical Nova revija was published in 1982, and it became the central intellectual forum of the country in the 1980s. The educated people of different convictions who gathered around it gave the core of the Slovene opposition. The 57th issue of Nova revija, entitled Studies for the Slovene national program, came out in the spring of 1987: this was where the opposition made its own suggestion for a national programme public. This issue was especially important, since it questioned the legitimacy of the regime.3 The first independent opposition party in the new Yugoslavia, the Slovenian Farmers’ Association (Slovenska kmečka zveza, the later People’s Party), was formed in the Slovene constituent republic on 12 May 1988. Most other parties came into existence only in 1989. The first in Croatia was the liberal Croatian Social Liberal Party (Hrvatska socijalno-liberalna stranka) formed on 20 May 1989, while the secret founding meeting of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ, Hrvatska demokratska zajednica) was on 17 June.4 In November 1989,

ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, BASED ON THE 1991 CENSUS

Albanian

Bulgarian Montenegrin

Macedonian Slovak

Croat

Slovene

Hungarian Muslim

Serb

No majority present

AUSTRIA HUNGARY

SLOVENIA ROMANIA CROATIA

VOJVODINA (autonomous province)

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA SERBIA

BULGARIA

MONTENEGRO KOSOVO (autonomous province)

Adriatic Sea

ALBANIA

ITALY

100 kilometers

MACEDONIA

100 miles GREECE

Serb, 36.3%

Yugoslav*, 5.4%

Croat, 19.7%

Montenegrin, 2.5%

Muslim, 8.9%

Hungarian, 1.9%

Slovene, 7.8%

Other, 3.9%

Albanian, 7.7% Macedonian, 5.9%

* Yugoslavs are those persons who listed themselves as such in the 1981 census. They are dispersed across the country.

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Soldiers of the Yugoslavian People’s Republic before a ﬁght in 1991

in preparation for the approaching elections, Slovene opposition parties formed their alliance, Demos. The actions of the federal authorities attempting centralisation, to solve the escalating crisis, were more and more determinedly protested by not only the critical intelligentsia but also the Slovene and Croatian communist leadership. The difference between the vision of those in power and the opposition was primarily in how quickly the changes were to happen and exactly what form they should take. In January 1990, an important tie was broken between Slovenia and the federation: the delegation of Slovene communists left the 14th (Extraordinary) Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, thus effectively ﬁnishing the League. The ﬁrst multiparty elections, held in April 1990, brought the victory of Demos in Slovenia: 55% of the votes were cast for the democratic opposition. Lojze Peterle, the leader of the strongest party in Demos, the Slovene Christian Democrats, could go on to form a government. However, the communist candidate, Milan Kučan won the presidential election held subsequently.5 At the Croatian elections, held in late April and early May 1990, HDZ won with the plan of “national peace” that pushed ideological differences into the background, and, when the Croatian parliament, called Sabor, was formed, it elected the leader of HDZ, Franjo Tuđman as president.6 72

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The (former) opposition wanted to reshape Yugoslavia into a confederation and introduce market economy faster than the previous regime. They invalidated several federal laws and declared that territorial defence7 is the concern of the constituent republics. In response, the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA, in Serbian: Jugoslovenska narodna armija), which served as the sole defender of state integrity, gaining a more and more signiﬁcant political role, issued a command that the weapons of Territorial Defence were to be removed. As a consequence, the two constituent republics had access to much fewer military supplies.8 In the autumn of 1990, the Slovene government suggested that they sign a confederation contract, but, except for Croatia, all constituent republics and the federal presidency refused to do this. In response, an independence referendum was held in Slovenia on 23 December 1990, with 95% of the votes (88.5% of legal voters) cast for independence.9 The Slovene law passed at this time speciﬁed that the government had six months to negotiate independence. The Croatian government, which was in a different situation for reasons already discussed and only cautiously supportive of Slovene intentions, held their independence referendum on 19 May 1991. 83.56% of voters took part, with 94.17% of them supporting the declaration of independence.10 After negotiations failed, the Slovene and Croatian governments went ahead, and, on 25

Bosnian president Alija Izetbegović (left) and Croatian president Franjo Tuđman sign the Washington Agreement on 18 March 1994, creating the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV TERRITORIES DURING AND AFTER THE WAR

AUSTRIA

HUNGARY Zagreb

Ljubljana

ROMANIA Novi Sad Velika Kladuša

Banja Luka

Belgrade Knin Sarajevo

Capital cities (name in brackets)

Adriatic Sea

Podgorica

Pristina ALBANIA

* Means that that entity was not internationaly recognised.

Slovenia (Ljubljana): 1991–

BULGARIA

Mostar

Skopje

GREECE

Macedonia (Skopje): 1991–

Central Serbia (Belgrade) Serbia – Vojvodina (Novi Sad)

Republic of Serbian Krajina (Knin): 1991–1995* Croatia (Zagreb): 1991–

Kosovo (Pristina): 1999– FR Yugoslavia: 1991–2003 Serbia and Montenegro: 2003–2006 Serbia (Belgrade): 2006–

Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo): 1992– Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo): 1994– Western Bosnia (Velika Kladuša): 1993–1995* Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina: 1995–

Montenegro (Podgorica): 2006– FR Yugoslavia: 1991–2003

Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia (Mostar): 1993–1994* Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina: 1994–

Serbia and Montenegro: 2003–2006 Republic of Srpska (Banja Luka): 1992–* Croatia (Zagreb): 1991–

June 1991, both parliaments accepted their respective declarations of independence,11 and, in June, both recognised each other’s sovereignty. Slovenia took over the defence of its outer borders from the federal authorities and started building the border along the Croatian– Slovene borderline. The Slovene government was aware that an independent Slovenia did not ﬁgure in plans of Greater Serbia, and they had to ﬁght for their independence with the Yugoslavian People’s Army, which sent armoured troops against Slovenia on the day of the declaration. The so-called Ten-Day War, fought between 27

Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo): 1995–

June and 6 July, 1991, started. The conﬂict left thirteen Slovenes and thirty-nine soldiers of the People’s Army dead.12 The armed conﬂict in Slovenia was ended by the Brioni Agreement on 7–8 July 1991, where the European Community mediated. A peace treaty was signed, and it was agreed that the Yugoslavian People’s Army retreat into their barracks. Slovenia undertook to suspend independence-related activities for three months, and, on 8 October, together with Croatia, they validated their declaration of independence again. A WIDE-ANGLE LANDSCAPE

Zagreb soon came to the conclusion that it was impossible to come to an agreement with the Serbs in Croatia, since they would not accept that the country became independent within the boundaries of the Croatian constituent republic, and, after August 1990, the Serbs were in open rebellion, and smaller armed incidents already happened at this time.13 More serious ﬁghting started from April 1991, and these led to direct Serbian aggression against Croatia by August 1991, when the siege of Vukovar started. In this period, about one third of Croatia’s territory was under Serbian control. The Yugoslavian People’s Army started its most devastating offensive against Dubrovnik in December 1991. In early 1992, UN Peace Corps appeared, and, in May, the Bosnian War started. Croatian victory was brought by relief actions between May and August 1995, and, in the last instance, by Operation Storm. As a result of this, Zagreb restored its sovereignty in most of the Croatian Republic’s territory.14 Croatians had fought a war for nearly four and a half years and with 15,000 casualties,15 and the closing operations made the majority of Serbs living in Croatia ﬂee the country. For Yugoslavia to dissolve and enable the creation of an independent Croatia and Slovenia, a change in international power relations, the loss of interests invested in keeping up the Yugoslavian federation were needed. European powers approved the creation of the Yugoslav state in 1918 and its reorganisation after World War II. However, after the turn in Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, these European powers, though they initially disapproved of independence plans, had no vested interests anymore in upholding the federal state in the long run. The defence function of the common state was also lost, since Slovenes and Croats did not have Italian and German threats at the end of the 1980s; indeed, the Slovene and Croat push for independence was supported most by the gradually recuperating Germany. Croatia and Slovenia that came into existence through seceding from the Yugoslav federation are countries that are different from each other in many respects: the differences in their economic 74

A WIDE-ANGLE LANDSCAPE

structure, political life, and their societies are mostly rooted in the different paths of historical development they took. Concerning economic productivity, standard of living, demographic tendencies, and emigration numbers, Slovenia is signiﬁcantly better off than Croatia. However, this is partly the result of the fact that Croatia paid a much greater price for its independence, which set its development back for a long period and made the transition there more troubled. Croatia is affected to this day by the ﬁnancial, demographic, and social damage of the war. Slovenia, however, started its life as an independent state with relatively little loss in the Ten-Day War.

ENDNOTES 1 Ivo Goldstein: Hrvatska, 1918–2008. EPH Liber, Zagreb, 2008. 690. 2 Božo Repe: Jutri je nov dan. Slovenci in razpad Jugoslavije. Modrijan, Ljubljana, 2002. 13. 3 Boris Jež: Nikoli več YU? Slon, Ljubljana, 1994. 59. 4 Zdenko Radelić [et al.]: Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat. Školska knjiga, Zagreb, 2006. 503. 5 Janko Prunk: Osamosvojitev Slovenije: s kratkim orisom slovenske zgodovine. Založba Grad, Ljubljana, 1996. 159. 6 Davor Marijan: Hrvatska, 1989–1992. Rađanje države. Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb, 2017. 177. 7 The Yugoslav leadership saw the Prague Spring as a warning, and, in the autumn of 1968, so-called Territorial Defences were established in all constituent republics. Later, these units became the core of the newly independent states’ armies. 8 Prunk, 161. 9 Prunk, 161. 10 Radelić [et al.], 505. 11 Marijan, 503. 12 Prunk, 167–168. 13 Marijan, 456. 14 Radelić [et al.], 504–512. 15 Radelić [et al.], 499.

BETWEEN REGIME CHANGE AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION: SERBIA, NORTH MACEDONIA, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA Andrรกs Braun

Authors writing about regime change in Eastern Europe usually agree that the reasons behind democratic transitions, and, generally, the circumstances of those transitions, were similar in the countries of the region. However, the process is not quite so uniform in the constituent republics of the former Yugoslavia. In Yugoslavia, the regime change meant not only the start of a political and economic transition but also, as a result of the dissolution of the federal state, the appearance of new countries. It is, however, instructive to draw a parallel between the changes in Central Europe and in Yugoslavia. As in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, the opportunities in Yugoslavia were also more advantageous compared to some other countries of the socialist bloc.1 The unique Yugoslavian socialist model, which was founded on self-government, seemed from some points of view a more liberal system than that found in the orthodox communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe.2 Due to the complex internal relations, however, the transition became a conflict-ridden, delayed process for the former constituent states. This is why we believe the best approach to understand the context of the transition is to look at it through a process-centric representation. This paper aims to examine, apart from their differences and similarities, the democratic development of three post-Yugoslav states, Serbia, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the post-Yugoslav period.

2006

Serbia and Montenegro

2002 1998

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (without Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina)

1994 1990

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (without Croatia and Slovene)

1986 1982 1978

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

1974 1970 1966 1962 1958 1954

Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia

1950 1946 1942

World War II

1938 1934

Kingdom of Yugoslavia

1930 1926 Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes 1922 1918

State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs Socialist republic

Kingdom Federal republic

State union

Chronology of the Yugoslav state

A WIDE-ANGLE LANDSCAPE

Zagreb

VOJVODINA

CROATIA

Novi Sad

Belgrade

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA Sarajevo SERBIA capital cities Serbia and Montenegro (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)

MONTENEGRO Podgorica

Pristina KOSOVO

territories controlled by Serb forces (1992â&#x20AC;&#x201C;1995) internationally recognised borders

Yugoslav territories controlled by the Serbs during the Yugoslav War

POLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE WESTERN BALKANS: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES In Hungarian public discourse, regime change (or its variants) came to mean the transition of a political system from a one-party to a multiparty arrangement and the concurrent changes in politics, economics, and the structure of society. In Central Europe, regime change was a peaceful process lasting several years. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary managed to complete the process relatively quickly. As opposed to the Polish, Czechoslovakian, and Hungarian changes, the transition in Yugoslavia was not a peaceful process in more ways than one. Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina all won their independence in wars, and, at the end of the 1990s, the disagreements between Serbia and the Albanians in Kosovo also came to an armed conflict. What is more, there were several local but ethnically based incidents in the region which forced the international community to 76

A WIDE-ANGLE LANDSCAPE

intervene. These processes define the regionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s relationships from a security policy viewpoint to this day. It is clear, then, that, unlike in Central Europe, the democratic transition in the former Yugoslavia had to overcome several obstacles. Reforms were halted after the initial process of pluralisation, and this hampered state of events, in several cases, eventually resulted in the termination of the democratisation process. Thus, the transition to democracy in Yugoslavia did not happen as a whole, that is, on a federal level, but in the constituent republics, and the initial reforms were not followed by their maturation but the dissolution of the federal state. This also means that, even though the transition started in the time of Yugoslavia, it concluded in the successor states. Accordingly, perhaps the most important difference between the Visegrad states and those countries today classified as the Western Balkan region3 is that, in the latter, the process involved not only the change of the political and economic systems but, in several cases,

a process of state- and even nation-building.4 In the four (at the time, three) Central European states, regime change meant a process through which the state party and its programmefocussed opposition negotiated in talks5 about the changes to be made in the political and economic systems. Though different authors disagree about when exactly the time frames of the regime changes start and finish, they do agree that this was a process lasting several years, during which political changes happened in the region’s countries, following similar models. According to this view, the Polish, Hungarian, and Czechoslovakian transition started sometime in the late 1980s (in Hungary, it is customary to put it to 1987 or 1990), and the first free elections mark an important phase, too.6 As mentioned earlier, the crisis of the socialist system in Yugoslavia also meant the crisis of the federal state, and this gave space to nationalism-based conflicts. The nations living in Yugoslavia had their latent conflicts as well as the cohesive forces between them. Due to this, by the end of the 1980s, there was not only an opposition to socialism in the country but also national conflicts, which affected the transition. It is interesting to examine disintegration and democratisation together, since there was a sort of duality about this process all along. The Balkans show both homogeneous and heterogeneous features from a political and cultural point of view, and this duality can easily be traced in the development of the successor states. There is, however, one more significant difference between the transition processes in Central Europe and in the Balkans: while the West not only supported but also welcomed the Polish, Czechoslovakian, and Hungarian transitions, their enthusiasm was more moderate in the case of Yugoslavia. Initially, they rather supported the status quo, the survival of the Yugoslav state, instead of national sovereignty. STALLED DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION As in all other socialist countries, in Yugoslavia, too, there were important antecedents and reasons for the crisis of state that appeared in

the 1980s. However, the Yugoslav crisis and, eventually, the collapse of socialism not only stemmed from the conflict of forces wishing to conserve the communist system and the liberal reformers but also had an ethnic colouring. The Yugoslav constitution of 1974 reinforced the rights of state-constituting nations, republics, and autonomous provinces, and started an expansive decentralisation in the country. After the death of President Tito in 1980, the Yugoslav presidency was filled in a yearly rotation system. By the end of the 1980s, a harsh disagreement developed in the constituent republics on whether the decentralisation process should continue and, thus, the country should move towards a confederation, or they should commit to a centralisation strengthening a federal format.7 Centralisation was supported by the Serbs, while Croatia and Slovenia leaned rather towards the confederation.8 The Serbs wanted to make Croat and Slovene attempts at decentralisation appear as “antiSerb.” As mentioned previously, the Serbs (due primarily to their numbers) had more vested interests in centralisation. Thus, the democratic transition was affected not only by fault lines like the conflict of old and new elites or other social oppositions but also by the evermore serious confrontations between ethnicities. The desire for pluralisation was overlaid with the pursuit of autonomy, and so fault lines overlapped. Croat, Serb and Slovene ambitions played exceptional roles in the continually escalating ethnic conflicts.9

Slobodan Milošević, Alija Izetbegović, and Franjo Tuđman at the Dayton peace talks

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čk o Br

Banja Luka

THE BALKAN REGION AFTER THE DAYTON AGREEMENT Before Dayton Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH or ABiH)

Sarajevo

Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) Croatian Defence Council (HVO) After Dayton Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH or ABiH) Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) Croatian Defence Council (HVO) Frontlines

At the beginning of the 1990s, these differences also made an appearance in the republics’ constitutions. Serbia insisted on centralisation, while Slovenia and Croatia moved increasingly towards pluralisation. Finally, between June and October 1991, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia declared their independence from Yugoslavia one after the other. Serbia and Montenegro formed a state union named the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992. With the secession of the constituent republics, the Yugoslav Wars broke out, which lasted until the Dayton Agreement in 1995. The other serious armed conflict of the decade was the Kosovo War between 1998 and 1999, which was finally brought to an end by NATO bombing raids.10 It is easy to see that there are similarities between the political transitions of the Yugoslavian member states, but several significant differences can be discovered, too. In 1995, György Fábián defined the three most important phases of the Yugoslav regime change. From the end of the 1980s to 25 June 1991, the first phase saw the crisis of the Yugoslav state, but attempts at solving it remained within the context of Yugoslavia. The second phase is the process of the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia,11 which brought the crisis of the system to a climax. Even more interesting is the period that Fábián considers as the third 78

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phase, to start from 27 April 1992. He states that this is “the period after the wars between the Serbs and the Slovenes and the Serbs and the Croats had finished, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been established, the Bosnian war crisis was brewing: it was neither war nor peace, the period when successor states were trying to evolve and consolidate their political structures.”12 Tibor Ördögh’s approach also highlights its temporariness, which was already seen in the 1990s: in his view, the democratic transition process started from Tito’s death in 1980 and lasted until 2000, the fall of Slobodan Milošević. In other words: unlike in other regime changes in Eastern and Central Europe, here, the first free elections and the constitutions replacing the socialist constitutions did not contribute to the completion of the democratisation process (except for Slovenia). Based on this approach, it is also of key importance to examine to what extent the new democracies could consolidate. According to Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, three requirements need to be fulfilled for a democracy to consolidate: there must be behavioural, attitudinal, and constitutional consolidation. They write that, if these three requirements are met, the resulting democratic systems are such that the social, economic, political, and institutional actors accept the rules and do not try to change the political system. Furthermore, citizens and political actors need

to be committed to democracy, and political actors also need to consider themselves to be parts of the constitutional system.13 The two authors add that the unquestionability of state sovereignty is also an important requisite of consolidation.14 These requirements were, however, present in the Yugoslav states to a very limited extent in the early 1990s, especially in the war periods. All this contributed in many cases to the imperfections of the democracies that came into being at this time. The initial reforms halted at the time of system crisis and the struggles for independence, and so consolidation was only possible in the successor states, at a different speed. All this means that it is pointless and also impossible to speak about a unified regime change in the case of the successor states, and, as we see in the readings of Fábián and Ördögh, too, in the course of time, the academic evaluation of the transition has also changed.15 This is why one cannot talk about a regime change in the Central European sense in the Western Balkan states: the processes in the

VOJVODINA Novi Sad

Belgrade

CENTRAL SERBIA

MONTENEGRO Pristina Podgorica KOSOVO

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which existed between 1992 and 2003

region between 1990 and 2000 should rather be seen as a series of regime changes. MODELS OF STATE DEVELOPMENT IN THE SUCCESSOR STATES Following the dissolution of Yugoslavia, studies in political science evolved three basic models of state development.16 If we consider the emergence, establishment, and consolidation of democracy, Slovenia is clearly the most successful. In Croatia, the transition took more time and was a more complex process. After achieving independence, a new institutional and power elite came into existence, but authoritarian features popped up during the transition here, too, and a real plural democracy emerged only after the turn of the millennium, after Franjo Tuđman’s presidency. Serbia or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia embodies a third type, where Slobodan Milošević built a regime even more authoritarian than the Croatian variety, and the earlier elite managed to preserve its economic and political power, too. The development of the other successor states can be interpreted with this “threefold model,” too. Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, is an exception: there, after the Bosnian War and the Dayton Accords, a very complex institutional and political system came into existence. In North Macedonia, similarly to the foregoing examples, the institutions required for democracy were established, unlike in Slovenia and Croatia, but the consolidation of democracy could still not take place. In what follows, we briefly discuss the countries where democratic consolidation proved, for some reason, a slower process than in Slovenia and Croatia. SERBIA Serbia was not only the biggest and most populous constituent republic of Yugoslavia, but, due to its size and geopolitical place, it is still one of the most important Balkan states. The dissolution of Yugoslavia was not in the Serbs’ best interest. In building the independent state and in the events of the decade that followed, Slobodan Milošević played a major role. Milošević became the leader of Serbian A WIDE-ANGLE LANDSCAPE

NATO bombing raids after the Kosovo War

communists in 1986, and, in only a year, purged his inner circle of all the reformers within the party who had opposed him. Consequently, the first and perhaps most important stage of the transition, the establishment of a multiparty system, happened not through negotiations but rather unilaterally.17 A strong, presidential system emerged in Serbia, governed by the Socialist Party of Serbia and its head, Milošević. During the Milošević regime, nationalism and centralising policies were dominant. The consolidation of the former party state not only helped the creation of a strong presidential system but also hampered some elements essential for pluralisation. Apart from all this, the first (1991–1995) and the second (1998–1999) Yugoslav crises also had serious consequences for relations in the region.18 Tibor Ördögh divided the Milošević period into two phases: first, the period between 1987 and 1990, when the defining elements were the crisis and gradual disintegration of the Yugoslav state; and second, the period between 1990 and the fall of the Serbian 80

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politician in 2000. As mentioned earlier, after 1990, a plural democracy came into existence, the successor states ratified new constitutions, and a new institutional system was established; however, in Serbia, all this was really tailored to suit Milošević himself. The legislative power’s opportunities to change the constitutional and governmental system were limited and the president’s power was increased. The regime also exploited the circumstances given by the war, since these offered further opportunities for concentrating power. It is easy to see, therefore, that even though steps had been taken in the 1990s towards a democratic system, unlike in the countries of Central Europe, the regime that came to power froze up the reforms, and not until 2000 did a real regime change happen. The economic sanctions of the UN, the Kosovo War, and the NATO bombing raids undermined the stability of the system. President Milošević and the Socialist Party of Serbia lost their support: they suffered crushing defeats from the opposition first at the federal presidential elections, and then at the subsequent Serbian parliamentary elections.19 The real Serbian regime change is thus connected to the fall of Milošević and the election victory of Vojislav Koštunica. The united opposition (in Serbian, Demokratska opozicija Srbije, or DOS) formed a seventeen-party government, led by Zoran Đinđić. Vehement internal struggles characterised the activity of this government, and the reformer prime minister Đinđić was assassinated in 2003.20 After the 2003 early elections, centre forces alternated in government, then, from 2012, the Serbian Progressive Party, which had split off from the Serbian Radical Party, won more and more room on the right.21 In summary, we could say that, in Serbia, political institutions required for democracy have become established, but democratic consolidation is still not completed. Serbia’s relationship with Montenegro and Kosovo had a great influence on its development. Practically, until his fall, Milošević remained the most important, essentially the only, leader of the state union, but, after the Kosovo War, opposition between Serbs and

and the question of how to define national identity. These intense fault lines have appeared on an ethnicity basis, too, and, as a result, Macedonians and Albanians had an armed conflict in the “quasi civil war” in 2001. Rival elites’ struggles for power over internal policy often lead to fierce disagreements, and these have several times resulted in splits in governing coalitions. Between 2014 and 2017, a serious political crisis developed in the country, and so the European Union and the United States had to play an important mediating role in restoring governability.24

NORTH MACEDONIA The process leading to Macedonia’s independence went peacefully, unlike in the case of Croatia and Bosnia; still, it was not unproblematic. The Albanians living in the country boycotted the independence referendum in 1991 while Greece did not recognise22 the constitutional name of the new state, the Republic of Macedonia. The Greek–Macedonian naming dispute was not the only problem for the country, since other important elements of Macedonian national identity were also called into question by two, also neighbouring states. The Serbian Orthodox Church did not recognise the autocephaly of the Macedonian church, and Bulgaria questioned whether the Macedonian nation and language were really distinct from the Bulgarian ones.23 After winning independence, it was the successor party that had an advantage in Macedonia, just as in Serbia. With a change in electoral law, competition became more balanced, and, since 1998, two big parties, the right-centre VMRO–DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization– Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity) and the social democratic SDSM (Social Democratic Union of Macedonia) have been alternating in power. In addition to the abovementioned naming dispute, the Macedonian situation is also characterised by the internal fragmentation of the country along diverse fault lines. The most important of these are the relationship of majority and minority communities

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA The very unique and complex Bosnian statebuilding is in stark contrast with the classic approaches sketched out previously. On the ethnic map of the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia was the most heterogeneous, and, sadly, this played an important role in the Bosnian war, too. The aim of the Dayton Accords of 1995, in addition to concluding the war, was to construct a state framework in which Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats could all exercise their rights freely. Many criticise exactly this kind of framework, since political entities created on an ethnic basis practically have national conflict encoded.25 The two entities that emerged from this decentralisation, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, have

Br čk

Montenegrins was amplified, too. A defining figure in Montenegrin political life, Milo Đukanović gradually managed to draw back from Belgrade’s political centre of gravity. The common state was renamed State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003. This dissolved when Montenegro became independent in 2006, and, on top of this, Kosovo also declared unilaterally that they were seceding from Serbia in 2008. Regional relations in the Balkans are even now deeply affected by the fact that Belgrade refuses to recognise Pristina’s unilaterally declared independence.

Banja Luka

Sarajevo

Brčko District Republic of Srpska Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina The parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina

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different visions about the future of the common state. What is more, Bosnia and Herzegovina is still the “ward” of the High Representative delegated by the UN, and so the state cannot be taken as entirely sovereign.26 Another important problem is that the country’s constitution, which is really a supplement of the Dayton Accord, has nothing to say on the common Bosnian identity.27 In this not at all ideal situation, ethnonationalism became the main form for expressing identity.28 As Florian Bieber wrote, this kind of nationalismbased party rivalry appeared even in the first free elections in 1990, which means that this ethnic “pillarisation” of the society is among the oldest products of independence in Bosnia and Herzegovina.29 In this complex situation, the statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina faces serious challenges,30 and so the country does not even have the basic requirements for the consolidation of democracy. From among the countries treated in this paper, it is clearly Bosnia and Herzegovina that struggles with the most setbacks even today. ON THE PATH TO CONSOLIDATION— CLOSING REMARKS This paper attempted to discuss the unique processes of the regime change in the successor states of Yugoslavia. In general, we can say that, in these countries, the initial process of pluralisation in the beginning of the 1990s was not followed by the maturation of democratic reforms, and so a political, economic, and social regime change in the Central European sense came only later. One of the most important elements of the transitions between successor states is the question of the consolidation of democracy. The emergence and consolidation of democracy was decidedly fast in Slovenia, more moderately paced in Croatia, and explicitly delayed in Serbia. North Macedonia shows somewhat similar characteristics to Serbia, while Bosnia and Herzegovina is a fully unique case because of its ethnical fragmentation. In summary, we can say that, after the first free elections in 82

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1990, democratic reforms were checked at the beginning of the decade. This process restarted between 1995 and 2000 in the countries, that had by then become independent, and, after 2000, it appeared to speed up. The consolidation process of democracy, however, has not been completed to this day, and, even now, faces a number of challenges due to the special relationships within the region. These challenges are well illustrated by the analyses of several experts. All these show that, following the regime change, the pattern of political systems in Yugoslav successor states has been to move from consensus-based approaches towards majority systems. This means that the present political conflicts are not likely to disappear in the near future, and so the consolidation period can reasonably be expected to stretch even further.31 It is nevertheless promising that the Western Balkan states unanimously imagine their future in the European Union, and the reform processes prescribed by the Union may easily contribute to the consolidation of the democratic system. One sign of this is that, despite initial differences, their development paths now tend to converge, that is, similarities now outnumber the differences.32

ENDNOTES 1 Fábián György: A rendszerváltás politikájának fő jellemzői Szerbiában, Hor vátországban és Szlovéniában. Acta Universitatis Szegediensis. Acta juridica et politica. 1996/3. 4. 2 We have in mind here primarily the post-Soviet states and Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania. 3 The usage that derives from the European Union terminology includes Serbia, Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Kosovo and is a concept representing political rather than geographical realities. 4 In this approach, we need to specify that Czechoslovakia is something of an exception. This country was split in two after the regime change, but the two successor states came into existence peacefully, unlike the sates af ter the disintegration of Yugoslavia. 5 This might have been the least true of Czechoslovakia, since, there, the communist state party had control of the political, economic, and social subsystems even in the

autumn of 1989. See Kiss Balázs: Forradalom bársonyos

24 Braun, 172–176.

hangulatban. Múlt-kor. 17 November 2009. <https://bit.

25 BTI 2018 Country Report. Bosnia and Herzegovina 2018.

ly/2Ud6IoD > Accessed: 17 November 2009.

Bertelsmann Stiftung. 4. <https://bit.ly/2w7kr7Y > Accessed:

6 Lengyel László: A szabadság melankóliája. Kossuth

3 February 2020.

Kiadó, Budapest, 2014. Google e-book. See the chapter “Az

26 Kemenszk y Ágnes: Bosznia-Hercegovina politikai

Isteni lökés.”

rendszere. Délkelet-Európa politikai rendszerei (1990–2017),

7 Ördögh Tibor: Szerbia, Horvátország és Szlovénia politikai

edited by Koller Boglárka–Ördögh Tibor. Dialóg Campus

rendszerének összehasonlítása 1990 és 2016 között. Dialóg

Kiadó, Budapest, 2019. 69–71.

Campus Kiadó, Budapest, 2018. 22–23.

27 Kemenszky Ágnes: Bosznia-Hercegovina, a mozaikosra

8 Fábián, 19.

töredezett állam. Mediterrán és Balkán Fórum. 2016/1–2, 43.

9 Fábián, 5–6.

28 BTI 2018, 7.

10 Ördögh, 23.

29 Florian Bieber: Undermining democratic transition: the

11 The official name of the second Yugoslavia, under Tito,

case of the 1990 founding elections in Bosnia and

was the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. In this

Herzegovina. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies.

paper, we refer to this formation as Yugoslavia. The third (or

2014/4. 550.

Smaller) Yugoslavia, which was the state union of Serbia and

30 Linz and Stepan think that the “stateness problem”

Montenegro existing until 2003, was officially called the

appears when a deﬁ nitive part of a country’s population does

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

not accept the borders of the state and its political authority

12 Fábián, 3.

as legitimate. They say this is especially problematic since the

13 Juan Linz–Alfred Stepan: Problems of Democratic

legitimacy of the state is fundamentally important for the

Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South

working of democracy both on a theoretical and a practical

America, and Post-Communist Europe. Johns Hopkins

level. See Juan Linz–Alfred Stepan: Political Identities and

University Press, Baltimore, 1996. 6.

Electoral Sequences: Spain, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia.

14 Linz–Stepan, 17.

Daedalus. The Exit from Communism. 1992/spring, 123.

15 The first free elections were held in 1990, when

31 Koller Boglárka–Ördögh Tibor: A balkáni demokráciák

Yugoslavia still existed, but they were organised on the level

természete. Délkelet-Európa politikai rendszerei (1990 –

of the individual constituent republics.

2017), edited by Koller Boglárka– Ördögh Tibor. Dialóg

16 See the already cited works of György Fábián and Tibor

Campus Kiadó, Budapest 2019. 41.

Ördögh.

32 Ördögh, 247.

17 Fábián, 7. 18 Ördögh, 22–24. 19 Ördögh, 47–49. 20 Milica Delević: Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans. Chaillot Paper 104. July 2007. 48. 21 Tibor Ördögh: Szerbia politikai rendszere. In: DélkeletEurópa politikai rendszerei (1990–2017), edited by Koller Boglárka–Ördögh Tibor. Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Budapest, 2019. 198–200. 22 Athens was not calling into question Macedonia’s territorial independence, only its constitutional use of nomenclature. For this reason, in international institutions, the name The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) was used. In February 2019, the country’s name officially became North Macedonia. 23 Braun András: Macedónia politikai rendszere. DélkeletEurópa politikai rendszerei (1990–2017), edited by Koller Boglárka–Ördögh Tibor. Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Budapest, 2019. 161–164.

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NARRATIVES

REGIME CHANGE AND REVOLUTION

Áron Máthé

There is no doubt about the numerous virtues of József Antall and his transition government that will secure a distinguished position for them in history books and in the nation’s memory. It is also undeniable that Antall came up with—or at least is attributed to saying—two lines that technically summarise the period between 1989 and 1991. “You change your underpants, not your political system,” he once remarked in connection with the regime change. His other one-liner was directed at people demanding a more radical, quicker change: “Well, you should have made a revolution!” For the sake of historical irony, we might quote Comrade Virág from the famous satirical movie A tanú (The Witness) and say that these oneliners “really grabbed the issue at hand by the throat.” So what is going on exactly? In 1989, time seemed not only to speed up but to be doing so almost explosively. At the beginning of the year, Imre Pozsgay’s notorious statement that 1956 was, in fact, a popular uprising instead of a counter-revolution only triggered agitated whispers, disapproval, and dissatisfaction among the leaders of the Hungarian communist party (Pozsgay was a reformist leaning toward nationalism within the

Pro-reform communist Imre Pozsgay among his fellow members of parliament 86

NARRATIVES

party). In stark contrast to this, by 23 October, the Hungarian People’s Republic actually ceased to exist. The precise date was very important: 1956 could even be called a revolution now (not merely a popular uprising), and it could ﬁnally begin to claim the position it deserved within the national memory. One of the basic ideological doctrines and messages of Kádár’s dictatorship was a lie—a lie that 1956 was basically the Evil incarnate—and the doctrine proved false within a couple of months. Based on all this, we might very well call 1989 the “year of wonders.” Parallel to this, the National Round Table negotiations were already under way, altering the system’s general framework. Was there any truth to the words of the samizdat magazine Beszélő [Speaker] when, at the beginning of the decade, it compared the country to a “quietly murmuring mass of people over whom two dwarves, the opposition and the country’s leadership are loudly arguing”? According to a similar viewpoint, 1989 was basically a “quiet revolution” that took place at the negotiations of the National Round Table. The concept of “quiet revolution” was created to circumnavigate the problem that, until the election, nobody could be certain about the others’ allegiances and their authorisation. Educated guesses could, however, be made as the local organisations of the Hungarian Democratic Forum had by this point developed into a nationwide network. It was also well-known that the Network of Free Initiatives and, later, the Alliance of Free Democrats represented a reform socialist–liberal tradition that was supported by urban intellectuals and American ambassador Mark Palmer, at times referred to ironically as “proconsul.” Other participants—at least the political ones—were relatively easy to identify: Fidesz represented radical and dynamic students and the youth, the Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers, and Civic Party represented

Mátyás Szűrös proclaims the Republic.

historical traditions and rural society. However, who was the new post-communist successor party, the Hungarian Socialist Party representing following its inception after the October congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party? To be fair, just at the beginning of the year, they had more than eight hundred thousand members! In a revolution, it is essential for the sides to see each other clearly. Who was with whom? All this could only be answered after the election, and, even then, only approximately, as turnout did not reach the numbers everyone had hoped for. The apparently serious—formally revolutionary—changes did, in fact, transpire quietly. The developments happened more or less similarly in other Central European countries, too; bloodshed was avoided in all of them, except for Romania, where the internal, comrade-like coup and the concept of a national revolution went hand in hand. In Hungary, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia the changes happened after a series of demonstrations varying in their intensity, while in Poland the same occurred after a decade of passive national resistance: in all these cases, the communist parties—or their successor organisations—seemingly passed the power on quietly to the victorious elected forces. Therefore, it is no surprise that the concept of a “Velvet Revolution,” previously only applied to Czechoslovakia, was extended in the international literature to the entire region, where the regime change (transformation?) went down rather “smoothly.” However, regardless of these revolutions, there seemed to be a chasm between the new

intellectual opinion leader elite that emerged during the years of the regime change and their respective societies. In their 1992 essay Értelmiség és dominancia a posztkommunista társadalmakban (Intellectuals and dominance in post-communist societies), György Konrád and Iván Szelényi stated, “Naturally, we are aware that the changes of the recent past were readied by a slower and quieter ‘underground revolution’ that had been gradually undermining communist systems ever since the 1960s. Today, the swiftly politicised and radicalised Hungarian intellectuals are often impatient about the witlessness of society or ‘the masses.’ Newly founded political movements and parties, in fact, find themselves faced with people’s reservations or even their complete indifference rather often.” The question arises: regardless of it being a “quiet revolution,” actually whose revolution is it? In retrospect, the question (taken from the title of a book by Sándor M. Kiss and Frigyes Káhler about the perceptions of 1956) seems to be a legitimate one as to the years of the regime change. Whose regime change was it if, later, it was met by indifference? Could the reason be the conversion of the elite instead of its permanent change? Was there something else behind this alienation? In 1994, George Soros told Michael Lewis, a journalist of the New Statesman, that the Soviet Empire that had once covered everything between Germany and China had been, by then, transformed into the “Soros Empire.” The Soros Foundation started its operation openly in Hungary in 1984. However, newly surfaced state security documents mention that, through dubious channels, international financial actors were looking for reliable figures capable for filling opposition positions. Could the social detection of this process cause the indifference? If so, then where does the conservative right-wing coalition that won the first free election fit into the equation? It is certain that financial matters also contributed to the wave of disillusionment and alienation that took hold after the period of quiet hopefulness that substituted for the euphoria of 1989. The effects of the rather cynical outlook of Kádár’s dictatorship could still be felt, with NARRATIVES

many Hungarians thinking like getting rid of communism was equivalent to the instantaneous advent of Western consumer culture and its assumed prosperity. It is rather tragico-comical that, on the last 4 April in 1989 (the birthday of the socialist Hungary), many Hungarians celebrated by crossing the border to engage in some shopping tourism in the neighbouring “capitalist” country, Austria. However, the expected land of Canaan did not arrive, instead, Hungary was hit by mass unemployment and uncertainty of income, things that were natural, yet still unexpected side effects of shifting gears from a socialist economic model to a market economy. This was further amplified by a high number of international investors merely looking to get their hands on some new markets for short-term profit or in order to eliminate potential competitors. This led to the disappearance of entire industries, which obviously did not feed the enthusiasm towards the changes in 1989, but definitely provided grounds for conspiracy theories expressed by phrases that called the regime change “change of method” or “change of gangsters.” This was dramatic only because one could genuinely argue for the former due to elite conversion and for the latter due to the arrival of international investors. Instead of the “quiet revolution” many people write about a “constitutional revolution” as well. This is true in the sense that “socialist law”— “socialist,” of course, being a privative suffix— was switched over to bourgeois law from this point on. According to Attila Horváth’s definition,

On the last 4 April in 1989, Hungarians celebrated by going to Austria in massive numbers to engage in shopping tourism.

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the pseudoconstitutionality of a dictatorship was replaced by a truly constitutional state. Although this is, more or less, undoubtedly true, we can still find two specific problems with it. The first is a saying that, in a number of variations, has been attributed to a number of different “authors,” stating that, since 1989, there is no administration of justice in Hungary, there is only administration of law. The series of arbitrations that went against a basic sense of justice did not make it easier for the Hungarian nation to find its home after such revolutionary events. The second instance contradicting the constitutional revolution is connected to this and went down in Hungarian history as the failure of justice. This was because the logical catharsis after the 1989 events ultimately did not happen, as the people responsible for the communist dictatorship could simply not be found. They could not be held accountable, since the Constitutional Court twice annulled the laws on a textual basis. Maybe this is what professor of law Csaba Varga meant when he warned that constitutionality could never be a “collective suicide pact.” However, for a while it really did seem like there were self-liquidating processes just about to start up. Here, I mean something more than the previously mentioned economic aspects. In the foreword to Polish anti-communist thinker Ryszard Legutko’s book The Demon in Democracy. Totalitarian Temptations in Free Societies, John O’Sullivan states: “In Western Europe, public and private institutions, including European Union bodies, seemed to ﬁnd former communists more congenial as partners in politics and business than former dissidents.” In the book Legutko expands on this idea as follows: “in the Seventies, to my unpleasant surprise, I discovered that many of my friends who consciously classiﬁed themselves as devoted supporters of liberal democracy displayed extraordinary meekness and empathy toward communism. . . . I experienced the same budding thought for the second time during Poland’s post-communist period, right at the very beginning of its existence in 1989. Those who were anti-communists were a threat to

As a symbolic event concluding the lies of the previous system, the reinterment of Imre Nagy and his fellow martyrs drew a massive crowd.

liberal democracy; those who were anti-anticommunist passed the most important and the most difﬁcult entrance examination to the new political reality.” There is no doubt that there was a sort of Central Europe–Western Europe misunderstanding as well. While the concept of Europe held by national–conservative forces was already outdated by the time they rose to power, liberal leftist thinkers gravitated towards the already forming post-European intellectual groups due to their more regular visits to the West, their language skills, and connections. It was the French author Fabrice Garniron who recently pointed out that, in Autumn 1989, the French elite “could not quite make sense of the national dimension of the Eastern European revolutions” and that Western societies welcomed the changes in the East with “proud blindness.” Looking at the 1989–1991 transformations in Central Europe from an outside perspective, as opposed to an internal one, we see a far more revolutionary picture. As if there was a struggle not even for the reuniﬁcation of a Europe split in

two in 1945 but for a Europe that had been split back in 1918, with a special emphasis on equality for Central European countries. The Iron Curtain was pierced and brought down in Hungary— with that, the symbol of a split Europe based on post-1945 ideologies and forced divisions was finally destroyed. The Soviet Union retreated, then dissolved completely. However, we had to discover that the Free World was only worthy of its name in contrast to communist totalitarian regimes, as it is formed by real people and profitoriented firms, not to mention the lobbies of a number of different networks. On top of this, the desire of Western countries to be stable had long overridden the efforts of smaller nations to attain sovereignty. This was already brought to light in Munich, then in Tehran, then in Yalta as well. In 1956 and 1968, it was proven again. In 1989, we saw a new manifestation of this when Western investors ended up getting along well with post-communist cadres known well in the era of socialism, cadres and technocrats that did not act in the nation’s best interest, and leaned heavily towards corruption. These people NARRATIVES

The ﬁ rst free election in Hungary—József Antall casts his vote.

represented the world of stability, the well-known and well-trodden paths to international investors, and did not really want to make autonomous decisions, since their whole socialisation was built upon adapting to a centralised empire. This was the framework in which the ﬁrst freely elected government and prime minister had to stand their ground after the fall of communism. Instead of the guidelines offered by the high priests of transitology, Antall chose to pursue independent policies focussing on Hungarian national and Central European interests. An initiative and, at the same time, successful Hungarian foreign policy had rarely been seen since Hitler’s coup, and it generally ceased to exist after 1945. József Antall’s move was undoubtedly revolutionary from the Hungarian point of view; from a European perspective, it was a game changer. This malleable era was characterised by the meeting of independent Hungarian foreign policy and opportunities to act. We rarely speak about these results, however, if we do not tell the story, no one will do it for us. The two most important institutions of the Soviet empire in Central Europe, the Warsaw 90

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Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) were both dissolved as a result of Hungarian proposals, with both events taking place in Budapest. In case of the Warsaw Pact, Antall was basically alone at the Moscow Summit on 7 June 1990 in his position that the political and military organisation contributing heavily to oppression should be entirely dissolved. The Polish, Czechoslovakian, and GDR leaders “did not approve . . . the proposal of the Hungarian draft agreement concerning the revision and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. I had the two drafts in front of me, the Soviet draft approved by the foreign ministers and the yet to be approved Hungarian draft. . . . It is a very special twist of fate and history that I happened to be chair at the last political meeting of the Warsaw Pact, and, as chair, I started reading the unapproved Hungarian text out loud. . . . The atmosphere became rather tense, then Gorbachev suddenly said, ‘Da, khorosho!’ [Yes, good!] I still do not know whether he had misunderstood or understood the proposal or they had simply wanted to avoid a scandal, but Gorbachev had said yes all the same, and, from that moment on, everybody became very enthusiastic.” Belying the image the leftist and liberal media spread about him, Antall impertinently and courageously tricked a superpower and defied the expectations of the other, more timid and cautious Central European leaders. In the rather strongly worded and firm text Antall referenced 1956 as well, when the Hungarian government actually proclaimed its secession from the Warsaw Pact. The brave political will finally bore fruit: on 25 February 1991, the document dissolving the military organisation of the Warsaw Pact was signed in Budapest. The dissolution of Comecon can also be linked to an initiative by the head of Hungarian diplomacy, Prime Minister József Antall. As he recalled, “We were on our own when it came to the dissolution of Comecon as well. We were the only ones that unambiguously wanted it. Even at the Visegrad conference, Havel and the Czechoslovakian delegation still did not want to agree to the dissolution of Comecon

without a successor organisation. I convinced Wałęsa separately before the signing of the Visegrad Agreement, then I convinced the Czech delegation with him on my side the next morning.” At the organisation’s meeting in Budapest on 28 June 1991 the members ﬁnally proclaimed the dissolution of Comecon. Antall’s personal determination also manifested itself in the government statement that declared the Molotov–Ribbentropp Pact illegal and stood up for the independence of the Baltic states. All this on 4 August 1991, merely four days after an especially sly incident in the long-drawn-out Baltic crisis, committed by the Soviet internal affairs corps with sporadic bloodshed. Antall was also one of the first leaders to call Boris Yeltsin during Yanayev’s attempted coup to assure him of his moral and political support. It was also the ﬁrst Hungarian government’s triumph to arrange the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary at a break-even point, while also forcing the Soviets/Russians to apologise for

1956 on three separate occasions. It once came from Gorbachev in a speech, once from Yeltsin in writing, then from Yeltsin again in a speech during his visit to Budapest. For a country of ten million, this is no small achievement. Hungary’s support for Ukraine’s independence also belongs here: Hungary was the ﬁrst to acknowledge the country’s independence both de facto and de jure. With regards to our narrower region, Hungarian initiatives were now aimed at eliminating the 1918 split of the nation (instead of the 1945 one). Antall’s words about being the prime minister of fifteen million Hungarians, in reference to the Hungarian–Hungarian split were, without a doubt, revolutionary. The communist dictatorship never stood up for the Hungarian diaspora so openly, not even when, in the background, it supported initiatives like the Kriterion publications printed in tens of thousands. The statement that Hungary took responsibility for the entire nation was entirely new.

Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary in 1990

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Árpád Göncz’s visit to Czechoslovakia in 1990— encouraging co-operation between the region’s countries was one of József Antall’s greatest achievements (middle: Czechoslovakian president Václav Havel, on the right: Alexander Dubček, chair of the Federal Assembly)

On top of the vital questions about Hungary’s destiny, this attitude naturally also includes the recognition of Slovenia’s and Croatia’s independence along with weapons and ammunition shipments for the latter, which was essential in the country’s struggle for political and territorial sovereignty against the Yugoslavian People’s Army. Moreover, it also included the recognition of Slovakia’s independence, since it signalled the end of another artiﬁcially created state from 1918. In this case, however, Hungary’s limitations became apparent as demonstrated by the Danube’s diversion to the Gabčíkovo power plant. The greatest achievement of Antall and his government on top of all this was, without question, the signing of the founding document of the Visegrad Group. This was undoubtedly a challenge to the reigning idea at the beginning of the century, according to which the three Western countries present at the peace talks between 1918 and 1920 had the ﬁnal word about Eastern European countries. It took a long time until this idea could take root in the souls of the four Visegrad countries. Similarly, it also took a long time—two decades—for us to be able to leave the state of post-communism behind. At a memorial conference organised in Timișoara for the 30th anniversary of the 1989 Romanian Revolution, the excellent Polish

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historian, Paweł Ukielski referred to the “Autumn of Nations” as a counter-revolution in the eyes of the communists and their allies, as it reversed the changes that had been brought about by the post-1945 communist takeovers (or “popular democratic revolutions”). In this sense, the word “re-volutio,” meaning “a rollback,” would be the correct term to use. This has been an attempt to fix a dislocated timeline with the above-detailed deficits. Although the accusation of the process merely being a “Horthyist restoration” was echoed hundreds of times by left-wing media platforms, in reality, this was clearly not and could not have been the case, not only because of Heraclitus’ theorem about the impossibility of anything happening the same way twice but also because the Hungarian diplomacy at the time was rather flexible with the purpose of preparing for a new world order. There is little doubt that the biggest and, in fact, quite revolutionary achievement of the first freely elected government after the fall of the communist dictatorship was laying down the foundations of an independent and initiative foreign policy, serving national interests. The prime minister of that government may also be considered one of the originators of the new concept of Central Europe that had been forming since 1968. This was the idea that, in the long term, will lead to the emancipation of Central Europe, a process that will conclude the dark legacy of the 20th century for us, Hungarians. In a foreign policy sense, Antall and his government may thus be rightfully considered conservative revolutionaries. The internal revolution of Hungarian society (the regime change) had all but begun. Antall simply could not be truly successful in his fight against the liberal and critical intellectuals having international backing among the circumstances of a newly born mass democracy and the “clotted structures” of a post-communist state. For the systemic changes in the name of the Hungarian national interest, József Antall has secured a place for himself in the national pantheon, even if we could not (yet) make a revolution at home.

REGIME CHANGE OR REVOLUTION?

Tamás Krausz

THEORY AND REALITY Ten years ago, considering also the literature on the regime change, I emphasised that “mainstream literature struck a radical blow against the historical point of view in the service of a festive ideological goal. In the theoretical, historical, economic, or politological works examining the history and the consequences of the regime change, there is an explicit or implicit struggle between different schools of interpretation (“discourses” and “narratives”) for the terms employed, for determining causes and effects. Politics and the mainstream literature that serves it have systematically expelled, “discredited,” from the explanations of the regime change Marx’s theory of social forms as an (so they say) unverifiable “grand theory.” In this, they were industriously helped by former ‘opportunistic’ Marxists. However, just as it happened to Marx’s theory of crisis, the theory of social forms might also prove to be too early to be buried.”1 The mainstream approach developed within the framework of the new legitimation ideology and classifies the history of the regime change under the concepts of freedom and democracy. The basis of the main paradigms in the “theories” explaining the regime change has been to this day the binary oppositions “democracy vs dictatorship” and “free market economy vs oppressive–totalitarian state economy.”2 Anything that does not fit into this framework is left out of the story. This Manichaeistic way of thinking might be suited for festivities, but it is certainly useless for the purposes of serious historical scholarship.3 I have not changed my mind about this. What is more, more recent experiences only reinforced my claim, since the very concept of revolution is abused by nonscholarly authors—and, quite frequently, even scholarly ones.

SO WHAT DID REALLY HAPPEN? I would like to remind everyone of the “historical scratch” where one “must” start from: based on experiences of the Russian Civil War, Lenin thought that no external enemy could possibly defeat Soviet power, “only our own mistakes” and the historical–cultural conditions (or the lack thereof) can “overthrow” the Soviet system. Later, after Lenin’s death, Stalin thought that the internal foundations of the system were stable and only external enemies could possibly overthrow the Soviet Union. After the victory in World War II, it seemed the Soviet Union had irrevocably secured its place among the most powerful and, as one of the superpowers, it was invincible. This belief was globally authenticated by its victory over Nazi Germany. However, in the second half of the 1980s, the elite in power in the perestroika period ﬁnally “solved” the escalating, serious economic–governmental crisis (which also involved the dissatisfaction of populous social groups) by themselves eliminating the state socialist system and the Soviet Union itself. They did it despite the fact that, in a legitimate referendum in March 1991 (held without the participation of Georgia and the Baltic states), 76% of voters supported the preservation of the Soviet Union. The decisive reason for destroying it and the system was that the elite in power and the upper echelons of the bureaucracy, afraid of the popular movements that came into existence due to the crisis, rather wanted to preserve their own power and political privileges at all costs. Instead of reforming socialism, their agenda showed a sort of restoration of capitalist private property, of “oligarchic capitalism,” and the transformation of state property into private property. In the course of privatisation, they reorganised themselves into a new economic ruling class.4 It is practically impossible to separate Eastern NARRATIVES

European transformations from all this, although there are, of course, specific national features which must be studied. REVOLUTION–COUNTER-REVOLUTION? Quite frequently, such “superficial” power transformations as the one we could witness in Ukraine in 2014 (“EuroMaidan”) are called revolutions even in the scholarly literature. In the Ukrainian instance, power went from one group of oligarchs to another group, and this latter group also bet on the West. Classic cases of the so-called “orange revolutions” are those internal political upheavals, induced and financed from abroad, in which one group of the elite in power ousts another (both standing on the ground of the same system, “oligarchic capitalism”) through violent or less violent means, as happened in the above-mentioned Ukraine instance. However, this is not really a revolution and not even a regime change in the “1989 sense” of the term. In the course of the last century and a half, social scientists of the most diverse convictions have toiled much with different definitions of the concept of revolution (and counter-revolution), but there was a point on which they all agreed: whatever worldview we employ, revolution (or counter-revolution) is about three things, groups of phenomena, system of relationships, connected closely: power, property, and a change in social forms. Marxists added that a revolution always aims at a superior social form and a counter-revolution purposes to return development from a superior form to a form already transcended. Thus, to simplify a little, they can be bourgeois revolutions or socialist revolutions. The starting point of the new system’s intellectual representatives and the key point in the “enlightenment” of earlier Marxists who sided with the new system in 1989 was the thought that the new bourgeois system (the “free market”) resulting from the 1989 regime change would be a superior form of socio-economic development than the abandoned state socialism. If we look at history “from below,” from the point of view of the inferior classes, this position is moot after thirty years for more than one reason, but, nevertheless, it is 94

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still the mainstream approach that perpetuates the system. The 1989–1991 collapse of state socialist systems brought such a radical transformation to the whole world-system that it can only be compared to the transformations in 1917– 1921 or 1945–1949. Logically, if these were revolutions, then counter-revolutions happened in 1989, since the social format after 1989, however we assess it, contained and implied economic and power-political tendencies that were opposed to the previous state socialist format. However, if we do not consider the “crashed” state socialist systems superior to the capitalist market mode of production, then, again, the regime change appears in a different light. Previous revolutions are reinterpreted as counter-revolutions, and 1989 turns into a revolutionary transformation. The concept of regime change is, thus, embedded in a much more general debate about the theory of history, a conceptual and political struggle. When József Antall said, “Well, you should have made a revolution!”, it was not simply about a warning to the extreme right (because, along with others, they, too, were excluded from privatisation handouts) but also about the fact that a “failure to make a revolution” deﬁned the possible frameworks of the regime change. Thus, we could only speak of a revolution if, during the transformation of property relations, a wider slice of society had been included in “the redistribution of power and wealth” through radically limiting or changing the role of the capital and the state.5 THE PERSPECTIVE OF 1989 AS A CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM: MANDEL, HABERMAS, ZINOVIEV . . . At the same time, numerous European thinkers approached the process of the change with the usual patterns of the period. From the excellent Marxist theoretician and economist, Ernest Mandel (a follower of Trotskyist political traditions) to the German social democratic philosopher Jürgen Habermas, a lot of people fell under the spell of the mythology of “revolution,” “freedom,” and “catching up

with the West” in a lot of different ways. While Ernest Mandel, enthused by the revolutionary spirit, saw Gorbachev’s “democratic socialism” (which was never actually worked out) as the image of the socialist future,6 Habermas took the opposite way, and embedded his basic observations in 1990 (which have since sublimated nearly to the level of a paradigm) in an intellectual perspective that exchanged any kind of socialism for “democracy” and “freedom” (meaning a multiparty political system). He used “rectifying revolution” (in German, nachholende Revolution) as a starting point, and, with this, he posited that a certain harmony would emerge between bourgeois and socialist elements of development through the West basically integrating Eastern Europe into its “freedom.” Yet he did not reflect on the proposition that this “ideal development” would have had to happen on the basis of capitalist private property.7 The liberal opposition in Hungary (similarly to the Polish and other liberal opposition movements in the region) put the replacement of capitalist private property at the centre of the process: “To create a parliamentary democracy based on a plurality of political parties and an economic system based on private property and on ensuring the freedom of the forms of ownership, it is not enough to ‘reform’ current relationships.”8 It is a different question that, later, the Alliance of Free Democrats (along with others) also voted against the freedom of forms of ownership when the parliament that came to existence after the 1990 election deleted even the possibility of workers’ municipal property from the constitution.9 Those voting against did so based on the fact that, in the model that operates in the countries of Western Europe which we have to catch up with, this kind of workers’ municipal property is not there either. However, by doing so, they cut short a truly revolutionary development—assisted, of course, by all the other parties. This was the background of the situation in which Prime Minister József Antall issued the warning quoted above.10 Finally, we need to mention the theoreticians of world-systems theory (Immanuel Wallerstein,

Giovanni Arrighi, and others) and the Russian ex-exile Alexander Zinoviev, whose works could only be read in Hungary in the periodical Eszmélet (Consciousness) around 1989. Even if using different terms, they saw a fundamental problem concerning perspectives (and related to the Marxist theoretical tradition): the regime change fits in the historically emerged and consolidated hierarchy of the world-system and the capitalist world market and, eo ipso, results in such global, local, and regional conflicts and inequalities that determine, but at the same time also derail the previously articulated ideological–political goals, the century-old project of catching up. The international division of labour and the corresponding global power hierarchy do not “recognise” the narrative of “freedom,” the neoliberal world order eliminates the economic foundations of the nation state, and, in a hierarchy based on oppression, the philosophical language of “freedom” and “emancipation” give way to bank-speech, the infinite advertising language of consumer society, while the “welfare state” is being (also globally) divested.11 The notable earlier opposition philosopher, Zinoviev, the author of Homo Sovieticus, had already at the beginning of the 1990s approached the regime change in the context of a transition “from communism to colonial democracy.” In this reading, too, the privatisation of state property was the alpha and omega, the precondition for joining the global hierarchy— the exact opposite of freedom. Thus, here the concepts of democracy and freedom escaped the clutches of merely political–legal interpretation, and, at the same time, became an economic–social and political concept.12 The experiences gained in Poland, Hungary, or basically any other transition country show that, at the so-called national round tables, preparing the sharing out of power, the civil organisations which had truly revolutionary goals refused the idea of privatisation, since they thought it was only in the interest of the “suddenly” emerging new parties. The parties, as “vanguards,” merely wanted to pass state property to their own social “clients” and called NARRATIVES

this privatisation. For them, democracy served ultimately to turn state property into their own private property. An overwhelming majority of society was thus excluded from the “big sharing out.” These questions were seriously raised also at the 1st Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Party concerning the political activities of the so-called popular democratic platform.13 At the same time, the history of the first decade of the Hungarian Socialist Party showed how quickly it emptied of theoretical depth: it was in the decision-making circles of this party that the concept of revolution faded the soonest and was degraded, to the greater glory of social democracy, into the advertising language of a supermarket, while “1989” was sublimated into an ideological “event” of “self-celebration” for them too. They got tired of forever repeating the same 1989 slogans like “catching up with the West,” “free market,” or “pluralism,” since these did not mobilise voters any more and became unsuitable for any party or election alliance. The utopia of the regime change grew cold. It had a role for a short while in maintaining a kind of euphoria, but that euphoria turned into its opposite within a few years. More serious scholarly discussions of 1989 mention critical points in development but seek to avoid having to classify the events into the revolution–counter-revolution paradigm. They detail the concept of the regime change within the traditional framework of a “positivist” history of politics, and this shows how “grand ideologies” were negated between the grinding wheels of petty, trivial power struggles.14 Theory was jettisoned as unneeded garbage— mostly by exactly the people who had earlier articulated, or at least cultivated, these theories. Symbolically speaking, it was thus that Marx, Lenin, and Gramsci were replaced by Fukuyama and Huntington. There are some approaches, mainly popular in the West, that, within a Marxist narrative, consider the old state socialist system just as much a form of state capitalism as the system we have today. Yet these still constituted 1989 as a sort of political revolution, a revolution that did not lead to a superior social form— 96

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actually it stayed within the same form. So, in some countries, above all in Germany (but not in Hungary), where significant mass movements emerged in the period of the German unification, they consider the regime change a political revolution, just as liberal scholars do.15 These approaches, however, cannot deal with those historical developments and those regional characteristics that determine the real dynamics of development. The development process of the regime change finally did not confirm their preconceptions and intellectual formations. They do not consider in sufficient depth the problem that the specific features of Eastern European history (an almost total lack of national bourgeoisie, the role of authoritarianism in the organisation of society, the forces moving conservative, bureaucratic nationalist development, etc.) proved to be stronger than expected and imagined by the internal forces that fuelled the regime-change. Numerous authors, with a kind of subjectivist devotion, would rather “rewrite” history itself if that allowed them to avoid facing their old, preserved ideological illusions.16 Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Emil Niederhauser had already claimed directly after the regime change that it was not decisively and basically the socialist ideas that made state socialism what it was; it became such a system because socialism sprouted from Eastern European (“Russian”) historical soil.17 That is, the regime change did not “break down,” its path was shaped by historical necessities of development. The region returned to what Arrighi called “semi-peripheral capitalism” despite the fact that, in the course of the transition process, there was practically no mass movement that demanded the restoration of capitalism. Neither did József Antall, as a matter of fact; he did not even utter the word for a long time, and talked instead about “social market economy.” It is worth rethinking the problem I have tried to sketch out here briefly in this different light.

ENDNOTES

Fórum (Csurka’s paper) and its debts: e. g., Cycle 1990–1993

1 Krausz Tamás: Tézisek a rendszer váltás tör téneti

of the Hungarian Parliament, day 232, speech 97. Accessible

értelmezéséhez. Eszmélet. 2010/winter. 95.

online on the Parliament’s webpage: <https://bit.ly/38T11ly >

2 In this respect, a recently published volume summarising

Accessed: 30 January 2020.

the experiences gained during the regime change is almost

11 Cf. Peter Gowan: A fejletlenség hegemóniája – Az euro-at-

paradigmatic. See ±30. Esszék a közelmúltról és a közel-

lanti szervezetek szerepe Kelet-Közép-Európában. Eszmélet.

jövőről, edited by Földes György. Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest,

1995/summer. 81–108. A volume of essays that presents a

2019. It is worth reading the review about it that also criticises

survey of one of the ﬁ rst methodical and radical critiques of

the mainstream: György László–Bartha Eszter: A hiányzó

the regime change is Rendszerváltás és társadalomkritika.

közös nevező. Eszmélet. 2019/autumn. 233–239.

Tanulmányok a kelet-európai átalakulás történetéből, edited

3 I already pointed this out in my paper referred to above.

by Krausz Tamás. Budapest, Napvilág Kiadó, 1998.

See Krausz (2010), 95.

12 See Andre Gunder Frank: Az Észak–Dél konﬂ iktus politikai

4 I have examined this transformation in several papers.

gazdaságtana. Eszmélet. 1992/winter, 83–90.; Alexander

See, for example, Krausz Tamás: A Szovjetunió története.

Zinoviev: A kommunizmustól a gyarmati demokráciáig.

Kossuth Kiadó, Budapest, 2008.; A jelCINIZMUS. In:

Eszmélet. 1995/spring. 107–130.

Posztszovjet füzetek XI. Jelcin és a jelcinizmus, edited by

13 Cf. Krausz Tamás: Kongresszusi Beszéd – az MSZMP

Krausz Tamás. Magyar Ruszisztikai Intézet, Budapest, 1993.

utolsó (XIV.) és az MSZP alakuló kongresszusán, 1989. októ-

67–92.; Krausz Tamás: A peresztrojka és a tulajdonváltás.

ber 7. Eszmélet. 2009/spring. 7–9. and Krausz (2010).

Politikai koncepciók és történelmi valóság. In: Peresztrojka

14 See Ripp Zoltán: Eltékozolt esélyek? A rendszerváltás ér-

és tulajdonáthelyezés. Tanulmá nyok é s dokumentumok a

telme és értelmezései. Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 2009, and

rendszervá ltá s tö rté neté bő l a Szovjetunió ban (1985–1991).

Ripp Zoltán: Rendszerváltás Magyarországon, 1987–1990.

Magyar Ruszisztikai Intézet, Budapest, 2003. 52–102. This

Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 2006.

last paper was also published in English: Perestroika and the

15 Cf., e. g., Gareth Dale: The East German Revolution of

redistribution of property in the Soviet Union: political per-

1989. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2007.;

spectives and historical evidence. Contemporary Politics.

Timothy Garton Ash: The Magic Lantern. The Revolution of

2007/March. 3–36.

’89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague.

5 In Hungary, the Left-Wing Alternative Union was the only

Random House, New York, 1990.; and Ádám Fábry: The

political–social organisation that put in this demand already

Political Economy of Hungary. From State Capitalism to

during the round table talks. Concerning this, see Tütő

Authoritarian Neoliberalism. Palgrave MacMillan, London,

László: Társadalomﬁ lozóﬁ ai alternatívák a magyarországi

2019.

rendszerátalakításban. Eszmélet. 2019/autumn. 66–99.

16 I have already discussed all this (especially in the light of

6 See Ernest Mandel: Beyond Perestroika. The Future of

Hungarian experiences) in my other papers: Krausz Tamás:

Gorbachev’s U. S. S. R. Verso, New York, 1991.

A magyar történetírás és a marxizmus. Megjegyzések a

7 Jürgen Habermas: What Does Socialism Mean Today?

„kelet-európaiság” problémájához. In: Tamás Krausz: Vitás

The Rectifying Revolution and the Need for New Thinking on

kérdések a Szovjetunió és Kelet-Európa X X. századi

the Left. New Left Review. 1990/September–October. 3–21.

történetében. Russica Pannonicana, Budapest, 2011. 219–

8 The program for the regime change – SZDSZ 1989.

290.; Krausz Tamás: 30 év múltán. Miért bukott el a liberal-

Available online on the page of Nézőpont Institute: <https://

izmus Magyarországon (is)? Eszmélet. 2018/winter. 5–10.

bit.ly/2HCHVEv > Accessed: 30 January 2020.

17 Niederhauser Emil: Előhang 1989 Kelet-Európájához.

9 For a discussion of the history of the regime change from

Eszmélet. 1990/summer. 24–42. In a methodological and the-

this point of view, that is, from the viewpoint of the third side,

oretical sense, I had a very similar debate with János Kornis

see László Tütő’s already cited work.

very early in the regime change. About this, see Krausz

10 Of course, the followers of Csurka did not want to “make

Tamás: A történetietlen politikai gazdaságtan. Eszmélet.

a revolution” in the least, all they wanted was to be a bit clos-

1994/winter. 157–178.

er to the “ﬂ eshpot.” The personal fate of István Csurka showed a particular case of this “money-grubbing” attitude, devoid of any “social-philosophical” aspect. See the documents about this in the parliament’s debates about Magyar

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WELL, YOU SHOULD HAVE DIRECTED ITHUNGARIAN FILM AND THE REGIME CHANGE Anikó Gorácz

Hungarian film culture can boast a number of exceptional periods, but, sadly, the period of the regime change is not one of them. In the decades of socialism, Hungarian film had some big successes, proving that a smooth sea did not make a skilled sailor, or, rather, what the eponymous character said in Monty Python’s Life of Brian: “We mustn’t fight each other! Surely we should be united against the common enemy!” And while filmmakers did unite with more or less success, forming creative communities, intellectual workshops, studios (the Balázs Béla Stúdió in 1959), Aczél’s cultural policy not only tolerated but (apart from a few exceptions) also supported their artistic conceptions, and so it enabled the making of a number of influential films that have proved their importance to this

Director Károly Makk and photographer György Illés in a break during the shooting of Fűre lépni szabad (Don’t Keep Off the Grass)

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day. It is enough to mention such timeless works as Zoltán Fábri’s Húsz óra (Twenty Hours, 1965), Miklós Jancsó’s Szegénylegények (The RoundUp, 1966), Ferenc Kósa’s Tízezer nap (Ten Thousand Days, 1967), Károly Makk’s classic Szerelem (Love, 1971), or István Gaál’s 1970 political parable Magasiskola (The Falcons) to see that the 1960s and 1970s were the high point of Hungarian filmmaking. The studio system, working with state subsidies, provided the necessary protection and freedom for all who were willing to conform to the rules of the period’s cultural politics: above all else that they do not speak about politics openly and critically. The system was, in reality, quite flexible, which is why Péter Bacsó’s film A tanú (The Witness) could even be made in 1969; however, it says just as much that the freshly appointed György Aczél banned it before the premiere, and so the film remained in the can for ten years. The script for the film Tízezer nap (Ten Thousand Days) had had eleven versions before the ministry approved it for shooting, just to remain in the can for three years, until its premiere at the Cannes Film Festival, because 1956 is called a “revolution” in it. Despite the anomalies, this well-defined framework offered security and brought opportunities, while viewer numbers and international successes were increasing too. Studios and directors learned to live with the regime, what is more, some adapted to it remarkably well. There is an anecdote about the leader of one of the great studios, a director with a Kossuth Prize and a Béla Balázs Award, who is reputed to have said once at a studio meeting: “Tell me which butts to lick so that we can make this film!” Though filmmakers did make compromises, they had handled past and present far more

Actor András Kozák at the shooting of Ferenc Kósa’s Tízezer nap (Ten Thousand Days)

bravely in the socialist era than they did in the period of the regime change. In the “bad old days,” film was an important forum for intellectuals, contributing significantly to the scholarly and public discourse about topics that official communications remained silent about to the extent that serious social debate emerged in connection with some of the more important works. Not only film aesthetes and critics but sociologists, philosophers, and historians also discussed these films which often treated the present’s problem by allegory in an indirect way. “Film was one of those cultural objectifications which touched upon things that could not easily appear in social sciences, in public writing and discourse.”1 Filmmakers concerned themselves with “public problems,” made films of social criticism and political involvement, and they chose such historical eras for the context of their messages that enabled them to avoid criticising the system directly. However, the allusions were clear for most people. Besides feature films, documentaries were also made with the explicit aim to reveal the problems of society and to provoke a dialogue about important questions. The films of the “Budapest School” (so named by the Balázs Béla Stúdió and foreign critics) strove to show viewers the reality and a kind of deeper truth. This is how docufiction was born from mixing feature films with documentaries. The fifth studio, Társulás, which was founded in the early 1980s, explicitly aimed at “coupling” cinematic art with the social sciences.

“The art of this generation was turned into diverse styles by the vice of the Kádár era: by the pressure of political truth as unspeakable on one side and the necessity of still telling it on the other.”2 One way of confronting this became to make films centred on problems and to make documentaries; the other (as with Miklós Jancsó or István Gaál) became the use of allegorical discourse full of allusions. In both directions, overthrowing taboos and showing reality became important motivations. Thus, telling the truth had a long tradition in Hungarian film-making, and this is why film became of exceptional importance for the intelligentsia in the decades of the dictatorship. Viewers were curious about the films, about what their makers had to say, and, of course, about the distorting mirror that these films showed up to the dictatorial system. This was not so in all the countries of the socialist bloc: while there were epoch-making films in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union, there was no sign of such filmmaking in, e.g., Romania. “The filmmakers’ opposition to the system, which created a strong tradition of art films in Czechoslovakia, Poland, or Hungary, was completely missing in Romania.”3 They had made nearly exclusively entertainment movies until the dictatorship was overthrown, which left social problems entirely without reflexion. “There was a huge rift between how people really lived and what they saw on the screen.”4 The only significant artistic work was Lucian Pintilie’s 1968 film Reconstruction, which used a banal story as a vehicle to show the mechanism of

Péter Bacsó at the shooting of Harmadik nekifutás (The Last Chance)

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dictatorship and the totality of how power seeps into everyday life. The first film that reflected openly on the Ceaușescu regime was Pintilie’s The Oak in 1992. Unlike our Eastern neighbours, Hungarian film-makers faced Hungarian reality bravely and defied the dictatorship. Yet the directors who often criticised the regime in their films would never have thought how hard the regime change was going to hit them. The decade-long crisis of Hungarian film had started before the change, since, at the end of the 1980s, state subsidies were decreasing at an alarming rate every year and the central cultural bureau was more interested in preserving their power than in film-makers and in saving the studio system. The famous old men (Péter Bacsó, Károly Makk, András Kovács, and others) could not withdraw from an active public role any more, and the winds of change enticed them to engage openly in politics while trying to cling to as much of their hard-earned privileges as possible. There were also some who stopped making films because of the regime change. Ferenc Kósa, for one, was a member of parliament between 1990 and 1996, and, later, he only made documentaries, not feature films. While film-makers enthusiastically supported the regime change, they were also scared of the future. Bigger names tried waiting it out or finding better positions, but the younger generation, fresh out of university, could not get a word in, let alone a film. From among the young directors who earned their degrees in the years around the regime change, only a handful remained active film-makers, since most found themselves in an impossible situation already at the very start of their careers. The main scene of “creative work” became Café Latinovits at the film factory, where film-makers were trying to talk their way out of the shock the regime change delivered. MAFILM, the Hungarian film factory, came to the brink of disintegration; work for abroad was scarce, and one could not make a living from Hungarian films, very few of which were being made. This situation was aggravated by the fact that not even films for television were being made, since the change shook Hungarian Television too. Many from the film 100

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industry, which used to provide a stable income, became unemployed, many became “forced entrepreneurs” employed only occasionally, for individual productions. These latter were in fact the lucky ones, since they were not left without any income from one day to the next. However, the carefully balanced film-making system, which took decades to build and meant the mix of creative freedom and necessary compromises, collapsed altogether. The regime change practically annihilated existing structures but did not bring new solutions. Yet, new methods were born too: film-making professionals reinvented themselves as “producers,” and were trying to fight for subsidies, primarily by attempting to bring private capital, a previously unheard-of source, into film production. It was thus that Postabank became a regular supporter of Hungarian films. All of this was, of course, not quite enough to avoid a significant decrease in the number of films made and the budgets of productions that could go ahead. State subsidies went back to the bare minimum, which meant that there was simply nothing left for promoting the films that got made. Among other things, this is the reason why viewer numbers fell steeply in this period, but it also contributed that people did not necessarily want to see their daily problems on the screen any more, and preferred entertaining movies instead. Professional distributors appeared on the market, who worked either as subsidiaries of foreign companies or based their operation on Western models (like Andy Vajna’s Intercom, founded in 1989) and brought

Szabadság (Freedom) movie theatre in Mezőtúr, in 1989—the regime change also changed Hungarian cinema culture.

a flood of American films. Cinemas scheduled ever fewer Hungarian movies from this point on. The disintegrating Hungarian film industry could not react properly to changing viewer demands and lost to Hollywood in an open market competition. People revelled in films from America: The Last Boy Scout, Speed, or Jurassic Park were understandably much more appealing to viewers than the Hungarian films of variable quality, made on meagre budgets. As always in its history, Hollywood did not fail to deliver ever more colourful dreams, now also to Hungary, wholesale. American superproductions were perfectly fit to make people forget reality for a few hours and make them escape from the oppressive weight of their problems. There was, of course, still demand to see their own lives on film, but this did not make them pay for cinema tickets: Hungarian Television satisfied the desire of housing estate voyeurism free of charge with their series Szomszédok (Neighbours), produced between 1987 and 1999. The financial and structural crisis of the Hungarian film industry brought with it a creative crisis too. The regime change and the innumerable difficulties that it brought to people’s lives did not feature much in scripts, but no earlier work, aimed at coming to terms with the traumas of the past and previously banned, came to light either. Hardly any films were made that were about the transition that clearly traumatised society. The history of the regime change and the milieu of the period appeared rather in documentary videos (primarily in those of Fekete Doboz, “Black Box”), thanks to the spread of video technology. Naturally, there are exceptions too, but there are no unforgettable films among them. The figures and motifs characteristic of the society of the transition period nevertheless make an appearance in the films made at that time. Péter Vajda’s Itt a szabadság! (Voilá la Liberté!), which premiered in 1990, centres on the so-called “Gorenje tourism” that sprang up in the wake of world passports (these were issued from 1988 on), the shopping rush to the Austrian capital, and its illegal side, grifting. The film is set in the period of the regime change, and the main character

After 1990, Western movies crowded out Hungarian ﬁ lms from cinemas.

goes to Austria with two other people not for refrigerators, colour TVs, Barbies, or Matchboxes but to procure some things for his client. Moneygrubbing grifters like Imre Kopa, the soon-to-be “entrepreneurs,” are iconic figures of this period. Lívia Gyarmathy’s 1992 movie, A csalás öröme (The Joy of Cheating) shows the upswing of rampant capitalism and the hospitality mafia’s operation. Its typical figures are the influential entrepreneur, the family man politician who keeps a mistress, and the unemployed woman who goes to work as a waitress. Intellectuals are also typical figures of the transition period, if less lucky than entrepreneurs. Within this group, journalists, only very few of whom could avoid some sort of commitment to the system during the Kádár era, deserve special attention. The story of Zsolt Kézdi-Kovács’s 1991 film És mégis (After All) starts at the time of the reinterment of Imre Nagy and his fellow martyrs. The main character, journalist Kristóf Zeyk, being at the age that he is, made his career in the socialist era. He is reproached for this by his younger colleagues, still at the start of their career: they call him a Stalinist in a TV talk show. This upsets Zeyk deeply, and, as many of his contemporaries, he is also prompted to self-reflect, to take account, by the new system. He thinks through which of his decisions during the previous decades were necessary compromises and which were opportunistic acts of coming to heel. Despite the fact that the regime change went peacefully in Hungary, it did push people, especially intellectuals, to personal crises. They were ridden with accusations and NARRATIVES

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Zsolt Kézdi-Kovács (far right) in 1957, one year after being recruited (the others, from left to right: director István Bácskai Lauró, photographer László Neuman, assistant photographer Nándor Száz, ﬁ rst assistant Márk Novák)

self-accusations about their conforming to the dictatorship. The film can be taken as a confession, too, since Zsolt Kézdi-Kovács was recruited by the secret police after 1956, which he openly admitted after the regime change. The hero, his alter ego, thus projects the director’s inner thoughts for the viewers. This is, however, not merely a film about the pangs of conscience, since it also shows the crisis of intellectuals not recruited, the depression resulting from the sudden loss of direction, from which many never recovered. The film’s journalist chooses action instead of painful self-reflection: upon hearing the news about the revolution in Romania, he decides not to remain idle, but to go and report about the events. The director himself did the same: after the premiere of És mégis, he went to Transylvania to shoot a documentary, and he never made a feature film again before he died in 2014. István Szabó’s film Édes Emma, drága Böbe (Sweet Emma, Dear Böbe), first shown in 1992, also features intellectuals, in this case, female teachers. The village-born girls of the title had taught Russian in a primary school in the capital until the abolition of compulsory Russian classes made their degrees useless from one day to another. As tens of thousands of others, they try to learn some new skills at night school, like a new language so they can remain teachers. 102

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Meanwhile, in the school, they teach lessons they themselves took just one day before. Their salaries are hardly enough to make ends meet, they have been sharing a room in a teachers’ hostel for years, and the regime change makes their life even more hopeless from all points of view. One of them takes on cleaning jobs, the other sells her body for free dinners, which gets her arrested for prostitution. The story shows very well how intellectuals lost their footing during the transition and desperately scrambled for new ways, and it is especially interesting that it does so from a female perspective, which is a rarity. Female lives and female losers are the main characters in Andor Lukáts’s 1992 film A három nővér (The Three Sisters) too. The director adapted Chekhov’s play to the Hungary of the regime change. In a Soviet barrack, the three daughters of a recently dead brigadier long to go to Moscow but cannot act because routine has them in its clutches. They cannot break this inertia, and so they rather remain within the wellknown walls where they have spent a decade locked up. Perhaps the most memorable film of this period was György Szomjas’s Roncsfilm (Junk Movie), from 1992, which is a grotesque memorial to the losers of the regime change. This time it is not the lamenting intellectuals, but the inhabitants of a run-down block in the “eighth district” slum and the regulars of a pub called The Stork who get their say. There is no sign here of the euphoria or pathos over the regime change: the story, set in 1989, does the opposite and holds up a mirror to the uplifting historical moment by showing the petty everyday struggles of insignificant people. The neighbourhood’s characters are just as typical figures of the transition period as the conflicted, self-reflective intellectual or the unscrupulous entrepreneur, but they are at the bottom of the food chain, and so it is their lives that are most in danger: this is the world of the unemployed, the odd-job men, smaller entrepreneurs who could do better, and small-time grifters, where no one gets ahead and everyone is entrenched in their own everyday misery. Still, these are all lovable characters, ones we can sympathise with, and

who make thinking about the regime change a bitter exercise for many to this day. When thinking about the regime change and Hungarian film, most of us (especially the generations who grew up after 1989) think first of Moszkva tér (Moscow Square), Ferenc Török’s diploma film from 2001. Török represents a new generation of directors: Simó’s class earned their degrees a good decade after the regime change, handled certain themes in a totally different way, and thought differently about the purpose of making films too. This is why this story, set in the spring and summer of 1989, speaks about the transition period in such a fresh and authentic way without succumbing to artifice. Török’s partly autobiographical film put the feelings of a whole generation into images, those dilemmas and conflicts that young people who came of age around the regime change had to face. Even though not a sociography, it gives a perfect representation of the society of the time. The figures stuck here from the previous era are looking for their place just like young people are, but there are characters, too, who manage to ride the wave. The sharp critique of contemporary adult society is represented through the youngsters’ eyes. The way people who tell kids how to live in the real world (where they are just entering after leaving school) lose their footing completely borders on the absurd. A generation looking for the way sees only chaos and uncertainty around them in a year critically important for their future: incompetent adults, botched school-leaving exams, the tempting opportunity of going abroad. To go or not to go? As in 1956, young people again debate this question. Török’s film remains valid to this day, it is maybe the most valid feature film about the regime change. For those born after 1989, it makes palpable the period of which they cannot possibly have any memory. With the above-discussed films, the lag in Hungarian film-making to work through the period of the regime change has lessened somewhat, but we can still not be fully content. The most important event of the last quarter of the 20th century would certainly deserves a much richer filmic representation. There are

hosts of untold stories, details handled as taboos, dramatic life events, and broken lives waiting for Hungarian film-makers to show interest in them, as did Romanian directors after 2010, who liked to treat themes that could help come to terms with the past and exposing those problems of the society that came into existence after the end of the dictatorship. For Romanian film-makers, the regime change and the revolution were not a taboo, so much so that Cornelio Poromboiu’s 2006 film 12:08 East of Bucharest even questions them and puts the events in inverted commas by holding up a grotesquely distorting mirror. Similarly, German director Wolfgang Becker’s film Goodbye Lenin (2002) also puts the regime change in inverted commas, but, at the same time, gives a perfect impression of it. In this story, the adolescent main character’s mother spends the months of the transition period in a coma, and, when she wakes up after the fall of the Berlin Wall, in order not to upset her, her son and his circle of friends try to preserve the appearance that they are still living in socialism. The film, rich in comic situations, shows both the opportunities of individual lives, limited by the circumstances and gives a full picture of different social arrangements. This multilayered story that leans towards the grotesque has the essence of those previous decades. The attitude of coming to terms with the past is as yet little in evidence in contemporary Hungarian film-making. However, healing the wounds left by trauma would certainly be the starting point if we would like to find valid and adequate solutions to present challenges on the level of society as a whole.

ENDNOTES 1

Báthory Erzsi: Kísérlet és kudarc. Beszélgetés Schlett

István politológussal, a Társulás Stúdió volt stúdióvezetőjével. Filmspirál. 2003/2. <https://bit.ly/39JIfgF > 2

Gelencsér Gábor: Director doctus. Filmvilág. 2015/1.

4–8. Available online at <https://bit.ly/2SAxjfG > 3

Nick Roddick: Eastern Promise. Sight and Sound. 2007/10.

36–39. 4

Roddick.

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A CONVERSATION WITH KÁROLY GRÓSZ IN GÖDÖLLŐ

Péter Antall, György Domokos Varga, Gödöllő, 24 August 1995

Around 1978, Ferenc Donáth1 told someone to prepare and stockpile things because the country’s economy was going to collapse. Ferenc Donáth was working on uniting the opposition. He was a good friend of Kádár. This suggests that, relatively early on, the leadership of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party had been preparing at least partially for passing power on but only to its own “home-grown” opposition. Is this a sound conclusion? Donáth was a politician of rather large stature. It is natural that, from the phenomena visible at the end of the 1970s (he did not have to do any speciﬁc research on this), he came to recognise that, if the economy continued that way, it would lead to a political breakdown. He was not alone with this view, since Brzezinski’s strategy,2 which is earlier, generalised 104

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this for the whole of Eastern Europe. Its fundamental work was published in Hungarian, too, which claimed that, as the economy had its own internal laws, such a situation would arise . . . These are, of course, affected by larger political decisions, first of all, armament. The gap left by our having fallen behind on technological development would broaden, not diminish, this could be seen clearly. They saw it there, too, as we saw it here, that the economic structure in Eastern Europe, or as it was fashionable to call it then, the control mechanism (which people now connect to the Nyers committee3 in the 1960s) really had great difficulties prevailing because of the Soviet Union’s inflexibility. A terrible amount was wasted. A lot of value that was produced in the country was not used very efficiently. It did not take any special genius to see that, if that remained the case, it would lead to very serious political conflicts. At such times, the political elite naturally looks for political alternatives, and more of them, not just one. I do not think it is a very well-founded conclusion to draw that Kádár was preparing people for this from the opposition, from among those who did not agree with him—I dare not say those who thought differently. He could not even imagine this situation emerging. Was there anyone who could? There were, and they said it, too. Of course, you had to know the political lingo very well to read this from what they actually said. This is why I do not like to refer to this today, because if someone took a look at the literal minutes from then, he or she could understand them in different ways, too. Some then said that this would lead to a tragic end, that the conflict between politics and the economy would become unmanageable, and they used other such expressions which exist to allow someone to phrase a genuine recognition presentably.

But who could have been the one who started organising the opposition to prepare for the new conditions? As far as I know (but I do not know very much, since, in 1978, I was working as a party secretary in Borsod county; however, despite that, I did know a considerable amount about this world), there was no one else, apart from György Aczél,4 who would be seeking contact with the hypothetical or suspected political opposition at the time or would seek to make some sort of coordination, if not cooperation, possible. Kádár was not very sympathetic towards this. I think Aczél did most of this on his own initiative. This was not the official party point of view. I have information that, from the opposition, János Kis5 and his associates often went to see Aczél. Of course, they did. And a lot of other people, too, some of whom deny it today. Who were they? It is not important, because I do not think they would admit it now. I do not want to put anyone in a difficult position. But a lot of people. Then do not name names, only mention positions. Were they intellectuals? Primarily intellectuals, and, more specifically, from the cultural intelligentsia. Aczél basically did not have any contact with the scientific–technical intelligentsia. Of course, he knew some thenfashionable economic leaders such as Ede Horváth.6 And they were interesting people, I do not mean to offend, do not misunderstand me. But Aczél was, most of all, interested in the matters of the cultural intelligentsia, that was what he liked dealing with. Because he loved doing this, I have to tell you. So, I think, apart from Aczél, there were not many people within the political leadership who would have thought in terms of such alternatives. At least, I do not know them. I did talk a lot about this with Aczél, not then, not in 1978, but in the mid-1980s, when I became the Budapest party secretary. Our dialogues in this direction started at that time... My relationship with Aczél turned out to be very

strange over fifty years. Sometimes he liked me very much, but sometimes he hated me. Why did he hate you when he did? It was a matter of principles, not any personal thing. Contrary to popular belief, he was a very stubborn, erratic, and sanguine person. He could move between extremes in a matter of seconds. I have him to thank for having started in politics at all when I was young. Between 1946 and 1948, he was party secretary in Zemplén county, and I was a youth leader there. He cherished me there, took me with him, and, when they merged the counties Borsod, Abaúj, and Zemplén in 1950, he paid extra attention to me. So I have a lot to thank him for, but I had always stood my ground against him, too, and he did not like that. He expected someone who he had helped, or whom he had stood alongside of, or who thought he could rely on him, to do the same in exchange. This is, how shall I put it, an old-school political style. There’s nothing new in this, but I did not like being beholden to someone and could not reciprocate it on this basis. He did not ask big things from me, just support in a few personal matters. Or organising what he could not, but I could, due to my own position; these things also came up. Who I really had conflicts about essential questions with was Kádár, not Aczél. So you would not do small favours for him, and he resented you for this? Yes. And, then, he was very sensitive, too. If, at some gathering, I said that I cannot accept the way our culture is managed today, this was on his desk in about five minutes—he could always see to this. He confronted me about this at least twenty times. “Why?”, he would ask. But he did not say, “Karcsi,” (because we sometimes called each other by first names, sometimes we did not), “let us sit down and talk it over, this opinion of yours.” I was the political committee secretary for the Hungarian Radio and Television after 1962, and there were a lot of outspoken people, especially at the radio, who also had professional authority, had a name. What I thought then, and what I also think now, is they had prestige in intellectual public life. This, they NARRATIVES

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felt (and they were right about this), gave them the right to present their problems and troubles in the programming. And Aczél expected that if any rather critical topics came up, especially, if they concerned his field . . . Culture, you mean? . . . the field of culture, then those should be cleared with him first, talked over, and they should only say what he could live with. Since the radio people did not like this, and I say it again, they were perfectly right not to, Aczél always badgered me: “What kind of discipline is this over there, why don’t you put them in their place?”, informally or formally phrased, depending on our current relationship; “These have to be removed,” and so forth and so on. I told him I was not removing them, they were right, and he was wrong. Let them say what they have got to say, because 90% of what they brought up was true, problems that needed to be faced. So our conflicts were like these, they were not about principles. How much did this double power bother Kádár—Aczél’s power alongside his? I think not at all at first. Anyone who knew Kádár knows he liked home affairs—he thought they were one of the pillars of power, of administration— and foreign affairs. He was not very interested in economy. You said earlier that information was on Aczél’s desk in five minutes . . . Of course. He organised his own mechanisms to make sure they work . . . I think he knew things before Kádár did. Was this independent of the internal secret service? No, that is what it was. So it was internal secret service. Of course! The boys would go see him regularly. I had many friends among them, too. To make things more complex, when I met them, they were all happy to tell me what they told him, how their meeting was. “Watch out!”, they would say sometimes, too. You know how this works. These 106

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were old contacts, we used to work together, twenty years before or even before that. Or just some incidental contacts I had had. They found a way. Or we would go to eat bean soup to a pub called Pozsonyi, or somewhere, and there they would go: “You should watch out!”, “You should shut up!”, things like that. Or “We reported it last time, he was very upset . . .” No worries, no problem, this is how it goes, however strange it might seem, politicians are humans, too. After a while, you became prime minister and general secretary, so rose to the top of the power chain. To what degree did this mean you had absolute power? It would have been absolute if I had not had selfcontrol. Was it really primarily a question of selfcontrol? Primarily, yes. I am convinced of that. But understand that, by self-control, I now mean primarily reason and not emotions. If one is honoured by being elected, or appointed, or put in a position of leadership, one has to look at things not only from the point of view of power, so what it is that one can do; one firstly has to ask what is reasonable. I do not want to resort to big words, but one has to ask what is reasonable in the service of the cause one is committed to. Or of the country, or the group . . . Everyone who is in politics has to think this through, from a general secretary to a county party secretary. So, primarily, self-control in that given political structure. In the political structure of civil democracy, self-control also has a great role, but there the reason is that the political mechanism is multipolar, the limits of political decisions and the pressures on them are influenced by objective possibilities independent of any person. For example, I have always made two arguments in discussing the multiparty system to explain why I agree with that and support it. One was that the country’s economic problems can only be solved on a wider social basis; this was my starting point. The other was that, in the previous decades, we could not find the political mechanism that, within a single-party structure, would have served to limit the corruption of power, its mistakes

deriving from subjective sources, and, quite often, its crimes. Civil systems have produced these mechanisms in the course of centuries. However different a leadership attitude or leadership style this requires, this is the direction to go. So when I mention self-control, I am primarily thinking of the old structure, not of bourgeoisie models, which I am, of course, rather unhappy with, I do not like them—but that is another matter. From this point of view, there is no question they work better. Do you remember any specific situation that contributed to your realising this? This was a longer process. Clearly, but may there have been a few persons, whose style was . . . There were such matters and personal experiences; still, this still was a longer process. Bear in mind that I grew up in a completely different school. I do not mean political school but a way of thinking. Like family motivation, social conditions, the times I lived in from 1945 on. All this made the stability of the model clear to me. Later, I started to see more of this world. I saw more from outside of Hungary, too, not just the inside. And so I have always passionately supported sending all Hungarians, if we can, out to the world, let them look around, as they will instantly see our things here in a different light—the good and the bad things, too. Well, this was a longer period, I am not exaggerating if I say ten years. All the more so because this first appeared in posing and articulating questions, not in providing answers. The answer came much later, and it evolved in many fora. There was intense intellectual work being done in the department where I worked. Also, at the radio—those who were occupied with politics all knew these questions. But you are asking for specifics. There were some right at home. This was personnel policy, which I was fighting against for reasons of principle, and this was also one aspect of my conflict with Kádár in the 1970s. What was it that you could not accept? One was a theoretical thing; the other, a point in the working style. The theoretical one was the

relationship of continuity and renewal. Kádár placed the weight on continuity, not on renewal. But this is no abstract ideological question, because what followed was that, if he prioritised continuity, he would do so in personal matters too—and I return here to what I mentioned before: he relied on people and personalities, that is to say, he considered those people as reliable about whom he had been of the opinion in an earlier, totally different phase of the political struggle that they were decent, honourable, good people. It is not that they had in the meantime become dishonourable, I am not saying that. But the system of requirements had changed, in an objective and not in a subjective way. So Kádár, for his peace of mind, was very reluctant to interfere with these people, and did not really initiate changes in these fields, because he was saying these were well-tried, reliable people. He represented different theories here; let me just give an example. There was this one person, I will not say his name, he is still alive, and I do not want to offend him; he used to be a social democratic leader. He was unfit for the high state position he was in. We proposed that he should be moved to a different field. It is not that he should be cast out of the world or something, it is simply that a more dynamic, younger, professionally more qualified person would be needed in this position. He said no, he should be left where he was because this is a message, a gesture towards Western social democratic parties . . . I think this is not true. It is much more important that he be able to do his job in the field where he is working. He can still be honoured and respected in a different position. Problems emerge, but the person stays. Right. Not one but many such persons. In personnel policies and decisions this was a dominant point of view that we need to prioritise continuity, while life rushed on and new challenges rose at home and abroad, too. In other words: generational change in the high leadership was politically long overdue. As we used to say among ourselves then, they were the great old guard. It was not because they clung to power; this is something people also misunderstand. Kádár was tired, he did not cling to power. He had NARRATIVES

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some sense of responsibility I could not accept. He told me once in private, when I was trying to convince him to finally step down by saying: “Let us do this in a civilised way, why do you insist on being brought out only in a casket . . . So he said, “Please understand, the captain goes down with the ship.” And I said, “You understand, please, that maybe a younger captain, one who has more freedom of movement, sees the big picture better, is not so tied down by the past, and so on . . . maybe he would be able to bring this miserable ship back!” What position were you in at this time? I was the first secretary in Budapest. Were you not afraid of being punished if you say something like that to Kádár? Listen to me, I do not know who was the first to say this, Pozsgay7 or whoever, that he was so terribly brave and fought all the time with this over his head like the sword of Damocles . . . Anyone who knew anything about that political situation knew that Kádár would not be happy to hear anything he did not like others to say. This is one thing. He would huff and puff, not shake hands for three months, not greet those people in the hall, just nod, as he would do, but that would be the end of it.

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Kádár did not want to wring anyone’s neck by this time. Exactly. This is not the same period and not the same Kádár who did the things he did, for a lot of reasons, after 1956. This was not the same Kádár. And people do not understand that. People want to make themselves heroes, saying how tough they were. We have the minutes, so an explanation must be given to why they said what they said. And so they say, “You have to understand, the sword of Damocles constantly over my head . . .” There was no danger at all, they simply had no courage to say it! I am not talking about Pozsgay now, just in general. Kádár got angry at me, rather passionately, in 1979, and he said, “You go to Borsod as a party secretary, it will be better for you and for us, too!” I did not want to go, though, because Aczél had already promised I can go back to the radio, the Department of Political Broadcasts. But Kádár said, “No, we need a party secretary in Borsod, you go there!” What I think he intended was . . . I was born there, I have other roots, and life will teach me a lesson. Because he thought he was right. He did not do this to me out of meanness. It was all due to our disagreement. When he came down in 1981, and just consider that, it is two years, and it was a big thing for him . . . he stayed for three days, and one night, at 2 in the morning, we were walking along a street in Görömböly or Miskolctapolca, and, then, he said, “I want to tell you something. What we spoke about in my office two years ago . . . in many things, you were right.” And that was it, case closed. Excuse my phrasing, but this was Kádár’s self-criticism, if you like . . . But, of course, it was not that. What I had said then was that economic leadership was no good, there was a lot of subjectivism, certain people (of course, I named them for him) bring their friends in; it was no comfort to me that he, Kádár that is, had worked with them, because they might have been good as a director of a mine, but that did not mean they would make a good minister. It was such things we disagreed on. And he said I had been right in many things, and the case was closed. Why would I have been afraid?

They are also slow to shift to new people in the Hungarian Democratic Forum. Is this the nature of power that it is so difficult to change? In Kádár’s staying on as long as he did, his environment had a larger role, than he himself did. I talked to people who had been very close to him then. When he turned sixty, he wrote a letter to resign, but they convinced him to stay. I read the minutes of the Central Committee meeting, where this was resolved. If they had let Kádár go then, that would have done a lot of good for the cause. But the motivation is mostly not this. People really like to . . . They believe there is no one better than them . . . I think something is not really fine here. The second stage, that is, the new generation cannot really show what they have got. And so they cannot accumulate such a great store of confidence in the period when the big old elephants are in the first line. I saw they solved this well in China. The middle tier, these provincial governors, have a huge freedom of movement. Of course, a province there, like the one I have visited recently, has 67 million people living in it. More opportunity to test the middle level cadres. Exactly. There is more opportunity for independence there. If he does a good job of managing the economy, the market, international economic relations, or social policy and the rest in, say, Shanghai, they move him on, upwards. So, as I see, it is not that the great old men cling to their positions, but that there is a strong environmental effect that is continually trying to convince them that the world is going to end without them . . . You remember de Gaulle’s8 famous saying that the graveyards are full of indispensable men? Well, I really saw that in Kádár. Secondly, and this is something I may talk about without fear of being misunderstood: if this leadership had thought to run me for prime minister or general secretary, they would have had to construct an entirely different career for me five years before that. It is a different question whether I wanted it, or not. I never thought of it.

So you found yourself in that position accidentally? From afar, it looks like an accident, from close up, it was a political necessity. A situation emerged that needed solving. A lot of people grew very hesitant exactly in this vacuum, but I kept speaking my mind, and this created a momentary political opportunity for me. If I had been intended for leading the party, then, after serving as party secretary for two counties, they would have had to bring me up, to the party leadership, and I would have had to deal with the theoretical work of the party, its organisation, or, as acting leader, I would have had to handle the party as a whole. On this route, in a few years, I could have been within the five, or ten, or fifteen candidates. But after having gone through such a career, you might as well have turned out not to be the right person to fill the vacuum. It might be. But this is guesswork, it is difficult to say it would have been so. Let us return to the original question but from a different aspect. András B. Hegedűs9 initiated the creation of the Committee of Historical Justice.10 He has recently been a member of the group around Kuncze11 which took a look at III/III files.12 But I could also mention János Kenedi,13 who was active in forming the Publicity Club14 at the time of the regime change. How consciously does a regime put its own people at the top of new and, thus, authentic organisations? I understand what you are saying, but I do not think this is what happened in Hungary. I do not think so. I think what happened was they were looking for ways to solve looming problems, and, in the meantime, the view gained strength that those people who can lead the given institution or organisation according to its function are not to be sought from a narrowly conceived pool. The pool needs to be enlarged. There were a lot of us championing this view, not just one person. It was not like someone, sitting in an office, came up with the idea that there were those five people in the opposition, they needed to be put there NARRATIVES

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because then they would become our people, or because then we could make the opposition believe they were not our people, while they, in fact, would be. It was not like this. But I do have information that some of these people were operatives, so, after all, the regime did play around with these people, organised the preservation of its power and its survival. But it is possible, of course, that you, not having gone the usual way to leadership, did not have an insight into this. Sure, such things happen, of course, they do. But I do not believe that the regime change was planned in Hungary in the political leadership actually in power. It was not planned. Not even its speciﬁc parts? Yes, those were. Yes, yes. I could tell you names, but they are public ﬁgures now, so I will not. So you are saying, after all, without mentioning names, that there were some who were consciously preparing for the change. Not Kádár and not you, but others were. That is right. And, while we are on that topic, one has to add that most of these did it for their own personal, individual interest, their own advancement. Yes, there was that, and there had to be. This was a party of eight hundred thousand members. We had been saying it for years that such a party, with the conception that predominated earlier and that I thought the best, is unfit for offering space for the ambition of people involved in politics. It is not true that, in a country where you have seven million adults, ten percent of them can possibly speculate about the big questions of life in the same way. But, since there was no other legal political freedom of movement and very few people were willing to go into illegal political workshopping, this was where they went, still representing different theories, points of view, and political directions. The new parties of the regime change had problems because they did not really 110

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have people who had been prepared for a political career. They did not have, say, a Young Communist League, where they could have acquired political leadership skills or experience . . . With all the burden that comes with that! Because someone might one day write about what characteristics this opportunity fostered in people who were relied on too early. What characteristics? Bad human characteristics. What are you thinking of? There is a famous story, which is, incidentally, true. When Rákosi sent the first students of the CPSU college15 to Moscow, he said to them, to Zoltán Komócsin,16 Kukucska,17 Béla Szalai,18 about seven people all told, ”You are the future members of the Political Committee!” There were those who preserved great human characteristics, but there were those—and out there, as everyone knows, sometimes you did have to drink that vodka even if you hated it, and then felt its effect—so there were those who were saying things like, ”Just wait for us to get back . . .” And this is a terribly dangerous thing. To be specific: Kádár was still the head of the party, and the Young Communist League boys19 came together in a chalet. It started out as a friendly gathering, perfectly natural: they worked together, they organised a hunt for friends each year in Somogy county. And there in the chalet, after midnight, after dinner, they were drinking wine and assigned themselves the positions. That of Kádár, that of the prime minister, all of them. When was this? In 1986 or 1987? I was told about this the next day, or two days later, by people who had been there. But they got a lower position than they would have expected secretly, or maybe, as it happens, they thought it is best to have many fingers in many pies. This is no big deal, nothing to worry about, I am just saying that there were some serious side effects of those opportunities.

On what level were there negotiations going on with the Soviets before the regime change? We already know, partly thanks to you, that, for instance, letting the Eastern Germans out was not due to Gyula Horn’s20 decision but a phone call to Moscow . . . There was also personal discussion, not just a telephone call. I discussed it with Gorbachev.21 And, then, you, Miklós Németh,22 and Gyula Horn discussed that Horn should announce it. Discussed it? You know how long that took? A minute and a half! Miklós Németh wanted to announce it, I said it should not be the prime minister who should do it, because his position was too high up, let us not elevate such a thing to the rank of world politics. Horn was there. “Go out, Gyula,” we said, “you like to talk, you like public speaking, you announce it!” And it is a rather regular thing for the foreign minister to do. In my judgement, that is the appropriate thing. What role did the Soviet comrades have in starting the negotiations with the Opposition Round Table?23 Was there any coordination with them? The ambassador regularly received information. So you had a rather free hand? Look, I have said this many times: leaders here had freedom of movement on a totally different scale from 1985 on. From Gorbachev’s appearance, that is. Yes. I even wrote it down that I saw it as Kádár’s fault that he had not recognised the changed opportunities. He even cautioned me from everything that would lead to an argument: “Do not argue, it is not worth it!” He might have meant that, apart from Gorbachev, many old comrades were still there, and so the race is not yet run. That is not how I see it . . . Kádár really was cautious, but he was cautious about everything, you need to know that. What he saw clearly was

that Gorbachev was a vain man. He wants to have successes. And for success, he is willing to move keystones, too, with incalculable consequences. It had not been thought through. But I will go further: he thought Gorbachev was politically superﬁcial. A decent person, but superﬁcial. He once told me, I will not forget till the day I die: “Listen to me! Just watch, this Gorbachev will ruin the Soviet Union!” I remember the word “ruin,” we did not use that often. “Why do you think that?”, I asked him. “Look how slapdash he acts!” Well, that much was true. In the former Soviet Union there are many people now who really think he ruined it. Yes. I do not remember when this happened, in the US or maybe before that . . . Edgar Bronfman24 was here, the president of the World Jewish Congress.25 I met him personally, I went to his home, I had dinner with him here and in America, too. He asked me to connect him to Gorbachev. Because the Gorbachev lot would not receive him, this was the point. One would say why not; no harm can come of it. And then one time when I was there, I asked Gorbachev, “Why do you not receive this man? The president of the World Jewish Congress is not a great politician, but what he undertook I think he is doing decently and fairly. And he is rather an economic person than a politician, but he makes great conversation about current political questions, too.” I said to him I thought it would be beneficial if they had an introductory meeting. And he received him, the president wrote about it in his book . . . But the point is that Bronfman asked me about what kind of person Gorbachev was. Beyond the obligatory things, when there is a more informal relationship, one tries to give hints, and I said to him, “I appreciate Gorbachev, I respect him, I have come to know many of his characteristics that are very valuable. As a political leader, he has the courage to make decisions, he has an opinion, but I sometimes notice he speaks first and thinks after.” And this he remembered. Some time elapsed, I do not remember how much, and, when we met next time, he said, “I think I noticed that, too.” Gorbachev was a good man, I cannot judge NARRATIVES

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how he is now, but this recognition of Kádár’s, this cautiousness, came from the fact that he thought it was not the diehard leadership that was coming back there but a different one, because you cannot govern a continent in such a slapdash style. And I felt like that, too. How far did the fate of Hungary depend on the Soviet Union, the US, the agreement between these two, and all the other great powers? How far did they influence what happened in Hungary? They did influence it. How much insight do you have into that? Considerable. But there are no “other great powers.” There are only two great powers here. So it was the Soviet Union and the US that decided whose sphere of interest Hungary was going to belong to? No. It was not Hungary that was at stake here. It was rather how long and in what ways this post– World War II construction can be maintained. And as the then foreign minister told me very straight, in private, in my office . . . Shevardnadze?26 I did not want to name him . . . But he said it straight to my face that they had to give up this region, and this would be the second Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Anyone who can think a bit, and you do not have to know history, just speculate . . . and, then, one can understand this. This opposition that we had in Hungary, they would never have been able to break the system. Any sane politician knew that. But a huge question remained: what will happen to this tiny country? The question was not whether this communist party stays or not. The question was: What is going to happen to the country? What policy and implementation are needed for a country to keep its right direction? The question is not who is going to be the prime minister or the general secretary. These are all minor questions. A new strategy had to be formed for the world that had changed. And this strategy has not really been formed to this day. 112

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But pluralism and a multiparty system were formed, were they not? Yes, that is an important thing, but it is not enough. But do not misunderstand me, I am not belittling that. What you miss, then, is a national strategy? Yes, that is my problem. When we were looking for the new model, because what I have always said was we need to construct a new model, not a new system . . . then this had one single core. Everyone knew this, and I will say it for those who are interested: it is not that we need to restore capitalism, capitalism in its old form. It is a different matter whether I was right about this or not, the question is whether it is what needs to be restored or not. I said that historically, what Hungary needs now for about a hundred or a hundred and fifty years is a transitional social formation. Not keeping this socialist formation that, based on the Russian model, is seeking new ways. But not bringing back the old form of capitalism either, which the world had transcended anyway. Not even the most developed capitalist countries consider themselves the eternal norm today. We need to find a new formation that has a place between all these. But you need to know that, at the time, I had not thought there would be changes of this scale in the Soviet Union. I saw and knew that some change would come, and I also knew that the role of China in the world would be qualitatively, hugely different in the new millennium. It would be worth considering these and positioning this small country so that whatever is valuable in this pathfinding and the future world, should be, if possible, incorporated into the system. But, at the same time, based on the experiences of the past forty years, we should get rid of everything that is obsolete, what we had seen did not work; but whatever had value we should try to use and create a transitional social structure. I said this in the US, in front of the Hungarians and in the press conference, too. I started with property because that is sacred for me. It fundamentally defines the character of society; not the conditions of distribution, but those of property ownership. And I said we needed to make a huge step backwards to private property. But I wanted to preserve

the predominance of collective ownership, with considerable private property, too. I found it unacceptable that 96% of property in this country is communal, with 4% of private property. This country is not there, neither in economic development, nor . . . Really, I do not think the world will ever get there to have 100% collective ownership, but this is a theoretical question, no point belabouring it. But, at that time, I thought, let us make collective ownership dominant with like 50-60%, and private ownership 40-45-50%. Not the way, of course, that they eventually did it. And, in development, we have to give a freer rein to private property, downsize those state properties that are not viable, and make them collective property if possible. So we have to move from state property towards cooperatives. But you know what journalists are like, you must have heard this: they wanted actual numbers. “Sir, tell us what you mean by a minority of state property, what percentage is that?”, that is what he asked, the reporter from the New York Times. I will not forget till the day I die: “What percentage for state property, what for cooperatives, what for private property?” And I said this is terribly difﬁcult to calculate, but I guess about 20-25% for state property, 30-35% for cooperatives, and the rest for private property. I said collective property can vary, too, because we could take the system of worker cooperative like what Taurus27 had already been doing, and expand it with stocks and other things. The Polish had been doing that for ﬁve years by then. It worked in a lot of places; not everywhere, but in a lot of places. Mostly where incentives were made for the management to reform. I imagined this model standing roughly in the middle concerning property formations. We knew we had to change distribution conditions, too. It was clear to us that there would be a well-to-do layer. I imagined that the well-todo and the wealthy would become so by work. Not by their connections, not by grifting, swindling, stealing. But by working and producing things. To go further, that we would not drive out and imprison the cherry pitters28 but make opportunities for them to thrive. And for Ernő Rubik and who knows who else. If they make decent money out of that, the system has to protect them against popular

Károly Grósz and Miklós Németh in the parliament

opinion. The theory of equality, which could be considered the cornerstone of earlier democracy, is unacceptable, that does not work in real life. Who do you think should have worked out this national strategy, and who should be doing it today? Was there an institution for it at the time? There was, for the economy. The Kapolyi committee.29 You must have seen the study they produced. It is heavy even to lift . . . A lot of people worked on that, a lot, and we earmarked money for it. It was not voluntary work like “Please write two articles . . .” These are professional people. And was there a national strategy that would have dealt with more general matters like how to remodel the property relations? If I understand you correctly, that did not exist. But let me tell you it would have been very easy to arrange for it to exist because a lot of workshops had worked up really serious strategic documents. Like the Institute of Foreign Affairs, for foreign policy. I remember they worked out four or five alternatives, up to the first fifty years of the new millennium, about how they thought the world would turn out. That military group that we had, a theoretical workgroup, had worked on strategic problems, too. And the Kapolyi committee had been preceded by a committee at the Academy of Sciences. They were doing this as a kind of voluntary work, so to speak, but then we saw it would not work like that. So, if there had been political time for it, it would have been quite easy to manage. Because it was a matter of political time, and, by that, I mean that, NARRATIVES

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in time, there would have been a wider need for this strategy and it would have been recognised that it needed to be done in order to form a new political structure. But, of course, by “quite easy to manage” I mean a few years. It has become entrenched in public knowledge that the key leaders of the old and the new systems, together with the representatives of several secret services, gathered on Rózsadomb to divide power.30 Do you know about this? I do not know anything about that. At the time, I had information that people gathered in some places; other people who had to report it promptly reported that there were gatherings like this going on. Home affairs had its own internal intelligence network that gave signals, too . . . About what? That there are these gatherings where professionals are starting to discuss, well, the future . . . But who were these professionals? If you want names, I will not oblige, let me be clear now; these people are still alive, and I do not want to put anyone in a difﬁcult position. I am not interested in names but rather in what jobs, what positions they were in. There were some from Home Affairs, that is certain, the organisation that worked with them reported it. Do you know about the Rózsadomb gathering? Not Rózsadomb, but I do know about gatherings. Did you receive any report that representatives of the CIA or the Mossad might have been present at any of these? There is a lot of confusion here. It was me who started diplomatic contact with Israel. And the way this went was that the head of Israeli intelligence service travelled here. After I had contacted them. We talked here, at the Parliament. Then, he 114

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went back, and, then, Shamir31 came one night unofﬁcially. He arrived in the evening, we had dinner, he slept in the government house on the hill, and he left the next day. The second time he came, he was coming back from the US, from a UN meeting or something, and, then, I invited Miklós Németh, too, to the meeting. This time, there was more security, he also brought some people, and they were from the security service. But this was not about the regime change. This is like letting the East Germans out, so people confuse things. There was the problem with the border, the border fence. There was a completely different motivation from what people say. There was letting the East Germans through, and there was taking back the atomic bomb from Hungary, which had to be negotiated with the Russians. And, now, I hear how well these two were got over with together! Like hell they were! These are different matters, they went entirely different ways . . . I do not know about any Rózsadomb meeting, but I do know there were gatherings with leading intellectuals, people from Home Affairs, people from other parts of the administration, at the time, I even got a list of them . . . And I guess there were some from the party administration, too. Yes, there were those, too, I think. But these were not the kind of things that would make leaders tremble. Did the Israeli leaders want to learn what Jews could expect here if there was going to be a regime change? This was not the main question. The main question was the diplomatic recognition of the state of Israel. They only had diplomatic relations with the Romanians from the whole of Eastern Europe. It was very important for them to break through this. They were looking for partners for it. And, presumably from my speeches or whatever, they thought I would be a partner in that. Because, in this matter, for instance, Kádár agreed with me totally, but he told me not to end up on the same platform as Ceaușescu.32 This was his only point. “Why should we not? I can believe you do not like him, that is one thing . . .”

Why did you initiate this meeting? This is interesting. How this went was, as I said, we sent a message that we would be willing to discuss this, and he offered to come immediately. Yes, but why did you offer? Because this speeded up the whole process. But what did you want to start with this? To make the whole socialist bloc recognise them, which eventually happened, indeed. Was this an element of opening-up? Of course. And one of its most important elements. I went to Gorbachev and told him we would do this. And that I would advise them to do the same. I asked what he wanted to do. He said, “Good, we cannot do the same now, because we are not in that position either from an international point of view, or form a home affairs point of view.” This was interesting because he usually did not refer to what people were saying at home. “We are not in that position, but very good, go ahead, we will have a precedent to cite later.” This was the first thing he said. Even Honecker33 said this. Am I right in thinking that the conflict known as the “popular vs urban opposition”34 made fault lines within the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, the Hungarian Socialist Party, and even in the secret services? I think that is a pseudo-opposition and its basic problematics relate to the political practice of the last 40-50 years. Because the earlier party—I am primarily thinking of the times before 1956— did make the mistake of totally ignoring national characteristics, values, and feelings. This was not so with Kádár, but he, too, was very careful in handling these, firstly, for reasons of foreign policy. But this is a mistaken approach, since this needs to be dealt with from the direction of home affairs. So the reason why this exploded with such force was something objectively there in the previous decades. I read Churchill’s memoirs, the ones which have been published recently, because that was a wider selection than the earlier book, and they can lead one to a few conclusions. Among other things, he also writes about the Hungarian

matter, Stalin’s point of view . . . It is perfectly clear that Rákosi did nothing else but servilely overdid what Stalin wished . . . If there even was an explicit wish; we do not even know that. Remarks had been made, and they built a political strategy on those . . . But the conflict that got incorporated into politics here in the last decade is an artificially constructed fault line. Whose interest is it to stoke this? I think its source can be found primarily within opposition intellectual circles. So they provoke public opinion, which waxes angry, and they capitalise on that? Look, I believed to detect different reasons with different politicians. For one thing, with this, you can always recruit people in this country as elsewhere, too. In other cases, it was a device to deflect attention from some other problems. But I also saw that there really are people who think this is an unsolved problem. However, on a national scale, it is certainly solved; what is not remains a huge question, and it is going to go in a very wrong direction: Where will this small country be situated in a community of nations? I think NATO is a dead end from this point of view. Joining the European common market is not, do not misunderstand me, I support that wholeheartedly and agree with it. Some time ago, I do not remember how long ago, Chancellor Vranitzky35 visited here, and we had a long talk. Then, a decision was waiting to be made about the interpretation of the relations to the European common market and a neutral position. It was terribly important for him what they were going to say about that in Moscow. He asked me to try to loosen the rather rigid position about this a bit because the Soviets were saying this could not be reconciled with neutrality, so it was out of the question. At that time, there were a lot of arguments about that among us here, in a smaller circle, and also with others, in Moscow. I think the right direction was to loosen and dissolve, as we said, the framework and mechanism of the Warsaw Treaty. To loosen political relations— however, loosening economic ties was a crime of historic proportions, and it is an irreparable damage to the country—and, thus, to find a place NARRATIVES

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for Hungary in the world. This is the real national and international problem that needs solving. And we are doing the worst thing possible right now. A lot of people on the so-called “national” side consider József Antall a traitor because he did not do the great spring cleaning, and by that . . . Because he used his head. That is all. . . . he transferred power to the other side. Do you think this clean-up could have been done? It could have been done if the leader at the moment had not been a calm person. But what would have happened if he had done it? There would have been unforeseeable consequences. One cannot really say what would have happened, this is speculation. But you are an experienced person, you know what happens when certain mechanisms are put in motion. Look, I have my own opinion about these ﬁrst four years. I am not asking anyone to accept it, I am just thinking it through for my own sake, see, I do not make any propaganda of it. A lot of things have happened here in the last four years which, by all means, had to be done, whatever political structure would emerge to stay. When I thought in terms of modernisation back in the day, I incorporated a lot of measures in my conception that were realised later. My friends who were involved with these matters supported me in this. The multiparty system was one thing, the change in the Parliament’s role in the life of the country, in the political structure, the expansion and enrichment of institutional systems. I see some overdoing here, too, I think the position of the Constitutional Court has not developed in the best way . . . Is it too strong for you? It is. But the direction in which institutional development has been going in the last four years—I consider that good. From the point of view of the operation of society and the success of 116

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its democratic features, these were important and valuable decisions. I think the social atmosphere, the more open handling of relations were also a push in that direction, and I think that is valuable, we should have done that earlier because we had also wanted to go in that direction. The things I disapprove of are, ﬁrst and foremost, not ideological in nature. Because I am not really interested in what they wanted to restore from an earlier way of thought, from the customs of Horthy’s Hungary; I do not care whether they bring Horthy home or not. I do not care and I do not think it is important at all. But I do think the false belief in the handling of the economy is important. I do not assume decision makers were guided by malice. One thing was ruining the Russian market; I still think that was a strategic mistake. I still have friends who are in leading positions in Russia today. One of them has recently visited me and told me, here, in this house, “You know, we feel that if Hungarian and other offers show the same parameters, we will not select the Hungarian one. Because others were fed up with us too,” he said, “but they found more civilised ways to ﬁnd an outlet for that anger.” This might not be typical and not true for everyone, but I think there is a lot in that. So this is one of the things I consider a large mistake. Are you thinking of “Tovarishchi, konets!”36 and things like that? Yes, those. And those political slogans they were saying. Not a poster in itself! You do not spit on a world power like that. Not even when you do not like it much. Because it is not sensible, that is why you do not. The other big mistake: the change in property ownership in this formation is, I think, a huge waste, effectively robbing the country. What I am thinking about is what the fourth government after this is going to do. Because I might not be alive then, but I hope there will be a Hungary and there will be people in it. How will they handle this whole thing? And I think how agriculture is handled is a mistake, too. In this, we, too, made mistakes because of the misery. And I was always hoping this would not continue.

What misery are you thinking of? The one caused by the economic situation. We did take money away from agricultural development, too. We had huge disagreements about this with Váncsa,37 he fought tooth and nail for agriculture, and he always went against me, though he knew that I valued agriculture, too, and that the couple of billion dollars that came in then were very important to the country. So this part is interesting, too, but what I am more concerned about is that the structural changes in agriculture have now put tens of thousands of people in a hopeless situation. You think this change in property ownership should have been done much more slowly? Way more slowly and with much more thought, with a much more sensitive mechanism. Listen to me, for one thing, I do not believe that capitalist factories, if they are in Hungary, produce more efﬁciently than earlier factories. First, I do not see any examples for that. Second, I know they brought in some money, but I also know they certainly took out at least the same amount. Tell me what proﬁt the country makes of this then! We collect taxes and everything that is here, but the fundamental thing is whatever can be taken from here will be taken. I have talked to an investor, he is a very fashionable man, we have an old relationship, and he said . . . A Hungarian investor? He invests here and everywhere in Eastern Europe . . . Is it Soros? I talked to him, too, but not about this . . . and to others too . . . So, we were talking, and he said, “I do not get why you are surprised at this. Why did you think they were bringing the money here? To leave it here? You are out of your mind! Man! They bring it here in order to take out anything that they can!” He said, “Show me one person, because I cannot think of a single one; show me one person who brings the money here because he is Hungarian and loves Hungary; I cannot mention a single one to you!” I asked him, “And you, why are you coming here?” Because

he had a lot of money. He said, “To make a profit. There is an opportunity here now, and not even in Hungary primarily but in Eastern Europe, that has to be exploited. It will not last long, a few years, ten years at the most, and one has to exploit it until then.” But if we consider that the parties of the regime change actually had to achieve the change, then it is a logical standpoint that the quicker and more definitive the change is in property ownership, the less chance and opportunity there is for the old system to come back. I understand that. But for me, the party is not an end, it is a means. I do not care whether there is one party or thirty; what I care about is what development opportunities the decisions made by the current government offer the country. So there were basically two points of view here. One is yours and the other is that of the regime-changing parties. I do not think the latter is ungrounded. But I do. And in its results, it is very serious because of its consequences. I do not even see how one might fix it. But luckily it is not my job. Now, I cannot do much apart from thinking about the matters of the world and the country to form an opinion about this . . . It could have been done in an entirely different way. Anyway, one shapes politics according to the economy. So what should we make of Gyula Horn doing the same? And he is a socialist, his party is the Hungarian Socialist Party. Who says it is a socialist party? Are you convinced of that? And if you say yes, I will ask you what you base that conviction on. What basis do you have for thinking it is not? What do you mean what basis? What I have just said; that is the basis. What they do. Their actual practice. I do not need to make an ideological lecture about this. Look at their programme. That is still tolerable. But, then, take a look at how the practice relates to that programme . . . NARRATIVES

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The Bokros Package?38 Not even the Bokros Package. The outlook they have on things. Strange as it may seem, I think only one aspect of this current politics is modern and up-to-date: foreign policy. What might be the reason why Horn and the others do it this way and not in the way that would come naturally to you? They probably believe this is the way out for the country. And I hesitate to say what else I think because I do not want to slander anyone. I suspect you are thinking that many made good proﬁts from setting off the regime change. ... After György Aczél was removed from his position, how much insight did he have, how far were you occupied with daily affairs? He had a lot of information. To the last moment, all information from home affairs and foreign affairs went to him. They sent it out to his home, and they did not only send it out, they went to see him. How far did they take part in forming the new parties before the regime change? We thought the historic parties had to be encouraged and helped to consolidate their social and political bases . . . I think it is a natural thing before such changes that the regime plants its own people in the future parties. . . . and there were some negotiations . . . Am I not right? Yes, that is usually how it happens. We gave some parties money, some technical stuff, this and that. But we did not take the new forces, the new political factors seriously enough. I am not saying we did not reckon with them, we knew they existed, but we did not pay them enough attention. Some say József Antall was a force majeure which no one expected when planning the regime change. 118

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I am not sure these terms make much sense. I usually do not approach it like that, not by asking who this ﬁgure to whom this or that aspect of the regime change is connected to is. It does not depend on one person. No, it does not. I have said this a thousand times. Do you know that, if you had not said “there is a danger of white terror here,”39 your reputation would have been very different, at least in intellectual circles? Maybe. It does not bother me especially; I have said that often enough. But I would not say that thing again. It does not bother me. But I had to say it, all the more so because, at the time, I did have a lot of information that it indeed had been a possibility. But I received a very clear answer . . . well, it was not an answer exactly, because I did not ask a question . . . anyway, I was told loud and clear, primarily by the Americans, that they have absolutely no interest in . . . For example, in replacing the KGB with the CIA? Yes. They said that very clearly and straight. You know, the head of KGB dropped by one night to talk to me. I got the most important information about us from him. What has been happening in the world for the last six or seven years, he sketched all of it out for me very accurately in my ofﬁce. For Hungary, or for the whole of Europe? The whole of Europe. In the winter of 1988. So seven years ago. It would not have hurt if we had had someone with the same foresight, too. Who was this, by the way? Kryuchkov.40 Is he this smart, or did he have good background? He did have good background, but he liked Hungary, and he made it his subjective, personal ambition to deal with it. He was here, too, in 1956, he had much experience. We were on very

good terms, and he was willing to come around one evening to talk until the morning.

In what sense? They knew all about it.

Here the secret service did not have its continuity. Its leadership was replaced by the Grósz government, then the Németh government, and, then, the Antall government. This destroyed the Hungarian services . . . Especially the foreign intelligence. I was also guilty about this because I did not like home and foreign military intelligence, I did not like their structure. I was really annoyed when I got two different evaluations on the same thing, the same topic. I initiated merging them and ﬁne-tuning them. This is too small a country to maintain such a huge network. It was not really that much money, but it did not work efﬁciently. The people were excellent and competent, but, from a technical point of view, the organisation was ripe for modernising. Also, its emergence can be traced back to the Soviet model. The partners had their own sister institutions established everywhere.

So because they let them? They did not regulate these things.

It is a favourite pastime of people to this day to fabricate operative lists. What could be done about this? This is a very stupid thing. I think no government can exist without a network of operatives. That is right. Though Kádár always said to me, “Do not read those!” Interestingly enough, just as József Antall . . . Kádár said to me, “You know, I have served as minister for home affairs, I have been surveilled, I have been a boss . . . Do not read them, it is a waste . . .” One evening, I was sitting in my ofﬁce, around 9 in the evening, and he saw the light and came in. “So what are you reading?” I told him I had just got that, a courier brought it. “Do not read that! Use your time for something else!” At the regime change, the socialist party preserved a considerable part of state assets for itself . . . Thank the Democratic Forum for that.

The law that made spontaneous privatisation possible was made under the Németh government. And why did they not change it? Why did they not revoke it? It was not a law made by Parliament, it was a government decree. Perhaps there was a secret agreement? I do have that feeling. Every party needed something to get started . . . They let each other live? They did, of course. I do not know who came up with the idea in the Democratic Forum, but, in his own way, he did an excellent job. One of the successor parties, Thürmer’s,41 was left with nothing at all ﬁnancially and was given the ideological heritage, while the other was given all the wealth. But this was arranged in the Socialist Party, not the Democratic Forum! No, not in the Socialist Party, that is not true. Not true! If the ruling government accepts the two parties as partners, this would have gone otherwise. But it did not do so, and only accepted one of them. And Horn was not stupid, he did not let the wealth go. I heard that the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party had already started siphoning money to abroad in 1983–1984–1985. That is not true. What was in the agreements, this “rolling dollar”42 thing, this was real, but this was not siphoned off for the party. I am telling everyone this is not true, there would have to be some record if a single cent went out in order to . . . There were 200 million Hungarian forints set aside, but this was in the Hungarian bank OTP (National Savings Bank). This was available to Kádár. Behind this, there was what I told those gentlemen who it concerned at the time: the party NARRATIVES

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wealth. The gold and the diamonds. The party had been bringing along that since 1945. There were some properties they had sold, there was money from that, too. This was a separate fund, less than 200 million Hungarian forints, it was deposited in the OTP, and the general secretary could make decisions about it. Was this left over? I do not know who used it afterwards. I did not. How come you did not go either with Pozsgay or with the Socialist Party, just were going off to contemplate things? Because I did not agree with either of them. It was about matters of principle, not personal matters. Was there no organisation you could identify with? Did it not cross your mind to found a party? Yes, it did. Then I concluded I would not. We were part of a different political culture, raised in a different school . . . Horn was raised in a different school than you? Not so much, I just could not identify with either his way of thinking or conceptions of the present and the future. So who did you mean by being part of a different political culture? I did not mean anyone in particular. I meant today’s political relations. I did not feel enough political strength in me. Not with the old ones, but not with the new ones either. I was happy to offer the new ones to be a partner for consultations or discussions. Are you thinking of the Democratic Forum? Even the Democratic Forum, yes. I even met them here. So they did not take you up on your offer, did they? 120

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Not really. I think, in the early days, mainly in the first three or four years, conventional wisdom had it in political circles, that I was very conservative . . . This was when the “white terror” line came back to haunt you? Perhaps. Many were careful for their own reasons, or for political reasons. I can understand that completely. Did you meet József Antall? No, I did not. You did not even talk on the phone? We talked once on the phone after the letter in which I apologised for not having answered his previous letter. But I had never got that first letter. Forces were at work there already. György Aczél told me, “Karcsi, you got a letter!” We were again on more formal terms then. “Karcsi, you got a letter from József Antall. Meet him!” I said to him, “Uncle Gyuri, I have not got it. I have got no letter!” “No way!”, he said, “I am telling you!” And, then, I think he told Antall that I had not got the letter, because I got a copy of it, and that was the one I answered, and I also called him. This is the authentic story. I apologised for being impolite. What he outlined in the letter, and I also told it to him, was mostly likable to me. That is how it is, a lot of it was right, although I could not accept all of it unconditionally, but I apologised because I did not intend to belittle him by not answering, I simply had not got the letter. Antall was also careful lest he be connected with Pozsgay. Yes. But I felt there were some who, in petty little things . . . I will tell you an example. Of József Antall, I would not have thought that, the first day he came into power, he would make a decision to take away my hunting rifle. Obviously, someone, in his name . . . I would not even have thought this of Boross. They had already taken away guns from, I do not know, eighteen people. This was basically a good laugh. And I still went with my rifle, I did not want them to say, “He did not get a licence, because he was stupid; he did not even know how to hold the barrel.” So I went,

and they still took it away. The lady major who took it away was crying, she said she knew this was mean, what she was doing at that time. She was obliged to give as a reason that I was not keeping the weapon in an appropriate place. And you have not had a hunting rifle since then? No. Since then, of course, I have received several messages that I should apply, but I messaged back that I had not applied to them to take it away, so why should I apply then to get it back. Not that I need it so much. I would sell it at once. I do not think I will go hunting again. I am happy I can move around in the garden here. Did you use to go hunting a lot? Yes, I quite liked it. Although not much in the last ten years. No time for it? Yes. When I worked in Borsod for the first time, and I was editor-in-chief of the county paper, I used to have time. Also, when I was working at the radio. Did a lot of things really get decided at hunts? Look, there was this hunting group, Heart of Jesus, as we called the bosses’ hunting group, Accord43 was its real name, and it was me who disbanded it. But it was great to be in that because one could shoot game at a quarter of the energy expanded. There were areas that were full of game. One just went for a walk, and could shoot twice at least. While, in our area, where I had been a member for thirty years, one went out three or four times and was happy if he saw any game maybe once. This was the difference, and that was tempting. But I never applied for membership there. And, once, Biszku,44 who was then deputy general secretary or whatever, asked me, “Who are you playing for, not going hunting with Heart of Jesus?” I told him no one had asked me in the first place. “Why would they have, that is a closer circle, I was not nearly there in the ranks.” And, second, I said to him,” I do not really like that atmosphere. There are rituals. I have enough of that in my life. When

I go hunting, I like to do it casually.” For a long time, I did not apply for membership. I came up to Pest from being party secretary in Borsod county when the boys said—this was about 1980—that I should enter that one and quit my old group. “That is how it is done.” “Well, all right, if that is how it is done.” But I did not quit the old one, I just entered here, too. I had a good time when I went out with them. But none of what they say is true about free hunts and the like; that is silly. I still have the bills, I sent my membership fees myself. And the money for lunch, and the accommodation; that was perfectly normal. I never paid in my own group, there we had not paid for thirty years. We founded the group, and then we supported ourselves from hunting. In Russia, the president of the banking association was killed by radiation. Forty banking professionals have already been murdered. What conclusion can you draw from that? That the banking world is dominated by organised crime. Only that. Nothing else. Concerning the fate of Russia, and more, of Hungary, is this not disturbing? I do not see any signiﬁcant effect on Hungary. On Russian economy, yes, but not on Hungary. I know the whole banking sector is dominated by huge mobs, I also know from reliable sources, that the basic sources of raw materials are also in their hands. This might be tragic for Russia. Why do they move against the banking leaders, of all people? After all, they represent the new system! Or are they just dividing things up? Oh no, they are not moving against the new, the banking system had to be done anyway. In whatever structure. I am convinced that the government tried to lay hands on the economy through the banking system, and there is a huge resistance to that. Now, a completely different question. I ﬁnd it astonishing how accurately the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party kept the minutes. NARRATIVES

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What is the explanation for that? Were they so sure they would always remain in power? I think this goes back to János Kádár. He was a terribly decent person when these matters were concerned. And, then, he had also had a formative political experience: his own show trial. That matter with the Peace Party45 that he was convicted for, when he simply had no evidence to show things had not been the way they interpreted them later. And he insisted very much that a short record be made of every decision, every ofﬁcial meeting; this was distributed to everyone concerned later, and that had the gist. It was rather a kind of memo. And, then, within two days, the full, literal minutes were made, which they archived. And, also, in the last years, audio recordings were made of the meetings of the Political Committee, and, for a very long time, of the meetings of the Central Committee. Were there no cases when Kádár told them to turn off the recorder for a bit because he did not want this or that on record? Never. But he found a way for what you are, I think, thinking of; if there was something that was not ready yet, that could not be brought up before a meeting. Every Monday, before or after the secretariat meeting, he always met the prime minister, in private, and they discussed things. There was no record of that. They sat down for a coffee and talked. This went on for decades, he did it with me, but with my predecessors, too. We sat down every Monday and just thought out loud, talked about this and that. If I had any problems, I told him. And, if there was an actual question that was not ready, could not be brought up in a meeting, then he invited the experts on that or the people who dealt with it. Then, they took an hour in the afternoon to talk about it. But he did not like too much prattle. And he understood processes in a minute. He felt if someone was stalling; he knew something was wrong: the person must not be informed enough or just did not understand what his task was. What is your relationship with Miklós Németh?46 Now? There is no relationship between us. 122

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Did it break completely? Completely. You are not even corresponding? No. Nothing. Are there no offended feelings in that? None. I formed an opinion of a person. In those political battles. This opinion is negative. That is all. I drew my conclusions. Why is it negative? Because of his character. How could he preserve his popularity in the country then? These two have nothing to do with each other. Was it because he went abroad early? I know things that are not public knowledge. Is there anything that could be made public knowledge? No need. Miklós Németh is a young man. Did he put you, personally, in a humiliating situation? I cannot say that. Once, nearly, but I did not speak about that anywhere at any time. So, if I understand you correctly, you thought his politics to be of bad character. That is right. Not in personal contact. Miklós Németh was made by Károly Grósz . . . That is right, too. That was one of his crimes. There are more, but that is one. The point of the matter is that I have always thought of him as a talented person, and I still do, so this opinion of mine has not changed. You know, I formed my opinion of people not on the basis of what they thought of me but on the basis of what I thought of them. You did not take kindly to his role in the regime change, did you? That is right. There was his role in the party congress!

He took a stand against the Socialist Workers’ Party too early? It is not that. If someone, on the basis of his experience, comes to the conclusion that the standpoint he had yesterday could not be maintained, and so he gives it up, I find that a perfectly natural human thing. Whatever or whoever it is about. So if someone changes his opinion because he finds what he stood for yesterday is not true, I find that a perfectly normal human thing, too. I think only a foolish person is entirely consistent. In a changing world, it cannot be the case that I took a vow on something thirty years ago, and that is exactly what I will keep standing by in forty years, too.

4 See note 52 of our interview with Péter Antall. 5 See note 72 of our interview with Péter Antall. 6 Ede Horváth (1924–1998): director of Rába Railway Carriage and Machine Works between 1963 and 1989, member of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers‘ Party between 1970 and 1989. 7 Imre Pozsgay. See note 47 of our interview with Péter Antall. 8 Charles de Gaulle (1890–1970): French military ofﬁcer, politician, and the president of France between 1959 and 1969. 9 András B. Hegedűs (1930–2001): economist. He joined the Hungarian Communist Party in 1946. From 1953, he supported Imre Nagy‘s reform direction, took part in organising the debates preceding the 1956 revolution, and stayed active during the revolution itself; for his role, he was sentenced to two years in jail in 1959. After having served his sentence, he devoted himself to his work and the collection of sources and

ENDNOTES

memoirs concerning the revolution. The one-time revolution-

1 Ferenc Donáth (1913–1986): communist politician, historian

aries and the relatives of those executed later formed the

of agriculture, public writer. He joined the Communist Party in

Committee of Historical Justice with him in 1988. He became

1934, held various agriculture-related positions until 1945, and,

the organisation’s president but quit in 1992. In 1990, he took

between 1945 and 1951, he was a member of the leadership

part in the foundation of the 1956 Institute.

of the Hungarian Communist Party and of the Hungarian

10 The Committee of Historical Justice was founded in András

Working People’s Party. He was arrested in 1951, then reha-

B. Hegedűs’s apartment in May 1988 by people imprisoned or

bilitated in 1954. He was a member of the reformist group

interned for their role in the 1956 revolution and relatives of

around Imre Nagy. For his role in the 1956 revolution, as a

those who had been executed. Its goal was to refute the fake

co-defendant of the Imre Nagy case, he was sentenced to jail but was pardoned in 1960. After this, he was a research fellow at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and, form the 1970s, part of the emerging opposition groups. 2 Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzezinski (1928–2017): American diplomat, political expert, and, between 1977 and 1981, national security advisor to President Jimmy Carter. In the interview, Grósz probably means his 1966 book The Soviet Political System. Transformation or Degeneration, or his 1970 book Between Two Ages. America’s Role in the Technetronic Era. In these, Brzezinski argued that, due to economic and social changes in the world and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union will fall into a decline unless it is willing to introduce reforms.

history that the communist regime propagated about the revolution and the preservation of the worthy memory of the revolution. They played an important role in organising the reinternment of Imre Nagy and others in 1989. 11 Gábor Kuncze (1950–): politician, member of the Alliance of Free Democrats and head of the party, Minister of Interior between 1994 and 1998. He employed a special committee to survey the state security files in his ministry in 1995. 12 The III/III Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior was the section of the political police of the People’s Republic of Hungary, concerned with internal intelligence. Its ﬁles contained the names of people who had been under surveillance

3 Rezső Nyers (1923–2018): Hungarian economist and a com-

and the names of operatives, too.

munist politician. He was minister of ﬁnance between 1960 and

13 János Kenedi (1947–): Hungarian writer, politician. One of

1962, a member of the Political Committee of the Hungarian

the leading figures of the leftist, liberal opposition movement in

Socialist Workers’ Party between 1966 and 1975, and the sec-

the 1980s. Between 2007 and 2010, he headed the committee

retary for economic policy to the Central Committee of the Party

which surveyed the state security files produced before the

between 1962 and 1974. In this last position, it was under his

regime change but not yet handed over to the Historical

leadership that the economic reform package known as the

Archives of the Hungarian State Security.

“New Economic Mechanism” was introduced in 1968. The aim

14 The Publicity Club, founded in October 1988, is an organi-

of these reforms was to include elements of market economy in

sation concerned with the freedom of speech and expression

the planned economy system in order to increase efﬁciency.

and the rights to these.

NARRATIVES

123

15 The party college operating next to the Central Committee

24 Edgar Bronfman (1929–2013): Canadian–American busi-

of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held further edu-

nessman, president of the World Jewish Congress. His import-

cation courses for the leading communist politicians of the

ant achievement is that in the name of his organisation, he

sister countries, so for the Hungarian leadership, too.

made diplomatic steps towards establishing contact with the

16 Zoltán Komócsin (1923–1974): communist politician, journal-

Soviet Union and managed to achieve that the Jewish inhabi-

ist, member of parliament. He joined the communist movement

tants of the country could practice their religion legally and

in 1944, and got various jobs at local party institutions and the

could immigrate to Israel.

party centre, too. In 1950, he was among the ﬁrst to be sent to

25 The World Jewish Congress was founded in 1936 with the

the three-year party college course operating next to the Central

aim of uniting Jewish communities and organisations and ﬁght-

Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. From

ing for their interest in diplomatic ways. Its centre is in New

1957 to his death, he was a member of the Central Committee

York.

of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party and, from 1962, also a

26 Eduard Shevardnadze (1928–): Soviet–Georgian politician.

member of the Political Committee. From 1957, he was the head

Between 1972 and 1985, he was the ﬁrst secretary of the

of the organising committee in the Young Communist League.

Georgian Communist Party, then, after Mikhail Gorbachev

Between 1961 and 1965, he was editor-in-chief at

came into power, he was appointed the foreign minister of the

Népszabadság, the party’s newspaper, and, from 1965 to his

Soviet Union. In the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, he was chair of the

death, the foreign secretary of the Party’s Central Committee.

State Council of Georgia and the Parliament, and, in 1995, he

17 János Kukucska (1926–1967): from 1957 to 1962,

was elected President of Georgia.

secretary of the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén country committee of

27 Taurus Rubber Industries was the name of the National

the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. Later, he transferred

Rubber Industry Company from 1973, created by nationalisa-

to the foreign ministry and was sent to Beijing. The Chinese

tions and mergers in 1951. After it nearly went bankrupt by the

secret service allegedly enlisted him after an accident he had

regime change, it was privatised in 1996.

caused. This, too, might have had something to do with the

28 Béla Demeter, known as the “cherry pitter” in the communist

fact that he was ordered home and that he then shot himself

era. The communist press put him on the pillory, and he was

in a toilet at the ministry building.

subsequently imprisoned for profiteering because he had

18 Dr Béla István Szalai (1922–2008): Hungarian communist

bought cherry pits from the Kecskemét cannery, planted them,

politician, economist. Between 1953 and 1956, he was a

and then sold the saplings. This enterprising behaviour was

member of the Cental Committe of the Hungarian Working

then considered a crime.

People’s Party, and, between 1954 and 1956, of the Political

29 László Kapolyi (1932–2014): Hungarian mining engineer,

Committee. Between 1953 and 1954, he was the head of the

structural engineer, energy professional, economist,

National Planning Ofﬁce, and, between 1954 and 1955, the

businessman, politician, and member of the Hungarian

minister for light industry. After the revolution, he worked in

Academy of Sciences. As deputy minister, he argued for

foreign trade, then, between 1960 and 1963, he was the direc-

reviving coal-based energy, and, between 1983 and 1987, he

tor of Hungarotex Foreign Trading Co., and, between 1963 and

served as the minister for industry. Between 1994 and 2012,

1975, undersecretary for foreign trade.

and again from 2013, he has been the president of the Social

19 The Young Communist League was the youth wing of the

Democratic Party of Hungary; between 2002 and 2010, he was

communist state party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party,

a member of parliament in the Hungarian Socialist Party’s

between 1957 and 1989.

parliamentary group. As an entrepreneur, he was active in the

20 See note 63 of our interview with Péter Antall.

energy sector and took part in breaking down the Russian

21 See note 27 of our interview with Péter Antall.

national debt.

22 See note 53 of our interview with Péter Antall.

30 The Rózsadomb Pact is a conspiracy theory about the

23 The Opposition Round Table was founded in 1989 by op-

Hungarian regime change, claiming that, as part of a secret

position groups operating in socialist Hungary because, as a

political agreement between the Soviets, the Americans, the

united front, they hoped to gain better negotiating positions

Hungarians, and the Israeli, the old socialist elite was allowed

against the state party that sought to divide them. The

to carry their positions on to the new system. A Hungarian

Opposition Round Table invited social organisations too to the

newspaper, Amerikai–Kanadai Magyar Élet (American–

National Round Table Talks, where the framework of the regime

Canadian Hungarian Life), published in the US, was the ﬁrst to

change was negotiated with the state party.

write about this pact in 1992. The pact is dated variously to

124

NARRATIVES

1989 or 1991. Both the political ﬁgures of the time and the

39 At a speech delivered to the leaders of the Workers’ Militia

researchers working on the period unambiguously declare it is

and party activists in 1988, in the Budapest Sports Hall

a ﬁction.

(Budapest Sportcsarnok), Károly Grósz said concerning the

31 Yitzhak Shamir (1915–2012): Israeli politician, prime minis-

reforms introduced in the country that the leading role of the

ter of Israel between 1983 and 1984, then between 1986 and

Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party must be preserved in di-

1992. In September 1988, he visited Hungary (according to

recting the changes, because, otherwise, “anarchy, chaos” and

ofﬁcial press releases, on a private visit), and had meetings

“white terror” will rule in the country. The expression “white

with László Kovács deputy foreign minister and Károly Grósz,

terror” is generally used for radical groups meting out extraju-

the head of government. Not long after this, the diplomatic

dicial punishments to the perpetrators of communist (or the

mission of Israel opened in Hungary.

“red”) terror in the course of political changes.

32 About Nicolae Ceaușescu, see note 55 of our interview with

40 Vladimir Kryuchkov (1924–2007): Soviet lawyer and diplo-

Péter Antall. The politician had discussions with János Kádár

mat, member of the Political Committee of the Communist

in 1977. At these talks, the situation of the Hungarian ethnic

Party of the Soviet Union, head of KGB between 1988 and

minority, even then a worrying topic in Hungary, was also dis-

1991. Between 1955 and 1959, as third secretary of the Soviet

cussed, since the Romanian politician was always playing on

embassy in Budapest, he took part in the organisation of re-

nationalist feelings in order to consolidate his power. Contrary

pressing the 1956 revolution.

to appearances, Kádár failed in these talks, and relations be-

41 Gyula Thürmer (1953–): communist politician, leader of the

tween the two countries became cooler. Ceaușescu invited

Hungarian Workers’ Party. After ﬁnishing college, he went into

Károly Grósz for talks, too, in 1988, but these talks were also

foreign affairs. From 1982, he worked at the Foreign Ofﬁce of

unsuccessful for the Hungarians.

the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, and, from 1988, he

33 Eric Honecker (1912–1994): East German communist poli-

became the foreign advisor of the party’s general secretariat.

tician, secretary general of the Central Committee of the

In 1989, after the split in the party, he took part in organising

Socialist Unity Party of Germany between 1971 and 1989, and

the formation known as the Hungarian Workers’ Party and was

also chair of the State Council of the German Democratic

elected its leader at the founding congress. He occupies the

Republic.

position to this day.

34 The roots of the “popular vs urban opposition” go back to

42 “Rolling dollars” was a term used for ﬁnancial support, sent

the 1920s and 1930s, and it continues to shape people’s pub-

during the Cold War era through the unofﬁcial channels of the

lic thinking and political discourse to this day. This opposition

socialist bloc, to communist parties operating in Western

had an important role in structuring political relations at the

Europe and the liberation movements in the Third World that

time of regime change, too, and also in the birth of the two

sympathised with the Marxist ideology.

most inﬂ uential parties of the period, since the Hungarian

43 Accord Hunting Association (Egyetértés Vadásztársaság)

Democratic Forum grew out of the movement of popular writ-

was founded in 1964 by the upmost tier of socialist political

ers, while the Alliance of Free Democrats emerged from the

leadership. Apart from organising their own gatherings, the

opposition group of urban connections.

association also hosted visiting foreign socialist leaders and

35 Franz Vranitzky (1937–): Austrian social democratic politi-

other friendly politicians who were fond of hunting.

cian, Chancellor of Austria between 1986 and 1997.

44 Béla Biszku (1921–2016): communist politician. Between

36 Tovarishchi konets! (Comrades, it is over) was the caption

1957 and 1961, as interior minister, he was one of those who

on an iconic campaign poster by the Hungarian Democratic

conducted the punishments after the 1956 revolution was put

Forum. The poster, made by István Orosz, shows the nape of

down. Between 1956 and 1985, he was a member of the

the neck of a service-capped Russian military ofﬁcer below the

Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party,

Cyrillic caption.

and, between 1957 and 1980, of the Political Committee.

37 Jenő Váncsa (1928–2016): agronomist, honorary university

45 The Peace Party (Békepárt) was founded in 1943 by

professor, and, between 1980 and 1989, minister of agriculture

Hungarian communists as a successor of the Party of

and food. He was a member of the Hungarian Working

Communists in Hungary. For this reform, disciplinary action

People’s Party from 1954, then, of the Hungarian Socialist

was taken against the party leader János Kádár after World

Workers’ Party between 1985 and 1989, and he was a mem-

War II, and then, in 1951, he was condemned in a show trial

ber of the Party’s Central Committee.

with several others.

38 See note 36 of our interview with Péter Antall.

46 See note 53 of our interview with Péter Antall.

NARRATIVES

125

A CHANGE OF DIRECTION

PERESTROIKA AND REGIME CHANGE IN HUNGARY Tamás Péter Baranyi

In public discourse, it is often said that the reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev in the “Eastern Bloc” actively contributed to regime changes in the countries of the region. It is especially interesting to look at the relationship between the Soviet reforms and Hungarian politics, but it is also clear that, if perestroika and other programs helped the democratic transition of the region, they did so quite contrary to their original purpose, unintentionally. Mark Palmer, former US ambassador to Budapest, said at the end of the 1980s: “glasnost and perestroika were really invented in Hungary, and, in this aspect, the country still preserves its twenty-year advantage.”1 The ambassador meant that, after 1963, from among the countries of the Eastern Bloc, it was Hungary that managed to distance itself most in social and economic

US ambassador Mark Palmer in front of the building of the American diplomatic corps on 23 October 1989, the day the republic was proclaimed

128

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structure from the Soviet Union. The “Hungarian reform” was born from the country’s international isolation and the lack of economic proﬁtability by the mid-1960s, and, from 1968, it received its new format in the “new economic mechanism.” Although its roots can be traced back to the views of certain Soviet economists, the invention was associated with the less ideological, more technocratic representatives of the Hungarian communist elite, Rezső Nyers and Jenő Fock. The reform incorporated market elements into planning, included incentives in the economy, and made it possible for citizens to have income from outside the state economy. All of this mobilised the economy and society and made Hungary truly the “happiest barracks” in the whole of Eastern Europe.2 But all of this came at a price: the reforms had to be defended in a foreign policy context, and, in some cases, they had to be “hidden” from observant Soviet eyes. In the early period, one could not even utter the word “reform”: Hungarians rather talked about improvement in economic management. According to György Aczél, reforms always had to be shown as “experimenting, almost like just playing around.”3 Although later, the acceptance of reforms was better, they always meant leverage, a potential for blackmail in the Soviet–Hungarian relation. The Hungarian party also wanted to include their own ideas in the planned reform of Comecon, but, on this forum, the much more rigid and closed suggestion, coming from the GDR, won out.4 While the great increase in oil prices in 1973 made it more difﬁcult for the countries of the Eastern Bloc to keep solvency, Comecon’s dysfunctional but strict integration system inhibited attempts to connect to the Western integration. The European Economic Community had contacts with the eastern countries, asking for political concessions

in exchange for the evermore needed economic privileges and encouraging them in loosening up the eastern integration. From among the countries of the Eastern Bloc, only Romania gave in to this pressuring: in its case, this was made possible by its isolation and politically precarious situation.5 The Soviets were still not pleased with the Hungarian economic reform: in the 1970s, they stopped it several times and sidelined its leaders. But, at the same time, the structure of the Hungarian economy was still farther from the Soviet model than anyone else’s. This might have been the reason why, at the beginning of the 1980s, from among the countries of the Eastern Bloc, Hungary was the ﬁrst to join the International Monetary Fund. In this peculiar Soviet–Hungarian push-andpull, the election of Mikhail Gorbachev as the general secretary of the communist party brought a huge change. Gorbachev promised a “new way of thinking” as early as 1985, and part of this would have been the reform of party democracy, the reorganisation of the economic structure, and a freer public sphere. However, the conception was far from being properly worked out and, in time, evolved further: initially, it merely meant a new attitude, a looking for new directions.6 Therefore, when determining how to relate to Gorbachev’s new way of thinking, there were more than one approaches within the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. First, Hungarians were very suspicious of any Soviet-inspired, topdown reform attempt, since the experience of earlier years had taught them that the Soviets ignore local speciﬁcs and force their ideas very aggressively on other countries. Second, they were also worried that Soviet “permissive politics” might in time turn into its exact opposite. It was feared that Gorbachev would quickly “fail” with his permissive-looking reforms, and it will be followed by a backlash that would leave no room for Hungary to manœuvre. But there was also reason for happiness, since all of this signalled that a “political vision” was back in the socialist camp.7 As a matter of fact, it was not just the Hungarian party leadership that looked at Gorbachev’s plans with suspicion: the Polish also warned each other not to welcome the reforms,

György Aczél, the most inﬂ uential person in cultural policy in the Kádár era

reminiscent of those of Peter the Great, too heartily.8 The Hungarian party leadership was especially worried because the Soviet reform plan included the closer integration of Comecon; this was cause for worry, since, by that time, Budapest had long been trying to establish closer economic connections not with the eastern but the western integration. By the middle of the 1980s, it also became clear that the interests of the Eastern European countries and those of the Soviet Union within Comecon were fundamentally different, and so a closer integration would certainly have left the smaller countries worse off. By 1987, Gorbachev himself realised that, out of his three goals (Soviet reform, Eastern European integration, and maintaining a superpower status), he would only be able to fulﬁl two and would have to let go of the closer integration of Comecon.9 As the importance of economic questions lessened and perestroika and glasnost turned into Soviet internal reforms and a sort of general politics of opening, the reform circle within the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party also acquiesced to the changes. After this, the conception of perestroika could be utilised in the service of a general thawing-up between East and West and could be used to move against such bothersome countries as Romania was for the Hungarians. Not only Gorbachev’s reform ideas but also the international context itself and the politics in the countries themselves went through such radical changes the likes of which had not been seen for decades. Before perestroika could have A CHANGE OF DIRECTION

129

been “tamed” for the Hungarian party leadership, they themselves had changed: in May 1988, the congress of the party voted out many old leaders together with János Kádár. A short transitional period started with Károly Grósz at the helm. Grósz was a Hungarian politician who made his political capital partly from perestroika— Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung even coined the term “grósznost” by merging Grósz’s name with glasnost. But, eventually, this was not enough. The period brought huge economic changes, too, but the logic in these followed not that of perestroika but of the by then decade-old Hungarian reform direction.10 It was exactly because of this different logic that Gorbachev’s branded reform could not take root in Hungary: the Hungarian reforms followed a basically different logic, partly already pointing towards democracy, and this was initially alien to Soviet reforms.11 A few months later, perestroika gave out both economically and politically, and Hungary chose the way of a pluralist democracy and a Western-style market economy. Perestroika did not play a decisive role in the process of Eastern European regime changes, it was rather a subplot, and, while the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party welcomed the spirit of the reform, it kept its distance from its content in questions of both the economy and sovereignty. A further cause for worry was that a sudden reform campaign might even have pushed the Soviet Union into a sharp left turn, and this could easily have meant the end of the earlier, better embedded Hungarian reform process. Although this eventually did not happen, by the time the

Hungarian leadership could accept perestroika, it had already started to become less and less relevant. The democratic opposition that came into power did not maintain any continuity with Soviet reform conceptions as a matter of principle and, instead, turned at full throttle towards democracy and the market economy. Thus, if we look at the question from a wider perspective, we see that perestroika was rather just a way station on the path to the collapse of the Soviet state.

ENDNOTES 1 National Archives of Hungary, M-KS 288. f. 32./1989/10. ő. e. 151. 2 Rainer M. János: Magyarország története. A Kádár-korszak, 1956–1989. Kossuth Kiadó, Budapest, 2012. 40–44. 3 Révész Sándor–Aczél György: Egy Kádár-portré töredékei. Beszélő, 1999/October. 114. 4 Földes György: Kádár János külpolitikája és nemzetközi tárgyalásai, 1956–1988. Vol. I. Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest, 2015. 88, 90, 99–100.; Kansikas Suvi, Room to Manœuvre? National interests and Coalition-Building in the CMEA, 1969– 1974. In: Reassessing Cold War Europe, edited by Sari AutioSarasmo–Katalin Miklóssy. Routledge, Oxford–New York, 2011. 198–200. 5 Stefano Bottoni: Unrequited Love? The Romanian Communist Party and the EEC in the 1960s and 1970s. In: Kommunismus und Europa: Vorstellungen und Politik europäischer kommunistischer Parteien im Kalten Krieg, edited by Francesco di Palma–Wolfgang Mueller. Schöningh Verlag, Paderborn, 2015. 118–136. 6 Andrei Grachev: Gorbachev’s Gamble. Soviet Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War. Polity Press, Cambridge– Malden, 2008. 73–75. 7 Tamás Péter Baranyi: Perestroika Made in Hungary? The HSWP’s Approach to the Soviet Reform of the Late-1980s. In: Perestroika and the Party. National and Transnational Perspectives on European Communist Parties in the Era of Soviet Reform, edited by Francesco di Palma. Berghahn, New York–Oxford, 2019. Amazon e-book. 8 Wanda Jarzabek: The Polish United Worker’s Party and Perestroika. In: Perestroika and the Party. 9 Földes, 468–669. 10 Thomas M. Cynkin: Glasnost, perestroika and Eastern Europe. Survival. 1988/July–August. 317. 11 Mink András: Grósznoszty. Beszélő. 1999/July–December.

Károly Grósz in the Parliament

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75–79.

CONSTITUTIONALITY AND LEGAL TRANSITION

István Stumpf

INTRODUCTION Due to its negotiated, bargained nature, one of the special features of the Hungarian regime change was the fact that the Constitutional Court (CC) was established even before the first free elections, and, after this, it played a major role in the “constitutional revolution.” The extremely rich tradition of Hungarian public law lacked a constitutional court before, since, until 1949, Hungary did not even have a written constitution. Some among the main characters of the regime change disliked the idea of establishing a new institution and would have liked it more if we had brought back the administrative courts that the communist regime had abolished. However, during the National Round Table Talks that worked out the script for a peaceful transition, those politicians prevailed who supported following the German model of a constitutional court.1 Even though the swift establishment of the constitutional court was not a priority among the opposition’s demands, as many were afraid that the new CC would become the institution helping the preservation of the communist cadres, later, the Opposition Round Table still saw the Constitutional Court as one of the institutions to guarantee that no party state restoration would happen.2 József Antall, who joined the work of the Opposition Round Table in the summer of 1989, was a committed adherent to the Hungarian parliamentary tradition,3 and, thanks to his compromise suggestion, the agreement was finally signed. Today, thirty years after the regime change, questions about the separation of powers and the rule of law have again become central to professional and political debate. This paper will present the doctrine of the “constitutional revolution,” worked out in the ﬁrst constitutional regime change, and the role of the

CC, closely connected to this concept, in the early period of the development of the rule of law. It will survey the views that have, from the very beginning, criticised the CC’s fundamental rights activism sharply and provided the foundations for the spread of political constitutionalism after the 2010 elections, the “revolution of public law” based on parliamentary supremacy, and the dethronement of the “invisible constitution.” THE CC AS ONE OF THE MAIN ACTORS OF THE REGIME CHANGE: A ROLE AND A NECESSITY One of the first institutions of the rule of law in the Hungarian regime change was the Constitutional Court, which started its work even before the first free election, on 1 January 1990.4 The most specific feature of the Hungarian transition was that the regime change happened through negotiations and compromises; this helped maintain the country’s governability and the operation of the state apparatus.5 The CC was enlarged with five new members after the first free elections, and it did not simply join the political processes as a new institution for the protection of the constitution but, shaping its own jurisdiction rather independently, became a definitive political actor in the transition process itself. However, the euphoria after the elections was soon cut short by the 1990 “taxi blockade.” The serious economic problems inherited from the previous system, party political conflicts, the inner tensions of the coalition government, the inexperienced, unprepared new political elite, and mutual distrust very soon eroded the faith placed in the multiparty system. The CC became a key actor in this political and confidential vacuum with its consciously adapted role of a constitutional revolutionary, its activism, its aristocratic distance, and the dogmatic terminology of professional law. A CHANGE OF DIRECTION

131

The year 1990 was spent with party political battles and election enthusiasm. In 1991 and after, the CC made those high-profile decisions which eventually influenced the course of the regime change significantly. It started to lay the foundations for the rule of law in its 1992 decisions, expanding on the claim that with the regime change, a sort of “constitutional revolution” was happening. “With the amendment to the constitution, proclaimed on 23 October 1989, practically a new Constitution became effective, which introduced a new quality, fundamentally different from earlier forms, of the state, the law, and the political system, with its definition that ‘the Republic of Hungary is an independent, democratic constitutional state.’ In a constitutional legal sense, this is the content of the political category of the ‘regime change.’ . . . The Constitution defines the basic institutions of the constitutional state apparatus and the main rules of their operation and contains the human and civil rights together with their basic guarantees.”6 In this decision, the CC thus translated the political regime change to the language of law; their starting point was that the whole legal system needed to be brought into harmony with the Constitution founded on the rule of law. The CC, headed by László Sólyom, left no doubt that the regime change stood on an entirely legal footing, and so, no difference could be made between the law as it had been before and as it was after the Constitution. Regardless of its genesis, it is a requirement for any legal norm that it conform to the current Constitution. Concerning the relationship of the two key concepts of the transition, “legality” and “constitutionality,” the first chair of the CC argued as follows: “The Constitutional Court differentiates between legality and legitimacy: the legitimacy of different earlier systems cannot be interpreted from the point of view of the constitutionality of legal norms. With this interpretation, the Constitutional Court took a stand about the question whether it had been a revolution that had happened in Hungary: the Court created the paradoxical concept of ‘constitutional revolution’ for the change. One practical consequence of this was 132

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standing up for legality and the principle of legal continuity, which did not in the least contradict the fact that the Constitutional Court clearly supported the future-oriented conception (Lat. novatio) of the regime and resisted aspirations towards restoration.”7 Sharp political criticism was directed at the CC for its conception based on legal continuity and legality, since, when judging the law of the old regime, the court, to a decisive extent, preferred the principle of legal certainty that goes hand in hand with the rule of law. Concerning the cooperativisation and nationalisation of agriculture, the court emphasised legal continuity and the protection of closed legal relationships and did not differentiate according to why and when the underlying law became unconstitutional. The court set down its conviction that “the declaration of constitutionality in Hungary can thus only be understood as the formal rule of law”8 in its decisions about the relationship of formal legal certainty and justice. The CC did everything to prevent the rise of the principles of natural law in resolving political disagreements about the regime change. In its view, “one cannot realise constitutionality going against the rule of law,”9 and it considered legal certainty a constitutional value with the help of which constitutional positivism can be preferred to natural law. László Sólyom writes the following in his work of synthesis about the professional and moral challenges that emerged in the early work of the CC: “Concerning the grand symbolic questions of the regime change (but, from among them, certainly concerning the question of criminal-law ‘justice’) it was unavoidable that we make a decision. It is widely known that Germany made judgements based on justice. The Czechoslovakian and the Polish constitutional courts also thought it possible that (emphatically exceptionally and just the once) legislators disregard the criminal-law guarantees of the constitution. The Hungarian Constitutional Court chose the other way. It overturned any kind of retrospective changing of the rules about the limitation of criminality. We did not have to sacriﬁce justice for the rule of law.

The Constitutional Court, through international law, opened up the possibility to prosecute the criminals leaving the most serious wounds in society—practically, the mass murders during and following the 1956 revolution.”10 The CC, in accordance with the dogmatics of the regime change that it had evolved, explained several times that classifying Hungary as a constitutional state was a statement of a fact and a programme at the same time. It sought to dull the singularity deriving from historical circumstances: it made its decisions aspiring to create an order in principles and consolidate constitutionality. The CC demonstrated continually that law limited politics, and, with its behaviour, it wished to inspire faith in the rule of law. In its decisions detailing the concept of the rule of law, it made clear that an offense against the core value of the rule of law, which was explicitly there in the Constitution, in itself substantiated the unconstitutionality of any law. Then, the CC “thawed out” the elements that are the content of the rule of law and function as an independent constitutional standard: the requirements of normative clarity and necessary preparation time, the requirement of the predictable operation of the law and of institutions, the prohibition of retroactive legislation, and, later, the doctrine of public-law invalidity. The majority of the CC11 was aware that they introduced requirements as the content of the rule of law that were not there in the Constitution, openly admitting the activism of the court.12 It is a widely held conviction that activism about fundamental rights can be approved, while activism about jurisdiction or state apparatus cannot. As István Kukorelli put it in one study: “Concerning activism, I would deﬁnitely separate the two types of norms: on the constitution’s norms about the execution of power and the state apparatus (the different powers), I would say no. On the civil part (for example, fundamental rights), legal development can be freer.”13 At the beginning of the 1990s, the CC, with extremely hard work (with its decisions about limitation, the cases of vetting, the responses it gave to petitions about remedying past offenses) worked out doctrinally the basic categories

meaning the content of the rule of law. Later, requirements about legislation were explained in detail, thus compensating for the lack of a chapter on legislation in the Constitution. Apart from normative clarity, preparation time, and public law invalidity, it dealt with the democratic legitimacy of exercising official authority, the protection of acquired rights, laws requiring qualified majority, and the constitutional requirements of specific fields of professional law (the power to punish, public administration, civil law). Constitutionality got a special role in the CC’s judicature primarily because of its normative content. In the period of the “constitutional revolution,” it was important that anyone could present a petition to the CC (actio popularis), and the court directly compared the given law with the constitutional requirements. “After the regime change, Hungary had to create faith in the rule of law. It was the historic task of the Constitutional Court to make it clear: the new Constitution demands unconditional validity.”14 The flagship of legal constitutionality in Hungary has undoubtedly been the Constitutional Court. It introduced and, through its decisions, institutionalised the idea and practice of the rule of law, connecting these to the common European traditions of constitutionality.15 The “founding fathers” of the CC, but especially its first chair, did their job with great constitutional commitment and a strong identity. It is, thus, perhaps not surprising that László Sólyom was convinced it had been the Constitutional Court that had brought Hungary into Europe, though, without József Antall’s political wisdom and readiness to compromise, the country could easily have become ungovernable. SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE TRANSITION PERIOD: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND THE DOMINANCE OF THE “INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION” After the 2010 elections, in the background of the debates over the public-law activism of the parliamentary majority wielding constitutional power, the question emerged openly or covertly: Had the time come, decades after the regime A CHANGE OF DIRECTION

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change, to curb the competency of the CC which had accumulated too much power? The problem was not entirely novel, since the executive power that had grown closely intertwined with legislation had often criticised the activism of the Constitutional Court referring to its authority won at the elections and claiming that the CC limited the operation of the most important representative body of popular sovereignty. The basic dilemma of constitutional justice as a “counter-majoritarian” activity is what authority a non-representative body can have, and, to what extent, it can override the decisions of the parliament, which has direct legitimacy.16 According to the Constitutional Court’s self-deﬁnition at the time of the regime change, under the circumstances, activism was to an extent unavoidable. The parliament as a constitutional power was not able to correct the contradictions in the Constitution or supply what was missing from it, and so the CC was left as the only institution which could, with creative interpretation of the law, resolve problems which could not be otherwise resolved due to the lack of the necessary political agreements. The principle of the separation of power does not appear in the 1989 Constitution expressis verbis, but, as an integral part of constitutionality, the CC consistently enforced this principle.17 In contrast to the well-worked-out system of the rule of law, the CC did not comprehensively expand upon the separation of powers but rather articulated its views on certain decisions. So, regarding its own public-law status, the CC declared as a matter of principle already in the early phase of work that, in exercising the jurisdiction directed at the individual provisions of the Constitution, “one by all means has to take into account the principle of the separation of powers which is the most important organisational and operational principle of the Hungarian state.”18 The Constitutional Court consistently refused to shoulder the governmental or legislative responsibility in the course of preliminary reviews of constitutionality. The CC accepted the traditional threefold division of powers, but it did so much more for practical than for theoretical reasons, making it clear that 134

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it refused to follow fads that thought to discover more and more branches of power (the media, local self-governments, interest representation). It was in the decision about the appointment of judicial leaders that the CC ﬁrst set down what the characteristics of the judiciary were in the system of the separation of powers. “The Constitutional Court, when interpreting the principle of the separation of powers (as an element of the rule of law) took the starting point of how this separation is valid in today’s parliamentary systems, and how it is declared in the Constitution. The ‘separation’ of the legislative and the executive power today essentially means the sharing of jurisdictions between the parliament and the government, which, though, have become politically intertwined. The government is formed by the parties having the majority in parliament, and parliament mostly ratiﬁes the government’s bills. . . . Under such circumstances, the characteristic of the judiciary power is that, unlike the other two ‘political’ powers, it is constant and neutral [even when it (also) applies the laws and decrees realising the political programmes]. Article 50, (3) of the Constitution describes this neutrality when it says that judges are independent and answer only to the law. . . . Judiciary is, thus, independent of the political determination of the other two powers and its changes, and, in this sense, it is constant, continual. The Constitutional Court will in what follows understand this by the neutrality of the judiciary.”19 The early decisions of the CC make it clear that the court interpreted the principle of the separation of powers not as a hierarchical relationship but as a balanced system of mutual control. Apart from the requirement of the separation of powers, it also heavily emphasised the obligation to cooperate: “[i]t follows from the principle of the rule of law [Article 2, (1) of the Constitution] that the institutions regulated in the Constitution have an obligation to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction in good faith, mutually helping the completion of tasks in a cooperative way.”20 Finally, I would like to highlight one of the decisions connected to the separation of powers, which was made under the two-thirds majority during socialist–liberal

The newly elected members of the Constitutional Court (from left to right: Dr Antal Ádám, Dr Géza Kilényi, Dr Pál Solt, Dr László Sólyom, Dr János Zlinszky, and Dr László Nyikos) take their oath before the National Assembly on 23 November 1989.

coalition government after the 1994 elections. In this decision, the CC committed to principles which later became of great interest again: “The principle of the separation of powers does not merely mean that one branch cannot take away another’s licences: it also means that there is not unlimited and unlimitable power in a democratic, constitutional state, and, in the interest of this, certain branches of powers necessarily limit the licences of others.”21 When the founding generation of the CC stepped down, many evaluations were made about the court’s work. All of these emphasise activist-type judging and the metaphor of the “invisible constitution.” Gábor Halmai, in the introduction of a volume presenting the ﬁrst nine years of fundamental-law judging, summarises his opinion as follows: “It cannot be doubted that the Sólyom period of the Hungarian Constitutional Court can be compared to the Warren Court, with a chair who is basically of liberal conviction and which, concerning both the constitution and the interpretation of jurisdictions, sought to lead Hungarian constitutional protection in an activist direction.”22

It is true that the text of the constitution, born in the whirlwind of the regime change and intended only as temporary, was not thought as mature a document by several members of the CC that it could not be improved upon by the professors of law in this body. It is, thus, not surprising that, in a later interview, the founding chair said the following: “Our constitutional judging is, for the sake of coherence and especially in ‘difﬁcult cases,’ borders on writing the constitution—I have never denied that.”23 Though the CC had been divided about the interpretation of its own role from the beginning, the majority understood that, in the given historical situation, the court needed to behave in an activist way. László Sólyom, in his parallel justiﬁcation attached to the decision declaring capital punishment to be unconstitutional, explained the concept of the “invisible constitution”: “The Constitutional Court has to continue the work of articulating in its interpretations the principal bases of the Constitution and the rights included in it and creating a coherent system with its decisions above the Constitution (today still often amended for daily political interests) which serves as an A CHANGE OF DIRECTION

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‘invisible constitution’ to provide a sure measure of constitutionality: for this reason, it is not expected to contradict the new constitution, still to be accepted, or any future constitutions.”24 It is certainly unprecedented that a “doctrine” mentioned in a parallel justiﬁcation should have such an incredible career. Even its author thought that many misunderstood the gist of the idea, since the metaphor of the “invisible constitution” is not a synonym of the “eternity clause” which can serve to ground a critical revision even of the written text of the constitution. Much rather, he wanted to point out that the constitution was of a higher rank: a strict order not only of technical rules but also the principles expanded upon in the Constitutional Court’s decisions. The court in its decisions must expand upon this system of principles, make it visible and apply it as a coherent system. As the German constitutional court, the Hungarian CC also took the Constitution as a logically closed system, and this is what the concept of the “invisible constitution” really expressed. It is very instructive, however, that, later, the court avoided reference to this metaphor, and made sure its decisions could be connected to actual individual provisions of the constitution. It also avoided making its interpretations seem a revision of the written constitution. Still, the spirit of the “invisible constitution” remained in the public-law culture and came up even in the practice of constitutional judging from time to time.25 The Fundamental Law, accepted in 2011, does not emphasise any authority that could subject the rest of the constitutional powers to itself. According to Lóránt Csink, two requirements derive from the cooperation of constitutional bodies as projected to constitutional law: ﬁrst, each body helps the others in exercising their own jurisdiction and, second, that based on the principle of good faith, constitutional bodies seek to preserve and strengthen the same Constitution, naturally each in their own way.26 Paragraph (3) of Article N prescribes that the Constitutional Court, the courts, local self-governments, and other state bodies are in their work obligated to respect balanced and sustainable budget management. All this, of course, does not mean 136

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that anyone would doubt that the task and responsibility of planning the budget lie with the parliament and the management of that budget with the government; it is rather an indication that other constitutional bodies have to help the parliament and the government in these tasks. Paragraph (3) of Article N is a basic principle with no normative content of its own, and the constitutional authority found it necessary to preserve it as a rule in the Fundamental Law based on earlier experiences. The principle of good faith also appears in the text of the Fundamental Law. Article 28 prescribes a rule of interpretation for the courts when it says that, in the interpretation of the law, one has to assume that it serves a moral and economic purpose according to common sense and the public good. That is, courts have to assume that the political branches of power perform their intended tasks, and, naturally, the parliament and the government also have to assume that the CC and the courts work for the enforcement of the law and the Constitution as much as they do. THE CRITIQUE OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ACTIVISM There is no consensual definition for constitutional court activism. “In most cases, it marks a disapproval: a court departs from the text of the constitution, disregards the precedent, employs an unacceptable method of interpretation, enters the field of legislation, or simply makes a decision the reviewer does not agree with, for political reasons. Some opponents of constitutional judging consider the very institution, the constitutional review of laws, as activism.”27 These debates have renewed in the previous years in, among others, the publications of the adherents to political and legal constitutionality.28 The activity of the Constitutional Court raised interest not only within the country but abroad, as well. Both in Hungary and abroad, the opinion was that “this was the most powerful and perhaps most active constitutional court in the world.”29 The court’s highest-profile decisions (the abolishment of capital punishment, the decisions about compensation and justice, the

deﬁnition of the limit between the powers of the president and the executive branch) sometimes excited very strong political reactions or even passions. Critics said that the CC initially sought only the approval and legitimation of the West, while sitting in its unapproachable ivory tower it did not show any sensitivity for everyday reality. One of the most radical critics of the CC, Csaba Varga, wrote that “the constitutional court had invaded the whole political process, determining its direction in more senses than one; that is, it had arbitrarily constrained under philosophies, points of view, views of society and humanity of its own making, together with the obligations and prohibitions that go with these, the whole of society, its political class, the parties, and with them, the legislative, executive, and judicial powers embodying the nation, in other word, the chance of the original intention for the regime change—that is, to actually transcend the past and engage in building a new nation.”30 He claimed that the professorial constitutional court had fettered the regime change with the “destructive liberal doctrinairism” of its decisions. Built on foreign law, it created an invisible constitution from mere abstractions. By itself making the standard by reference to which it annulled the will of the sovereign, it performed “unconstitutional constitutional protection.” As opposed to the legal nihilism of the party state, it fetishised law and put the rule of law at the centre of the new catechism. The decisions of the CC were integrated in the law with constitutional force, irrevocably. From among the early, profession-based critics of fundamental rights activism, it is worth noting Béla Pokol’s remarks, listed in ﬁve points: “1. Activism transfers too much of the weight of basic decisions about society from the parliament to the Constitutional Court, and, with that, undermines the foundations of a parliamentarism based on the elections and the parliament. 2. The most favourite fundamental rights formulae of activism are the most abstract declarations of constitutional law, which do not have legal normative guidelines behind them—at least not as covered by a consensus of certain

circles of the legal profession. Thus activism has no legitimation at all except for the judge’s own moral courage. The argument appearing sometimes in favour of side-lining parliament (that, ‘instead of the struggles of politics, thus we have the logic of the law and its predictable arguments’) can be said to be perfectly ungrounded. 3. In activism, the compromise-based, ad hoc decision mechanisms are to a large extent replaced by deduction from abstract fundamental principles, and this stiffens society. This decisionmaking mechanism is unsuited for reconciling the million internal contradictions of a complex society and maintaining it. 4. The rise and strengthening of fundamental rights constitutional judging has in the last forty years brought tensions into the traditional structure of the law in the Western world, too: into the cooperation of political legislation, black-letter law activities, and the judicial development of the law. Activism intensiﬁes this tension dangerously, and ‘makes dynamite’ out of fundamental rights, which might after a while damage the legal system. 5. Finally, the problems listed might in the Hungarian political system make the dominant political power seriously consider that constitutional judging should be radically curbed, or, in the case of radical movements, abolished altogether. Activism, thus, is not only dangerous for the legal system and parliamentarism but also to the very institution of constitutional judging.”31 In addition to the frontal attacks, there were also some people offering friendly criticism. Their majority considered activism about fundamental rights acceptable, even to be supported expressly, while, in the case of questions about jurisdiction and the structure of the state, they thought one should stick to the written text of the constitution.32 János Kis deﬁned three different types of activism in his analysis of constitutional democracy.33 In his view, jurisdictional activism is when the CC starts a procedure or makes a decision for which it is not authorised by the law and if it expands its review to the constitutionality of laws which the petitioner did not object to. A CHANGE OF DIRECTION

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Activism of constitutional interpretation is when the CC does not merely apply but, in reality, modiﬁes or supplements the constitution, mostly by comparing the law under review with rules that do not appear explicitly in the constitution. If the court makes a partial decision based on political motives, it is committing activism deriving from political bias. He thinks one should appoint the limits of the interpretation of fundamental rights on this side of natural law but beyond constitutional positivism in the traditional sense and this framework does not make it possible to overrule the text of the constitution on moral grounds. Gábor Halmai, whose views are similar to Dworkin’s and who engaged in a debate with Béla Pokol, defends activism about fundamental rights on a moral basis, but he criticises activism about the structure of the state and jurisdiction: “judges have to decide in actual cases not simply on the basis of the constitution’s letters but the principles determined by the constitution’s abstract clauses. Activism as argument based on such principles, therefore, cannot possibly be eliminated from constitutional judging.”34 The debate did not come to a consensus about what conceptual basis there is for the support of activism about fundamental rights and for the prohibition of jurisdictional activism. As Gábor Attila Tóth writes, “the question is not whether there exists a sort of activism that is acceptable but whether the solutions that activists of fundamental rights support are really equivalent to the expansion or the rephrasing of the constitution.”35 After serious internal debate, the Constitutional Court evolved its own understanding of its role: to function as a real counterweight to the majority rule. It admitted that the constitution stands above it as an absolute standard and it is the parliament that makes the constitution. The majority of the CC until 2011 held by the view that they did not require a content review of the constitutionality of amendments to the constitution, even though, it added subtly, “that could in principle be argued.” During the two-thirds majority of the Horn government, the governing powers were not excited by the interpretation of unconstitutional amendments 138

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but by trying to handle the constitutional veto of the Bokros Package and by making a new constitution. There were ﬁerce debates already in this period about whether it should be the parliamentary supremacy, built on the principle of representation, or the constitutional control providing the protection of fundamental rights that should be the determining ordering principle of public-law relationships. These debates came to be even ﬁercer in the period of the second Orbán government wielding a constitutional majority. AFTER THIRTY YEARS: THE DETHRONEMENT OF THE “INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION” AND THE VICTORY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PARLIAMENTARY SUPREMACY The 2010 parliamentary elections brought the overwhelming victory of the Fidesz–KDNP alliance. The supermajority-wielding government set out to make a new constitution. Strategic decision-makers in Fidesz had been preparing for a long time to bring down the system bargained for by the economic, political, and intellectual elite of the status quo and to break the power of “congealed post-communist structures.”36 Those scholars ideologically close to the government’s national–conservative point of view kept emphasising that “the changes that happened, to the advantage of the rule of law, with repelling multiparty parliamentarism, can today be seen more or less as the suffocation of democracy.”37 They thought serious distortions had happened within constitutional structures, seriously limiting the capacity of governments to act. Thus, the exaggerations of the separation of powers must be curbed, the supremacy of the elected parliament replaced, and a strong state and effective administration built. They put in several suggestions for reforming the system of constitutional law and for new innovations in constitutional regulation.38 Some analyses suggested a radical break with the previous period, the rehabilitation of the jurisdiction of the Holy Crown, and the restoration of the public-law continuity broken by the elimination of the historic constitution. Others called our constitutional development a dead end that far

and argued that “constitutionality, the rule of law cannot emerge but as an answer of our own to challenges of our own”39 so it is time to stop copying foreign examples. The reason behind the European attacks on the Hungarian government is mostly the prime minister’s intention to repoliticise political questions and to realise the majority authorisation. This motive went against the main direction of the European Union’s politics, the legalisation of political questions, that is, the solution of problems through legal or judicial ways. “With the extreme dominance of human-rights thinking and the clear limitation of the realisation of the majority principle, European politics is sharply opposed to the principle based on the full sovereignty of a parliamentary majority given by a single party.”40 This argument is the fundamental pillar of political constitutionalism. The acceptance of the Fundamental Law and its amendments show that the national– conservative government majority made use of the “constitutional moment”41 and—at numerous points, building on the critiques about the constitutional setup—performed the largest reform of the Hungarian legal system after the regime change in both content and structure. The Fundamental Law, accepted exactly one year after the 2010 parliamentary elections, was intended to symbolise, even in its title, a break with the system built on the pacts of the old elite. Here, a new political generation was claiming its place that was not bound by the compromises of the previous period, did not accept the “annulment” of the historic constitution, judged the role of the family in maintaining communities important, and did not give up the idea of reunifying the nation without revising the borders. The break with the earlier constitutional identity, which aspired to a certain political neutrality, is expressed best in the preamble of the Fundamental Law, the National Avowal.42 From the point of view of the increase of political constitutionality, the introductory chapter of the Fundamental Law can be interpreted as intending to symbolise the dethronement of the “invisible constitution” and the rehabilitation of the historic one. The text shows a return to a kind of traditional statehood by not even mentioning

the rule of law. Instead, it has the following: “We hold that the common goal of citizens and the State is to achieve the highest possible measure of well-being, safety, order, justice and liberty.” The National Avowal seeks to establish the new constitutional identity not only emotionally; it can also be of key importance in the interpretation of the constitution’s text. Article R, (3) adds that “The provisions of the Fundamental Law shall be interpreted in accordance with their purposes, the National Avowal contained therein and the achievements of our historic constitution.” The message of the obligatory triad of constitutional interpretation (especially if we connect it with the fourth amendment, to be discussed later) is clearly the replacement of the “invisible constitution” as the standard of fundamental rights activism. If we look at the critiques directed at the earlier constitution, it is easy to see that the Fundamental Law also includes what the critics found most important but lacking. In addition to the catalogue of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, there is now community-centred regulation, in addition to rights, there are now civil obligations, and, among the interpretive criteria for the judiciary, there is the requirement to accord with common sense and the public good, and the standard of the moral and economic purpose (Article 28). Apart from reinforcing the role of the state and limiting the selling of national property, the Fundamental Law now also includes the (muchdebated) rules of public burdens and pensions. The new constitution shows an interesting duality: “by identifying itself as the endpoint of the regime change—continuity in it is not built on the constitution of the previous twenty years. . . . In its rhetoric, it suggests a return to the historic roots of Hungarian statehood, in its normative content, however, it is connected to the democratic Constitution of 1989.”43 Thus, the “revolution in the voting booths” brought the victory of political constitutionality. The activism of the constitutional court was replaced by the activism based on a supermajority parliamentary supremacy. This constitutional majority amended the Constitution nine times still in the year of the elections (that is, parallel A CHANGE OF DIRECTION

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to the preparation of the Fundamental Law), radically changing the structure of the Hungarian state organisation.44 These amendments served purposes of power politics and symbolism, achieved a strong shift in the system of the separation of powers, and delegitimised the 1989 Constitution. In the new system of the separation of powers, the sharpest conflicts came to be those between the Constitutional Court and the governmental supreme power that has become closely intertwined with the legislative power posing as constitutional.45 The creators of the Fundamental Law intended to make a constitution as hard as a rock. The democratic and professional deficits of “revolutionary legislation,” the “boundless lawyering” of the Constitutional Court, and the “intrigue of globalist cadres” hiding behind the Venice Commission forced the constitutional majority to adjust the text of the Fundamental Law to the actual political challenges with multiple amendments. After the fourth amendment, the political agenda was no longer dominated by constitutional conflicts. If we want a landscape after battle, we could say that the governing majority, for its part, considered the first phase of constitutional work done and intended to consolidate the achievements of the second constitutional revolution. The opposition thought in terms of a certain “restorative constitutional work,” the radical side argued for a return to the 1989 bases of the rule of law, and the moderates urged a compromise with the national–conservative side. The profession of constitutional law sought to process the changes through academic conferences and scholarly research projects.46 AFTERWORD—WITH SOME FOOD FOR THOUGHT The rule of law has no democratic alternative, and one cannot govern effectively without stable constitutional foundations. As the historic constitution could not be eliminated from Hungarian public-law culture, it is also impossible to make the twenty-year-long legal development work of the Constitutional Court disappear from Hungarian constitutional 140

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culture. The political elite of the regime change cannot shift the responsibility for its inability to make decisions or to agree to the overly active Constitutional Court. Today, we face a reverse situation: the governmental majority made several decisions which have far-reaching socioeconomic consequences. It is responsible for this, and voters will decide whether they consider these policies right or wrong. The Constitutional Court has no competency to judge political decisions, but it does have the competency to judge the constitutionality of the laws brought in front of it. This is, indeed, its task assigned in the Fundamental Law. If the constitutional majority, for short-term political interest, pulls out budgetary and taxation questions from constitutional control, it hurts the rule of law and economic constitutionality seriously. If it regularly “overconstitutionalises” by annulling decisions of the Constitutional Court it does not like, it disturbs the unity and consistency of the constitution and can be accused of abusive constitutionalism.47 In the system of the separation of powers, the constitutional requirement of the cooperation of powers must be fulfilled, too, not only their separation. If there is a constitutional majority in parliament, the Constitutional Court, the only real counterweight, has an especially great responsibility. In consolidated periods, it is more apparent how heavily the parliament and the government need to rely on the protector of constitutional order, the Constitutional Court. It is in the common interest of the constitutional institutions (not to say of the nation) that the implicit values and normative rules of the Fundamental Law should win the voters’ approval and, therefore, the people should be willing to follow them. If we sacrifice constitutional values and stability in petty power struggles, the whole society will have to pay a heavy price later. In a democratic, constitutional state, the separation of powers is not the question of who defeats who but must offer solutions to the essence of the mutually supportive and limiting systems of constitutional responsibility and the ever-fuller service of the public good. This is what we should learn from the debates of the first constitutional regime change.

ENDNOTES

48/1991.(IX.26) CC decision. Az Alkotmánybíróság

1 Roman Herzog, former chair of the German constitutional

Határozatai, 1991, edited by Sólyom László–Holló András.

court, called Spanish and Portuguese constitutional courts the

TRIORG Kft., [s.l.a.]. 239–241.

“daughters of Karlsruhe” but those founded after the regime

12 “The rules of legal certainty for legislation are evident, and

change in Central and Eastern Europe the “granddaughters”

they are just as not the inventions of the Constitutional Court

of the German court.

as the basic requirement of legal certainty. These principles

2 “The opposition united in the Round Table originally by no

would be provisions of a constitutional rank—if the concept of

means wished to make a constitution. . . . They wanted even

the constitutional act had remained, and if the parliament had

to touch upon the Constitution itself only insofar as they

made the law about the order of legislation back then.”

wanted to delete from it the basic values, also protected by

Sólyom, 708.

criminal law, that fixed the foundations of the state socialist

13 Kukorelli István: Tradíció és modernizáció a magyar

regime and, at the same time, hoped to create a real system

alkotmányjogban. Századvég Politikai Iskola Alapítvány,

of political liberties. They did not even wish to discuss the

Budapest, 2006. 102.

basic public-law structure, the great institutions of the

14 Paczolay Péter: „Jó állam – jó jog”. In: Állam és jog.

separation of powers. They thought it was the task of the

Kodifikációs kihívások napjainkban, edited by Fejes Zsuzsanna

freely elected Parliament to frame all this in a new constitution.”

[et al.]. Magyar Jog- és Államtudományi Társaság–Gondolat

Tölgyessy Péter: Az alkotmányosság helyreállításának húsz

Kiadó, Szeged–Budapest, 2013. 13.

esztendeje. Vissza a kezdőkörbe. In: A köztársasági alkotmány

15 The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe defined

20 éve, edited by Kocsis Miklós–Zeller Judit. Pécsi

the content elements of the rule of law: 1) legality and ensuring

Alkotmányjogi Műhely Alapítvány, Pécs, 2009. 22.

transparent, accountable, democratic legislation; 2) guarantee

3 Antall József: Modell és valóság. Vols. I–II. Antall József

of legal certainty; 3) prohibition of arbitrary exercise of power;

Alapítvány, Budapest, 2007.

4) the right to appeal to independent and impartial judicial

4 The party state’s parliament approved the law on the

bodies; 5) respect of human rights; 6) prohibition of

Constitutional Court as no. XXXII in 1989 and, then, on 23

discrimination and the principle of equality before the law. In:

November 1989, elected its first five members: Antal Ádám,

CDL-AD (2011)003rev. Report on rule of law. Adopted by

Géza Kilényi, Pál Solt, László Sólyom, and János Zlinszky.

Venice Commission at its 86th plenary session (Venice, 25–26

5 A lot has been written about the regime change. For a most

March 2011).

structured survey of the processes, see Bihari Mihály: A

16 Norman Dorsen [ ET

magyar politika, 1944–2004. Politikai és hatalmi viszonyok.

Cases and Materials. St. Paul, Thompson West, 2003.

Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2005. 333–413. Focussed not so

108–109.

much on structural processes is Kéri László: A rendszerváltás

17 In the earlier legal system, the principle of the separation

krónikája, 1998–2009. Kossuth Kiadó–Népszabadság,

of powers is mentioned only once, in the preamble of the law

Budapest, 2010. For an approach focussed on public law, see

on the Constitutional Court. The Fundamental Law of Hungary,

Smuk Péter: Magyar közjog és politika, 1989–2011. Osiris

on the other hand, explicitly includes the separation of powers:

Kiadó, Budapest, 2011.

“The functioning of the Hungarian State shall be based on the

6 11/1992. (III.5) CC decision. Az Alkotmánybíróság

principle of the division of powers.” See The Fundamental Law

határozatai, 1992, edited by Sólyom László–Holló András.

of Hungary, Article C, (1).

UNIÓ Lap- és Könyvkiadó Kereskedelmi Kft., Budapest, [s.a.].

18 31/1990.(XII.18.) CC decision. See Az Alkotmánybíróság

80.

határozatai, 1990, 137.

7 Sólyom László: Az alkotmánybíráskodás kezdetei

19 38/1993. (VI.11.) AB decision. See Sólyom László–Holló

Magyarországon. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2001. 686–687.

András: Az Alkotmánybíróság határozatai, 1993. UNIÓ Lap- és

8 31/1990.(XII.18.) CC decision. Az Alkotmánybíróság

Könyvkiadó Kereskedelmi Kft., [s.l.a]. 261–262.

határozatai, 1990, edited by Sólyom László–Holló András.

20 8/1992. (I.30.) CC decision. See Az Alkotmánybíróság

TRIORG Kft., [s.l.a.]. 141.

határozatai, 1992, 54.

9 Az Alkotmánybíróság határozatai, 1992, 82.

21 28/1995.(V.19.) CC decision. See Az Alkotmánybíróság

10 Sólyom, 699.

határozatai, 1995. [s.l.a.n.]. 142.

11 Judges of the CC Géza Kilényi, Péter Schmidt and Imre

22 Halmai Gábor: Bevezetés. Az aktivizmus vége? In:

Vörös attached their minority report in this question. See, e.g.,

A megtalált alkotmány? A magyar alapjogi bíráskodás első

AL .]:

Comparative Conctitutionalism.

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141

kilenc éve, edited by Halmai Gábor. INDOK. Emberi Jogi

34 Halmai Gábor: A véleményszabadság határai. Atlantisz

Információs és Dokumentációs Központ, Budapest, 2000. 12.

Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1994. 85.

23 A „nehéz eseteknél” a bíró erkölcsi felfogása jut szerephez.

35 Tóth, 24.

Sólyom Lászlóval, az Alkotmánybíróság elnökével Tóth Gábor

36 This concept was introduced into the political discourse by

Attila beszélget. Fundamentum. 1997/1. 37.

Gyula Tellér, who characterised the socialist–liberal coalition

24 23/1990. (X.31.) CC decision. See Az Alkotmánybíróság

that replaced the first freely elected government as follows:

határozatai, 1990, 89.

“The parties entering into coalition in 1994 had vast economic

25 András Zs. Varga’s book sharply criticised court activism

and social forces behind them. On the one hand, the financial–

and the use of constitutionality as a “free pass” in the

administrative apparatus with its constructions to operate and

constitutional court. See Varga Zs. András: Eszményből

finance the economy that they had built up in two decades on

bálvány? A joguralom dogmatikája. Századvég Kiadó,

the Monetary Fund’s recipe and that always defined how much

Budapest, 2015. 16–19 and 109–111.

room governments had to manoeuvre, the three circles of

26 Csink Lórant: Mozaikok a hatalommegosztáshoz. Pázmány

usury; on the other, the party clients of the Hungarian Socialist

Press, Budapest, 2014. 27.

Party with their network of significant financial and network

27 Tóth Gábor Attila: Túl a szövegen. Értekezés a magyar

power, with the ‘congealed structures.’ On the surface,

alkotmányról. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2009. 17.

relatively little could be seen of these forces operating in the

28 A professor of University College, London, in a book

depth and determining elbow room.” Tellér Gyula:

published a few years ago, really questions the legitimacy and

Hatalomgyakorlás az MSZP–SZDSZ koalíció idején. Kairosz

the effectiveness of constitutional judging. See Richard Bellamy:

Kiadó, Budapest, 1999. 51.

Political Constitutionalism. A Republican Defense of the

37 According to Béla Pokol, “However large legislative majority

Constitutionality of Democracy. Cambridge University Press,

comes into power to realise society’s will to change, replacing

Cambridge, 2007. German Law Journal had a special issue

the overwhelmed, earlier governmental majority, it is confined

devoted to the constitutional law debates instigated by political

in legislating by the detailed prescriptions of about twenty

constitutionalism: German Law Journal. 2013/december. Two

thousand pages of the collected decisions of the constitutional

Hungarian authors have written on this in some detail. See

court, which can, on top of this, be interpreted in several

Pócza Kálmán: Alkotmányozás Magyarországon és az Egyesült

ways, and so a government majority can never be sure to be

Királyságban. Kommentár. 2012/5. 35–50; Antall Attila: Politikai

able to realise its will.” Pokol Béla: Demokrácia,

és jogi alkotmányosság Magyarországon. Politikatudományi

hatalommegosztás és az állam cselekvőképessége. In: Húsz

Szemle. 2013/3. 48–70.

éve szabadon Közép-Európában. Demokrácia, politika, jog,

29 Georg Brunner: Development of a Constitutional Judiciary

edited by János Simon. Konrad Adenauer Alapítvány,

in Eastern Europe. Review of Central and Eastern European

Budapest, 2011. 451.

Law. 1992/6. 539.

38 In his study cited in the previous note, Béla Pokol makes

30 Varga Csaba: Jogmegújítás alkotmánybíráskodás útján?

suggestions about a more accurate normative content of

In: Formatori Iuris Publici. Studia in Honorem Geisæ Kilényi

constitutional fundamental rights and obligations, a significant

Septuagenarii. Ünnepi kötet Kilényi Géza professzor 70.

recasting of the CC’s jurisdiction and operation, the rethinking

születésnapjára, edited by Hajas Barna–Schanda Balázs.

of the judicial organisational hierarchy and the system of

Szent István Társulat, Budapest, 2006. 540.

appointments, and the guarantees of interpreting the new

31 Pokol Béla: Aktivizmus és az Alkotmánybíróság. In:

constitution limiting the use of the “invisible constitution.” See

Magyarország politikai évkönyve. Vass László–Sándor Péter–

Pokol (2011), 453–455.

Kurtán Sándor. Demokrácia Kutatások Magyar Központja

39 In his writings, Csaba Varga is extremely critical of the CC’s

Alapítvány, Budapest, 1992. 154.

responsibility that, with overemphasising entitlements, tipped

32 Gábor Attila Tóth gives a good summary of professional

the balance of rights and obligations, made the state a public

attitudes about activism in the first part of his book,

enemy and the law empty by exempting it from morality, and

highlighting the critical remarks of Tamás Győrfi, Béla Pokol,

rehabilitated the law of the past that had denied laws.

János Kis, Gábor Halmai. See Tóth, 15–30.

According to him, constitutionality “primarily offered protection

33 Kis János: Alkotmányos demokrácia. Három tanulmány.

to the legal positions, actors and the rights acquired by the

INDOK Bt., Budapest, 2000. 112–114.

previous regime, and, by taking the present as continuously

142

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deriving from the past, helped the legal, political, sociological,

deputy prime minister, and created the status of government

and economic survival of post-communist forces. . . . By

official. The second made it possible for a person who is not

handling the law as eggheaded theoreticians, insensitively,

a locally elected representative to be elected deputy mayor.

they expelled from it the virtues of experience and practical

The third changed the make-up of the body nominating

wisdom.” Varga Csaba: Küzdelem a jogért. In: Húsz éve

constitutional court judges. The fourth transformed the system

szabadon Közép-Európában. Demokrácia, politika, jog, edited

of the public service media. The fifth made it possible to

by Simon János. Konrad Adenauer Alapítvány, Budapest,

delegate decisions to assistant judges. The sixth created the

2011. 488–489.

conditions to retroactively tax the severance pays that had

40 Pócza.

raised much political consternation. The seventh served the

41 This is Bruce Ackerman’s term for a constitutional situation

execution of changes that had become necessary after the

when a political force single-handedly commands the majority

annulment of the law on legislation, among other things,

needed for making a constitution, and no veto player can

reshaping the law on public prosecution. It also included the

prevent it from reshaping the political rules of the game as it

Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority and the status of

pleases. Bruce Ackerman: We the People. Foundations. Vol.

government deputy into the constitution. The eighth limited

1. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1993. 17.

the powers of the CC concerning laws of economic relevance.

42 In one of his studies, Péter Szigeti expresses serious

The ninth inserted into the text of the Constitution the

worries about this fundamental thought: “The ‘National

institution of the National Media and Infocommunications

Avowal’ is a break with the ideological neutrality of the state

Authority, the president of which is appointed by the prime

because it elevated to the level of the constitution the

minister for nine years. It is worth adding that six out of these

Hungarian Right’s sense of historical value, its system and

nine amendments were initiated by individual representatives.

understanding of values. This is a foundation that is anything

45 In detail, see István Stumpf: Az Országgyűlés és az

but innocent, and there is no knowing what they will build on

Alkotmánybíróság viszonyának változásai. Parlamenti Szemle.

this pro futuro. Does denying 46 years of legal continuity lead

2019/1. 5–30.

to the logic of ‘guilty period–guilty regime–guilty institutions–

46 The opposition does not consider the Fiscal Council of

guilty persons’? The criminal accusation of history itself?”

Hungary as a serious constitutional counterweight, since its

About this, earlier in his study he also remarks that “the

make-up (the president of the Hungarian National Bank, the

constitutional construction, built on the separation of power

president of the State Audit Office, and the president of the

and valid for twenty years, was replaced by a governalist

Fiscal Council) ensures Fidesz majority in it for a long time.

state building up a new political course.” Szigeti Péter:

About its real function, they think that, if the parliamentary

A alaptörvény karaktere államelméleti és alkotmányjogi

majority had a different political make-up, it would offer an

aspektusokból. In: Tanulmányok a 70 éves Bihari Mihály

opportunity to obstruct government work or even force a new

tiszteletére, Szoboszlai-Kiss Katalin–Deli Gergely. Universitas-

election.

Győr Nonprofit Kft., Győr, 2013. 533, 535.

47 American professor of law David Landau in one of his

43 This contradiction is even more apparent in the fact that,

recent studies brings up Hungary, along with Venezuela and

while the preamble of the Fundamental Law declares the

Columbia, as an example of abusive constitutionalism. David

“nullity” of the 1949 constitution, (2) of its Closing Provisions

Landau: Abusive Constitutionalism. UC Davis Law Review.

stands in sharp opposition with this, since the Fundamental

2013/189. 189–260.

Law was ratified according to the procedural rules included in the replaced democratic Constitution. Jakab András– Sonnevend Pál: Kontinuitás hiányosságokkal. Az új magyar Alaptörvény. In: Állam és jog. Kodifikációs kihívások napjainkban, edited by Fejes Zsuzsanna [et al.] Magyar Jogés Államtudományi Társaság–Gondolat Kiadó, Szeged– Budapest, 2013. 122, 125. 44 The essential elements of the amendments: the first amendment posited a radical decrease in the number of parliamentary representatives, introduced the institution of the

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143

THE NEWBORN MULTIPARTY SYSTEM

László Kéri

The following statement appeared about the two-day meeting of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (which had conclusively dominated the official side of the country’s political life for decades), held on 10–11 February 1989: “For the wider development of democracy, taking the principles of popular sovereignty and the rule of law as starting points, the Central Committee is firmly committed to a continued in-depth reform of the system of political institutions. The Committee is convinced that the pluralisation of the political system, given the circumstances in Hungary, can be realised in a multiparty system. Based on historical experience, this would provide better guarantees for controlling government work and against the abuse of power.” This political statement, from the exclusive circle of people who exercised power, caused quite some surprise at the time both in Hungary and abroad. Of course, it did have its own history, but its significance was really proved by the confusion in domestic policy again and again in the following months. However, to better understand the enlightened and permissive statement quoted above, it is worthwhile to mention that, by that time, Fidesz had already existed for ten months,

The meeting of the Alliance of Free Democrats in the Jurta Theatre, where the members, among others, voted on forming a party in 1988 144

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having been founded before the replacement of János Kádár, at the end of March 1988. In the meantime, at the beginning of September 1988, the Hungarian Democratic Forum held its second Lakitelek meeting where its members essentially completed the programme of their projected work as a political party. In the autumn of the same year, in November, the loose Network of Free Initiatives also became a party (under the name Alliance of Free Democrats), and, nearly the same day, the most prestigious historical party, the Independent Smallholders’ Party, also announced its re-formation. We could, thus, say that the reigning party, with some delay, only acknowledged what the others no longer asked their permission about. The new parties had already been formed, but it is also true that they did so in a rather unclear legal and institutional framework that was fraught with uncertainties. That is, they took clear political risks and, thereby, coerced those in power to take the next step. There was no law yet regulating parties, but the loophole of the regulations about social organisations and associations did give a bit of room for manœuvring to those who were brave enough to experiment.1 One day before this same year was out, on 30 December, fifty parties were registered at the courts. In 1990, by the beginning of February, sixty-five parties had registered to take part in the election, to be held a month later. As speciﬁed by the rather unformed regulations of the time, in the election programmes of the public service television, all of them could have their say in the evenings. With some exaggeration, I would risk saying that it was from these ﬁve-to-ten-minutelong party adverts, broadcast every evening, that most people in Hungary were informed that the multiparty system had really arrived in the country. And it did so with thousands of styles, messages, and internal problems.2

Not half of them could, however, overcome the obstacles, made more difficult by having to collect “knock notes,” citizens’ recommendation slips needed for running in the elections; only twenty-eight parties managed to put up at least one candidate. To be able to start a national list, they would have had to do this in at least seven counties, and, in this, only twelve parties were successful. It was really only them that could take part in the “first free Hungarian elections” held on 25 March 1990 and its second round on 8 April. Out of this dozen, only six parties made the parliamentary threshold that was then at 4%—but these six parties managed to become practically the only protagonists in Hungary’s political life for the next two decades. Several conclusions can be drawn from this short overview; for example, that, in this period, there already must have been a surprisingly big social demand for the multiparty system. It is also clear that only a few organisations were really fitted and prepared to become competitive political forces. We have not mentioned the international context yet, but we need to devote at least one sentence to point out that, from the summer of 1989 to February 1990, the whole of the former Soviet empire (including the [step] mother country, the Soviet Union) was going through a crisis and changes, unprecedented since 1945. Keeping all this in mind, in what follows, we rather concentrate on shedding some light on the details of Hungarian riddles. THE DYNAMICS OF THE SPECIFIC PERIOD: A SKETCH OF 1989 There was a very instructive power rearrangement to observe behind the changes described briefly above, which were undoubtedly of unparalleled speed in historical comparison, too. In the first eight to ten weeks of 1989, the public perceived that the basic field of political and power conflict is within the party in power, between two leaders of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. This perception was inherited by the public from the autumn of the previous year, from the chaotic months after Kádár’s fall. The conservative direction, the one blocking the changes, was embodied in Károly Grósz, who

served as head of the government until the end of November 1988, but, at the same time, he was the one-man party leader, too. There was no doubt that, at this time, he still had a decisive influence on all important power factors. The opposing pole was Imre Pozsgay, who had been for years the most progressive person in the ruling party and who was thought to be able to cooperate with other political forces, too. The Central Committee statement, quoted in my prologue, also showed the draw between the two directions. The significance of the Grósz vs Pozsgay struggle faded later, in the spring, since, at that time, the poles of a new and much more important struggle were starting to form. On 22 March 1989, eight opposition parties created a forum named Opposition Round Table (Ellenzéki Kerekasztal, EKA). They wished to accomplish two tasks with this step. Firstly, they wanted to defend themselves against the ruling party’s intentions of negotiating with the opposition forces separately and, thus, dividing them. (In retrospect, one might perhaps briefly recall that there was some reality to this: at that point, there were still significant differences between the opposition parties concerning how important they thought cooperation with those in power or the open refusal of it.)3 Second, with the regular meetings they were trying to prepare for the time when the real task would not be the introduction of reforms but creating the foundations of an entirely new system. The activities of the Opposition Round Table initially did not raise much interest. Apart from those involved, really very few could actually know what was happening in a seminar room at one of the departments at Eötvös Loránt University’s Faculty of Law. However, this isolation worked to the advantage, rather than the disadvantage, of forming the common ground between the eight parties. As a matter of fact, the special importance of this unity soon became clear. From April (not the least thanks to the bargaining in preparation for the reinterment of Imre Nagy and his fellow martyrs4), it seemed more and more unavoidable to start making arrangements between the opposition and the ruling party in some institutional context. This A CHANGE OF DIRECTION

145

finally happened on 13 June, when, surrounded by television cameras, the three-sided National Round Table (Nemzeti Kerekasztal, NKA) could start its work, and, meeting every day until 18 September, in the series of unimaginably long negotiations, came up with the most important two dozen documents of the regime change. Between the spring and autumn of 1989, thus, the basic conflict between the sphere of power and political life was one between the ruling party, representing the single-party model, and the opposition, which had by that time become unified.5 It became apparent on the same day (18 September), however, that members of the opposition, unified up to that point, had serious disagreements with each other on a number of basic issues. Even though, until the beginning of October, the ruling party was caught up in some delayed organisational realignments, the party that emerged there (the Hungarian Socialist Party) seemed to come too late for the new political competition. Meanwhile, the two biggest opposition parties, the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats got a start on the long campaign struggle with each other before the future elections. And, from this point on, the fundamental fault line of the sphere of power was located within the opposition. The Free Democrats got the first advantage at the end of November with the so-called “Four Yeses” referendum, which, to everyone’s surprise, was quite successful. The other parties also appeared and had some voice in the events sooner or later, but the main factors of the

Campaign posters from the period of the ﬁrst free elections in 1990

146

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equation remained these two big parties. (What this looked like in practice was that each new party was put down as the satellite of one or the other.) So it was not very surprising at the 1990 elections that nearly half of the valid votes were cast for these two parties and that, after the first round, the difference between them was really negligible (finally 164,000 votes decided it for the Hungarian Democratic Forum). The second round, held in April, then moved the deeper layer of Hungarian society’s political culture, and so the more moderate Hungarian Democratic Forum, which campaigned with less dramatic changes, could mobilise more undecided voters than the apparently too radical Free Democrats. After all this, the two could even have governed in a grand coalition, and their respective voters also showed the demand for it. But the political representatives did it in an entirely different way, and rather attempted to institutionalise the fault line that had freshly formed between the two parties during the previous half year. So the Hungarian Democratic Forum became the governing power, and the Free Democrats the leading power of the opposition. (And if truth be told, they did manage to perpetuate this fault line in Hungarian society right up to 2010; the most that changed was the exact party make-up of the poles and their proportional power while the important points did not change. However, in the very same year, apparently, some kind of a new structure started to evolve.) Let us look back for a moment: in the course of a single year, incredibly fast changes, continually showing brand new political content, rained down on a country whose inhabitants could not have possibly lived through any important political changes for thirty-five years. First, the conflicts within the sphere of power seemed of landmark importance. Then the struggle between those in power and the opposition claimed everyone’s attention. From autumn, the conflict between forces only just introduced, the opposition parties, became the most important fault lines.6 It is a miracle indeed that, in the course of this transformation of breath-taking speed, in March 1990, the overwhelming majority of Hungarian

voters could, in fact, choose the half-dozen new applicants who were capable of governing. It is worth noting that the public opinion, the media, the parties, and their supporters all had to adapt to these whirlwind-like changes in public and political life. The newly organised political forces could do this much faster than the powerful Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, with its eight hundred thousand members, ninety thousand units, its real estate wealth, thousands of employees, and its economic background. The new parties had neither wealth nor officers dependent on them, nor did they have any significant membership, and so they were not bound by anything. This was why they could adapt much more easily to the changes with their new party elite of a few dozen people. This is a puzzling phenomenon, but, as a matter of fact, in a historical context, it is only inexplicable at first sight, since, if we look back at these parties’ background in a longer perspective, it explains a lot of later developments, too.7 To understand these factors, however, we must recall an event that had happened half a decade earlier and seemed to lie dormant for a long time. THE LATENT PHASE OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE HUNGARIAN MULTIPARTY SYSTEM: 1985–19888 The Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party held its 13rd congress in the spring of 1985; it was a rather meaningless event only proving the party was not fit to face the ever-multiplying signs of the crisis. This prompted a number of protopolitical social groups and civil organisations which had been active anyway to try to gather information and seek a way out themselves. Those formations that had a longer history and more courageous traditions, went nearly up to openly organising politically. In June 1985, in a camping site near Budapest (in Monor), forty-five members of the then opposition groups gathered to discuss the tasks the Hungarian nation was facing and the details of preparation work for the crisis. On the list of those invited and those who gave talks we find the most important future leaders of the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the

An issue of the samizdat periodical Beszélő

Free Democrats, the representatives of the radical economic reformer group, and the socalled ’56-ers, too, those who wanted to keep the memory of the silenced revolution alive. It might also be of interest to mention that the overwhelming majority of those present at the Monor meeting were, half a decade earlier, involved in making the Bibó memorial volume, which (at least in this author’s opinion) was one of the highest-standard and most enduring intellectual achievements of the Kádár era.9 In the same summer, in August, the 4th Summer Camp of Special Colleges was held (organised by Bibó Special College and Rajk Special College) in Szarvas, where, in four days, the hotbeds of crisis in Hungarian society were also discussed. Among those giving talks, chairing sessions and debates, we find the key figures of the first Fidesz government (in office from 1998) from Viktor Orbán through Attila Chikán and István Stumpf to László Kövér. (The Special Colleges were perhaps the freest intellectual workshops of the 1980s, although they were merely tolerated on the margins of university life as closed communities.) Later, this casual unity seen in Monor dissolved. The Beszélő circle published its own programme in the summer of 1987, entitled The social contract, as a special issue of their samizdat periodical. However, from this, they left out the popular intellectual side of the opposition.10 This latter group, in turn, did not invite the members of the Beszélő circle to their initial meeting in Lakitelek in September. In the intellectual groups, clubs that were being established everywhere in the country and in A CHANGE OF DIRECTION

147

the debate forums held regularly, the organisers could not know about these inner tensions, so the well-known ﬁgures of both camps were still invited to these weekly forums. The several dozen research economists who took part in preparing the comprehensive reform plan package called Turn and reform were equally popular.11 It was in these few years that the Hungarian public split into half in a fundamental and serious way. One could talk and debate about anything at the forums by then, but the ofﬁcial media wanted to have nothing to do with what kept hundreds of thousands of people occupied every week. (The later parties could create their missing pool of cadres mostly from the activists that surfaced in these various movements.) Returning to the 1990 election competition of the parties, this brief overview of antecedents can shed some light on the early weaknesses of Hungarian multiparty politicking. That is, that with the urgency of this sort of awakening and then the pressures of having to build up a marketable organisation in one year, those specialised intellectual circles whose members had not had much chance to appear in public before came to have unproportionately more opportunities to do so. These groups had, as compared to the majority of society, incomparably more motivation and willingness to debate ideological and subcultural issues than to process and effectively solve the economic, social, and administrational questions that the regime change necessarily brought up. It was mostly thanks to this that even the parties that made it into parliament

The two victorious parties of the 1990 election could even have formed a grand coalition—but their leaders decided otherwise.

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The 2nd Congress of Fidesz

were unable to increase their members’ number significantly in the next years and could not change their social connectedness. A SIDE NOTE—AFTER THIRTY YEARS Having surveyed a period of several decades, we see that the internal relations of the Hungarian party structure have gone through at least three or four significant changes since 1989.12 Out of the six parties that were of definitive importance at the regime change, four have disappeared or disintegrated. Only two of them remained active. The socialists initially made attempts to become a modern people’s party on the Left, but, in the eight years in which they governed, they used up all their organisational, personal, and intellectual capacities, and, now are fighting for bare survival. After its 2002 defeat, Fidesz leapt to the task with elemental force to create its missing social base and had by 2010 largely completed it: they managed to build themselves up as a people’s party on the Right. It is mostly thanks to this that they could win three elections in a row. It seems that, however, they are threatened by the same danger that the socialists faced after 2002. Lost in governmental labyrinths and the need to create a long-term, secure financial base, the party is starting to lose its people’s party character and slide back to the well-known and rather fragile category of an “election party.” After thirty years and only years before the next election, what we see is that new party configurations have appeared in Hungary, and the party structure is due for a new turn. However, no serious attempts can be seen now to correct its original mistakes.

ENDNOTES

7 István Stumpf’s two papers, written at that time, give an

1 One of the most interesting documents about these

overview of these problems that is still valid. See Stumpf

developments is the book Magyarország politikai évkönyve,

István: Pártosodás ’89. In: Magyarország politikai évkönyve,

1990, which is about the year 1989. Péter Szalay’s paper,

1990, 386 – 399, and Stumpf István: Pár tosodás és

published in this volume, is a document of the age, a legal

választások Magyarországon. In: A többpár trendszer

memorial, and advice for beginner party founders. See Szalay

kialakulása Magyarországon, 1985–1991, edited by Bihari

Péter: Hogyan kell pártot alapítani? In: Magyarország politikai

Mihály. Kossuth Kiadó, Budapest, 1992. 40–55.

évkönyve, 1990, edited by Kurtán Sándor–Sándor Péter–Vass

8 It is impossible to keep up with the scholarship that has

László. Aula Kiadó Kft.–OMIKK, Budapest, 1990. 378–386.

been published about this period of key importance, but that

2 These party introductions and debates on television,

has made it possible to sum up the long (and, at the time,

weeks before the first elections, widened our knowledge

not very public) process of the parties’ formation with the

about the unimaginably colourful political–cultural heritage

historian’s professionalism. See a recent and very thorough

more than anything else before. This author recorded all

pape r by Romsic s. Romsic s Ignác: A z 1989 -e s

these at the time and used them as excellent teaching aids

rendszer váltók. In: Romsics Ignác: Magyar rebellisek.

for twenty years to illustrate how many different, dormant

Helikon Kiadó, Budapest, 2019. 351–425.

traditions of Hungarian political subculture we have to pay

9 The creation of the Bibó memorial volume was one of the

attention to.

least appreciated and rarely mentioned events of Hungarian

3 Sadly, we can only refer very briefly to the importance of

post-war public life. The Wikipedia article about it gives the

international context, which, at the time, was changing very

gist, but Miklós Szabó’s article, written at the time, is a much

rapidly. In the spring of 1989, not very many signs implied

better source. See Szabó Miklós: A Bibó-emlékkönyv.

that the Soviet bloc would collapse by the end of the year,

Beszélő. October 1981/1. 98–101.

and so it is not fair to reproach in retrospect those who still

10 See Beszélő 20. Beszélő. June 1987/2. 847.

thought that they needed to cooperate with the party state

11 This publication could appear as a special issue of

if only because of the hostile reactions of the international

Közgazdasági Szemle only after months of struggle with

context.

the party centre in June 1987. See its new edition: Antal

4 To accomplish this reinterment, which happened on 16

László [et al.]: Fordulat és reform. Közgazdasági Szemle.

June and can be considered the psychological turning point

2014/October. 1175–1199.

of the regime change, a lengthy series of negotiations was

12 I have discussed these structural changes in great detail

needed, fraught with turns worthy of any detective movie.

in a 2009 volume of essays. See Kéri László: A

Which is understandable, since both sides knew well that the

többpártrendszer húsz éve. In: A rendszerváltás húsz éve.

relationship to 1956 and the execution of Imre Nagy and his

Változások és választások, edited by Bayer József–Boda

fellows could easily destroy the legitimising ground of the

Zsolt. L’Harmattan Kiadó, Budapest, 2009. 113–135.

Kádár system. And, as it turned out, it was exactly this that happened. 5 The series of negotiations in the summer of 1989 that lasted for nearly a quarter of a year was one of the most successful and most productive political event of modern Hungarian history, an event of supreme importance which did not receive public recognition then and has not received it since then either. Even though its scholarly processing is complete, the public has still not become fully aware of how exceptionally important it was that the Hungarian transition was peaceful and bloodless due to these talks. 6 I discussed this realignment of fault lines in detail in a study. See Kéri László: Az átmenet hosszú évei és a demokrácia serdülőkora, 1985–1998. In: Mi a politika? Bevezetés a politika világába, edited by Gyurgyák János. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2004. 394–421.

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FREEDOMFREIHEITSZABADSÁG: THE EFFECT OF THE REGIME CHANGE ON EVERYDAY LIFE Eszter Zsófia Tóth

The first freely elected government, József Antall’s, realised the goals of the 1956 revolution: speech and the press were free, parliamentary democracy was established, freedom of assembly and association were again liberties belonging to everyone—we could go on listing the achievements. However, this paper rather aims to explore what it was that meant freedom most to the citizens themselves and what alternative interpretations of the world appeared in this change-ridden period. MUSIC In the summer of the regime change, not long after American President George H. W. Bush’s visit to Hungary, it was Kaoma’s “Lambada” that was blaring from everywhere. Earlier, during Kádár’s dictatorship, it would have been unimaginable that the music for such an erotic dance could be heard anywhere in Hungary. Then there was “Ooops Up” by Snap!, with a similarly erotic content. Commercial radio stations like Calypso had already existed, so one could listen to music all day, freely. It was not Péter Erdős and Hungaroton that decided what people listened to any more. The spread of music was facilitated by copied cassettes, too.

It was not Péter Erdős and Hungaroton that decided what people listened to any more.

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One could bring in dual cassette decks from Vienna, and, thus, one could procure practically any music, even if not in the best quality. I myself was Depeche Mode’s distributor in my high school class, but I got the albums of the Hungarian alternative band Pál Utcai Fiúk in the same way, too. This way, everyone could have the music of their own, it was not the state any more that declared what one had to listen to. The new instrument of listening to music was the Walkman. “Walkman. That was the name of this epoch-making invention. . . . The small cassette player and headphones hide humbly on passers-by. One click, and one does not have to listen to others in the street, on the bus, in the stores; the sweet melodies, the invigorating pulse fill one’s ear. . . . If you use it a lot or improperly, it can cause hearing disorders, states a doctor in an institution for young hearing-impaired people in Paris. Overusing this gadget tires out the ears. In Switzerland, they banned the use of Walkman for those who ride two-wheeled vehicles: bicycles, motorbikes.”1 The market value of a Walkman was still high in 1987. According to an ad, someone wanted to exchange his stereo record player and Walkman for a small-screen television or a hi-fi stand.2 A journalist at Hét considered it an advantage of Walkman that, while earlier the youth brought their portable cassette players with them to blare music from, and, thus, escalated generational conflicts by disturbing the elderly, the new device made all of that disappear. The age of the Walkman was ended by technological development. As a retrospective article said in 2003: “More than twenty years have passed since the first appearance of the Walkman. During this time, the music source that used to be the size of two cigarette boxes shrank to the size of a peach kernel, or, if it did not, then,

Radio Calypso was one of the first commercial radio channels in Hungary (pictured: László B. Tóth editor-in-chief).

with a high-capacity, miniature hard drive, it can contain more than ten hours of music.”3 Ágnes Gy. remembers this: “In the higher years of primary school, my Walkman was like my entire world. Every week, I would record my favourite songs from the radio and make mistapes which were labelled according to moods. I even made the covers with great care and wrote the names of the artists and the titles of the songs strictly in orange gel roller pen. I always used up every single second on both sides A and B. . . . In that period, we often went on trips to Vienna with my parents, and, then, for my sake, we always went to the huge Virgin Megastore, too, where I always got some new cassette. On the way back, I was already listening to it in the car, while, on the way there, I was listening to my own mixtapes, so it was practically impossible to communicate with me. Oh—and no way we could start any longer trip without spare batteries!” THE FREEDOM OF TRAVEL After the Hungarian border was opened for the East German refugees on 11 September

1989, free travel had become an even more everyday opportunity for Hungarians, who had already acquired some experience with that during their shopping trips to Vienna. One of the most popular ways to travel, primarily among those who felt hitchhiking was too risky, was InterRail, an unlimited train ticket that could be used for travel in the whole of Europe, even if this meant that travellers slept on trains for up to thirty days. This way, if one managed train schedules skilfully (that is, always took night trains to destinations one night’s journey away), one could travel the entire continent from Scotland to Sicily. Some tried counterfeiting InterRail tickets, and they could also easily have gotten away with it. InterRail had actually been available earlier, too, but, due to the strict limits on how much foreign currency one could buy, it did not mean so unlimited an opportunity as after the regime change. In 1991, the ticket for people under twenty-six years of age cost HUF 16,000.4 British historian Alan Bullock in an essay interestingly calls InterRail one of the most important instruments of peace in postwar European history.5 Motorcycle racers could go and participate in Western competitions, too, which had been practically impossible before. UFOS AND ALTERNATIVE CURES Great changes always go together with a host of miraculous phenomena and moral panic. Changes mean trials, and they can be scary; this is especially true of the society

Hitchhiking was a popular and cheap way of travelling to the West. A CHANGE OF DIRECTION

151

This is what an InterRail pass looked like in the 1980s.

frozen into the leaden time of the last years of the Kádár era. As the band KFT sang in the song Idegen lény (Alien creature) in 1990: “Something in the sky— / Maybe a flying saucer, / A ball approaches, and that / Softly chirping noise. // The alien creature is coming, . . . // It looks very much like it, people / That Däniken turned out to be right.” No accident: in this period the popularity of UFO-spotting and the literature dealing with it soared. Earlier, aliens could not be talked about much, except for, of course, the Steven Spielberg movie E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial, which was first shown in Hungary in 1983. The film could also become a generational experience because E.T. arrived from outer space directly to an American suburban family, in the middle of all the objects of American consumer culture that at the time seemed unattainable in Hungary. Think of the M&M’s chocolates with which Eliott entices E.T. into the house from the garden: this was, at the time, an unknown and unobtainable delicacy in Hungary. At the same time, socialist retailers, 152

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the world of gift shops wanted to jump on the bandwagon, too: soon one could buy plastic E.T. figures, with a heart that lit up. In 1989, a book could also be published: És akkor jöttek az UFO-k (And then the UFOs came) could be considered a true survey of UFO history.6 Meanwhile, there were more and more UFO-spottings in, among other places, Kecskemét. The press reported about a 1989 UFO-spotting in the town: “[S]o now we have UFOs, too. Why would we not have them? Who says only superpowers can have UFOs? And such a talented small people as the Hungarians cannot? . . . So Kecskemét now has its own UFO. Of course, some will want to hush this up, like so much else.”7 In 1989, Uránia Observatory even established a centre for collecting UFO data because of the more and more frequent UFO-spottings. They created a financial fund which was contributed to by both companies and private persons.8 Meanwhile, in Garé, Baranya county, a UFOspotter group sprang up around teacher Pál Nagy: “In the last few years, a loosely organised and operating UFO-observation network came into being around Pál Nagy. All it means is that people of the same conviction sometimes inform each other about their observations. The Garé pedagogue has been keeping a diary about his celestial experiences for decades. This far, he has detected 23 unexplained phenomena of light.”9 In the same period, crop circles were also found in ever greater numbers: “Since the discovery of the first crop circles at Székesfehérvár, there has hardly been a day when someone did not report the appearance of mysterious signs in a wheat field. Most recently, it has been in Kisláng that circles, five, three and 1.5-2 metres in diameter were discovered. The news spread in minutes, and the wheat field turned into a veritable place of pilgrimage for the whole day. The crop circles in Fejér county are, by the way, being scientifically investigated by the Budapest group of young engineers, called ‘Network for the Examination of the UFO phenomenon.’ They have already drawn several interesting conclusions. For example, they found the

ground to be of higher temperature in the inner parts of some circles, and found the grains in the circle to be harder than those outside it.”10 The famous Swiss UFO scholar Erich von Däniken also visited Budapest as the guest of honour of Fantasztikus Hét (Fantastic week) in 1988.11 His book We Are the Offspring of the Gods, published by Háttér Kiadó, sold very well, even though its price (HUF 147) was rather high at the time. The central question of the book is whether human intelligence was smuggled to Earth from a different planet. The author suggests that aliens exterminated the weak of Earth’s native inhabitants, transformed the viable into homo sapiens and classical Sanskrit texts are full of allusions to flying divine chariots and celestial cities. During his research in Bolivia, he found an exciting system of canals, and also pointed out that, for the horns to topple the walls of Jericho, modern sound technology was needed, and so he thought to have found aliens in this story, too. In the society of the socialist period, when the official worldview was atheism and the faith in science played a privileged role in public discourse (think of heart transplants, treating premature births, or artificial insemination), alternative healing methods could not gain any ground. And so these all poured down on society in 1989, with the appearance of brain control and acupuncture, too. So, in 1989, citizens could also make use of alternative cures. The magazine Képes 7 (A week in pictures) featured a Vietnamese lady, Dr Vo Mong Lan who practised acupuncture. The article was entitled Daughter of the Jungle; the doctor was a survivor of the Vietnam War, a very delicate person. The article raised huge interest, and readers’ letters flooded the magazine’s office. The doctor helped twentyone readers: according to the letters, she helped several bedridden people to walk again, and her method was effective for depression, too.12 By 1992, acupuncture became more and more accepted even in medical circles, and so Orvosi Hetilap (Doctors’ weekly) also printed a letter from a doctor who supported the new method.13

In addition to acupuncture, other alternative cures also found their audiences: for example, Maria Treben’s herbarium, Health from God’s Garden, published in Hungarian in 1990, was very popular, too.14 This also marks a change: Miklós Szalai, a priest expert in herbs who wrote the Halimba herbarium,15 was in the 1970s persecuted and deemed a charlatan.16 Though Baptist preacher Billy Graham had already visited Hungary in 1977 and preached for about ten thousand people, among other places, in the Baptist church in Nap street and in Tahi,17 his next visit, in 1985, was not much written about in the press.18 On his third visit, the goal of his preaching in Népstadion, on 27 July 1989, was to call Hungary to prayer. After forty years of state atheist propaganda, the visit of this “media preacher,” as he was called, was a rather special event. A thousand volunteers guided the faithful, who came from all over the country. Those travelling to the event enjoyed a 50% discount on train fares, and entry was free of charge. About a hundred thousand people listened to Billy, and, at the end, they gave out ten thousand Bibles among the participants.19 On television recordings, one could see how people surged forward, thirsty for faith. Within a month, the State Office for Church Affairs was closed down with no official successor institutions established. BOMB THREATS Before 1989, the Hungarian press only wrote about bomb threats abroad. In the period of hard dictatorship no one dared to try such a thing. However, around the time of the political transition, everything became looser, and 1989 brought new developments concerning this situation, too. Népszava wrote about the more and more frequent bomb threats to schools in the 28 March 1989 issue. The callers were mostly kids who did not want to write a test or be called on to report by the teacher in class. The idea might have come from the fire drills that had been introduced to schools earlier. The calls were taken very seriously, a school building could be evacuated in a minute and forty seconds. This author experienced several bomb A CHANGE OF DIRECTION

153

threats in eighth form, and they really were not a pleasant experience. Not so much because we were afraid, but, since they did not let us go home, we had to spend several pointless hours in the park, and this was not an appealing way to spend time at the age of fourteen. Especially, if we had been about to write a test that day, and I had prepared. In 1989, 609 bomb threats were made to schools in Budapest. In the first four months of 1990, there were 120.20 Then, in the early 1990s, not only schools but courts, cinemas, airports, and marketplaces had to be evacuated, too, because of bomb threats. There was a whole series of threats in Veszprém: “A vocational high school, a vocational school, and a primary school suffered (or maybe did not suffer that much?) the consequences of rushed evacuations after the phone call. At one place, they just let pupils go. The quick detective work of the teachers and the police found the crime story-loving, handkerchief-on-phone, hoarsevoiced perpetrators in the matter of mere

hours. Four underage students readily admitted to having made the calls. One could smile at their motives if one did not think of how many other people are needed to handle the situation: policemen, bomb squads, teachers, and so on. The first was a prank. They did the second one when they saw the success of the first, and because the perpetrator wanted some extra hours to walk around with a girl going to the school, who, of course, would be let go home from school, but her parents expected her only after school hours. The next one was to avoid an important test. But success evaded them: the principal decided that they would have to go in on Saturday, to make up for the day, and they would also write the test then.”21 There were a lot of similarly worded news pieces, but let us see another case from 1991: “A bomb threat! The news whizzed through Ferenc Liszt Primary School in Zugló. Panic broke out. They could have been used to it: the one on 12 April had been the ninth threatening

Youth life took a radical turn with new musical styles, bomb threats, and branded Western clothing. 154

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phone call since January. ‘I placed a bomb in the school.’ And that was it. The caller hung up. He did not vex loquacious, did not make a threat. Just made a statement. For two full hours, the building was emptied. Students and teachers rushed to the ‘shelter,’ the Petőfi Hall. Some of the boys from the higher years went into the restroom to talk. They were talking about the bomb threat. Someone overheard them: one of the teachers who reported it at once to the director. Three boys finally admitted that they were in on the threat,” as Esti Kurír wrote on 19 April 1991.22

ENDNOTES 1

v—t: Érzéktelenítés. Népszava. 19 November 1983. 16.

Bolhapiac. Ludas Matyi. 29 April 1987. 13.

Kenczler Mihály: Digitális fülolaj. Népszabadság. 27

March 2003. 16. 4

Kedvezmények – igazolványok. Nemzetközi értékcikkek

nemcsak diákoknak. Turista Magazin. 1 April 1991. 25. 5

Erik Fosnes Hansen: Utazás Skandináviába. Magyar

Lettre. 1993/autumn. 41. 6

Ú. L.: “Ufológia.” Szabad Föld. 24 October 1989. 8.

(peredi): Független csészealj. Népszava. 13 November

1989. 12. 8

UFO-adatgyűjtő központ. Népszava. 27 December 1989.

12.

CONSUMPTION: BRANDED CLOTHES AND SECOND-HAND SHOPS A change in consumption and multiplying opportunities were also seen on the clothing market. The boutique world and the Comecon markets of the 1980s were replaced by brand clothing stores and second-hand clothes shops, where you could get branded clothing even if the original would have been too expensive for you. Lacoste and Fruit of the Loom were considered very cool. The little crocodile on T-shirts (less so on shirts) and the embroidered fruits in the basket became emblematic of the early 1990s. The success of the secondhand clothing business was based on the commitment of the sellers: some persistent entrepreneurs drove thousands of kilometres in the Western countries to bring back the best goods. There were always some durable, highquality clothes, too, in the bales. If one hunted skilfully, they could even gain appreciation if a good brand was found. Thrift stores sold clothes by the kilo or individually; this latter was more expensive. Freedom and its experience, thus, could be very varied. It could reify, be expressed in emotions or articulated in alternative cures. However, the most important point, and the basis of all that, is democracy itself, which made the coexistence of more interpretations of the world possible.

Ungár Tamás: A garéi ufólátó. Népszabadság. 27

October 1990. 23. 10 (MTI): Ufójárás. Népszava. 18 July 1992. 16. 11 Radio and televison programme. Népszabadság. 25 August 1988. 9. 12 Molnár S. Edit: Nem kuruzslás – akupunktúra. Képes 7. 15 January 1990. 63. 13 Dr. György Klazsik: Akupunktúra az alapellátásban. Orvosi Hetilap. 21 June 1992. 1587. 14 Maria Treben: Egészség Isten patikájából. Tapasztalatok gyógynövényekről és tanácsok a felhasználásukhoz. Hungaprint, Budapest, 1990. 15 Szalai Miklós: Halimbai füveskönyv. Gyógyteák és természetes gyógymódok. Planétás Kiadói és Kereskedelmi Kft. – Mezőgazdasági Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1991. 16 Kiss György Mihály: Kuruzslók, füvesasszonyok… A halimbai “teás pap” életműve. Magyarország. 18 October 1991. 32. 17 A. T.: Pesti riport Graham látogatásáról. Magyarság. 2 December1977. 4.; Rózsa László: Billy Graham új szavai. Népszabadság. 1 October 1977. 4–5. 18 Fóris György: Ima a stadionban. Magyarország. 7 July 1989. 11. 19 Bubrik Gáspár: Billy Graham imára hívja Magyarországot. Reform. 1989. július 21. 9. 20 (MTI): Bombariadók a fővárosi iskolákban. Eddig mindegyik vaklárma volt. Népszava. 15 May 1990. 12. 21 Sztankay József: “Sipirc – Bumm!” Bombariadó-sorozat Veszprémben. Kurír. 7 November 1990. 10. 22 Horváth Teréz: “Kihallgatás” a mellékhelyiségben. Kurír. 19 April 1991. 1.

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THE SHORT HISTORY OF THE ECONOMIC REGIME CHANGE Egon Zsiros

INTRODUCTION It is 25 March 1985. The Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party starts its 13rd Congress where the representatives of the party accept the last five-year plan that turned away from earlier restrictions and focussed on the stimulation of growth. The General Secretary of the party, János Kádár, says in his speech that “It was a historical development that Hungary has a single party system, and that will remain the case.” Four years before the economic and political regime change, the general secretary delivers this wrong prognosis with his usual confidence, and the wall is decorated with a slogan in large red letters: “Forward on the Lenin way!” The party leaders did not only make political mistakes; they also misjudged the efficiency of market socialism which had started from the early 1980s. This period was characterised by high inflation, economic growth seemed to dwindle to nothing by the middle of the 1980s, the small businesses, which became the seeds of the later private sector, employed more and more people, and the spread of market mechanisms somewhat alleviated the symptoms of chronic shortages

János Kádár visits the Company of Cutting Tools. 156

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that people had gotten used to earlier. By 1985, Hungary had not been on the Lenin way for a long time. The unsustainability of the market socialist system, which had a predominance of state property, became clear even to the reformers within the party. The power of the orthodox circles, close to Kádár, was seriously threatened by not only opposition organisations outside but also by the spread of reform spirit within the party. In addition, we can also read the study of the researchers connected to the Financial Research Institute as a semiopposition phenomenon. This was initially published in samizdat, but, in 1987, it became available to the public as well as a special issue of Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review). The work Fordulat és reform (Turn and reform) offered a thorough institutional and economic critique of the socialist system, and its radicalism “rightfully” drew the dislike of the regime. It is a valid question to ask what led to the preordained fall of the socialist system. Was the disintegration of the Kádár regime the result of an internal or an external process? Why were the reforms introduced at the beginning of the 1980s unsuccessful? Before we turn to the events of 1989–1990 and the case of economic transition, let us briefly survey what happened before and answer the question: Why did socialism fail in Hungary? ANTECEDENTS Market socialism. The strict, inflexible planned economy system was replaced in 1968 by the so-called “new mechanism.” This intended to support company autonomy and decentralised decision-making, in addition to the liberalisation of prices and wages. The reform did not question the Marxist–Leninist

redistributed them to loss-making companies. In this way, in a market socialist system, the goal of being interested in being profitable was not present. Loss-making companies could go on making losses due to the phenomenon of soft budget constraints.2 For reasons of length, I cannot detail all the faults of the market socialist system, but it was the phenomenon described above that served as the basis for the collapse of the socialist system, and the most serious difficulties met in the course of the economic transition also derive from this. Macro tensions. Even though a micro level phenomenon, soft budget constraints were, directly or indirectly, in the background of the Kádár era’s most important macro tensions, too. I would like to distinguish three distinct phenomena here. The first is shortage. János Kornai, in Contradictions and Dilemmas (Ellentmondások és dilemmák) explained that, due to fear of shortages, companies tend to overconsume and this might create a shortage not only on the market of productive goods but also on the market of consumer goods.3 Deriving from this, people accumulate a significant part of their income in cash, and, thus, the quantity of cash is cut loose from the level of issuing. Accumulating cash4 played an important role in the high inflation rate following the regime change.

dogma of the superiority of common property, and its main goal was to create an interest in making a profit in companies; as part of the process, the regime entrusted the distribution of certain assets to market mechanisms instead of bureaucratic regulations. Strict plans were replaced by regulatory bargaining: this meant that the companies, still as common property, bargain with those in power to organise their production and to use a part of the accumulated profits according to their own discretion (e.g., in investments of their own). So the point of the system was to combine state property and market mechanisms, and this meant a certain transition from the planned economy of socialism, based on state property and bureaucratic coordination, to an “exploitative” capitalist system, based on private property and market mechanisms.1 The greatest obstacle to the functioning of this model was the fact that, being a state property, companies were not forced to operate economically and effectively, since, if they had financial difficulties, they could expect the state to solve them. The state did this by realigning the profits of those companies that did turn a profit. The system, thus, helped loss-making companies, while profitable ones could not enjoy the fruits of their labour, since the state 22500

14,1

1975

5,3

9,7

8,2

7,6

1988

1974

4,6

1978

1,7

1977

1,7

1976

1,7

5,6

11,6

7,1

1987

1986

12,9

1985

12,1

7500

1973

9,2

Gross dept

Average net interest burden

Net debt

Current account balance

1989

1984

1983

1982

1981

1980

0 -1480 1979

Million USD

15000

Average interest (%)

The rate of Hungarian debt accumulation between 1973 and 1989, based on the 1993 data of the Central Bank of Hungary

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157

The second phenomenon is the increase of budgetary deficit. “Helping” loss-making companies by realigning the profits of profitmaking ones can only be managed to a certain extent. If the number of profitable companies falls, the state has to offer the subsidy drawing on the budgetary deficit. In Hungary, this was often financed by “printing money.” However, financing deficits by the central bank results in higher inflation through an increase in the quantity of money. Inflation could already be felt in the last years of socialism but only became an urgent problem after the regime change. The third phenomenon is the inefficiency of production. Since companies could make loss (or turn profit) without any consequences, none of them felt compelled to do any modernisation, improvements, or investments to increase efficiency. It followed that Hungarian products, due to their associated costs, became unmarketable in Western export markets, and the country’s foreign trade was relying solely on exports going to the markets of the Soviet bloc. On top of this, thanks to liberalisation, the import of Western products was constant, and this led to a continual increase in the deficit of the external account balance. As a result of this process, Hungary’s state debt increased drastically. Repayment (or debt service) became one of the defining topics of the regime change. Reform efforts and market transition. As mentioned earlier, reform circles connected to the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party also took part in the preparation of the market transition.

A typical format of small companies in the Kádár era

158

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In the 1980s, a number of progressive steps were taken, but here I only mention them in passing. In building up of the country’s small business sector, it was of definitive importance that, from the beginning of the 1980s, it was possible to form economic working groups, company working groups, and small cooperatives.5 The gist of these constructions was that some entrepreneurs or entrepreneurial groups could carry on business activities with larger companies either in a rent system or cooperating in accumulating property and governed by an interest in profits. This process was of definitive importance for building up the entrepreneurial sector, employing the workforce that was forced out of the state sector, and alleviating the phenomena caused by deficit. An important point in the economic transition was that, in 1982, Hungary joined the International Monetary Fund. The standby loans provided by the Monetary Fund were of crucial importance in the years of the transition.6 In the period between 1987 and 1990, the Grósz and Németh governments had to stabilise the economy and prepare for the market transition. One of the most important points in this was the reform of the tax system in 1988, which had as its most important goal to make the Hungarian system more similar to the Western ones by introducing the most important tax types (sales tax, income tax, and profit tax). The introduction of the two-tier banking system in 1987, the acceptance of the stock-trade law in 1989, and the foundation of the stock exchange were also significant developments. By the start of spontaneous privatisation in 1987, the transformation of property relations also started. This meant that numerous large state companies were now owned by the company management. I will return to this later, as this is a controversial topic. In summary, we could say that, in the early 1980s, cautious reform could be seen in the socialist system: apart from the stagnating economic performance, this was justified by the shock of raw material prices in 1982–1983. The year 1985 meant a turn in Hungarian economic policy, since the 13rd congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party then approved another

10.5%

3.5%

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

0% 1991

TRANSITION AND TRANSFORMATION CRISIS Crisis. The period 1989–1990 and the next three or four years were the time of the transformation crisis.7 The former socialist countries (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, etc.) all faced serious economic setbacks. In Hungary, by 1992, the gross industrial production fell below its 1975 level, and GDP plummeted by nearly 20% in two years. Such output decrease was unheard of in peacetime. The main reason for the crisis was the collapse of demand. Because of a rise in unemployment, the consumption of households fell, but because of debt service and the high level of budgetary deficit, the government could not perform a Keynesian demand boost in its classical sense. The disintegration of our Eastern export markets only escalated this. Since Hungarian products were still rather unmarketable, the Western export of Hungarian products could not make up for the deficit caused by the collapse of Comecon. The decrease in net exports took demand with it. For companies, the lack of proper financing was also a problem; this derived partly from the undeveloped financial transfer systems.8 All this was accompanied by the constant increase of prices.9 The price index, measuring yearly rise in prices, reached the top in 1991, at 35%. The Hungarian transition can be called successful, since Hungary managed to avoid the sort of extreme hyperinflation that hit, e.g., Poland: there, the consumer price index got up to nearly 90%. The reason for this was that the huge amount of cash accumulated by the population “found the goods” after the symptoms of shortage disappeared, and, due to the laxation of administrative price control, the market balance was found with prices significantly higher than before. However, the

14%

1990

ﬁve-year plan that supported a forced increase. Due to macro tensions and imbalances, the plan failed, and the period between 1987 and 1990 was spent with economic stabilisation and building up the economic and legal infrastructure needed for market economy.

Changes in Hungary’s unemployment index between 1990 and 1998

Hungarian transition cannot be called a relative success, because of the rise of unemployment. With closing and transforming inefficient companies, a lot of people were let go. By the end of 1992, the rate of unemployment reached 11%. It is important to notice that statistics showed only those who registered as unemployed, so actual unemployment numbers could be even higher than that. The socialist legacy. To assess the performance of the transition government objectively, we need to map out the socialist legacy accurately. We could say you can only cook with what you have. This was the case with József Antall’s government, too. Let us see the company sector first. At the time of the regime change, the Hungarian economy was already showing the first signs of a dual economy. The large enterprise sector concentrating production and the means of production and employing most of the workforce was mostly state owned. However, from the early 1980s, small enterprises that formed the basis of private economy and worked more efficiently, turning more profit, were already on the rise. Absurdly, their profitability was mostly due to the symptoms of shortage, the result of socialist economy: part of the consumer demand was satisfied by this “second economy,” often at a higher price level than the centrally determined, administrative prices. Certain small enterprises were forced to come into existence to employ workers who fell out of state employment. Tax A CHANGE OF DIRECTION

159

Hungary

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1992

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1990

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1988

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1986

1985

1984

Poland

The consumer price index between 1984 and 1994

evasion and ignoring state regulations were very frequent among such companies, and it was also at this time that the Hungarian underground economy started to emerge. After the regime change, loss-making companies often could not continue by handouts from the budgetary deficit, which led to unemployment and lost tax revenues. After the end of shortage economy, a significant part of the small enterprise sector lost its “business advantage,” and this also meant a blow to the revenue side of the budget. Due to these reasons, inability to compete affected the balance of both the budget and the current account rather badly. The technical skill of employees working in production was very high, but the necessary legal and financial knowledge was in shortage in Hungary at the time of the regime change. Demography in the years before the transition can be considered favourable, since the birth rate in the socialist era was stable around two. The greatest problem was the drastically increasing unemployment: by compulsory retirement and unemployment benefits, this placed considerable pressure on the budget. EXCERPTS FROM THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE HUNGARIAN DEMOCRATIC FORUM Privatisation. One of the most important dilemmas in the economic policies after the regime change was connected to the 160

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settlement of property relations. For reasons discussed above, by the end of the 1980s, it became evident that an economy with the predominance of state property cannot function properly. However, to give state property to private owners (privatisation) brings up a lot of questions. Before discussing these, we need to clarify the main criteria of privatisation processes. The first one is revenue. Because of the high budgetary deficit, after the transition in 1990, the Hungarian Democratic Forum’s government handled privatisation not merely as a process needed to transform economic organisation. The revenues from selling state property were an important factor of keeping financial solvency, too. The second is the technological criterion. The stock of assets in Hungary was mostly obsolete, since, in earlier periods, due to soft budgetary constraints, nothing made companies to modernise. This did not only lower the purchase price of state property but also necessitated that future owners being able to modernise assets. The third criterion is that of knowledge. In the course of privatisation, it was important that the given company’s new owner should be able to “operate” within the framework of free market economy. For this, the legal and economic knowledge mentioned before was indispensable—but there was a shortage of this, too, in the country. After the criteria, let us survey the most important questions. One of the most vital was

1.5

0.5

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1993

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1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

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1983

1982

1981

0 1980

how and how fast privatisation should happen.10 Different countries solved this task in different ways (e.g., voucher privatisation, management buyout, employee buyout). For reasons of length, we will deal only with the Hungarian solution here. The Hungarian Democratic Forum’s government privatised a significant part of state property through marketing, in many cases, to foreign institutional investors. This solution fulfils all three previously discussed criteria. The new owners, in most cases, had the capital and the knowledge for modernisation, and these sales generated revenue for the budget. However, much criticism was also levelled at the process, and when speaking about the regime change, many customarily mention the “giving away the nation’s wealth.” It is true that the relatively concentrated privatisation partly took away the “democratic legitimacy” of the process (especially as compared with, e.g., the concept of issuing employee stock), but it is important to see what dilemmas the decision-makers were facing. If the sale of state property does not happen, the state not only loses a large part of the revenues; it also has to maintain a deteriorating stock of assets or operating it at a loss which incurs extra expenditure, too. In view of the critical status of the budget, this was hardly an acceptable way for the decisionmakers. Marketing, of course, means that state property will be owned by whoever has the assets to buy it. Thus, the process undoubtedly benefitted the foreign capitalist groups and those members of the socialist establishment who, due to their connections, amassed great wealth in the previous period. Even though Hungarian privatisation was far from perfect, it is worth asking whether decision-makers had any real alternatives, especially taking into account that most of the credit costs of building the “happiest barracks” was received by the government after the regime change. Debt service. Hungary’s gross national debt rose from USD 1.5 billion in the early 1970s to about USD 20 billion by 1989. Many will remember Miklós Németh’s speech in parliament in 1989, in which he announced the real amount of the debt, contrary to the false data

Hungarian fertility indicators between 1980 and 1995

published earlier. Those in power decided to falsify the numbers because that enabled them to bargain for better conditions on taking out further loans. After the regime change, a great part of budgetary expenditure was the interest payments deriving from debt that accumulated in the previous decades. The situation was made more difficult by the fact that budgets for both 1991 and 1992 were in deficit, and this only increased indebtedness. Concerning the national debt at the time of the regime change, the accusation often surfaces that the government did not bargain hard enough for more advantageous repayment constructions. Critics of the Antall government often refer to the Polish example with rescheduling and partial remission of debt. It is, however, important to point out that, in Hungary, after 1990, neither the political nor the economic conditions for this were present. The most important reason for this was the difference between the Polish and the Hungarian debt: while most of the Polish debt was to other states, most of the Hungarian debt was to smaller investors (e.g., banks). Obviously, in the first case, it is much easier to bargain for rescheduling the repayment or for possible remission. József Antall was personally committed to the repayment of national debt. It is also important to see that orderly debt service improved the country’s investor perception, A CHANGE OF DIRECTION

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18685

19328

agriculture, and also individual average yields, had showed stagnation or mild decrease, so it was right to think a reform might be needed. The shock treatment going with the economic transition did not leave agriculture untouched: gross production index fell by nearly 30%.11 Unlike industry, agriculture took much longer to recuperate; the significant narrowing of foreign market outlets might have had a role in this. Looking back after thirty years, we can state that the criticism about the dissolution of producer cooperatives was partly valid, but it is also important to see that the consequences of this step were far from clear to foresee. As mentioned, the Antall government also faced much criticism for “withdrawing” from Comecon. Here, the accusation of deliberate political distancing is hardly tenable. E.g., Finland, which engaged in significant foreign trade with Comecon, suffered a serious recession in the three years after 1990, and

31.12.1991

31.12.1992

Starting price as percentage of ﬁnal price Number of registered businesses The balance of preprivatisation in Hungary 162

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31.12.1994

Purchase price (million HUF)

146%

148%

151%

31.12.1993

31.12.1995 Privatised businesses

31.12.1996

11037

10203

11024

10111

11014

9870

10929 149%

146%

5088 134%

4066

7637

9065

10760

10240

11183

15730

17856

and this had a great significance for financing future budget deficits with good conditions. However, the other side of the coin is that the state had less room to manœuvre due to the interest payments that meant expenditure in the budget, and the tools of a Keynesian demand boost were not available either. Producer cooperatives and foreign trade. The first Antall government has had to field much criticism in the past and present for “smashing the cooperatives to bits” and the “pointless withdrawal” from Comecon. Let us see the first accusation. It is true that the government dissolved producer cooperatives at the time of compensation and privatised most of the state cooperatives. They considered the producer cooperatives a legacy from the past, and, thus, had a certain resistance to them as a matter of principle. It is also important to note that, since the beginning of the 1980s, the volume of both animal husbandry and

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Growth of Hungarian gross national product between 1992 and 2000

that suggests that the fall in foreign trade was largely the product of the internal tensions within Comecon, the increasing insolvency of the Soviet Union, and the transformation crisis itself. SUMMARY The goal of this brief survey was to discuss a few economic topics, not at all exhaustively, that have interested the Hungarian economist community and a great part of the Hungarian population, too, in the thirty years since the regime change. A lot of people have very definite opinions about the events of this change. Personal stories and involvements sometimes give rise to high passions, and the political elite and social scientists need to understand these. The most important achievement of the economic transition was that the centralised socialist organisation of the economy, fraught with irresolvable internal tensions, could be replaced by an open, continental market economy based on private property. Of course, as the regime change was not perfect, the economic transition had its own victims, too. The criticism directed at the transition process is, from more than one aspect, valid, and the nostalgia for the Kádár era, which might be felt by many, is also understandable. Still, we always have to consider these sentiments together with the earlier chronic indebtedness of the country, the increase in uncompetitiveness, the symptoms of shortage, the tipping of the budgetary balance,

in other words, the unsustainability coded in the socialist system. The economic transition happened because it had to happen. Along with the criticism, we always need to consider those pressures, too, that the transition government had to yield to and were an organic part of the socialist legacy. If we do all this, we are on the right track to being able to look at the events of the regime change from a well-balanced, critical point of view. József Antall and his government made timeless achievements in establishing the rule of law and social market economy in Hungary and in directing the peaceful transition. Yet the debates about the economic transition will not stop. In the public discourse in Hungary and abroad, one meets criticism over capitalism more and more frequently. I hope the lessons learned from the Hungarian economic transition will also be a part of this very current, topical discourse. László Békési helped me much in the writing of this article, and I thank him here for the conversation.

ENDNOTES 1

Kornai János: A szocialista rendszer. HVG Kiadó Rt.,

Budapest, 1993. 2

Kornai, A szocialista rendszer.

Kornai János: Ellentmondások és dilemmák. Magvető

Kiadó, Budapest, 1983. 4 5

Kornai, A szocialista rendszer. Laki Mihály: Kisvállalkozás a szocializmus után.

Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány, Budapest, 1998. 6

Lengyel László–Surány György: Határátkelés. Kalligram,

Budapest, 2013. 7

Kornai János: Útkeresés. Századvég Kiadó, Budapest,

1993. 8

Kornai, Útkeresés.

10 Bod Péter Ákos: Magyar gazdaságpolitika – tűzközelből. Akadémia Kiadó, Budapest, 2018. 11 Gockler Lajos: A rendszerváltás hatása a mezőgazdaság eredményeire. Mezőgazdasági Technika. 2017/october. 41–43.

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JÃ&#x201C;ZSEF ANTALL

THE GOALS AND STEPS OF JÓZSEF ANTALL’S FOREIGN POLICY János Sáringer

In the spring of 1990, József Antall already had a well-worked-out and specific conception of foreign policy.1 On 22 May 1990, still as a candidate for prime minister, he, in the Parliament, spoke about the foreign policy goals of the Hungarian government and the tasks of the diplomatic service which he repeated at an "ambassadorial meeting" after his election, held at Bem Square on 25 July. “Our goal is to secure, first, the restoration of Hungary’s sovereignty and, second, that against our free will no external influence could have an effect here, no foreign army could be stationed here, and that we can draw further political consequences from all that. This, at the same time, means that we wish to evolve a foreign policy that ensures the country’s decision-making capacity and independence. It is clear that our foreign policy goals are partly global foreign policy goals deriving from our own national interest and partly the observation of realities deriving from the geopolitical situation of the country. Third, we wish to pursue a foreign policy that helps, ensures, and promotes the solution to the economic and social problems of Hungary, this rather small country. . . . We are not in a position to maintain friendly relationships with any neighbouring country that does not respect the human and minority rights of Hungarian minority.” However, these foreign policy goals did not spring up from one day to the next: they were the result of a process. József Antall defined himself as a person “of patriotic commitment, with faith in a united Europe, [and] of liberal Christian democratic” conviction. “By all means a follower of the liberal, or, if you wish, conservative liberal Christian democratic direction with a strong social sense and commitment that is not far from the ‘popular writers,’ and from the sort of political thinking 166

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that let to the distribution of land.” His thinking was undoubtedly shaped by his family, most of all his father, his immediate environment, his studies and his teachers, his readings, the history of Hungary, and the turning points of his own life. He came from an intellectual, politically minded family that held both Christian and bourgeois values, so he was socialised within a bourgeois mentality and way of thinking, while, as a child, he also absorbed the values of life in the 1930s and 1940s in Budapest and the Somló region. His father, who worked as a government official and held roles in the Smallholders’ Party, was of immense influence on him, and he was also his most immediate political role model. József Antall saw the history of the peoples in the valley of the river Danube and the Carpathian Basin in a comprehensive way. He looked at the world, Europe, the Central European region, and Hungary from a historical and geopolitical point of view, so, in his case, the analytic view of a scholar was intertwined with the overarching, synthetic view of a politician. Concerning Hungary’s thousand-year history, he spoke of lines of force running through the Carpathian Basin. From a geopolitical point of view, he thought the Italian kingdoms and, then, Italy had for centuries been advancing towards the Balkan Peninsula and the southern part of the Carpathian Basin, while the Germanic peoples were trying to extend their sway to the Danube and, later, the river Tisza, with Hungary’s foreign policy mostly directed towards the south. “The Hungarian foreign policy mindset, in a certain historical context, had prevailed in the region for centuries,” Antall said in June 1993, at a NATO workshop meeting. The essence of his foreign policy conception was that Hungary needed to be a stable support for Western Europe in

order to become a driver in the Western part of the continent and to serve to offer security to Central Europe. Antall’s thinking about foreign policy was, even by his own admission, significantly influenced by Walter Lippmann’s work about the foreign policy of the United States of America, first published in English in 1944, and in Hungarian in 1946.2 Lippmann’s thinking is close to the neorealist school of foreign policy, but it also shows European traits insofar as it concentrates mainly on powers, placing the United States, as a superpower, in the coordinate system of goal, instrument, and results. Lippmann’s Atlantism was one of the main pillars of Antall’s concept and direction of foreign policy. What did the European region mean in József Antall’s foreign policy concept? He took Pál Teleki and Alexis de Tocqueville as starting points. The former was a representative of the theory of foreign policy differences deriving from geographical regions, and the latter sketched out already in his 1835 work Democracy in America how the United States of America and Russia might become the world’s superpowers with the largest sphere of influence in the 20th century. Antall’s understanding of Europe was characterised by complexity in a geographical, political, and cultural sense too. For him, as for Charles de Gaulle, Europe in the geographic sense meant the region from the Atlantic to the Urals. In Antall’s approach, Central Europe was the meeting place of Western European and eastern influences. On one side, there was Western Christianity—with or without religion, this is characterised by the spirit of the cultural sphere of Christian Europe. While on the other side, there is “the Byzantine spirit that survived Byzantium in Orthodoxy and Greek Christianity, represented in spirit not only by the Balkan countries but also by Russia.” To the Western European spirit belongs the culture created from antiquity to the 20th century by the Middle Ages, Catholicism, the Renaissance, humanism, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the models of liberal constitutionalism and the social state. In Antall’s reading, this

region of Europe has always been a buffer zone between empires. “When I consistently insist on referring to Eastern and Central Europe together, I state that I am giving a voice to the historical experience of Hungarians living in the eastern part of Central Europe, and (if my fellow politicians abroad empower me to it) to those of Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes and Croats too.” There are historical fault lines in Eastern and Central Europe, and the Holy Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the Russian Empire, set up in the Eastern European region, were all situated along these. Antall also looked at Europe from a cultural historical point of view. He thought that, from a Christian viewpoint, the border of Europe and the East is where the borders of the Ottoman and the Russian Empires used to be, by the fault line of Western and Eastern Christianity. In his conceptual system, the “political Europe” had an important place: by this, he meant the values represented by parliamentary democracy, fundamental human rights, the democratic rule of law, social market economy, the Council of Europe, the European Community, the European Communities, the European Union, and EuroAtlantic integration. Another characteristic feature of the “political Europe” is that, in its culture, it is Western and Christian. Antall’s concept of Europe was undoubtedly influenced by the centre–periphery model and the history of the three-centre Europe. The historical and political development of Europe has, from the age of barbarian expansion, been determined fundamentally by (using Jenő Szűcs’s term) the historical regions of the “elder” and the “younger” Europe. Looking at 19th–20th-century Europe from the viewpoint of Hungarian historical development, we see an image of a two- and three-centre Europe. The countries of the Central European region (this was in the Cold War era often confused with Eastern Europe) were in a time lag compared to Western Europe. From the 19th century on, the main features of being Central European and, thus, of being Hungarian have been the unfinished, marred social transformation and JÓZSEF ANTALL

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József Antall and Mikhail Gorbachev at their meeting in Paris on 21 November 1990

the self-inflicted binding-up of the individual— right up to the process of the 1989–1990 regime change. However, the government headed by József Antall became the engine of social, civil transformation, and freed the individual from its own bounds. The citizens of Western Europe gained strength in an economic, political, and cultural sense, too, within the framework of the nation state, on a national basis. In 19th-century Hungary, the national idea and the new liberties appeared together, and, as a result, both the sense of belonging to Europe and the emphasis on the Hungarian national character were there, strengthening one another, in Hungarian political thought from the 19th century to the 21st. “St Stephen’s heritage means that being Hungarian, being Christian, and being European are inseparable from each other, and our whole mentality, our Europeanness, is rooted in this.” Even though its layers have been accumulating on top of each other for centuries, the concept of Central Europe shows a characteristic cultural unity, one of its cohesion forces being the connecting role of the German language. Due to all this, one of the foreign policy goals of the prime minister was to draw (or if you 168

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will, reinforce) the contours of Central Europe and East-Central Europe. A part of this was the consolidation of regional cooperation from the Baltic to the Balkans of, among others, the Pentagonale and the creation of new formats (the Visegrad Three, and, later, Four). Instead of the slogan “We are alone in Europe,” Antall brought the shared East-Central European and Eastern European fate into Hungarian foreign policy thinking. As a realistic politician, he knew that the leading power in Central Europe and one of the most important states in Europe will be the unified Germany. This was why his first official visit as prime minister was to Germany, and, with this, he also pointed out who was going to be the most important partner of Hungary’s foreign policy. After this, he made official visits to France and the United States of America, too, and so symbolically conveyed the wish for a Euro-Atlantic integration on the part of the makers of Hungarian foreign policy. The new leaders of Hungarian diplomacy saw the basis of foreign policy in the making of new, bilateral treaties. Their goals with this were twofold. First, they wished to guarantee the country’s security in the long run with a

multi-layered “net.” An important element of this “net” was the good neighbourly relations built on the bilateral treaties. This was also in Hungary’s best interest from a security policy point of view. Second, parallel to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of Soviet troops, they wished to support the reforming Soviet leadership by considering the rightful Soviet security interests. Budapest supported the so-called negative security assurances (that is, no threat against Moscow should be permitted to start from Hungarian territory), and, with this support, it wished to lessen the weight of conservative Soviet forces both within the Soviet Union and outside of it. In the most conservative groups of Soviet military leadership, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the spirit of “We are alone in Europe” arguments gained traction, along with strong imperial attitudes. One of the foreign policy goals of Antall’s government was the restoration of Hungary’s sovereignty in order for Hungarian politics to become free and independent in all matters including foreign troops being stationed in our territory. The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact met in Moscow on 7 June 1990. The meeting was, based on the principle of rotation, chaired by József Antall, so the Hungarian politician suggested to dismantle the military organisation of the Warsaw Pact. Another important point of the Hungarian– Soviet relations was the meeting between József Antall and Mikhail Gorbachev in Paris on 21 November 1990. The two leaders discussed matters two days after the meeting of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, at the Soviet Union’s embassy in Paris. Gorbachev started by saying that too many words had been said on the problems. According to him, the question was rather whether the issues can be solved democratically in the Soviet Union. He thought the Soviet people wanted order and the Kremlin had already been ready with a program to stabilise the country. There is a power struggle going on, he added, which must be kept within democratic limits. In his answer, Antall stated

that he thought the settlement of bilateral relations important, and suggested that the best solution might be if the Soviet Union initiated the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and placed it on entirely new foundations. He proposed that the individual countries should rather make bilateral agreements, treaties with each other, and he said that Hungary would be happy to sign one with the Soviet Union. However, Gorbachev responded that the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact had to be thought through and properly prepared. The Hungarian prime minister asked whether the foreign ministers could start negotiations on the topic, and Gorbachev instantly replied in the positive, then added that it had to be announced because the process, in its current form, fitted the strategic conception of Moscow; however, it could not be a unilateral thing, as it had to include a common initiative. The nature of the Warsaw Pact would need to be chosen confidently, and its framework should be maintained until the new European security structure was created. At the end of the discussion, Gorbachev stated: “We have not grown cold. Everyone should. Everyone should think it through themselves and decide in a sovereign way.” József Antall responded: “They think the same of us. Western relations mean a balancing-out, this is not neglect. Our eastern relations concern the whole of our industry, the greatest crowd of workers, no one can think we do not want good relations with our neighbours.”

George Bush’s 1989 visit to Hungary. The American president contacted the opposition already at this time.

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169

On 19 August 1991, certain members of the Soviet government, the leaders of the military and the KGB attempted a coup against Mikhail Gorbachev. Boris Yeltsin and the Russian parliament declared this partial seizure of power unconstitutional. Yeltsin told soldiers not to turn against the people and called people to a general strike. After consulting with George W. H. Bush by telephone, József Antall and the Hungarian government issued a statement on the situation. Budapest supports the Russian reform processes and condemns the coup. The next day, on 20 August, the Hungarian prime minister managed to talk on the phone to Yeltsin, and assured him of his government’s support. Yeltsin did not forget that Antall was among the first to call him. The first personal meeting of the Russian and the Hungarian politician happened in Moscow on 6 December 1991; this was also when a breakthrough was reached in the financial accounting following the withdrawal of Russian troops. Yeltsin agreed to the socalled “breaking even” solution: that meant that the buildings put up and left in Hungary by the Soviet military were to be the compensation for the environmental damage caused in the country. Between 10 and 11 November 1992, Yeltsin visited Budapest, and, then, finally the deal was made: the agreement about troop withdrawal was to have the “breaking even” solution, and, in another document, they agreed about the humanitarian aid that Hungary was to offer to Russia. Boris Yeltsin and József Antall also signed the agreement that

Margaret Thatcher, who visited Hungary in the autumn of 1990 and praised the economic and political changes to József Antall

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dealt with the property and the financial and other considerations related to the temporary stationing of former Soviet troops in Hungarian territory and to their withdrawal. An agreement was also made about cooperation concerning the provision of rights to national, ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities, thereby further strengthening Hungary’s security net. The leaders of Hungarian diplomacy had to think of Washington, too, in addition to Moscow. Thus, it was very well received in Budapest when President George H. W. Bush invited József Antall to the US. The ofﬁcial visit was scheduled from 14 to 20 October 1990. This was the ﬁrst time since 1947 that a Hungarian head of state had visited the United States and the White House. With this visit, the prime minister wished to reinforce that it was two democratic countries that were furthering friendly relations at that time. The Hungarian government sought to get the American side to remove those discriminative prescriptions and rules which categorised Hungary as a state “under communist control” and “not operating a market economy.” Antall asked President Bush not to let the Gulf crisis draw all his attention away from the Eastern European region, which the president promptly promised. After the discussion in the White House, ministerial meetings and the leaders’ talks continued. President Bush declared a new era in American–Hungarian relations, one based on full trust. Hungary lifted its visa requirements altogether while the United States made visa requirements lacker for Hungarians. The dynamism of Hungarian diplomacy is signalled by how fast the negotiations on the association agreement with the European Community were progressing; thus, Budapest made a very important step towards European integration. The Hungarian government reoriented itself towards NATO, the European Union, and the Western European Union. While Antall was in America, on 17 October 1990, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe invited the Republic of Hungary to be the twenty-fourth full member of the organisation. In the spring of 1991, Antall appointed György Granasztói to gather information and prepare arguments concerning

Helmut Kohl delivers an address to parliament in the course of his 1989 visit to Hungary—the German chancellor was an important supporter of the Euro-Atlantic integration of the region.

the role the Western European Union could take in Central European security policy. The prime minister thought that, with reinforcement and restructuring, this organisation could become the second stage of NATO. On 25 March 1991, Granasztói accordingly outlined the Hungarian conception for ambassadors working alongside NATO in Brussels. Not long before the last Soviet soldier left Hungarian soil, the members of NATO had held a meeting in Copenhagen. The resulting statement, entitled “Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” published on 6 June 1991, declared that the security of NATO is inseparable from the security of the European countries. In this spirit, a suggestion was made that a network of closely connected institutions and relations must be established, which would together form a global edifice. In this system, NATO, the European integration process, and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe were the key elements, but an important role was given to regional cooperation, too. On 16 December 1991, three states, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland signed the association agreement with the European Community. Hungarian foreign policy handled relations with the European Community as a priority and held that the undisturbed work and development of diverse forms of regional, subregional, and international cooperation were very important.

This was the purpose of the Central European Initiative, and also of the multilateral Czech– Slovak–Polish–Hungarian cooperation. At the Visegrad meeting, held on 15 February 1991, the heads of government from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary signed a cooperation agreement, and, thus, the Visegrad Three was born. Summit meetings of the representatives of the three states were held in Krakow in October 1991 and in Prague in May 1992. It was at the earlier of these that they decided to create the Central European Free Trade Agreement. In Krakow, the foreign ministers of the three countries issued a joint statement: “It is our shared opinion that the former system of diplomatic liaisons will have to be expanded considerably in an attempt to include Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republic, and Poland directly in the activities of the Organisation. . . . The ministers of the three countries would appreciate if these suggestions were to be seen in the resolutions made at the next summit meeting of NATO, in Rome, and they express their countries’ readiness to start talks as soon as possible about the practical realisation of these suggestions.” By 1992, the former Yugoslavia dissolved after Croatia and Slovenia had seceded in 1991, Macedonia in January 1992, and four months later, in April, Bosnia and Herzegovina had also declared their independence. Armed conflicts had by this time turned into a three-sided civil war. The Yugoslav crisis was a serious threat to Hungary’s security, and not only in a military sense, since the war affected the Hungarian minority living in Vojvodina, and numerous refugees also arrived in Hungary. In the course of the meeting of the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in Oslo, on 5 June 1992 a special meeting was initiated by the Americans between the leaders of the Hungarian and the US delegations. Hungarian Foreign Minister Géza Jeszenszky and Lawrence Eagleburger, deputy foreign secretary of the United States of America, talked for three-quarters of an hour, primarily about the Yugoslav crisis and the expected effect of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. JÓZSEF ANTALL

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Géza Jeszenszky, foreign minister of the Antall cabinet

In mid-June 1992, József Antall sent letters to the leaders of the major powers to point their attention to the events happening in Central Europe. In this diplomatic action, the Hungarian prime minister first addressed George H. W. Bush (dated 10 June), then sent the same message to Helmut Kohl, François Mitterand, and John Major too. In the first part of his letter, he stated that the changes of the 1989–1990 period meant a real historic turning point in East and Central Europe but, above all else, gave an opportunity to the peoples of the region. He emphasised, however, that this opportunity is merely a chance, and does not mean certain success at all. He added that in the former communist countries the former communist cadres pose a real danger, since they exploit the problems in the region and attempt to secure positions of power for themselves. In the autumn of 1993, Hungarian diplomacy made further active steps to secure Hungary’s membership in NATO. There were many factors in that: first, the escalating Yugoslav crisis; second, the conflict between Boris Yeltsin and the communist majority in the Duma; third, the NATO summit to be held in January 1994. Antall sent a letter to the president of the United States of America, William J. Clinton, and the Secretary General of NATO, Manfred Wörner, in which he stated the Hungarian government’s opinion. The gist of his conception was that the preparation for the Visegrad Group’s states’ planning to join NATO should start as soon as possible. For this, the political, security, and military stages had to 172

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be determined, since, for the security of the region, appropriate guarantees were needed. In summary, we can say that József Antall and his government set a new direction for Hungarian foreign policy, just as they had proposed. The steps the country took towards Euro-Atlantic integration, and the relations Hungary had with the Soviet Union, and later with Russia, after becoming sovereign again, showed that the two parties were equal peers. Antall’s foreign policy always paid attention to the Hungarians living beyond the borders. From among regional cooperations, that of the Visegrad Three (later Four), initiated by Antall, has stood the test of time, as seen in present events. Antall’s conceptions built the foreign policy foundations for a new Hungarian national awareness, and, at the same time, defined the place Hungarians had in Europe and the world. I think that the evaluation of the events of 1943–1944, when we “somehow lost our way in foreign policy, too,” had by 1990 been replaced by the statement “we found the way for Hungarians in foreign policy too.”

ENDNOTES 1 Parts of this paper have already been published elsewhere. See

Sáringer

János:

Mozaikok

Antall-kormány

külpolitikájához és diplomáciájához (1990–1993). In: VERITAS Évkönyv, 2014, edited by Ujváry Gábor. VERITAS–Magyar Napló, Budapest, 2015. 389–412; Antall József külpolitikai gondolkodásának genezise és főbb jellemzői. In: VERITAS Évkönyv, 2015, edited by Ujváry Gábor. VERITAS–Magyar Napló, Budapest, 2016. 317–338; Iratok az Antall-kormány külpolitikájához és diplomáciájához (1990. május – 1990. december). Vol. I. VERITAS–Magyar Napló, Budapest, 2015.; Iratok az Antall-kormány külpolitikájához és diplomáciájához (1991. január – 1991. december). Vol. II. VERITAS–Magyar Napló, Budapest, 2018. Cf. Jeszenszky Géza: Kísérlet a trianoni trauma orvoslására. Magyarország szomszédsági politikája a rendszerváltozás éveiben. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2016. 2 The original work is Walter Lippmann: U.S. War Aims. Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1944. Its Hungarian edition was entitled Amerika válaszúton. Az U.S.A külpolitikája. Anonymus Irodalmi és Művészeti Kiadó Részvénytársaság, Budapest, 1946.

JÓZSEF ANTALL’S CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THOUGHTS Gábor Erdődy

ON DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALITY AND PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY Enforcing and protecting civil liberties as best could in accord with his democratic understanding was in the centre of József Antall’s political philosophy. “We want the European Hungary, bringing human rights to completion and enabling the exercise of all rights. A constitutional state that gives its citizens every liberty,”1 as he said in his speech on the evening before the election. The interpretation of human rights, incorporating Antall’s understanding as well, prevailed in the amendment of the Constitution in a way that they appeared “not [as gifts] left to the discretion of the supreme power,” but “exactly as the limits of that power.”2 From the point of view of realising the rule of law, Antall called it indispensable that the Hungarian legal system and the practice of law accord fully with transatlantic norms. Starting out from Montesquieu’s principle of the separation of powers, he named the operation of an independent and modern judicial system as one of the keystones of a democratic, constitutional state, and, above all, he put the requirement of the autonomy of judicial bodies in the centre.3 It is widely known that, in international practice, the cornerstone of the rule of law, the most important body for the protection of the constitution, the constitutional court (which is able to radically limit the operation of the parliament and the government, too, as endowed in its licences), was also born of the principle of the limitation of power. Antall considered the sovereignty of the institution defending the rule of law, standing above government and parliament, as an unquestionable fundamental value. László Lengyel identiﬁed the very high-standard interpretation of democracy that the prime minister had from the fact that “in opposition

to the traditional model of democracy, he stood for the modern understanding” according to which, apart from the parliamentary parties functioning as checks, there is a need for such “national institutions,” working as effective counterweights, as the Constitutional Court, the State Audit Office, the central bank independent of the government, and the independent, public service television and radio.4 In accordance with his democratic values, Antall wished to found the operation of the rule of law on the principle of popular sovereignty as embodied in parliamentarism. He considered it fundamental that the parliament function not only as the place for legislature but as a forum for debates, where representatives make “good and bad decisions.” Reserving the right to be wrong for everyone, including his own government, he saw “sharp criticism” as a natural part of parliamentary work and explicitly required it, since he defined one of the most important functions of the legislative body as the strict monitoring of the government’s work, in all circumstances keeping the interests of the country in mind.5 Antall named the alternation of democratic parties as the indispensable guarantee of parliamentary democracy. He called strengthening the multiparty system, which articulates the varied interests of social strata, a national concern of the first order, and he identified the attempts at its weakening and elimination, as the impairment of parliamentary democracy. He repeatedly refused to unite the three conservative governing parties into a single party, since he saw it as very important that “in a multiparty system, there should always be political forces that are not worn out in exercising power, and . . . the possibility of a political alternation should always be there.” JÓZSEF ANTALL

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József Antall and László Sólyom, the chair of the Constitutional Court—this newly established body was an important guarantee of the rule of law

He saw the case in which only one setup existed in Hungary as downright tragic, and emphasised that the creation and preservation of a colourful variety of parties is a condition for real democracy, since “the country is in balance if everything from conservative values . . . to left-wing values can be represented across the political spectrum.”6 He called principled and fair debate between the parties, conducted according to the rules of a plural democracy, an indispensable and necessary element needed for the healthy functioning of a democratic community, the healthy psychological state of the nation. It was his conviction that there is no unity without difference of opinion, and he ﬁrmly refused any attempt to create this by force.7 While he saw the provision of rights to the opposition, which works as a counterweight to the government’s power, as an important guarantee of parliamentary democracy, he also found the cooperation between government and opposition indispensable for the development of the transition.8 In order to enforce the rule of law, “he strove to keep to the rules of fair play 174

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even in the ever rougher political battles.” In a strategy meeting, he said categorically: “While I am prime minister, we will not act against our political opponents in administrative ways. That was a custom in the party state; in a democratic political struggle government and opposition have similar opportunities, and a government has no right to use instruments of power in such a struggle.”9 In the balanced operation of parliamentary democracy, Antall ascribed an essential role to including the local governments’ counterweight, which gives room for the local exercise of power. He hoped that the introduction of a local selfgovernment system in accordance with European modernisation will eliminate the last important base of the party state.10 He gave priority to guaranteeing “small communities’ rights to selfgovernance” in the government’s programme, and, to creating the necessary conditions, to working out and putting into action a reform that is built on the historic traditions of Hungarian self-governance and would take into account the modern principles of local governance.11

The conceptions József Antall had about creating the institution of the head of state “with limited powers” was reflected accurately in §16 (on the legal status of the president) of the Hungarian constitution worked out in 1989, in which László Sólyom saw “the foundation of the constitution of our parliamentary republic.”12 The regulation that returned to Act I of 1946 and, thus, restored the broken continuity of legal status considered as a great value that, with accepting this solution “in accordance with Hungarian traditions and the international parliamentary practice”, we were “positioned on historic legal grounds.”13 During the debates at the Opposition Round Table, Antall resisted the attempts to create a presidential republic. As one of the protagonists of the work to come up with a presidential institution based on the parliamentary model, insisting on regulations in accord with “the spirit of Hungarian public-law continuity,” he wished to keep to the heritage of the two key laws of Hungarian public-law development (Act III of 1848, fixing the principle of ministerial government, and Act I of 1946, based on 1848). This means that the “president is the head of the executive branch, who governs through the government” and has no licences over branches of power.14 Apart from the indirect election of the president (through the parliament), the 1989 constitution restored the original status of the president in accordance with Act I of 1946, by making the task of the head of state to “guard the democratic operation of the state organisation” and admonishing him to sign and declare “only constitutional laws.”15 Antall took a definitive part in getting those provisions accepted that exclude the possibility of power overconcentration and according to which “the president does not have the licences of either the legislative or the executive branch,” which means neither has he any power nor can he be held politically responsible. Further, he cannot be interpellated and no motion of no confidence can be brought against him, while his acts (apart from strict exceptions) are only valid if countersigned by the prime minister or the relevant minister. Antall thought it important to remind everyone

that, according to the practice usual in modern parliamentary systems, the “powerless head of state” who represents national unity and stands above political parties “[was] the symbolic embodiment of the sovereignty of the state, but he [did] not actually exercise that sovereignty.”16 ON THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THOUGHT AND ON THE RELATION OF STATE AND CHURCHES Antall considered the full freedom of the press, culture, and education as a strategically important sphere crucially deﬁning the rule of law, and any limitations to that, due to his classical liberal–democratic conviction, he found acceptable only where these freedoms impinged on someone else’s liberties of rights. He assigned a marked function in the operation of democracy to the freedom of press, he respected as an indispensable attribute of freedom, and accepted as inseparable the full freedom of criticism and commentary; he held lying irreconcilable with democratic journalistic behaviour. He called it inadmissible that the centres of mass communication should become the scenes of party political struggles, and cautioned against letting “national media be appropriated by any party, professional community, artistic movement or ﬁnancial circle of interest,” as this would be a distortion to be avoided at all cost.17 Antall quoted with full agreement the principle that has nearly become a commonplace since István Széchenyi: “for the renewal of the nation, we need well-educated people.” In this spirit, he assigned the support of culture, the reinforcement of the social role of education and its modernisation, the renewal of national culture, and the rebirth of national traditions an emphatic place in his government’s programme.18 He was a believer in the “reformed educational policy” that would contribute to the country’s prosperity. He considered the full realisation of academic freedom, the exclusive right of parents to choose the educational institutions for their children, and the undisturbed work of school selfgovernments as the foundation of a democratic educational policy. It was of similar importance JÓZSEF ANTALL

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to him to put an end to children’s and parents’ vulnerability and to restore teachers’ dignity.19 Antall argued with conviction for the key role of sciences in society. As most urgent tasks, he highlighted the restoration of the freedom of research and, inseparable from that, the autonomy of the institutions of higher education and research workshops. In this reform process, he intended to give an exceptional role to the renewed Academy of Sciences, hoping for no less than a factor that balances the rivalries of the political branches of power with its prestige and, thus, contributes substantially to the country’s stability.20 The freedom of arts was for him self-evident too. He was convinced that artistic activities should not be laid open to market forces, but he also ﬁrmly held the view that state subsidies could not entitle the government to interfere in the artistic creative process or the evaluation of artistic work in a way that would limit artistic freedom.21 The interconnected and interrelated historic renewal of state and churches formed a central part of József Antall’s political philosophy. He took freedom of religion, one of the greatest achievements of the regime change, as a basic human right, and recognised that defining the relationship between the state and the churches is not simply a fundamental element of democracy but also its touchstone. With this in mind, he supported the reregulation of the relationship between the state and the churches according to modern Christian Democratic principles: the acceptance of Act IV of 1990,

With József Antall heading the government, the relationship between the churches and the state was placed on entirely new foundations.

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“On the Freedom of Conscience and Religion and on Churches.” This regulation said that the state, ideologically neutral, ensured full equality of rights to all denominations in the spirit of the freedom of conscience. In his governmental programme, Antall made it clear that the government, committed to the autonomy of churches, also “[stood] on the basis of a full and real separation of church and state.”22 However, for a church to fulfil its historical mission successfully in the process of national rebuilding, Antall considered it an unbreakable condition that it strictly did not enter into political struggles. 23 “Churches should not devote their attention to fights in parliament and tiffs among parties; rising above these, they must rather concentrate on wider issues concerning the whole of society, lending support to individuals facing the modern world’ juggernaut,” he said once in an interview. A committed Catholic, Antall refused the heritage of centuries of conflicts among Christian churches in Hungary and consistently rose above them supported by 19th-century liberal Catholic traditions: he was unshakeably supportive of ecumenism, the fruitful cooperation among religious denominations. He talked about the “unique symbiosis” of Hungarian Catholicism and Protestantism as a key point in development up to this day because, thanks to this, Hungarian Christian mentality got a “special puritanical–ecumenical aspect.”24 ON SOCIAL CONSTITUTIONALITY AND THE SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY In Antall’s political ideology, rooted in Christian humanism, the respect of human dignity was a deeply held and all-pervasive principle. He thought a healthy family in a healthy society as the indispensable background for the sovereign citizens respected in their dignity, supported in their identity. Since he saw children as the natural fulfilment of family, he paid special attention to the effective protection of foeti and children, and proposed definite provisions for “helping the bodily, intellectual, and psychological development of all children,” the emphatic help of young people’s early careers.25

As an essential goal, Antall urged the renewal of social and health services, based on social solidarity. He emphasised that the rule of law could only be properly fulfilled socially. He stated that, since the rule of law, appearing as the product of 19th-century liberal political thinking, could not in itself handle social problems, social needs had called into existence the caring social state. However, he found it important to add that the paternalistic state, indispensable in its function, could not outweigh the rule of law. He identified the guarantee for harmonious development in the inseparable unity of these two entities, since he was convinced that, “on the one hand, the social state is nothing but a dictatorship without the rule of law, and, on the other, the rule of law without social care and solidarity cannot stabilise society.”26 Antall was fully aware that the basis of parliamentary democracy could only be a free market economy. He called the security of private property the unavoidable criterion for democracy, and, keeping the binding force of property in mind, he argued for the untouchable nature of the sanctity of property.27 He considered restoring the freedom of enterprise and economic freedom as a historic task. He saw the realisation of achievementand value-oriented society, built on the bourgeoisie middle class, the strongest basis for democracy, possible only within the competitive framework of modern market economy and the development of “capacity for enterprise,” fulfilled with the assertion of equal opportunities and the principle of solidarity.28 Antall placed in the centre of his social and economic–political strategy a social market economy that is based on private property and private enterprise, is equipped with effective protection of interests and a social welfare system, pays special attention to pensioners, and works with a state coordination that asserts a social solidarity–based moral control to protect human dignity from the unlimited free competition that one-sided views of the market prefer. For this to function properly, he assigned particular importance to ensuring the independence of the state’s central bank. He

József Antall and businessman Péter Zwack—Antall thought freedom of enterprise and market economy important

called it a fundamental requirement that the president of the National Bank, representing the interest of the whole nation and standing above parties, not be involved in party politics or any party activity, and that he be obligated to support the ﬁnancial policies of the elected government with full responsibility.29 Antall’s conception about the modern European social market economy that integrates into a globalising world market is built on the primacy of private property and eschews both populist promises and the idea of a condescending state. This was closely tied to the direction of “ordoliberalism,” which reconciles order and liberalism. The articulation of his regime-changing Christian Democratic political philosophy was eminently inﬂuenced by Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi, and Robert Schuman, who he called “the giants of European rebirth.”30 ON THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL STRATEGY FOUNDED ON THE SYNTHESIS OF THE HUNGARIAN AND THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY Apart from a fanatical respect for liberties, the central ordering principle of Antall’s political philosophy was the commitment to the idea of the nation. “We believe in the idea of the nation and the democratic liberties, human rights, and the desire for social renewal in a balanced way, not prioritising any to the detriment of any other,”31 he stated in his exposition delivered on the 1st National Meeting of the Hungarian Democratic JÓZSEF ANTALL

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Forum on 1 March 1989. His dynamic national strategy, which made use of historic traditions and was founded on popular, national, and Christian intellectual grounds, connected the need to catch up with the requirements of modernisation, and showed a clear way out of the grip of the Central and Eastern European region’s nationalisms. His thinking on national politics recognised the primacy of international circumstances, but it avoided isolation and provincialism, as well as the pursuit of aggressive middle-power illusions. His value-oriented, patriotic commitment was coupled with a keen sense of responsibility, refusing the fantasies of supremacy that lead one astray. He undertook to face historic traumas, serious cataclysms openly, while he consistently kept clear of the idea of revisionism.32 He saw national and European commitments as inseparable values and took a stand repeatedly by the preservation of national traditions and the joint representation of universal European Christian values that form a connection beyond nationality. “We believe the variety and unity of Europe derives both from the unique nature of nations and the great Christian traditions expressed both in Catholicism and Protestantism,”33 he declared in his speech on 11 March 1989. Antall regarded the provision for minority rights as the cornerstone of democracy. “There is no democracy without the rights of national minorities,”34 he claimed at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact in the Kremlin. He sought a way to solve the situation of Hungarian minorities living in the neighbouring countries by joining the European uniﬁcation process built on EuroAtlantic commitments, in the framework of federalism, and through connecting the systems of personal, regional, and cultural autonomy.35 In an interview (published in issue 1, 1990, of the periodical Valóság), he made it clear that Hungarian identity, general human rights, and European identity were for him values of the same weight which cannot be separated, and that he could only interpret and apply these “in synthesis, in harmony.”36 In his programmatic speech a day before the election, he explained 178

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that urging the matter of minority rights is not nationalism or chauvinism, since “we do not want more rights, more national rights, than any other people in the world for its nationals living in minority beyond the borders.”37 Considering that one-third of Hungarians live beyond the borders of the country, Antall declared it a special responsibility of the Hungarian state in the programme of his government to support “the preservation of the Hungarian nation as a cultural and ethnic community” everywhere and with all means, but, in all circumstances, strictly keeping international agreements in mind.38 He suggested that the question of borders be handled by acknowledging the facts, keeping in mind European security issues, and with a European mentality. “If someone within our borders stoops to political charlatanism and extremism, that hurts not only the country, but much more emphatically the Hungarians beyond the borders,”39 he warned. He handled the question of Hungarians living beyond the borders and the minorities in Hungary as one. He acknowledged the culture of national and ethnic minorities as enriching Hungarian national culture and wanted to provide preschool and school education to all nationalities and ethnic groups in their own mother tongue as a subjective right. He explicitly urged those involved that, in an ethnic environment, at least one of the languages used should always be the minority language. In the programme of his government, he ensured nationalities that, for the preservation, care, and development of their culture and language, he would support with

László Tőkés in the Hungarian Parliament—the issue of Hungarians beyond the borders was important to József Antall

all available “speciﬁc means” the “freedom of the self-organisation of minority communities” and fought for an amendment in electoral law that provides proportional parliamentary representation to them.40 REFUSAL OF EXTREMISM (ANTI-SEMITISM AND TOTALITARIANISM) Antall took a stand against anti-Semitism too, just as consistently as he refused chauvinism. In his speech at the dedication of a memorial to Jewish martyrs, he recalled the historic crimes against the Jewish people and expressed his conviction that “there is no sensible, honourable person who would not refuse this tragedy, this despicable political act, and not see it as the shame of humanity.” He found it important to make every member of society aware that “what happened to the Jewish people is a special shame of history,” while he hinted that it was also true that “not all people and not everyone [had been] guilty, and not everyone [had taken] part in this.”41 He emphasised that his government “feels responsible for the Jewish community living in Hungary too,” and takes it as an obligation to protect them if needed.42 Refusing nationalism and anti-Semitism integrated into Antall’s system of norms and was part of his objection to all sorts of extremities. He distanced himself with the same determination from adherents of totalitarian dictatorships on both the Right and the Left. In his speech about the German occupation, he highlighted that the extreme Right and the extreme Left threatened the newborn Hungarian political democracy together, and, emphasising the responsibility of politicians, he pronounced it very harmful to strengthen these negative phenomena with behaviour motivated by petty political interests.43 He considered a political mission to discourage extremities threatening democracy and recalled the message of the French Revolution (placing freedom, equality, and fraternity in the centre). However, in the light of historical experience, he also mentioned that it was necessary to understand, and more so to apply, these three ideas in synthesis. Referring to the historical ﬁgures of Hungarian national liberalism, and

above all else following the thought of József Eötvös, he pointed out that “these three ideas in balance form the basis of our political culture,” since “equality and fraternity without freedom holds the danger of dictatorship,” while “freedom, without equality and fraternity, drives society into anarchy.”44 Identifying with Eötvös’s view that it is essential to create a balance, he warned that if any of the three he saw as part of an inseparable unit was raised above the others, or any of them disappeared, it meant that “either in the name of equality, by rejecting freedom and fraternity, a dictatorship [was] born, or equality and fraternity, without the idea of solidarity, [led] to unbounded freedom.”45 ON THE INTELLECTUAL ROOTS OF MODERN HUNGARIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY: THE SYMBIOSIS OF NATIONAL LIBERAL, POPULAR–NATIONAL, AND CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC TRADITIONS In an interview given to Európai Utas, Antall asserted that he took as the ideological basis of his government’s policies the “modern Christianity” that relied intellectually on the modern middle class, and in which “all Hungarian citizens, all Hungarians [could] find their place, regardless of religion, race, denomination, or nationality.”46 He thought that a Christian democracy based on the principles he referred to could realise the synthesis he discussed in detail in many talks, could give adequate answers to the challenges of the times, and still bring together the values of Hungarian progressivism in a unique way. He identified the popular–national direction as a defining intellectual movement within the political ideology of modern Hungarian conservativism, reborn at the end of the 20th century. He found the “special legacy” of this direction in Eastern and Central Europe, and traced its Hungarian roots helping national rebirth to literary and intellectual movements evolved in the 19th century. He recognised the renewed version of the popular tradition, deeply embedded in the Hungarian identity, in the tendency that derived from the 1930 and had strong social sensitivity and national commitment, which unfolded in the literature of village research and sociography.47 JÓZSEF ANTALL

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Linked to this discourse that strengthened around the regime change, Antall firstly wanted to clarify that popular–national thought “[was] not the opposite but a part of a political democracy sensitive to social questions,” and counted the clear acceptance of the values of liberal democracy among the basic features of an authentic popular–national thought.48 He refused with indignation the interpretations that used the popular–national thought, “which transmits popular wisdom and the common sense of the people,” as a synonym for antiEuropeanism and provincialism,49 and recalled that strong social empathy was an element of both modern liberalism and Christian Democrat Ludwig Erhard’s model of social market economy.50 Another current of the modern popular political ideology embodied in the Hungarian Democratic Forum was liberalism. In his interview, Antall made it clear that his understanding was connected not to the radical direction of the French Revolution but the thought of classical European liberalism, built on the principles of the rule of law and free market economy. He found it a definitive feature in the development of liberal political philosophy that these principles were supplemented with social elements already in the first half of the 19th century, and, from the second half of the century, they had an increasingly determinative influence on liberal thinking, since representatives of classical liberalism quickly recognised that “a direction of liberalism that did not have social checks could not survive.”51 At the conference of the national liberal direction of the Hungarian Democratic Forum he explained that liberalism and democratism had been closely interconnected since the 19th century, and that, at the end of the 20th century, liberalism basically meant the democratic rule of law and a free market economy. With time, democratic political movements were permeated by the ideas of historical liberalism, so, even in democratic political parties, a certain liberal norm became definitive.52 Antall thought that the big parties of civilised countries all accepted the values of liberalism that had become an organic part of the democratic political system. Liberalism, 180

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thus, got into a very unique and contradictory situation after “winning such a historic victory that even social democrats and conservatives had become liberal.” With its programme realised in Western Europe, “liberalism [had] played its great historic role.”53 Interpreting the role of liberalism in Hungarian development, Antall defined it as a legacy that had functioned as “the intellectual workshop of national Hungarian modernisation and renewal,” connecting national independence to the rule of law and market economy. Since he saw its essence in the strong interconnection between the rule of law and the commitment to a strong national independence, he found it justifiable by all means to use the concept of “national liberalism” that symbolised the essence of Hungarian liberalism embodied in the activities and works of Széchenyi, Kossuth, Deák, and Eötvös.54 He ascribed great importance to making people aware that accepting national liberalism was closely connected to accepting the Hungarian popular–national heritage. Similarly, he emphasised that classical Hungarian liberalism, “this great historical legacy, [belonged] to everyone” and could not be appropriated by any, and that, of course, it could not be excluded by any from the nation’s history.55 Antall identified the Christian democratic tradition that was infused with new content after World War II and integrated liberal traditions, as for example CDU and ÖVP did, as the third main direction that determined the complex ideology of the Hungarian Democratic Forum. He considered it the essence of modern Christian democracy that it was not organised on the basis of worldview but was realised on an interdenominational basis resting on the cooperation between Catholics and Protestants. He also pointed out that it was not connected to the church either and it did not follow religiosity, but that it was a political direction integrating values that served the Christian spirit independent of the clergy.56 In his lecture about the three intellectual currents of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, Antall defined the landmark importance of the

Conservative József Antall and liberal Péter Tölgyessy next to each other

renewal of Christian democracy as the party’s acceptance of integrating liberal elements into its programme. Christian Democratic parties that accept Christian, social, and liberal elements are characterised by the acceptance of the liberal minimum of the rule of law and free market economy, the representation of a social market economy, and a commitment to European values. He thought it no accident that the idea of a European unity had been articulated and realised in practice by Robert Schuman, Alcide de Gasperi, and Konrad Adenauer. It was their huge achievement that, as Christian Democrats, they emphasised their European identity against nationalism and stressed the unity of the continent. They served the cause of integration but still preserved their national commitment and wanted to give up only as much of sovereignty as it was absolutely necessary for their plan to be realised.57 “In a Christian democracy, democracy means the same thing it does in popular–national and national liberal thought, but it lends it especial importance that it means the basic ethical values, the basic spirit of the two-millennia-old Christian religion, and the universality that has connected the peoples of

Europe since late antiquity and the Middle Ages; this universality that appeared in Christianity and was born in Europe, in the Middle Ages, balances out biases.” “Christian values include patience for those still outside all this,”58 he added in his lecture. In his speech of historic validity, delivered on 12 October 1991, Antall declared that national liberal and Christian Democratic values do not in the least form opposing ideologies. Through historical examples, he proved that Christianity, a European identity, liberal thinking, and social sensitivity are values that, “integrate each other instead of excuding one another.” He found it important to emphasise that Hungarian national liberalism defined our political heritage and values very positively, and finally asserted: “We can easily call ourselves liberal Christian Democrats, too, since we only want to accept a Christian democracy that . . . embraces in its political programme all those values that we have identified as liberal ones.”59 In József Antall’s pronouncements, the basic characteristics of a modern Hungarian Christian democracy defining his political philosophy and going back to the liberal Catholicism of the JÓZSEF ANTALL

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Hungarian Reform Era are crystallised. It is his historic achievement that he created a synthesis that offered up-to-date answers that accord with the requirements of universal modernity, all relying on the traditions of universal Christian democracy, Hungarian national liberalism, and the special Hungarian constitutional law to the challenges posed by the regime change. From this basis, he set the country’s direction of development connected to the total transformation of the world order and the realignment of relationships in Central Europe, and laid down the democratic foundation for the Hungarian regime change. On the solid ground of two thousand years of shared values in Christian and Jewish communities and the Hungarian national liberal traditions—in the consistently value-based and value-oriented spirit of Christian future, keeping this spirit as a priority all through—he articulated a coherent and pragmatic conception, valid in both the national and the universal sphere.

Antall József: Békés átalakulás és stabilitás. (1993. márc.

13.) In: Antall (1994), vol. II, 524, and Antall József: Az MDF három eszmei irányzatáról. (1991. ápr. 21.) In: Antall (1994), vol. II, 129. 7

Antall József: A forradalom és a szabadságharc 35.

évfordulóján. (1991. okt. 23.) In: Antall (1994), vol. II, 221, 223. 8

Antall József előterjesz ti a Kormány kétéves

tevékenységéről szóló beszámolót. 1992. szeptember 16. In: Pálmány, 275. “The opposition is the political opposition to exercise control, contribute criticism, and censure,” Antall explained in his pre-agenda speech on 30 December 1990. In: Pálmány, 143. 9

Kónya Imre: Antall József közelről. „Én köszönettel

tartozom Magyarország népének.” Kortárs Kiadó, Budapest, 2019. 65. 10

Antall József kijelölt minisz terelnök válasza a

kormányprogram vitája során elhangzottakra. 1990. május 23. In: Pálmány, 55. 11 Antall: A nemzeti megújhodás útján, 43, 54. Cf. Szűcs Zoltán Gábor: Az antalli pillanat. A nemzeti történelem szerepe a magyar politikai diskurzusban, 1989 –1993. L’Harmattan Kiadó, Budapest, 2010. 147–162. 12 Antall József: Az Ellenzéki Kerekasztalnál (1990.) In: Antall (1994), vol. II, 409. László Sólyom is quoted in Szűcs, 79. Cf.

ENDNOTES

Tordai Csaba: A Harmadik Köztársaság alkotmányának

születése. In: A rendszerváltás forgatókönyve, edited by

Antall József: A választás „előestéjén.” (1990. márc. 23.)

In: Antall József: Modell és valóság. Vol. II. Atheneum

Bozóki–Kalmár–Révész. Vol. VI. 489–490.

Nyomda Rt., József, 1994. 38.

13 On Antall’s point of view, discussed in the 6 July 1989

meeting of the Opposition Round Table, see Szűcs, 80.

See Halmai Gábor: A z 1949. évi alkotmány

jogállamosítása. In: A rendszer váltás forgatóköny ve.

14 See Szűcs, 84; A rendszerváltás forgatókönyve, edited by

Kerekasztal-tárgyalások 1989-ben, edited by Bozóki András–

Bozóki–Kalmár–Révész. Vol. IV. 20. Cf. Halmai, 185 and

Kalmár Melinda–Révész Béla. Vol. VI. Új Mandátum

Tordai, 489.

Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 2000. 182.

15 Kukorelli István: Az alkotmányozás évtizede. Közjogi,

politikai tanulmányok, parlamenti jegyzetek. Korona Kiadó,

Antall József: A nemzeti megújhodás útján. (1990. máj.

22.) In: Antall (1994), vol. II, 54. Cf. Kukorelli István: Tradíció

Budapest, 1995. 20–21, 29, 80.

és modernizáció a magyar alkotmányjogban. Századvég

16 Debreczeni József: A miniszterelnök. Antall József és a

Politikai Iskola Alapítvány, Budapest, 2006. 17.

rendszerváltás. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 1998. 299.; Tordai,

490.

See the declaration of intent publicised by György Szabad

in the name of the Opposition Round Table on 21 June. A

17 Antall: A nemzeti megújhodás útján. 43.; József Antall,

rendszerváltás forgatókönyve, edited by Bozóki–Kalmár–

Félidőben. (1992. ápr. 13.) In: Antall (1994), vol. II, 252.

Révész. Vol. VI. 69. Cf. Lengyel László: A kerekasztal hősei.

18 Antall: A nemzeti megújhodás útján. 51, 54.

In: A rendszerváltás forgatókönyve, edited by Bozóki–

19 Antall József: A pápai kollégium újjászületésénél. (1991.

Kalmár–Révész. Vol. VI. 211, 217.

szept. 1.) In: Antall (1994), vol. II, 198. Antall: A nemzeti

megújhodás útján. 51.

Antall József napirend előtti parlamenti felszólalása.

1990. december 30. In: Antall József országgyűlési beszédei,

20 Antall: A nemzeti megújhodás útján. 53. Antall József: A

1990–1993, edited by Pálmány Béla. Athenaeum Nyomda,

Tudományos Akadémia szerepéről. In: Antall (1994), vol. II,

Budapest, 1994. 143. Cf. Antall József napirenden kívüli

77–78.

felszólalása. 1990. december. 4. In: Pálmány, 133–134.

21 Antall: A nemzeti megújhodás útján. 53.

182

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22 Antall: A nemzeti megújhodás útján. 54. Cf. Romsics

37 Antall: A választás „előestéjén.” 36–38.

Ignác: Volt egyszer egy rendszerváltás. Rubicon-Ház Bt.,

38 Antall: A nemzeti megújhodás útján. 64.

Budapest, 2003. 237, 261. Debreczeni, 146.

39 József Antall: Horthy Miklós történelmi szerepéről. (1993.

23 Antall József: MDF és kereszténydemokrácia. (1990.) In:

aug. 22–23.) In: Antall (1994), vol. II, 583.

Antall (1994), vol. II, 435.

40 Antall: A nemzeti megújhodás útján, 44, 47, 54. Antall

24 Antall József: Magyar reformátusok világtalálkozóján.

József kijelölt miniszterelnök válasza a kormányprogram

(1991. jún. 22.) In: Antall (1994), vol. II, 162–164. Antall: A

vitája során elhangzottakra. 1990. május 23. In: Pálmány, 53.

pápai kollégium újjászületésénél. 191.

41 Antall József: Magyar zsidó mártírok emlékművénél.

25 Antall: A nemzeti megújhodás útján. 48.

(1990. júl. 8.) In: Antall (1994), vol. II, 82.

26 Antall József: A társadalombiztosítás korszerűsítéséért.

42 Antall: A nemzeti megújhodás útján. 44, 47, 54.

(1991. máj. 27.) In: Antall (1994), vol. II, 153. Antall: A nemzeti

43 Antall: Magyar zsidó mártírok emlékművénél. 84. Cf.

megújhodás útján. 48.

Antall: A nemzeti megújhodás útján. 44.; Antall József

27 Antall: A választás előestéjén. 35.

napirend előtti felszólalásában megemlékezik 1944. március

28 Antall: A nemzeti megújhodás útján. 43, 45, 54. Antall

19-ről, Magyarország német megszállásának évfordulójáról.

József: Szabálytalan interjú. (1991. karácsony) In: Antall

1991. március 19. In: Pálmány, 165–167.

(1994), vol. II, 484.

44 Antall: Az MDF legyen középpárt! 10, and Antall: A

29 Antall József válasza a Surányi Györgynek, a Magyar

társadalombiztosítás korszerűsítéséért. 155. Cf. Kulin Ferenc:

Nemzeti Bank elnökének leváltása tárgyában folytatott

A történész és a politikus. In: A politikus Antall József. Az

napirend előtti vitában. In: Pálmány, 222, 224. Cf. Antall, A

európai úton, edited by Jeszenszky–Kapronczay–Biernaczky.

választás előestéjén. 55, and Antall: A nemzeti megújhodás

144.

útján. 59.

45 Antall József: Cserkészek ünnepén. (1991. márc. 14.) In:

30 Antall József: Az átalakulás esélyei. (1989. okt. 20.) In:

Antall (1994), vol. II, 100.

Antall (1994), vol. II, 25, 27. Cf. Bod Péter Ákos: Rend és

46 Antall: Szabálytalan interjú. 481.

Szabadelvűség. In: A politikus Antall József. Az európai úton,

47 Antall: Az MDF három eszmei irányzatáról. 117.

edited by Jeszenszky Géza–Kapronczay Károly–Biernaczky

48 Antall: A nemzeti liberalizmus öröksége. 208. Antall

Szilárd. Mundus Magyar Egyetemi Kiadó, Budapest, 2006. 258.

József: Népi mozgalom és európaiság (Szárszó elé). (1993.

31 Antall József: Az MDF legyen középpárt! (1989. márc. 11.)

aug. 7.) In: Antall (1994), vol. II, 559.

In: Antall (1994), vol. II, 10. The deﬁ nitive basic element of

49 Antall: Az MDF három eszmei irányzatáról. 117.

Antall’s conception of the nation was the “indivisible” unity of

50 Antall: Az MDF élén. 420–421.

commitments to both national and democratic values. See

51 Antall: Az MDF élén. 420.

Szabad György, a Magyar Országgyűlés elnöke országgyűlési

52 Antall: A nemzeti liberalizmus öröksége. 202.

megemlékezése Dr. Antall József miniszterelnök haláláról

53 Antall: Az MDF élén. 422.

(1993. dec. 13.). In: Országgyűlési Értesítő, 1990–1994.

54 Antall: Az MDF három eszmei irányzatáról. 119.

Országgyűlési Könyvtár, Budapest, 325.

55 Antall: A nemzeti liberalizmus öröksége. 208, 210.

32 See Romsics, 265. József Antall behaved with

56 Antall: MDF és kereszténydemokrácia. 434. Antall:

neighbouring peoples “not with arrogant condescension” but

Az MDF élén. 421. Cf. Erdődy Gábor–Fazekas Csaba:

as with “sister nations,” according to his eulogising old fellow

A magyarországi kereszténydemokrácia gyökerei és

ﬁ ghter. See Szabad, 325.

alternatívái. Magyar Szemle. 2005/7–8. 111.

33 Antall: Az MDF legyen középpárt! 10. Antall: Az MDF

57 Antall: Az MDF három eszmei irányzatáról. 120. Antall:

három eszmei irányzatáról. 120. Cf. Szűcs, 196.

A nemzeti liberalizmus öröksége. 208–209.

34 Antall József: A szovjet katonai tömb feloszlásának

58 Antall: Az MDF három eszmei irányzatáról. 118–119.

javaslata. (1990. jún. 7.) In: Antall (1994), vol. II, 323.

59 Antall: A nemzeti liberalizmus öröksége. 209.

35 Antall József: A nemzeti liberalizmus öröksége. (1991. okt. 12.) In: Antall (1994), vol. II, 210. Antall József: Politikai helyzet Magyarországon az 1990. március 25-i választások előtt. (Bonn, 1990. febr.) In: Antall (1994), vol. II, 313. 36 Antall József: Az MDF élén. (1990) In: Antall (1994), vol. II, 426.

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EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE RULE OF LAW AROUND THE REGIME CHANGEFORMAL AND MATERIAL CONSTITUTIONAL STATE AND QUESTIONS PRECEDING THE LAW

Miklós Szánthó

Writing the history of the regime change (even if only from a certain point of view) is an important task for the witnesses of those great times, as much as it is for the researchers of the younger generation. Thirty years ago, on 2 May, the first freely elected parliament convened for the first time, so we could consider this day the end of the public-law transition. However, this process practically ended only with the Fundamental Law coming into force in January 2012. This document declares (even if only twenty-one years after the departure of the last Soviet soldier) that the Stalinist constitution, ratified in 1949, was invalid, that there is no limitation on the humanitarian crimes committed under the national socialist and communist dictatorships, and that the state organisation based on the rule of law and the previous communist dictatorship cannot be reconciled. Thus, the constitutional rule that the rule of law is based on declares that the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party and its predecessors were “criminal organizations,” and their successors share their responsibility.1 We also know full well that expectations from the regime change were not limited to dismantling the party state, and the question at the time was not simply that Hungarians wished to establish a democratic system. The desire was there (on the part of József Antall and the Hungarian Democratic Forum as well) to repair the infringements committed in the previous system, to compensate for injustices, and to draw conclusions—but this desire was for some reason left unfulfilled. It is impossible to write the history of the regime change without answering the questions: What is the 184

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reason for this sense of lack, and why did the process of the regime change feel incomplete for a lot of people? I think the common denominator of the present and the period of the regime change is, paradoxically, one term: the rule of law. Familiar words might get new meanings, concepts are reinterpreted, and, in consequence, the persons, institutions able to lend weight to these different interpretations could decide these interpretive debates for a long time. On the following pages, I make a brief attempt to point all this out from the direction of the concept of the rule of law. The concept of the rule of law, of constitutionality, is (in addition to democracy) the trump card in the discourse of present political philosophy.2 In many public debates, references are made to it by everyone, from professor of law to politicians wanting to deploy an unanswerable argument in defence of their value judgements made by reference to facts or independent of them. At these times, the rule of law seems both a goal to strive for and an existing framework that is continually threatened by real or “made-up,” quote-unquote dangers. It has become a fad to evaluate the political system morally, legally, and politically by reference to the rule of law, since the use of this term as an argument endows its user with a magical power against which it is difficult to bring up acceptable counterarguments that seem or actually are valid. However trite this reference to the rule of law may seem, that does not make it evident for everyone how the argument is unfounded in its content.

DEFINITIONS OF THE RULE OF LAW AND OTHER DILEMMAS Looking back from this well-known situation, it is especially problematic to look for what the concept of the rule of law had for content at the regime change. I am certain that it is now even more difficult to find our way back to the original meaning of the term than it was at that time: that is, it requires serious effort now to “strip off” the non-immanent meanings that have accumulated over the last decades and delimit these from the earlier meaning.”3 The question of the rule of law can thus only be examined by surveying the relevant theoretical bases, but it also necessitates briefly presenting the legal system of the party state. The original meaning of the rule of law was that a predictable legal system must be established which everyone can learn and follow. Thus, people can adjust their doings to the law, and the legal system is actually in force in reality too. That is what the formal idea of the rule of law means. Based on the formal rule of law, state authorities cannot act against the law or without legal ground. The material rule of law contains more: beyond the formal rule of law, it also includes the judicial remedy in the case of offenses, the protection of natural human rights based on common sense, the equality of rights, the multiparty system and free elections, the separation of powers, and democracy. The content of the formal and material rule of law could, however, be anything we please if the real values that form the basis of human life and the order of society, preceding the law itself, are not clarified; the values on which “the whole thing” is built. One of the lessons to be learnt from today’s debates (but also from those at the regime change) is that, while there was formally more or less agreement between the parties (except, of course, the communists) concerning the “superficial” definitions of the rule of law, it often turns out that there is no consensus at all regarding the things “preceding the law.” In the field of human rights the actual beginning and end of a human life is a valid question, or whether having been treated unfairly once could generally destroy someone's dignity. Similar examples are numerous.4

The socialist constitution of 1949 stayed with us for a long time.

SOCIALIST LAW VERSUS THE RULE OF LAW But what was the situation in Hungary before the regime change? In the party-state system, socialist law was in force, and this “came to existence through the socialist revolution of the working class, the expression of the will of the working class, leading the socialist change, and their allied workers.” A textbook summarising the socialist theory of state and law, published a few years before the regime change,5 says that “the conception that the law has a definitive role was and still is important in bourgeois philosophy of the state. . . . This is essentially there in the neoKantian conception, which defines the state as legally regulated order. The concept of the rule of law is one way this approach appears: state activity happens according to legal prescriptions, the separation of powers, based on the provisions of the constitution, ensuring the execution of the authorities’ arbitrary actions and the force of liberties contained in the constitution. . . . [The conception of the definitive role of the law] solves the mutual relationship of state and law in a onesided, distorted way. The . . . socialist theory of state . . . denies this conception, according to which the law determines the state.” Socialist law stood on a class basis, and even though it emphasised the importance of civil rights and the principle of democracy, it denied equality of rights, and this means an irreconcilable opposition between it and the content of the civil concept of the rule of law. JÓZSEF ANTALL

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The products of the socialist legal system, the communist constitution and the laws put into practice the theoretical framework sketched out above. The constitution, ratiﬁed under Soviet pressure as Act XX of 1949, followed the Soviet model, and, in it, the rights (mostly provided for only in name) were placed after the part on the organisation of the state. The text usually subordinated the exercise of these rights to some socialist idea.6 The communist constitution lacked the separation of powers: even though there were provisions about the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches, there were no controlling functions at all.7 However, what is even more important: there were no laws which would have helped exercise the rights provided for in name (as in the case of association law), and the laws helping exercise fundamental rights (as the electoral code) already in force had to be amended too. Based on the theoretical grounding and the more important laws, we can thus say that the People’s Republic of Hungary did not have the rule of law, neither materially nor formally, and especially not concerning the morality of values preceding the law. All those who fought for the regime change, and among them József Antall in particular, fought essentially for the rule of law:

the “difﬁculties” of the party state were caused by the communist ideology, the system of norms saturated with this ideology, the socialist law, and the psychological and physical terror that was exercised in their name. ON THE TRANSITIONAL, CONSTITUTIONAL FORUMS In shaping the content of laws necessary for the regime change in a consensual way, the Independent Lawyers’ Forum (Független Jogász Fórum, FJF), founded on 5 November 1988, played an important role. Their goals were to shake up the legal profession from passivity and to “mobilise” for the democratic and nonviolent reform of the system. It was thanks to their commitment that, after the 15 March 1989 demonstrations, the opposition forces heeded the call of the FJF chair Imre Kónya and started talks among themselves about the most urgent questions of the transition: the electoral law and other important topics connected to the transition. The inaugural meeting of the Opposition Round Table (Ellenzéki Kerekasztal) was held on 22 March 1989.8 The members of the round table, according to their own way of thinking, fought for the rule of law: they considered it

József Antall and György Szabad at the Opposition Round Table Talks 186

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their goal to establish popular sovereignty, and they did not wish to share the privileges of the power monopoly and to ally themselves with organisations which had taken part in the party state’s rule of terror. It was important to record these three as a matter of principle because, with this, they made it clear that they did not identify with the party state and the ideology at its core. At the opening of the National Round Table Talks (Nemzeti Kerekasztal Tárgyalások), on 13 June 1989, Imre Kónya repeated these basic principles again when speaking for the Opposition Round Table, emphasising that Hungary belonged to the people who lived there and the mission of the talks was to find the way to free elections. “We make it clear that the purpose of the talks is to provide a peaceful transition from a dictatorial system to a representative democracy that actually reflects the will of the people. . . . Our goal is that the citizens of the country should be able to decide, and should decide, what political forces they entrust with the exercise of power for the period between two elections.”9 This was exceedingly difficult a task, since, due to the transitional nature of the process, the role of the last party-state parliament could not be disregarded in it. Thus, the differences between the viewpoints on the rule of law really surfaced in what each delegation would have entrusted to the freely elected parliament and what they saw as unavoidably important to realise even before the new elections. Yet, as others have remarked already, the conception of the first legitimately elected prime minister of modern Hungary made it clear that, in the given situation, the only principal basis of the talks could be the continuation of Hungarian democratic public-law traditions, broken violently by communism.10 At the National Round Table Talks, the viewpoints connected to the rule of law crystallised around agreeing on the fundamental questions and how they should appear in the legal system. The Opposition Round Table fixed its point of view about the amendment of the constitution: the form of government in Hungary should be a republic, and a democratic, constitutional state must be created where the basis of authority is popular sovereignty exercised through elected

representatives or directly. The demands of the state party would have overwritten these principles because they insisted that the term “socialism” remain in the constitution. However, the word “socialism” would not have been a simple ideological reference or a positing of value—that would have been contradictory, too, since, as Gábor Czakó pointed out, the adjective “socialist” functions as a negative prefix.11 Its appearance would rather have provided the opportunity for the formal survival of the party state system, although all this could not have excluded a more informal “infiltration,” and it, in fact, did not exclude that at all.12 Since the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party was not willing to compromise, the Opposition Round Table gave some ground on two conditions: the term “socialism” could only appear in the preamble, and, even there, it had to be balanced out with the values of “bourgeois democracy.” The question was finally resolved before the convention of the freely elected parliament in a pact between the leaders of the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats. Based on this document, signed by the leaders on 29 April 1990, the majority in parliament struck out from the normative text of the constitution the references both to democratic socialism and its counterbalance, bourgeois democracy. It is from this time that the formula “The Republic of Hungary is an independent, democratic constitutional state” appeared in the preamble of the temporary constitution.13 The legislative work that was done in the autumn of 1989, necessary for the transition, resulted in the creation of the constitutional framework of a bourgeois democracy, in the form of a parliamentary republic, to replace the “people’s republic,” at least according to the Opposition Round Table, and, thus, also according to the consensus of the National Round Table Talks. Still, even if we accept this as a certain sort of hypothesis, we have to state that all of this was in itself necessary but not sufficient: numerous tasks were left to the freely elected parliament, and some obligations that remained could not be fulfilled even by the legislations of later election cycles. JÓZSEF ANTALL

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IF THERE WAS A MISTAKE SOMEWHERE . . . It is an oft-discussed topic that the price of the “peaceful transition” was “not bringing to trial” the criminals of the previous system, the actual perpetrators of the atrocities, as opposed to, for example, the period following World War II. Generally, classic rules of doing justice concern a deﬁnite group of people, and, accordingly, if victim-oriented provisions are made, it is the victims, if perpetrator-oriented provisions of justice are accepted, it is the perpetrators of the dictatorship who are concerned.14 The parliament accepted an act of nullity already in the autumn of 1989, which was followed by three similar laws. Information compensation started, and steps were taken towards ﬁnancial compensation, too. These were victim-oriented actions, but action against the perpetrators was proposed only in a few early legislative initiatives and more, objectively late, laws. Except for very few cases where criminal prosecution did start, the people who exercised authority and committed crimes in the party state practically did not have to face any consequences. The rule of law could, thus, not have been complete, since one of its most basic actions, justice done against the perpetrators, did not happen, paradoxically by reference exactly to the thencurrent concept of the rule of law. Many explanations are possible for this turn of the Hungarian history, but, if we look at the question primarily from the direction of the rule of law, we can state that the elite of the regime change had a single goal in common, which was the antithesis of the forty years of trampling the law underfoot in the communist dictatorship: the restoration of democracy.15 In the course of the National Round Table Talks, the need for justice, thus, did not appear, but the peaceful transition would not have necessarily excluded the uncovering of the past and the prosecution of the dictatorship’s criminals later.16 Punishing the criminals, however, was disapproved of not only by the successor party: it was the politicians of the Alliance of Free Democrats and the intellectuals in their orbit who thought that doing justice was not a necessary condition for the completion of the regime change. 188

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The argument between the two camps was finally not decided by politics: the bill concerning justice, proposed by Zsolt Zétényi and Péter Takács, from the Hungarian Democratic Forum, was found unconstitutional by the serving judges of the Constitutional Court. After the constitutional veto of President Árpád Göncz, the Constitutional Court annulled the law amendments declaring the limitations on serious crimes on the grounds that they clash with Act XX of 1949, declaring the rule of law and the principle of nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without a law).17 The Constitutional Court ruled that the law restarted the limitation period on crimes which had already fallen under limitation, and extended the limitation period on crimes which had not fallen under limitation as of 2 May 1990. According to the Constitutional Court, the unfair result of legal relationships, in itself, is not a valid argument against legal certainty, and basic criminal-law guarantees derive directly from the concept of the rule of law. The ruling says that “in law, the regime change means, and a legal regime change is possible, only in the sense that the legal system has to be harmonised with the constitution, and . . . it has to be kept consistent.” In summary, the above means that, according to the Constitutional Court, the requirement of formal legal certainty has priority over subjective justice. Looking at the question as a matter of principle, it is clear today that there would have been opportunity to prosecute the serious crimes committed in the party state system, since no rights are derived from crimes, and so perpetrators cannot refer to rights to which they are entitled. The four decades before the regime change was a period when there was no guarantee that actions that constitute crimes, committed in the interest of the party state, would be prosecuted according to the law. Even though the professors of law and politicians who turned against the ideas of the regime change thought the rule of law could not be realised against the rule of law, the rule of law that they desired would have been complete if, in its interest, the deeds opposing the rule of law were assessed at the first possible opportunity. Rather late, but today this is contained in the Fundamental Law of Hungary, and, in this sense, we can consider the regime change finished, even if not complete.

INSTEAD OF CLOSING REMARKS I am convinced that what happened at the time of the regime change is instructive even in today’s discourse about the rule of law. We need both wisdom and daring to take on what is important and make compromises in only those questions in which they are absolutely necessary and morally acceptable. Thirty years after the event, it is still problematic to decide how one can evaluate the regime change and the period directly following it, since the country got a democratically elected, legitimate, civil, and Christian government, which guaranteed the stability of social life in a rather confused period. Beyond creating the formal and material frameworks for the rule of law, however (maybe due to the informal survival of socialism, maybe not), this government proved to be less successful in giving unified answers to questions “preceding the law.” Still, we cannot conceal the fact that this “failure” was not only “our” fault. More than forty years of international communism, the party state elites’ embeddedness in the structure of the state, the vested interests of financial and other circles in a “peaceful” transition (that is, without being impeached) meant serious limitations. A suggestive example for this limited situation and for how successfully the earlier regime’s influence and style survived, is the answer Antall gave in parliament to a speech a socialist representative made in 1992, concerning the state of the economy. Antall’s words at the same time demonstrate the absurdity of the political circumstances too: “You can write and say anything about us, it all comes unashamedly from those who led this country into this situation. You unashamedly accuse us. We did not ruin the country, we did not put it in this position. Those who did should at the very least not be so arrogant with us.” I am certain that the message that József Antall’s political work has for today is that respecting the law is an absolutely necessary but not in the least sufficient condition of serving the public.18 I am equally sure that we would still have the catharsis we experienced at the regime change if at least some symbolic justice had been done concerning the perpetrators of communist terror.

ENDNOTES 1 See the National Avowal in the Fundamental Law and Article U. 2 Tóth J. Zoltán: A jogállamiság tartalma. Jogtudományi Közlöny. 2019/5. 197. 3 Tóth, 197. 4 It is not my task here to answer such questions, but just to give some symbolic examples: Why is abortion legal and not punishable, when acts committed against protected animals are not legal? Does life really end with brain death, if a pregnant woman can, after brain death has been declared, give birth to her child? Why is “assisted death” in a “health procedure” permissible in some countries when assisting a simple suicide is punishable everywhere? There are, of course, many such questions. 5 Dr. Samu Mihály: Állam- és jogelmélet. Manuscript. Tankönyvkiadó Vállalat, Budapest, 1984. 131–132. 6 Ésszel az észszerűtlenségben. Aktuális társadalmi problémák viselkedési közgazdaságtani megközelítésben, edited by Deli Gergely. Alapjogokért Központ, Budapest, 2019. 221. 7 Mezey Barna: Magyar alkotmánytörténet. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2003. 465. 8 Bozóki András: Szemérmes alkotmányozás. Rendszerváltás és jogállami forradalom 1989-ben. In: Alkotmányozás Magyarországon és máshol. Politikatudományi és alkotmányjogi megközelítések, edited by Jakab András–Körösényi András. Új Mandátum Könyvkiadó–MTA Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont Politikatudományi Intézet, Budapest, 2012. 207. 9 Bozóki, 217. 10 Gulyás Gergely: Antall József politikája a jogállam szemszögéből. Magyar Szemle. 2007/11–12. 7–16. 11 Czakó Gábor: A holokauszt és a kereszténység. Gondola. hu. 2 March 2003. <https://bit.ly/2w3ERPz > 12 Gróh Gáspár: Különös választás. Magyar Szemle. 2010/5–6. 17–25. 13 Bozóki, 225. 14 „Az nem lehet ugyanis, hogy súlyos bűntett ne legyen büntethető.” Jogi fejezetek a magyarországi igazságtétel és kárpótlás történetéből, edited by Máthé Áron. Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága, Budapest, 2017. 10. 15 Máthé, 12. 16 Varga Csaba: Válaszúton – Húsz év múltán. Kráter Műhely Egyesület, Pomáz, 2011. 72. 17 Decision 11/1992. (III. 5.) of the Constitutional Court. 18 Gulyás.

JÓZSEF ANTALL

189

ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE

The Antall József Knowledge Centre (AJKC) in Hungary, during its ten years of existence, has introduced a variety of events targeting Hungarian students enrolled in higher education, as well as domestic and international professional audiences. The Knowledge Centre is named after József Antall (1932–1993), a Hungarian teacher, educator, librarian, historian, and statesman, who served as the ﬁrst democratically elected Prime Minister of Hungary after the fall of communism (from 23 May 1990 to his death on 12 December 1993). The Knowledge Centre’s main objectives, in line with the Antall’s philosophy, include managing talent and providing students and young professionals with wide-ranging practical knowledge through various events. The Knowledge Centre is a think tank researching topics of national, regional, and international relevance, such as the Visegrad Cooperation, the future global role of the EU, the US, China, and the Middle East, security policy, sustainable development, as well as technological and social innovation. The whole of AJKC works toward strengthening institutional relations both at the national and international level, developing scholarship and

internship programmes, and boosting professional cooperation via international conferences, workshops, and event series. Our institution’s main office is located in Budapest, operating with three international departments—dealing with the EU and the V4, the USA, and Asia and Africa— and three thematic departments—focusing on security policy, sustainable development, and talent management. In addition, AJKC has two regional offices in Pécs and Győr, as well as an office in Brussels, which was established in 2015 to represent the Antall philosophy in the heart of the European Union and promote the values that he stood for at an international level. The publishing activities of AJKC involve releasing professional publications, scholarly works on political and social sciences (with special regard to security policy and international relations), as well as university textbooks. In our autobiographical series, prominent personalities of the Cold War period, including Ronald Reagan, George Bush, Margaret Thatcher, and Helmut Kohl, recount crucial years and decisions still affecting their lives. Reacting to events of political, social, and economic significance in the 21st century, the

professional publications series of the Knowledge Centre features works incorporating the latest results of international relations and geopolitics, the history of politics, economics, and psychology. Hungarian Memories is an original guidebook series published by AJKC that presents the common history of Hungary and the country under scrutiny in a unique way, then guides the reader through the various regions, while also recounting the story of locations with Hungarian memories accompanied by their picturesque images. The AJKC’s most ambitious professional event is called think.BDPST. The conference, organised in cooperation with Hungary’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and supported by the International Visegrad Fund, focusses on regional development and the new perspectives of research, innovation, and future technologies. The business world's most notable, creative and innovative thinkers are all invited to think.BDPST along with actors from NGOs and from the political sectors to share and inspire one another to develop forward-thinking strategies that will facilitate the development of the whole Visegrad region. The event also aims to position Budapest as an ideal destination for

enterprises with a pioneering spirit seeking new horizons, new markets to enter, or a new territory and knowledge base to include in their plans for the future. The Antall József Summer School is an educational programme for MA and PhD students, as well as young professionals, that examines the Central European region, in particular, the Visegrad Cooperation, and its wider neighbourhood from various aspects through frontal and more interactive forms of education. In 2019, the Knowledge Centre organised the seventh Summer School that revolved around the role of the Visegrad Cooperation in international partnerships such as the EU, OSCE, or NATO. Each year, the Knowledge Centre organises its Foreign and Security Policy Conference, which focusses on the key diplomatic priorities of Hungary, the Central European region, and the Transatlantic Alliance as a whole, such as the future of NATO, stability in the Western Balkans, and EU defence cooperation. The conference series is organised in cooperation with the KonradAdenauer-Stiftung and supported by the NATO Public Diplomacy Division.

G RS UE

AUTHORS

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AUTH ST

AUTHO ST

The Third Wave—The End of Communism and Anti-communism in the 1980s Baranyi, Tamás Péter Deputy Director for Strategy, Institute of Foreign Affairs and Trade

The End of Communism and the Political Transformation of the Visegrad Four (V4) Countries Perestroika and Regime Change in Hungary

Erdődy, Gábor Historian, professor at Eötvös Loránd University, Doctor of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences

József Antall’s Christian Democratic Political Thoughts

Kéri, László Political analyst, former researcher at the Institute of Political Science of the Centre for Social

The Newborn Multiparty System

Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Krausz, Tamás Historian, Doctor of History, professor emeritus,

Regime Change or Revolution?

Eötvös Loránd University

Lukács B., György Researcher at the Institute of Central European Studies, National University of Public Services,

The Croatian and Slovenian Way of Independence and Regime Change

Eötvös József Research Centre

Máthé, Áron Historian, Sociologist, Vice-Chair of the Hungarian Committee of National Remembrance

192

AUTHORS

Regime Change and Revolution

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G RS UE O

AUTH ST

AUTHO ST

Sáringer, János Head of the Institute of Social Sciences at the Budapest Business School University, Head of the Central European Regional Research Group at the

The Goals and Steps of József Antall’s Foreign Policy

University’s Faculty of International Management and Business, associate professor

Stumpf, István Professor at Deák Ferenc Faculty of Law and Political Sciences at the University of Győr, senior research fellow at the Institute of Political Science of the

Constitutionality and Legal Transition

Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, former judge of the Constitutional Court, and former Minister of the Prime Minister’s Office

Szánthó, Miklós Lawyer, Director of Centre for Fundamental Rights, President of Central European Press

Expectations About the Rule of Law around the Regime Change

and Media Foundation

Tóth, Eszter Zsófia Historian, senior research fellow at Veritas Research Institute

Freedom—Freiheit—Szabadság: The Effect of the Regime Change on Everyday Life

Zsiros, Egon Student at Corvinus University of Budapest, member of Széchenyi István College

The Short History of the Economic Regime Change

for Advanced Studies

AUTHORS

193

T H O S

F A J

Braun, András Research fellow

Csepregi, Zsolt Deputy Director for International Affairs

Dobrowiecki, Péter Historian, Head of Research

Gorácz, Anikó Head of Press and Media Relations, Head of Publishing

Between Regime Change and Democratic Consolidation: Serbia, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina

An Important Point in the Third Wave of Global Democratisaton: Athens, 1974

The End of Communism and the Political Transformation of the Visegrad Four (V4) Countries

Well, You Should Have Directed It—Hungarian Film and the Regime Change

Interview with Gergely Gulyás Pál, Zsombor Szabolcs

Interview with Frank Spengler

Historian, senior researcher

Portugal: The Beginning of the 20th Century’s Last Wave of Democratisation

194

AUTHORS

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

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4 NARRATIVES

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Regime Change and Revolution

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Antall’s private collection. Author: Péter Antall. Used with After 1990, Western movies crowded out Hungarian ﬁlms

the author’s permission.

from cinemas. Source: FORTEPAN (76422)/Erdei Katalin, On the last 4 April in 1989, Hungarians celebrated by going

licence: CC BY-SA-3.0.

to Austria in massive numbers to engage in shopping tourism. Source: Péter Antall’s private collection. Author:

Zsolt Kézdi-Kovács (far right) in 1957, one year before

Péter Antall. Used with the author’s permission.

being recruited (the others, from left to right: director István Bácskai-Lauró, photographer László Neuman, assistant

As a symbolic event concluding the lies of the previous system,

photographer Nándor Száz, ﬁrst assistant Márk Novák).

the reinterment of Imre Nagy and his fellow martyrs drew

Source: FORTEPAN (19185)/Kotnyek Antal, licence: CC BY-

a massive crowd. Source: Péter Antall’s private collection.

SA-3.0.

Author: Péter Antall. Used with the author’s permission. A Conversation with Károly Grósz in Gödöllő The ﬁrst free election in Hungary—József Antall casts his

Károly Grósz’s photographic portrait. Source: Péter Antall’s

vote. Source: Péter Antall’s private collection. Author: Péter

private collection. Author: Péter Antall. Used with the

Antall. Used with the author’s permission.

author’s permission.

Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary in 1990. Source:

János Kádár and his successor, Károly Grósz. Source:

Péter Antall’s private collection. Author: Péter Antall. Used

FORTEPAN (41310)/Angyalföldi Helytörténeti Gyűjtemény,

with the author’s permission.

licence: CC-BY-SA-3.0.

1990—

Károly Grósz and Miklós Németh in the parliament. Source:

encouraging co-operation between the region’s countries

Péter Antall’s private collection. Author: Péter Antall. Used

was one of József Antall’s greatest achievements (middle:

with the author’s permission.

Árpád

Göncz’s

visit

Czechoslovakia

Czechoslovakian president Václav Havel, on the right: Alexander Dubček, chair of the Federal Assembly). Source: FORTEPAN (138489)/Szalay Zoltán, licence: CC BY-SA-3.0.

5 A CHANGE OF DIRECTION

Well, You Should Have Directed It—Hungarian Film

Perestroika and Regime Change in Hungary

and the Regime Change

US ambassador Mark Palmer in front of the building of the

Director Károly Makk and photographer György Illés in a

American diplomatic corps on 23 October 1989, the day

break in the shooting of Fűre lépni szabad (Do Step on the

the republic was proclaimed. Source: https://commons.

wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mark_Palmer_1989.jpg, author: Solkim,

Radio Calypso was one of the ﬁrst commercial radio channels

licence: CC BY-SA 3.0.

in Hungary pictured: László B. Tóth editor-in-chief). Source: FORTEPAN (56361)/Vahl Ottó, licence: CC BY-SA-3.0.

György Aczél, the most inﬂuential person in cultural policy in the Kádár era. Source: FORTEPAN/Urbán Tamás, licence: CC

Hitchhiking was a popular and cheap way of travelling West.

BY-SA-3.0.

Source: FORTEPAN (150130)/Barna Imre, licence: CC-BY-SA-3.0.

Károly Grósz in the parliament. Source: Péter Antall’s private

This is what an InterRail ticket looked like in the 1980s. Source:

collection. Author: Péter Antall. Used with the author’s

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Interrail1982.jpg,

permission.

author: Deutche Bundesbahn, licence: public domain.

Constitutionality and Legal Transition

Youth life took a radical turn with new musical styles, bomb

The newly elected members of the Constitutional Court (from

threats and branded Western clothing. Source: FORTEPAN

left to right: dr. Antal Ádám, dr. Géza Kilényi, dr. Pál Solt, dr.

(25275)/FORTEPAN, licence: CC-BY-SA-3.0.

László Sólyom, dr. János Zlinszky and dr. László Nyikos) take their oath before the National Assembly on 23 November

The Short History of the Economic Regime Change

1989. Source: MTI Fotó/Cseke Csilla.

János Kádár visits the Company of Cutting Tools. Source: FORTEPAN (41315)/ Angyalföldi Helytörténeti Gyűjtemény,

The Newborn Multiparty System

licence: CC-BY-SA-3.0.

The meeting of the Alliance of Free Democrats in the Jurta Theatre, where the members voted on reforming into a party

The rate of Hungarian debt accumulation between 1973 and

in 1988. Source: FORTEPAN (60447)/Phillipp Tibor, licence:

1989, based on the 1993 data of the Central Bank of Hungary.

CC BY-SA-3.0.

Source of data: Szabó Gergely: A magyar államadósság keletkezése (1973–1989). Pénzriport, [s. l.], 2016. 17., design:

Campaign posters from the period of the ﬁrst free elections

Gergely Kiss.

in 1990. Source: FORTEPAN (136141)/SZITAKRI, licence: CC BY-SA-3.0.

A typical format of small companies in the Kádár era. Source: FORTEPAN (127190)/Bauer Sándor, licence: CC-BY-SA-3.0.

The two victorious parties of the 1990 election could even have formed a grand coalition—but their leaders decided

Changes in Hungary’s unemployment index between 1990 and

otherwise. (The picture shows Bálint Magyar, a founding

1998. Source: Gulyás László – Marianucz László: A magyar

member of the SZDSZ). Source: FORTEPAN (55404)/Magyar

gazdaság rövid története a rendszerváltástól napjainkig (1990-

Bálint, licence: CC BY-SA-3.0.

től 2008-ig). Országinfó Kormányzati Portál. 2009. április 1.

<https://regi.orszaginfo.magyarorszag.hu/informaciok/

An issue of the samizdat periodical Beszélő. Source: Péter

gazdasag/gazdasagtorteenet/gazdasagtortenet_3.html >,

Antall’s private collection. Author: Péter Antall. Used with the

design: Gergely Kiss.

author’s permission. The consumer price index between 1984 and 1994. The 2nd Congress of Fidesz. Source: Péter Antall’s private

Source: Consumer price index (2010 = 100) – Hungary. The

collection. Author: Péter Antall. Used with the author’s permission.

World

Bank.

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.

TOTL?end=1994&locations=HU&start=1985&view=chart > Freedom—Freiheit—Szabadság: the Effect of the Regime

Hozzáférés: 2020. március 20. Licence: https://datacatalog.

Change on Everyday Life

worldbank.org/public-licenses#cc-by, design: Gergely Kiss.

It was not Péter Erdős and Hungaroton that decided what people listened to. Source: FORTEPAN (1519529/Szigetváry

Hungarian fertility indicators between 1980 and 1995. Source:

Zsolt, licence: CC BY-SA-3.0.

Fertility rate, total (births per woman) – Hungary. The World

Bank.

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.

IN?end=1995&locations=HU&start=1980 > Hozzáférés: 2020. március

20.

Licence:

guarantee of the rule of law. Source: FORTEPAN (138510)/ Szalay Zoltán, licence: CC BY-SA-3.0..

https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/

public-licenses#cc-by, design: Gergely Kiss.

With József Antall heading the government, the relationship between the churches and the state was placed on entirely

The balance of preprivatisation in Hungary. Source of data:

new foundations. Source: FORTEPAN (152341)/Szigetváry

Csáki György – Macher Ákos: A magyarországi privatizáció 10

Zsolt, licence: CC BY-SA-3.0.

éve (1988–1997). In: Magyarország politikai évkönyve, 1988– 1998. 1998/2. 115–160., design: Gergely Kiss.

József Antall and businessman Péter Zwack—Antall thought freedom of enterprise and market economy important.

Growth of Hungarian gross national product between 1992

Source: FORTEPAN (152417)/Szigetváry Zsolt, licence: CC

and 2000. Source: GDP growth (annual %) – Hungary. The

BY-SA-3.0.

World Bank. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP. M K T P. K D . Z G ? e n d = 1 9 9 4 & l o c a t i o n s = H U & s t a r t = 1 9 9 1 >

László Tőkés in the Hungarian parliament—the issue of

Hozzáférés: 2020. március 20. Licence: https://datacatalog.

Hungarians beyond the borders was important to József

worldbank.org/public-licenses#cc-by, design: Gergely Kiss.

Antall. Source: FORTEPAN (152323)/Szigetváry Zsolt, licence: CC BY-SA-3.0.

Conservative József Antall and liberal Péter Tölgyessy next to

JÓZSEF ANTALL

each other. Source: FORTEPAN (152286)/Szigetváry Zsolt,

The Goals and Steps of József Antall’s Foreign Policy

licence: CC BY-SA-3.0.

József Antall and Mikhail Gorbachev at their meeting in Paris on 21 November 1990. Source: MTI Fotó/Soós Lajos.

Expectations about the Rule of Law around the Regime Change—Formal and Material Constitutional State and

George Bush’s 1989 visit to Hungary—the American President

Questions Preceding the Law

contacted the opposition already at this time. Source: Péter

The socialist constitution of 1949 stayed with us for a long

Antall’s private collection. Author: Péter Antall. Used with the

time. Source: FORTEPAN (15336)/MHSZ, licence: CC BY-

author’s permission.

SA-3.0.

Margaret Thatcher, who visited Hungary in the autumn of

József Antall and György Szabad at the Opposition Round

1990, and praised the economic and political changes for

Table Talks. Source: Péter Antall’s private collection. Author:

József Antall. Source: FORTEPAN (152456)/Szigetváry Zsolt,

Péter Antall. Used with the author’s permission.

licence: CC BY-SA-3.0.

Helmut Kohl delivers an address to parliament in the course of his

1989 visit to Hungary—the German Chancellor was an important

ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE

supporter of the Euro-Atlantic integration of the region. Source:

All pictures published in this chapter are possessions of the

FORTEPAN (124985)/Urbán Tamás, CC BY-SA-3.0.

Antall József Knowledge Centre.

Géza Jeszenszky, foreign minister of the Antall cabinet. Source: Péter Antall’s private collection. Author: Péter Antall. Used with the author’s permission.

8 AUTHORS The portraits of our contributing authors were provided by

József Antall’s Christian Democratic Political Thoughts

themselves.

József Antall and László Sólyom, the chair of the Constitutional

The portraits of authors of the Antall József Knowledge Centre

Court—this newly established body was an important

are possessions of the Antall József Knowledge Centre.

10 NEXT ISSUE

As the Visegrad cooperation is celebrating its 30th anniversary next year, this country group, just as the wider region it belongs to, will be In Focus. Hence, 2021’s first issue is aiming to throw light on what exactly Central Europe means historically, politically, geopolitically, and economically within and without the borders of its strongest regional format, the V4. The authors are going to have a look at how these countries interlock, what are their joint interests, challenges, and in what ways they can further these regionally and internationally. Touching upon the most recent topics that have had a major impact on Central European policymaking, there will be articles on migration, green transition, financial interests, and what future these countries imagine for Europe. This turf of Europe has always been in the intersection of great power interests, the issue will wherefore also have pieces discussing the main traits and goals of the region’s foreign policy and how it blends into today’s likely emerging world order. Although the region is of utmost relevance in itself, we also cover all the above keeping the Antall legacy relevant, as Central Europe and, most particularly, the Visegrad countries were always pivotal to our eponym’s political thought.

Previous issues of In Focus are available for free on the Knowledge Centre’s webpage www.ajtk.hu.

202

NEXT ISSUE

IMPRINT Publisher: Antall József Knowledge Centre Publishing Director: Péter Antall, Director, AJKC Editor-in-Chief: Zsombor Szabolcs Pál Editor: Emese Schwarcz Editor of the Károly Grósz interview: Kálmán Soós Language Editor: Mónika Vajda Proof-reader of the chapter 2 and 3, and the Károly Grósz interview: Réka Major Contributors: Csilla Lichtenstein, Zita Mihály Layout: Gergely Kiss, Csilla Lichtenstein Graphic Design: Gergely Kiss Cover: Gergely Kiss Pre-press Preparation: Péter Somos Printed and Bound: Printing Solutions Bt. Managing Director: Ádám Szöllősi

CONTACT INFORMATION Antall József Knowledge Centre 1093 Budapest, Czuczor utca 2. +36 20 310 8776 www.ajtk.hu www.ajtkkonyvmuhely.hu

ISSN 2677112X HU ISSN 2677111X