In Focus_The V4 and Central Europe

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I N F O C US

2021. 1st Issue ISSN 2677-111X

The V4 and Central Europe

Economy

History

Security

Foreign relations



IN FOCUS

2021. 1st Issue ISSN 2677-111X

The V4 and Central Europe

All rights reserved. Articles found in this publication are the intellectual property of the Antall József Knowledge Centre. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher.


TABLE OF CONTENTS

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5

Welcoming Words

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2 Introduction 6 Central Europe and Its Most Important Cooperation, the V4 8 Central and Eastern Europe’s Interests within the EU—Interview with Hungary’s State Secretary for EU Affairs Attila Steiner 12 V4 in the World and within the EU—Interview with Executive Director of the International Visegrad Fund Edit Szilágyiné Bátorfi 17

3 How to describe Central Europe? József Antall’s Conception of Central Europe Political System Changes in Central Europe: A Bird’s Eye View Clash of Conceptualisations—Geopolitical Concepts and Their Significance in Central Europe New Visegrad in New Europe Subregionalism and Minilateralism in Contemporary Europe

20 22 29

37 47 50

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6 Antall József Knowledge Centre

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7 Authors 156 Guest Authors 156 Authors of AJKC 158

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Central Europe and the EU 58 The Visegrad Group Countries’ Representation in the European Parliament after Brexit 60 A Quadratic Nexus—The National Minorities of Central Europe in the EU 66 Immigration and Multiculturalism in Central Europe—Social, Political, and Cultural Dilemmas 72 Central Europe in the European Budgetary Politics: Can It Still Be Bypassed? 82 The European Green Deal and its Implications for Central and Eastern Europe 90 The Unquiet Frontier: The NATO Enlargement and Partnership from the Perspective of Central Europe 97 4

Great power politics in the CEE region 108 American Interests in Central Europe: Continuity and Shifting Emphases 110 Russia and the Geopolitics of the New Cold War 120 Chinese Influence in Central Europe: Myth or Reality? 123 The Crossed Red Line: The Past, the Present, and the Unclear Future of Chinese–Czech Relations 129 Emmanuel Macron’s Vision on Central European Geopolitics 135 A Special Relationship? The UK’s Relations with Central Europe and Its Countries Post–EU Exit 140 Germany, a Central European Great Power 145

TABLE OF CONTENTS

References of pictures and used data

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9 Next issue

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WELCOMING WORDS

Dear Readers,

Editor’s Note

Central Europe, and, more concretely, the tetrad that comprises the countries of the Visegrad Group, is often referred to as the new heart of Europe, for it is said to lend the old continent the economic vigour and the new ideas it needs. Still, Central Europe’s virtual borders sometimes seem blurred, and it is not always clear what the true nature of the Visegrad cooperation is. Our present issue provides a tour d’horizon of what Central Europe and the Visegrad Group are. It guides our readers through the most important issues the region needs to face today, encompassing topics such as geopolitics, economy, security, minorities, the role of external actors and partners, and the most pivotal challenges of the European Union. Our institution has as a mission to keep József Antall’s legacy and political tradition alive, and Central European cooperation was irrefutably a cornerstone of József Antall’s foreign policy. Therefore, this issue offers an overview of his thoughts on and political motivations for building a strong partnership in a region that historically bonds together but was marked by hostility among peoples and, thus, went through several trials and tribulations over the last century. Central Europe is, no doubt, a focal part of the continent, and it is getting into the swing of things now that, after freeing itself from communism and joining the Western multilateral world, it took its rightful place in the European concert. And what may the future hold for it? We are more than keen to keep close tabs on that.

The vast lands from the Danube to the Ural Mountains consist of many nations, small and great, perhaps differing in their culture, religion, or language, nonetheless having certain similarities, which enable the readers to distinguish them from any other parts of Europe. This magazine aims at showing what the meaning of being a Central European is, what kind of common interests these nations have in Europe, and what the global powers’ perception of this region is. Regional cooperation has appeared in many different forms during the history of Central Europe. Alas, not all the initiatives have been destined to survive, but the most important ones, especially the Visegrad cooperation, still have many tasks ahead. The V4 celebrates its 30th anniversary in 2021. Politically, the V4 countries have sometimes travelled on a bumpy road but could sometimes switch to high speed. Beyond the realm of high politics, the V4 created an atmosphere of cooperation, leaving historical grievances behind for good. If that was the only achievement we could thank József Antall, Václav Havel, and Lech Wałęsa, it would be more than enough. However, so much more has happened in the last thirty years that it seems a great task to list all of them. Thus, we intended to focus on three particular topics in this issue: the definition of Central Europe, the role of Central European countries in European politics, and great powers’ interests in our region. We sincerely hope that our magazine can give food for thought and contribute to broadening our readers’ knowledge of Central Europe.

Zsombor Szabolcs Pál—Editor-in-Chief

Péter Stepper—Editor WELCOMING WORDS

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2

INTRODUCTION



ICELAND

CENTRAL EUROPE AND ITS MOST IMPORTANT COOPERATION, THE V4

V4 COUNTRIES

Warsaw

IRELAND POLAND

UNITED KINGDOM

Prague CZECH REPUBLIC

BELGIUM

SLOVAKIA

Bratislava Budapest HUNGARY

FRANCE

PORTUGAL Central Europe Northern Europe Western Europe Southern Europe Southeastern Europe Eastern Europe Following actual state borders Following cultural proximities

SPAIN


FINLAND

NORWAY

RUSSIA

SWEDEN ESTONIA

LATVIA DENMARK

LITHUANIA RUSSIA

BELARUS

POLAND

NETHERLANDS

UKRAINE GERMANY CZECH REPUBLIC

MOLDOVA

SLOVAKIA AUSTRIA

HUNGARY

ROMANIA

SWITZERLAND SLOVENIA

CROATIA

BOSNIA SERBIA AND HERZEGOVINA ITALY

BULGARIA

KOSOVO MONTENEGRO NORTH MACEDONIA ALBANIA

TURKEY

GREECE

CYPRUS

MALTA


POPULATION (2020)*

MOST OF THE V4 COUNTRIES HAVE A POSITIVE OPINION ABOUT THE EU CZECHIA

43% (2.39%)

(2.18%)

(8.48%)

52%

(1.22%)

Czechia:

Hungary:

Poland:

Slovakia:

10,693,939

9,769,526

37,958,138

5,457,873

EU-27: 447,706,209 (%) = percent of the total EU-27 population

HUNGARY AREA (KM2)*

EU-27: 4,233,255

25%

67%

Poland: 312,685 (7.3%) Czechia: 78,866 (1.8%) Slovakia: 49,035 (1.1%) Hungary: 93,030 (2.1%)

(%) = percent of the total EU-27 area

GDP PER CAPITA IN PURCHASING POWER STANDARDS (PPS) EXPRESSED IN RELATION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AVERAGE SET TO EQUAL 100 (2019)* EU-27 (from 2020)

14%

84%

100

Czechia

92

Hungary

73

Poland

73

Slovakia

74

REAL GDP PER CAPITA (EUR, 2019)* EU-27 (from 2020)

27,980

Czechia

18,330

Hungary

13,260

Poland

13,000

Slovakia

15,860

*Source: Eurostat

POLAND

SLOVAKIA

26%

70%

Note: ”I don’t know” responses are not shown.


V4 COUNTRIES’ TOP TRADING PARTNERS IN 2018

Top 3 export destinations

Top 3 import sources $46.37 billion

CZECHIA

$65.64 billion

$26.05 billion

$15.28 billion

$14.14 billion

$12.24 billion

Top 3 import sources $30.46 billion

Top 3 export destinations

HUNGARY

$33.80 billion

$7.17 billion

$6.42 billion

$6.77 billion

$6.41 billion

Top 3 import sources $59.96 billion

Top 3 export destinations

POLAND

$73.69 billion

$30.97 billion

$16.66 billion

$19.64 billion

$16.20 billion

Top 3 import sources $16.80 billion

Top 3 export destinations

SLOVAKIA

$20.72 billion

$9.56 billion

$10.98 billion

$7.26 billion*

$7.15 billion

*Unspecified partner


CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE’S INTERESTS WITHIN THE EU—INTERVIEW WITH HUNGARY’S STATE SECRETARY FOR EU AFFAIRS ATTILA STEINER Péter Stepper–Zsombor Szabolcs Pál, 30 October 2020, Budapest and region have something unique to offer to the European family, so we should cherish these unique national and regional characteristics rather than obliging a unified, multicultural attitude on European nations. This region is an integral part of the European Union, and, while maintaining stability, it has the potential to be the powerhouse of Europe. The Central European countries also support deeper integration in some crucial fields where more European cooperation has added value, for example, in security and defence policy.

How would you describe the role of Central Europe within the European Union? How may it change in the future? When and how will it provide the engine for growth in Europe as presaged on various occasions by many? Cooperation between Central European countries, such as the V4 countries, is a link dating back a thousand years. So it is a natural phenomenon that Hungary today exists and acts in unison with the countries of the region. The Visegrad cooperation is a success story; its leaders, despite their different political backgrounds, frequently find common solutions. Historical and cultural similarities help us to understand each other better and speak the same language. Unfortunately, this is often seen as a threat by many in Western Europe, mainly because they do not know the people living here and the history and the specifics of the region. We believe that every member state 12

INTRODUCTION

The multifold crisis of the EU highlighted the importance of solidarity and alliances. Who are the international partners of Hungary we can rely on? When it comes to solidarity, the current COVID-19 situation is a good example, as it has changed and is changing our lives to an unprecedented extent. Member states were doing their best to protect the citizens, and the pandemic showed that, in fact, sovereign member states are best suited to act quickly to tackle local challenges in these times, while international and community action was lagging a few steps behind. Even in the midst of the crisis, many criticised us. I believe that, during a pandemic, when the most important thing is to protect human lives, if someone cannot help, at least should not hinder the efforts of others. Solidarity is very important: Hungary has also provided assistance to several countries in the region (e.g., Serbia, Ukraine, Romania), and, most recently, we have offered 150 respiratory machines to the Czech Republic. The Visegrad Four (V4) cooperation is a good practical example of the efficient regional


collaboration of nation states that not only have similar views in several issues but also have the will and the ability to properly coordinate their activities. The COVID-19 situation reinforced our belief that the best foundation for the functioning of the EU is the close cooperation among strong nation states. The V4 countries are traditional allies; we rely on a strong network of relations among our countries and work along the principle of mutual trust in resolving strategic issues. The COVID-19 pandemic has just reinforced this strong engagement. What is the Central European and, more specifically, the V4 countries’ take on the future of Europe? Where do we have common ground with the older member states of the EU, and what are the main differences and divides? Who are our—if we may say so—greatest opponents? Due to the historical and cultural ties, the V4 countries have always belonged to the European community, and these ties have only been strengthened with the accession to the European Union. These countries have all fought for their freedom behind the Iron Curtain. The fall of the socialist regime was not that long ago, and the revolution of 1956 is still alive in the memories of our parents and grandparents. We always stood up against oppression even if the attempt was unsuccessful and was suppressed by force. I think this courage is what characterises these Central European countries; we have all fought for the freedom and democracy we live in today. Naturally, these countries are sovereign nations with their own specific interests. At the same time, we work every day not to deepen the gap but to look for common points along which we can work together. A great platform for this is the V4 Presidency, which is currently held by Poland. It is important that we can discuss anything at the negotiating table, keeping national interests in mind. What are the region’s interests in the “deepening or widening” debate? What do we expect from the possible future

THIS REGION IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND, WHILE MAINTAINING STABILITY, IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BE THE POWERHOUSE OF EUROPE. enlargements of the EU, such as the accession of several Western Balkan states? Is there not a threat that a wider but less deep Europe will eventually dilute and lose its initiative, torn between interests? In the previous months, quite rightfully so, the focus of the European political debate was on responding to the situation created by the coronavirus, tackling the challenges, and recovering from the crisis. The question whether we should deepen the EU integration or not divides the member states. Hungary opposes deepening the EU integration for now. Provisions of the current treaty framework offer ample room for further cooperation, and we think that, before deepening EU integration, we should look at using the existing tools at our disposal. On the other hand, we have already experienced on several occasions the creeping circumvention of the commonly agreed rules. I think that, first, we should focus on building trust among the member states by properly adhering to the treaties’ provisions, and, only after it is proven that there is no other way, would Hungary be ready to consider the idea of deepening. On the other hand, Hungary is a great advocate of the EU’s enlargement. The importance of INTRODUCTION

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THE COVID-19 SITUATION REINFORCED OUR BELIEF THAT THE BEST FOUNDATION FOR THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EU IS THE CLOSE COOPERATION AMONG STRONG NATION STATES. the Western Balkans in geographical, political, economic, security, and cultural terms speaks for itself. Unfortunately, there is indeed a certain “enlargement fatigue” within the EU. In Western Europe, there is an interpretation of Europe’s economic problems according to which the Western half of the continent would do much better without the past enlargements and the associated debates that have consumed so much energy. These member states are now predominantly interested in deepening. Furthermore, member states in favour of deepening integration would even resort to political blackmailing on some occasions in order to further their agenda while completely disregarding the will of EU citizens. Of course, they are mistaken. A considerable proportion of the European Union’s growth comes from Central Europe, and the enlargement of the internal market—and our accession meant just that—generated additional economic potential. Therefore, we do not think that further enlargement would dilute the union; rather, it would strengthen its economy and, thus, its position on the geopolitical map of the world. Europe needs a bigger market, a larger 14

INTRODUCTION

labour market, greater economic potential, higher growth, better results in competitiveness, and greater security. We can obtain all this from the Western Balkans. The EU needs to show credibility and geopolitical strategic thinking when it comes to enlargement; otherwise, other players will come and fill the geopolitical vacuum. Enlargement seems more realistic since the new European Commission took office with Commissioner Várhelyi in charge of the policy field. The new methodology, the negotiating framework for Albania and North Macedonia, and the recently released economic and investment plan all suggest that the Western Balkans are in the interest of not only Hungary but also the union. Europe is home to unique nation states that share several similarities and common goals and values while representing and respecting their own and each other’s characteristics. The cooperation of European nation states takes several forms: the European Union is at the forefront of these; however, there are many other ways of cooperation on a regional level (like the V4 group) that offer real added value. The strong partnership of the V4 countries is in the interests of not only our countries or the region but also Europe as a whole. Indeed, the V4 is a modern cooperation with relevant answers to the challenges ahead of the EU: it is an economic powerhouse, the only sustainably developing, politically stable area in the EU, and an active contributor to the debate on the future of Europe. The unity of the V4 countries has already proved to be able to transcend the division of party lines and to create a regional power that is unavoidable within the EU. The vacuum generated by Brexit offered momentum to channel the V4 position and vision more intensively into the EU’s political thinking, and the planned Conference on the Future of Europe will be a great opportunity to share our vision for the future of the continent. Generally, we are certain that endless theoretical debates on institutional matters would only burden the EU’s agenda and divide member


states. European citizens are rather interested in policy issues connected to the EU’s recovery, and it is their opinion that should be a guideline for the discussion on the future of integration. The common wish for more effective economic cooperation and increased competitiveness could serve as a great basis for discussion. What were the region’s joint interests during the multiannual financial framework negotiations? Do you feel that we could successfully stand by and argue for our case? How can the new budget help countries in the region to achieve their aims, and what are the potential setbacks or challenges? How do you see the process of the mentioned negotiations in the light of the cohesion policy? Even if economic growth has been significantly higher in the V4 countries than the EU average in recent years, the region still needs to catch up. That is why we emphasised from the very beginning of the negotiations that the treatybased objectives of the cohesion policy, such as supporting the convergence of less developed regions, should be deeply respected. The Visegrad Four—as net beneficiaries of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)— fought together during the MFF negotiations to keep the funding of the traditional policies at a high level. Several summits of the Friends of Cohesion countries were organised, where fourteen to sixteen member states signed the joint statements reiterating that the cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy proved their success and their treaty-based objectives remain valid. It is a huge achievement that, recognising the need to act urgently, the EU leaders were able to come to a decision and agree on a recovery package that we had never seen before. Our countries negotiated successfully as we managed to increase our cohesion envelopes, which, in addition to the recovery funds, will provide adequate financial means for boosting the economy. Our next task is to use the resources of the MFF and the Next Generation EU as effectively

as possible so our region and the whole of the European Union can recover quickly and become even stronger and more competitive. How deeply did the COVID-19 pandemic affect our region economically, and how do you assess the recovery plans for the European Union? Although the first wave of the pandemic affected us seriously, thanks to the prompt measures by the Hungarian authorities, we successfully managed to tackle the first phase in Hungary. Now, in the midst of the second wave, we can make use of the experiences and lessons learnt earlier this year. The Hungarian healthcare system was able to prepare for the pressure the pandemic constitutes. Our protocols on the functioning of schools and higher education institutions seem to be effective. We have not had to completely close these institutions, and we hope that future circumstances will not force us to do so. Actions have been taken to help businesses and employees to survive the most demanding

THE EU NEEDS TO SHOW CREDIBILITY AND GEOPOLITICAL STRATEGIC THINKING WHEN IT COMES TO ENLARGEMENT; OTHERWISE, OTHER PLAYERS WILL COME AND FILL THE GEOPOLITICAL VACUUM. INTRODUCTION

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THE V4 IS A MODERN COOPERATION WITH RELEVANT ANSWERS TO THE CHALLENGES AHEAD OF THE EU: IT IS AN ECONOMIC POWERHOUSE, THE ONLY SUSTAINABLY DEVELOPING, POLITICALLY STABLE AREA IN THE EU, AND AN ACTIVE CONTRIBUTOR TO THE DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE. period. Fortunately, employment rates started to recover during the summer months. Mandatory measures (e.g., face masks, social distancing) to stop the spread of the virus are in force. We hope we will be able to avoid tightening the measures, as it is questionable whether the economy could bear the serious consequences again. The functioning of the internal market has been greatly affected by the coronavirus pandemic. We are introducing, restoring, and reinforcing measures in order to recover the European economy. However, reaching the pre-pandemic state of the internal market will not be enough. We consider that Europe 16

INTRODUCTION

should focus on further deepening the internal market, but without creating new barriers. The emergency situation has also highlighted the EU’s dependence on imports; therefore, it is necessary to build capacities for key industrial sectors and strategic value chains within the EU in order to strengthen our industrial and strategic autonomy. In order to minimise the economic effects of the pandemic in the first phase, Hungary designated green lanes and transit corridors in March to guarantee the free flow of goods in the CEE region and the whole of the EU. These measures helped to sustain the functioning of the internal market to make the CEE region more resilient against the serious economic consequences of the pandemic. Hungary also designated humanitarian corridors to enable movement from border entry points to reach neighbouring countries. How does the pandemic affect the evolution of regional concepts about the future of Europe? Will it help them in the long run? What is the main takeaway we can have from it? Due to the pandemic, the number of face-toface meetings and work trips has been greatly reduced. At the same time, the possibility of digitisation and virtual encounters has reduced distance and brought the countries of the region even closer together in many ways. Coordination among neighbours has become more streamlined. Although there might have been technical difficulties, most of the partners easily switched to these new solutions. This can even serve as a guideline for the future as digitalisation is evolving. The union will certainly learn a lot from the pandemic regarding not only how to use digital tools in policymaking but also how to be more reactive to a crisis than before. The agreement about the MFF and the recovery fund achieved in July by European leaders illustrates that the EU can react to a crisis more swiftly than before if the cooperation is built on a strong agreement and solidarity between the member states.


V4 IN THE WORLD AND WITHIN THE EU—INTERVIEW WITH EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL VISEGRAD FUND EDIT SZILÁGYINÉ BÁTORFI Péter Stepper–Zsombor Szabolcs Pál, 10 November 2020, Budapest

You have come into contact with many countries in Central Europe during your diplomatic career. What do you think the main traits are that connect cultures and peoples in this region? Over the centuries, there have been continuous interactions between cultures and peoples inhabiting this region, forming our identity and, in my assessment, contributing to the omnipresent unique creativity. Common historical experience and traditional exchange between scientists, craftsmen, artists, and thinkers within the region contributed to mutual understanding and shared views, which, in many ways, distinguishes our region from other regions of Europe. One should not forget about either the language skills that tie many people together regardless of borders or the typical humour which helped us survive difficult chapters of history. How would you describe Hungarian diplomatic relations within the region?

What role does the country bear in different regional cooperation formats, especially the V4? “The regional cooperation of Central Europe, and, especially, of the Visegrad Group, is at the heart of the Hungarian diplomatic relations,” said Hungarian minister of foreign affairs and trade Péter Szijjártó at the GLOBSEC conference in October. In a globalised world, it is of utmost importance to have cooperation with one’s neighbours as close as possible. Only by joint efforts can the countries of this region successfully overcome their inherited shortcomings. The insufficiency of infrastructure networks across the region hampers its growth potential. At the same time, there are new challenges, such as robotisation or artificial intelligence, that demand widespread skills in digital technologies. In order to address all these challenges, we need intensive cooperation, to which the mutual trust we have developed over the years provides a solid basis. The V4 speaks with one voice, and a consensus that the V4 partners manage to reach is always an asset to the region and to the rest of Europe. There are other regional frameworks, too. Let me mention only two of them now: the Central European Initiative, founded at the time of democratic regime changes, and the recently launched Three Seas Initiative. All cooperation formats, I believe, carry out important missions in their spheres of application. In your view, what is the role of the Visegrad Group in Central Europe and in Europe as a whole? How do our regional partners perceive us? The Visegrad Group has been very active in promoting regional cooperation within Central INTRODUCTION

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REGIONAL PARTNERS CONSIDER V4 A RELIABLE PARTNER, AS OUR CREDIBILITY WAS PROVEN IN ACTIONS. Europe. The V4 forged its alliance thirty years ago to solidify the democratic changes, to make them irreversible, and, primarily, to set out on the journey towards Euro-Atlantic integration together. It has since become an engine of intraregional cohesion. To this end, a practical tool was created twenty years ago: the International Visegrad Fund. Our funding scheme is unique because it is obligatory to involve project partners from at least three V4 countries. Furthermore, V4 has been investing considerable resources in the Eastern Partnership and Western Balkan countries through the fund and gladly shares this model with our partners abroad. In my experience, regional partners consider V4 a reliable partner, as our credibility was proven in actions. In your view, do other foreign actors see our cooperation as an important, serious, and unanimous international player they should cooperate and have talks with? There is a long-standing V4 commitment to support cooperation, stability, and socioeconomic development in the neighbouring regions. By building bridges between the nongovernmental sectors of the V4 and the broader Central European region, we further contribute to wider European policies through enabling partners from third countries to participate. The relevance of our actions is proved by the fact that we managed to attract funding from external donors (e.g., Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, South Korea, Switzerland, and the United States) and to develop special research and development programs with Japan and Israel. 18

INTRODUCTION

As the director of the International Visegrad Fund, how do you see the last two decades of the organisation? In what ways has the IVF been successful in its mission to help build people-to-people relations in the region? How has it contributed to forging and deepening a regional identity? The fund has in twenty years supported around 6,000 projects with a total amount of almost 100 million euros. It has become an integral part of the grant-making infrastructure in Central Europe, playing an important role both as a facilitator and supporter of the non-governmental sector within and beyond our region. Visegrad grants are demand driven and they respond to the needs of local actors. The high number of applications for joint regional projects for support that we receive every year clearly shows a very dynamic picture of people-to-people relations. There is a high number of proposals for joint cultural and artistic projects building common regional identity and forging mutual understanding. It is worth saying we spend 30% of our means on culture and 25% on education and R&D. What plans do you have to improve or broaden the activity of the International Visegrad Fund? This year it is the 20th anniversary of the fund and next year it is the thirty years of the Visegrad cooperation to celebrate and, maybe, more importantly, to take stock and make use of the lessons learned over previous decades. There are still strategic tasks to be solved, which were formulated back then by the founding fathers, to which the fund can contribute in the long run. Currently, it is the pandemic that provides us with new incentives. Keeping distance makes us develop our digital skills. We hope to help our grantees develop these capacities so that Visegrad can go (more) digital. We further optimise our processes and reshape our funding rules by inviting our grantees to reduce their waste and carbon emissions. Our main mission remains to support peopleto-people projects and to strengthen mutual understanding within the region and beyond, in an even more efficient way.


’21 Implementation of the Three Seas Initiative >> Possibilities and Challenges

<< The second installment of the Central European Visions conference series will analyse the most important aspects of the Three Seas Initiative in addition to its current and potential relevance to future US and Central European interests. >>


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HOW TO DESCRIBE CENTRAL EUROPE?



JÓZSEF ANTALL’S CONCEPTION OF CENTRAL EUROPE Péter Strausz It is almost a cliché to say that, for the previous centuries, the fate of Hungary and that of Central Europe have become closely intertwined. Political and economic networks, long coexistence, and mutual influences combine to make the region an independent entity on its own: the way of life, worldview, and culture of the peoples who live here are rather similar and can be easily differentiated from Western, Eastern, and Southern European mentalities. The Czech, Polish, Hungarian, and Slovak nations, now constituting their own states, have developed a way of life that is, in many respects, reminiscent of that of Western or Eastern European peoples but essentially unique and cannot be interpreted solely in the West versus East dichotomy. The common interests of the region’s nations, often not recognised or even denied by themselves, and the common dangers have pointed out, especially during the 20th century, how interdependent the states that came to exist here in the last millennium really are. The German plans for Mitteleuropa, the Third Reich’s politics of Lebensraum, inspired by Nazi racial theory, have endangered these nations’ very existence, just as pan-Slavism and the Soviet Union’s settling in the region after World War II did. However, the formula of Central European coexistence, which had never been a simple question, was made even more complex by a number of factors. The 19th-century partition of Poland by the great powers of the day, the conflicts of interest between the Czechs, Hungarians, and Slovaks living in the Habsburg Empire and later in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and the lack of independent statehood hindered and complicated the organised cooperation of these nations. In the 22

HOW TO DESCRIBE CENTRAL EUROPE?

20th century, the Paris peace treaties at the end of World War I inflicted serious wounds on regional cooperation that are difficult to heal. The Peace Dictate of Trianon inevitably made official Hungarian and Czechoslovakian politics be in opposition turn into opponents, and the latter also found itself opposed to the recently revived Poland. The common fate after 1944−1945, the Soviet occupation, and the oppressive power practices of the communist regimes established in its wake, served only to cover up these oppositions, but they quickly resurfaced after the democratic transition. It was in these circumstances that Hungary, which became independent again in the course of the regime change, had to develop its own neighbourhood policy and a policy on Central Europe. This policy was heavily influenced between 1990 and 1993 by Prime Minister József Antall, who considered promoting the cooperation between Central European nations a key issue besides Hungary’s European integration. The politician, who became head of government in 1990, was well aware of the complexity of the problem, which was also made more sensitive by the status of the Hungarian minorities living beyond the country’s borders. Through his family background, studies, and work as a historian, József Antall had an intimate knowledge (and, perhaps just as importantly, personal experience) of the region’s past and its most important problems. His father, József Antall Sr, oversaw the care of Polish refugees in Hungary between 1939 and 1944, was in the prison of the Gestapo under the German occupation and, in the coalition period, served as one of the leaders of the Independent Smallholders’ Party committed to civil and national values. Both Antalls played active roles


in the events of 1956. The younger Antall grew up to be a founding member of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum, MDF) in 1988, and he directed the work of the new party as its chair from 1989. Following the 1990 free elections, he headed the coalition government that had the development of the Central European cooperation as one of its tasks. Antall was highly interested in questions of foreign policy. Besides, his deep knowledge of the history of politics and administration, which was relevant here, also made him capable of seeing things in context: he recognised the background to and the driving forces behind dry facts and mere events. Being a historian, he was committed to observing things from several perspectives. Though he cared deeply for improving the lot of Hungarian minorities over the border (he considered this a sort of a personal issue), he did not let the Central European horizon be clouded by the wounds that the Hungarian nation had suffered since Trianon, and he was also willing and able to adapt other regional nations’ points of view.1 The period of the Hungarian regime change opened up the opportunity for the opposition movements, organised against the state party called Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt, MSZMP), to form their opinion about not only the country’s future neighbourhood policy but also the possible forms of Central European cooperation. One of the definitive forces of the opposition, the MDF, elected József Antall as its chair at its second national assembly on 20−22 October 1989. In his program speech delivered before his election, Antall not only spoke about the tasks of the democratic transformation of home affairs, but he also mentioned the fateful questions of the region and the tasks Hungary faced on their account.2 He pointed out that there was a need for a “new type of East-Central European politics”: apart from the brotherly relationship with the Polish, Hungary needed to renew its friendship with the other nations of the region, too. What was more, he also added that the country had to strive for good relationships,

based on equality and understanding, with the nations of the Soviet Union.3 Perhaps we are not far from the truth if we say that this speech summed up not only Antall’s credo as chair of the party but as head of government, too. The Antall government’s efforts in foreign policy were consonant in nearly everything with the principles laid down here. This programme speech is also important because it highlights the complex thinking of the future head of government. He included two countries in the (East-)Central European region that had traditionally not been considered to belong there: first, Romania, important for Hungary because of the Hungarian minority living in Transylvania, and second, taking into consideration the realities of the situation in those days, the Soviet Union, still present as a great power at the time. In this speech, Antall sketched out the goal of Hungary’s Central European policy, its terrain, and international frame of reference. He was aware that the future of the minorities separated from the country, and, with them, that of the whole Hungarian nation, can only be guaranteed by cooperation with the great powers interested in Central Europe and especially by establishing good relationships with the region’s nations. However, in its efforts to realise all this, the country had to consider even more factors: it was important to establish new, friendly relations with the sole superpower after the Cold War, the United States, and win Washington over to the Hungarian plan. The task was the same with Germany starting on the road towards reunification. The relationship between Bonn and Budapest was, at the time, highly amicable thanks to the Hungarian help East German refugees had received, and Hungarian politicians had the intention to exploit this situation to make Germany, a definitive economic power of the continent, look at the cooperation to be formed on its Eastern side not as a threat but something that deserves its help. The country and those who had won the right to shape Hungarian foreign policy in the free parliamentary elections in the spring of 1990 had, thus, a complex task, requiring steps HOW TO DESCRIBE CENTRAL EUROPE?

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The first meeting of the Visegrad Group in February 1991 (left to right: Václav Havel, József Antall, Lech Wałęsa)

that, in many respects, were to be built on each other. This opportunity and responsibility went to the coalition government led by the MDF in May 1990. As prime minister of this cabinet, József Antall could think, plan, and act in a different status concerning the formation of Central European cooperation, too. His vision as prime minister and the conception of his government were detailed in his programme speech as a candidate for head of government on 22 May 1990, in front of the National Assembly. This programme speech contained logically ordered objectives concerning our topic. For the country’s security and independence, József Antall declared it an important task that the occupying Soviet forces should leave Hungary by 30 June 1991. Meanwhile, he stressed that Hungary needed to strive for a “well-balanced, fair neighbourly relationship, built on equality” with the Soviet Union.4 He indicated that the primary terrain of Hungarian foreign policy was the European continent: he considered it of exceptional importance that the country start the process of European integration, become a full member of the European Council as soon as possible, and, in the near future, enter the precursor of the European Union, the European Communities. However, the foreign policy towards these goals, according to Antall, had 24

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to be consonant with the approach towards the United States and the engagement in the Atlantic cooperation. The candidate thought Europe was heading towards becoming a federation but the regionalism based on Central European cooperation had to be a promoter and an important element in the process rather than an obstacle. He said that the moment had arrived in the region for the nations to lay aside their decades-old opposition and form partnerships and friendly relationships with each other, which would bring prosperity for all of them. He also added that cooperation built on trust made it possible for Budapest to stand up for and guarantee the rights of that one-third of the Hungarian nation who had been forced outside its borders.5 How tasks should follow each other was clear from the speech: the sovereignty of the country had to be restored, good relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, and the member states of the European Communities had to be established, and then, all these also needed to be stabilised in the long run. Besides, based on the above, the cooperation of Central European nations needed to be established and, in this framework, the rights and, thus, the survival of the Hungarian minorities beyond the country’s borders needed to be guaranteed. This vision was also adopted in the official


government programme, which was published on 25 September 1990, entitled The programme of national revival. Although The programme of national revival mostly concerned questions of economic policy,6 it also involved the government’s Central European policies briefly. Chapter XII of the document dealt with the tasks and objectives of the government in the field of foreign policy. It stated, “intensive regional cooperation is an essential part of pan-European cooperation, and this is what we strive for with all of our neighbours.”7 Concerning Czechoslovakia, which still existed at the time, the programme claimed that it was in both parties’ interest to clear up disagreement; concerning Romania (and the then still existing Yugoslavia, too), it declared that the interests of the Hungarian minorities living there were a strong motivation for the government to strive for good relations. In treating Polish−Hungarian relations, the following sentence also foreshadowed how the government urged closer cooperation among the countries of Central Europe: “The country between a reuniting Germany and the Soviet Union has an interest in approaching the Danube−Adriatic cooperation. We wish to assist Poland in strengthening its North−South relations.”8 Thus, the foreign policy goals (and, within these, the Central European diplomatic goals) of the government headed by József Antall were outlined clearly. The phase of planning and defining objectives was over, and it was time to act. The government was initially supposed to have the support of the whole of the Hungarian political sphere: outside the governing coalition, the parliamentary opposition was also in agreement with the basic principles of its foreign policy. This situation, however, changed starting with the summer of 1990, since the opposition increasingly criticised and attacked (among others) the foreign policy of the Antall cabinet from then on.9 There were party-political considerations behind most of these criticisms. All this, naturally, did not help but rather hindered the development of the emerging Hungarian foreign policy.

Though the opposition made it more difficult for the Antall government to realise its Central European policies, it could not prevent their implementation. Directed by Foreign Minister Géza Jeszenszky, the diplomatic efforts for establishing the formal cooperation in the region started in the mid-1990s. As a result, the cooperation between Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary was outlined. It was in this process that Poland was connected to the Pentagonale, a primarily economic cooperation among Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Italy established in 1988, which was, thus, transformed into the Hexagonale. At the same time, a more strictly understood Central European cooperation was also developing; the Czechoslovakian, Polish, and Hungarian parties all strove for establishing closer relations with each other. The year 1990, especially its second half, was spent with preparation work. This cooperation was formalised on 15 February 1991, when the previously accepted declaration of cooperation was signed by Czechoslovakian president Václav Havel, Polish president Lech Wałęsa, and Hungarian prime minister József Antall in the royal palace of

The founding members of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) in 1992

POLAND

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

HUNGARY

HOW TO DESCRIBE CENTRAL EUROPE?

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Visegrád. The ceremonial statement was also signed by heads of state and government present, and Hungarian president Árpád Göncz besides Antall. In these documents, the leaders of the three countries committed themselves to eliminating all elements of totalitarian systems and to developing parliamentary democracy, the rule of law, and a modern market economy, as well as acknowledging their historical common ground. They declared it one of their commonly held principles to tolerate and guarantee the rights of minorities, and they also announced their intentions to cooperate in security and economic policy and in securing the rights of ethnic minorities living in the region.10 Beyond all this, there seemed to be agreement about seceding from the military cooperative system of the (ex-)socialist countries, the Warsaw Pact, and about European integration, too. The Visegrad Group that thus came into existence was univocally presented as significant by the world’s press (although its putative goals were interpreted slightly differently).11 This initiative brought quick results both in terms of foreign policy and security policy: this common action led to the dissolution of the supranational organisations of the communist era, Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) and the Warsaw Pact. By mid-1991, both organisations were disbanded by the common will of their members. In the economic field, CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement), a free trade agreement between the Visegrad countries, was signed in 1992. The cooperation of the three states was accepted as a legitimate partner in international diplomacy, too, and other states often negotiated with the Visegrad countries instead of bilateral talks. The year 1991 was busy in foreign policy. The attempted coup of “hardliners” in the Soviet Union and the unfolding civil war in Yugoslavia presented serious threats to the democratic transition in Central Europe and to the future of the cooperation, not to mention the sovereignty and peaceful existence of the region’s states. Even in these tense months, Antall did not forget one of the main pillars of his Central European policy: accepting the realities of 26

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foreign policy and great powers. While preparing the withdrawal of Soviet troops to restore the full sovereignty of Hungary, he always tried to maintain a calm attitude so that Moscow would also be a partner in withdrawing the troops as soon as possible. In an important speech about the already finished withdrawal process, he emphasised that Budapest accepted the realities and considered carefully the weight that the Soviet–Russian state would, in the future, carry in the wider Eastern European region. In Antall’s words: “We should not forget that one can do many things against geography but make politics against it.”12 The Visegrad countries responded well to the challenges of 1991, and the three countries were stronger than ever in their intention to join the Euro-Atlantic security organisation, NATO. The second Visegrád summit, held on 5−6 October 1991, this time in Krakow, might not have been successful in all respects (for instance, at protecting minorities), but it contributed significantly to further formalising the three countries’ cooperation through establishing joint work groups. The Hungarian side also maintained an interest in expanding the cooperation with other neighbouring states. In his exposé as foreign minister, at the 15 October 1991 meeting of the national assembly, Géza Jeszenszky stated that, through specific programmes, the ministry intended to draw Hungary’s neighbours into the cooperation, too. This was also Antall’s point of view. (At this point, it primarily meant Romania because of the Hungarian minority living in Transylvania. It was no fault of the Antall government that Bucharest eventually did not join the cooperation.) However, from the turn of 1991−1992, there were upsets in the Visegrad cooperation: the new Czech prime minister, Václav Klaus was not very committed to the initiative, and, after Slovakia had become independent, the chauvinistic line represented by head of government Vladimir Mečiar did not support real cooperation, either, even though Bratislava formally became a member of the cooperation which unofficially came to be referred to as the “Visegrad Four.”


The member states of the Quadragonale, Pentagonale, and Hexagonale in 1991, and the Central European Initiative (CEI) in 1992

POLAND

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

AUSTRIA

HUNGARY

Slovenia Croatia

YUGOSLAVIA Bosnia and Herzegovina

ITALY

Quadragonale (1991) Pentagonale (1991) Hexagonale (1991) Central European Initiative (CEI, 1992)

Due to the joint action of these two, the common statement about the protection of minorities was not passed at the 1993 Budapest summit. Contrary to the intentions and will of Antall’s government, the Visegrad cooperation halted for a few years, and meaningful cooperation restarted only at the end of the 1990s, after political changes in certain countries.13 However, József Antall’s and the Hungarian foreign policy’s efforts proved to be effective in the long run: they managed to lay the foundations based on which the countries of the region can act united to guard the region’s interest. The Visegrad Four has also preserved its own voice within the European Union (albeit not always

and not in complete unison on all occasions), and, due to this, they have, in a certain sense, become joint actors in today’s European politics who need to be taken into account. It proved to be a huge task to build the pillars of Antall’s vision of Central Europe, but the initial efforts of the prime minister and his government were mostly successful. To regain freedom of movement, they established the country’s sovereignty and gained the support (or, at least, the acknowledgement) of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the countries of the European Communities for the region’s states to eliminate the international systems of cooperation inherited from the communist era. Apart from this, Antall’s HOW TO DESCRIBE CENTRAL EUROPE?

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government initiated and actively championed the creation and development of the Visegrad cooperation. Hungary and the other Visegrad countries attempted to move forward with the European and Atlantic integration process in partnership, and not as rivals. Antall’s government did successful preparatory work here: Hungary became a full member of the European Council already in the autumn of 1990 and took the first step towards full European integration.14 József Antall was also present at a conference held in Vienna on 18 July 1992 where the Hexagonale was supplemented with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia and continued work as the Central European Initiative. This was an important step in regional cooperation. The Hungarian prime minister also took this opportunity to expand on his point of view and objectives concerning the region. In addition to the already established conditions of regional cooperation (the existence of sovereign, democratic “member states,” guaranteeing minority rights while retaining national rights of self-determination, common aspirations in security policy), he spoke much more emphatically about the need for economic stability: the region, he said, should follow a kind of third model in order to make a full transition to a market economy and to minimise social tensions. He stated, “If we in Central-Eastern Europe cannot assure economic–financial stability in the foreseeable future, social problems might explode the limits of democracy in this region. And, if we cannot maintain political democracy, then we cannot speak of security and stability in the region.”15 Due to his premature death, József Antall could not finish the work he had started. However, the head of government, already seriously ill, could still see the viability and reality of his plans for Central Europe, and the processes going on in the region also confirm that he laid down rational foundations for Hungarian regional foreign policy. His speech in Vienna, quoted above, shows that his vision was mature and flexible at the same time. It was mature in its objectives and principles, but flexible because it placed the responses given to the events that concerned 28

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the region in a larger strategic framework. His plans for the region’s future were integrated into a coherent system, with the pan-Hungarian national interests at its centre. His conception of Central Europe was not an end in itself, and, in its realisation, he never lost sight of the ultimate goal: to ensure the survival and strengthening of the whole of the Hungarian nation.

ENDNOTES 1 Concerning the matters of the last paragraph, see in more detail Jeszenszky Géza: Kísérlet a trianoni trauma orvoslására. Magyarország szomszédsági politikája a rendszerváltozás éveiben. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2016. 23–24. 2 Marschal Adrienn: Az MDF II. Országos Gyűlése. RETÖRKI Kronológia. A rendszerváltás mérföldkövei. <https://bit. ly/3lbtmcv > Accessed: 4 November 2020. 3 Antall József: Az átalakulás esélyei. Az MDF II. Országos Gyűlésén tartott politikai beszámoló. In: Modell és valóság. Vol. 2. Athenaeum Nyomda Rt., Budapest, 1994. 21–22. 4 Quoted from Antall József: A nemzeti megújhodás útján. Miniszterelnök-jelölti programbeszéd, 1990. május 22. In: Modell és valóság. Vol. 2. 64. 5 For his speech, see Antall József: A nemzeti megújhodás útján. 63–65. 6 Jónás Róbert: A nemzeti megújhodás programja. RETÖRKI Kronológia. A rendszerváltás mérföldkövei. <https://bit. ly/3o04giy > Accessed: 11 November 2020. 7 A Nemzeti Megújhodás Programja. A Köztársaság első három éve. [s.n.], Budapest, 1990. 178. 8 A Nemzeti Megújhodás Programja, 181. 9 On the change of the opposition parties’ views, see Jeszenszky, 58. 10 Magyar–csehszlovák–lengyel Visegrádi Nyilatkozat. In: Magyar Külpolitikai Évkönyv, 1991. Külügyminisztérium, Budapest, 1991. 146–149. 11 For more details on international media coverage, see Jeszenszky, 124. 12 Antall József: Vége a megszállásnak! In: Modell és valóság. Vol. 2. 172. 13 In more detail, see Jeszenszky, 128–132. 14 Jónás Róbert: Magyarország az Európa Tanács teljes jogú tagjává válik. In: Házi Balázs [et al.]: A rendszerváltás mérföldkövei. Rendszerváltás Történetét Kutató Intézet és Archívum, Budapest, 2020. 272–275. 15 Antall József: A közép-európai együttműködésért. In: Modell és valóság. Vol. 2. 354.


POLITICAL SYSTEM CHANGES IN CENTRAL EUROPE: A BIRD’S EYE VIEW Bence Kocsev THE MAKING OF THE IDEA OF (EAST) CENTRAL EUROPE—SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS Central Europe seems easier to be defined by what it is not than by what it actually is— so is the common wisdom, and, due to the conceptual and geographical elasticity of the region, it would indeed be rather difficult to find a consensus on what exactly the term Central Europe means. As the question has a vast literature, it may suffice here that, while the idea of Eastern Europe was an invention of the West in the 18th century and served as the negative mirror image of the progress-oriented, liberal, secular, and economically developed Western Europe,1 the notion of a narrower Central Europe as a distinct entity somewhere between the East and West emerged in the 19th century and developed in various ways. Nonetheless, the problem remained predominantly a (wider) German one until World War I, when Friedrich Naumann’s Mitteleuropa, envisioning a German cultural and economic dominance in the region but often mistakenly understood as a manifestation of German imperialism, found serious resonance outside the German-speaking area (Tomáš Masaryk’s “Slavic standpoint” was one of the concepts developed in opposition to it).2 Detached from this German context, academicians, such as Oskar Halecki, Marceli Handelsman, or Jaroslav Bidlo, increasingly began to deal with the notion of (East) Central Europe in the interwar period. A few decades later, with a renewed interest and in a rather different political constellation, the idea of Central Europe gained new relevance, and the revitalised discussion was joined by West German, Austrian, and Hungarian intellectuals and politicians. An internationally well-recognised example of the efforts to define

Central Europe was provided by the Hungarian medievalist Jenő Szűcs in the early 1980s. His essay on the three historical regions of Europe became extremely popular because it conveyed a serious political message that questioned the legitimacy of the Eastern Bloc (and, hence, the bipolar metanarrative of the Cold War) by defining (East) Central Europe as a separate region having a specific path of development. Even more politically motivated, the essays of Milan Kundera, Václav Havel, Czesław Miłosz, György Konrád, and many others further sparked the debate on the region and gave serious impulses to intellectual movements on both sides of the Iron Curtain, pondering on the idea of a new (imagined) Central Europe.3 Thirty years after the collapse of communism, although with a rather different emphasis, the idea of Central Europe stays yet again in the middle of a discussion and is currently experiencing a certain renaissance. Regardless of the actual content of these ideas and the period in which they were conceived, what becomes evident from the debate is that Central Europe is not just a specific geographical entity but, at the same time, is determined by a number of markers, including a particular political development greatly impacted by its in-betweenness.

Central Europe according to the German geographer Joseph Partsch in 1904 HOW TO DESCRIBE CENTRAL EUROPE?

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New states in Central Europe after World War I RUSSIAN EMPIRE Prague

GERMAN EMPIRE GERMANY

Salzburg

ITALY

SOVIET UNION

Vienna

AUSTRIA ITALY

POLAND Lviv

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

München SWITZERLAND SWITZERLAND

Kraków

Bratislava THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE Sopron Budapest HUNGARY

Ljubljana Trieste Rijeka Pula

ROMANIA Timișoara

Zagreb

ROMANIA

Belgrade

KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES Sarajevo Zadar SERBIA Split Mostar MONTENEGRO

Bucharest

BULGARIA Sofia BULGARIA

Borders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1914

ALBANIA

New borders in 1920 ALBANIA The Austro-Hungarian Empire Austrian Empire Kingdom of Hungary Condominium of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Obviously, a full and comprehensive historical inquiry into the political development of Central Europe is far beyond the scope of this article; I wish, nevertheless, to highlight a few aspects of the turbulent political contexts and the concomitant changes in the political systems in the region. The text would primarily focus on the “short” 20th century that was characterised by dynamic changes in the regional political structure. Geographically, on the other hand,I will apply a rather narrow (Polish, Czech, Slovak, and Hungarian) focus when referring to Central Europe. Nevertheless, as, in certain periods, the fate of the region was closely tied to dominant—let us call them so—spatial formats (like the Eastern Bloc in the Cold War era), a wider overview is inevitable. 30

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THE RISE AND FALL OF EMPIRES Most of the current states in the region were formed quite recently, since many emerged at the end of World War I upon the collapse of the empires of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia (or came only into existence with the collapse of the communist federal states in the early 1990s). Central European states are, however, not without historical precedents, although many of them lost their sovereignty between the 16 th and 18 th centuries. In 1526, with the death of Louis II during the Battle of Mohács, the Habsburgs managed to acquire both the Bohemian and the Hungarian crowns and incorporated these territories into their monarchy. While, during the following centuries, the economically strong


Bohemian estates were closely integrated into the Austrian structures and had almost similar legal status as the hereditary lands (Erblände), the Hungarian part of the monarchy gradually achieved a limited extent of independence. Eventually, the separation of Transleithanian part of the monarchy was further reinforced by the Ausgleich (Compromise) of 1867 that opened the way for more political participation and, thus, gave more say to the Hungarian political class in the affairs of the Dual Monarchy.4 Nonetheless, the question whether Hungary was a constitutional monarchy during the dualist period or parliamentarism became so significant that we should classify Hungary as a parliamentary monarchy is still a contested issue among political historians. For centuries, the Kingdom of Poland (and, later, the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth) was a solid regional player characterised by an idiosyncratic system with strict checks upon monarchical power through a legislative body (Sejm) being controlled by the politically privileged nobility. Eventually, the once expansive and prospering Rzeczpospolita, stretching from the Baltic almost to the Black Sea, began to crumble and gradually ceased to exist after being partitioned three times between 1772 and 1795. As in the case of Hungary and the Czech lands, central governments suppressed any particular political resistance, and, despite the many uprisings and rebellions aiming to restore the sovereignty of the Polish state, Poland remained divided until 1918.5 By the end of the 18th century, Central Europe was, thus, completely captured by the great powers of the time (Austria, Prussia, and Russia), and national movements had to confront the fact that, while the foundations of the modern state and national institutions were laid down across Europe, they were excluded from actively engaging in these processes. 6 Besides the lack of national independence, further problems, such as the underdevelopment of their economies (except probably for the Czech lands, which were the strong sources of export and revenue for the Habsburg Empire) and its unavoidable sociological effect, the weakness

of the middle class, were also responsible for the later malaise of Central Europe. World War I and the ensuing Paris Peace Treaties, however, completely redrew the map of Central Europe and led to the hasty dissolution of the regional empires. In this regard, it is difficult to overemphasise Woodrow Wilson’s impact on the political transformations of Eastern and Central Europe. In the spirit of Wilson’s vision on the right to self-determination of peoples, new countries were formed or reconstituted. 7 Despite the Wilsonian euphoria, it is also worth briefly referring to a proposal initiated by General Jan Smuts that depicted Eastern and Central Europe as a region in need of custody. 8 This notion of the limited capacities of the emerging new states remained an idea that influenced the decisions of the Paris Peace Conferences and Western thinking between the two world wars in many respects. With the end of empires, the rearrangement and the settlement of the new order of the region did not go without difficulties, and all of the countries had to define their borders with both military and political actions. This tumultuous and fragile situation, combined with the economic effects of the war and the world economic crisis, substantially determined the political stability of the region having only a limited or no recent experience of independent statehood. In contrast to Hungary that had been a constituent part of the Dual Monarchy and, hence, had its own administrative and political institutions, the interwar period was extremely formative and bore enormous significance for Czechoslovakia and Poland, as these few decades enabled them to develop their own national political, economic, and cultural structures and, thus, legitimised their existence in the eyes of the outside world— though it eventually did not prevent them from being occupied in 1938 and 1939, respectively. After the war, the new states had to develop or, at least, reconfigure their systems of laws, customs, and governance, and encouraging developments were underway in many fields. Political stability anchored in stable institutions, however, struggled under the influence of the HOW TO DESCRIBE CENTRAL EUROPE?

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economic, social, and national problems that the next decades featured. New political institutions were often unsuitable for the society, the party system did not lead to political stability, 9 and the attempted solutions to political, economic, nationality, or minority problems did not succeed. This all led to the rejection of the idea of mass democracy, and authoritarian-type political systems (like the one in Poland after Józef Piłsudski took power in 1926) emerged, in which many of the democratic institutions managed to survive. In addition, the margin for manœuvre was heavily circumscribed by the geopolitical position of such countries, and the deteriorating international context eventually led to the collapse of their states.10 THE SOVIETISATION OF CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EASTERN BLOC, 1944–1989 After the war, Soviets envisaged the greater East-Central Europe region as a protective zone

against future invasions from European armies. With the establishment of the Cominform and with the announcement of Zhdanov’s Two Camps Doctrine, a Stalinist system was already imposed on East and Central Europe, and the region was subsequently integrated into the “anti-imperialist and democratic” camp led by the Soviet Union. Whether Central Europe had any room for manœuvre after the war (and, thus, the democratic development of the region was a real option) is a question that historians have debated for decades. The multiparty system established in Central and Eastern Europe was, nonetheless, planned to be temporary by the Soviets. Meanwhile, communist parties suffered from a fundamental lack of legitimacy, though the level of domestic support for the communists varied greatly: it was substantially great in Czechoslovakia, where communists, led by Klement Gottwald, managed to win a relatively fair election in 1946 The map shows the collapse

The partition of Poland

of Poland devided into parts by its neighbours.

KINGDOM OF SWEDEN

Pskov Russia Prussia Austria Ryga

1772 1793 1795

KINGDOM OF PRUSSIA

Stettin (Szczecin) Bydgoszcz

Second Polish Republic

Königsberg Gdańsk (Kaliningrad) Elbląg

Wilno (Vilnius)

1918 1939

Toruń

Poznań Warsaw

Glogau (Głogów)

Lublin Breslau (Wrocław)

Kraków

HABSBURG EMPIRE Vienna

Kijów (Kiev)

Kassa (Košice) PRINCIPALITY OF MOLDAVIA

32

RUSSIAN EMPIRE

Lwów

HOW TO DESCRIBE CENTRAL EUROPE?

OTTOMAN EMPIRE

CRIMEAN KHANATE


without having any Soviet troops deployed in the country, while, in Hungary or Poland, only the blatantly falsified elections could help them to ascend to power. The early phase of communist rule and the concomitant Gleichschaltung of societies exhibited a number of common traits: largescale collectivisation and forced industrialisation occurred; a centrally planned economy was introduced to manage an autarchic system (in which they never succeeded); social organisations, security forces, administrative structures were modelled on the Soviet examples; leading positions were filled with members of the nomenclature; personality cult was developed; and party control over all channels of communication and censorship was introduced in all the countries of the Soviet bloc. Moreover, to prove loyalty towards Moscow, purges, such as the show trial of László Rajk or Rudolf Slánský, to name but two well-known examples, often took place.11 Democratic rules were blocwide undermined, and, despite the slogan of subordinating all branches of power to the people’s interest (the new constitutions, modelled on the 1936 Soviet one and adopted in each Eastern Bloc country, described the state as a socialist one owned by the workers and working peasants), communist parties exerted full control over the legislative, executive, and judiciary bodies. After they seized power (either by electoral fraud like in Hungary and Poland or by coup d’état like in Czechoslovakia), the communist regimes, however, did not abandon democratic institutions, but they let them exist only pro forma without the ability to exercise any real limitation on state power, while the power of political initiative and decision-making were reserved for the party leadership. Though the oversight functions of the legislative bodies were minimal, legislative elections were held more or less on a regular basis to give the impression of a pluralistic society; nonetheless, they were always overwhelmingly won by the popular or national front, an alliance of political parties and mass organisations subservient to the communist party.12

After the Stalinist period, when the scope and character of totalitarian repression were the highest, fewer doctrinaire communist regimes emerged from the 1960s. The events that followed Stalin’s death found, thus, reflection in the Soviet bloc. In the coming years, a new economic course was adopted in most of the bloc countries, repressions were loosened, and—to avoid one-man dominance—a socalled collective leadership was introduced (which apparently did not prevent some of the leaders from ruling in an autocratic fashion). Due to the different historical traditions and depending on the political leadership’s adaptive political strategies, communist rule sometimes was harsher and sometimes less rigid in the countries of the bloc. Temporary concessions were granted in many of the countries: in Poland, farming largely remained in private hands, in Hungary, a more relaxed economic policy was pursued, in Czechoslovakia, a sort of liberalisation had been well underway before the country was invaded by the “friendly” armies of the Warsaw Pact (except Romania). During the socialist period, there were periodic attempts at political and economic reform, but their momentum was always halted by either bureaucratic or political countermoves. Most notably, all of the countries in question attempted (albeit unsuccessfully) to “exit” communism: Hungary, in 1956, Czechoslovakia, in 1968, and Poland, in 1980– 1981 (in the last case, there was no Soviet or Warsaw Pact intervention, but the military junta introduced martial law after oppressing political opposition). 13 From the (late) 1970s, the crisis of state socialism was increasingly visible and undeniable. The regionally and locally deteriorating real economic and financial conditions of the Eastern Bloc, the failure of centrally planned economies, the growing identity crisis of communist parties, the relaxation of the geopolitical constraints by the Soviet Union, and a number of further disintegrative tendencies, however, sealed the destiny of the communist regimes. Recognising the unsustainability of the real existing socialism, HOW TO DESCRIBE CENTRAL EUROPE?

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a new form of opposition emerged with dissident movements starting to organise themselves in each country while maintaining a transnational regional network. The most important one was the already mentioned Polish Solidarity Movement (Solidarność), but other initiatives followed suit. It is arguable whether Timothy Snyder’s statement (we should call 1989 as the Polish Revolution) is an exaggeration or not;14 nevertheless, it is undoubtedly true that Poland set the stage, as it was the first country in the region that engaged in political negotiations with the ruling party. CENTRAL EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS OF 1989 AND THE END OF COMMUNISM The changing internal and external political conditions yielded their results: Central European communist regimes collapsed between 1989 and 1991. The fall of the communist regimes and the democracies (based on liberal and capitalist values) replacing them triggered Fukuyama even to proclaim the end of world history. A vast body of literature has since been produced on the history of Central European transitions to democracy, the formation of new institutions, the role of particular actors, and the problems emerging during these processes, but I only want to highlight a few characteristic features here. While undergoing a seemingly similar transition process, each country developed its own path determined by local political, economic, and social differences. While, for instance, in Poland and Hungary, some changes were initiated by the regime reformers (partly to convert their political power to other means of influence)15 and the transitions were dominated by negotiations, in Czechoslovakia, where the political leadership governed in a more authoritarian style, representatives of the ruling party stood aloof from any reform initiatives. Hence, mass mobilisation appeared to be the only means of resistance, and negotiations followed only later. Because of the non-violent nature of these transitions (as only Romania erupted into violent protests), literature label them as “peaceful,” “velvet,” 34

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or “negotiated.”16 Although contemporary interpretations in almost all Central European countries differ very much on the assessments of the events of 1989–1990, their non-violent nature is a remarkable achievement that should always be celebrated, given the history of bloody uprisings in the region. One key and distinctive feature of the transitions in a number of Central European countries was the emergence of round table discussions, in which representatives of the communist political system, the opposition, and, in some cases, the members of political and social organisations (usually aligned with the ruling communist party) were involved to set the terms for transition and a new political

Central and Eastern Europe under the Soviet rule ESTONIA LATVIA

RUSSIA

LITHUANIA BALARUS

EAST GERMANY

POLAND UKRAINE

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

HUNGARY

MOLDOVA ROMANIA

YUGOSLAVIA BULGARIA

ALBANIA

The Soviet Union (USSR) USSR-aligned countries Former USSR-aligned country Non-aligned country


system. Further observers and participants— like the Catholic Church in Poland and the Independent Lawyers’ Forum in Hungary— were also essential to facilitate or even initiate the discussions. Against this background, some argue that the round tables, and the activities of the opposition movements, and civil society presented a radically new message in the field of democracy. Others, however, saw no original idea to emerge and claim that things only got in place in 1989, so, in this sense, these are rather to be described, to use Habermas’s expression, as rectifying revolutions (nachholende Revolutionen).17 The leitmotiv of the domestic and foreign policy reforms in most of the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe was the restoration of their place in the community of European nations in every aspect. For pursuing this goal, serious economic decisions had to be made in the years of transformation (market liberalisation, privatisation, the reform of the banking and financial sector, etc.), but probably an even greater number of political issues ought to have been resolved (concerning the type and form of the new electoral system, the system of government, the lustration of communist party officials and the members of security apparatus, the reform of the constitution, etc.). While these urgent political and economic reforms could no longer be postponed, the new governing elite was forced to take these far-reaching socio-economic and political decisions with a feeling of insecurity and under time pressure. As the results usually did not coincide with the expectations of the population, former communists managed to assume political power again in many countries of the region between 1993 and 1994.

the end of Central European empires and on the new political order with fragile small states increasingly endangered by emerging great powers. Then, the focus was shifted to the Cold War era, when the whole region was integrated into the Soviet-led Eastern Bloc, and—in a political sense—made part of the East. The short (and necessarily vague) tour d’horizon was concluded with the 1989 revolutions that changed the political landscape in the region almost simultaneously and (seemingly) overnight and put these countries back on the map of Europe. As it was presented, the “inbetweenness” of the region highlighted in many of the concepts concerning Central Europe has always affected political choices and orientations deeply in the region. While, historically, the area has often been referred to as the periphery of Europe with limited independence in shaping its political development, the situation has recently changed substantially and, as Erhard Busek and Emil Brix hinted in their recent book, Europe should build on the particular political experiences Mitteleuropa accumulated in the previous periods. 18 Nonetheless, the newly discovered potential of Central Europe and its possible ramifications for the European political development should be the topic of another study. ENDNOTES 1 Larry Wolff: Inventing Eastern Europe. Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1994. 2 Friedrich Naumann: Mitteleuropa. Reimer, Berlin, 1915.; Tomáš Masaryk: The new Europe (The Slav standpoint). Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 1918. 3 For more about these concepts, see, e.g., Johann P. Arnason: Introduction: demarcating East Central Europe. European Journal of Social Theory. 2005/4. 387–400.; Tony

CONCLUDING REMARKS This article focussed on the political transformations of Central Europe along with the symbolic turning points of the century, namely 1918, 1945, and 1989, as all three have significant ramifications for the political systems of these states. On this basis, it first elaborated on the political consequences of

Judt: The Rediscovery of Central Europe. Daedalus. 1990/1. 23–54. 4 For more about the administrative/political differences within the Habsburg Monarchy, see A. Wess Mitchell: The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2018. 5 For more, see Jürgen Heyde: Geschichte Polens. Verlag C.H. Beck HG, München, 2017. 43–91. HOW TO DESCRIBE CENTRAL EUROPE?

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6 Cf. István Bibó: Válogatott tanulmányok 3. A kelet-európai

15 About this transformation of power, see Tőkés Rudolf: A

kisállamok nyomorúsága. Magvető Kiadó, Budapest, 1986.

harmadik magyar köztársaság születése. L’Harmattan Kiadó,

194.

Budapest, 2015.

7 On Wilson’s influence on the events in Central Europe, see

16 For more about the multiple events that unfolded in or

the recent book of Larry Wolff: Woodrow Wilson and the

culminated around the year 1989, see 1989 in Global

Reimagining of Eastern Europe. Stanford University Press,

Perspective, edited by Ulf Engel–Frank Hadler–Matthias

Stanford, 2020.

Middell. Leipziger Universitätsverlag, Leipzig, 2015

8 Jan Christian Smuts: The League of Nations. A Practical

17 Jürgen Habermas: Die nachholende Revolution. Kleine

Suggestion. Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1918. 12–13.

politische Schriften 7. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main,

9 In this respect, Czechoslovakia, where the transition to

1990.

democracy was carried out quite well and lasted until the

18 Emil Brix–Erhard Busek: Mitteleuropa Revisited: Warum

country was invaded by Germany in 1938, was an exception.

Europas Zukunft in Mitteleuropa entschieden. Verlag Kremayr

Propaganda, of course, exaggerated this image when creat-

& Scheriau, Wien, 2018. The two authors, building on their

ing the myth of a stable republic holding steadily to such val-

original study from the 1980s and from an Austrian vantage

ues as liberalism and democracy. Nevertheless, this golden

point, provide an intriguing concept in which they claim more

age of democracy (with democratically elected governments

say for the Central European countries in the “management”

and voluntarily cooperating political parties) also became a

of Europe.

point of reference and intellectual inspiration for the Czechoslovak dissidents in the 1970s and 1980s. For more, see Andrea Orzoff: Battle for the Castle. Czechoslovak Myth and Propaganda, 1914–1948. Oxford University Press, New York, 2009. 10 For more about the development of Central European states in the interwar period, see Robert Bideleux–Ian Jeffries: A History of Eastern Europe. Crisis and Change. Routledge, London–New York. 1998. 11 About the purges, see the contemporary assessment of Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Pattern of Political Purges. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 1958/1. 79–87. 12 For more about this period, see, e.g., The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1949, edited by Norman Naimark–Leonid Gibianskii. Westview, Boulder, 1997.; Stalin and Europe. Imitation and Domination, 1928– 1953, edited by Timothy Snyder–Ray Brandon. Oxford University Press, New York, 2014. 13 For detailed essays about the post-Stalin period, see Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe. Challenges to Communist Rule, edited by Kevin McDermott–Matthew Stibbe. Berg, Oxford, 2006. 14 “We call the revolution of 1789 the ‘French Revolution’ and the revolution of 1917 the ‘Russian Revolution,’ but it seems unlikely that we will ever call the revolution of 1989 the ‘Polish Revolution’—even though that is essentially what it was.” Timothy Snyder: 1989: Poland Was First! The New York Review of Books. 9 December 2009. <https://bit. ly/3paWxzu >

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CLASH OF CONCEPTUALISATIONS— GEOPOLITICAL CONCEPTS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE Adam Reichardt INTRODUCTION Geopolitics is not a new concept, especially in the region of Central and Eastern Europe. The rise of geopolitics as a term and concept can be traced back to the 19th century, when big powers (particularly European ones) played influential roles in world politics and those influences were bound by geography— either implicitly or explicitly. John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge in 1989 argued the historical emergence of “a society of territorial states” and outlined three specific geopolitical orders which emerged after the Napoleonic Wars: the British geopolitical order (1815–1875), the geopolitical order of inter-imperialist rivalry (1875–1945), and the Cold War geopolitical order (1945–1990).1 The fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War brought up new questions on the role

of geopolitics. The bipolar order of the Cold War, which arguably was a very stable order, had collapsed. With some exceptions (e.g., the US–Cuba relations or the Korean conflict), the narratives of geopolitics began to shift dramatically, and there was some confusion as to the role that geopolitics would play following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. First, Francis Fukuyama in 1992 famously noted the “end of history,” which argued that one political ideology had emerged victorious over another.2 This gives way to only “one” system that would be right for the world, liberal democracy, and to the fact that global connectivity based on the rules of that system would determine international relations, hereby leaving geopolitics defunct. Samuel P. Huntington in 1993 published his argumentative essay titled “The Clash of

Cultural dividing lines according to Huntington

Western Orthodox Islamic African Latin American Sinic Hindu Buddhist Japanese

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Civilizations?”3 in which he claimed that “the fundamental source of conflict in this new [post–Cold War] world [would] not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict [would] be cultural.” Huntington argued that yes, geography could still play somewhat a role in world politics and conflicts but the dividing lines would rather be based more on cultural and demographic aspects. Hence, according to Huntington, countries which are similar in culture are less likely to experience conflict. Interestingly, he noted the example of Russia and Ukraine. “In 1991 and 1992 many people were alarmed by the possibility of violent conflict between Russia and Ukraine over territory, particularly Crimea, the Black Sea fleet, nuclear weapons and economic issues. If civilization is what counts, however, the likelihood of violence between Ukrainians and Russians should be low.” Lastly, in 1998, Gearóid Ó Tuathail introduced the concept of “postmodern geopolitics” to try to understand the post–Cold War world which was quickly globalising while technology and the internet started to emerge as a force.4 Ó Tuathail wrote, “[t]oday, the fraying of the modern geopolitical project is becoming more and more evident as the daily practices of ‘global life’ slip territorial bounds and accelerate beyond the modern map, prompting declarations of the ‘end of geopolitics.’ . . . It is to the fraying lines and edges of the modern map, to the irruptions of the postmodern within our still nominally modern world politics, that we now turn.” All these arguments and narratives, plus countless others as Ó Tuathail admits, tried to define the world we live in by either removing or modifying our understanding of geopolitics. Yet, as the events of the first two decades of the 21st century have shown us, geopolitics—in its more traditional understanding—continues to play a role in international relations and the thinking of certain actors on the world stage. This is even more the case when examining the region of Central Europe and its Eastern neighbourhood. The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, reminded the world of this when he said in 2005 that “we 38

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should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union [had been] a major geopolitical disaster of the century.”5 This article aims to review certain (re-)emerging concepts of geopolitics in Central Europe. I will look at specific actors who try to employ these concepts and finally discuss the outlook these concepts may have for the near future. MULTILATERALISM AND CENTRAL EUROPE The fall of the Berlin Wall and, later, the Soviet Union in 1989–1991 became a catalyst for the countries of Central Europe to pursue the goal of greater integration with the then-emerging European Union. The establishment of the Visegrad Group in 1991 emphasised this path with its four declared aims: “1) to eliminate the remnants of the communist bloc in Central Europe; 2) to overcome historic animosities between Central European countries; 3) to undertake joint efforts to achieve the set goals, i.e. to successfully accomplish social transformation and to join the European integration process; and 4) to bring together the then ruling political elites.”6 This cooperation of the Visegrad countries was the first effort by the Central European countries to achieve a goal through multilateral means. In other words, the four countries of the Visegrad Group (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) understood that they could achieve their joint aims better through collective action rather than individual bilateral approaches. Thus, we can look to James A. Caporaso, who defined multilateralism as “a belief that activities ought to be organized on a universal (or at least a many-sided) basis for a ‘relevant’ group, such as the group of democracies.”7 Since 1999 and 2004, the countries of Central Europe have joined the multilateral organisations of NATO and the European Union, respectively. These institutions play a significant role in the security architecture of the region and impact its political and geopolitical arrangements. They can be seen as blocs of countries that share similar values, political systems, and goals in international relations.


Central Europe joining the multilateral organisations of NATO and the EU

ESTONIA NATO: 2004 EU: 2004

LATVIA NATO: 2004 EU: 2004

LITHUANIA NATO: 2004 EU: 2004

POLAND NATO: 1999 EU: 2004 GERMANY NATO: 1955/1990 EU: 1952/58

CZECHIA NATO: 1999 EU: 2004

AUSTRIA EU: 1995

SLOVAKIA NATO: 2004 EU: 2004

HUNGARY NATO: 1999 EU: 2004

SLOVENIA NATO: 2004 EU: 2004

CROATIA NATO: 2009 EU: 2013

Member states of NATO Member states of EU Non-NATO and non-EU states 1949: Year of accession


Overall, the concept of multilateralism plays one of the most significant roles in geopolitics, especially when considering policies towards the Eastern neighbourhood region. Here, the leading policy of the European Union is the Eastern Partnership established in 2009 as a means to better integrate six countries of the post-Soviet space (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) with the European Union. This policy is based on decisions made at a multilateral level and carries the assumption that, by bringing the politics, economies, and societies of these countries closer to the European Union, it would lead to greater stability and joint prosperity. However, both the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, the annexation of Crimea, and the war in eastern Ukraine since 2014 demonstrate that there are limits to the effectiveness of multilateralism in geopolitics. Furthermore, the implications of a disengaging American administration (under President Donald Trump between 2016 and 2020) undermine the success of multilateralism in this region. Big powers can still play a disproportionate role if there is less interest in pursuing a multilateral approach. Nevertheless, the mechanisms of multilateralism still play an important role in the countries of Central Europe and should not be written off as ineffective. Instead, they should be viewed as if they were, at times, in competition with other concepts of geopolitics (outlined below). Moreover, as Will Moreland concludes, “the world of [today] is not that of 1929. It possesses a robust network of institutions absent a century ago to help combat international challenges to peace and security.”8 UNIPOLAR WORLD As noted above, the end of the Cold War brought about the end of a bipolar world that had lasted for four decades. It was organised into two spheres: the democratic/capitalistleaning countries (led by the United States and the West) and the socialist/communist-leaning bloc and its allies (led by the Soviet Union). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, scholars on international relations noted that the world 40

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order would be restructured after Fukuyama’s “end of history.” This is what Charles Krauthammer called America’s “unipolar moment.” In 1991, Krauthammer wrote, “the true geopolitical structure of the post–Cold War world is brought sharply into focus by the Gulf crisis: a single pole of world power that consists of the United States at the apex of the industrial West. Perhaps it is more accurate to say the United States and the West behind it, because where the United States does not tread, the alliance does not follow.” 9 Indeed, American dominance on the global stage was seen throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. The war in Afghanistan following 11 September 2001 and the wars in Iraq served as illustrations of the United States’ ability to take unilateral action (almost) anywhere in the world without being challenged. The implications for Central Europe in the geopolitical concept of an American-led unipolar world were particularly revealed during the Iraq War. When building a coalition for its efforts to go to war with Iraq, the administration of George W. Bush looked to the newer members of NATO (i.e., Central Europe) as likely allies. Then Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld even labelled this distinction between “old” Europe (countries of Western Europe) and “new” Europe (countries of Central Europe). In this case, there was a division among European states as a result of US unipolar action. In some sense, it undermined the multilateral framework of the United Nations and the nascent European Union. Further, it illustrated that global politics in a unipolar world was less stable, depending on how the single power planned to use its influence. The earlier example of the War in Afghanistan as a result of 9/11 illustrated the opposite: when the bulk of American allies felt sympathy for the United States being attacked, there was broad support for a mission to oust the Taliban and to end its support for the alQaeda terrorist group.10 At this point, the question as to how unipolar the geopolitical situation is today can be raised. Again, Russian aggression in 2008 and 2014, which were considered violations of international


The positions of the European states on the invasion of Iraq in 2003

States participating in the invasion of Iraq States in support of the invasion States in opposition to the invasion States with an uncertain or no official standpoint

laws and norms, directly challenged this concept. Further, the rise of China as a power with more than regional aspirations, together with other regional powers (e.g., Turkey), provides evidence that the unipolar system may be coming to an end. This is also a direct result of the Trump administration’s “America First” policy of disengagement from global politics. That is why the next concept, which is promoted by other powers, is also an important one to understand as we look further at geopolitics in Central Europe. MULTI-UNIPOLAR WORLD/SPHERES OF INFLUENCE In his 2007 speech in Munich, Russian president Vladimir Putin derided the US-led unipolar world, stating, “I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world. And this is not only

because if there was individual leadership in today’s – and precisely in today’s – world, then the military, political and economic resources would not suffice. What is even more important is that the model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no moral foundations for modern civilisation.” 11 Putin’s words demonstrate the developing Russian thinking of the day on how geopolitics and the world order should be structured. The concept of a unipolar world led by the United States directly challenged any other powers playing a role in international politics. By the early 21 st century, many Russian thinkers began to interpret unipolarity as a threat to Russian sovereignty and its uniqueness in having a strong influence on the countries it saw as a natural part of its sphere of influence, the socalled Russkiy Mir. As scholar Andrew Wilson notes, the idea which drives Russian thinking HOW TO DESCRIBE CENTRAL EUROPE?

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Russia and its approximate sphere of influence FINLAND SWEDEN

ESTONIA

RUSSIA

LATVIA LITHUANIA

BELARUS POLAND

GERMANY

CZECHIA

UKRAINE SLOVAKIA

KAZAKHSTAN

AUSTRIA

ITALY

HUNGARY SLOVENIA CROATIA MONTENEGRO

ROMANIA

MOLDOVA

SERBIA

Black Sea

BULGARIA

ALBANIA

UZBEKISTAN Caspian Sea

NORTH MACEDONIA GREECE

ARMENIA TURKEY AZERBAIJAN

Mediterranean Sea CYPRUS

EU and NATO members

Russian frozen conflicts

Only EU members Only EU applicants NATO members and EU applicants Only NATO members

UKRAINE

5.

1. MOLDOVA

RUSSIA

CSTO, CIS, CISFTA, and EAEU members* 2.

Only CIS and CISFTA members Only CIS members

Black Sea

Only CISFTA members * CSTO = Collective Security Treaty

1. Moldova – Transdniestria

Organization, CIS = Commonwealth

2. Ukraine – Crimea

of Independent States ,

3. Ukraine – Donetsk and Luhansk

CISFTA = Commonwealth of Independent

4. Georgia – Abkhazia

States Free Trade Area,

5. Georgia – South Ossetia

EAEU = Eurasian Economic Union

6. Azerbaijan – Nagorno-Karabakh

3. 4. GEORGIA AZERBAIJAN 6.


in geopolitics, opposing the unipolar world, is largely based on Vadim Tsymbursky’s concept of “a multi-unipolar world.” As Wilson argues, “In Tsymbursky’s view of the world, there is Russia, there is the United States, there is China and so on. It is not a fixed number, but there are seven or eight poles, regional hegemons, and they should control their neighbourhoods.”12 In other words, Tsymbursky’s concept, which is becoming largely accepted in Russian foreign policy circles, interprets spheres of influence much more like the 19 th-century view of geopolitics. Large regional powers should have full influence over smaller countries that belong to the respective sphere. This concept directly challenges not only the unipolar concept but also the concept of multilateralism. In multilateralism, each country is considered sovereign and not subservient to any power. That is why international law is also so important to multilateralism. In the multi-unipolar world concept, however, influence over countries takes precedence over a rules-based order. Hence, the Russian Federation felt justified to take aggressive actions in Georgia and Ukraine, as it felt that it had the “right” to impose its will on these countries, which are not allowed to shift spheres (from a Russian-led sphere to a Transatlantic-led one). For the countries of Central Europe, this concept poses serious challenges. Accepting a multi-unipolar world would mean abandoning some or all of their sovereignty. One should also be cautious when comparing Russian-led integration policies with European-led ones, as they are not analogous, even though both do require the abatement of some sovereignty. The Russian multi-unipolar concept, however, requires subservience to Moscow, while the EU, for example, is much more based on consensus. Lastly, this type of multi-unipolar order brings a greater level of instability, as regional powers will likely attempt to expand their influence, which leads to a clash with other powers. This was seen in 2015, when Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet over its airspace, escalating tensions between the two regional powers.

CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE Another important geopolitical concept that is being promoted by a large power (i.e., China) and has an influence in the Central European region is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This China-led concept, not always seen through the lens of geopolitics, has been described by its proponents as a project to foster international cooperation by investing in infrastructure and economic connectivity. However, as Colin Flint and Cuiping Zhu argue, “[t]he BRI is a mixture of three goals and strategies: economic integration, regional influence and global geopolitical competition.” 13 The crux of this concept is China’s massive and long-term investment in nearly seventy countries, which will connect China to a large part of the world via road and rail connections. The countries of Central Europe are assumed to play a role within the framework of the BRI, especially in the rail transport of goods from China to wider Europe. Poland, in particular, has already established some important rail connections. The first-ever direct cargo transport train from China (Xi’an) arrived in Poland (Gdańsk) in November 2019. The time to transport cargo took only twelve days with a potential of shortening the connection to ten days (as opposed to previous maritime connections of over forty days). Further development of the BRI through this route and others via the southern corridor continues. The main format for relations between China and the countries of Central Europe can be found in the 17 + 1 (previously 16 + 1) initiative, whereby China engages in relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (as a bloc, which includes China plus seventeen countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia). This format largely focusses on infrastructure, investment, and trade, but there are also areas of cultural exchanges via various dialogues. It is important to note the growing role of China in the world. While its influence remains HOW TO DESCRIBE CENTRAL EUROPE?

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Members of the 17+1 initiative between China and the CEE countries

EU member states’ participating in the 17+1 Non-EU member states’ participation in the 17+1

largely economic (and less political), its potential as a global power to possibly challenge the world order should not be underestimated, and Chinese policymakers also view their approach in long-term and strategic terms with hopes of having some level of influence. As Jakub Bornio recently wrote, “it is not surprising that China locates its greatest projects in countries affected by serious internal problems (for example, Greece in the aftermath of the 2007– 2008 financial crisis), those who do not feel threatened by Russia and want to diversify their economic portfolio (for example, Hungary and 44

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its ‘Eastern Wind’ doctrine), and those who are contesting US foreign policy (Serbia) or remain in the so-called grey security area (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine).” 14 He concludes that there is no doubt China has an interest in the region. Whether its investments and engagement could change the geopolitical structure of this region remains to be seen. INTERMARIUM Lastly, a few words must be given to a geopolitical concept which has its roots in the region itself: the concept of Intermarium. This concept was first formulated by Józef Piłsudski, head of Poland after World War I. As Nick Cohen writes, “Intermarium (which translates to ‘between the seas’), was formulated in the context of post-WWI Europe. Recognising that the fledgling nation-states in Eastern Europe could never stand up to the imperial designs of Europe’s power players on their own, Piłsudski advocated for an economic, defence and quasipolitical association modelled loosely on the medieval Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. In its most ambitious iteration, the Intermarium coalition would have formed a united political community stretching from the Baltic Sea down to the Adriatic and Black Seas, capable of pushing back against economic, military and political pressures exerted by powers both to the east and west.”15 This concept has never been realised. After World War II, the Soviet-imposed communist regimes in the region quashed the memory of such a concept (as it was also seen as antiRussian), and Intermarium only returned after the fall of communism. The resurfacing of Intermarium, primarily in Polish foreign policy thinking, illustrated a desire to implement a geopolitical concept that was more locally designed. Debates on Intermarium throughout the 1990s and early 2000s led to an even greater revival of this concept. Adapted to the 21 st century, it has now taken a new, modified form—but one that is important for Central Europe—the “Three Seas Initiative.” This initiative by twelve countries (all members of the eastern part of the European Union),


The original version of the Intermarium federation in Central Europe proposed by the Polish Józef Piłsudski after World War I and the Three Seas Initiative (TSI, Trimarium) of today Intermarium

Note: Eastern parts of Ukrainian and Belarusian lands in 1922 incorporated into Soviet Union.

Trimarium

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which is now being implemented, has become primarily a vehicle for economic investment in infrastructure and energy-related projects to better connect the countries. While the roots of the Three Seas Initiative are clearly tied to the Intermarium geopolitical concept, the project itself is not as political as such. Hence, it has less potential to clash with the other geopolitical concepts outlined above, as it is more of a cooperation mechanism and one that is not geopolitically competitive. Nevertheless, the Three Seas Initiative will certainly have an impact on strengthening the position of the countries of Central Europe overall.

6 History of the Visegrad Group. Visegrad Group. <https://bit.ly/2UGFO95 > Accessed: 30 October 2020. 7 James A. Caporaso: International relations theory and multilateralism: the search for foundations. International Organization. 1992/3. 603. 8 W ill Moreland: The Purpose of Multilateralism. A Framework for Democracies in a Geopolitically Competitive World. Brookings Institution Report. 2019/September. 19. <https://brook.gs/2KpMCWW > 9 Charles Krauthammer: The Unipolar Moment. Foreign Affairs. 1990–1991/1. 24. 10 David P. Calleo: Follies of power: America’s unipolar fantasy. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009. 11 Vladimir Putin: Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy. President of Russia.

CONCLUSIONS As argued above, there is a need to recognise the fact that multiple concepts are playing various roles in the geopolitics of Central Europe and beyond. Knowing the dynamics between these concepts will be critical to understand how they influence international relations, security, and domestic politics in the countries of the region and its wider neighbourhood. Clearly, Central Europe plays a significant geopolitical role in this part of the world. As the above concepts illustrate, the developments in the Central European region should be monitored closely, as they may set the tone for the concepts that might take greater precedent over others.

ENDNOTES 1 John Agnew–Stuart Corbridge: The New Geopolitics: The Dynamics of Geopolitical Disorder. In: A World in Crisis? Geographical Perspectives, edited by R. J. Johnston–P. J. Taylor. Blackwell, Oxford, 1989. 266–288. 2 Francis Fukuyama: The End of History and the Last Man. Free Press, New York, 1992. 3 Samuel P. Huntington: The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs. 1993/3. 22–49. 4 Gearóid Ó Tuathail: Postmodern Geopolitics? The Modern Geopolitical Imagination and Beyond. In: Rethinking Geopolitics, edited by Gearóid Ó Tuathai–Simon Dalby. Routledge, London–New York, 1998. 16–38. 5 Vladimir Putin: Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. President of Russia. 25 April 2005. <https://bit.ly/2IS3DIA > 46

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10 February 2007. <https://bit.ly/3nJmuEW > 12 Island Russia. Interview with Andrew Wilson. New Eastern Europe. 17 December 2014. <https://bit.ly/2IYPARh > 13 Colin Flint–Cuiping Zhu: The geopolitics of connectivity, cooperation, and hegemonic competition: The Belt and Road Initiative. Geoforum. 2019/February. 95–101. 14 Jakub Bornio: Will China’s facemask diplomacy pay off? New Eastern Europe. 2020/5. 59. 15 Nick A. Cohen: Intermarium in the 21 st Century. A new path for Europe? New Eastern Europe. 2019/6. 101–105.


NEW VISEGRAD IN NEW EUROPE Tomáš Strážay Each of the three decades of the Visegrad cooperation’s existence was specific. The first one was affected by big enthusiasm (and idealism), also embodied in the slogan “return to Europe.” The second decade was definitely dominated by the process of EU accession and included the pre-accession period in the early 2000s and the first years of the EU membership. The third decade was more about finding responses to severe challenges, be they the consequences of the 2009–2010 economic crisis, the migration crisis, Brexit, or the most recent COVID-19 pandemic. All these challenges also affected the European Union, of which the V4 countries have been members for more than sixteen years. In fact, the V4 spent more years of its entire existence in the EU than outside. The Visegrad Group was developed as a regional grouping inside the EU, and not as an integrationist structure that would present itself as an alternative to the EU. Therefore, the future of the V4 is closely connected to the future of the EU. In order to respond more efficiently to challenges—the existing ones but also the expected ones—the EU decided to launch the Conference on the Future of Europe, with particular attention paid to the bottom-up approach. The conference is going to involve representatives from all EU member countries and EU institutions, as well as the public in the member states. It is scheduled for two years, which implies that it aims to think over different aspects of the European project and its future thoroughly. The conference has strategic importance for the EU and is expected to deliver tangible results. The crucial question in the whole exercise is what citizens expect from the EU and in what fields they consider it an added value. In light of the above, the commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the Visegrad Group might

also serve as a trigger for a broader discussion concentrated on the question: “What kind of Visegrad do we want?” The outcome of this debate, which would have several layers and would include several activities in the V4 countries, might result in the creation of a framework for the future development of the V4 cooperation. The output of such a debate could assist the representatives of the V4’s ministries of foreign affairs to rewrite the 2004 guidelines of the Visegrad cooperation which are outdated and definitely need an update.1 In addition, the debate could be interlinked with the Conference on the Future of Europe 2 in many regards, especially when it comes to the role of citizens and the broader issue of communication between the governmental and non-governmental sphere. The future of Europe itself could be an excellent topic for the V4 project, especially when dealing with the role of regional initiatives in the EU, while other important policy areas such as migration or security could also be topics for discussion. Of course, the Visegrad debate would last shorter than the Conference on the Future of Europe— maybe half a year would be enough—and would include much fewer participants. Besides the public, the list of involved stakeholders would encompass V4 governmental institutions, think tanks, NGOs, and academia. THE REASONS FOR LAUNCHING THE DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF THE V4 The 30th anniversary as such would naturally not be the only reason for launching the debate on the future of the V4. The main explanation for the incentive would be the long-term viability and effectiveness of the Visegrad Group. The need for launching the debate reflects the Visegrad countries’ increasingly different perceptions of the Visegrad cooperation itself and the role they play in it. The V4 countries HOW TO DESCRIBE CENTRAL EUROPE?

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differ over what they want to achieve with the V4 trademark and what purposes it should serve. This divergence also makes citizens hesitate over their perception of the Visegrad cooperation. In addition, some other regional initiatives, such as the Three Seas Initiative or the Slavkov Triangle, have also been established in the region over the last decade, so it is more difficult to recognise the V4’s added value, at least at first glance. This has become apparent in the Czech Republic and Slovakia but also in Poland. Conversely, Hungary, which currently seems to identify itself the most with the Visegrad cooperation, would like to apply the three musketeer’s “one for all, all for one” approach to the V4. Another reason is that, more often than before, particular countries tend to create micro-coalitions on some issues inside the V4. Such cleavages weaken the Visegrad cooperation. The debate on the future of the V4 would, therefore, also serve as a platform for discussing the V4 priorities. The V4 needs to offer such an agenda that is attractive for all four countries and reflects actual needs and challenges. This task is connected with the need to update the foregoing guidelines on the future areas of the Visegrad cooperation. The fact that the V4 countries find added value in the Visegrad cooperation is not contested at all, the aim is rather to modernise the V4 agenda and the leading principles of the cooperation. The third reason reflects an increasing worry that the so-called political Visegrad overshadows

Countries participating in the Slavkov triangle

CZECHIA SLOVAKIA AUSTRIA

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the practical one. The balance between the two is the essence of the Visegrad cooperation. The V4—or, originally, the V3—was founded by the high representatives of Hungary, Poland, and the former Czechoslovakia, so it was clearly a political project, but, after the cooperation was revitalised in 1998–1999, it soon became open to the civil society. The International Visegrad Fund, founded in 2000, was aimed to work in this direction. The balance between political and practical Visegrad was struck, and it has been working quite well until recently. With the arrival of the migration crisis in 2015, the prime ministers of the V4 countries started to dominate the stage and became the faces of Visegrad. This change, however, resulted in the politicisation of the V4, which overshadowed other—particularly important—dimensions of the Visegrad cooperation. In other words, the political Visegrad overshadowed the practical one. By involving the broadly defined civil society in the debate on the future of the V4, the bottom-up approach would be significantly strengthened. The debate as such could, therefore, contribute to restoring the balance between the political and practical dimensions of cooperation. THE RED LINES In order to concentrate the debate on priority issues, it might be useful to set some limits within which the debate would take place. The first issue which is suggested to remain untouched is the size of the V4 in terms of the number of participating countries. The overall agreement that the V4 is a regional initiative encompassing four countries should last. For cooperation with non-V4 countries and their groupings, the V4 + instrument proved to be effective. The second “no-touch” issue should be that the V4 keep its low level of institutionalisation. The informal character of the V4 cooperation proved to be effective, especially in times when the V4 countries could not reach a joint position. The V4’s only standing institution should remain the International Visegrad Fund, while, if need be, smaller sectoral institutions


similar to the Visegrad Patent Institute could also be created. The V4 cooperation should, however, continue to be based on informal institutions, which include the regular meetings of the V4 countries’ political representatives and the regular cooperation of experts on different levels. Thirdly, the “equal right, equal contribution” principle should be preserved. This principle particularly applies to the Visegrad Fund, since the V4 countries contribute with the same amount to its budget. However, it also has a broader symbolic value. (This, however, does not imply by any means that the IVF’s budget should not increase—on the contrary, it should increase regularly.)

on the future of the V4, the Visegrad political leaders would send the message that they are open to communicating with their citizens and able to think beyond one or two political cycles. This would be a positive discovery for their partners in other EU countries—but primarily for V4 citizens.

ENDNOTES 1 Guidelines on the future areas of Visegrad co-operation (12 May 2004). Visegrad Group. <https://bit.ly/3o10x4i > Accessed: 11 November 2020. 2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Shaping the Conference on the future of Europe. European Commission. 22 January 2020. <https://bit.ly/3lcjwHc >

THE ADDED VALUE OF THE V4 The V4 will enter the fourth decennium of its existence as an established trademark and efficient regional cooperation in Central Europe. The V4 countries are interested in pragmatic cooperation, for which V4 can offer the common ground. Still, the V4 could work even more effectively and could be better targeted on the needs of the V4 countries and their citizens. The debate on the future of the V4 could bring tangible results in terms of innovative ideas or practical recommendations. The EU needs regional initiatives like the V4, as it supports the cooperation of the member states on a regional basis. Whatever its future shape will be, the EU will also remain the main framework for V4 activities and the main platform for negotiating with important global stakeholders, including the US or China. Therefore, the idea to connect—at least in some aspects—the Conference on the Future of Europe with the debate on the future of the V4 seems to bring added value to both but, particularly, to the Visegrad Group. Innovative ideas on how to solve pressing issues might attract the attention of other EU members or perhaps serve as inspiration for regional groupings within or beyond the EU. Naturally, the debate’s format and its technical parameters need to be further discussed. However, by considering to launch the debate HOW TO DESCRIBE CENTRAL EUROPE?

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SUBREGIONALISM AND MINILATERALISM IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE Nikolett Garai INTRODUCTION Following the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union (EU) and the sudden interest shown towards the Visegrad Cooperation because of its recent activity, the topic of subregional cooperation and minilateralism in Europe has become quite popular in recent years. However, cooperation on a subregional level is not a new phenomenon at all, especially in East-Central Europe (ECE). 1 In the last thirty years, post-communist small states started to form different cooperation platforms with diverse motivations. In Figure 1, the most important subregional initiatives of the ECE region are collected with their members today. Similarly, minilateralism also has long traditions in the EU. When I refer to minilateral groups in this article, I only mean minilateral groups in the context of the European Union’s decisionmaking architecture. In Figure 2, I have shown the most prominent minilateral groups today. As it is visible by comparing Figure 1 and Figure 2, there are numerous minilateral groups inside the EU which overlap in membership with subregional groups or there are a couple of occasions when an initiative qualifies both as a minilateral and a subregional group. The difference between subregional and minilateral groups is that, in the case of the former, the organising force is always geographic closeness, which is a necessary condition, and the functions of the cooperation can include issue areas that concern only a specific subregion. In contrast, the raison d’étre of minilateral groups is the similar interests that participating countries would like to advocate on an EU level. Thus, geographical closeness is not a factor in principle. However, it is quite hard to draw an exact line between the two types of groups, if not impossible, because of the 50

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complexity of European politics that is practised on many different levels. This article aims to assess the contemporary state of subregionalism and minilateralism in Europe and to highlight the processes that led us to a new phase of subregionalism that started in the mid-2010s. THE EVOLUTION OF SUBREGIONALISM IN EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE To understand the current developments of subregionalism in the ECE, it is vital to review its historical evolution shortly. Andrew Cottey argued in his famous study published in 2009 that European subregionalism had developed in three phases.2 Each new phase was triggered by a change in the European strategic context. The first phase started in the early 1990s because the end of the Cold War created a new geopolitical situation for the region that is sometimes referred to as the region between two great powers, Germany and Russia.3 The fall of communism, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the end of the bipolar world order altered the geopolitical realities of the small states in the ECE. They established their independent foreign policy agendas and perceived that cooperation platforms could be useful tools to achieve the commonly shared interests of the region. These shared interests stemmed from one main motive, namely, the wish to enter the wider regional (European) integration process that had already started in the Western half of Europe in the 1950s. To this end, the consolidation of neighbourly relations and the completion of national political, economic, and social reforms were also needed. Thus, from 1989, many multilateral cross-border cooperation platforms were formed by states in the ECE region. Newly founded organisations


were established on a geographically limited, historically coherent, and/or functionally specific basis, commonly referred to as subregional groupings.4 Therefore, I argue that subregional cooperation is a more appropriate term to use when we would like to refer to cooperation frameworks established by East-Central European states. These subregional formats are embedded in, and important actors of, wider regional cooperation, namely, the European integration process. The second phase lasted from the late 1990s until the late 2000s. During this period, the enlargement of the EU and NATO took place. The main goal of the ECE cooperation platforms was to prepare participating countries to join these two regional organisations and to overcome the dividing lines between old and new member states once accession was completed. Countries of the Western Balkan region gradually engaged in reconciliation efforts after the Yugoslav wars ended. In this period, subregionalism expanded with two new initiatives, the Eastern Partnership and the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) which later became the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) in 2008.5 Nonetheless, these were different in nature to the already existing organisations because, within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership was a policy of the EU to reach out to the former post-Soviet countries. It focussed more on bilateral arrangements between the EU and individual countries than on the cooperation among Eastern Partnership countries. Therefore, it cannot be considered a subregional initiative in a pure sense. The RCC is also an interesting initiative because its membership is greatly diverse. It ranges from the original SECI members through different international organisations, such as the EU, the World Bank, or the Council of Europe, to multiple donor countries outside Europe, such as the US, Canada, or Turkey.6 Finally, the third phase started in the late 2000s, when further EU enlargement towards the Western Balkans was put on a hold, and an increasingly expanding Russia stirred up trouble

on the eastern borders of the EU. In this postenlargement period, subregional cooperation platforms of the ECE region developed into constant and established components of the European diplomatic landscape; however, they were still not prominent actors.7 A NEW ERA OF SUBREGIONALISM Since the publication of Cottey’s work, sixteen years have passed. During these years, the global financial and economic crisis hit the world in 2008, unleashing the European sovereign debt crisis, Russia’s expansionist endeavours in Ukraine renewed military conflicts in Europe, Chinese soft power strategies like the Belt and Road Initiative began to target the eastern half of Europe, and, finally, the European migration crisis hit the continent in 2015. These external factors altered geopolitical realities, which, in turn, affected subregionalism. At the same time, internal factors also had an impact on the subregional cooperation formats. The political implications and long-term economic effects of the global financial and economic crisis revived the East–West divide among EU member states. This divide, on the one hand, was a structural legacy of the Cold War. On the other, there is another innate division haunting Europe: a psychological one that stems from stereotypes and misperceptions. To illustrate my point here, I would like to quote two important ideas. Jarosław Kuisz writes in a recent essay that the “two halves of Europe have failed to meet in many respects, especially on issues of collective memory and the way society is imagined.”8 Similarly, György Schöpflin in his lately published article “Europe after Thirty Years, a Long Chapter of Misperceptions?” argues that “the West has never really bothered to learn about Central Europe” and that the reverse is equally true.9 The euro crisis had, however, another crucial impact: it accelerated the deeper integration of eurozone member states. The coexistence of this economic and psychological division led to the emergence and persistence of multiple clusters inside the EU. This is an important internal factor that shapes subregionalism in the ECE region. HOW TO DESCRIBE CENTRAL EUROPE?

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FIGURE 1: SUBREGIONAL INITIATIVES IN THE ECE REGION IN 2020

Functions of subregional groups

17+1

Initiatives: BSEC =

Black Sea Economic Cooperation

CBSS =

Council of the Baltic Sea States

CEDC =

Central European Defence Cooperation

CEI =

Central European Initiative

CEFTA = Central European Free Trade Agreement SECI = CEDC V4 after

EU accession

Three Seas Initiative

V4 =

Visegrad Cooperation

17+1 =

Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries

BSEC TSI

RCC

Southeast European Cooperation Initiative

TSI =

RCC =

CBSS

Regional Cooperation Council

Legend:

CEFTA CEI SECI V4 before

EU accession

Establishment:

Bridging function

1 Phase 1

Policy-oriented function

2 Phase 2

National reforms function

3 Phase 3

Integration function

4 Phase 4

Interest advocacy function

BSEC & CEDC

Members of CEI

Members of BSEC

1

1 Members of CEDC 3

CBSS’ 11 member states and the EU

17 European members of the 17+1 initiative

EU members of CBSS

4

Non-EU members of CBSS +CHINA

CEFTA & SECI

Other EU members 1

V4 & TSI

Members of CEFTA 1

Members of V4 1

Members of SECI

Before EU accession:

2 After EU accession: Members of TSI 4 52

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REGIONAL COOPERATION COUNCIL (RCC)

30 European participants of RCC

Other participants of RCC • Canada • US • Council of Europe • Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) • European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) • European Investment Bank (EIB) • EU, represented by a delegate of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by a representative of the European Commission • International Organization for Migration (IOM) • NATO • Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) • Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) • SECI • United Nations (UN) • United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) • United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) • World Bank

The European migration crisis further altered political dynamics inside the EU when the Visegrad countries challenged the dominant German position on the management of the migration crisis, articulated by Angela Merkel. This was another interesting development that shifted the attention to the Visegrad Cooperation, and the world rediscovered the subregional cooperation platform of the four ECE countries. It seems that the migration crisis drew the attention of foreign policy decision makers, think tankers, scholars, and the public, as well, to the importance of subregional cooperation. Two other events that reinforced the newly emerging interest in subregionalism were the debate over the future of Europe, which was inseparable from the negotiations of the multiannual financial

framework of the EU for the years 2021 to 2027 (MFF 2021–2027), and the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU. Brexit triggered a discussion on new possibilities of European coalition building. Those member states which considered the United Kingdom as an important ally in preserving national sovereignty over excessive integration felt that a much stronger presence will be needed in European politics to balance the Franco-German axis. All these processes signal that the strategic environment in Europe has once again changed. This alteration—just like in the case of the previous three phases of evolution— gave an impetus to the further development of subregionalism in Europe. This means that a new, fourth phase started in the mid-2010s.

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Non-EU members

** Autonomous territories

*

CYPRUS GREECE MALTA PORTUGAL

Eurozone members

Southern Seven

UK*

Benelux

FRANCE

GERMANY

Founding Six

NETHERLANDS

BELGIUM LUXEMBOURG

ITALY

EU-3

New Hanseatic League

IRELAND

SPAIN

G6

FIGURE 2: MINILATERAL GROUPS IN THE EU IN 2020

ESTONIA LATVIA LITHUANIA

Baltic states

Nordic countries

FAROE ISLANDS** GREENLAND** ÅLAND**

DENMARK FINLAND ICELAND NORWAY* SWEDEN

NordicBaltic Eight

Weimar Triangle

Visegrad Four

POLAND

CZECHIA SLOVAKIA

AUSTRIA

Slavkov Triangle

HUNGARY

BULGARIA CROATIA ROMANIA SLOVENIA

Three Seas Initiative (TSI)


A NEW ERA BRINGS NEW INITIATIVES AND NEW FUNCTIONS New Initiatives What exactly happened with subregionalism during this time? New initiatives were formed, which reflected the new realities of Europe. One of the newest initiatives is the Three Seas Initiative (TSI), which was launched in 2016. It serves not only as a coordination platform for its member states to realise the much-wanted north–south interconnectedness in energy and transportation infrastructure but also an advocacy group inside the EU, mainly in these policy areas. Another interesting platform, the 16 + 1 Cooperation, appeared in 2012. It was a mechanism primarily aimed at managing the flow of investment and trade between China and sixteen ECE countries. It also served as an economic cooperation platform through its annual summits. With the accession of Greece in 2019, it transformed into 17 + 1.10 On the other part of Europe, the New Hanseatic League was brought to life to promote the common interests of its members in a specific EU policy area, the future direction of the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union. Let us stop here for a second to highlight another important aspect of interest advocacy in the EU. Minilateralism on the Rise At this point, it is unavoidable to discuss the topic of minilateralism, a term that became quite popular and widely used in the last few years. A new strand of academic inquiry emerged, building on Moises Naim’s idea of minilateralism, which was outlined in a Foreign Policy article in 2009.11 According to Naim, if countries want to solve today’s pressing issues on a multilateral level, they need to gather the “smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact to solve a particular problem.”12 Although Naim initially raised this idea in the context of international trade negotiations, academia started to use this term in connection with EU coalitions. This is not a coincidence considering that minilateral groups have already been present in the EU for a very long time; however, this phenomenon

was embodied in the idea of a multi-speed Europe and various opt-outs. For example, eurozone member states can be regarded as a formation of a minilateral group because they chose to deepen integration while leaving the rest of the countries behind. In the meantime, Poland opted out of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights while Denmark could negotiate and back out of introducing the euro, of defence policies, and of the area of freedom, security, and justice.13 As the MFF 2021– 2027 negotiations between different “clubs” or the introduction of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (in only twenty-two member states) showed, the future trend prevailing will definitely be minilateralism. Interest Advocacy on EU Level as a New Function Cooperation platforms are not static creatures, they are dynamic entities that adapt to the changes that occur in their regional and global environment. Therefore, it is natural that their goals, functions, and membership may change over time. Change can manifest itself in organisational goals, the scope of membership, or institutional reforms. In the V4’s case, new functions have been added to the group once the original objectives of the format (the EU and NATO accession) have been fulfilled. Another good example of dynamism is the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). When its founding members joined the EU in 2004, their membership ended in CEFTA. However, a group of Western Balkan states joined the organisation in 2006 once they met the necessary criteria.14 In addition, there are certain cooperation formats such as the Weimer Triangle or the Slavkov Triangle which do not have a formal institutional setup. Consultation and cooperation are occasional, which is well suited to the need for flexible coalition building; thus, these groups can be regarded as ad hoc political alliances rather than overarching and fixed cooperation platforms. Likewise, functions can change, as well. According to Cottey, subregional groupings HOW TO DESCRIBE CENTRAL EUROPE?

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can have four different functions: 1) they can serve as bridges between their member states to overcome the conflicts of the past and to bring their members closer in a formal way; 2) they can be vehicles of integration helping their members to achieve accession to the EU and NATO; 3) they can be forums to solve transnational policy challenges; 4) they can be facilitators of national reforms in different issue areas.15 Naturally, these functions are not mutually exclusive. Subregional cooperation formats can have several different functions at the same time. I believe that in phase four of subregionalism, a new complementary function materialised for the ECE cooperation formats: platforms can act as interest advocacy groups on an EU level regarding specific EU policy areas. In Figure 1, the functions of the ECE subregional 56

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initiatives are shown. In the case of the Visegrad Cooperation, leaders managed to transform the platform in an efficient way, which resulted in a changed behaviour that was uncharacteristic of them. V4 Presidency Programs from the last couple of years set the goal of effective interest advocacy within the EU as a priority.16 This advocacy function resembles much to the role that miniliateral groups play in EU politics. Therefore, we can assume that those subregional entities that aim to establish the interest advocacy function generally have more influence in the EU affairs than those entities that lack this function. CONCLUSION Because of a change in the European geopolitical context, European subregionalism entered a new era in the mid-2010s. This new


phase was triggered by external factors like the global financial and economic crisis, the Russian expansion, the emergence of Chinese soft power strategies that targeted the eastern half of Europe, and, finally, the European migration crisis. Internal factors like the persistence of the East–West divide, the corresponding political emancipation endeavours of “new member states,” and the quest—or, I dare say, competition—for defining the future of the European integration also transformed the landscape in which subregional groupings operate. The new phase brought new initiatives to life and blurred the lines between the functions of subregional and minilateral groups, which signal the ever-increasing complexity of European politics. As for the future, it will be interesting to see how these ECE platforms will evolve—especially with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. It is indubitable that the TSI could play a crucial role not only in the region but on a European level, as well. However, the question remains whether it will be able to finance designated projects, speed up their implementation, and push for a strong-minded stance on the energy and infrastructure policies of the EU. Another piece of the puzzle yet to be seen in the future is whether the 17 + 1 cooperation will transform into a platform with real content. Doubts can be raised due to the recent American–Chinese rivalry, which manifested itself in the ECE region as the battle for 5G infrastructure development. Will this and COVID-19-related effects put an end to this Chinese endeavour in the EastCentral European region? As for the V4, considering the negotiations of the MFF 2021–2027, a strong Hungarian– Polish axis emerged, which was not supported by the Czech Republic and Slovakia. However, we should not forget that cooperation is never one-dimensional. Lack of cooperation in a policy area does not mean that the future of the initiative is at stake. On the contrary, it shows that the V4 is an effective and useful tool that is resilient enough to allow members to diverge in one policy area while maintaining cooperation in others.

ENDNOTES 1 ECE is used in its broader meaning which includes the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, and the Western Balkan countries. 2 Andrew Cottey: Sub-regional cooperation in Europe. An Assessment. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers. 2009/3. <https://bit.ly/2KjNkFa > 3 Cottey, 2009 4 Martin Dangerfield: From Subregionalism to Macroregionalism in Europe and the European Union. In: A ‘Macroregional’ Europe in the Making, edited by Stefan Gänzle– Kristine Kern. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2016. 22. 5 Cottey, 2009 6 RCC Participants. Regional Cooperation Council. <https:// bit.ly/3464Tzj > Accessed: 8 November 2020. 7 Cottey, 2009 8 Jarosław Kuisz: The two faces of European disillusionment. An end to myths about the West and the East. Eurozine. 1 April 2019. <https://bit.ly/381DWyd > 9 György Schöpflin: Europe after Thirty Years, a Long Chapter of Misperceptions? Aspen Review. 2019/4. <https:// bit.ly/2Lkuiif > 10 Andreea Brînză: The “17 + 1” Mechanism. Caught Between China and the United States. China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies. 2019/5. 213. 11 Moises Naim: Minilateralism. The magic number to get real international action. Foreign Policy. 21 June 2009. <https:// bit.ly/3mcy1vg > 12 Naim, 2009 13 Maya Sion: The Politics of Opt-Out in the European Union: Voluntary or Involuntary Defection? In: Thinking Together. Proceedings of the IWM Junior Fellows’ Conference, Winter 2003, edited by Alison Cashin–Jakub Jirsa. Vol. 16. IWM Junior Visiting Fellows’ Conferences, Vienna, 2003. <https://bit.ly/37SqgW4 > 14 WTO membership or commitment to adhere to WTO regulations, having an EU Association Agreement, and free trade agreements with other CEFTA members are the three criteria for joining CEFTA. 15 Cottey, 2009 16 Nikolett Garai: Challenges faced by the Visegrad Group in the “European dimension” of cooperation. International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs. 2018/1–2. 24.

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CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU



THE VISEGRAD GROUP COUNTRIES’ REPRESENTATION IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AFTER BREXIT Jakub Charvát INTRODUCTION Modern democratic political systems are hardly conceivable without political representation. This also applies to the European Parliament, a directly elected and fully fledged assembly representing EU citizens. From an institutional perspective, the European Parliament is special in many ways. Not only is it one of the largest representative bodies of the world representing more than 500 million inhabitants, but it is also the only directly elected institution in the current political system of the European Union (EU). Moreover, it is the first international (or transnational) parliamentary assembly to strive for democratic political representation. Consequently, if the European Parliament is the first transnational representative body, its composition, especially the apportionment of seats among EU member states, appears to be an issue of special importance. Some might argue that the size of their representation (i.e., the number of their seats) in the European Parliament does not directly affect the EU member states’ strength in the decision-making process and/or that, given the largely transnational nature of the party system in the European Parliament, the issue of the member states’ representation is irrelevant. However, the opposite seems to be true. As the Common Assembly was created in 1952, the question of in what way the member states would be represented in the assembly also arouse. And, as former British member of the European Parliament (MEP) Andrew Duff explained, the question of the size of EU member states’ representation in the European Parliament had traditionally been one of the most complex and sensitive issues of intergovernmental conferences.1

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DEGRESSIVE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT When composing national parliaments, there are two general approaches to how territorial units can be represented. One of them is the proportional representation based on each unit’s population size, and the other is the equal representation of territorial units. While the former follows the “one person, one vote, one value” principle (regardless of the voters’ location), the latter expresses the idea that each territorial unit may have the same weight (regardless of its population). The former principle is often followed when composing parliaments in unitary states or the first chambers of federal parliaments, whereas the latter is closely connected with the second chambers of federal states. Only the Senate of Canada and the Bundesrat in Germany represent a sort of compromise between the two aforementioned principles, as they allot more seats to more populous units but without a proportional distribution of seats.2 In other words, while the representation of territorial units in the case of unitary states is mostly suppressed, territorial representation is considered one of the basic principles of federal states. The importance of this principle is even more stressed in transnational assemblies, where the question whether the members of a transnational parliamentary assembly should represent either the citizens or states is even more pressing. All the more so because it is not possible to implement both principles, the equality of citizens and the equality of territorial units, in a pure form within a single institution simultaneously. As this paper focusses on the member states’ representation in the European


CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

61

142

78

Total

– – –

– –

Bulgaria

14 36 36 36 6 14 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

10 18 18 18 4 10 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

1958

Romania Croatia

Belgium France Germany Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Denmark Ireland United Kingdom Greece Portugal Spain Austria Finland Sweden Cyprus Czechia Estonia Hungary Lithuania Latvia Malta Poland Slovakia Slovenia

1952

198

– –

14 36 36 36 6 14 10 10 36 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

1973

410

– –

24 81 81 81 6 25 16 15 81 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

1979

434

24 81 81 81 6 25 16 15 81 24 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

1981

518

– –

24 81 81 81 6 25 16 15 81 24 24 60 – – – – – – – – – – – – –

1986

567

– –

25 87 99 87 6 31 16 15 87 25 25 64 – – – – – – – – – – – – –

1994

626

– –

25 87 99 87 6 31 16 15 87 25 25 64 21 16 22 – – – – – – – – – –

1995

732

– –

24 78 99 78 6 27 14 13 78 24 24 54 18 14 19 6 24 6 24 13 9 5 54 14 7

2004

785

35 –

18

24 78 99 78 6 27 14 13 78 24 24 54 18 14 19 6 24 6 24 13 9 5 54 14 7

2007

736

33 –

17

22 72 99 72 6 25 13 12 72 22 22 50 17 13 18 6 22 6 22 12 8 5 50 13 7

2009

751

32 11

17

21 74 96 73 6 26 13 11 73 21 21 54 18 13 20 6 21 6 21 11 8 6 51 13 8

2014

Table 1: The member states’ representation in the European Parliament by number of seats since 1952

705

33 12

17

21 79 96 76 6 29 14 13 – 21 21 59 19 14 21 6 21 7 21 11 8 6 52 14 8

Brexit


Parliament, it is necessary to reiterate in this context that, despite some early discussions, 3 the European Parliament has been conceived as a unicameral representative body since the very beginning of its existence. At the same time, it cannot be disregarded that individual EU member states differ significantly in terms of their population size; Germany, for example, is roughly 168 times more populous than Malta, the least populous EU member state, and nearly 135 times more populous than the second least populous Luxembourg. This emphasises the importance of the issue in question even more. Until the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU law did not provide any general principle on how the European Parliament’s seats should be allocated to the member states. Seat apportionment was traditionally the result of political negotiations at intergovernmental conferences, and its underlying principles were based on the composition of the Common Assembly in 1952, where the member states were clustered

according to their population size: four seats were granted to Luxembourg, ten seats to both Belgium and the Netherlands, while Italy, France, and Germany each obtained eighteen seats. Even though the principle was not explicitly codified by EU law until the Lisbon Treaty, the apportionment of the European Parliamentary seats was degressively proportional (meaning that it gave more seats to smaller territorial units than would be allocated strictly in proportion to their population) for a long time, especially because of the politics that clustered countries with similar population size into groups with the same number of seats (see Table 1). It was the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 that officially introduced the degressively proportional representation in the European Parliament into the EU law; while the degressive proportionality principle was already included in the draft European Constitution, it was finally left out at that time. Nevertheless, degressive proportionality remains a rather abstract concept that needs to be further defined. Thus, a report on the

Chart 1: Member states’ representation in the European Parliament by population until end of January 2020 100

96

90 80

73 73 74

70

million people

60 51

50

54

40 32 30

26

6

Malta

9

9

Slovenia

6

Latvia

6

Luxembourg

10 6

Estonia

20 11 11 11

13 13 13

20 21 21 21 21 21 17 19

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Germany

France

Italy

Spain

Poland

Romania

Netherlands

Portugal

Greece

Hungary

Czechia

Belgium

Austria

Sweden

Bulgaria

Finland

Slovakia

population (million)

United Kingdom

seats in the European Parliament

Denmark

Ireland

Lithuania

Croatia

Cyprus

0


Table 2: Modelling Visegrad Group countries’ representation: reality vs proportional representation 2004

2009

2014

2019

Brexit

real.

model

real.

model

real.

model

real.

model

real.

model

Czechia

24

16 (+8)

22

15 (+7)

21

16 (+5)

21

16 (+5)

21

17 (+4)

Hungary

24

16 (+8)

22

15 (+7)

21

14 (+7)

21

15 (+6)

21

15 (+6)

Poland

54

61 (–7)

50

56 (–6)

51

56 (–5)

51

57 (–6)

55

60 (–8)

Slovakia

14

8 (+6)

13

8 (+5)

13

8 (+5)

13

8 (+5)

14

9 (+5)

composition of the European Parliament was prepared in October 2007 by the Committee on Constitutional Affairs. According to this report, a more populous country shall not have a smaller number of seats than a less populous country, but the larger the population of a member state is, the more inhabitants are represented by each of its MEPs in the European Parliament, and vice versa.4 This was further clarified by the European Council in June 2013 which stated that the average number of citizens per MEP increases with the number of citizens in the member state, and vice versa.5 As it is evident from its very designation, the degressive proportionality necessarily assumes the presence of malapportionment. Or, in other words, the existing EU legislation implies the disproportionate (unequal) representation of the member states’ citizens in the European Parliament, favouring less populous countries. With the less populous countries being overrepresented in the European Parliament, the precise degressively proportional representation has not been met since the 2004 European election. Paradoxically enough, European Parliament representation was, therefore, degressively proportional only before it had been codified by the EU law.6 Besides, there was a controversial issue regarding the composition of the European Parliament after the May 2019 elections: the Hungarian over-representation, which conflicted with the degressive proportionality principle, namely the requirement that “the larger the population of a Member State, the greater its entitlement to a large number of seats.”7 In 2019, there were about 250,000 more inhabitants in

Sweden than in Hungary; yet the Scandinavian country had twenty MEPs, while the Central European country twenty-one (see Chart 1). THE VISEGRAD GROUP COUNTRIES’ REPRESENTATION IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT UNTIL BREXIT As the European Union is largely formed by less populous countries, under-representation concerns only a few of the most populous EU member states. Since the MEPs’ direct election was introduced in 1979, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and France have been among the under-represented countries in the European Parliament, joined by Spain (except for the 1994 European elections) and Poland after they acceded to the communities. Thus, only the six EU member states with the largest population were under-represented in the European Parliament after the 2019 elections, while the remaining twenty-two member states were more or less over-represented.8 If we focus on the Visegrad Group countries’ representation in the European Parliament, we can state that Poland has been the only under-represented V4 country in the European Parliament (with about a tenth of its share in the total population of the EU). In other words, Poland could have occupied about five or six more seats in the European Parliament until Brexit if the seats had been allotted under the principle of proportional representation. In contrast, the other three Visegrad Group countries, i.e., Czechia, Hungary, and Slovakia, have been over-represented in the European Parliament throughout the whole of their membership in the European Union, compared to their population CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

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Chart 2: Representation of Visegrad Group countries in the European Parliament since 2004 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 2004

2004

2004

2004

2004

Czechia

1.4763

1.4274

1.3486

1.3482

1.2498

Hungary

1.4878

1.4836

1.4353

1.4692

1.3594

Poland

0.8868

0.8869

0.9056

0.9183

0.8679

Slovakia

1.6345

1.6338

1.6205

1.6308

1.6280

shares (see Chart 2). Following the degressive proportionality principle, Slovakia, the least populous among the Visegrad Group countries, was the most over-represented country among them, occupying about 60% more seats (five extra) in the European Parliament in 2019 than it would do as per a strict proportional apportionment. Slightly less over-represented was Hungary and Czechia, with Hungary occupying seven and Czechia five more seats in the most recent European elections in May 2019 (see Table 2).9 THE VISEGRAD GROUP COUNTRIES’ REPRESENTATION AFTER BREXIT Brexit, inter alia, opened the question of how the seventy-three British seats would be handled after the United Kingdom left the EU. In the end, the reapportion of as few as twenty-seven out of the seventy-three seats among the other EU member states was decided, while the remaining forty-six seats remained unoccupied. 64

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Although the number of the reapportioned seats corresponds to the number of the member states in the union after Brexit, this does not mean that each of them can improve its representation in the European Parliament by one seat. Instead, some member states, including all Visegrad Group countries, retained the same number of seats they had had before, while others could increase their representation by one (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Croatia, Poland, Austria, Romania, Slovakia, and Sweden), two (Ireland), three (Italy and the Netherlands), or five seats (Spain and France). Although no change in the Visegrad Group countries’ representation was made after Brexit, Czechia, Hungary, and Slovakia remained over-represented, compared to their population ratio. It is also true, however, that the rate of their over-representation decreased, compared to the 2019 figures. Meanwhile, Poland continues to be under-represented in the European Parliament, and the degree of


its under-representation increased further after Brexit (see Chart 2). When converting the above-mentioned data to European Parliamentary seats, Poland would occupy about eight more seats if they were allotted under the principle of proportional representation. Meanwhile, the three other Visegrad Group countries, i.e., Czechia, Hungary, and Slovakia, are over-represented in the European Parliament: Hungary has six, Slovakia five, and Czechia four seats more than they would according to a proportional representation (see Table 2).

Institutions de la Communauté européenne (La Haye, 8–10 octobre 1953). CVCE. 8–10 October 1953. <https://bit. ly/3epM667 > 4 Alain Lamassoure–Adrian Severin: Report on the composition of the European Parliament (2007/2169(INI)). European Parliament. 3 October 2007. <https://bit.ly/3em164Y > 5 European Council Decision of 28 June 2013 establishing the composition of the European Parliament (2013/312/EU). Official Journal of the European Union. 29 June 2013. 57–58. <https://bit.ly/2JqHFwR > 6 Jakub Char vát: Poměrné sestupné zastoupení v Evropském parlamentu: unijní právo vs. realita. Mezinárodní vztahy. 2019/1. 22–40. 7 European Council Decision of 28 June 2013, 58.

CONCLUSION Brexit meant, inter alia, the need to reapportion seventy-three seats left vacant following the departure of British MEPs. Although no change in the Visegrad Group countries’ representation in the European Parliament was made due to Brexit, none of these countries’ representation deteriorated significantly. Czechia, Hungary, and Slovakia remain significantly overrepresented— as has been the case since they acceded to the European Union in 2004—even though their over-representation rate has slightly fallen since 2019. Similarly, Poland remains underrepresented, as has also been the case since 2004, and the degree of its under-representation even slightly grew after Brexit.

8 Charvát: Poměrné sestupné zastoupení. 9 Jakub Char vát: The Visegrad Group Countries Representation in the European Parliament. Biztpol Affairs. 2019/1–2. 104–124.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The paper was written as a part of a research project “Representing European Citizens? Geography of European elections, degressive proportionality and member states representation” (no. 18-09161S), funded by the Czech Science Foundation.

ENDNOTES 1 Andrew Duff: Finding the balance of power in a post-national democracy. Mathematical Social Sciences. 2012/2. 74–77. 2 Trevor J. Allen–Rein Taagepera: Seat allocation in federal second chambers: Logical models in Canada and Germany. Mathematical Social Sciences. 2017/5. 22–30. 3 Fernand Dehousse: Rapport de Fernand Dehousse sur les CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

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A QUADRATIC NEXUS—THE NATIONAL MINORITIES OF CENTRAL EUROPE IN THE EU Ágnes Vass The attitude of states towards ethnic minorities living on their territories is fundamental to the future of security and democracy in Europe. According to the website of the Federal Union of European Nationalities, more than four hundred minority groups live in Europe, meaning that one in seven Europeans belongs to an autochthonous minority or speaks a regional or minority language. Language diversity in the EU is even more colourful: there are twenty-four official languages in the union, but the number of regional and minority languages exceeds sixty. The European Union is home to over five hundred million people, and approximately forty-five million of them are considered as people belonging to one of the national minority communities residing on the territory of one of the twenty-seven member states.1 The approach of countries towards the political significance of minorities is influenced by two main factors: the history of the given country, the region the minorities live in and the political developments of the last thirty years. In most states of the broader Central, Eastern, and South East European region, ethnicity itself is politically significant: a different kind of political institutionalisation of ethnicity can be witnessed in the Baltics, the Balkans, and the Central European states.2 The Eastern enlargement of the European Union in 2004, 2007, and 2013 brought new national minority groups into the EU: most of them are demographically significant in the countries where they reside, the majority of them are geographically concentrated, and they are also characterised by experiencing a certain level of exclusion. Most of them also claim ties to a neighbouring kin state that is either a country outside the EU or an EU member state. It is often argued that the enlargement of 2004 also meant that kin-state politics appeared in the European Union.3 66

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Guaranteeing and protecting minority rights is a key issue when it comes to the security and stability of the region. International law, however, does not have a definition of national minorities— even the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities is silent about the meaning of the term. The first time people belonging to (national) minorities were mentioned explicitly in EU primary law was in the Treaty of Lisbon.4 As it will be discussed below, the main question regarding the protection of minority rights on an EU level is connected to the fact that, between the EU and (national) minorities, there is always the intermediate position of (nation) states. It is still not fully clarified what role the EU would like to fulfil in this regard, and there is no consensus about the role (nation) states are willing to give the EU in terms of minority and ethnic diversity protection. In this article, the terms national minorities or ethnic minorities are understood as communities that came into existence as a result of political and historical developments in Europe, live on a territory of a given state as minorities, and have a language that is different from the official and/or majority language of that given state. The EU itself, however, is not consistent in the usage of this terminus technicus in its legal documents. It is also important to highlight that Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union refers to “the rights of persons belonging to minorities” as an essential part of the foundations of the EU together with “the respect of human rights.”5 This means two important things: the protection of minorities is understood not as an aim but something that is already part of the EU’s foundation, and minority rights are not collective rights but rights of the individual.


Rogers Brubaker’s triadic nexus involving a national minority, the minority’s kin state, and the so-called nationalising state (in which that minority reside) are often used for understanding the dynamics in the region.6 Obviously, there are several differences regarding kin-state activities and kin-minority claims in the region. The triangle of minority communities, kin states, and nationalising states was transformed into a quadrangle when the process of Europeanisation started.7 However, the European minority rights regime does not have an autonomous capacity, as it is based on the rules and rights member states agreed with.8 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, and especially after the EU integration negotiations had started with the post-communist candidate states, a historic opportunity was provided for the development of common European standards in minority rights regime and minority protection. State practices regarding the implementation of minority rights differ significantly within the EU member states, and it is also true that the majority of international documents on minority rights are soft-law instruments that are non-

binding in most of the cases. What is more, minority rights norms are not unanimously recognised among the members of the EU.9 It is often highlighted that the EU applies double standards in minority protection: while it is one of the accession criteria for candidate states, members are almost unaccountable for minority protection after their accession. This is mainly the reason why scholars characterise European minority rights instruments as ineffective, unstable, and insufficient.10 Europeanisation, in general, had a deep impact on the character of the state–minority (and state–society) interactions, especially in candidate countries before the 2004 enlargement. During the accession negotiations (that are often also called “return to Europe”) European institutions were in a unique position with the countries of Central Europe. As Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy highlight, the process of EU enlargement negotiations and the gradual compliance with the acquis communautaire extended the EU’s “soft governance” towards the societies of Central European countries.11 The aim to comply with the accession

THE TRIADIC AND QUADRATIC NEXUS BASED ON ROGERS BRUBAKER’SAND DAVID J. SMITH’S THEORY

EUROPEAN UNION (INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY)

KIN-STATES (EXTERNAL HOMELANDS)

NATIONAL MINORITIES

NATIONALISING STATES (STATES WHERE NATIONAL MINORITIES RESIDE)

CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

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requirements also brought some changes in the minority policies of the candidate states.12 As we can see it today, Europeanisation has mainly had an indirect impact on the effectiveness and improvement of minority participation. The reason for this is that minority members are regarded mainly as recipients and not as political agents who design, influence, and actively contribute to the political and social outcomes of minority policies.13 Another reason is that, while certain interpretations of minority rights were favoured over others on a European level, anti-discrimination policies on a national level were designed in a way that had no significant impact on the development of minority–majority relations in general.14 While the major part of the literature analysing the changes of minority rights regimes during and after the accession sees inequality between the more powerful EU institutions, other international organisations and the states that are perceived as less powerful actors in this regard, what reality shows is that states have the most influence and power over minority rights implementation. The protection of minorities became one of the most important goals of the EU integration for candidate states, as the requirement for states to guarantee the “respect for and protection of minorities” became a significant membership criterion adopted by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993. Despite the fact that it was not normatively or legally defined what kind of rights were exactly needed to be implemented, the EU institutions had to give a clear interpretation what the respect for and protection of minority rights mean in reality. Regarding the countries joining the EU in 2004 or thereafter, the meaning of minority protection was tightly connected to conflict prevention and political stability in the region. The ratification of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for Protection of National Minorities was understood as one of the preconditions for EU accession.15 The fact that the articulation of ethnic diversity was encouraged and the requirement in the Copenhagen criteria to guarantee the “respect for and protection of minorities” got priority during the accession 68

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period contributed to the development of today’s minority rights regimes in the region. The transition period and the accession to the EU created those circumstances that made it possible to introduce and develop European standards in areas such as independent judicial institutions, a free market–based economy, or minority rights and political representation, but, in many cases, these policies were structured to balance the fears of the majorities in these countries about the future of their culture, language, titular status, and the sovereignty of their nation states. This was especially the case in the Baltics, where the independence, transition, and nation-building process of these countries transformed the Russianspeaking population from a formerly dominant nationality into minority communities residing on the territory of the three independent nation states of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians.16 Although, due to these reasons,—namely, that these policies were designed to protect the positions of the majorities—scholars of minority studies contest the long-term effectiveness of EU conditionality regarding minority rights regimes,17 it is unquestionable that, without Europeanisation, these regimes would look different today.18 As Will Kymlicka and other authors point it out, minorities, on the one hand, have often been seen as communities threatening the stability of European states and Europe itself, while, on the other hand, they are also viewed as communities vulnerable in those nation-state structures that are based on the titular position of a certain majority.19 The last three decades, however, showed us that the international community has been able to limit these states in promoting and fulfilling those efforts that were aiming to reduce or negatively change ethnic diversity within their societies. The paradox is that, while, from the minority rights point of view, many of the postcommunist states have more comprehensive regulations than “old” member states do, their accession to the EU did not affect significantly how new member states facilitated ethnic diversity and the protection of minority rights. In other words, the attitude and approach


towards minority communities have not changed significantly over the years. The situation of minorities in the broader Central, Eastern, and South East European region is special, as, due to earlier state transformations, most of these minority communities have active relations with their kin states. In fact, as a result of the political and societal changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, many of the newly independent states in the region had to face issues connected to minorities. These were not only about the status, rights, and overall situation of these communities, as questions such as their member’s citizenship also arose. The way these actors (minority communities, new nation states, and kin states) handled the above issues created a highly sensitive situation. Action–reaction-based relations of these actors make the situation even more sensitive, especially from the point of view of sovereignty, stability, and security. The European minority rights regime made the new member states be able to recognise minority groups and promote ethnic diversity, but, in many of these countries, minority groups were in a situation where protection from their nationalising states was needed. Security concerns connected with the situation of minorities were also significant factors during the accession period of the Baltic states. The EU actors and the majority elites in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia agreed that the need to compensate titular nations for being subordinate under the Soviet Union legitimised the entitlements of majorities over minorities. This approach, combined with the fear about Russia’s geopolitical influence in the region that can destabilise these newly independent countries and also with the uncertainties about the loyalty of Russian-speaking minorities, significantly affected the integration of minorities and the implementation of their rights.20 Good neighbourly relations emphasised during the accession process of post-communist Central and Eastern European states increased the costs for minority communities to claim support from their external kin states. The approach of the EU based on the minority-protection legislation made it possible to avoid any kind of tensions in the region. Answering the question why Central

European state transformations, regime changes, and independence were peaceful, unlike in the Balkans in the 1990s, Zsuzsa Csergő and James M. Goldgeier argue that, among others, the aim of EU integration was to be able to de-securitise the relations between the state and minority communities.21 However, as, among others, Myra A. Waterbury points out, after the EU membership had been achieved, many states kept the security paradigm alive in some forms, since, for instance, in the 2000s many of the political parties employed (and still employ) nationalist rhetoric for electoral mobilisation.22 Analysing the voting behaviour of minority members in Central and Eastern Europe, scholars highlight that the most significant political action of minorities is voting for a given ethnic political party and this act is based on the voters’ assumption that the given ethnic party is the only acceptable choice for the members of the community.23 Also, majority political parties have often been able to mobilise their voters using nationalistic rhetoric against national minorities living on the territory of the given state.24 This trend, however, seems to be changing, as, for instance, a lot of ethnic Hungarians voted for Slovak parties during the last elections in Slovakia in March 2020,25 and even the far-right, nationalist party campaigned in Hungarian cities in Slovakia to gain Hungarian votes.26 This was unimaginable in the 1990s. It is beyond dispute that European integration has had positive effects on minority participation. As an example, the EU accession made it possible for minorities to represent themselves in the European Parliament; however, it is also important to add that the majority of new opportunities the EU accession brought are available mainly for minority communities that are well-organised, institutionalised, and resourceful.27 This means that domestic political and institutional conditions and resources greatly influence their access to new opportunities the EU can provide for them. As it is argued above, minority protection on a European level is limited and mainly driven domestically by the member states. The Treaty of Lisbon introduced the concept of citizens’ initiatives on a European level—it provides the possibility to submit a CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

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proposal about a specific initiative if it is supported by one million EU citizens. One of these initiatives is the so-called Minority SafePack. Although the European Citizens’ Initiative is described as a tool for bottom-up initiatives, the Minority SafePack is a good example showing that, in reality, it looks a bit different. The Minority SafePack itself mobilised citizens mainly in two countries: Hungary and Romania, the two countries where the initiative gained more than two-thirds of all signatures and where issues regarding minority communities are politically sensitive. This example, again, underlines the importance of the states between the EU level and the minority communities while pointing out the fact that, for collecting the required signatures, mobilisation across the EU is not needed—it is more effective to mobilise citizens of the states where the given issue is important. As we can see, minority politics from both the EU’s and member states’ perspectives have its anomalies. Understanding the development of minority rights regimes or the changes of different national minority groups’ situation within the given member state is similar to observing a constellation in the night sky: to see a certain constellation, we have to take into consideration a lot of different stars, their positions, and we also have to be able to connect them. The same goes for minorities, as well: their rights, status, and political representation depend on a lot of different factors; their relations with their kin states and claims have direct and indirect effects on their relations with their home states. The way they use their resources and are able to manage their political representation, and the kind of political decisions made on local, regional, national, and European levels also influence their relations with the members of their communities, with the states in which they reside, and with their kin states. The history of the last thirty years clearly shows us that (national) minorities are important not only because they make our societies more diverse and colourful but also because of their significant and unquestionable role in supporting democratic values, the rule of law, and equality in those countries where they live and on a European level, as well. 70

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ENDNOTES 1 Based on the data available on the website of the Federal Union of European Nationalities. See Autochthonous minorities in Europe. Fe de ral Union of European Nationalities. <https://bit.ly/2Wl5hFZ > Accessed: 1 December 2020. 2 Rogers Brubaker: Nationhood and the national question in the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Eurasia: An institutionalist account. Theory and Society. 1994/1. 47–48. 3 Kjetil Duvold: Beyond Borders: The Return of Kin-state Politics in Europe. Baltic Worlds. 2015/1–2. 19–32. 4 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007. Official Journal of the European Union. 17 December 2007. Article 1a. 5 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union. Official Journal of the European Union. 26 October 2012. Article 2. 6 Rogers Brubaker: Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996. 11–76. 7 David J. Smith: Framing the National Question in Central and Eastern Europe: A Quadratic Nexus? The Global Review of Ethnopolitics. 2002/1. 3–16. 8 Timofey Agarin–Karl Cordell: Minority Rights and Minority Protection in Europe. Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd., London, 2016. 115–120. 9 The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) and the Framework Convention for Protection of National Minorities (FCPNM) could be mentioned as examples. These two documents are created by the Council of Europe aiming to protect and promote languages used by national minorities as well as the rights of persons belonging to national minority communities. While the ECRML was ratified altogether by twenty-five European states (from those countries that joined the EU after 2004 only Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia ratified it), all countries from the region joining the EU after 2004 are among the countries party to the convention. 10 Will Kymlicka: The internationalization of minority rights. International Journal of Constitutional Law. 2008/1. 1–32. See also Guido Schwellnus: “Much Ado about Nothing?” Minority Protection and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. ConWEB – webpapers on Constitutionalism and Governance Beyond the State. 2001/5. 11 Lykke Friis–Anna Murphy: The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Governance and Boundaries. Journal of Common Market Studies. 1999/2. 211–232.


12 Heather Grabbe: How does Europeanization affect CEE

amended the Slovak citizenship law by refusing dual

governance? Conditionality, diffusion and diversity. Journal

nationality. The amendment of the Hungarian citizenship law

of European Public Policy. 2011/8. 1013–1031.

supported Slovak nationalistic political powers to gain

13 Tamara Hoch-Jovanovic: Introduction – Rethinking

support during the campaign of the national elections,

Approaches to Europeanization of Minority Politics. Journal

reaching its final phase when the Hungarian government

on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe. 2014/3. 1–14.

introduced preferential naturalisation for Hungarians living

14 Agarin–Cordell, 57–70.

abroad: the government rapidly amended the Slovak

15 Balázs Vizi: European Integration and Minority Rights

citizenship law by changing the former practice regarding the

Conditionality Policy. In: Beyond International Conditionality.

acceptance of multiple citizenship. Until 2010, Slovak

Local Variations of Minority Representation in Central and

citizenship could be lost only upon the request of a Slovak

South-Eastern Europe, edited by Edgár Dobos–Norbert

citizen, and there was no regulation regarding the loss of

Tóth– Balázs Vizi. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2017. 51–78.

Slovak citizenship in case of dual citizenship. However, since

16 Timofey Agarin: Nation-States into Nationalising States:

the 2010 amendment, Slovak citizens automatically have lost

The Impact of Transformation on Minority Participation in the

their Slovak citizenship if they have acquired the citizenship

Baltic States. Intersections. East European Journal of Society

of another state voluntarily. The citizenship dispute supported

and Politics. 2017/4. 41–65.

Slovak nationalistic parties to gain extra votes on the

17 Ece Ozlem Atikcan: European Union and Minorities:

elections held shortly after the Hungarian citizenship

Different Paths of Europeanization? Journal of European

amendment was made. Some politicians from the Hungarian

Integration. 2010/4. 375–392. See also Gwendolyn Sasse:

minority community living in Slovakia warned the Hungarian

Tracing the Construction and Effects of EU Conditionality. In:

government about the situation in Slovakia, and some of

Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe, edited by

them even proposed postponing the amendment of the

Bernd Rechel. Routledge, New York, 2009. 17–31.

Hungarian citizenship law after the Slovak elections.

18 Judith G. Kelley: Ethnic Politics in Europe. The Power of

25 The campaign period of the 2020 election in Slovakia, and

Norms and Incentives. Princeton University Press, Oxford,

especially its results, showed that the policy based only on

2004. 174–195.

the ethnicity of the voters was not effective enough for the

19 Will Kymlicka–Wayne Norman: Citizenship in Diverse

voters of the Hungarian minority community. Also, the need

Societies. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000. 15–20.

for unseating the government and the fact that Hungarian

20 Agarin, 43–47.

political parties were not able to offer alternatives made many

21 Zsuzsa Csergő – James M. Goldgeier: Nationalist

voters vote for Slovak parties, especially for Ordinary People

Strategies and European Integration. Perspectives on

and Independent Personalities. For a more profound analysis

Politics. 2004/1. 21–37.

of the voting results, see Ágnes Vass: Wind of change – but

22 Myra A. Waterbury: National Minorities and Intra-Ethnic

what kind of change? AJRC-Analyses, 2020E03. 31 March

Coordination in European Parliament: Evidence from Central

2020. <https://bit.ly/2WiHLcO >

and Eastern Europe. Europe-Asia Studies. 2016/3.

26 Marian Kotleba, leader of the far-right political party

391–408.

Kotlebists–People’s Party Our Slovakia, was campaigning

23 István Gergő Székely–István Horváth: Diversity recognition

before the 2020 parliamentary election in the Hungarian

and minority representation in Central and Southeast Europe:

towns of Southern Slovakia. In letters written in Hungarian,

a comparative analysis. Nationalities Papers. The Journal of

he tried to convince Hungarian voters to vote for him,

Nationalism and Ethnicity. 2014/3. 426–448.

reminding Hungarians that deportations belonged to the past

24 In 2010, the Hungarian government amended its

and that all Slovak citizens, including Hungarians, were

citizenship law, offering preferential naturalisation for

“fighting for a better future.” See Kovács Balázs: Kotleba

Hungarians living outside the country without residence

magyar kampányának 5 hazugsága. Közbeszéd. 19 February

requirements. The preferential naturalisation is available for

2020. <https://bit.ly/3r5hTPC >

those non-Hungarian citizens who have an ascendant that

27 Zsuzsa Csergő–Ada-Charlotte Regelmann: Europeanization

was a Hungarian citizen or demonstrate the plausibility that

and Collective Rationality in Minority Voting. Lessons from

their descendant was holding Hungarian citizenship and

Central and Eastern Europe. Problems of Post-Communism.

speak Hungarian. Slovakia was the only country that

2017/5. 291–310.

responded by legal means; the Slovak government also CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

71


IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURALISM IN CENTRAL EUROPE—SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL DILEMMAS Bianka Restás–Péter Stepper

Migration and refugee movements have gained increasing global attention in the last few years. Cultural heterogeneity has always been a unique characteristic of the European Union; the question of immigration, however, has not only changed the demographics of many parts of the EU but has also created various new challenges and dilemmas. European societies are becoming more diverse linguistically, ethnically, and culturally, which creates not only new opportunities but also political, social, and cultural barriers. The question of immigration has become a key political concern and a very sensitive issue for the European Union and its member states. While some arguments emphasise that migration contributes to national economies, others point out concerns over national identity, social cohesion, and security.1 As a consequence, immigration is one of the most divisive issues in not only local politics but also the European political arena: there are significant differences between countries and political parties over how to handle migration and its social, political, and economic consequences. The unprecedented arrival of forced migrants in the EU, which peaked in 2015, has revealed a series of weaknesses and gaps in the EU policies on asylum, external borders, and migration, thus generating various debates and deep divisions among the European Union’s member states. The member states’ different attitudes and approaches to tackling the issue, as well as their diverse approaches to solidarity and real dialogue, have created serious confrontations. The underlying reason for the existing challenges is that examining the asylum claims of new arrivals predominantly falls under 72

CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

the responsibility of the frontline member states as per the “first country of entry” criterion of the current Dublin system. In practice, this means that a small number of member states bear the responsibility of processing the majority of asylum claims; therefore, the countries of first arrival have repeatedly pointed out the disproportionate responsibilities that the Dublin Regulation imposes on their domestic asylum system.2 Even if the reform process of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) ended in 2013, the system still could not manage practical problems deriving from the very logic of the Dublin Regulation. The new EU legislation considered the possibility of national security concerns, thus changing regulations to implement “detention in case of asylum seekers,” but with an ultima ratio character. However, it has not been used as a measure of last resort: authorities lacked the capacity to identify which asylum seekers are a real threat to national security, so they started to apply group detention as an automatic measure.3 According to some states, the reason for the unequal burden sharing is the Dublin system itself, while others say that the basic logic of the system is correct but, in times of crisis, all states must contribute to alleviating the burden in the spirit of common solidarity.4 Migration and multiculturalism—the latter generally defined as a strategy for “managing ethnic diversity”—are closely connected. Mass migrations unavoidably raise questions related to the social and political “management” of ethnocultural relations, and this very “management” becomes problematic when the levels of migration intensify and/or significantly


CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

73

Asylum applicants benefit from common minimum material reception conditions, such as housing and food. (Reception Conditions Directive)

If the negative decision is overturned on appeal, the applicant can be granted asylum

Refugee or subsidiary protection status is granted. This gives the person certain rights, like a residence permit, access to the labour market and healthcare (Qualification Directive).

EASO is an EU agency assisting EU States in fulfilling their European and international obligations in the field of asylum.

An application for asylum is made.

Migration and

The asylum applicant is interviewed to determine whether they may qualify for refugee status or subsidiary protection (Qualification Directive and Asylum Procedures Directive).

C

Confirmation of the negative decision by the court. The applicant may be returned to the country of origin or transit.

Asylum is not granted to the applicant at first instance, but this refusal may be appealed in court.

O DA

E UR

The applicant is fingerprinted. The information goes to the Eurodac database (Eurodac Regulation). This data is used to help identify the country responsible for the asylum application (Dublin Regulation). The database is managed by eu-LISA (European Agency for the Operational Management of largescale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice)

Asylum is granted to people fleeing persecution or serious harm

THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM (CEAS)

the CEAS as a whole. The EU now needs to put in place the tools to better manage migration flows in the medium and long term. The overall objective is to move from a system which, by design or poor implementation, encourages uncontrolled or irregular migratory flows to one which provides orderly and safe pathways to the EU for third country nationals.


74

CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

9.58 18.20 16.17 8.62 4.41 4.53 19.40 7.84 7.96 131.73 147.54 32.20 33.63 31.27 46.82 4.35 16.59 1.29 1.58 46.63 118.42 20.42 141.29 4.38 4.35 83.69 18.17 76.94

603.95

(thousand)

105.63 137.86 29.56 26.03 23.44 65.91 64.67 17.55 31.11 386.91 893.89 119.49 82.94 97.71 332.32 10.91 28.91 24.64 26.44 194.31 214.08 43.17 172.58 7.25 28.46 643.68 132.60

(thousand)

12.74%

9.07% 13.20% 54.70% 33.11% 18.82% 6.87% 30.00% 44.66% 25.59% 34.05% 16.50% 26.95% 40.54% 32.00% 14.09% 39.84% 57.38% 5.24% 5.97% 24.00% 55.31% 47.29% 81.87% 60.44% 15.30% 13.00% 13.70%

(%)

Nationals

527.01

96.00 118.85 13.36 17.40 19.03 61.38 45.26 9.62 22.21 255.19 742.51 87.29 49.30 65.15 285.50 6.53 12.32 23.33 24.87 146.74 95.67 22.76 31.06 2.87 24.10 560.00 113.99

(thousand)

(%)

87.26%

90.88% 86.21% 45.21% 66.84% 81.18% 93.13% 69.99% 54.81% 71.41% 65.95% 83.06% 73.05% 59.45% 66.68% 85.91% 59.90% 42.62% 94.65% 94.03% 75.52% 44.69% 52.71% 18.00% 39.56% 84.70% 87.00% 85.96%

Total

201.96

64.18 62.13 0.74 2.11 N/A 17.25 23.34 3.98 6.57 69.28 N/A N/A 10.64 N/A 55.31 0.62 0.71 15.85 N/A 73.46 N/A N/A 9.13 2.09 3.25 121.34 26.04

(thousand)

33.44%

60.76% 45.07% 2.49% 8.10% N/A 26.18% 36.09% 22.69% 21.11% 17.91% N/A N/A 12.83% N/A 16.64% 5.64% 2.45% 64.32% N/A 37.80% N/A N/A 5.29% 28.82% 11.44% 18.85% 19.64%

(%)

Citizens of other EU-27 Member States

325.05

31.70 56.70 12.59 15.29 N/A 44.13 21.74 5.64 15.56 185.91 N/A N/A 38.66 N/A 230.18 5.91 11.60 7.47 N/A 72.61 N/A N/A 21.93 0.78 20.85 438.25 85.95

(thousand)

53.82%

30.01% 41.13% 42.59% 58.75% N/A 66.95% 33.62% 32.13% 50.02% 48.05% N/A N/A 46.61% N/A 69.26% 54.18% 40.12% 30.30% N/A 37.37% N/A N/A 12.71% 10.74% 73.26% 68.09% 64.82%

(%)

Citizens of non-EU-27 countries

Non-nationals

0.00

0.12 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.08 0.00 1.78 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.68 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 2.00

(thousand)

0.00%

0.11% 0.01% 0.13% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.27% 0.00% 0.27% 0.00% 0.20% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.08% 0.05% 0.04% 0.00% 0.35% 0.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.06% 1.51%

(%)

Stateless

b estimate provisional Note: The individual values do not add up to the total due to rounding and the exclusion of the 'unknown' citizenship group from the table. Germany, Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Malta, Poland and Portugal are not displayed because no detailed data by the individual countries are available.

a

Austria Belgium Bulgariab Croatia Cyprus Czechia Denmark Estonia Finland France Germanya Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Polandab Portugal Romaniaa Slovakiab Slovenia Spain Sweden United Kingdomb

Country

Total immigrants

Table 1: Immigration by citizenship in the EU-28 member states in 2018


change a society’s established ethnic composition and the sociocultural status quo that it is tied to.5 The questions of multiculturalism and integration (the latter discussed many times in close connection to the former) have created further debates about migration. European leaders such as German chancellor Angela Merkel have announced the failure6 and/or the end of multiculturalism and emphasised the need for better replacement strategies. Critics of multicultural societies point out the different short-, medium-, and long-term impacts of cultural diversity, and it is not at all rare to find examples of oversimplified conclusions and opinions on the issue. It should be underlined, however, that multiculturalism is a specifically difficult term to define and it has many different theoretical, ideological, and practical manifestations.7 The literature on the topic is extremely broad, and research focusses on its various aspects and their consequences. According to the definition of Jennifer L. Eagan, Professor of Philosophy and Public Affairs & Administration at the California State University, multiculturalism is “the view that cultures, races,

and ethnicities, particularly those of minority groups, deserve special acknowledgment of their differences within a dominant political culture.”8 Eagen underlines that most modern democracies comprise members with diverse cultural viewpoints, practices, and contributions; therefore, “multiculturalism seeks the inclusion of the views and contributions of diverse members of society while maintaining respect for their differences and withholding the demand for their assimilation into the dominant culture.”9 The European Commission uses a definition according to which multiculturalism is “a policy that endorses the principle of cultural diversity and supports the right of different cultural and ethnic groups to retain distinctive cultural identities ensuring their equitable access to society, encompassing constitutional principles and commonly shared values prevailing in the society.”10 The respect for and the protection of diversity and identity seem to be key elements of the concept of multiculturalism, and the social, political, and economic integration are further aspects that make the question even more complex and divisive. While some

Chart 1: The proportion of immigrants in the EU-28 member states in 2018 per 1,000 inhabitants 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5

estimate

b

United Kingdomb

Portugal

Slovakiab

Italy

Bulgariab

Finland

Polandab

Latvia

France

Czechia

Croatia

Hungary

Romaniaa

Lithuania

Greece

Germany

Denmark

Austria

Netherlands

Belgium

Estonia

Sweden

Spain

Slovenia

Ireland

Cyprus

Malta a

Luxembourg

0

provisional CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

75


countries support the concept of multicultural societies, others partly or entirely refuse it or focus more on its potential negative impacts and consequences. A country’s approach and contribution to the management of international migration and multiculturalism depend a lot on not only its historical experiences, but also its political leadership. One of the most significant challenges that should be noted in this context is that the issue has, in recent years, become highly politicised. In certain cases, politics and the media also contribute to the emergence of extreme or xenophobic viewpoints, oversimplified opinions, stereotypes, social tension, and prejudice, which are (potentially) accompanied by fear, anger, frustration, and other negative feelings. These factors can make it very difficult to integrate diverse people into a cohesive polity where the concept of “unity in diversity” is a realistic scenario. Anna Triandafyllidou and Ruby Gropas proposed a typology of migration experiences in EU countries based on four key aspects: the relationship between the sending and receiving countries (e.g., the relationship between erstwhile colonies and colonists), past migration experiences (earlier or recent conversion from sender to host, experience in integration policies and migration management), the size of the immigrant population (in absolute and relative terms, that is, as a percentage of the overall population), and the factors that have triggered migration flows (political, economic, or geopolitical circumstances). The authors define four different categories based on the countries’ historical experiences: old host countries (such as France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom), recent host countries (such as Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), emigration countries (such as Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria), and small island countries (such as Malta and Cyprus).11 A research paper written by John Sides and Jack Citrin on the influence of material interests and cultural identities in European opinion about immigration (based on the opinion of respondents in twenty countries sampled in the 2002–2003 European Social Survey) points out that the European public 76

CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

is not insensitive to the economic impacts of migration, but symbolic attitudes such as beliefs and cultural diversity seem to be more decisive factors.12 It should be noted that the integration of diverse people is even more complicated, posing a cultural and linguistic challenge as a consequence of their differing religious and ethnic roots. This is becoming all the more important with the increasing level of Muslim immigrants. Questions connected to immigration, such as allowing Muslim women to wear headscarves (e.g., hijab, niqab, or burka), following Sharia law in a European context, or constructing Islamic religious places (mosques) within the EU, have created a series of debates among the member states, and some of them expressed doubts about the compatibility of such religious and cultural elements with the European practices. It is important to underline once again that European member states have diverse historical experiences in migration management, and, as a consequence, old and recent host countries have notably different attitudes and responses to it, and these are also influenced by other relevant factors. As a result, there are opposing views on how to deal with the question in Western and Central/Eastern European countries, as recent experiences of mass migration (such as that of 2015) were sometimes more “traumatic” and problematic for some member states than others. Immigration waves, which hit many European states for the first time in history, involved high numbers of people considerably different from the host population in not only their language, culture, and identity but also their religious beliefs, outlook, and everyday practices. The integration of such arrivals from the destabilised, fragile, and war-torn regions of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East has proven more challenging than the absorption of immigrants coming from a less different background. At the same time, many extra-European immigrants have limited experience and knowledge of their host countries, and, consequently, less “integration capacity” than intra-Europeans. These circumstances are, in many cases,


exacerbated by the traumatic experiences of migration,13 which could make the integration into a host society particularly challenging. Due to the complexity of the question, there are various views on the effective social, economic, and cultural inclusion of immigrants and its necessary components. As a consequence, the existing national legal frameworks, policies, and strategies are remarkably different, just as the available financial tools allocated for the relevant areas. LABOUR MIGRATION IN VISEGRAD COUNTRIES Since the remarkable happenings of 1989, international migration in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe

has undergone a significant transformation. Novel and powerful international populational movements became (have become) the focus of Central European countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. For almost two centuries, these countries have been sending migrants to the West, and this tradition of emigration to the European Union still continues in new ways.14 The demographic challenges and the ageing population of Europe have created further dilemmas about how to tackle the question of immigration. While many experts and political actors emphasise that Europe will need immigrants to “substitute” its decreasing population and workforce, others support the idea that this is not what Europe needs in the medium and long run. In this regard,

Chart 2: Distribution of immigrants in the EU-28 member states in 2018 (% of all immigrants) nationals

non-nationals

unknown

100% 95% 90% 85% 80% 75% 70% 65% 60% 55% 50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5%

CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

United Kingdomb

Malta

Austria

Czechia

Spain

Belgium

Italy

Sweden

Slovenia

Cyprus

Germanya

Finland

Greece

Ireland

Denmark

Croatia

Latvia

France

Hungary

Estonia

Portugal

Bulgariab

provisional

Luxembourg

b

Polandab

Lithuania

estimate

Netherlands

a

Slovakia

Romaniaa

0%

77


the importance of differentiating between the categories of regular, irregular, and illegal migration should also be pointed out.15 In many cases, the media and politicians do not use the correct term while referring to immigration; however, for lack of the specification of the appropriate categories (e.g., refugee movements or labour migration), it is problematic to analyse the question correctly and to provide adequate policy answers. In this context, it is important to underline that Central and Eastern European countries have less experience in handling refugee movements, while they have more practice in labour migration. It is especially true for Poland which produced one of the most spectacular population movements in the post–EU accession period. Not only the UK but all other EU-15 countries witnessed a major inflow of Polish workers at that time.16 Short-term migration to Germany has not been unprecedented following the period after Ostpolitik, in the 1980s and 1990s, when more than 1.3 million people (3% of the country’s population) lived abroad. Then, this quantity decreased a bit but started to rise again after the millennium. In 2020, 790,000 permanent residents of Poland (1.8% of its population) lived abroad according to statistical data.17 This level reached 2.2 million in 2008, when onethird of the temporary migrant workers lived in the United Kingdom, while the second-biggest group (500,000 people) lived in Germany. Between 2004 and 2008, 6% of the working-age population went abroad, mostly to seek better job opportunities.18 While the outflow of the workingage population concerns the government, it is also essential to mention what an important role Ukrainian workers have in the Polish economy. According to data on employers’ declarations of intent to employ a foreigner, the majority of Ukrainian workers were registered in agriculture, followed by construction and industrial processing in 2014. Tens of thousands of work permits have so far been issued for Ukrainians, a major part of whom does not have any permanent residence in Poland but crosses the borders on a daily basis. According to the Polish border protection agency, more than 10 million 78

CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

border crossings happened under the local border traffic agreement until 2016. Generally speaking, around 30% of the Ukrainians work in Poland in compliance with the law, following the rules and regulations of the Polish Labour Code and the EU legislation. Thus, almost 120,000 out of 180,000 people can be considered as irregular migrants. Moreover, Poland also had a few thousands of refugee applications because of the 2014 annexation of Crimea.19 Ukrainians became also the largest minority group in the Czech Republic as regular employees, self-employed, or migrants with a valid residence permit in a number of 80,000140,000 after the EU accession in 2004. Some research papers portray Ukrainians in the Czech Republic as well-educated but underpaid construction workers and farmers;20 however, the majority of work permit holders have only elementary education. That said, Ukrainian nationals can be found in various sectors of the Czech economy as construction workers, university professors, CEOs of big companies, or SMEs. Many of them could integrate into Czech society, and Ukrainians did not form ethnic enclaves either.21 Net migration data in the Czech Republic shows that the country has transformed from a land of emigration to that of transit and immigration. Legal immigrants were around 0.8% of the total population of 10.2 million, but, recently, this number has increased to 250,000 people. Before the country’s EU accession, 30,00040,000 Czechs worked abroad; however, unlike in Poland, this value decreased after 2004. Moreover, the country’s unemployment rate is not different from the average of Western European countries. The number of immigrants is below 200,000, and 70% of them have a permanent residence permit.22 Compared with other states in the region, Slovakia is a relatively small country. This has so far been the highest number of inhabitants in the history of the country, the population of which has been increasing since 1946. This trend, however, seems to halt in the near future, mostly because of demographic reasons. Besides the demographic aspects


Chart 3: Share of non-nationals in the resident population on 1 January 2019 (%) citizens of other EU-27 member states

50%

citizens of non-EU-27 countries

45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10%

b

provisional

Poland

Bulgaria

Lithuania

Latvia

Romania

Croatia

Hungary

Slovenia

Portugal

Slovakia

Finland

Estonia

Greece

Czechia

Italy

Franceb

Sweden

Denmark

Netherlands

Spain

Germany

Irelanda

Austria

Belgium

Malta*

estimate

United Kingdom

a

Cyprus*

0%

Luxembourg

5%

* EU-27 related data are not available and so the blue bar shows citizens of other EU-28 member states (therefore including the United Kingdom) and the brown bar shows citizens of non-EU-28 countries.

of societal security, Slovakia also had to face the challenges of emigration, brain drain, and the increasing number of foreigners who have traditionally been living in the country only in small numbers. In 2011, the number of foreign citizens in Slovakia reached 70,727 (1.3% of the total population).23 Until recently, Slovakia was almost exclusively a country of origin for migration. In this regard, the country’s EU accession resulted in a fundamental transformation. Since 2004, asylum applications have decreased, but labour immigration has increased more than four times. Between 2004 and 2008, the increase of foreign population in Slovakia was the second highest within the EU. The number of foreigners in Slovakia increased by 16,813. Since 2004, the number of foreigners living in Slovakia legally has increased more than six times. The most numerous groups of foreigners in Slovakia are formed by the citizens of neighbouring countries and other EU member states; more than 40%24 of the foreigners living in Slovakia are from Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Ukraine. On the other hand, European countries

are also the main destinations for emigrants from Slovakia: the largest number of Slovak citizens emigrated to the Czech Republic, Austria, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Hungary will also have to face serious demographic challenges in the coming years due to a decrease in its working-age population. The annual decrease is driven mainly by a a demographic deficit due to the higher number of annual deaths than birth, and not by migration. However, net migration is also an important factor because a relatively high number of Hungarian labour workers are employed in the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands, while the government follows restrictive immigration and asylum policy. According to calculations by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, approximately 180,000 foreigners live in Hungary: 100,000 of them come from Europe, 50,000 from Asia, while the others are from the rest of the world. EU cross-border worker flows data is also interesting. In this context, Hungary belonged to the top sending countries in 2017, as, in that year, 339,000 Hungarian citizens worked CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

79


in other EU countries. However, it is also worth mentioning that 18,500 Hungarian nationals returned home in that same year. The Hungarian government has aimed to prevent a further decrease in population; thus, it has been constantly searching for successful policies to increase the birth rate, to decrease emigration (especially among the young), and it also found a way to make certain profit from issuing residence permits. One good example of this was the naturalisation program for non-EU citizens between 2013 and 2017. For those who wanted to acquire a residence permit in Hungary, the government issued so-called settlement bonds for EUR 250,000-300,000. The overwhelming part (81%) of the applicants originated from China; they most probably wanted Hungarian citizenship for free movement rights within the European Union. However, in Hungary, supporting immigration is not seen as a good tool to tackle the population decrease in general, and refugee mass influx is to be considered a security threat in particular. Therefore, Hungary launched a diplomatic offensive in the region as well as in the European Union to put asylum policy on the top of the security policy agenda. The number of those who were born in Hungary and moved abroad was 400,000 in 1990, and it peaked at 600,000 in 2017. The Come Home, Youth (Gyere haza fiatal) programme was one of the first experiments to fight against brain drain. Almost four hundred people registered and applied to the programme, which offered more than two thousand job positions for those interested in returning to Hungary. A little more than one hundred young employees returned in 2016. Probably this low turnout led to the closure of the programme one year later.25 The refugee crisis of 2015 also put EU asylum and border protection affairs in the limelight in Central European countries. The region has barely been affected by asylum claims before; hence, it was shocking for authorities to handle such a high number of new applications within a single year. Hungary registered a total of 199,165 asylum applications until the end of October 2015.26 This was the second-largest number within the EU after Germany, the main 80

CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

destination country for refugees. After the arrival of Kosovar applicants in 2014 and the mass influx of Syrian, Afghan, and Eritrean nationals in 2015, Hungary’s overburdened asylum system almost collapsed. Hungary refused to become a new refugee hotspot of the EU but asked for assistance from member states. Furthermore, Hungary urged that surveillance in border control be enhanced, and it supported the idea that extraterritorial defence should be established in cooperation with a zone of “safe third countries” in the Western Balkans. Based on this argument, refugees should not be resettled or relocated across the European Union but simply kept outside the EU’s territory. Hungary successfully mobilised its partners within the Visegrad Group to become vocal about security concerns related to migration and asylum issues.27 Albeit for different reasons, all of the three partners agreed to the securityfirst approach and urged European member states to find common solutions on that basis.

ENDNOTES 1 Ioanna Charalambous–Michalinos Zembylas–Sotiris Themistokleous: New Migration and the European Dilemma of Unity and Diversity. In: Unity in Adversity. Immigration, Minorities and Religion in Europe, edited by Vít Novotný. Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, Brussels, 2017. 109–110. 2 Bianka Restás: Towards a more sustainable and effective migration management? (Ursula von der Leyen’s proposals to rethink migration and asylum policies in Europe). AJRCAnalyses, 2020E12. 19 May 2020. 1. <ht tps://bit. ly/39BbK7I > 3 For more, see Stepper Péter: The Challenges for Common European Asylum Policy—The Practice of Detention in Hungary. Biztpol Affairs. 2014/2. 29–49. 4 Stepper Péter–Restás Bianka: Kényszervándorlás. In: Biztonságpolitikai Cor vinák, edited by Szálkai Kinga– Baranyai Tamás Péter–Szarka E. Luca. Vol. I. Antall József Tudásközpont, Budapest, 2019. 185. 5 Ja n

Pa k uls k i – S tefa n

M a r kows k i:

G loba lis atio n,

immigration, and multiculturalism – the European and Australian experiences. Journal of Sociology. 2014/1. 3. 6 Merkel says German multicultural society has failed. BBC. 17 October 2010. <https://bbc.in/37t62Sv >


7 Ábel Ravasz: Alternatives to Multiculturalism: Why Saying

Olena Fedyuk–Marta Kindler. Springer, [s.l.], 2016.

It has Failed is not Enough. In: Unity in Adversity.

22 Dusan Drbohlav: The Czech Republic: From Liberal Policy

Immigration, Minorities and Religion in Europe, edited by Vít

to EU Membership. Migration Policy Institute. 1 August 2005.

Novotný. Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies,

<https://bit.ly/3g5kFzy >

Brussels, 2017. 100.

23 Péter Dobrowiecki [et al.]: Global Demographic Outlook

8 Jennifer L. Eagan: Multiculturalism. Encyclopædia

2020 – Demographic Perspectives from the Antall József

Britannica. <https://bit.ly/3lw8eOb > Accessed: 16 October

Knowledge Centre Research Team. AJRC-Analyses,

2020.

2020E07. 7 May 2020. <https://bit.ly/39CIT2B >

9 Eagan.

24 Dobrowiecki [et al.].

10 Multiculturalism. European Commission. <https://bit.

25 Dobrowiecki [et al.].

ly/3lwkT3F > Accessed: 16 October 2020.

26 Stepper Péter: The Visegrad Group and the EU agenda

11 Anna Triandafyllidou–Ruby Gropas: Concluding Remarks.

on migration: A coalition of the unwilling? Corvinus Journal

In: European Immigration. A Sourcebook, edited by Anna

of International Af fairs. 2016/1. 62– 82. <https://bit.

Triandafyllidou–Ruby Gropas. Ashgate, Aldershot, 2014.

ly/3g3Psws >

389–392.

27 Stepper Péter: A kényszermigráció mint biztonsági

12 John Sides– Jack Citrin: European Opinion About

fenyegetés a visegrádi országokban. Nemzet és Biztonság.

Immigration: The Role of Identities, Interests and Information.

2018/1. 115–141.

British Journal of Political Science. 2007/3. 500–501. 13 Pakulski–Markowski, 4. 14 Claire Wallace–Dariusz Stola: Introduction: Patterns of Migration in Central Europe. In: Patterns of Migration in Central Europe, edited by Claire Wallace–Dariusz Stola. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2001. 3. 15 Stepper–Restás, 171. 16 Paweł Kaczmarczyk–Marek Okólski: Demographic and labour-market impacts of migration on Poland. Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 2008/3. 599. 17 Kaczmarczyk–Okólski, 608. 18 Kaczmarczyk–Okólski, 621. 19 Zuzanna Brunarska [et al.]: Ukrainian Migration to Poland: A “Local” Mobility? In: Ukrainian Migration to the European Union. Lessons from Migration Studies, edited by Olena Fedyuk–Marta Kindler. Springer, 2016. 115–129. 20 Dusan Drbohlav: The Czech Republic. In: Patterns of Migration in Central Europe, edited by Claire Wallace– Dariusz Stola. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2001. 203–226.; Zdeněk Uherek–Kateřina Plochová: Migration from the former Soviet Union to the Czech Republic: Comparing the cases of re-settlers from areas affected by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, Kazakhstan and labour migration from Subcarpathian Ukraine. In: Social Networks in Movement. Time, Interactions and Interethnic Spaces in Central Eastern Europe, edited by Davide Torsello–Melinda Pappová. Forum Minority Research Institute, Šamorín, 2003. 211–227. 21 Yana Leontiyeva: Ukrainians in the Czech Republic: On the Pathway from Temporary Foreign Workers to One of the Largest Minority Groups. In: Ukrainian Migration to the European Union. Lessons from Migration Studies, edited by CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

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CENTRAL EUROPE IN THE EUROPEAN BUDGETARY POLITICS: CAN IT STILL BE BYPASSED? Krisztina Iszák

INTRODUCTION In the last decade, it became increasingly difficult for the European Union (EU) member states (MS) to decide how the common European budget, the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), should be allocated among different priorities. The union faces a rising number of challenges. External threats such as migration, geopolitical tension, and trade wars are getting more common, and such issues also make the settlement of internal affairs troublesome. Areas such as digitalisation or artificial intelligence, which received little attention from high politics before, are now turning into top priorities along with the fight against climate change and the debacle of the EU’s lengthy rule of law. In this environment, interest representation in European politics has become evermore complex. One of such examples are the negotiations on the MFF, where, beyond a few usual positions, country coalitions and actor behaviours turned out to be less predictable than before.1 Budgetary politics is one of the most complicated and most politicised processes of European decision-making. The EU has a variety of programmes, such as Erasmus, Galileo, and Horizon, that are financed through various instruments. To maintain financial discipline, the union operates with long-term budgets, setting expenditure ceilings for key categories. The way the budget is allocated amongst different categories reflects the areas which the EU considers as a priority. For example, European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen set ambitious goals in her speech in the plenary session of the European Parliament in 2019. Her flagship projects include a Green Deal, a digital Europe, and the promotion of a European way of life. 2 Thus, while the allocation 82

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of money keeps to traditional lines, financing new elements, such as green and digital transition, are also introduced into the latest budget. While budgetary politics is already convoluted by itself, there are always additional challenges to tackle. The last two negotiations took place in times of turmoil. During the negotiations of the 2021–2027 budget, the EU was hit by the COVID-19 pandemic in the spring of 2020. Many EU economies had already been struggling, but the public health crisis and national measures imposing a lockdown affected everyone badly. Existing divisions between MSs over the central aspects of the budget, such as its size or the allocations among policy areas, became deeper. To overcome the crisis, a historic agreement on a EUR 750 billion temporary financial instrument, called Next Generation EU (NGEU), was reached by EU leaders. The NGEU brings in new money by borrowing on financial markets to boost economic recovery. While it nicely tops up the otherwise reduced size of the next budget, this is a one-time-only addition— so it is far from a true Hamiltonian moment. Additionally, budget negotiations heated up between the South and the North, the West and the East with questions about solidarity and legitimacy. At the same time, Eurosceptic political parties are gaining momentum, and the future of the EU is debated more extensively, putting even more pressure on negotiators.3 Commonly, budget negotiations are closely linked to what kind of future the MSs envisage for the EU and where the integration should head for. While the discussions on the 2021– 2027 MFF are still ongoing as of the writing of this article, it is worth exploring the EU’s financial debate in general and the interest the Central European region has in it. This paper


describes the practicalities of MFF negotiations (e.g., what the MFF is, how the MFF is built up, and how the long-term budget is adopted) with specific attention to the Visegrad Cooperation. The Visegrad Cooperation—commonly known as the Visegrad Four (V4)—originally aimed to facilitate its members’ EU and NATO accession. Today, the countries of the grouping often coordinate their positions and achieve better outcomes for the region in EU negotiations as it was the case with migration policy. However, despite their best efforts, they succeed to varying degrees in budgetary disputes compared to the previous MFF negotiations.4 Their common interest to strengthen economic convergence notwithstanding, the countries have differing goals due to their own domestic economic and political contexts. The cooperation is also affected by the members’ diverse relations to the core of Europe.5 Although the current MFF had not yet been adopted when this piece was submitted, it is fair to say even at this point that a lot has changed since the Commission’s original proposal in 2018. Drawing on these, the article examines to what degree the V4 countries’ interests collided in major issues, and what the most notable achievements of the grouping are.

WHAT IS THE MULTIANNUAL FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK? To maintain financial discipline, the EU’s expenditure is laid down in a common budget. However, due to its sui generis nature, the EU’s budget is different from that of federal states like the US in both structure and size. The European block operates with long-term budgets, now covering periods of seven years. Despite its ambitious goals, the union’s budget is relatively small in size, varying around 1% of the block’s gross national income (GNI). Attempts to increase the size of the budget have remained unsuccessful, although the European Parliament loudly advocated for it. 6 The MFF sets out expenditure ceilings for given categories called headings, e.g., single market, innovation and digital, or natural resources and environment, which are broad enough to include various policy areas.7 These have a crucial role: the allocation among headings determines the direction of EU policies for the upcoming years by defining how much can be spent each year on commitments and payments in a given area. Then, the EU’s annual budgets are set up within the limits of these ceilings, and the legislation on sectoral programmes is discussed. The MFF is built upon the EU’s own resources, the surplus from previous years,

THE EUROPEAN BUDGET FOR 2021–2027 Total €1,824.3 billion

Multiannual financial framework (MFF) The EU’s 7-year budget

€390 billion grants

€1,074.3 billion

€750 billion

Next Generation EU (NGEU) COVID-19 recovery package front-loaded over the first years

€360 billion loans

Capital raised on financial markets

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ALLOCATION BETWEEN THE HEADINGS OF THE 2021–2027 BUDGET EUR billion, 2018 prices

Total €1824.3 billion

€22.7 billion

€98.4 billion

Migration and border management Includes: Asylum and Migration Fund Integrated Border Management Fund

Neighbourhood and the world Includes: Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation (NDICI) Humanitarian Aid Instrument

€73.1 billion European public administration

€13.2 billion Resilience, security, and defence Includes: European Defence Fund Internal Security Fund

€356.4 billion

€17.5 billion

Natural resources and environment Includes: Common Agricultural Policy Just Transition Fund

Multiannual financial framework (MFF) Next Generation EU (NGEU)

€377.8 billion

€721.9 billion

Cohesion, resilience, and values Includes: Cohesion policy funds Recovery and Resilience Facility Union civil protection mechanism – RescEU Health programme

€132.8 billion

€10.6 billion

Single market, innovation, and digital Includes: Horizon Europe InvestEU Fund


and other sources such as fines on companies breaching EU competition rules. While own resources make up most of the revenue, their composition has not changed much over the decades. Each MS has a GNI-based, adjusted contribution and a value-added tax–based contribution, that are added to the EU’s traditional own resources—customs duties and sugar levies.8 As more than two-thirds of the own resources come from GNI-based MS contribution, the commission regularly, but unsuccessfully, proposes the introduction of new own resources. The current MFF also faces the loss of the biggest contributor, as the United Kingdom leaves the EU. With Brexit and the need to service the debt stemming from the NGEU, reforming the structure of own resources is more pressing than ever. THE ADOPTION OF THE BUDGET Since the Lisbon Treaty was signed in 2009, the MFF has been a regulation—a strong legal act that is directly applicable and binding on all MSs. The procedure to adopt the budget is outlined in Article 312 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). According to this, the European Council (EUCO), gathering the heads of states and governments of the MSs, defines political guidelines for the European Commission to draft the legislation to be adopted via a special legislative procedure. In contrast to the ordinary legislative procedure, where the commission’s proposal is adopted jointly with equal say by the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of the European Union, bringing together national ministers in different formations, the special legislative procedure entails fewer rights for the EP. Under this procedure, the council is the sole legislator and must decide unanimously. Concerning the MFF, the EP can merely adopt or reject the proposal but cannot amend it. Although the process appears theoretically simple, reality is more nuanced. Despite the lack of mention of the EUCO by the legislation on the MFF, major decisions on the size or allocation among areas are political and discussed there. Due to recent changes in the

way policymaking is done in the EU, 9 financial questions are debated in detail by the leaders. Budget negotiations resemble the good old intergovernmental brinkmanship with country coalitions and compromises being made as package deals. The “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” principle applies to the negotiating box prepared to simplify the discussions, and the EUCO always decides by consensus.10 While this is a complex way of decision-making with potential veto rights, it gives certain leeway to countries having little leverage like Hungary. Compromise is usually reached by providing bargaining chips for concessions on more important aspects. Based on the leaders’ political agreements, technical discussions are held within the council while negotiations are ongoing with the EP to ensure the adoption of the texts. While the MSs have strong control over the budget via the EUCO and the council, the EP’s position is rather ambivalent. If the EP endorses the budget and the council adopts it unanimously, then the work is focussed on the sectoral programmes, which mainly go through the ordinary legislative procedure. The EUCO regularly comes back to see the state of play of the negotiations. It exercises the “power of the purse” and aims to pressure the EP to take on its line in negotiations. The power of the EP rests in its right to veto, and the budget was, for example, rejected by the majority of the members of the European Parliament in 2013. 11 Such events result in delays and a late start in financing the policy areas, as more substantial work on sectoral programmes starts only after the MFF’s adoption. NEGOTIATIONS ON THE COMMON BUDGET FOR 2021–2027 According to the current state of negotiations, the budget for 2021–2027 amounts to EUR 1824.3 billion and comprised of a EUR 1074.3 billion MFF and the EUR 750 billion NGEU.12 The MFF was cut in size by a lot compared to the EUR 1135 billion originally proposed in 2018 by the commission. 13 The proposal in 2018 also suggested a shift of CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

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money from traditional policy areas, such as agriculture and cohesion, towards green and digital transition, innovation, and research. This was a major issue for the Visegrad Group, for example, that puts cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy (CAP) before other areas, to achieve better economic convergence. Following the commission’s proposal, the countries positioned themselves according to three main categories. The group of status quo preservers, mainly southern and eastern net recipients and Italy, aimed to keep the level of cohesion and agricultural funds unchanged. These countries, named the “Friends of Cohesion,” wanted to increase the overall size of the budget so that it can rise to new challenges. Some of them, e.g., Poland and Hungary, were even prepared to pay more.14 Another group, the moderate modernisers, gathers countries such as Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Finland, and Ireland. These countries would opt for modernising the treaty-based policies—as, for example, the efficiency of cohesion policy is highly questionable15—and own resources.

While both Germany and France were willing to increase their contribution to the budget, the French government was a strong opponent to any reduction in the CAP.16 This latter was rewarding for the V4 whose main interest is to keep the level of financing for the treaty-based policies. Compared to the original proposal that suggested major cuts in real terms for both areas, negotiations developed positively for the Visegrad Group. Funding for the CAP was increased and more direct payment for farmers was added. Furthermore, major reforms of the CAP seem to be delayed to the next budgetary term, and the commission’s proposed 30% requirement for green projects was also reduced.17 In sharp contrast to the previous two groups stand the rigid savers—net contributor Sweden, Denmark, Austria, and the Netherlands—also known as the “Frugal Four.” Their ideal would be to limit the budget to 1% of the EU’s GNI, with money reallocated from traditional policy areas to new ones. 18 The group was sceptical about the NGEU, too, as the Frugals are not in

INCREASING INVESTMENT IN THE CLIMATE AND DIGITAL TRANSITIONS Green and digital transition has a growing significance in the European budget.

Climate mainstreaming Target: 30% of overall spending across programmes

Digital mainstreaming Spending in digital transformation across programmes Budget increases for: • Digital Europe programme • Connecting Europe Facility (digital strand)

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favour of financial solidarity, and they strongly advocate for conditionality to have control over EU money. NEXT GENERATION EU, COHESION POLICY, AND FUTURE FINANCIAL INTEGRATION The NGEU that is financed by a one-time borrowing of EUR 750 billion on the financial markets which will be distributed among MSs in the form of loans (EUR 360 billion) and grants (EUR 390 billion). On the one hand, the temporary NGEU boosts the available finances for most headings and the EU budget is now of historic size. This agreement is extraordinary in EU history. It is supposed to facilitate economic recovery from the pandemic and contribute to green and digital transition. On the other hand, both the size and the efficiency of the instrument are questionable. The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)—the biggest instrument of the NGEU—was placed under the cohesion policy heading, providing additional money for funding. 19 Due to successful efforts by the Frugals, however, money was reallocated within the NGEU from grants towards loans, reducing the former EUR 500 billion of grants to EUR 390 billion and giving more money as loans instead. Although the Frugal Four’s position is well coordinated, the other groups’ cohesion is less strong. For example, there is a stark contrast between Germany and France regarding new own resources and the elimination of the rebate system.20 Nevertheless, the contrast between net contributors and net recipients seems to be less sharp than in previous years, even if the group of rigid savers advocates for strict control over the budget. While the CAP is an absolute win from a V4 point of view, the RRF is shadowed by the rule of law conditionality that is still discussed as of the writing of this article, and strongly targeted at Poland and Hungary. V4 positions seem particularly weakened in this regard as the proposal goes through the ordinary legislative procedure by qualified majority voting in the council. 21 This further hinders efficient cooperation in negotiations among the V4, as Slovakia and even the Czech

Republic count as more democratic and more integrated than their two fellows. 22 Most of the money from the temporary budget facility is allocated to the cohesion, resilience, and values category. While the commission set guidelines for MSs on how to spend the recovery money, it is unlikely that governments will follow them. Many fear that regular spending will eat up most of the new money and that less will be directed to new investments.23 Factions generally exist among the V4 because of the cohesion policy and the flexibility of spending the funding. While the Czech Republic needs money for transport infrastructure, the others have already done such investments. For example, having completed its main highways, Hungary can more easily meet commission requirements for focussing on innovation and green policies.24 On the other hand, while the move resulted in less funding for areas such as health, innovation, or climate policies, V4 countries are still among the beneficiaries. Poland, for example, secured an additional EUR 600 million from the Just Transition Fund25 and succeeded in eliminating the emissions trading system–based new own resource from the proposals.26 Although the RRF eliminated the V4’s preliminary fear that the COVID-19 crisis would result in a backtrack on already negotiated allocations for traditional policy areas, it also brought new ones. Common EU borrowing opens the door to closer financial and political integration even if the instrument is called temporary now. This is a direction not supported by the Visegrad Group. Even though financial solidarity is considered legitimate by Poland, for example,27 the V4 countries are not in favour of debt sharing and are rather financially prudent. 28 However, a division within the Visegrad Group is also present in this regard. While Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are clear on their lack of intention to join the eurozone, Slovakia is already a member and, in terms of integration, is closer to France than to its fellow Central European countries.29 In 2019, French president Emmanuel Macron called again for a multispeed Europe with those willing to take the integration further. CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

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Although the V4 is reluctant to do more, such a direction was flatly refused by Poland in fear of pushing the region towards redundancy in negotiations.30 Therefore they refused to set up a separate eurozone budget proposed by Macron to stabilise the euro area.31 CONCLUSION At the time of writing, negotiations are rather heated with the European Parliament and focussed on striking a deal on the rule of law conditionality. Assuming any technical details regarding the outcome of the negotiations would merely be speculation at the current moment. Nevertheless, a compromise will likely to be reached to soothe the language of the conditionality, as EU leaders will not backtrack on their historic agreement made in July 2020.32 With the coronavirus situation worsening, delaying the budget would also have a heavy impact on most of the MSs. The position of the V4 countries is rather controversial, with Poland and Hungary being in the spotlight, and it is clear that their cooperation in MFF negotiations is not 88

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as strong as in migration policy, for example. Despite the above, however, three important things can be certainly concluded: First, money allocations turned out positively for the group compared to the original proposal. Second, more divisions are expected to emerge within the Visegrad Group in the future. And third, the opinion of the countries in Central Europe is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore for the core countries of the EU.

ENDNOTES 1 Peter Becker: A new budget for the EU. Negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027. SWP Research Paper 2019/RP 11. 2019/August. <https://bit. ly/2ImmsDb > 2 Ursula von der Leyen: Speech in the European Parliament Plenary Session, Strasbourg, 27 November 2019. European Commission. <https://bit.ly/34Y6vMk > 3 Thierry Chopin–Nicole Koenig–Sébastien Maillard: The EU facing the coronavirus. A political urgency to embody European solidarity. Jacques Delors Institute, Policy Paper No. 250. 10 April 2020. <https://bit.ly/389qREr >


4 Nikolett Garai: Challenges faced by the Visegrad Group in

16 Becker.

the “European dimension” of cooperation. International

17 Watch out for the political fallout of CAP reform.

Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs. 2018/1–2. 24–42.

Eurointelligence. 23 October 2020. <https://bit.ly/32fACNO >

5 Dariusz Kałan–Paweł Tokarski–Patr yk Toporowski:

18 Becker.

Visegrad’s Winding Road to the EU Multiannual Financial

19 Jorge Núñez Ferrer: Reading between the lines of Council

Framework 2014–2020. PISM Policy Paper, No. 39. 2012/

agreement on the MFF and Next Generation EU. Centre for

October. <https://bit.ly/2JnXQLb >

European Policy Studies. 31 July 2020. <https://bit.

6 Jorge Valero: Parliament wants to top up EU budget with

ly/3p2327N >

€110 billion. Euractiv. 8 September 2020. <https://bit.

20 The rebate system is a compensation to certain member

ly/3oyhowj >

states for excessive financial contributions and originated

7 Kaare Barslev: Multiannual Financial Framework.

from special regulations for the UK. Read more about the

European Parliament. July 2020. <https://bit.ly/3djKIBu >

budget correction mechanism at the European Commission’s

8 Long-term EU budget 2021–2027. European Council,

website. Budget correction mechanisms. European

Council of the European Union. Last reviewed: 9 October

Commission. <https://bit.ly/3kGNiEr > Accessed: 28 October

2020. <https://bit.ly/3ovCdby >

2020.

9 The European integration has extended to policy areas of

21 Recovery and Resilience Facility (2020/0104[COD]).

core state sovereignty. Deliberation and consensus seeking

Legislative Observatory, European Parliament. <https://bit.

in decision-making, which have been previously used to

ly/34FAhW0 > Accessed: 28 October 2020.

negotiate the supranationalisation of policy areas, are

22 Jiří Lacina: In multi-speed Europe, Czech Republic is not

becoming the default mode of governance in the EU. This

in any rush. EUROPEUM. 25 June 2019. <https://bit.

provides a stronger role for the European Council, with the

ly/3jJLhWF >

heads of states and governments often discussing policies in

23 Wolfgang Münchau: Beware of smoke and mirrors in the

technical details. Puet ter called this “deliberative

EU’s recovery fund. Financial Times. 20 September 2020.

intergovernmentalism.” For further details, see Uwe Puetter:

<https://on.ft.com/32hQlM9 >

Europe’s deliberative intergovernmentalism: the role of the

24 Martin Ehl: Visegrad Money Song. The New EU Budget.

Council and European Council in EU economic governance.

Visegrad Insight. 14 February 2020. <https://bit.ly/3jHjjea >

Journal of European Public Policy. 2012/2. 161–178.

25 Maria Wilczek: Poland celebrates EU budget success but

10 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021–2027:

confusion remains over rule-of-law conditionality. Notes from

Negotiating Box with figures. Note from the Presidency to

Poland. 21 July 2020. <https://bit.ly/34CBxt4 >

the Council, 14518/1/19 REV 1. European Council, Council

26 The author’s interview with an official of the Polish

of the European Union. 5 December 2019. <https://bit.

Permanent Representation to the European Union.

ly/2TyZWtb >

27 Idem.

11 Johannes Müller Gómez–Wolfgang Wessels–Johannes

28 Edit Inotai: Disguised as Solidarity. Central Europe Strives

Wolters: The European Parliament and the European Council:

for Maximising Gains at MFF talks. Visegrad Insight. 19 June

a shift in the balance of power? In: The European Parliament in

2020. <https://bit.ly/3jEYPD3 >

Times of Crisis. Dynamics and Transformations, edited by

29 Lacina.

Olivier Costa. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2019. 53–76.

30 Charles Grant: Fast forward to two-speed Europe.

12 Long-term EU budget 2021–2027.

Politico. 7 November 2017. <https://politi.co/3eatKWu >

13 Margarida Marques–Jan Olbrycht: Legislative Train

31 Becker.

Schedule. New Boost for Jobs, Growth and Investment.

32 Lili Bayer–Hans von der Burchard: EU negotiators near

European Parliament. 23 October 2020. <https://bit.

deal to unlock €1.8T budget and rescue package. Politico.

ly/35ESkLD >

28 October 2020. <https://politi.co/3e6ZV9v >

14 Becker. 15 John Bachtler–Carlos Mendez–Fiona Wishlade: Reforming the MFF and Cohesion Policy 2021–27: pragmatic drift or paradigmatic shift? University of Strathclyde, European Policy Research Paper, No. 107. January 2019. <https://bit. ly/34BrODq > CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

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THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE Elina Herédi

The United Nations Paris Agreement signed by 195 countries of the world and also by the European Union aims to limit global temperature increase below 2° and ideally below 1.5°, matching preindustrial levels. Even though climate change has been an important topic for the European Union for the last decade, the issue has recently moved up on the list of priorities. The European Union cannot be accused of not pulling its weight when fighting climate change. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the new target of a 55% greenhouse gas emission reduction by 2030 during her first State of the Union speech in September 2020, setting an exceptionally ambitious goal. The European Green Deal has now become the European Commission’s flagship project with the ultimate aim of achieving climate neutrality by 2050. The Green Deal is a series of legislative and nonlegislative initiatives, involving numerous policy areas. Reaching the target requires action to be taken across all sectors of the member states’ economies, addressing challenges from sustainable and secure energy through mobility and green industry to renovating Europe’s old buildings. The European Green Deal is seen as a long-term investment, and it is composed of multilayered programmes, such as the European Green Deal Investment Plan, the Climate Law, the Just Transition Mechanism, the New Circular Economy Action Plan, the long-awaited reform of carbon tariffs, such as the already existing European Union Emission Trading Scheme, and other tools. The Commission President called attaining the set target by or before 2050 “Europe’s man on the moon moment,” as it would make Europe the first climate-neutral continent of the world. The Green Deal is not only important for 90

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the environment, but—hand in hand with the European Commission’s digital agenda—it is also the European Union’s forerunner strategy aimed at securing its leading global role as a legislative power. Taking action now is thought to lead to innovation and to strengthening European companies’ competitive force in the future world, making Europe more interesting to third-country investors. Raising the 2030 ambition helps the commission to deliver on its longer-term commitments and provide the nowadays so important certainty factor to policy makers and investors. By putting forward the 2030 Climate Target Plan, a comprehensive action plan, we can be sure that decisions that will be made in the coming years will not lock in emission levels inconsistent with the EU’s goal of becoming climate neutral by 2050.1 As the discussion entered a trialogue phase, the European Parliament’s enthusiasm for the commission’s proposal was remarkable, and it made even more progressive amendments to the proposed climate law to increase the 2030 target to a 60% reduction in emissions.2 The European Council’s approval was granted in December 2019 for the original target, and negotiations regarding the climate law are likely to soon succeed. The success of the future climate law will depend on not only the decision makers but also the Europeans themselves. The public perception of the problem is key to its successful implementation, and social support in Europe is certainly present. A Eurobarometer survey published in 2019 shows that, over the years, European citizens have become increasingly aware of the relevance of climate change3—even though citizens of the member states with higher GDP per capita are slightly more interested in the issue, more than nine out of ten European


citizens see it as a “very serious concern.” A change in citizens’ demands from their political leaders was clearly shown in the 2019 European Parliamentary elections when the Greens/ European Free Alliance increased its seats in the European Parliament by one-third, compared to the previous cycle. Most of the seats were taken from the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats who may no longer seem progressive enough in their climate ambitions. In March 2020, the Commission launched a public consultation, inviting all stakeholders and citizens to submit their views on the EU’s 2030 climate ambition increase and the action and policy design, making the public opinion an important factor in decision-making. Member states, thus, need to respond to the moral pressure coming from the citizens, but they also need to make the green transition economically advantageous, encouraging the private sector to participate and the foreign companies to invest. With the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, this seems to be a challenging task.

“Do we, humans, want to continue living well and safely on this planet? Humanity faces an existential threat – the whole world is beginning to see. Forests burn from America to Australia. Deserts are advancing across Africa and Asia. Rising sea levels threaten our European cities as well as the Pacific Islands. Mankind has seen such phenomena before, but never at this speed. Science tells us that we can still stop this epidemic, but we are running out of time. The new European Commission is wasting no time,” wrote the Commission President in December 2019, 4 shortly after taking office, almost eerily foreseeing the challenges waiting for Europeans. Ursula von der Leyen once called the Green Deal “our new growth strategy,” and it is true that the European economy never needed a growth strategy more than in these turbulent times. Experts predict a recession as grave as in the post-war period. However, European decision makers seem to have learnt from the experiences of the past decades, and, unlike after the 2007–2008

Share of employment in sectors expected to decline (lhs) and expected to transform (rhs) <0.1

<0.1

0.1–0.5

0.1–1

0.5–1

1–2.5

1–2

2.5–5

>2

>5

Note: As defined by the European Commission (2018), the sectors expected to decline are 1) mining of coal and lignite, 2) extraction of crude petroleum and 3) natural gas, and the sectors expected to transform are 1) the manufacture of chemicals and chemical products, 2) the manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products, 3) the manufacture of basic metals and 4) the manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers.

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financial crisis, when they thought they could not pose a challenge to companies in a phase of economic depression, they are sticking to their goal-setting ambitions this time. But is the commission putting its money where its mouth is? The COVID-19 recovery can be seen both as an opportunity and a barrier to action concerning our climate goals. The Green Deal has been created as a new framework for linking economy and climate goals, and, therefore, it is at the heart of the COVID-19 recovery plans. The European Commission attacks climate change on different fronts through policy coordination, with 37% of the proposed EUR 672.5 billion COVID-19 Recovery and Resilience Facility going to green investments and reforms. The 2021–2027 multiannual financial framework’s cohesion allocations, which contribute substantially to the Central and Eastern European member states’ economic integration, also have an important green conditionality. “The European Union must ensure sufficient regional investment through its cohesion policy, as well as through the Just Transition Fund, to achieve the objectives of the Green Deal, but these mechanisms should not undermine each other,” warned the President of the Committee of the Regions. Increasing the Just Transition Fund and decreasing the funds allocated for cohesion policy within the union’s budget would result in an unchanged sum for allocations, but with more criteria. The European Commission proposed the increase of the Just Transition Fund to EUR 40 billion (in 2018 prices, with EUR 10 billion under the core EU budget and EUR 30 billion from Next Generation EU) to help the socio-economic transformation of those regions that rely heavily on fossil fuels and high-emission industries and to avoid widening the gap between the regions.5 While the Cohesion Fund mainly focusses on the energy and transport sector, the Just Transition Fund puts emphasis on the socio-economic aspects of the transition, such as future education or retraining of the labour force in the industries most affected by the transition: the coal and automotive industry. 6 92

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VISEGRAD GROUP AND THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL The ratification of the Paris Agreement is the respective responsibility of both the European Union and its member states. On 12 December 2019, the European Council, except for Poland, endorsed the objective of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 and highlighted in its conclusion the need for tailored support for regions and sectors most affected by the transition, recognising that there are national differences as to the starting points. Even though there are industries stretching across different regions, green transition interests are oftentimes divided along geographical lines. However, the countries of the Visegrad Group and their neighbours share many interests. Many things have changed in the now four members of this grouping since they signed the Visegrad Group’s cooperation agreement in 1991, when the bloc’s Euro-Atlantic integration began. The countries have since caught up at a fast pace with growth rates above the European average, and the region has become the “growth engine for Europe” as the then European Commissioner for Regional Policy Johannes Hahn put it.7 However, the old structures left from communist times still affect somewhat the ability of these EU member states to adapt to the ambitious future challenges of the European Commission. When it comes to clean energy, starting points differ greatly between them. Though all economic sectors contribute to greenhouse gas emissions, the energy industry has the most important share. However, transitioning to renewable energy is not only advantageous for the climate, as the renewable energy market seems to be much more resilient than that of coal or oil. Despite the long-term benefits, Central and Eastern European member states in general still seem to favour nuclear power over investing in renewable projects. Although there are individual differences, these countries’ energy sectors are still heavily reliant on coal and nuclear power, and renewable energy only takes a small fraction of their energy mix.


Achieving the goals set by the commission will be hard for every member state, but the Visegrad Group’s largest country, Poland, is in a special position. The “coal-loving” country argues that the European Union was born out of the coal industry, and the country is reluctant to make overly ambitious future commitments. Most other Central and Eastern European

countries introduced nuclear power by the end of the 1980s, but Poland is still heavily reliant on coal energy, as it takes 75% of the country’s energy mix. The country is, therefore, required to accelerate its green transition in order to catch up, and it will be a great challenge, especially during heating season. When it comes to budget and transition negotiations in the European

Chart 1: Tons of CO2 per USD 1,000 of GDP in 2018 Estonia Bulgaria GLOBAL TOTAL Czechia Poland Greece Cyprus Slovenia Slovakia Belgium Finland EU-27 Croatia Germany Netherlands Hungary Portugal Luxembourg Austria Spain and Andorra Romania Lithuania Italy, San Marino and the Holy See Latvia France and Monaco Denmark Ireland Sweden Malta 0.00

0.10

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0.30

0.40

0.50

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Chart 2: Tons of CO2 per capita in the V4 coutries in 2018 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2

1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

0

——— Chechia

——— Hungary

——— Poland

——— Slovakia

——— EU-27

Hungary is ahead of the game.

Council, Poland shares common interests with not only Hungary, Czechia, and Slovakia but also France. Poland’s greenhouse gas emissions per capita are similar to those of France, but, while emissions have been gradually decreasing over time in France due to the extensive use of nuclear power, a slight increase has been observed in Poland in the past decade. France, therefore, complies more easily with ambitious greening objectives. The two member states’ interests are similar in agriculture and farming, and they are on the same page when negotiating cohesion policy and common agricultural policy. The recovery fund helping economic recovery following the COVID-19 pandemic will, therefore, provide both countries with an opportunity to modernise their agriculture and industries. It is understandable why Poland was the only country opting out of the 2050 climate goals with the manifold obstacles it faces. However, after decades of economic expansion, Warsaw understood the need for solidarity in the COVID-19 recession and signed up for the deal, but with rather flexible goals.8 Despite being the country with the most elevated GDP per capita in the region,9 94

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something that usually correlates with emphasis on non-economic issues such as climate change, the Czechs seem to be equally sceptical about the Green Deal. Andrej Babiš was the first to veto the Green Deal in March 2020, when Europe seemed to be the hardesthit continent in the world, urging the European Union to set less ambitious climate targets. The Czech prime minister then made a U-turn in his May 2020 statement, as he said that he saw the implementation of the Green Deal objectives into the next multiannual financial framework and recovery fund an opportunity for an effective economic recovery. Despite supporting the initial decision made at the December 2019 council meeting, he highlighted that a new impact assessment is needed as the member states could not yet foresee the full impact of the crisis—an impact that will not be symmetric in all member states. In his view, it is, therefore, fundamental to maintain the funding dedicated to cohesion, including investments which will be directed to reducing dependency on imports of raw materials and to make further progress in implementing circular economy, especially in terms of replacing primary raw materials with


secondary ones, or ensuring the promotion of local solutions and innovations in all sectors of the economy. Despite the still ongoing divisions along geographical lines within the European Union over the details of financing and implementing the Green Deal, Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán—similarly to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on a European level—is committed to not making the topic a domestic political issue offering an alternative approach to green liberalism. There has been a shift in how the question of climate change is perceived in the general public, and it seems to become less and less politicised. The Hungarian prime minister found a niche with a Christian conservative approach to greening. Even though climate change has not always been a priority for conservative parties, the prime minister is committed to implementing the greening project in a realistic way that does not favour the polarisation of the country’s population. Conservatism has always attached special importance to supporting rural communities and local initiatives. Such communities typically live close to and depend on nature and play a crucial role in passing on important ecological knowledge, values, and skills from generation to generation, focussing on long-term goals.10 Pressing on the issues raised by Czech prime minister Andrej Babiš, the Visegrad Group’s environment and climate ministers addressed a letter also signed by Bulgaria and Romania, to Frans Timmermans, executive vice-president of the European Commission, on the impact assessment of the European Union’s 2030 climate ambition and action plan in July 2020. In the letter, they pleaded for a more thorough assessment of the real social, environmental, and economic costs of increasing the emission reduction target in different sectors. Their main concerns were social transition and energy poverty, highlighting that the long-term decarbonisation strategies and national energy and climate plans conceived the year before could not possibly take into account the effects of the pandemic and Brexit on these countries’

economies and, therefore, they are not adapted to the current challenges. The European Green Deal promised to make the European Union’s economy sustainable by turning climate and environmental challenges into opportunities. The reform of the EU’s emissions trading system is a long-awaited starting point which can make the European industry fit for the future and create new jobs. However, we are now facing another challenge: the challenge of an uncertain and painful economic recovery. Besides catering to sustainable growth, the Green Deal’s other main promise is job creation through innovation and restructuring industries. The job creation aspect of the future climate policy is becoming more emphasised, as the COVID-19 pandemic advances. Unemployment is forecast to go up by 1% on average throughout the whole of the European Union in 2021. Greening would have a negative impact on low-skilled jobs in the future, especially in the mining and utilities sectors, which would have an immediate impact on Poland’s and its neighbours’ labour markets as a direct consequence of reduced coal mining.11 Central Eastern Europe’s competitive edge within the European Union comes from its investment-friendly atmosphere and low labour costs, which make it an attractive destination for outsourcing tasks within the European single market. Foreign investment in manufacturing (for example, in the automobile industry) can be an engine for modernising these member states’ industries. The pace of economic convergence between the member states has continuously been slowing, while overregulation and a too quick and too ambitious goal-setting in an uncertain environment following the pandemic risk that these countries’ competitive edge is further decreasing. Meanwhile, the Central and Eastern European countries’ growth narrative is changing. Both the environment created by the COVID-19 pandemic and the demand for green transition act as an accelerator to change these countries’ European integration model. The competitiveness of the European industry is key in an increasingly globalised world, and a shift has to be made in the Visegrad countries CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

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towards higher value–added activities and a strategic growth model based on innovation so they can fully benefit from the opportunity offered by a green recovery. Inequality between regions, countries, or societal groups needs to be taken into account in times of moving from labour-intensive economies to capital-intensive solutions, and the European Union must design a plan that makes the transition inclusive. Gradual transition, solidarity, and equity are the keywords when considering the European Green Deal’s effects in the Central and Eastern European region. With the still ongoing pandemic struggle, European growth and greening policies have to find a careful balance.

ENDNOTES 1 2030 Climate Target Plan. European Commission. <https://bit.ly/2IpHyRF > Accessed: 27 October 2020. 2 Amendments adopted by the European Parliament on 8 October 2020 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the framework for achieving climate neutralit y and amending

R e g u l ati o n

(EU )

2018/19 9 9

(Eu ro p e a n

Climate Law). European Parliament. 8 October 2020. <https://bit.ly/36sbZOW > 3 For data, see the report and fact sheets of the 2019 climate change sur vey. Public Opinion. European Commission. September 2019 <https://bit.ly/32AuMXn > 4 The European Green Deal – our new growth strategy: Opted by Commission President von der Leyen. European Commission. 11 December 2019. <https://bit.ly/2Ikvjp7 > 5 Agnieszka Widuto–Pernilla Jourde: Just Transition Fund. European Parliamentary Research Service Briefing, PE 646.180. October 2020. <https://bit.ly/36sm1jl > 6 Aliénor Cameron [et al.]: Just Transition Fund – How the EU budget can best assist in the necessary transition from fossil fuels to sustainable energy. European Parliament, Policy Depar tment for Budgetar y Af fairs, Directorate General for Internal Policies of the Union, Study, PE 651.444. April 2020. <https://bit.ly/3pdAiZP > 7 “The Visegrád Group – Growth Engine of Europe” international conference, speech by Johannes HAHN, Commissioner for Regional Policy, 24 June 2014. European Comission. <https://bit.ly/3niooMv >

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8 Justin Worland: Europe Has Big Plans for a Green New Deal. Poland’s Coal Countr y Isn’t So Sure. Time. 22. October 2020. <https://bit.ly/2IpXK52 > 9 Report for Selected Countries and Subjects: October 2020.

I nte r n at i o n a l

M o n e ta r y

Fu n d.

<ht tp s:// b i t.

ly/2UeWd4z > Accessed: 28 October 2020. 10 Judit Varga: Time for a Christian conservative Green policy. Politico. 27 January 2020. <https://politi.co/3kp6k1h > 11 Cameron [et al.]


THE UNQUIET FRONTIER: THE NATO ENLARGEMENT AND PARTNERSHIP FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CENTRAL EUROPE Péter Dobrowiecki–Péter Stepper

NATO’S TRANSFORMATION AFTER 1990 The future role of NATO in Central Europe was not self-evident directly after the regime change in 1990. A multitude of tasks were up ahead, for example, the de-escalation of strategic confrontation with a Russia still having its strategic nuclear weapons while filling the power vacuum created by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It was a key question if non-alignment with a pro-Western approach will be favoured by Central European leaders. On the one hand, their freely elected governments welcomed the end of oppression, but, on the other hand, they had to face severe economic challenges without the help of the Soviet big brother. The failed coup d’état of 1991 in Moscow raised awareness of a possible ultranationalist turn in Russia, potentially dangerous for Central Eastern Europe (CEE). Václav Havel, József Antall, and Lech Wałęsa could still recall 1956, 1968, and 1981, even if Mihail Gorbachev and Boris Yelcin seemed to be having different attitudes from their predecessors. The Visegrad countries and Romania decided to choose NATO orientation instead of military neutrality, and all of them announced their willingness to join the organisation in 1991. The countries of the Visegrad Group could start the cooperation with NATO through the Partnership for Peace programme which some Central European leaders perceived as a “too little step towards the right direction.”1 NATO’s Madrid summit in 1997, when NATO granted accession to three of the five countries, can be considered a milestone in the process. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic could join NATO in 1999, while Slovakia and Romania had to stay

in the waiting room for a few more years. The year 2004 was important not just because of the Slovak and Romanian accession but also because Ukraine and Georgia applied for a membership status. However, Membership Action Plans (MAP) have not been accepted for them, and NATO preferred the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework for cooperating with them instead. PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORK FOR POSTSOVIET COUNTRIES NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) where leaders of former Warsaw Pact countries and postSoviet member states also had their seats at the table. Compared to the NACC, the PfP focusses on specialised, defence-related, and military cooperation areas, including defence economics, scientific research, military exercises, best practices, and information sharing in terms of intelligence assets. The NACC, however, was a diplomatic channel to negotiate issues of vital interest with NATO. It transformed into Euro-Atlantic Participation Council (EAPC) in 1997, reflecting the fact that not every PfP country was also a member of the NACC framework. The EAPC now consists of twenty-one PfP countries and twentynine NATO members all over the world. The fundamental aim of PfP is to ensure transparent defence planning and budget, democratic control over the armed forces, operational capabilities in order to contribute to UN, OSCE, and NATO missions, the development of military relations with NATO, army modernisation, and interoperability with NATO.2

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* Canada and the US are also member states of EAPC.

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)*

Partnership for Peace (PfP)

PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP)

Membership Action Plan (MAP)

Members of NATO’s partnership framework


The PfP countries can be categorised into two major groups. There are countries such as Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, and Malta, which decided to keep military neutrality. These states struggle to find the best and most cost-effective way to react to challenges stemming from the changing environment. They have to combine the assets coming from the nature of non-alignment and from good partnership with NATO. Countries of the South Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia), Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan ), and the East European Plain (Ukraine, Belarus) are fundamentally different from the first group, as they are all former members of the Soviet Union, struggling to ensure their national security on their own, and they are located between Russia’s and the NATO’s zone of influence. Some of them, namely Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, are also members of the Russian-led defence organisation, the CSTO. Three PfP countries (Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan) were also former members of CSTO but left the organisation in 1999.3 WHAT IS PFP GOOD FOR? Peace-keeping and crisis management are one of the most important pillars of NATO’s global activity. Militarily neutral countries can help with military and financial assets in return for learning from NATO’s experiences and modernising their army, using NATO standards, without giving up their neutrality. It is also beneficial for the transatlantic alliance to have more countries on board when it needs to build a coalition for a peacekeeping mission. Sweden, Austria, and other developed countries with modern army components can provide significant help regarding these activities. ENERGY SECURITY The post-soviet space is a place of constant clashes of interests and conflicts threatening the security of Central Europe. Thus, the most important aspect of regional politics is ensuring political stability. The region is both a source and a transit hub of fossil energy products,

such as crude oil and natural gas. Central European concerns almost exclusively focus on the issue of energy security in terms of both protecting critical infrastructure and maintaining political stability. It is essential to guarantee the flow of Russian gas towards the West through Ukrainian and Azeri pipelines. In order to succeed, de-escalating frozen conflicts and keeping the level of great-power rivalry as low as possible are fundamental. Traditionally, more emphasis has been put on the issue of violent non-state actors and terrorist organisations potentially attacking energy infrastructure, but, since 2014, great-power competition is an equally important aspect for NATO. However, NATO’s toolbox to deliver in terms of energy security is somewhat limited.4 KEEPING FROZEN CONFLICTS COLD Another important aspect of evaluating NATO PfP is whether it could help maintain the status quo and keep the new cold war cold enough. Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgian secessionist territories, Crimean and Eastern-Ukrainian crises, and the Transnistrian de facto republic can generate proxy wars with the potential of escalating into a direct confrontation between Russia and NATO. Central Europe supports NATO’s efforts in terms of special relations and through intensive dialogue with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova in order to keep them close to the alliance. Army modernisation, introducing civil control over the military, and all other PfP goals are exactly what Central Europe needs in the neighbourhood of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Even if this open-door policy provoked Russians from the very start, NATO did everything to keep good relations with Moscow through the NATO–Russia Council and to build the image of a cooperative Russia which is rather a partner country and a friend than a foe. Central European countries would prefer to return to this approach as soon as possible, but, for the time being, the most important task is to present unity and credibility and to tackle the situation with Russia by the toolbox of coercive diplomacy. CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

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MILITARY CRISES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON NATO PARTNERSHIPS Several political and even military conflicts have been born since the 1990s and the establishment of PfP. Some of them could have been prevented by NATO, taking a more active and brave role in the question of enlargement (e.g., letting the Georgian accession happen before 2008), or vice versa, behaving in a bit less confusing way in the Russian sphere of interest to avoid counteractions. Nonetheless, it is essential to see that the PfP toolkit is a somewhat limited— but still useful—way of projecting stability. This is a fact, even if the case of Georgia, Ukraine, or the Azeri–Armenian war prove it otherwise. The Russo-Georgian War During the Soviet period, relations between ethnic Ossetians and Georgians were peaceful. However, this situation changed after the nationalist programme of President Zviad Gamsakhurdia.5 Under the Shevardnadze era, Georgia joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and, as a result, four Russian military bases were established in the country. After 2005 and the building of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, an increasing Western interest in the region appeared. In parallel with this process, the Georgian leadership realised that Russia would not give up

Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Russia after the Russo-Georgian War Caspian Sea RUSSIA

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its influence in the country by helping Georgia to restore its integrity. Therefore, their only logical choice was Western reorientation. After the Revolution of Roses, Mikheil Saakashvili was elected as a new president in 2004, and he started a deep reform, including the military, as well. From the US’s perspective, Georgia was a poster child of democracy export and a reliable ally who contributed to the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan and to the global war on terror. As a result of this misperception, some argued that Georgia was close to full membership in NATO those days. In reality, the country quitted the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization only in 1999, while the Russian military bases on its territory were operational on the Georgian mainland until 2007.6 As Russia is still present in Ossetia and Abkhazia today, talking about full membership before 2008 was a bit hasty and overoptimistic.7 Cooperation mechanisms between Georgia and NATO started in 1992 when the country joined the NACC. Georgia helped NATO during the Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission in 1999, and served as a host country and as a cooperative partner for a joint military and naval exercise in 2001. Tbilisi expressed its willingness to join NATO during the Prague NATO summit in 2002 and signed an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) in 2004. Although NATO decided that Georgia was not ready for a MAP, it started an intensive dialogue with the country in the framework of the IPAP.8 The Russo-Georgian War in 2008 resulted in quick progress in institutional relations, and the NATO–Georgia Commission was established while the adaption of an Annual National Programme started.9 It clearly signalled to Moscow that, despite the 2008 war, the development of institutional relations with Georgia continued. This process, however, will not end in potential NATO enlargement in the short term. Ukraine Ukraine has traditionally been interested in joining Western structures such as the EU and NATO.


From time to time, Ukrainian leadership hinted at the idea of the EU and NATO accession, which provoked increased caution in the Kremlin. In January 1992, representatives of Ukraine already took part in a high-level working-group meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and Manfred Wörner, the then Secretary General of NATO, visited Kyiv in February that year.10 A document on distinctive partnership was signed in 1997, and a NATO liaison office was established in Kyiv to support Ukraine’s effort to create a modern army, compatible with NATO standards. Even though Ukraine does not want to become part of NATO, it works on reforming its defence and tries to contribute to global security through participation in international operations. The 1997 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership established the NATO–Ukraine Commission (NUC) which is a decision-making body responsible for developing NATO–Ukraine relations and coordinating joint efforts.11 Ukraine became the very first CIS member of the PfP in 1994, a few years after it declared independence from the Soviet Union. After a decade-long reform process in the military, Ukraine successfully signed the Membership Action Plan in 2008. However, the election year of 2010 brought a significant change in the leadership of Ukraine. President-elect Victor Yanukovych proved to be more cautious of sending messages to Putin’s Russia, especially after the Russo-Georgian War in 2008. Victor Yanukovych withdrew from signing the EU’s Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement in 2014, which led to severe mass demonstrations. The crowd on the Maidan Square had to face brutal police repression; officers even used lethal weapons against the demonstrators, and many opposition leaders were arrested. Police violence increased the popularity of demonstrators, and the regime tried to back off, so Yanukovich decided to set hundreds of protesters free from prisons.12 These steps seemed to be too little and too late. An interim government, led by Olexander Turchynov, succeeded the former Russianfriendly leadership, and Moscow, keeping a close eye on the events, acted surprisingly quick.

NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg and president Petro Poroshenko on a meeting of the NATO–Ukraine Commission in 2017

Oleksandr Turchynov had to face the challenges of Moscow’s hybrid warfare activities in Crimea and East Ukraine, which finally led to the escalation of a military conflict between regular forces. Launching a counterterrorist operation against separatists proved to be a slow process for Kyiv. Defending its territory, Ukraine was at the mercy of the United States, which primarily provided non-lethal military equipment and financial help (military aid) for the government. The first ceasefire agreement was signed in Minsk in September 2014, followed by a second agreement (also in Minsk) on 12 February 2015.13 These fragile peace agreements will hopefully serve as a good platform for creating long-term peace. Without the intention to give an in-depth analysis of history, it is worth drawing some conclusions based on the events of the past six months. Ukraine’s diplomatic relations with Russia are on a historically low level today, which does not help the country in economic recovery and narrows down foreign policy options for the Ukrainian ministry of foreign affairs. Ukraine is now a war-torn country, deeply reliant on US military and economic aid. US political figures have seen an opportunity in the intervention in Ukraine and started to increase their influence within the country’s key sectors like military industry and agriculture. This geopolitical rivalry is not in the Central European countries’ interest, since they prefer to build stability in their direct neighbourhood. The European Union is also fragmented over its Ukraine policy because of the differing interests of its member states. Regional great powers, such as France CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

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and Germany, would like to improve their relations with Russia, but they find it important to remain persistent in condemning the illegal annexation of Crimea. Simply speaking, Macron and Merkel are running out of patience because they would like to restart business relations with Moscow while showing responsibility in keeping to the international law and prohibiting aggression in world politics. Central European leaders are more afraid of political tendencies such as increasing nationalism and populism in Ukraine. Central European states would not like to improve NATO’s relations with Kyiv until the new Zelensky leadership can prove its trustworthiness. However, there is a large proportion of Russian minorities living in the country and even working for the government on various levels. Public servants with Russian origins can be found in the military, law enforcement, and the government. Speaking of the potential dangers of having Russian spies in the Ukrainian public service sector, it is not something that a responsible leader of a NATO member state could accept as a reasonable level of security risk. Not considering these vulnerabilities, there is also the question of minority- and language-law issues which need to be addressed by the new administration. The Hungarian government vetoes that the NATO–Ukraine Commission can function until Ukraine respects the transatlantic values of minority protection and human right issues. According to Central European countries, NATO partnership projects are the most that NATO can realistically offer to Ukraine right now, and they can be extremely helpful to convince the Zelensky leadership to share our European values. NATO ENLARGEMENT IN THE WESTERN BALKANS14 The Euro-Atlantic integration of the CEE’s southern neighbourhood is a foreign policy priority for the Visegrad states.15 Although their level of support and the underlying factors may differ, the general understanding is that the EU and NATO membership of those applying will greatly serve as a stabilising factor in the region 102

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and also benefit the CEE and the Western Balkans just as the whole of the EU.16 NATO’s partial involvement in the wars that followed the break-up of the former Yugoslavia—most notably the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999— means that the alliance is still looked upon as a former adversary by some, and, thus, some parts of the population still strongly reject the idea of NATO membership. Therefore, in contrast to the joint European project, which all Western Balkan countries declared their intention to join, NATO membership remains a more divisive question in the region.17 The United States has been a strong supporter of NATO’s Western Balkan enlargement from early on, facilitating the establishment of the Adriatic Charter (sometimes referred to as the US–Adriatic Charter) during the first presidency of George W. Bush in 2003. Following Albania’s and Croatia’s NATO accession in 2009, the integration of Western Balkan states into the alliance noticeably slowed down. However, the occupation and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia and its aggression against Ukraine in 2014 proved to be a turning point, as projecting stability in the Western Balkan region became one of the key components of NATO’s answer to the new threat. 18 With this renewed focus on regional cooperation, the deepening collaboration between the alliance and regional states regained pace, leading to the accession of Montenegro in 2017 and North Macedonia in 2020. Currently, KFOR,19 established in June 1999, is the only active NATO military mission in the region, which gradually transformed from a peacekeeping operation to a facilitator of ongoing defence reforms and training programmes. NATO’s activities in the region also served as an incentive to the establishment of mutually beneficial cooperation between the alliance and the European Union—a collaboration that is of key importance for regional and wider European stability. The development of the EU’s post-crisis stabilisation capabilities in the region resulted in the creation of successful EU-led civilian and military operations that were supported by NATO’s security guarantees.


Following the accession of former Warsaw Pact member states in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the alliance’s enlargement strictly focussed on the Western Balkan region.

MONTENEGRO AND NORTH MACEDONIA— NATO’S LATEST MEMBERS After a long and challenging process, North Macedonia became NATO’s 30th member state and, following Slovenia, Croatia, and Montenegro, the fourth former Yugoslavian constituent state to join the alliance. North Macedonia first applied for membership back in the mid-1990s under the name of FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). The long-standing name dispute with Greece was only one (albeit the most important) factor that led to a two-and-a-half-decadelong accession process. The country’s road towards NATO membership was started by its joining the Partnership for Peace programme in November 1995—at a time when NATO was starting its peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and armed conflicts still ravaged the region. Then, the next step was commencing its Membership Action Plan in 1999 at NATO’s Washington summit. North Macedonia’s accession was greatly hindered by internal political strife in the country, which culminated in the armed insurgency of the

Albanian National Liberation Army against the Macedonian security forces in February 2001. After international mediation, the conflict was resolved with the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement.20 NATO supported the implementation of the agreement with three short-term missions (namely, the operations called Essential Harvest, Amber Fox, and Allied Harmony), while also setting up a military headquarters in Skopje (which has been functioning as a NATO military liaison office since 2012).21 Montenegro joined NATO in 2017, alas, in contrast to Albania and Croatia, Montenegrin membership was not supported by a clear majority of the population.22 Throughout the accession process, the question of voter support for NATO membership remained a controversial issue with the country’s ethnic Serbian population and several political parties strongly opposing the move and demanding a referendum on the question—a request denied by the subsequent governments of pro-NATO prime minister (and current president) Milo Đukanović.23 Following the parliamentary defeat CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

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of Đukanović’s Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro in August 2020, several commentators expressed their concern that the new Montenegrin government might be less committed to the country’s Euro-Atlantic path, as some political formations within the winning opposition bloc expressed their disapproval of Montenegro’s NATO membership in the past. While the treaty itself rules this possibility out,24 it was, nevertheless, important that the recently appointed prime minister, Zdravko Krivokapić, reaffirmed his government’s commitment to the alliance.25 Although Russia maintained a reserved stance during the previous round of NATO enlargement in the Western Balkans, it gradually developed an openly hostile approach towards the question of Montenegrin and North Macedonian membership over their accession process and in parallel with the deteriorating relations between Russia and NATO.26 OPEN QUESTIONS: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, KOSOVO, AND SERBIA Together with Georgia and Ukraine, NATO recognises Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) aspirations to NATO membership. Following the outbreak of hostilities, NATO was directly involved in the international efforts aiming to stabilise the war-torn country—initially, through establishing airspace control from 1992 and, later, by a NATO air campaign aimed at crippling the offensive military capability of the Army of Republika Srpska. NATO was also instrumental in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords (officially the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina) that put an end to the armed conflict and guaranteed the creation of two political entities—the Bosniak–Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb Republika Srpska. NATO also played a vital role in the realisation of the peace agreement through the deployment of peacekeeping forces between December 1995 and December 2004 (initially, through IFOR and, then, by SFOR—Hungary provided troops for both missions). Due to its past involvement, NATO’s 104

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perception was highly distinctive in the two constituent states of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Politicians of the Bosniak–Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina actively supported BiH’s involvement in NATO programmes, while leading politicians of the Republika Srpska, most notably the former prime minister and current president Milorad Dodik, roundly rejected the idea. As a symbolic move against NATO membership, the entity’s parliament even passed a resolution affirming the constituency’s military neutrality in October 2017.27 BiH joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme in 2006, followed by an agreement on security cooperation the next year. The country’s Individual Partnership Action Plan commenced in January 2008, and Sarajevo was invited to join the MAP in 2010. However, despite the progress made, the country has for many years been unable to fulfil the conditions required to launch an Annual National Programme (ANP) under its MAP, due to the political deadlock over transferring the registration of immovable defence property from the local level to the central government. 28 Despite the ongoing political strife and the partial fulfilment of the registration criteria, NATO foreign ministers indicated in December 2018 that NATO is ready to accept the submission of BiH’s first ANP. The ongoing dispute between the political stakeholders led to a political crisis following the October 2018 general elections, and the issue prevented the formation of a new government. Following a political compromise, Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted its reform programme to NATO; however, there is continuous disagreement whether the programme might be considered as BiH’s first ANP.29 Following the declaration—and partial international recognition—of its independence in 2008, Kosovo signalled its willingness to join NATO. However, Pristina’s membership aspirations have been hampered by the nonrecognition of the country’s independence by four NATO member states, namely, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain, resulting in the lack of a fundamental contractual agreement


with NATO. Future NATO membership has not been ruled out, but Kosovo has to address several key issues to reach it. First and foremost, a final and concluding agreement has to be signed with Serbia on key bilateral questions. While some progress was made after resuming talks between Serbia and Kosovo, following an almost decade-long hiatus, the politically sensitive nature of the talks makes it hard to achieve a significant breakthrough. In spite of previous statements by leading Kosovar politicians, Kosovo has not yet officially applied for NATO membership. 30 Currently, Kosovo is the only Western Balkan state where NATO maintains a continuous military presence. A multinational force has been stationed in Kosovo since 1999 as part of the KFOR peacekeeping force, deriving its mandate from the United Nation Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 and the Military–Technical Agreement between NATO, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Serbia.31 Serbia is the only Western Balkan state not aspiring for NATO membership. The NATO’s bombing of the Army of Republika Srpska during the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 made the alliance and Serbia adversaries. Relations were further strained following Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, while the country remained a protectorate of the United Nations with security support from NATO. 32 Despite this, cooperation between NATO and Serbia has gradually increased since the country joined the Partnership for Peace programme during the 2006 Riga summit and the EuroAtlantic Partnership Council. 33 In December of the same year, the NATO Military Liaison Office in Belgrade was established, and, in 2008, Belgrade signed the Information Exchange Agreement with NATO—a prerequisite for fuller membership in the PfP programme. In 2011, Serbia’s request for an Individual Partnership Action Plan was approved, and the final twoyear action plan was finalised by 2015. Since 2007, Serbia has joined a number of NATO

Due to historical reasons, anti-NATO sentiment is still prevalent in Serbia.

programmes and participated in a wide variety of joint military exercises that, while less publicised, largely exceed the number of joint exercises conducted with Russia. 34

ENDNOTES 1 Przemyslaw Pacula: NATO integration process of the Visegrad countries. In: Central Europe and the Visegrad Cooperation, edited by Péter Stepper. Antall József Knowledge Centre, Budapest, 2018. 96–108. 2 The toolbox of PfP consists of different initiatives, like the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP), the Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP), financial investment funds, Partnership Action Plan for Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB), Partnership Action Plan Terrorism (PAP-T) and Intensive Dialogue. 3 Stepper Péter: Expanding Stability in the Neighbourhood: NATO’s Partnership for Peace Programme. In: NATO in the 21st Century. A Central European Perspective, edited by Tamás Péter Baranyi–Péter Stepper. Antall József Knowledge Centre, Budapest, 2019. 257–269. 4 Péter Stepper–Kinga Szálkai: NATO’s Energy Security Agenda and its Possible Applications in the South Caucasus. Caucasus International. 2014–2015/3–4. 27–43. 5 Political steps by Gamsakhurdia resulted in a bloody civil war and the secession and de facto independence of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Adjara. Eduard Shevardnadze, Georgian by nationality but serving earlier as a Soviet minister for foreign affairs, consolidated the situation to a certain degree after 1992. Thus, the country’s relations with Moscow normalised, but Georgia could not restore its territorial integrity anymore. 6 Benes Károly: A NATO és Grúzia kapcsolatai. In: NATO Partnerség 2014. A szövetségi partnerségi programok múltja, CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE EU

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jelene és jövője, edited by Kiss Petra–Zsolt Melinda. Nemzeti

18 Szenes Zoltán: A NATO új politikája: stabilitás kivetítése a

Közszolgálati Egyetem, Budapest, 2014. 98–117.

déli régióba. Honvédségi Szemle. 2019/2. 6–26; Németh

7 The Bucharest NATO summit could have been a perfect

Bence–Orosz Anna: „A nyitott kapuk politikája” újratöltve.

occasion for NATO to make a strong commitment towards

NATO-bővítés a Nyugat-Balkánon, mint a feltartóztatás

Tbilisi or to reject any enlargement ideas and send some

eszköze. Külügyi Szemle. 2017/Special Issue. 178–180.

positive messages to Moscow, but neither happened. Instead,

19 Hungary currently deploys close to 400 military personnel

NATO welcomed Georgian willingness to join NATO, while

in Kosovo as part of KFOR.

neither guarantees nor a Membership Action Plan was given

20 Misha Glenny: The Balkans, 1804–2012: Nationalism, War

to it in exchange. Still, Georgian leadership seemed to be

and the Great Powers. Granta Books, London, 2012.

happy with the Western promises of potential future

692–693.

membership.

21 Niall Mulchinock: NATO and the Western Balkans. Palgrave

8 NATO helped to disarm unused Georgian artillery missiles

Macmillan, London, 2017. 215–232.

and created Virtual Sky Highway, a satellite-based

22 Gordana Delić: Security Matters to the Western Balkans.

telecommunication network for higher education. This project

NATO at 70: From Triumph to Tumult?, The German Marshall

was implemented in the framework of NATO’s Science for

Fund of the United States, Policy Brief 360. 2019/April. 9.

Peace and Security Programme. Georgia provided one

23 Lénárt

hundred troop for the International Security Assistance Force

körülményei. Nemzet és Biztonság. 2017/3. 26–30.

mission in Afghanistan and participated in the exercise

24 Samir Kajosevic: BIRN Fact-check: Can Montenegro

Cooperative Best Effort 2002. NATO offered an intensified

Withdraw from NATO? BalkanInsight. 7 September 2020.

dialogue to Saakashvili but made no promises for accession.

<https://bit.ly/3qjRZGz >

9 Benes.

25 Várhelyi: Krivokapić’s first official visit will probably be to

10 Gelsei András: Ukrajna esete a NATO-val. In: NATO

Brussels. European Western Balkans. 20 November 2020.

Partnerség 2014. A szövetségi partnerségi programok múltja,

<https://bit.ly/35z3su2 >

jelene és jövője, edited by Kiss Petra–Zsolt Melinda. Nemzeti

26 Dobrowiecki Péter–Orosz Anna: Nyugat-Balkán. In:

Közszolgálati Egyetem, Budapest, 2014. 78–97.

Biztonságpolitikai Corvinák, edited by Szálkai Kinga–Baranyi

11 NUC is a forum for consultation on various security issues.

Tamás Péter–Szarka E. Luca. Vol. I. Antall József

It reviews Ukraine’s activity on three areas: the PfP programme,

Tudásközpont, Budapest, 2019. 298.

military reforms discussed with the military committee, and the

27 Andreychuk, 13.

annual national programme under the auspices of NATO.

28 Hamza Preljević: UNsatisfied? The Rocky Path to NATO

12 Ukraine crisis: Parliament abolishes anti-protest law. BBC

Membership – Bosnia and Herzegovina: A New Approach in

News. 28 January 2014. <https://bbc.in/3nBBVyp >

Understanding the Challenges. Croatian International Relations

13 A harmadik minszki megállapodás: törékeny esély a politikai

Review. 2017/80. 47.

rendezésre.

29 Dženita Šiljak–Kristian L. Nielsen: Bosnia and Herzegovina’s

KKI-elemzések,

E-2015/2.

<https://bit.

Éva:

Montenegró

NATO-csatlakozásának

ly/3icOyPh >

Best Friend and Worst Enemy. KKI Policy Brief, E-2020/62. 4.

14 The Western Balkan region comprises the states of Albania,

<https://bit.ly/2XDCcGl >

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North

30 Vukašin Živković: NATO perspective of Kosovo and Bosnia

Macedona, and Serbia.

and Herzegovina. European Western Balkans. 8 February

15 Dobrowiecki Péter–Stepper Péter: Hungary’s Foreign Policy

2019. <https://bit.ly/35ADlmB >

and the Eastern Partnership. Antall József Knowledge Centre.

31 Mulchinock, 181–204.

February 2020. <https://bit.ly/3qdszdL >

32 Németh–Orosz, 176–177.

16 Christina Griessler: The V4 Countries’ Foreign Policy

33 For more, see Participation of the Republic of Serbia in the

concerning the Western Balkans. Politics in Central Europe.

Partnership for Peace Programme. Ministry of Foreign Affairs

2018/02. 141–164.

of the Republic of Serbia. <https://bit.ly/39q5RbH > Accessed:

17 Péter Dobrowiecki: NATO Accession of the Western Balkan

24 September 2019.

States: Challenges and Achievements. In: NATO in the 21st

34 EWB: Serbia held more exercises with NATO than with

Century. A Central European Perspective, edited by Tamás

Russia in 2019. European Western Balkans. 18 November

Péter Baranyi–Péter Stepper. Antall József Knowledge Centre,

2019. <https://bit.ly/35wQDk3 >

Budapest, 2019. 283–293. 106

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5

GREAT POWER POLITICS IN THE CEE REGION



AMERICAN INTERESTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE: CONTINUITY AND SHIFTING EMPHASES András Lázár

The extraordinary US presidential election in 2020 once again drew attention to the evolution of American interests towards our region, Central Europe. The present study sets out to introduce the historical background of these interests and to discuss the recent American foreign policy on the Central European region with a special emphasis on the Visegrad Group (V4), taking into account the anticipated effects of the Trump– Biden transition. Naturally, the US’s foreign policy on Central Europe cannot be described by one or two adjectives; however, as we shall see, the factors and tendencies influencing it can be discerned more or less accurately. The US has continually been following and, at times, actively shaping Central Europe’s destiny; still, we cannot speak of either a fixed, century-old strategy or any linear increase or decrease in activity. Although it sounds like an exaggeration at first glance, it is actually a well-founded statement that Central Europe matters to the US because Europe matters to US,1 a claim that, in turn, allows us to conclude that the geopolitical significance of the region springs not from Central Europe itself but rather from the activities of outside actors in the region and the consequences of these very activities. An important characteristic of the US foreign policy thinking is its tendency to deal with Central Europe in the same framework as they do with the East. It is interesting to note here that, although the concept of “Central Europe” is widely used in the region itself and all over Europe, the everyday and the political discourse in the US still often refers to the region as Eastern Europe. This needed no explanation during the days of the Cold War and the Soviet confrontation; however, there seem to be many factors supporting this view even to this day, even if we adjust for our transformed understanding of the words “East” and “confrontation.” 110

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It is worthwhile to begin our historical retrospective in the early 20th century: the first US grand strategy on Europe, and Central Europe within, was Wilson’s foreign policy that ultimately never made it past the level of principles and ambitions. After Wilson, the US withdrew from Europe (therefore, from Central Europe, too) for a long time, a move that led many of its critics to deem it a partial reason for the failure of the negotiations ending World War I and for the outbreak of World War II aiming to change it on revisionist grounds. The new world order was a major change, constructed with the leadership of a post-1945, now globally active US that had learned its lesson of isolationism. The US foreign policy at the time—for want of a better plan— tacitly accepted Central and Eastern Europe to be part of the Soviet sphere of interest and treated it in a “realist” way. For decades to come, transatlantic relationships could only be built with Western European countries, with which the US established a close alliance. During the Eastern Bloc’s existence, American activity concerning the region focussed on anticommunist rhetoric and anti-Soviet criticism on international forums; in addition to having rather limited contact with the region’s political elite, the US made efforts to reach the region’s societies directly with its messages in order to weaken Soviet influence (through, e.g., Radio Free Europe, Voice of America). The irreversible weakening of the Soviet Union—aided, in part, by American activities—and the independence efforts of its satellite states paved the way for the most recent chapter of US foreign policy in Central Europe. The country had already established close relations with anti-communist forces in the region, later unequivocally supporting that these countries “return to Europe” by joining the EU, get closer to transatlantic


integration, join NATO, and, simultaneously, that the new, independent governments could become democratic and have market economy. Trade relationships also strengthened with US companies becoming significant investors in the region, something that is an important (and, in some respects, the most stable) pillar of this partnership up to now. Besides the geopolitical milieu, the evolution of these relations was also helped by US citizens with Central European roots—mostly emigrants from the turn of the century, after World War I and II, or people fleeing from communist regimes—playing a role in the public and political life of their county. (In Poland’s case, the ten million Americans with Polish roots are still an important aspect of the relations between the two countries, not lacking implications for the US domestic politics.) With their set of personal connections, monetary and intellectual support, US politicians, scientific and non-governmental personalities contributed to a great degree to “building” and strengthening civil societies in Central Europe, and launching new political forces. Central Europe expected and, in most cases, gladly welcomed the US’s support, a feeling that was shared not only by the political elite but by the majority of the population, too. This atmosphere laid the groundwork for a strong pro-US attitude in the entire region, in many places prevalent even to this day. Transatlanticism as a strategic value statement also became an important point connecting the V4 countries and played a major role in launching the Visegrad cooperation in 1991. One of the formative experiences of people with a public interest and the political forces actively engaged in regime changes is the Central European tour of George H. W. Bush (a US president vocal about his support for a reunited Europe and Germany even against certain European powers) that included his visit to Budapest in 1989 where he promised support for the region and its reform efforts in front of a cheering crowd. Later visits by US presidents to Central Europe struck a rather similar tone, just like the first—and, to this date, only—V4–US conference between presidents and prime ministers held in Prague in 1994, which mainly concentrated on

the Visegrad countries’ intention to join NATO and which President Clinton also attended.2 It is a commonly held opinion (at least looking at the issue from Central Europe) that the intensity of American presence in the region decreased after the V4 countries had successfully joined the EU and NATO by 2004, as the US started to regard the EU and other countries belonging to its transatlantic alliance system as one unit. Of course, there were other pivotal issues during the 2000s that provided basis for regular highranking meetings, including president Bush’s two visits to Warsaw and his single trips to Prague, Budapest, and Bratislava (which was also the first time that a US president had visited Slovakia). Said issues included the US’s war on terror, the proposed contributions of the V4 countries to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (which they all fulfilled), the dragging, and at that time still pending, NATO accession process of Slovakia, and President George W. Bush’s plans to install a missile defence complex involving Poland and the Czech Republic, which were

US president George George H. W. Bush’s visit to Budapest in 1989 GREAT POWERCENTRAL POLITICSEUROPE IN THE CEE ANDREGION THE EU

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justified by threat from Iran and North Korea and vehemently opposed by Russia. The then first Obama administration starting in 2009 brought additional changes, too. According to a significant proportion of the researchers (and the practitioners) of foreign policy, the US moved a step farther away from Central Europe, at least for a few years. This did not stem from a general passivity in foreign policy, since Obama, Vice-President Biden, and Secretary of State Clinton announced a new, active foreign policy covering Europe, as well. However, an important pillar of the new administration’s foreign strategy, made famous by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, was Pivot to Asia (referred to more as rebalancing in official White House communications), the first-ever strategy to set counterbalancing China’s increasing regional and global influence as its most essential priority, according to many. The other geopolitical shift concerning Europe/Asia happening simultaneously was the attempt at rapprochement with Russia (often referred to as reset). Although this policy was partially successful,3 the new attitude and other unexpected steps like the US’s abandonment of its missile defence complex in Poland and in the Czech Republic prompted worries to certain Central European leaders and thinkers despite the fact that “turning away” from the region had never been a declared intention of the US. The question arose whether the role of our region in American foreign policy had changed. These worries are well illustrated by an open letter sent to President Obama by a number of Central European politicians (among them János Martonyi, former and later Foreign Minister of Hungary), saying that Central Europe was not in the changed focus of the US’s foreign policy strategy and that the US “was no longer worried” about the region, mistakenly regarding its mission to strengthen Western and transatlantic orientation there as accomplished. According to the letter, the US’s pullback was running the risk of weakening traditional transatlantic orientation, presenting an opportunity for other powers (primarily Russia) to fill the void or for other ideas (introversion, nationalism, populism) 112

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The ceremony to mark the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the North Atlantic Treaty on 16 March 1999 (from left: Jerzy Buzek, prime minister of Poland, Miloš Zeman, prime minister of the Czech Republic), NATO secretary general Dr. Javier Solana and Viktor Orbán, prime minister of Hungary)

to grow stronger.4 These concerns later proved to be partly valid according to a large number of analysts and the US government itself, a realisation that provides an important point of reference for understanding the US’s activity in the region. With events during the second Obama administration such as the Ukrainian protests of 2013, ultimately leading to the fall of the proRussia leadership, the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the war in East Ukraine, “geopolitics” returned once again to Europe, leaving America no choice but to “return,” as well. The phrase “from reset to the new Cold War” is appropriate,5 encapsulating something that clearly had a big effect on the relations between the US and Central Europe. In the eyes of the US foreign policy, reactions from Central European countries to the Ukrainian–Russian conflict became the almost exclusive centre of attention. Supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and reforms was a clear expectation (which the region’s countries all fulfilled as single states and together as the V4 group, as well), along with endorsing the proposed sanctions against Russia (the EU’s sanctions had been supported all along by the V4, with a few members also pointing out the losses stemming from them), aiding Ukraine’s unstable energy supply due to Russian pressure (which the region’s countries fulfilled, too), and


strengthening NATO’s eastern flank with military supplies (which also saw various contributions from the V4 countries). The events have shown that, as a strategy, reset could not override the notion traditionally shared by all major powers, namely that gaining influence in Central and Eastern Europe was a zero-sum competition. Thus, the sorely missed attention of America reappeared in Central Europe, although with a rather narrow and limited focus. Suddenly, the attitude of Central European governments towards Russia came under scrutiny and became a point of criticism, a turn that questioned whether the “vigilant attention of American politicians” was, in fact, a blessing or more of a limiting factor. Prior to the Ukrainian crisis, Russian–Central European relations were improving (obviously influenced by America’s friendlier attitude), from which the two sides expected economic benefits after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. The V4 countries (including Poland, the country traditionally most worried about Russian intentions) all had their own “Eastern resets” towards Russia,6 making it quite understandable that, from 2013–2014, the region’s governments became rather concerned about losing the benefits of an improved Russian relationship on top of the Ukrainian conflict. (Poland was the exception once again as the fear of direct aggression on Russia’s part overrode all other points of view in the country.) The dependency of the V4 countries (Poland least of all) on Russian gas called for a traditionally pragmatic political approach to Russia; however, this stood in stark contrast with the strengthening American expectation for Central European countries to cut ties with Russian energy as quickly and extensively as possible, to reject all major energy projects involving Russia (e.g., the Nord Stream 2) even outside V4 territory, and to look for other sources, even considering options that ignored the logic of price-based competition. The US, thus, expected the question of Central and Eastern European energy supply to be handled as a political and security issue rather than an economic one, claiming that Russia used gas negotiations to exert political

influence and to blackmail countries. Another practical reason was the US’s search for a market to sell its liquefied gas to be exported, a commodity that could not compete economically with Russian gas supplied to Central European countries from a much shorter distance using an already existing distribution network. (The US often offers the same repeated message on this topic in diplomatic settings: winning energy independence should be worth a higher price to Central Europeans, so they should be willing to pay extra as a “security premium.”) Besides its criticism of no or slow-moving energy independence, the US has acknowledged and encouraged already existing diversification results and plans (e.g., the LNG terminals in Poland, Lithuania and, later, in Croatia; gas interconnectors between V4 countries). Since the Ukrainian conflict, the White House, the State Department, and the US media have been following energy-related and all other negotiations between the EU (including Central Europe) and Russia with growing suspicion. The prime ministers of Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and, especially, Hungary have all received criticism for such high-profile negotiations.7 Albeit fulfilling basic expectations, V4 leaders (excluding Poland) have tried to balance the double task of complying with US requests as an ally and keeping up a steady relationship with Russia, often resorting to a “division of labour” within their own governments (between the pro-Russian Czech President and a pro-EU/Atlanticist government or the

US president Barack Obama and his wife greet the crowd waiting for his speech at Prague Castle in 2009. GREAT POWERCENTRAL POLITICSEUROPE IN THE CEE ANDREGION THE EU

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pro-US Slovak foreign policy leadership and the prime minister often making gestures of goodwill towards Russia) or using pragmatic communication, often branded as pro-Russian, that uniformly accepts the EU’s stance but has minority reports, as it happens in Hungary. Naturally, the V4 countries have all supported the strengthening of NATO’s eastern flank, but Poland, the country feeling the Russian threat in the most direct way, demanded and welcomed the most the increased political and military presence of the US (see the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw,8 often considered a milestone) and a tough anti-Russian activity. Besides the definite priority of the Ukrainian– Russian issue, another major characteristic of the US–Central Europe relationship—but by no means a new one—came to the forefront at the time when the US started publicly voicing criticisms of Central European (mostly the Polish and Hungarian) governments over their constitutionality, judicial systems, the freedom of the press, the state of civil society, and corruption. According to public opinion, this shift resulted in a significant political estrangement in bilateral relationships during the second Obama administration, especially in the case of Hungary (less so for Poland due to the overwhelming importance of the two nations’ military and security cooperation). For Budapest, the low point came in 2014 when— on top of regular criticisms from the leadership of US foreign politics—president Obama himself listed the country as one where civil society was being restricted.9 The year 2014 also saw the eruption of the so-called “ban scandal” when US authorities banned six Hungarian officials from entering the country under suspicion of corruption—an unprecedented move at the time.10 Criticisms voiced by American diplomatic agents over fundamentally domestic policies (e.g., minority and LGBTQ rights, memory politics, etc.) have caused minor frictions with other V4 countries, as well, but it is important to emphasise that, despite the occasionally frosty atmosphere, the dialogue between the US and Central Europe—although mostly on a lower level—still continued and the ongoing 114

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military–security cooperation and ascending trade-investment relations bore fruits. All this demonstrates the universal truth that “American interest” as a concept has always transcended the traditional, institutionalised relationship systems of foreign policy, and, in order to muster an accurate evaluation, one must investigate the wide and varied circle11 of US foreign and national security policy makers along with those with an indirect influence on them (with their own individual autonomies and motivations). As a result, the quality of US–Eastern European relations under Obama cannot be evaluated merely on the basis of statements made by the leaders (sometimes on opposing ideological sides) and cannot be described as being simply “good” or “bad.” The US’s attitude towards Europe, and Central Europe within it, has been a similarly complex issue under Donald J. Trump’s administration. Leaders of the region will, however, agree that regardless of what they might have thought about Trump’s unusual style and rhetoric, the period from 2017 to 2020 brought significant improvements from Central Europe’s point of view. The Trump administration took an undoubtedly more active approach to Central Europe than its predecessor, although this had not been quite evident yet at the time of its election: the new president’s remarks about Russia (hinting at a possible reconciliation) and NATO (implying its “outdatedness”) rekindled both old and new concerns. Despite the palpable paradigm shift in domestic policy making, no strategic turn happened concerning Central

US president Donald Trump delivers his speech at Krasinski Square in Warsaw in 2017.


European policies. The issue, however, did undergo a tactical retune. The familiar system with three main goals stayed unchanged: the focus remained on economy, defence and security, intertwined with driving back Chinese and Russian influence. Summarised briefly, this meant supporting Ukraine and its rapprochement with NATO, strengthening NATO cooperation in the regions that demanded the demonstration of US security guarantees most (i.e., in the Baltic states, Poland, Romania), defending American company interests (including sales connected to the armaments and energy industries), and counterbalancing China’s increasingly intensive political, economic, and technological advances (such as the 5G network or the infrastructural projects of the Belt and Road Initiative), and the growing influence of Russia (by economic and energy deals, misinformation, and propaganda). At the same time, the intensification of high level political dialogue could be considered a tactical novelty and a shift in tone, just like the comprehensive exploitation of regional cooperation frameworks (providing political and financial support for the Three Seas Initiative) along with prioritising certain issues for ideology-based cooperation in the case of governments ideologically closer to President Trump (e.g., countering illegal migration, initiating conservative family policies, aiding Christian communities). However, in a certain sense, the most notable change was the practical, behindthe-scenes handling of problematic fields (e.g., constitutionality concerns) instead of publicly voicing criticisms about them. The general tone of high level relations was set by Trump’s trip to Warsaw in July 2017, less than six months after his inauguration, which came as a major gesture implying America’s “return” and, simultaneously, confirming Poland’s role as a high priority partner in the region. Besides the bilateral negotiations, Trump finally affirmed the importance of NATO’s Article 5 (about collective defence) publicly, attended the summit of the Three Seas Initiative, emphasising the US’s interest in developing the region’s energy networks and logistic infrastructure. It is also noteworthy that the president did not

The 2017 summit of the Three Seas Initiative in Warsaw, where President Trump also participated.

bring up the by then rather habitual criticism over constitutionality (a choice that triggered disappointment in certain spectators, while the host of the event, Poland, considered it a clear success in its domestic policy and Hungary— the target of heavy criticism previously—took it as reassuring news). The reaffirmation of US security guarantees was a gesture aimed at the Baltic states along with Central and Eastern European countries; this policy later included the decision to supply Ukraine with weapons (lethal military aid) that even exceeded the aid previously provided by the Obama administration. All this dispelled Western concerns—together with, those of the US foreign policy community— about a radical shift of direction. (The motivation behind the president’s deeds is a different matter: Trump’s options were strongly influenced by domestic accusations against him involving Russia and Ukraine and the impeachment process in motion). As a further sign of the previously mentioned policy of “opening” to Central Europe, Trump— besides his Warsaw visit—invited the leaders of all other V4 countries to bilateral meetings, a gesture that seriously boosted the level of political dialogue (given that no similar negotiations had been organised between the two sides for many years). Additionally, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo paid visits to all four Visegrad countries between 2019and 2020. With a clear intention of achieving tangible results, these meetings focussed on topics that well demonstrate the continuity of US priorities in the region: breaking GREAT POWERCENTRAL POLITICSEUROPE IN THE CEE ANDREGION THE EU

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away from Russian energy resources, barring Chinese companies from participating in digital infrastructure development (5G network), supporting Ukraine, and setting up new security partnerships (the DCA, or in the case of Poland, the EDCA). The complex nature of US foreign policy on Central Europe in the Trump era, namely the duality of friendly dialogues and geopolitical expectations, is well illustrated by Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs A. Wess Mitchell’s evaluation repeated on multiple occasions, which deemed that “neglecting” the region and handling it in a confrontational manner had been a mistake by the US, which gave room for malign Chinese and Russian influence, a process to which the US will react actively in the framework of the geopolitical “scramble” for the region. Although the US will handle criticism for this in a diplomatic manner, continues Mitchell, it will not tolerate its allies’ pivoting towards the East.12 Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s pragmatic approach is also justified by the improving relations between America and the Hungarian government which was often in open debate with the former US administration, (actually US Ambassador to Hungary David B. Cornstein also played a role in this, serving as a direct channel to President Trump13). America’s foreign policy on Central Europe under Trump mainly followed the logic of the above-detailed power struggle and was, in fact, transactional. Defying all contrary evaluations, the high expectations could not be lowered even by ideological proximity to the president (as in the case of Poland and Hungary). Steps taken against US interests (e.g., in Hungary, the CEU’s exit, the cooperation with the Chinese Huawei, the appearance of the International Investment Bank with alleged Russian ties, and the obstruction against Ukraine in order to block it from being able to attend NATO sessions because of its government restricting Hungarian minority rights, in Slovakia, the halt to the Defence Cooperation Agreement, in Chechia, pro-Chinese and pro-Russian statements by the president) still triggered criticism, while the fulfilment of expectations still 116

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obtained recognition (e.g., Hungary’s ratification of the DCA and participation in the realisation of the LNG terminal in Krk, the Czech, Polish, and Slovakian declarations of intent about the exclusion of “risky,” in effect, Chinese actors from 5G development, the purchase of US LNG through the Polish terminal, etc.). The V4 countries could also score big on the economy: as the biggest weapon procurement of its history, Poland decided to purchase the US Patriot air defence missile system, the Czech Republic bought combat helicopters and battleground communication systems, Slovakia purchased F-16 fighter aircraft, while Hungary procured airdefence missile systems from US companies. The Trump era produced interesting developments in regional partnerships, as well. The most important (and, arguably, most unexpected) of these was that, although the thirty-year V4 partnership, well known in Europe, did not have great familiarity and attention in the US (apart from the V4 + US dialogue on lower levels and a number of shared projects), Washington firmly started to support the Three Seas Initiative14 (TSI, 3SI) launched in 2015 with the involvement of twelve EU member states on a governmental, academic, and even a domestic policy level with bipartisan support in Congress.15 The 3SI was originally a forum for presidents with the focus of developing logistic, energetic, and digital connectivity within the region between the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas. Apparently, the body could “work out” the initial contradiction between its aims and its format (as such priorities traditionally fall under the authority of governments instead of presidents) by 2020, while its intergovernmental and business dimensions were being strengthened, as well: governmental coordinators were named, the Three Seas Investment Fund and, for the energy infrastructure, the Partnership for Transatlantic Energy Cooperation were brought into existence. The creation of the 3SI is a development of geopolitical significance, in which the US played a decisive role. Although it has never been expressed on a political level, it is rather hard to miss the similarities between the priorities of this new formation and the US interests in


those very fields (the gas trade and nuclear energy in Russia’s, while the 17 + 1 format and infrastructural projects within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative in China’s case) where the two Eastern powers had already secured considerable influence, which the US actively tries to counterbalance. The speed at which this new cooperation was put together, propelled most vigorously by the Polish, Romanian and Baltic governments that are in a close strategic relationship with the US or are striving towards one, could not have been gathered without support and diplomatic pressure by the US, especially taking into account the fact that, in an almost unprecedented way in the history of informal (not institutionalised) partnerships in the region, 3SI members agreed to make serious financial commitments, as well. By the end of 2020, Poland, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovenia, and Bulgaria had all contributed to the 3SI fund, which, in turn, has made its first investments. Furthermore, the US announced its intention in 2020 to contribute a sum of up to 1 billion dollars to the fund, 300 million of which have already been invested.16 Germany also took notice of the 3SI and has for the moment been attending its meetings as a partner. It is interesting to note here that Trump’s attendance at the 3SI summit of 2017 in Warsaw, besides providing strong outside legitimation to the group, also gave rise to the narrative that, due to the region’s apparent openness to Trump’s policies, Central Europe was seen in the president’s circles as a tool for counterbalancing (in a more ill-disposed way: dividing17) certain EU members (especially Germany) in the context of ongoing conflicts. In other words, the Trump administration worked to make Central Europe choose between “America and Europe.”18 Regardless of all this, due to the magnitude of already invested resources and the fact that the 3SI cooperation could unite US and Central European interests, it is likely that the formation will continue to be supported by the incoming Biden administration. Examining regional cooperation dynamics, such as the V4, the 3SI, the Slavkov format, and others, it will be

interesting to observe, which of these groupings will have an increased or lowered profile at the new administration, and which countries the US will “promote” as closer partnerships. Within the V4 countries, Slovakia and the Czech Republic have been showing great interest in capturing the high profile attention of Biden’s cabinet ever since the election took place, which is not at all an unrealistic idea, as it would be a politically valid move for the US to take “problem-free,” reliable Central European countries as good examples, especially if ideological debates rekindle with, e.g., the governments of Poland or Hungary. The discourse on a potential shift in the US foreign policy in Central Europe resumed due to the 2020 election. In many occasions, Biden’s victory has inspired exaggerated guessing or wishful thinking about a fundamentally different set of policies compared to Trump’s original direction. Although there will be changes in foreign policy on a general level when it comes to, e.g., strengthening the role of international organisations, seeking multilateral solutions to problems instead of resorting to one-sided “power politics,” or returning to a rhetoric of compromises, politicians and experts could only name one significant field concerning Central Europe where there is a strong demand for change: the firmer “defence” of values traditionally associated with American liberal democracy and criticism against governments that are populist and nationalist and erode constitutionality and civil society according to the Democrat’s assessment. Against the backdrop of what happened before, for example, during the Obama–Clinton era, however, even this would not qualify as a fundamentally new approach, as such a change would likely to be more about “trimming back” Trump’s pragmatism and reanimating the ideological way of foreign policy making, especially in relation to Poland and Hungary but potentially including any government that passed decisions conflicting with US expectations. The assessment that criticisms coming through official diplomatic channels (the State Department) and from representatives in Congress will no longer be dampened by the GREAT POWERCENTRAL POLITICSEUROPE IN THE CEE ANDREGION THE EU

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Trump White House neither on a pragmatic nor on an ideological level is a realistic one. The main question remains the degree to which and the way how this new-old approach would be employed and this will determine to what extent the countries of the region on friendly terms with the Trump administration will fear diplomatic pressure, neglect, or, in extreme cases, active isolation attempts. In view of the statements made during the 2020 presidential campaign (Biden explicitly listed Poland and Hungary in the same category as Belarus in connection with totalitarian regimes19), the previous experience of people with a strong influence on Biden’s foreign policy (Antony John Blinken, a person with deep knowledge of Hungary as Secretary of State and Jacob Jeremiah Sullivan, a person with close ties to the previous Democrat government as National Security Advisor20), and, of course, Hungary’s (and little less so, Poland’s) spectacular support for Trump,21 these governments might be facing even harder times than during the Obama era. Beyond the policy level, the Biden administration will obviously employ the tools of soft diplomacy, as well (through supporting think tanks, civil organisations, etc.) In practice, however, the level of confrontation will be determined by the leeway of the new administration (e.g., how much energy they will have to deal with issues after addressing international crises22 and how much public support they will have behind their domestic policies), the activities of outside actors (the increase or decrease of Russian and Chinese influence), and the attitude of Central European countries (whether they will try to avoid criticism, or they will take it as a necessary evil). The extent to which this will affect the whole spectrum of bilateral relationships will itself be affected by the previously mentioned variety of foreign policy actors (business, political, and scientific interest groups with specific agendas): instead of deepening conflicts, such factors usually direct the flow of affairs towards rationality even during frosty times in a political relationship. If we accept that a Democrat-led US would still look at Central Europe as a part of a geopolitical whole, using the logic of world-power competition, 118

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we may conclude that, currently, there are not that many strong reasons (not counting the ones listed above) for considerably altering the priorities, expectations, and tools solidified under president Trump. The main factors besides the US government’s political orientation, namely, the country’s interests in business (energy and arms exports), and military terms (strengthening NATO’s eastern countries), its concerns of growing Russian and Chinese influence in Europe, intertwined with interests in supporting pro-US initiatives (e.g., the actual contribution of the Three Seas Initiative to infrastructure development) all remain unchanged. Considering the clear expectations and the all too cordial transatlantic milieu, Central European countries now have a real opportunity to establish a positive or at least neutral relationship with the US, perhaps to even build a closer partnership— achieving this, however, will require governmental leaders ready to make compromises and the prioritisation of positive topics (e.g., energy diversification, the fight against climate change, trade, digital cooperation) along with the identification of constructive agents looking to strike a harmonious tone.

ENDNOTES 1 Daniel Fried: The United States and Central Europe: what’s gone right, what’s gone wrong, and what’s next. Atlantic Council. 17 July 2019. <https://bit.ly/3ohwfuq > 2 The transcript of the press conference held after the 23 January 1994 meeting is available here: The President’s News Conference With Visegrad Leaders in Prague. The American Presidency Project. 12 January 1994. <https://bit. ly/2LpK0IQ> 3 U.S.–Russia Relations: “Reset” Fact Sheet. The White House, President Barack Obama. 24 June 2010. <https://bit. ly/3hMjJAW > 4 An Open Letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern Europe. Gazeta Wyborcza. 15 July 2009. Quoted in An Open Letter To The Obama Administration From Central And Eastern Europe. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 16 July 2009. <https://bit.ly/3hH9C0b > 5 Póti László: A „resettől” az „új hidegháborúig”: amerikai– orosz kapcsolatok az Obama-korszakban. Külügyi Szemle. 2017/Special Issue. 56–68.


6 Ugrósdy Márton: Barát vagy Nagy Testvér? Az Egyesült

17 See, for example, Thomas Wright: Trump Wants a Do-

Államok Közép-Európában. KKI Elemzések, E-2015/14.

Over in Europe. Politico. 4 July 2017. <https://politi.

<https://bit.ly/3hGqAf8>

co/2XbyDai>

7 Ugrósdy Márton–Reinitz Katalin: Végül megkaptuk, amit

18 Joerg Forbrig–Daniel Hegedüs: Why the U.S. Presidential

kértünk: Közép-Európa és az Egyesült Államok Barack

Election Matters for Central and Eastern Europe. The German

Obama elnöksége alatt. Külügyi Szemle. 2017/Special Issue.

Marshall Fund of the United States. 16 October 2020.

91–107.

<https://bit.ly/2Mz9vs2>

8 Tálas Péter: A varsói NATO-csúcs legfontosabb

19 According to the already quoted Daniel Fried, former

döntéseiről. Stratégiai Védelmi Kutatóközpont Elemzések,

ambassador and assistant secretary of state for European

2016/10. 11 July 2016. <https://bit.ly/3b8Hbqt >

and Eurasian affairs, the statement strongly rejected by both

9 Remarks by the President at Clinton Global Initiative. The

Poland and Hungary was, in fact, suggested to Biden by A.

White House, President Barack Obama. 23 September 2014.

Blinken, the runner-up for the Secretary of State position

<https://bit.ly/2XdDnMs>

under the new president. See U.S. Elections: What Do the

10 An example of international reports: U.S. bans Hungarians

Outcomes Mean for Central Europe? GLOBSEC. 5 November

from entry over corruption charges. Reuters. 18 October

2020. <https://bit.ly/3oke7jQ>

2014. <https://reut.rs/2MvKyO1>

20 Lara Jakes–Michael Crowley–David E. Sanger: Biden

11 Within the executive branch, we can primarily highlight the

Chooses Antony Blinken, Defender of Global Alliances, as

role of the president, the National Security Council, the vice-

Secretary of State. The New York Times. 22 November 2020.

president, the US Department of State and of Defense; the

<https://nyti.ms/38f7F7V>

role of the legislative branch (the House of Representatives

21 Hungary’s Orban congratulates Biden as his ‘Plan A’ for

and the Senate) may also be highlighted, but the corporate

Trump win flops. Reuters. 8 November 2020. <https://reut.

sphere (defence industry, energetics and other sectors) and

rs/2Xe2cYF>

non-governmental actors are similarly important, too,

22 According to Biden’s foreign policy plan introduced in

including foreign policy think tanks (e.g., the Atlantic Council,

early 2020 (Joseph R. Biden, Jr.: Why America Must Lead

CEPA) that follow Central European activity and are much

Again. Foreign Affairs. March/April 2020. <https://fam.

more influential compared to Central European standards.

ag/35de8OR>), an active American involvement may be

12 A. Wess Mitchell: Winning the Competition for Influence in

expected in all major global challenges including Chinese,

Central and Eastern Europe. Atlantic Council. 19 October

Russian, Iranian, and North Korean threats, climate change,

2018. <https://bit.ly/3pVPJFD> and A. Wess Mitchell: Central

and terrorism, which will put an extraordinary burden on the

Europe’s China Reckoning. The American Interest. 23 April

administration and a huge pressure to look for possible

2020. <https://bit.ly/3rOT2QF>

compromises.

13 „Trump egyszer csak azt mondta, hogy hívjuk föl Viktort!” Népszava. 15 October 2020. <https://bit.ly/3b8gHWc> 14 See the webpage of the initiative at https://3seas.eu/. 15 The American connection goes even further: although the formation was officially launched by the Prime Ministers of Poland and Croatia, the original idea had first been proposed in a study by the American think tank Atlantic Council (with the inclusion of numerous Central European authors). See Completing Europe – From the North–South Corridor to Energy, Transportation, and Telecommunications Union. Atlantic Council. 21 November 2014. <https://bit.ly/3ofxPND> 16 Secretary of state Pompeo announced that maximum of one billion dollars would be given as a contribution at the Munich Security Conference in February 2020 with the involvement of the International Development Finance Corporation. The Corporation made its decision to invest a sum of 300 million in Autumn 2020. GREAT POWERCENTRAL POLITICSEUROPE IN THE CEE ANDREGION THE EU

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RUSSIA AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE NEW COLD WAR Laura Szilágyi From the 2000s onwards, the Russian Federation has been trying to regain its great power status in the world. Russia’s grand strategy aims to shift the global balance of power and create a system of multipolarity where it can be recognised as a significant actor with its own sphere of influence. In order to achieve this goal, the power of the West—primarily that of the United States—needs to be limited and scaled back, while the Russian global influence must be increased. Moscow, therefore, tries to intensify its presence in different regions of the globe, for instance, in Central Europe.1 The Russian great-power aspiration can be observed in three different—economic, social, and political—dimensions in the Central European countries. In each of them, Russia uses different toolkits to achieve its goals. In the first dimension, Russia seeks to establish economic ties with the Central European states and to use these relations to gain influence over them and to project its power. Moscow’s number-one tool in this sphere is energy dependency. Russia is extremely rich

Chart 1: EU imports of natural gas from Russia between 2016 and 2019, trade in value (EUR billion) 35 30.7 30 25

24.7

24 21.3

20 15 10 5 0 2016 120

2017

2018

2018

CENTRAL GREAT POWER EUROPE POLITICS AND THE IN THE EU CEE REGION

in mineral fuels and other natural resources, which are the country’s main export products.2 Europe is a substantial consumer of Russian minerals, especially natural gas.3 In terms of natural gas trade, five pipelines connect Europe with Russia: the Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2, the Brotherhood, the Yamal, and the Blue Stream. The largest gas transportation routes are the Brotherhood pipelines, which can carry over 100 billion cubic metres of gas each year. They go through Ukraine to Slovakia, where they split to several directions. They deliver natural gas to Hungary, Italy, Croatia, and Slovenia. The second-largest route is the Nord Stream pipeline, which runs between Germany and Russia and has been operating since 2011.4 It can transport 55 billion cubic metres of gas each year, combined with Nord Stream 2, which has been operating since 2018. The Yamal pipeline transports the third-largest amount of natural gas—33 billion cubic metres per year. It runs through Belarus, Poland, and Germany.5 In 2019, Russia’s share in the EU-27’s import of natural gas was 44.7%. This data shows the European states’ energy dependency on Russian supplies.6 In Central Europe, Germany was the main destination of Russian mineral fuels with a 5.8% share in Russia’s fossil fuel export. It was followed by Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and Hungary, with 3.9%, 1%, 1%, and 1%, respectively.7 According to Gazprom’s 2019 report, the company delivered 57.01 billion cubic metres of gas to Germany, 16.28 billion to Austria, 9.73 billion to Poland, and 11.26 billion to Hungary. It also exported a significant amount of gas to Slovakia and Czechia.8 “Excessive dependence on Russian energy makes Europe weak,” said former Polish prime minister Donald Tusk in 2014. The disruption of energy supply can incur significant economic


losses, which can subsequently escalate into social problems, affecting countries directly. Russia has several times proved that it is not afraid to use energy coercion on states in order to promote its interests. This happened in Ukraine, for instance, when Gazprom nearly doubled the price of natural gas while Russia invaded Crimea, causing the country energy shortages and financial problems. However, this tool can also have an opposite effect to that intended. It may provoke anti-Russian sentiments in the “attacked” countries, which usually decide to reduce direct gas import from Russia as Ukraine did.9 Similarly, Central Europe also tries to reduce its energy dependency from Moscow, which can be seen in the statistics. In 2019, Russian energy product sales fell in Europe, compared to the 2016–2018 data, while the European natural gas import increased.10 Russia also increases its influence in the financial sector. The state-owned Russian banking and financial services company, Sberbank operates in eighteen foreign countries and has a relatively large commercial banking presence in Central European countries, including Austria, Czechia, Germany, and Hungary.11 Another influential Russian-led financial institute is the International Investment Bank, which has nine member states—four of them from Central Europe (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia). The chairman of the bank, Nikolay Kosov, has long-standing ties with Russian intelligence agencies, which raises concerns among Western security officials. They believe that the bank poses a security risk and operates as a Russian spy corps.12 In the social dimension, Moscow’s numberone goal is to gain a pro-Russian foothold within Central Europe. The main tools used for this are disinformation and propaganda, which typically create uncertainty within the targeted society and bring social tensions to the surface. Both confuse and overwhelm the audience and spread rapidly. The leading Russian media service providers in Central Europe are Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik. These two channels are highly responsive to events and strive to create resilient, false impressions in their audience by fake news.13

Chart 2: The extent of social vulnerability to foreign influence in the V4 countries (%) 57%

60%

51%

50% 40%

38% 30%

30% 20% 10% 0%

Czechia

Hungary

Poland

Slovakia

The content of RT and Sputnik primarily focusses on the very worst of Western society. Western countries are presented as fundamentally divided, dysfunctional, and let down by incompetent political actors. These news outlets want to arouse distrust in societies towards the West or even towards the democratically elected governments of the countries which they cover.14 Russian disinformation mostly emerges in the V4 countries. A recent study showed that Hungary is the most vulnerable to fake news, and it is followed by Slovakia, Czechia, and, finally, by Poland.15 In the political dimension, Russia seeks to establish close ties with individuals in positions of power who may serve its interests within their countries. The Kremlin typically supports rightwing parties and populist actors. Since 2014, Russia has been more assiduously courting Europe’s (far) right through official channels and has established a reliable pro-Russian stronghold in every Central European state. For example, Moscow supports the Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) in Austria, which portrays Russia as a bastion of sovereignty and cultural conservatism against the forces of liberalism destroying Europe.16 In Czechia, President Miloš Zeman is an influential Kremlin-friendly actor. He often reiterates Kremlin messages, such as denying the presence of organised Russian troops in Ukraine and demanding that Western sanctions imposed on Russia be lifted.17 The above shows how the Russian Federation’s great power aspiration in Central Europe appears GREAT POWERCENTRAL POLITICSEUROPE IN THE CEE ANDREGION THE EU

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in economic, social, and political dimensions. All three of them use soft power tools such as energy dependency, disinformation, and proRussian political actors. Moscow does not necessarily harbour the ambition to restore its old Soviet sphere of influence; rather, it wishes to weaken Western powers and shift the current global order towards multipolarism and more fragmentation. The Central European countries could primarily serve Russian interests by dividing the European community and by weakening transatlantic relations. They are all part of the Western alliances (the European Union or NATO) and can operate in favour of the Kremlin from the inside. Central European states should not let Russia exert its will and influence over them. They need to tackle this issue and take action against it in order to protect Europe’s safety and stability. It is a complex but by no means unattainable task.

10 Statistics Explained, 6–8. 11 Sberbank outside Russia. Sberbank. <https://bit. ly/354OI6y > Accessed: 22 October 2020. 12 Matt Apuzzo–Benjamin Novak: Hungary Rolls Out Red Carpet for Obscure Russian Bank, Stoking Spy Fears. The New York Times. 18 March 2019. <https://nyti.ms/3expoZP > 13 Christopher Paul– Miriam Matthews: The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model. RAND Corporation. 2016. 1–4. <https://bit.ly/2Ia78K5 > 14 Gordon Ramsay–Sam Robertshaw: Weaponizing news: RT, Sputnik and targeted disinformation. Policy Institute, Centre for the Study of Media, Communication & Power, King’s College London. January 2019. 83. <https://bit. ly/3etaTGw > 15 Daniel Milo – Katarína Klinová: Vulnerability Index. Subversive Russian Influence in Central Europe. Globsec Policy Institute. 2017. 5. <https://bit.ly/2JlZgWz > 16 Andrew S. Weiss: With Friends Like These: The Kremlin’s Far-Right and Populist Connections in Italy and Austria. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 27 February 2020. <https://bit.ly/32gkV8Q > 17 Jakub Janda: How Czech President Milos Zeman Became

ENDNOTES

Putin’s Man. Observer. 26 January 2018. <https://bit.

1 Jeremy W. Lamoreaux: The Three Motivations for an

ly/2Ia7TTr >

Assertive Russian Grand Strategy. Russian Strategic Intentions, Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) White Paper, May 2019. 1–2. 2 List of products at 2 digits level exported by Russian Federation in 2019. International Trade Centre. <https://bit. ly/3l1fjXn > Accessed: 19 October 2020. 3 List of importing markets for the product exported by Russian Federation in 2019. International Trade Centre. <https://bit.ly/3k7S50Q > Accessed: 20 October 2020. 4 Energy for Europe. The Nord Stream Pipeline Project. Nord Stream. 17 April 2014. 239 5 Tr a n s p o r t ati o n.

G a z p ro m

E x p o r t.

<ht tp s:// b i t.

ly/2Gu9kvg > Accessed: 20 October 2020. 6 Statistics Explained. EU imports of Energy Products – recent developments. European Council. 15 October 2020. 4. <https://bit.ly/3qdt7RO > 7 List of importing markets for the product exported by Russian Federation in 2019. International Trade Centre. 8 Delivery statistics, gas supplies to Europe. Gazprom Export. <https://bit.ly/3jWYqvS > Accessed: 16 October 2020. 9 Gabriel Collins: Russia’s Use of the “Energy Weapon” in Europe. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Issue Brief. 18 July 2017. <https://bit.ly/350mU2W > 122

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CHINESE INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE: MYTH OR REALITY? Tamás Matura It is always the countries on the periphery that feel the first signs of large historical turning points, since it is on the fringes that the great powers come up against each other. A glance at the map of Central Europe is enough to see how history ground up the region’s countries into small states in the last few centuries—and, although a lot of people hoped and believed so, history did not end with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the United States becoming a global hegemon. The tectonic plates of world politics are once again pushing against each other, and the speed of such changes is shown well by the fact that, mere thirty years after the end of the Cold War, we are now looking at the influence of great powers in Central European countries again. However, only a few people would have been willing to bet some decades ago that the new great power appearing in the region will be the People’s Republic of China, a country so far from here. Still, what we see today is that one of Washington’s important goals has become to oust Beijing from this region and that the European Union fears for its unity because of the Chinese influence detectable in Central Europe. The 16 + 1 (now 17 + 1) cooperation, established in 2012 to develop relations between China and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), has come under a lot of criticism since its emergence. The Western worry was that China had effectively bought the political sympathies of the region’s countries in exchange for economic advantages and established such a strong influence in the regional capitals of Central and Eastern Europe that it endangers the common China policy of the EU. In this paper, I will examine the question whether China’s role in the region is really strong enough to have a substantial influence on CEE states or this is merely a narrative amplified for political reasons.

PUPPETS ON BEIJING’S FINGERS? The first Chinese−Central and Eastern European meeting, held in Budapest in 2011, was so successful that the Chinese decided to organise a meeting of prime ministers with the participation of sixteen Central and Eastern European leaders in Warsaw the next year. This organisation, later known as 16 + 1, included eleven EU member states, and so Brussels was soon annoyed by the fact that the union’s post-communist Eastern members founded an exclusive club with the People’s Republic of China that was interfering with EU−Chinese relations. These initial worries manifested in gritty criticism, a lot of which I had the opportunity to feel personally. At a 2013 meeting in Brussels, a Western diplomat happened to claim, “China and its Eastern European partners are building a new Berlin Wall in the middle of the EU.” A few years later, at another meeting of experts in Brussels, even a statement could be made that said, “China bought the Central European states, and now they are merely puppets on Beijing’s fingers”. Meanwhile, the prestigious German Handelsblatt wrote in 2018, “EU officials said China was trying to divide Europe to strengthen its hand in relations with individual member states. Countries such as Hungary and Greece, which both rely on Chinese investment, have in the past shown they’re susceptible to pressure from China.”1 It must be noted that these accusations were not entirely unfounded, since, in recent years, it happened several times that Central and Eastern European countries that had established or were hoping to establish close relations with China went against the EU’s stand. Hungary and Croatia, for instance, prevented the union from accepting a common declaration concerning the South China Sea, GREAT POWERCENTRAL POLITICSEUROPE IN THE CEE ANDREGION THE EU

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and, what is more, Hungary was the first EU member state to join the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which both Brussels and Washington were suspicious about, and openly supported the acceptance of China’s market economy status, which the EU itself was against. It was also because of Budapest that, in March 2017, the EU could not unanimously condemn China for arresting and allegedly torturing human rights lawyers,2 while the Hungarian ambassador, alone from among the union’s delegations in Beijing, did not sign a letter criticising the BRI.3 Czech president Miloš Zeman was the EU’s only leader who took part in the military parade organised in Beijing to commemorate the anniversary of the end of World War II, while Western countries boycotted the event because of China’s ever pushier foreign policies. Meanwhile, several issues suggested that the countries of 17 + 1 have become more tolerant of Beijing’s foreign and home policies.4 A particularly spectacular example of that was seen in Serbia in recent months, where large billboards hailing the Chinese president and general secretary of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping, appeared in Belgrade, and President Vučić declared him to be his and all Serbians’ brother.5 SOURCES OF INFLUENCE Based on the above, it does not seem an entirely unfounded worry that Beijing gained substantial political influence in our region. But what could be the source of this? Were they coercive means of hard power or a kind of appeal that belongs rather to the category of soft power? It is true that, by now, China has built up one of the world’s strongest armies, but its military means cannot extend to Central and Eastern Europe. What is more, there is no strategic, security policy conflict of interest that would raise the suspicion that Beijing might want to influence CEE states by military means. We can, thus, quickly exclude this option. Another possible means of hard power— and, therefore, of influencing—is economy. In recent years, CEE countries were often accused of selling out the unity of the European 124

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Union as presented against China in exchange for business, commercial, and investment advantages. It is, thus, worth taking a closer look at how investment and trade relations between China and our region have developed in recent decades. Within 17 + 1, the most frequently mentioned objective of Central and Eastern European countries was to increase export to China, and so, when examining trade relations, this direction is of primary interest. The global financial crisis and then, the eurozone crisis urged the countries in our region to supplement the decreasing demand of the ailing Western markets by opening up Eastern markets, since foreign trade and, within it, export is an important source of growth in the region. Despite the grand foreign trade announcements and events of recent years, China is still not among the most important foreign trade partners of the region’s countries, since only an average 4% of the region’s foreign trade is conducted with the Asian state, and most of it results from our import. Naturally, it can be argued that, in the last decade, the export of Central and Eastern European countries to China has increased dynamically, as it doubled between 2009 and 2018. However, a more important question concerning the Chinese influence is how the proportions of our dependence on Chinese markets have changed. Two pieces of data need to be considered here: how important the Chinese market is now to Central and Eastern European countries, and what percentage these countries have of the European Union’s total export to China. In both cases, the reassuring answer (at least as far as the concerns about Chinese influence go) is that Central and Eastern European countries show minimal dependence on China, and, within the whole of the EU, their share in trade is negligible. The total export of the region’s countries increased dynamically in the last decade but not only to China; therefore, the weight of the Chinese market has only grown slightly in their export. While only 0.97% of the export from the countries examined ended up in China in 2009, this ratio grew to 1.3% by


Chart 1: Share of China in the total exports of CEE-11 and EU-28 and the share of CEE-11 in total EU exports to China, 2009-2018 (%) 6%

5%

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2018, so it remained negligible.6 The countries of Central and Eastern Europe provided 4.8% of the EU’s export to China in 2018, which was a mere half percentage point higher than the figure from 2009. As Chart 1 shows, the weight of China (indicated by yellow) grew more sharply within the export by the EU than within that by the region’s countries (indicated by blue), where it was characterised by stagnation following some increase. It, thus, follows that, within the total EU export to China, Central and Eastern European countries were not able to increase their rather small share. It is somewhat more difficult to track how investment relations have changed between the two parties, since the available sources of data often show differences in orders of magnitude, and the politicians involved are also keen on exaggerating the importance of Chinese investment. What seems certain is that, in the crisis-ridden years around the formation of 17 + 1, the region’s governments aimed at attracting Chinese working capital to Central and Eastern Europe in addition to increasing their export. However, the announced windfall did not come, and, to this day, Chinese working capital plays only a marginal role in the economy of the region’s countries. The main reason for this is that

2015

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the things that appeal to Chinese investors (large markets, advanced technologies, established brands, know-how, etc.) are mostly to be found in Western Europe, and, thus, Chinese capital went there in recent years. Meanwhile, the list of Chinese investments that had been promised and never happened in some CEE countries has grown considerably. There were hopeful spikes in Chinese capital invested in the region, but these often had scandalous ends, like in the Czech Republic. On the whole, what we see is that the trade and investment relations between China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are so weak that Beijing is hardly able to coerce or even influence decision making in the region’s countries significantly. More and more governments have recently come to the conclusion that they have waited for long enough for the promises to become reality, and, because of the cancelled investments, the growing deficit in foreign trade, and the ever tenser American−Chinese relations, they are rather trying to loosen their relations with China. However, China always plans for the long term, and the question arises whether the country’s soft power has grown enough in GREAT POWERCENTRAL POLITICSEUROPE IN THE CEE ANDREGION THE EU

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the Central and Eastern European region to ensure Beijing’s survival in a period of economic difficulties. Concerning this, it is worth examining what image the media creates about China and what opinion polls say. In our project called ChinfluenCE, we examined with my colleagues from the region how the media presented the news about the Chinese economy and politics in the Visegrad countries between 2010 and 2017. After processing nearly ten thousand news items, we saw that China appeared rather negatively in the region, since, in the Czech Republic, 41%, in Slovakia, 26%, and, in Hungary, 9.4% of the total news items were negative, while the proportion of positive items was 14% in the Czech Republic, 6% in Slovakia, and 4.8% in Hungary. The large number of neutral items is explained by the fact that the topics covered about China concerned economic data in most countries, and these were naturally discussed neutrally by the media. It is also revealing that politically sensitive topics (censorship, communism, Tibet and Taiwan, human rights) dominated the Czech media, which is the most critical towards China, while the discourse was primarily about bilateral economic relations in Hungary, and Slovakia was between these two. However, if we exclude the economic news items, there is a rather negative image of China prevalent in the most important countries of the region, and this is, of course, not too conducive to increasing Chinese soft power within these societies.7

Chart 2: Distribution of Chinese FDI transactions in the EU by country in 2019 (EUR billion) 60 50

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Small wonder that China sought to take the shaping of the discourse about itself into its own hands. For this, social media offers a good platform. In recent years, Chinese embassies in Central and Eastern European capital cities have registered their Facebook and Twitter profiles to present the Chinese point of view about several issues (especially the coronavirus pandemic or the events in Hong Kong) through these. However, the efficiency of these means is questionable, since Chinese social media communication can hardly be called professional. Their posts use a rather bureaucratic and propagandistic language, and so very few Central and Eastern European citizens give them credence.8 It is true that China had a definitely disadvantageous position in this region: in the countries that suffered for decades under communist oppression, the country ruled by the Chinese Communist Party could never expect a warm welcome from society in general. A spectacular example of this is the Czech Republic, where the norms and the way of thinking laid down by Václav Havel still work to elicit strong opposition to China from nearly all social strata, making the Czech Republic the most anti-China member state of the EU with 69% of its population perceiving the People’s Republic of China negatively. However, other Central and Eastern European countries cannot be called expressly China friendly either. 9 In recent months, the country’s perception deteriorated further in the region due to worldwide anti-China sentiments and the effects of the coronavirus pandemic. Chart 3 shows the data from an international survey done in the second half of 2020, which suggests that China’s positions declined in all four of the Visegrad countries, since the number of those who take a more negative view of the People’s Republic of China than before grew in each of them. The Central and Eastern European political elite has no better opinion of China. Governing parties usually seek to approach China in a purely businesslike, pragmatic manner, while the opposition is wont to bring in value-based


Chart 3: Change in the perception of China among V4 citizens in the last three years (% of respondents)

Czechia

Hungary

Poland

Slovakia

–50% –45% –40% –35% –30% –25% –20% –15% –10% –5% 0% declined

issues (human rights, Tibet, Taiwan, oppression, etc.) to the discourse, primarily to help criticise the governments. In Slovakia, China-related issues do not come up very often, but the new president, Zuzana Čaputová, was not afraid of taking the Chinese foreign minister to task in 2019 over human rights. After the earlier unanimously anti-China political climate, the Czech Republic was, for a short while, friendlier to Beijing but has now gone back to having a critical voice—and Prague was one of the first to take action against Huawei’s presence. Even Czech president Miloš Zeman, who was for a long time considered to be one of the most important allies of China in the region, threatened to cancel his participation in the next 17 + 1 summit because of the innumerable cancelled Chinese investment promises. In the end, the summit was called off due to the coronavirus pandemic. In Poland, a process reminiscent of that in the Czech Republic went down: the country’s relations with China were closer for a few years, but, then, they reversed to the degree that two Huawei employees were arrested and accused of espionage by Warsaw at the beginning of 2019. Romania has recently cancelled talks

5%

10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% improved

with the Chinese concerning the extension of the Cernavodă nuclear power plant and made a deal with an American contractor instead. Apart from these, there is a great number of smaller or larger issues that suggest that, far from increasing, Chinese influence is actually decreasing in most of the region’s countries, endangering the very survival of the 17 + 1 cooperation. The overall picture is disrupted most by Hungary, since here the governing party, which had for long had a strong antiChina stance, did an about-face following its victory at the 2010 election and has since then pursued pragmatic, occasionally friendly relations with China. 10 As nearly all Central and Eastern European EU member states made similarly sharp turns in their policies about China in the last few years, Budapest can be considered Beijing’s last friendly partner in the region—if not in the whole of Europe. AN INFLUENTIAL MIRAGE In summary, we can conclude that the main source of China’s influence in Central and Eastern Europe was the belief that the region’s countries had in economic cooperation. The promises of Chinese investment and trade opportunities GREAT POWERCENTRAL POLITICSEUROPE IN THE CEE ANDREGION THE EU

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hung like mirages in front of governments and business circles. Ironically, this image was constructed not so much by Beijing but local politicians and the media. This, of course, is not entirely specific to the region: processes of initial enthusiasm followed by disappointment also went down in numerous other countries where coming out of the crisis of the world economy or the opportunities of the Belt and Road Initiative seemed to be there for the taking. However, China’s image in the region has got worn significantly by today, and several governments have expressed their disappointment because of cancelled Chinese investments and trade opportunities. The American−Chinese rivalry, which was in the meantime intensifying, and the EU−China relations becoming tenser urged most Central and Eastern European countries to do quick changes of direction, and, thus, China’s influence, not very strong to begin with, will probably decrease further in the region, however much Beijing seeks to use coercion or some appeal on these countries.11 There is, however, a factor in our region we have not yet considered, which might have a strong influence on the role of China: Germany. Berlin is a decisive economic and political partner to nearly all Central and Eastern European countries and also a key player in EU−China relations. German economy provides 45% of EU export to China, while France is the second with a mere 22%. In the light of this, it is not surprising that Berlin has difficulties in handling the contradiction between its short-term economic interests with Beijing and its long-term strategic considerations. When Germany decides which direction to take, the way it shows will be followed by the members of the European Union and the countries of Central Europe, too.

ENDNOTES 1 Dana Heide [et al.]: EU ambassadors band together against Silk Road. Handelsblatt. 17 April 2018. <https://bit.ly/38PKxh3 > 2 Diego Torres: Why the West treats China with kid gloves. Politico. 21 June 2017. <https://bit.ly/38PKxh3 > 3 Keegan Elmer: EU presents (nearly) united front against China’s ‘unfair’ Belt and Road Initiative. South China Morning Post. 20 April 2018. <https://bit.ly/3f8APrb > 128

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4 Gisela Grieger: China, the 16+1 format and the EU. European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing PE 625.173. September 2018. <https://bit.ly/2IHXrmw > 5 Vuk Vuksanovic: China Has Its Eyes on Serbia. Foreign Policy. 8 April 2020. <https://bit.ly/3f9t7NK > 6 It is important to note that a significant but undefined part of Central and Eastern European export goes to China through Western countries, especially Germany, built into their products. However, this is hardly a way for the Chinese government to influence the leaders of these countries. 7 Ivana Karásková [et al.]: Central Europe for Sale: The Politics of China’s Influence. AMO Policy Paper 03. April 2018. <https://bit.ly/38UtLNF > 8 Karásková [et al.]: China’s propaganda and disinformation campaigns in Central Europe. AMO Briefing Paper. August 2020. <https://bit.ly/2UPTRcN > 9 Special Eurobarometer 467. Future of Europe. Social issues. European Commission. November 2017. <https:// bit.ly/3kFbhmH > 10 Matej Šimalčík [et al.]: Perception of China among V4 Political Elites. Central European Institute of Asian Studies. 29 December 2012. <https://bit.ly/32SrQp2 > 11 Ivana Kakásková [et al.]: China’s Sticks and Carrots in Central Europe: The Logic and Power of Chinese Influence. Prague, AMO, 2020.


THE CROSSED RED LINE: THE PAST, THE PRESENT, AND THE UNCLEAR FUTURE OF CHINESE–CZECH RELATIONS Lukács Krajcsír “Maybe I can be more humble [sic], but allow me to use the same determined phrase to conclude my speech in your country’s parliament, in Taiwan: I am Taiwanese,” these words were said by the president of the Senate (i.e., the upper house) of the Czech Republic at the beginning of September 2020.1 Miloš Vystrčil used John F. Kennedy’s famous phrase “Ich bin ein Berliner” to show his commitment to Taiwan. The idea of an official Czech delegation visiting the Republic of China (ROC) originally came from former Senate leader Jaroslav Kubera, but he died in January 2020. Vystrčil did not hesitate to finish what his predecessor had started—knowing that his trip and speech would definitely exasperate the People’s Republic of China (PRC). It came, therefore, as no surprise that Wang Yi threatened the leader of the Czech Senate that he would pay a “heavy price” for his visit to the ROC because Vystrčil’s act in Beijing meant “crossing the red line.” As of the writing of this article, some unanswered questions still linger among analysts and journalists. What kind of negative consequences will the trip have? Will it cause a “short setback” only with no long-standing effects? Or, on the contrary: Does this mean the beginning of a conflict-laden era in Czech– Chinese relations? Several scenarios could be outlined, but one thing seems obvious: this is not the first time that a diplomatic conflict has broken out between Beijing and Prague. Right after the end of the Cold War, China became a sensitive and divisive topic in the Czech Republic, and, for years, the disputes damaged their economic relations. However, after 2010, there were some attempts from the Czech side to improve its relations with the East Asian country. Meanwhile, it also

seemed that Beijing paid more attention to the East-Central European country. However, recent events foreshadow that this kind of “honeymoon” will be short-lived. Therefore, this article will not try to predict the future of Sino-Czech relations; rather it will analyse their three main periods. FROM A STRONGLY ANTI-CHINA STANCE . . . After the fall of the socialist system, Czechoslovakia was among the few countries that kept a distance from the PRC.2 Václav Havel followed a strong “values-over-interests” policy: the former president often criticised the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) action against the protesters in Tiananmen Square. Havel was the first-ever head of state worldwide who invited the Dalai Lama, as well as Liu Binyan and Shen Tong, two famous Chinese dissidents, to his country. 3 In 1993, when Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, China recognised both.4 While Beijing’s relations with Bratislava slowly improved, they worsened with Prague and reached their nadir in 1995: this was the year when the Czech leadership warmly welcomed Lien Chan, the premier of the ROC. Later that year, during an interview, Havel supported the idea that Taiwan should get back his seat in the United Nations. 5 Additionally, the Czech sympathy towards Tibet also started to deepen. The so-called “Flag for Tibet Day” has been organised every year since 1996, aiming at remembering the 1959 Tibetan uprising and its suppression.6 On top of that, after the Tibet uprising broke out in March 2008, the Czech leadership issued an official statement which condemned the Chinese actions. Prime Minister Mirek Topolánek even indicated his future GREAT POWERCENTRAL POLITICSEUROPE IN THE CEE ANDREGION THE EU

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Chart 1: Czech trade with China after 2008 (USD billion) 25 23.53 21.77 20.56

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absence from the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Later, several other politicians, members of government and Senate, as well as members of parliament, followed his decision and did not attend the Summer Olympics in China in August 2008. The next year, Jan Fischer—the new prime minister—received the Dalai Lama in his official residence in Prague; this act also provoked harsh comments from the PRC. For all these reasons, it is little wonder that economic relations between the two countries stayed on an extremely low level. Official visits to China, and vice versa, did not bring any significant change.7 There was a Czech trade deficit with China: in 2009, it exceeded USD 10 billion (for more about Czech trade with China, see Chart 1). Czech export products to China included manufacturing engineering products, such as steam turbines, automobiles (Škoda, 130

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2.49 2017

turnover

Tatra), engines and generators, electrical devices, textile machinery, transmission shafts, glass, chemicals, and scrap metal, while China mainly exported telecommunications devices, TV and radio accessories, integrated circuits, electrical appliances, electronic devices, chemicals, clothing, footwear, toys, canned fruits, and vegetables to the Czech Republic.8 The situation in investments was even poorer than in commerce. According to official sources, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Czech Republic did not exist until 2005. The picture was much worse on the Czech side—there was no high-prestige or highprofile investment in the East Asian country, and only few Czech trading companies, such as CzechInvest, CzechTrade, and CzechTourist, were opened in Chinese cities. The biggest hopes were pinned on the expansion of an


energy project in Shentou, a thermal power plant based on Czechoslovak technology in Shanxi Province, but this business fell through.9 . . . THROUGH A PRO-BEIJING POLICY . . . A slow adjustment in the Chinese–Czech relations came after the 2008 financial crisis. Czech business circles wanted to reduce their dependence on Western countries and to boost their economic engagement with East Asia and other regions. By 2014, China had become Czechia’s second-biggest importer—the first was Germany. Compared to the pre-2010 period, there was no significant difference in the commodity structure. A more notable change happened in Chinese FDI: it saw a dramatic increase between 2011 and 2012 (see Chart 2). The number of Chinese companies, such as Huawei or ZTE, began to rise in the Czech Republic. However, despite the increased Chinese FDI, the Czech Republic still lagged behind other East-Central European countries. Until 2015, the Chinese FDI in the Czech Republic did not even reach 0.5%, whereas the proportion of South Korean or Japanese FDI was 7% and 14%, respectively.10 While Czech politicians did not attend the Olympic Games in Beijing, Czech businessmen organised small

promotional campaigns. One of the companies was the První privatizační fond (PPF), which was founded by millionaire Petr Kellner.11 Although political relations between the two countries began developing during Prime Minister Petr Nečas (2010–2013), Miloš Zeman took more serious steps to strengthen them. The president —who assumed his office in 2013—instantly indicated his support for improving ties with Beijing. In the autumn of 2014, the Czech president travelled to the East Asian country where he met Xi Jinping; they signed several agreements, agreed to open a new Czech consulate in Chengdu (functional since 2015) and a Bank of China branch in Prague. Furthermore, Zeman never criticised the PRC’s policies and internal affairs—rather, he became one of China’s main supporters in the European Union. To prove his “independent, interest-oriented policy,” Zeman was the only high-ranking Western official who attended the Chinese Victory Day Parade in 2015.12 In 2016, for the first time since the establishment of the PRC, the Chinese president visited the Czech Republic. During his three-day stay, Xi Jinping signed twenty different commercial and investment contracts amounting to CZK 45 billion (USD 1.7 billion) with the Czech. The Chinese, for

Chart 2: Chinese direct investments to the Czech Republic, 2000–2016 (EUR million ) 400 362 350 300 250 200 150 100

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example, invested in the Czech energy industry, brewery (Lobkowitz), media (Empresa Media), and tourism (Prague–Shanghai flight). In Beijing’s global strategy, Prague started to play a unique role: in the so-called Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it was seen as a potential financial and logistics hub, and a key member of the 17 + 1 format (i.e., the Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, a.k.a. China–CCE).13 In May 2017, Zeman visited China for the third time to attend the first BRI Forum. Zeman’s fourth visit took place in 2018, when he attended the International Import Expo in Shanghai. The Czech president said in his opening speech that he “[felt] like a friend” in the East Asian country and the Czech Republic was a “faithful ally of China.”14 . . . TO A POSTURE MORE CRITICAL OF THE PRC Thanks to these official visits and successful negotiations, the Czech Republic became China’s third-largest strategic partner in the CEE region in 2016. However, despite all efforts, views extremely critical of the PRC as well as sympathy towards Taiwan remained in society. The Czech media, human rights organisations, intellectuals, and the opposition always raised their voices when they heard the news about the persecution of Chinese intellectuals, ethnic, or religious minorities. The anti-PRC camp did not stay idle when Xi visited the Czech Republic either. The protesters carried photos of Václav Havel and the Dalai Lama meeting in person in 2011. The Czech–China banners to welcome President Xi Jinping were hit with paintballs. The pro-China demonstrators were sponsored by the Chinese embassy, and they clashed with the proTibet protesters in parks and on the street.15 In October 2016, Minister of Culture Daniel Herman of the junior government party, the Christian and Democratic Union—Czechoslovak People’s Party, met the Dalai Lama, who arrived in Prague to attend the Forum 2000 conference.16 Other Czech political actors also joined the campaign: in recent years, members of conservative–liberal parties (TOP09), the liberal party (Pirátí!, i.e., the Czech Pirate Party), activists, 132

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and independent mayors hoisted Taiwanese and Tibetan flags on administrative buildings. In 2019, there was a “dogfight” between the Chinese embassy and the Czech opposition, when the latter supported the protests in Hong Kong. As a result, Beijing did not extend its sister-city partnership with Prague.17 On 13 January 2020, the administration of the capital city welcomed Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je, and then Zdenek Hřib, the mayor of Prague, made a sister-city agreement with Taipei. As a retaliation, the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government decided to sever its sistercity ties with the Czech capital because “the Czech Republic [had] repeatedly made wrongful moves on the Taiwan question.”18 However, it was not only ideological or political factors that caused friction between the parties. It sparked an outrage when Zeman—first among European leaders—appointed a Chinese businessman, Ye Jianming, the CEO of the CEFC China Energy Company Limited, as his economic adviser. This act proved to be very mischievous: every year since 2015, the Czech Security Information Service has reported that, apart from the Russians, the Chinese intelligence services are also very active in the country.19 They also revealed that the Chinese embassy had secretly funded the activities of an academic centre at Charles University and financed a course designed to spread Chinese narratives on the BRI.20 As a result of such analyses and media covers, China’s reputation among the Czech remained bad. According to the social research company STEM Institute’s opinion poll data in 2019, 41% of the respondents thought negatively about the East Asian country—China’s prestige in Czechia was the lowest compared to twenty-two other countries.21 It was only a matter of time before these negative views infiltrated the state level. The first problems appeared in October 2017, after the political party ANO (Akce nespokojených občanů, Action of Dissatisfied Citizens) had won the Czech legislative election. The new prime minister, Andrej Babiš, underlined his “pragmatic but careful” approach to China many times. In July 2018, he criticised that China prioritised acquisitions over greenfield investments. Prior to


the 17 + 1 summit, Babiš said, “In the past, many [Czech] politicians went there [to China], but there were not any results.” He also added that Czech exports to China “had risen just by 160 million dollars between 2017 and 2018, while China had increased its imports to the Czech Republic by 6 billion dollars.”22 There is another reason why billionaire Babiš became critical of China. It is Petr Kellner, who is described as his main rival in the country—especially in the economic sector. Kellner not only has strong ties with Huawei but also uses the Chinese tech giant to develop the country’s 5G network, which Babiš wants to prevent.23 A surprising turn of events in recent years is that even Zeman has lost his faith in Beijing. The first sign was in March 2018, when Jianming was detained and put under investigation on suspicion of economic crime in the PRC. His company, CEFC, was blocked from acquiring the 50% share of the J&T Financial Group because of “transparency problems.” Since he was missing, the Czech leadership could not negotiate with Chinese companies—and, two years later, Prague admitted that the Chinese businessman is no more an advisor to Zeman. During his fifth visit to China, the Czech head of state acknowledged the absence of any big Chinese investors and stressed that Beijing should be more active in connecting the Czech Republic to the BRI.24 Before COVID-19 became a global pandemic, Zeman had announced that he would skip a summit between Chinese and European leaders in April and would not attend the 17 + 1 summit either. According to South China Morning Post reporter Keegan Elmer, Zeman “feels that promises made to him personally were not fulfilled, since he has had personal contact with Xi Jinping on a number of occasions.”25 Maybe these words are a little excessive, but they contain a seed of truth: analysts and experts underlined that the promised Chinese FDI, amounting to CZK 100 million (USD 4.3 million), is still not facilitated. At the same time, Czech companies’ business did not go well in the East Asian country either. The Czech Home Credit abandoned the idea of a USD 1.5 billion initial public offering in Hong Kong because investors demanded a lower

valuation. And while the Czech export to China grew in 2019, reaching USD 25 billion, it still lags behind the USD 28 billion Chinese export to the country.26 TWILIGHT OR DAWN? As of the writing of this article, it is still unclear what kind of consequences COVID-19 will have on international relations. Many suggest that one of the main negative changes will happen in the relations with and/or attitudes towards China. The growing tension between Beijing and Prague could be an example of this process. It definitively started before the emergence of the coronavirus but intensified during the year 2020. Moreover, many analysts and economists wrote that, despite all former efforts, the Czech Republic’s economic relations with the PRC remained less fruitful than those with the ROC. Some even jumped to the conclusion that Prague must enhance its relations with Taiwan— no matter the cost.27 So, when Vystrčil’s trip to Taiwan began at the end of August, it did not mean the first, rather the “next level” in the Sino-Czech conflict. Nevertheless, Miloš Zeman in his speech on China’s National Day on 1 October urged cooperation and the restoration of relations with China. Will that be enough to appease Beijing and pretend nothing has happened? Whatever the answer might be, it is without doubt that a new era has begun in the Chinese–Czech relations.

ENDNOTES 1 Nick Aspinwall: Czech Delegation Pledges Support for Taiwan, Vows Not to Bow to Chinese Threats. The Diplomat. 5 September 2020. <https://bit.ly/39pkiOP > 2 For more details about the Cold War era, see Rudolf Fürst– Gabriela Pleschová: Czech and Slovak Relations with China: Contenders for China’s Favour. Europe-Asia Studies. 2010/7. 1363–1381. 3 Fürst–Pleschová, 1366. 4 This article focusses only on Sino-Czech relations. For more about the Slovakian case, see Barbara Kelemen [et al.]: Slovakia and China: Challenges to the future of the relationship. Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CIEAS), Bratislava, 2020.; Richard Q. Turcsányi: Chinese financial presence in GREAT POWERCENTRAL POLITICSEUROPE IN THE CEE ANDREGION THE EU

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Slovakia and Slovak China-policy. In: Chinese investments and

Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland,

financial engagement in Visegrad countries: myth or reality?,

Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The initiative was

edited by Ágnes Szunomár. Institute of World Economics,

launched in 2012, when Jiabao, the Chinese prime minister of

Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of the Hungarian

that time, had a meeting with the leaders of sixteen Central and

Academy of Sciences, Budapest, 2014. 89–107.

Eastern European countries in Warsaw. In 2019, Greece joined

5 Fürst–Pleschová, 1369.

the group. For more about the cooperation, see Chen Xin: The

6 Informace o kampani Vlajka pro Tibet. Lungta. <https://bit.

Thriving China–CEEC Cooperation. In Focus. 2018/2. 51–58.

ly/2I7zyEA > Accessed: 2 November 2020.

14 Alžběta Bajerová–Richard Q. Turcsányi: Between Defender

7 Until 2016, a Chinese president has never visited the Czech

of Values and Faithful Ally: Czech Approaches to China in the

Republic. The first-ever visit of the Chinese prime minister

Prism of Role Theory Approach. Studia Orientalia Slovaca.

happened only in 2005. From the Czech side, President Václav

2019/2. 112.

Klaus visited the East Asian country in 2004. The China-visiting

15 Živě: Ať je Česko pro Čínu nerušeným přístavem, řekl

Czech prime ministers were Václav Klaus (1994), Miloš Zeman

Zeman. Pak zahájil ohňostroj. Aktuálně.cz. 29 March 2016.

(1999), and Jiří Paroubek (2005).

<https://bit.ly/3p2l1e0 >

8 Rudolf Fürst: Czech–Chinese relations: Evaluation of

16 Bajerová–Turcsányi, 109.

economic ties. In: Chinese investments and financial

17 Peking vypověděl sesterské partnerství s Prahou, základy

engagement in Visegrad countries: myth or reality?, edited by

pro něj už prý neexistují. Lidovky.cz. 10 October 2019. <https://

Ágnes Szunomár. Institute of World Economics, Centre for

bit.ly/3ets2j9 >

Economic and Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of

18 Matej Šimalčík–Adam Kalivoda: Sister-City Relations and

Sciences, Budapest, 2014. 77–78.

Identity Politics: The Case of Prague, Beijing, Taipei, and

9 The Czechoslovak technology equipped six units that were

Shanghai. The Diplomat. 25 February 2020. <https://bit.

built during the communist era in 1979–1989. The enlargement

ly/3jWrwLX >

of two more units, 500 MW each, was made by Czech and

19 Tomáš Hošek: At Times of Intensified Enemy Espionage,

Slovakian companies. The contract for the Shentou project was

Czech President Attacks Counterintelligence Service.

finally signed in 1999. However, for political (i.e., the Kosovo

European Security Journal. 27 December 2018. <https://bit.

War) and human rights reasons, the Czech side did not accept

ly/3p19pbe >

the final price that was reduced from the originally claimed

20 Kelemen [et al.], 34.

USD 400 million to USD 280 million.

21 Hodnocení vztahu českých občanů k vybraným zemím

10 Václav Kopecký–Alice Rezková: Will Prague be rewarded for

Evropy a světa. STEM. 12 August 2019. <https://bit.

its new attitude to China? Euractiv. 29 March 2020. <https://bit.

ly/3mXWTY6 >

ly/32hul43 >

22 Byznys se pohnul hlavně ve prospěch Číny, řekl Babiš po

11 The PPF is a financial group, which opened the Home Credit

jednání s čínským premiérem. Aktuálně.cz. 11 April 2019.

financial services as the provider of non-cash loans to retail

<https://bit.ly/32fzDwO >

customers for purchasing consumer goods. The main targeted

23 Lenka Ponikelska–Krystof Chamonikolas: Czech Billionaire

markets are Western Europe, Central Europe, Russia, Central

Could Get Caught Up in Huawei Spying Scandal. Bloomberg.

Asia, India, China, and Vietnam. The PPF Group received the

6 March 2019. <https://bloom.bg/2TSXWMC >

first-ever non-banking license of this kind in China in 2007 and

24 Nejsem spokojen, investujte v Česku víc, řekl Zeman v

established its headquarters in Tianjin city. As of 1 January

čínské televizi. Idnes. 23 April 2019. <https://bit.ly/38fALEG >

2020, PPF Group’s assets are worth USD 56.6 billion, and the

25 Keegan Elmer: Why the ‘honeymoon is over’ between the

number of its employees is 158,000.

Czech Republic and China. South China Morning Post. 18

12 Česko nepodléhá tlaku Ameriky a Evropské unie jako dřív,

January 2020. <https://bit.ly/32hALQF >

sdělil prezident Zeman čínské televizi. Aktuálně.cz. 28 March

26 Stuart Lau: The Czech Republic’s relationship with China?

2016. <https://bit.ly/364NIyp >; Runya T. Qiaoan: Czech

It’s complicated. South China Morning Post. 3 November 2020.

President Zeman at Chinese V-day Parade. Central European

<https://bit.ly/3l1fv9i >

Institute of Asian Studies. 8 September 2015. <https://bit.

27 Jaroslav Krejčí–Adam Mašek: Tchaj-wan je pro český

ly/3kZVeB5 >

byznys důležitým partnerem, Číně navzdory. Hospodářské

13 The 17 + 1 countries are China, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina,

noviny. 9 June 2020. <https://bit.ly/3jYbWiU >

Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, 134

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EMMANUEL MACRON’S VISION ON CENTRAL EUROPEAN GEOPOLITICS Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse Historically, French policy towards Central Europe had three basic goals. First, it was about gaining political and economic influence in the region. It was important to win the countries of the region over to the geopolitical objectives of Paris and to expand the market for French goods and investments. The second goal was to weaken the influence of France’s greatest rivals in the region. French support for the so-called Little Entente in the interwar period, primarily aimed to weaken the efforts of the Kingdom of Hungary to revise its borders after World War I, could serve as an example of this. Nevertheless, it was also supposed to indirectly limit the German Reich’s influence in the region. The aim was, therefore, to play a geopolitical game and either weaken the cohesion within the entire region or limit the influence of France’s rivals there and, thus, reduce their potential. Finally, the third goal was to stabilise the region within a geopolitical order favouring French influence. Paris has tried many times in history to construct a European order within which France would be given a privileged place. In the event of its construction, it was also important to stabilise this order. During the interwar period, France supported the arrangement of the Little Entente, thus defending the geopolitical order in Europe after the Treaty of Versailles (1919) and the treaty signed in the Palace of Grand Trianon (1920). It seems that all these historical tendencies have been present in Emmanuel Macron’s politics. Firstly, the president has safeguarded French interests, both economic and geopolitical. This is revealed by Macron’s visit to Poland in February 2020. The French wanted to interest the Poles in French military weapons and nuclear technology to produce electricity.1 At the same time, he wanted to encourage the hosts to support the French ideas of deepening

the European integration in defence and climate policies. Poland was primarily treated as a market for French products and technology. Simultaneously, Poland was to join the French plans in European politics, even though they aroused controversy in Warsaw. The ambitious changes in the climate policy proposed by Paris were difficult for Warsaw because the Polish economy is based on coal and natural gas as the main sources of energy. The transformation of the economy into a lowemissions economy would have been particularly costly for the Polish budget, domestic entrepreneurs, and individual energy recipients. At the same time, the climate policy promoted by Paris in the European Union was particularly beneficial for France—French companies could offer countries, such as Poland, their technologies, including the expensive nuclear energy technology. Moreover, the burdens resulting from climate transformation would

The countries of the Little Entente after World War I

CZECHOSLOVAKIA ROMANIA

YUGOSLAVIA

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Chart 1: Structure of electricity production in Poland, 1990–2017 (TWh)

have limited the competitiveness of the Polish economy based primarily on low production costs. It was, therefore, beneficial for the French economy, which rivalled Polish enterprises on the internal market. In the case of EU defence policy, France’s goal has for years been to support the development of an arms industry cartel built around French and German companies.2 Simultaneously, it has aimed at facilitating the sale of weapons produced by this cartel on the EU internal market and, at the same time, hindering that weapons manufactured outside the EU, especially in the US, can access this market. Poland, as one of the largest arms importers in the European Union, was an obvious target for such a policy. Macron’s visit to Warsaw aimed to increase the chances of Poland purchasing French weapons. On the other hand, the European regulations proposed by Paris intended to force the opening of the public procurement market in the EU countries, including Central Europe, and, at the same time, to impede that American weapons can access them. It should be recalled that the Polish government signed a USD 4.6 billion deal to buy thirty-two F-35 fighters from the US in 2020 and spent USD 4.75 billion on US-made

on in Poland in 1990–2017 136

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Patriot anti-missile batteries in 2018. Warsaw has also pushed hard to have US troops permanently stationed on Polish soil.3 Poland and the rest of Central Europe, however, were perceived more as a sales market rather than a partner in geopolitical relations. The French vision for relations with Central Europe was, therefore, asymmetric in nature and, consequently, unilaterally beneficial for France. Macron, who in 2019 declared, “What we are currently experiencing [in the era of Donald Trump] is the brain death of NATO,” has been trying to find a new geopolitical balance for the EU that relies less on American power. That meant ensuring cordial ties with Russia but also beefing up European defence capabilities. The effort gained new urgency in the wake of Brexit, as the UK remained a NATO ally but was no longer part of any EU defence initiatives. Although Macron tried to convince Poland to reconcile itself with Russia, he did so without faith in success. During a visit to Warsaw, he called for a “new architecture of confidence and security” in Europe that includes Russia because, as he said, “when I look at a map . . . we see that Russia is in Europe.”4 However, it was difficult to find an agreement between the French president and


the authorities in Warsaw on this key issue. That is why Macron preferred to talk to Chancellor Merkel and directly to Vladimir Putin about the EU’s eastern policy. Central Europe was only supposed to be a silent witness to these arrangements and then to implement them. France has been treating the policies of the European Union as a platform for pursuing French economic and geopolitical interests. In the case of the economy, it meant to shape the EU regulations in particular areas in a way that would be beneficial for French producers while burdening partners from other countries, including new EU members from Central Europe, with costs. Apart from the climate policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy, the internal market policy should be mentioned as a case in point. Macron initiated a project to limit the arrival of posted workers from Central Europe to France, which was one of his greatest election promises in the 2017 presidential campaign.5 That is why he promoted the change of the European regulation concerning these employees. The aim was to make their financial benefits equal to that of local workers, thus increasing the costs of posting workers from Central Europe. This led to a reduction in the influx of cheaper and, therefore, more competitive labour from this region to Western European countries. The proposed directive was, therefore, unfavourable to the countries of Central Europe and for the economic model prevailing in those countries that based their competitiveness on low production and service costs. Macron’s goal was to limit the power of Central European economies in the EU internal market through regulatory changes. Thus, competitiveness was no longer determined by market forces but by political power to introduce top-down legislation. To this end, Macron mobilised a coalition of countries from the western part of the EU which could vote against opponents from Central Europe. In addition, he decided to divide Central Europe itself. To achieve this, he made a tour of Central European countries in the summer of 2017 in order to gain favour for the draft amendment of the Posted Workers Directive. Simultaneously, he intentionally bypassed Poland—a great opponent

of French plans in the matter. The tactic of “divide and rule” ( “divide et impera”) in relation to Central Europe was successful, as some countries of the region supported the French proposals. The regulation was adopted by majority vote in the European Council in 2018. Poland and Hungary voted against the final adoption of the directive. Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia, and the United Kingdom abstained. The aim of this French policy was, therefore, to break the unity of Central Europe as long as it was united against France’s interests in European politics. Another challenge was the weakening of German influence in the region. Germany was an indispensable ally to Paris’s European policy, but it increasingly exceeded France’s geopolitical potential, especially economically. An important consequence of the growing power of Germany was disputes between Paris and Berlin about the future of integration and, more precisely, Berlin’s assertiveness towards some French proposals. Therefore, the aim of French diplomacy was not only to win Germany over to French ideas but also to try to limit its political base, especially if it could be mobilised against Paris. Central Europe has for many years been perceived as not only an important reservoir of Berlin’s economic power but also a group of allies for German policy in Brussels. Paris took this opportunity to weaken Germany’s allies in European politics. There was a dispute over the rule of law in the EU in which Hungary and Poland, and soon Bulgaria, were accused of violating EU values. Paris usually stigmatised these countries for their actions in domestic politics

Emmanuel Macron and Andrzej Duda in during the French president’s visit to Poland in February 2020 GREAT POWERCENTRAL POLITICSEUROPE IN THE CEE ANDREGION THE EU

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Macron called for a “new architecture of confidence and security” in Europe that includes Russia—this goes against what many Central Europeans think.

and demanded sanctions from the EU. The aim was not only to support European values, which, in the EU, were usually interpreted liberally, i. e. in a way proximate to Macron’s reading. It seems to have been more important to drive a wedge into the political cooperation between Germany and Central European countries, thus limiting Berlin’s means for using the support of its usual allies. This was above all visible in relation to Viktor Orbán, whose party, Fidesz, was in the same European political group as the German Christian Democrats of Chancellor Angela Merkel. The governments of Hungary and Poland, discredited in the European arena, were losing their credibility and influence as potential allies to Berlin. This was especially true when there were additional disputes between them, as it was the case between the Polish and German governments after 2015. It is worth noting that the French move was also about discrediting the governments of Central Europe which have repeatedly opposed Paris’s ideas about the future of the EU. Poland, together with Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Estonia, blocked the attempt to move towards zero emissions by 2050 at an EU summit in June 2019. In response to this, in one of his interviews, the French president criticised Poland for blocking the fight against climate change. He also told young people to travel to Poland to voice their protest.6 In Macron’s policy, the dominant game was to divide Central Europe or weaken it, for example, by criticising the violation of the rule of law and democratic backsliding. In one of his interviews 138

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with the French weekly Le Point, Macron said that the policies of the Polish government undermined the rule of law and that Poland did not speak for all of Eastern Europe.7 It was about breaking the cohesion of Central Europe which was against French goals in European politics. It was similar in the case of migration policy. Macron said EU countries that had failed to show solidarity on migration should be kicked out of the passportfree Schengen area. “Countries that don’t want more Frontex or solidarity will leave Schengen. Countries that don’t want more Europe will no longer touch structural funds,” he said.8 Simultaneously, in relation to the intransigent position of the Visegrad Group states, he said that he would not “cede any ground to nationalists and those who advocate hate speech.”9 Thus, regional cooperation in Central Europe was treated by Paris as a threat, not as an opportunity for French diplomacy. Only to a slight extent were attempts made to win the favour of the countries of this region, not to mention more permanent allied relations. There was a game aimed at weakening Berlin’s potential allies or the opponents to Paris’s initiatives. All this indicated that the countries of the region in question were not treated seriously as real players and partners of French diplomacy. Even if Paris was trying to have these countries on its side, its initiatives were ad hoc, as in the case of the Posted Workers Directive, or the political benefits offered to the countries of Central Europe were limited to empty declarations and less meaningful gestures. French politicians noticed the development of Central European economies as well as their growing importance in international politics. For example, it was difficult to implement the French policy aimed at rapprochement with Russia or increasing Europe’s strategic autonomy towards the US against Poland and other countries in the region. Nevertheless, it did not fundamentally change Macron’s course towards the discussed part of the EU. Macron’s policy towards Central Europe was dominated by a pragmatic approach. The region was, first of all, an increasingly developing market for French goods and services. Potentially, it could also support French ideas about the future


of European integration. The problem was that many of Macron’s proposals were supposed to improve the situation in France at the expense of Central European countries. This was also the case with migration policy, climate policy, and the Posted Workers Directive. Since Central European countries were not enthusiastic about French ideas, they had to be punished by either being stigmatised for violating the rule of law or by being threatened with the withdrawal of EU funds. Macron has repeatedly criticised “illiberal” forces in Eastern Europe and suggested that they used Europe as a “supermarket.” According to him, “Europe is a common destiny. It is weakened when it accepts its principles being rejected. The countries in Europe that don’t respect the rules should have to face political consequences. And that’s not just an East–West debate.”10 Another way to weaken the role of this region in the EU was through his ideas of a multispeed Europe. The French president has made it clear he favours a multispeed Europe based on deepening integration among Eurozone members, going as far as having a separate Eurozone budget, finance minister, and parliament. That could mean less cash and influence for eastern countries like Poland which do not use the common currency.11 Such an approach resulted from underestimating Central Europe’s potential and from a disrespectful attitude towards the new member states among the French elite. Therefore, Macron’s policy brought about only short-term benefits. It is certainly difficult to talk about a good and lasting alliance between France and the region. Sometimes there has even been a cool-down of mutual relations, as it was the case between Paris and Warsaw after 2015. As a result, France froze its cooperation within the Weimar Triangle, a grouping of France, Germany, and Poland. Another effect of Paris’s attitude was the growing tensions and divisions between the western and eastern parts of the EU. Macron had no problem with limiting integration to the Western European core of the founding states of the European Communities, excluding Central Europe. This was the purpose of proposals for deepening integration within the euro area.12 However, Berlin prevented these fractures only

to a limited extent. Admittedly, Angela Merkel did not want a deeper integration within the euro area and, thus, a division into a two-speed Europe. Nevertheless, she succumbed to the political rhetoric coming from Paris, which essentially contributed to splitting up the EU into two parts. In this way, instead of stabilising the geopolitical order within the EU, Macron’s policy contributed to its decomposition.

ENDNOTES 1 Macron: France to support Poland’s transition away from coal. TVN24. 3 February 2020. <https://bit.ly/2HyhGCR > 2 Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse: Development of Defense Policy and Armaments Industry in the European Union. In: Fuel for Dominance. On the Economic Bases of Geopolitical Supremacy, edited by Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse. Peter Lang, Berlin, 2020. 189–236. 3 Rym Momtaz: Macron torn between Poland and Putin. Politico. 4 February 2020. <https://politi.co/37UGPm1 > 4 Momtaz. 5 Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse: A Social Europe or a more protectionist one? The single market in the aftermath of the crises. In: A ‘Social Turn’ in the European Union? New trends and ideas about social convergence in Europe, edited by Jacek Kubera–Tomasz Morozowski. Routledge, London–New York, 2020. 33–54 6 Valérie Hacot–Pauline Théveniaud: Sur l’immigration, Macron chasse à droite. Le Parisien. 16 September 2019. <https://bit.ly/3jzpJvR > 7 Laureline Dupont–Etienne Gernelle–Sébastien Le Fol: EXCLUSIF. Emmanuel Macron : le grand entretien. Le Point. 30 August 2017. <https://bit.ly/3e4JRou > 8 Jacopo Barigazzi: Macron: EU migration holdouts should be booted out of Schengen. Politico. 20 September 2018. <https://politi.co/31Q2V5e > 9 Esther King: Macron: Orbán and Salvini are right to ‘see me as their main opponent.’ Politico. 29 August 2018. <https:// politi.co/2JfRBZG > 10 Esther King: Emmanuel Macron: ‘Europe is not a supermarket.’ Politico. 22 June 2017. <https://politi. co/35G1JCt > 11 Claudia Ciobanu: Why Poles are bearish on Emmanuel Macron. Politico. 6 June 2017. <https://politi.co/3jE45GZ > 12 Initiative pour l’Europe — Discours d’Emmanuel Macron pour une Europe souveraine, unie, démocratique. Élysée. 26 September 2017. <https://bit.ly/37MNMoT > GREAT POWERCENTRAL POLITICSEUROPE IN THE CEE ANDREGION THE EU

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A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP? THE UK’S RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL EUROPE AND ITS COUNTRIES POST–EU EXIT Levente Nyitrai To those following international affairs, one of the most memorable events of 2016 was, no doubt, the United Kingdom’s vote on its membership of the European Union (EU). Originally promised by the then prime minister David Cameron in the so-called Bloomberg speech in January 2013, the possibility of an in/out referendum became a certainty following the Conservative Party’s victory at the 2015 parliamentary elections. In line with their election manifesto (which stated that the question would be put to vote before the end of 2017), the referendum took place on 23 June 2016. Over 33 million people took part in it, the majority of whom opted for ending the forty-year-long relationship with the EU. The close, but final outcome came as a surprise to many. It resulted in a change of prime minister and government, as well as the establishment of a new ministry, the Department for Exiting the European Union. DExEU, as was commonly known, was tasked to oversee negotiations relating to the United Kingdom’s (UK) exit from the EU and to help establish the future relationship between London and Brussels. The referendum’s outcome, as well as these changes, raised various questions about the UK’s future foreign policy directions, most notably on its relations with the EU as a whole and with its members bilaterally. The British leadership, however, has made it clear that the vote was not a rejection of the values they share as fellow Europeans, nor was it an attempt to do harm to the EU or any of the remaining member states. The United Kingdom’s departure from the EU, as members of the British Government regularly point out, does not mean the country would not wish to remain a committed partner and ally to its friends 140

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across the continent. In today’s interconnected world, no one could seriously believe that it makes sense to turn inwards. As one of the five members of the UN Security Council, the largest European contributor to NATO, and the leader of the Commonwealth of Nations (as well as the home of its headquarters), the United Kingdom’s international weight and dedication to playing an active and influential role in international and global affairs could hardly be questioned. The departure from the EU is not changing this direction and will not result in the UK’s turning its back on the continent. On the contrary, as Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab has pointed out, the UK wants a relationship with the EU and its members which is based on friendly cooperation between sovereign equals, centred on free trade, and inspired by their shared history and values. At the time of writing (autumn 2020), negotiations on future relations are still ongoing between London and Brussels; therefore, it is not yet known what the exact relationship would look like between the UK and the EU starting 1 January 2021. However, whatever the outcome, Central European countries, as well as the region as a whole, would have the opportunity to explore novel ways of cooperation with the UK in the newly emerging set-up. As the EU’s multilateral platform is phased out of these relationships, direct engagement would have the potential to significantly increase. Those bilateral discussions formerly taking place in the corridors of EU institutions or on the margins of EU meetings will now, understandably, move to the respective capitals and London. The value and significance of this change are indeed


recognised by the UK. Prime Minister Boris Johnson himself has recently said, “We are leaving the EU but we are not leaving Europe. We remain strongly committed to our bilateral relationships in Europe.” In that spirit, since the outcome of the referendum, the then Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO, today known as the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office or FCDO) has started to lay the foundations of strengthened bilateral relations across EU countries, including Central Europe. Amongst others, over fifty additional diplomatic posts have been created at British embassies in EU capitals. At the same time, the UK’s treasury provided additional funding for bilateral projects across the EU. As a result, the socalled programme funding (including Prosperity Funding, Global Britain Funding, or the Enabling Fund), which allocates resources to British diplomatic missions in Europe, as well, increased significantly. These additional resources made it possible for British embassies across the continent to support worthwhile initiatives (including the Antall József Knowledge Centre’s annual Foreign and Security Policy Conference in 2020), to signal UK commitment, and to help further strengthen the foundations of joint and mutually beneficial cooperation. And the scope for close future collaboration, may it be regional or bilateral, certainly seems to be on the rise. Amongst many others, enhanced cooperation in the post-transition period starting on 1 January 2021 in areas such as prosperity, foreign policy, defence and security, or peopleto-people links presents new prospects for the further strengthening of relationships. Let us take a closer look at them one by one. PROSPERITY Promoting prosperity has long been a high priority for the UK. Even before the referendum, the British government launched the so-called GREAT campaign, which is, as described in its manifesto, the “UK government’s most ambitious international promotional campaign, uniting the efforts of the public and private sector to generate jobs and growth.” In the first

three years after its 2012 launch, over GBP 113 million was invested in the campaign, which should certainly be interpreted as a clear sign of the government’s commitment. The campaign had a targeted focus on business opportunities and economic cooperation in Central Eastern European countries, as well. The UK’s enthusiasm about and emphasis on the region to boost trade cooperation and to enhance economic opportunities have remained strong since. Not only did it fail to fade postreferendum, but London has also reaffirmed its commitment to further widen its scope and level of activities. After the vote, the UK government’s department working with businesses to assist their success in international markets, the socalled UK Trade and Investment (UKTI) body, was modernised and transformed into the Department for International Trade (DIT). Its managing director at the time, Michelle Thorpe, said that the aim of this change was to be able to capitalise fully on the UK’s departure from the European Union. Her words were followed by action. By 2020, over seventy DIT colleagues worked in British embassies across Central Europe to take on prosperity and investment promotion work and to contribute to building new economic bridges between the UK and countries in the region. But simply having your feet on the ground without financial backing hardly could achieve ambitious prosperity goals. For this reason, the UK launched the so-called Europe Prosperity Programme in 2017. It is focussed on the UK and the Single European Market with the aim of promoting and furthering projects in support of UK and European prosperity. With a generous launching budget of GBP 750,000 (which further increased over time), it supports a range of work including smart and clean cities, green finance, artificial intelligence, pan-European supply chains, digital sector development, and fintech. And Central Europe certainly benefits from this stepped-up engagement. One of many recent examples is the Smart Cities Project for Central Europe which started in March 2020 and is still ongoing. It involves ten Central European and Western Balkan countries GREAT POWERCENTRAL POLITICSEUROPE IN THE CEE ANDREGION THE EU

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(Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia), engaging more than fifty cities, organising webinars and sharing best practices between UK cities and UK tech companies with partners in the region. As part of the project, for example, a memorandum of understanding on smart cities’ cooperation has recently been signed between Milton Keynes and the Hungarian town of Paks, laying the foundations for close future cooperation. The number of such engagements between the UK and Central European countries is only likely to increase in the future, with a significant amount of potential cooperation on artificial intelligence, hydrogen, clean energy, or green public procurement awareness–raising activities, just to name a few. FOREIGN POLICY As an outward-looking, seafaring nation, with historical links to almost every corner of the globe, the UK will always make foreign policy one of its top priorities. A Foreign Office with close to a quarter of a millennium of experience and with over two hundred diplomatic missions around the world maintaining its global presence ensures that the UK remains internationally recognised and significant. Building new alliances as well as maintaining and strengthening existing ones have long been a British tradition. Moreover, with the UK’s exiting the European Union, this tradition will not change whether around the world or within Europe and its regions. The year 2021 will be a great example of that. In a year of international leadership, the UK will have the presidency of the G7, organise and host COP26, and celebrate the 75th anniversary of the first United Nations General Assembly Meeting in London. At the same time, the foundations of the UK’s new foreign policy relations and cooperation with the European Union, its regions, and its member states will also be laid. And, given the strong historical and cultural links as well as the similar foreign policy objectives and shared values, such as standing up for universal human rights and 142

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defending the international rules-based order, these relationships are indeed likely to be active and strong. We can already see a number of examples of that across the continent, including Central Europe. The UK and countries in the region have mutually invested a substantial amount of time and energy in the recent past to significantly strengthen ties. Since the referendum, a British prime ministerial visit to Warsaw, the hosting of two special British–Central European foreign ministerial meetings in Chevening, or the inauguration of the new British Embassy in Budapest by the then FCO minister Sir Alan Duncan have taken place. These, as well as dozens of similar examples, signalled the UK’s strong commitment to future bilateral foreign policy cooperation with Central European partners. Regional engagements are also likely to gain further momentum. Since the referendum, the UK has continued to represent itself on the highest level at the Northern Future Forum (organised by the Northic-Baltic Cooperation), reaffirmed its openness to cooperation with the Three Seas Initiative and their countries, expressed readiness to high-level UK and Visegrad Four meetings, and, as underlined by the then FCO Deputy Political Director Jill Gallard at the Antall József Knowledge Centre’s 2019 security policy conference, voiced its wish to work closely with Central Europe on helping the Western Balkans. And Hungary’s upcoming Visegrád Four Presidency starting in July 2021 could offer as yet another unique opportunity to further deepen such mutually beneficial relationships. DEFENCE AND SECURITY The UK is a nuclear power with a serious defence industry and with the largest European contribution to NATO. These will remain unchanged now that the country is outside the European Union. What will also remain the same is the UK’s dedication to contributing to European security and to continuing with cooperating with friends and allies on shared threats and challenges. There is no reason


why there should not be close cooperation on a wide range of issues including Iran, Libya, climate change, or Russia, for instance. COVID-19 has also been exacerbating security threats and challenges and demonstrated that it is more important than ever that alliances and partnerships be strengthened among countries that share common interests and values. The UK believes that a strong transatlantic partnership is fundamental to European security. And, while the UK has left the EU, it wants to continue to advocate an open and inclusive approach to the development of EU initiatives and full coherence with NATO. It will remain in the UK’s interest to see a globally competitive and outward-facing European defence, industrial, and technological base, driving innovation and delivering capabilities that complement NATO’s core competencies. The UK will continue to engage constructively with the EU and its member states, including Central Europe, in areas of shared interests, such as the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, and priority regions of Africa; it will remain a supportive voice on the EU’s common security and defence policy.

Defence and security will remain a high priority for Britain. Prime Minister Boris Johnson signalled that clearly in his November 2020 announcement on the biggest programme of investment in British defence for thirty years. With increased defence spending of GBP 16.5 billion over four years, the UK will set up a new agency dedicated to artificial intelligence, create a National Cyber Force and a new ”Space Command,” capable of launching its first rocket in 2022. These strengthened capabilities will allow the UK to face current and future security challenges more successfully and to support European allies better to be able to do the same. And, despite fears, the level of engagement on defence and security between the UK and EU member states, including Central European countries, has remained high since the referendum. In 2017, a new treaty on defence and security cooperation between the UK and Poland was signed. The two countries also hold the annual ”2 + 2” Quadriga meeting between their foreign and defence ministers. As part of NATO operations, the number of British troops in Estonia reached record numbers, while the defence ministers of the UK and Hungary GREAT POWERCENTRAL POLITICSEUROPE IN THE CEE ANDREGION THE EU

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signed a statement of intent on bilateral military cooperation in 2019, just to name a few recent examples. Euro-Atlantic security is British security. Therefore, the UK, regardless of its exit from the EU, will remain strongly committed to it as well as to close relationships with those to whom it is also a priority. PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE LINKS One of the many strengths of British–Central European relations is the strong ties people and communities have formed with one another in the recent past. Never before did this many people with Central European backgrounds live in the United Kingdom, and vice versa. This is also true when it comes to Hungary, which, according to the British Ambassador to Budapest, significantly contributed to the current “best-ever UK–Hungarian relations.” This is unlikely to change significantly even with the UK being outside the European Union. One of the signs of that is, at the time of writing, close to two million Central European citizens applied for Britain’s so-called EU Settlement Scheme, which grants them the opportunity to remain in the UK after 2020. As Central European countries, including Hungary, are passing legislation along similar lines to allow British nationals to be able to continue their lives in their respective countries, these communities will remain firm bridges between the region and the United Kingdom. As the UK will also remain home to many of the world’s leading universities, European and global financial institutions, and wideranging employment opportunities, it will, no doubt, continue to attract people from Central Europe. And the phenomenon certainly seems to be mutual. Eight emerging British fintech companies have recently established their hubs in Lithuania, Poland has been attracting growing British business presence thanks to its lower operating costs, while the UK expressed renewed interest in close academic and scientific cooperation with Hungary (just like at Antall József Knowledge Centre’s 2019 think. BDPST event). 144

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Connecting people, academia, businesses, and communities served as part of the backbone of British–Central European relations before, and will continue to serve as such now after the referendum. Most likely for a long time to come. CONCLUSION Outside the European Union, the United Kingdom would want to, and will aim to have close relations both with the EU, its regions, and member states. These should go hand in hand. The UK’s efforts to strengthen bilateral relationships are complementary to its efforts to build a new, deep, and special relationship with the EU institutions and member states in Brussels. The UK’s vision is a future where a strong framework for cooperation with the EU and its deep and enduring bilateral ties with all twenty-seven member states are mutually reinforcing. As the UK has left the EU, both parties will need to work together in different ways. They will no longer sit within the same common institutional framework, nor will their ministers have the “automatic” engagement that comes with attending frequent European Council meetings. Bilateral cooperation will be an important component of how they will work together in the future. A shared history, common values, and common interests will shape these new ties. The relationship with each country is unique, reflecting the specific connections the UK shares with it. The UK is ensuring that it has in place the resources, network, and platform to build these relationships and to maintain its interests with Central Europe and its countries beyond its exit from the EU. And, if the ambitions are mutual (which they certainly appear to be), there is no reason why we could not anticipate future UK–Central European relations to flourish both on the regional and the bilateral level.


GERMANY, A CENTRAL EUROPEAN GREAT POWER Péter Hevő “The European Community cannot end at the Elbe but needs to be open towards the East. It is only this way that the European Community (and we have always considered the Europe of the Twelve only partial, and not a whole) can become a real foundation for a wider European unity,” said Chancellor Helmut Kohl in November 1989, a few weeks after the Berlin Wall came down.1 He made this remark while expounding his famous ten-point program in parliament, and, with this, he practically took the initiative in the German reunification process. While the Eastern Bloc was disintegrating, this statement of key importance gave some hope for those Central European countries who had their eyes on Western integration. They expected Germany to play a kind of mediator role in this, even though historical experiences were mixed (to say the least) about German expansion in Central Europe. Mitteleuropa, Drang nach Osten, Zwischen­ europa—expressions from the last one hundred years that referred to the consolidation of the region by the German. Innumerable politicians and thinkers had a plan for a “new” and “better” Central Europe in their desk drawers, some of them treating the nations actually living there almost as partners while others endangering their very existence. In general, however, all of these plans considered the area between the Baltic and the Black Seas as a hinterland that can offer an economic base for building up Germany as a continental or even a world power.2 After the two world wars and the ousting of at least twelve million Germans, the topic was off the agenda for decades. Most of the German minorities in the region disappeared, and, with the Soviet presence, these plans did not have any political reality anyway during the Cold War. At the dawn of the disintegration of the German Democratic Republic, there was a

distinct possibility that Germany could become not a battlefield but a kind of mediator between the West and the East. However, not all EastCentral European countries were glad to have a powerful new neighbour, Poland least of all. On the day the Berlin Wall came down, Helmut Kohl visited Polish prime minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who had been known for years to be a proponent of German−Polish conciliation.3 At this time, Kohl stated that, after World War II, the Federal Republic of Germany needed to make a reconciliation with three countries and this had already happened with two of them (France and Israel); however, the country’s Eastern neighbour was still unreconciled. “The often invoked ‘fraternity’ between the German Democratic Republic and Poland has not allayed suspicions but actually fuelled them,” he added.4 The most sensitive question of rapprochement continued to be the issue of the borders, but, after a long struggle, Kohl finally managed to pacify those of his supporters who had been ousted from Eastern Prussia or Silesia and did not consider the Odera–Neiße line as final. The Polish took part in the Two Plus Four Talks and, in the end, they were reassured that no “revision” would take place, Gdańsk would never be Danzig again, nor Wrocław Breslau. There were, thus, no further obstacles to reunification, but it was at least of the same importance to define the future foreign policy orientation of the new Germany and the place the countries to the east of it would play in this. The geopolitical status of the new state was significantly different from that of the earlier Federal Republic of Germany. From the fringe of Cold War West, it suddenly became the centre of Europe again, while Russia shifted even more to the east than it had been between the two World Wars. This Zentralmacht,5 as Hans-Peter Schwarz, a conservative historian close to the GREAT POWERCENTRAL POLITICSEUROPE IN THE CEE ANDREGION THE EU

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MAJOR PARTNER COUNTRIES BASED ON FDI STOCK DATA UNTIL THE END OF 2016 GERMAN FDI HAS A FUNDAMENTAL ROLE IN MOST OF THE V4 COUNTRIES. CZECHIA

HUNGARY

1

1

2

3

2

3

POLAND

SLOVAKIA

1

1

2

3

2

3

CDU/CSU called it, was hedged round with there was a wish to compensate the nations of RANKING OF MAIN PARTNER COUNTRIES BASED ON GUEST-NIGHTS AT TOURIST inbuilt limits despite itsESTABLISHMENTS larger area, population, these states for the historical crimes committed ACCOMMODATION IN 2016 and economic power: it could not have CBRN but theTOURISM support INDUSTRY. was primarily GERMANY IS ALSO AN IMPORTANT PARTNER TOagainst THE V4 them, COUNTRIES’ defence, its army was maximised at 370,000, practical in nature. The German interest lied it had no chance of CZECHIA getting a permanent place first and foremost in getting the economy and HUNGARY on the UN Security Council, and had to allocate society of the region’s states stabilised, since most of its resources to the catch-up process they could create a hazard of constant crises of the eastern states and to giving credit to along its borders: poverty and permanently Russia, while internally it was rather divided high unemployment could boost international about its new role in the world. However, most organised crime, halt local reform processes, of the German parties agreed on one thing: and all this could result in strengthening political though they have to continue the directions formations friendly with Russia.6 Berlin had to of an earlier West German foreign policy that count on intense migration, too, the destination supported European integration, they also need of which was Germany itself. This quickly to be careful not to infringe on Soviet and, later, became apparent during the Yugoslav Wars, mostly its Bosnian phase. Russian interests. POLAND SLOVAKIA Bonn initially held normalising bilateral relations to be the most important task. The politics of BILATERAL RELATIONS—RELOADED Germany wished to support the peaceful bilateral treaties took place in an order similar transition of the East-Central European states, to its first wave at the beginning of the 1970s, which had newly regained their sovereignty, from and so, between 1990 and 1992, five treaties having communist systems to having stable were signed with the Soviet Union and Russia, democratic institutions and working market two with Poland, and one each with Bulgaria, economies. In its ideological background partly Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Romania.7 These

1

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1

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2

1

2

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3

1

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CENTRAL GREAT POWER EUROPE POLITICS AND THE IN THE EU CEE REGION

2

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mostly concerned future political and economic cooperation and, occasionally, the status of local German minorities. Germany wanted to fix the region’s stability by economic and not by military means. In this framework, they bilaterally allocated DEM 18.3 million of support to the Visegrad states between 1989 and 1993. This was several times the amount that the Balkan states or the Baltic states received in a support of a similar type. In the first half of the 1990s, Germany undertook the lion’s share of the catchup programme run by the fifteen EU states, since it covered 45% of its cost, although its own treasury was rather depleted by the catch-up in the former German Democratic Republic, the Gulf War, and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. In comparison, the second-largest contributor, France, undertook to pay 19% of the support, and the United Kingdom took the last place with 2.6%.8 Germany contributed significant capital, DEM 1.7 billion to the establishment of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).9 Apart from these, there were several smaller ways in which Germany offered help: these included economic advice and advising about privatisation and the supply of start-up capital or even non-refundable support for small businesses. This degree of investment naturally had some beneficial effects on the German economy, too. Germany’s geographical proximity to the region held innumerable new opportunities, since it was to be expected that, because of this, Germany can easily become the greatest beneficiary of the economic opening in East-Central Europe with some smart political manœuvring. To achieve this, it had to stimulate the economy of the countries that were just getting to know capitalism with appropriate investments and to avoid an open, violent intervention which could easily have become counterproductive. After the regime changes, trade between Germany and the countries of the region increased sharply, especially with Poland and Czechoslovakia and, later, also with the Czech Republic. With its modernising economy, Poland became one of the favourite destinations of German investors, and so, between 1995 and

2004, the volume of trade between the two countries increased by a yearly 15-20%. In this period, Poland even outstripped Japan in becoming the third most important commercial partner of Germany outside the EU, while Germany became Poland’s number-one partner.10 By 1998, twice as many goods were shipped to Germany from the Czech Republic than from Czechoslovakia in 1990, and there was a significant increase in trade with Hungary, too.11 What shows how Germany’s relations with the countries of East-Central Europe improved is that the importance of this region continued to grow within its foreign trade, and, by 2003, more goods came to Germany from the Visegrad Four than from the United States, while German export to these four countries came near the export to the United States. However, an asymmetrical dependence also formed behind this positive tendency, and the region primarily worked as a supplier base for Germany where a significantly cheaper but still relatively well-trained workforce produced goods of smaller added value than Germany. Therefore, Germany became the primary trading partner for the Visegrad countries, and, if a German supercompany such as Audi, Mercedes, or Volkswagen, established a subsidiary in one of them, its effect was felt already in the short run. However, even with this express dominance, it would have been easier for Germany to extend commercial and economic cooperation and safely realise investments made in East-Central Europe by German companies if these countries had also been included in those international organisations which Germany was a member of—especially the European Union, which, at this time, was deepening the integration among its members. In the long run, Berlin would rather shift from bilateral solutions (which had never been very typical of German foreign policy) to a multilateral level. GERMANY, THE MEDIATOR Naturally, after its reunification, Germany did not wish to abandon a European integration that it had benefitted so much from before as a trading state.12 It was rather in its interest to GREAT POWERCENTRAL POLITICSEUROPE IN THE CEE ANDREGION THE EU

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Trade balance (USD thousand)

Export (USD thousand)

Import (USD thousand)

Import partner share (%)

Export partner share (%)

1993 Poland

645,194.00

5,864,288.00

5,219,094.00

1.52%

1.54%

Czechia

733,330.00

4,623,234.00

3,889,904.00

1.14%

1.22%

Hungary

382,524.00

3,116,916.00

2,734,392.00

0.8%

0.82%

Slovakia

-52,470.00

846,914.00

899,384.00

0.26%

0.22%

Poland

196,060.00

8,877,864.00

8,681,804.00

1.87%

1.7%

Czechia

858,282.00

8,264,709.00

7,406,427.00

1.6%

1.58%

Hungary

80,065.00

4,911,602.00

4,831,537.00

1.04%

0.94%

Slovakia

-38,298.00

2,158,132.00

2,196,430.00

0.47%

0.41%

1995

2000 Poland

2,384,125.00

13,350,113.00

10,965,988.00

2.19%

2.43%

Czechia

-88,701.00

11,753,928.00

11,842,629.00

2.36%

2.14%

Hungary

-270,983.00

9,472,923.00

9,743,906.00

1.95%

1.72%

Slovakia

-96,008.00

3,056,240.00

3,152,248.00

0.63%

0.56%

2005 Poland

6,887,873.00

27,729,562.00

20,841,689.00

2.67%

2.84%

Czechia

1,825,955.00

23,815,108.00

21,989,153.00

2.82%

2.44%

Hungary

-663,248.00

16,955,679.00

17,618,927.00

2.26%

1.74%

Slovakia

-1,129,916.00

7,397,080.00

8,526,996.00

1.09%

0.76%

Poland

13,021,724.02

49,611,940.72

36,590,216.71

3.45%

3.91%

Czechia

-2,959,075.51

35,065,251.92

38,024,327.43

3.58%

2.77%

Hungary

-2,984,389.34

18,729,803.85

21,714,193.18

2.05%

1.48%

Slovakia

-607,744.07

11,547,390.83

12,155,134.89

1.15%

0.91%

2010

2015 Poland

8,105,836.60

57,696,644.50

49,590,807.90

4.69%

4.34%

Czechia

-3,363,679.03

40,099,283.08

43,462,962.11

4.11%

3.02%

Hungary

-2,158,904.42

24,197,885.91

26,356,790.33

2.49%

1.82%

Slovakia

-1,550,108.71

13,485,543.75

15,035,652.46

1.42%

1.02%

2018 Poland

9,511,909.98

74,773,677.15

65,261,767.17

5.05%

4.79%

Czechia

-4,592,334.03

51,826,716.46

56,419,050.49

4.36%

3.32%

Hungary

-1,567,793.22

30,956,987.55

32,524,780.77

2.52%

1.98%

Slovakia

-630,699.90

16,360,783.47

16,991,483.37

1.31%

1.05%

148

CENTRAL GREAT POWER EUROPE POLITICS AND THE IN THE EU CEE REGION


deepen the integration, even to increase the number of member states. “The more European German politics gets, the more it is in the service of German interests,” as foreign minister HansDietrich Genscher summarised at the end of the 1980s.13 Concerning the Eastern enlargement, Germany, thus, volunteered as the “solicitor and mediator” of Central Europe,14 partly for economic and political and partly for historical and moral reasons. Germany tried to keep the enlargement on the agenda, so it not only committed its support to the Visegrad countries in bilateral cooperation agreements, but it also declared in the 11 April 1991 Prague theses that EEC membership was “open for the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.”15 The terms of accession were finally worked out in Copenhagen in 1993; these criteria can essentially be taken as a kind of political declaration, since, for the first time in its history, the EU defined its terms for a group of countries wishing to join it.16 Bonn expected this to lead to the stabilisation of its Eastern neighbours, since the goal was now clear, and the aspiring states had to start the required political and economic reforms. However, the process was slower in the countries liberated from Soviet oppression than many hoped and expected, and, in order to speed it up, these aspiring states often went to Germany for help. Important as the eastern enlargement of the union was for German foreign policy, it only had a secondary role since the southern EU member states were still behind in catching up. What is more, there was no consensus in Western Europe about the whole question, and even the German decision makers’ opinion was different from that of their voters. The German population observed the process more sceptically than the EU average, and, while East Germans showed some solidarity with their onetime “friendly socialist countries,” West Germans were mostly against the enlargement. The opinion poll ordered by the European Commission in 2004 showed that only 28% of Germans supported the enlargement, while 56% of them was against it.17 However, a greater sympathy towards Visegrad countries (and, among them, primarily towards Hungary) was also a definite tendency, and more

Germans supported their integration than that of the Balkan or Baltic states.18 The German government, thus, had to convince not only its Western partners but also its own internal supporters about the viability of its strategy. However, concerning the eastern enlargement of NATO, Germany did not take such an open stand. Helmut Kohl had to consider several important factors here. Germany could not be in such a vulnerable situation any more as it had been in the Cold War era: on the periphery of one of the military blocs. However, after its reunification, it still constituted the eastern border of NATO, and so it was worth including at least the closest countries (that is, the Visegrad Four) in the alliance. Integration could also possibly heal the nationalist conflicts that arose in Central Europe following the collapse of the bipolar world order. Nevertheless, Germany also had to consider France, which was not an enthusiastic supporter of the enlargement,19 and Russia, which expressly protested against it. Kohl often suggested that European stability could only be achieved with Moscow and not against it and that, therefore, having Russia as NATO’s partner in solving problematic situations was of utmost importance. In the first half of the 1990s, not everyone even in the governing coalition(s) led by Kohl had hopes that NATO would establish European stability, but the renown of the alliance went up steeply with the successful conclusion of the Bosnian War. Even though the Germans carefully hinted at the expediency of the enlargement (with an eye on Russian internal policy), it was US president Bill Clinton who finally took the initiative. The accession of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary in 1999 was really good news for Berlin, since it meant that, Germany was now encircled by NATO member states besides Switzerland, Sweden, and Austria; in peacetime, the country had never been in such an advantageous situation before. Thus, in the decade and a half from the reunification to 2004, German integration politics turned out to be very successful. Its closest East-Central European partners, the Visegrad countries, were admitted into the two most important organisations of Germany’s alliances: the EU and NATO. What is GREAT POWERCENTRAL POLITICSEUROPE IN THE CEE ANDREGION THE EU

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more, these goals were reached by convincing the Western powers despite their initial misgivings that it was not the country’s aim to establish German dominance in Europe. AFTER INTEGRATION: A SUCCESS STORY WITH SOME BLEMISHES? As was to be expected, after the 2004 accession of the Visegrad countries to the European Union, Germany consolidated its place among their commercial partners. With some fluctuations, more or less a quarter or one-third of the four states’ export goes to Germany. However, their rise in the German economy is much more spectacular than that. For instance, Hungarian export to Germany in 2019 was worth EUR 28.845 billion, while its import EUR 27.013 billion. With this, Hungary is the thirteenth most important country in German export, and fourteenth in import, outstripping the Scandinavian countries, but also Japan or Turkey.20 Within Hungarian exports, the vehicle industry is especially important, so, with the completion of BMW’s new factory in Debrecen and the continuation of present tendencies, more increase can be forecast. The same is true of German−Slovakian trade, which is at about 55% of the German−Hungarian one. Even more striking is the case of the Czech Republic and Poland. The Czech got into the top ten of German foreign trade partners a few years ago: the trade between Germany and the Czech Republic was worth EUR 92 billion in 2019. Poland took an incredible leap to become the most important foreign trade partner of Germany in Eastern Europe. The trade between these two countries has quadrupled since 2004, and, thus, the Polish outdid the British and the Italian by the end of the 2010s and are currently ranked fifth.21 In 2018, Germany traded with its eastern neighbour to the value of EUR 118 billion, and, in the first three months of 2020, it could even increase its export to Poland by a further one billion euros, to 17.1 billion.22 On the other hand, Russia has been losing importance since 2012, and German− Russian trade is worth almost half of the German− Polish one. What is more, the Russians were ranked behind the Hungarian in 2018.23 150

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The Visegrad Four, thus, advanced to being prominently important partners to German foreign trade: taken together, the trade with these countries exceeds that with China and the United States, and it is not expected that this tendency would stop even in the crisis caused by the new coronavirus. While, in the first quarter of 2020, the German GNP decreased by 2.2%, its trade with its eastern neighbours kept increasing, even if by a mere 1.7%. The region is deeply embedded into the production chain of the German industry, and the factories installed here now form a significant element of their parent companies. Without German investments, the economy of the Visegrad countries would probably have gone a different way. The working capital routed to these four countries is the highest in Poland and the Czech Republic, with Hungary taking third place (in 2017, total investment stood at EUR 19,694 million). Direct investments in Germany from the Visegrad countries are, in comparison, lower by several orders of magnitude. The German investments, naturally, have a strong effect on the labour market of the region, since the companies satisfying German import needs employ several hundred thousand people in each of the Visegrad countries, i.e., 5-9% of all the employees in each country. While this 9% means 470,000 people in the Czech Republic, 5% equals to 890,000 employees in the much larger Poland.24 Central European employment trends show an interesting curve, anyway. In the 1990s, Germany hoped to alleviate the rampant unemployment in the Visegrad countries by taking a limited number of guest and seasonal workers and commuters by the borders, even though it had its own labour market problems (especially in the eastern states). Around the turn of the millennium, Germany issued 350,000 work permits every year to people from East-Central European countries.25 In the few years following the accession of the Visegrad countries, immigration peaked, mainly from Poland, but the 2008 crisis broke this trend. After the German labour market opened to everyone from the region without limitations in 2011, it was mostly Hungarians and the Polish who went to Germany to work. Even though their number was much lower at the time than expected, most


2

3

2

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RANKING OF MAIN PARTNER COUNTRIES BASED ON GUEST-NIGHTS AT TOURIST ACCOMMODATION ESTABLISHMENTS IN 2016 GERMANY IS ALSO AN IMPORTANT PARTNER TO THE V4 COUNTRIES’ TOURISM INDUSTRY. CZECHIA

HUNGARY

1

1

2

2

3

2

3

POLAND

SLOVAKIA

1

1 3

people who went to Germany to work in 2012 were from Poland, while Hungary was the fourth in rank.26 However, the majority of fears that a sudden crowd of Eastern European immigrants would supplant German employees proved to be unfounded. In the source countries, however, more problems emerged. The phenomenon known as “brain drain,” when mostly young, highly trained professionals are lured away to work abroad, creates serious problems in some employment sectors in the former Eastern Bloc countries and leads to a demographic crisis that hardly had any precedent in previous centuries in peacetime, without famines.27 This is of course not the only source of problems in the relations between Germany and the Visegrad countries. Even though the Western and Eastern halves of Central Europe have already become closely intertwined in an economic sense, there are political differences and differences in mentality along the line of the former Iron Curtain. After their accession to the European Union, Eastern countries who had once stood in line for

2

3

German help had more room for manœuvre in their foreign policies, and they could even come in open conflict with Berlin, for instance, because of relations with Russia, questions of rule of law, or immigration from developing countries. The governments led by Angela Merkel tried to handle this in the well-honed way of German foreign policy: when they criticised maverick Eastern member states, they did it within a multilateral framework, for example, through the European Commission.28 With this, they wished to preclude accusations that German objections arise from raw power politics and prevent the other party from sidestepping the critique by dredging up irksome examples from the past. With this tactic, Berlin occasionally succeeded in making its opponents back down, and, while the German efforts were not always so successful, the other party was always careful not to overstep the mark concerning German economic interests (even compensating for some more controversial steps with concessions to German companies). German voters are, however, not so understanding about GREAT POWERCENTRAL POLITICSEUROPE IN THE CEE ANDREGION THE EU

151


these questions and are worried about what is happening in the eastern end of the EU. A 2019 study showed that almost half of German voters still found the eastern enlargement of the EU a mistake.29 Seventy-seven per cent of the people asked felt closer to Western Europe than to the Eastern half of the continent, while only 12% claimed to feel the other way around. German voters are also worried that the rule of law is being dismantled by their eastern neighbours and consider democracy to be most in danger in Hungary (44%) and in Poland (42%) among EU member states, while hardly at all in the Czech Republic (4%) and Slovakia (3%). They think the German government simply looks on without taking action, and 62% think financial sanctions should be imposed against countries violating the values of the rule of law. In this respect, a strong difference of opinion can again be seen between East and West Germans: while only 27% of the latter are against such sanctions, people from the former German Democratic Republic are more understanding, with 42% opposing them. Counterarguments are often voiced that other interpretations of democracy need to be tolerated, other points of view understood, and sanctions would only deepen the conflicts within regions. Moreover, as the argument goes, Germany also needs to be grateful to the Visegrad countries for the positive treatment of the 1989 refugee crisis, since, without that, there is a good chance the reunification would not have gone so smoothly— these four countries, therefore, actually took part in the birth of modern Germany.30 CONCLUSION After the highly important 1989−1990 changes in Europe, Germany again had the chance to influence the processes in the East-Central European region. Seeing the destabilisation of the Soviet Union and the Balkans, the rise of ethnic tensions, Berlin primarily strove to contribute to the consolidation of democratic institutions and market economy in the countries of the region at first. In the background, there could be the guilt stemming from the country’s crimes in World War II and the wish to make amends, as well as the gratitude for dismantling 152

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the Iron Curtain. However, German interests were almost as important: the Germans wanted predictable order and stability in their neighbourhood, and they wanted to exploit the economic potential of the region. To achieve this, Berlin was willing to allocate serious resources to help the region catch up—more than any other power involved. This German investment was recouped very quickly, since Germany became the most important trading partner of all four Visegrad countries. Trade between Germany and the Visegrad Four rose steeply, and Berlin was persistent in pursuing its long-term goal, the Euro-Atlantic integration of the region. For this, Germany had to fight its own battles with the opponents of the Eastern enlargement of the European Union and NATO, but, at the same time, it could help the required economic and political reforms in the East-Central European countries. With the 1999 enlargement of NATO, Germany was finally not on its periphery for the first time since the organisation had been founded, and it is today only encircled by allied or neutral states. Five years later, the EU was joined by ten new member states, and the Visegrad countries did not turn away from Germany after this event, either; they rather came under yet more German influence. While this was undoubtedly profitable for both parties, relations stayed asymmetrical due to German predominance and led to a certain vulnerability in the Visegrad countries. Even though political conflicts are not a rarity between Germany and the Visegrad countries, Berlin seeks to handle these not on a bilateral but a multilateral level, and this means that no Visegrad government dares to endanger German economic interests.

ENDNOTES 1 Zehn-Punkte-Programm 1989. Deutscher Bundestag. <https://bit.ly/38Oaz4s > Accessed: 22 October 2020. 2 Mező Ferenc: Közép-Európa fogalmi változása térben és időben. Tér és Társadalom. 2001/3–4. 84. 3 Basil Kerski: Polen. In: Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik, edited by Siegmar Schmidt–Gunther Hellmann– Reinhard Wolf. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2013. 406.


4 Helmut Kohl: Németország egységét akartam. Zrínyi Kiadó,

16 Horváth Zoltán: Kézikönyv az Európai Unióról. Magyar

Budapest, 1998. 76.

Országgyűlés, Budapest, 2007. 85.

5 Hans-Peter Schwarz: Die Zentralmacht Europas.

17 Eurobarometer Spring 2004. Public Opinion in the European

Deutschlands Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne. Siedler Verlag,

Union. European Commission. 2004/July. <https://bit.

Berlin, 1994.

ly/3kBUMba >

6 Ulrike Kessler: Deutsche Europapolitik unter Helmut Kohl:

18 Andrea Gawrich–Maxim Stepanov: German Foreign Policy

Europäische Integration als „kategorischer Imperativ“? In:

toward the Visegrad Countries. DGAPanalyse, N o 17.

Deutsche Europapolitik. Von Adenauer bis Merkel, edited by

2014/September. 6.

Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet [et al.]. Springer, Wiesbaden,

19 Jacques Delors, the popular chair of the European

2011. 163.

Commission, was not a proponent of sudden and excessive

7 Frank R. Pfetsch: Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik

enlargement, either. His compatriot, French prime minister

Deutschland. Von Adenauer zu Merkel. Wochenschau,

Édouard Balladur, agreed with him, since, in his opinion, a rash

Schwalbach, 2011. 176.

enlargement would not solve acute problems, merely create

8 András Hettyey: A Multilateralized Civilian Power Approach:

more. See Christian Hacke: Die Haltung der Bundesrepublik

The German Foreign Policy and Central Eastern Europe.

Deutschland zur NATO-Osterweiterung. In: Ostmitteleuropa,

European Mirror. 2018/Special Edition 1. 74–75.

Rußland und die Osterweiterung der NATO. Perzeptionen und

9 There was only one person appointed from the Eastern

Strategien im Spannungsfeld nationaler und europäischer

Block as one of the first five vice presidents of the EBRD: it was

Sicherheit, edited by August Pradetto. Westdeutscher Verlag,

Miklós Németh fully disappointed by the situation after the

Opladen, 1997. 238.

regime change and by the Hungarian Socialist Party. Helmut

20 Außenhandel nach Ländern. Deutschlands wichtigste

Kohl is said to have a significant role in his assignment. See

Handelspartner 2019. Deutsch–Ungarische Industrie- und

Horváth István: Az elszalasztott lehetőség. A magyar–német

Handelskammer. <https://bit.ly/2IBgZst > Accessed: 25

kapcsolatok, 1980–1991. Corvina Kiadó, Budapest, 2009. 231.

October 2020.

10 In 2004, one-third of the Polish export went to Germany,

21 Claudia von Salzen: Mehr Handel mit Polen als mit

and 24% of its import came from there. See Kerski, 410.

Großbritannien. Tagesspiegel. 14 November 2019 <https://bit.

11 Statistische Jahrbücher BRD 1993, 2002. Quoted in Michael

ly/3pxZ8Um >

Dauderstädt: Mittel- und Osteuropa. In: Handbuch zur

22 Mathias Brüggmann: Wirtschaftswunder in Europa:

deutschen Außenpolitik, edited by Siegmar Schmidt–Gunther

Deutscher Osthandel trotz Krise gewachsen. Handelsblatt. 21

Hellmann–Reinhard Wolf. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften,

May 2020. <https://bit.ly/2H9aCfG >

Wiesbaden, 2013. 430.

23 Östliches Europa bleibt Wachstumsmotor für den deutschen

12 According to the theory of “trading states” (Handelsstaat),

Handel. 21 February 2019. Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen

the Federal Republic of Germany maintained its well-being

Wirtschaft. <https://bit.ly/32P2PLu >

through peaceful trade with its neighbours, and not through

24 Menyes Roland: Németország és a visegrádi országok

arbitrary, violent ways. As a trading state, the country’s primary

gazdasági kapcsolatai a rendszerváltástól napjainkig.

interest is a stable world market, and so free world trade and

Fókuszban – Németország. 2017/5. 48.

the free and unlimited availability of raw materials and markets

25 Hettyey, 77.

are also important to it. Beyond the safety of its citizens, it can

26 Bundesministerium des Innern, Migrationsbericht 2012.

have the strongest effect on its own European context; it can

Quoted in Gawrich–Stepanov, 11.

export stability, so to speak, and this can be done most

27 Ivan Krăstev: Ein geistiger Vorhang senkt sich über Europa.

efficiently in a common alliance. Stefan Tognoni: Deutschland

Die Zeit. 6 November 2019. <https://bit.ly/2K5MxHC >

und die NATO. Eine Analyse der gegenwärtigen Bedeutung der

28 Hettyey, 81.

NATO-Mitgliedschaft Deutschlands für die Außenpolitik der

29 30 Jahre Fall des Eisernen Vorhangs und 15 Jahre EU-

Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Salon Literatur Verlag, München,

Osterweiterung – August 2019. Eine Studie von Kantar im

2012. 44.

Auftrag der Körber-Stiftung. Körber-Stiftung. 21 August 2019.

13 Quoted in Pfetsch, 165.

31–40. <https://bit.ly/3ntHyil >

14 Andreas Wirsching: Der Preis der Freiheit. Geschichte

30 Elisabeth von Hammerstein: Deutschland schuldet seinen

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Nachbarn Dankbarkeit. Die Zeit. 9 November 2019. <https://

15 Europa-Archiv. 1991/46. D253–254.

bit.ly/3f50NMr > GREAT POWERCENTRAL POLITICSEUROPE IN THE CEE ANDREGION THE EU

153


6

ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE

The Antall József Knowledge Centre (AJKC) in Hungary, during its twelve years of existence, has introduced a variety of events targeting Hungarian students enrolled in higher education as well as domestic and international professional audiences. The Knowledge Centre is named after József Antall (1932–1993), a Hungarian teacher, educator, librarian, historian, and statesman, who served as the first democratically elected Prime Minister of Hungary after the fall of communism (from 23 May 1990 to his death on 12 December 1993). The Knowledge Centre’s main objectives, in line with Antall’s philosophy, include managing talent and providing students and young professionals with wide-ranging practical knowledge through various events. The Knowledge Centre is a foreign policy think tank researching topics such as the Visegrad Cooperation, the future global role of the EU, the US, China, issues of the Middle East and the Far East, security policy, as well as technological and social innovation. The whole of AJKC works towards strengthening institutional relations both on a national and international level, developing scholarship and internship programmes, and boosting professional cooperation via international conferences,

workshops, and event series. Our institution’s main office is located in Budapest, operating with two international departments—focusing on European and global relations, respectively—and a thematic department—covering areas such talent management and innovation. In addition, AJKC has a regional office in Győr and an office in Brussels which was established in 2015 to represent the Antall philosophy in the heart of the European Union and promote the values that he stood for at an international level. The publishing activities of AJKC involve releasing professional publications, scholarly works on political and social sciences (with special regard to security policy and international relations) as well as university textbooks. In our autobiographical series, prominent personalities of the Cold War period, including Ronald Reagan, George Bush, Margaret Thatcher, and Helmut Kohl, recount crucial years and decisions still affecting their lives. Reacting to events of political, social, and economic significance in the 21st century, the professional publications series of the Knowledge Centre features works incorporating the latest results of international relations and geopolitics, the history of politics, economics, and psychology. Hungarian Memories is an original guidebook


series published by AJKC that presents the common history of Hungary and the country under scrutiny in a unique way, then guides the reader through the various regions, while also recounting the story of locations with Hungarian memories accompanied by their picturesque images. The AJKC’s most ambitious professional event is called think.BDPST. The conference, organised in cooperation with Hungary’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and supported by the International Visegrad Fund, focusses on regional development and the new perspectives of research, innovation, and future technologies. The business world’s most notable, creative and innovative thinkers are all invited to think.BDPST along with actors from NGOs and the political sector to share and inspire one another to develop forward-thinking strategies that will facilitate the development of the whole Visegrad region. The event also aims to position Budapest as an ideal destination for enterprises with a pioneering spirit seeking new horizons, new markets to enter, or a new territory and knowledge base to include in their plans for the future. The Antall József Summer School is an educational programme for MA and PhD students as well as young professionals that examines the Central European region, in particular, the Visegrad

Cooperation, and its wider neighbourhood from various aspects through frontal and more interactive forms of education. In 2020, the Summer School, postponed to autumn and renamed as Antall József Autumn Seminar, was organised online, engaging participants in discussions on topics such as European responses to the pandemic, different interpretations of Central Europe, the Three Seas Initiative, the future of the EU, the US elections, NATO, and data protection. Each year, the Knowledge Centre organises its Foreign and Security Policy Conference, which focusses on the key diplomatic priorities of Hungary, the Central European region, and the Transatlantic Alliance as a whole, such as the future of NATO, stability in the Western Balkans, and EU defence cooperation. The 2020 event examined security challenges originating from the latest space and cyber technology achievements, while also putting emphasis on the rapid development of information technology and its viral role in our everyday lives and national economies, as well as the new type of arms race and cooperation between national security bodies. The conference series is organised in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and supported by the NATO Public Diplomacy Division.


S GUE OR

AUTHORS

S GUE OR

AUTH ST

7

AUTH ST

Charvát, Jakub Assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Humanities, Metropolitan University,

The Visegrad Group Countries’ Representation in the European Parliament after Brexit

Prague

Garai, Nikolett Research fellow and project coordinator at the Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade,

Subregionalism and Minilateralism in Contemporary Europe

Hungary

Grosse, Tomasz G. Sociologist, political scientist, historian, and a professor at the University of Warsaw

Emmanuel Macron’s Vision on Central European Geopolitics

Hevő, Péter Historian, researcher at the Hungarian Museum of Science, Technology and Transport,

Germany, a Central European Great Power

and lecturer at the Faculty of Humanities, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest

Lázár, András Máté Diplomat, international relations expert, and V4 national coordinator of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Hungary

156

AUTHORS

American Interests in Central Europe: Constancy and Shifting Foci


S GUE OR

S GUE OR

AUTH ST

AUTH ST

Matura, Tamás Lecturer at the Corvinus University of Budapest, president of the Central and Eastern European Center for Asian Studies, and the Hungarian

Chinese Influence in Central Europe: Myth or Reality?

member of the European Think Tank Network on China

Nyitrai, Levente Foreign policy attaché of the Embassy of the United Kingdom, Budapest

A Special Relationship? The UK’s Relations with Central Europe and Its Countries Post–EU Exit

Reichardt, Adam Editor in chief of the journal New Eastern Europe and a junior scholar and media fellow

Clash of Conceptualisations—Geopolitical Concepts and Their Significance in Central Europe

at the College of Europe in Natolin, Warsaw

Strausz, Péter Historian, head of the historical research group at Research Institute and Archives for the History of Regime Change, and a habilitated associate

József Antall’s Conception of Central Europe

professor of the Institute of Management, Corvinus University of Budapest

Strážay, Tomáš Director of the Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association and one of the founders

New Visegrad in New Europe

of the Think Visegrad—V4 Think Tank Platform

AUTHORS

157


C AUT JK

C AUT JK

RS OF A HO

RS OF A HE

Dobrowiecki, Péter Historian, head of research

Herédi, Elina Project manager at the Brussels Office

Iszák, Krisztina International relations manager at the Brussels Office

Kocsev, Bence Historian, head of the Győr Office

Krajcsír, Lukács Historian, international relations expert

158

AUTHORS

The Unquiet Frontier: The NATO Enlargement and Partnership from the Perspective of Central Europe

The European Green Deal and its Implications for Central and Eastern Europe

Central Europe in the European Budgetary Politics: Can It Still Be Bypassed?

Political System Changes in Central Europe: A Bird’s Eye View

The Crossed Red Line: The Past, the Present, and the Unclear Future of Chinese–Czech Relations


C AUT JK

C AUT JK

RS OF A HO

RS OF A HE

Pál, Zsombor Szabolcs Senior Research Fellow

Restás, Bianka International relations manager

Stepper, Péter Senior research fellow

Interview with Attila Steiner Interview with Edit Szilágyiné Bátorfi

Immigration and Multiculturalism in Central Europe—Social, Political, and Cultural Dilemmas

Interview with Attila Steiner Interview with Edit Szilágyiné Bátorfi Immigration and Multiculturalism in Central Europe—Social, Political, and Cultural Dilemmas The Unquiet Frontier: The NATO Enlargement and Partnership from the Perspective of Central Europe

Szilágyi, Laura Intern, BSc student at the Faculty of Military Science and Officer Training, National University

Russia and the Geopolitics of the New Cold War

of Public Services, Budapest

Vass, Ágnes Head of the EU–V4 Office

A Quadratic Nexus—The National Minorities of Central Europe in the EU

AUTHORS

159


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Continuity and Shifting Emphases

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Emmanuel Macron and Andrzej Duda in during the French

in thousands United States dollars, annual. UNCTADSTAT.

president’s visit to Poland in February 2020. Source:

<http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.

MaciejGillert/Shutterstock.

aspx?ReportId=195182&IF_Language=eng > Graphic design: Péter Somos.

Macron called for a “new architecture of confidence and security” in Europe that includes Russia—this goes against

Chart 2: Distribution of Chinese FDI transactions in the EU

what many Central Europeans think. Source: Frederic

by country in 2019 (EUR billion). Source of data: Agatha

Legrand - COMEO/Shutterstock.

Kratz, ‘Chinese FDI in Europe: 2019 Update.’ Mercator Institute for China Studies. 8 April 2020. <https://merics.

A Special Relationship? The UK’s Relations with

org/en/report/chinese-fdi-europe-2019-update > Graphic

Central Europe and Its Countries Post–EU Exit

design: Péter Somos.

London skyline with Big Ben and environs. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Ben#/media/File:

Chart 3: Change in the perception of China among V4

Palace_of_Westminster_from_the_dome_on_Methodist_

citizens in the last three years (% of respondents). Source

Central_Hall.jpg, author: User:Colin, licence: CC

of data: Richard Q. Turcsányi et al., ‘European public

BY-SA 4.0.


Germany, a Central European Great Power Major partner countries based on FDI stock data until end of 2016. Source of data: Main Indicators of the Visegrád Group Countries. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal. 2018. 35. <https://www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xftp/idoszaki/ev4_ fobbadatok.pdf > Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’ Chart 1: Trade between Germany and the V4 countries (reporting country: Germany). Source of data: Worldbank. Graphic design: Péter Somos. Ranking of main partner countries based on guest-nights at tourist accommodation establishments in 2016. Source of data: Main Indicators of the Visegrád Group Countries. Központi Statisztikai Hivatal. 2018. 40. <https://www.ksh. hu/docs/eng/xftp/idoszaki/ev4_fobbadatok.pdf > Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

6 ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE All pictures published in this chapter are possessions of the Antall József Knowledge Centre.

7 AUTHORS The portraits of our contributing authors were provided by themselves. The portraits of authors of the Antall József Knowledge Centre are possessions of the Antall József Knowledge Centre.

Maps in the magazine are drawn using these maps: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Blank_map_ of_Europe_1956-1990.svg, authors: maix, Alphathon, licence: CC BY-SA 3.0; https://hu.wikipedia.org/ wiki/F%C3%A1jl:Blank_political_map_Europe_in_2008_ (with_Kosovo).svg, authors: Júlio Reis, Ssolbergj & other, licence: CC BY-SA 3.0; https://commons.wikimedia.org/ wiki/File:World_Map_Blank.svg, author: Moyogo, licence: public domain.


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The upcoming issue of In Focus magazine will revolve around a highly dynamic and even turbulent region: the Eastern Mediterranean. This region is, without a doubt, home to many ambitions, fault lines, challenges, and opportunities. Small wonder there is a myriad of issues drawing the political analysts’ attention to this region, where the potential for cooperation and conflicts among and within states exist in parallel. By publishing this issue, the Antall József Knowledge Centre’s goal is to give comprehensive insight into the realities of a complex region. We offer interviews with diplomats and many articles aimed at bringing the Eastern Mediterranean closer to our readers. Topics like the dilemmas of the reconstruction in Syria, the internal and external challenges of Libya, the crises and the quest for reforms in Lebanon, or Israel’s strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean are just some of the many others our upcoming issue is planning to cover. Stay tuned!

IMPRINT – Publisher: Antall József Knowledge Centre Publishing Director: Péter Antall, Director, AJKC Editor-in-Chief: Zsombor Szabolcs Pál Editor: Emese Schwarcz Language Editor: Mónika Vajda Proof-reader: Mónika Vajda Contributors: Csilla Lichtenstein, Zita Mihály Graphic Design: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks,’ Péter Somos Cover: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks’ Pre-press Preparation: Péter Somos

CONTACT INFORMATION – Antall József Knowledge Centre 1027 Budapest, Királyfürdő utca 4. +36 20 310 8776 www.ajtk.hu www.ajtkkonyvmuhely.hu

Previous issues of In Focus are available on the AJKC Digital webpage digitalistudastar.ajtk.hu/en/in-focus

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