ENDGAME IN SYRIA? THE DILEMMAS OF RECONSTRUCTION László Csicsmann The military scene in Syria witnessed a radical change with the recent defeat of the Islamic State (IS) near the city of Baghouz in 2019. Despite the military setback of the terrorist organisation, Jihadism still poses a significant risk to the country. After the elimination of the former rebel strongholds in southern Syria, Idlib province became the main military challenge for the Assad regime. This article analyses the recent political and economic developments of the Syrian conflict on a local, regional, and global level. It argues that, with the US’s disengagement from Syria under the Trump administration, Russia has become the main policymaker in the conflict. This interpretation echoes Assad’s narrative, who portrays himself as the winner of the civil war. The goal of the regime is to re-establish the pre–Arab Spring political structures, returning to the pre-2011 political settings. However, the recent shift in the local, regional, and global geopolitical context does not promote this objective. The author would argue that the Assad regime has not won but survived the civil war, and its existence is not taken for granted in the long run.1 RECENT LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SYRIA With the defeat of the Islamic State in Syria, the military phase of the conflict seems to be in its final phase. After the military combat, the country has been divided into four parts, three of which are not under the sovereignty of the Assad regime today: 1) The territory controlled by the Assad regime. Since reoccupying the southern part of the country from the rebel groups, the Assad regime has sovereignty over the most densely populated cities in Syria except for Idlib province. The Assad regime claims that the country has returned to its normal life since the defeat of 32
COUNTRY STUDIES
the Islamic State and the regime provides all the necessities for the citizens. The administration in Damascus follows Bashar al-Assad, who perceives himself as a politically legitimate president due to the “successful” 2014 election. According to the amended constitution, the next presidential elections will take place in 2021 in which Assad could be nominated as a presidential candidate. This narrative also has an effect on the refugee situation. Currently, six or seven million Syrian citizens get asylum in one of the neighbouring countries or elsewhere. This situation satisfies the regime, as most of the refugees are the main opponents of Assad’s rule in Syria. The Assad regime does not have the intention to resettle the refugees in Syria after terminating the civil war, as the current population of 16 million serves the interests of those who are ruling Damascus. The regime has already started the reconstruction process since 2017. According to a recent estimate, the reconstruction in Syria would cost USD 250 billion, which raises several questions.2 After the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the regime transformed itself into a typical war economy. During the flowering of Assad’s rule, the regime was based on the support of the Alawite minority and the Sunni trading class in important cities such as Damascus and Aleppo. This unwritten social contract was breached after the unfolding of the popular uprising which turned into a civil war in July 2012. A new kind of balance has emerged since then, reinforcing the Assad regime which builds on new types of warlords and businessmen controlling Syria. To strengthen this new type of bargain, the regime has adopted several laws and legal measures which also serve as a means of confiscating the lands and property of the old guard and those who left
