In Focus - Mediterranean Europe by Antall József Tudásközpont

I N F O C US

2021. 3rd Issue ISSN 2677-111X

790 Ft 2,49 €

Mediterranean Europe

Economic prospects

Political processes

Foreign relations

Social changes

IN FOCUS

2021. 3rd Issue ISSN 2677-111X

Mediterranean Europe

All rights reserved. Articles found in this publication are the intellectual property of the Antall József Knowledge Centre. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Welcoming Words

2 Introduction and Interviews Spain, Europe, and the World—Interview with He Anunciada Fernández de Córdova, the Ambassador of Spain to Hungary The Future ahead of Us: The Education, Innovation, and Economic Recovery of Italy and Southern Europe—Interview with Marco Del Panta Ridolfi, the Secretary General of the European University Institute

5 22

3 Politics 28 Geopolitics in the Mediterranean: Geographical and Identity Realities in and beyond the Mare Nostrum 30 A Populist Decade in the European South 38 When Southern Europe Became a Distinctive Part of the EU 43 Whose Mare Nostrum?—Italian and French Rivalry in the Mediterranean 52 France and the EU: What’s after Brexit? 65 Italy and the Hard Post-Coronavirus Pandemic Recovery 74 At the Edge of Two Worlds—The Future of Portugal’s Atlanticism 85 Spain is Back—Again 93 Russian Influence in Southern Europe 100 China and Southern Europe 107 On the Front Line—The Role of Spain, Greece, and Italy in International Migration Management 120

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Economy 128 Productivity, the Twin Transitions, and the European Divide(s) 130 “Friends of Cohesion” and Regional Disparities between the South and the East of the EU 140 Company Size in Italy, Export Performance, and Challenges to Digital Transformation 144 Start-ups and Competitiveness in Mediterranean Europe 151

Society 158 Alto Adige/Südtirol—The German Minority in Italy 160 Demographic Trends in Southern Europe 166 Hungarian−Italian Cultural Relations— Interview with Gábor Kudar, Director of the Accademia d’Ungheria in Roma 174

6 Antall József Knowledge Centre

180

7 Authors 182 Guest Authors 182 Authors of AJKC 184

8 References of Pictures and Used Data

186

WELCOMING WORDS

Dear Readers,

Editor’s Note

It is almost a cliché to say that Mediterranean Europe is the cradle of what we know as the Western world today. It was home to the Greek and Roman civilisations, Christian faith, the Italian trade cities, and, later, it was the region the states of which explored the globe and opened up new horizons, skirting the edge of the known world during the Age of Discovery. Mediterranean Europe, therefore, used to be an important part and the shaper of European and world history. But does it continue to do so? Although it still has a prominent role in the EU and forms a vital part of it politically, as well as demographically and economically, its one-time splendour appeared to be lost in recent times. Its troubles became painfully manifest during the last roughly one and a half decades, especially following the crises that started in 2008 and with the outbreak of the global pandemic. Faced with these pressing problems, and lest they could lose their favourable position in the global world order for good, these countries lined up with those who wished to give the EU new stimulus for changing the way it works. Now, all eyes are on them to see whether they can take this opportunity to rise and thrive again or are destined to fail. With insight from several experts from different fields, our latest issue invites our readers to ponder the scenarios this region is likely to face and the odds it is expected to defy.

The COVID-19 crisis has had terrible effects on the European economy and highlighted the big divide between Northern and Southern Europe. However, today the EU could respond to this challenge unlike after the 2008 financial crisis. At that time, Southern European member states were the main victims of the EU’s short-sighted economic decisions that created divisions within the union and threatened with its collapse. Last year, however, the EU made a U-turn on its former approach: the European debt mutualisation and the creation of a recovery fund, called Next Generation EU, represent a reversal of the former approach, and, therefore, Italy, Spain, and other Mediterranean countries might be their biggest beneficiaries. This issue aims to show that Mediterranean Europe, contrary to common perception, represents a heterogeneous group of countries which share only a few similarities. Our authors try to shed light on each country’s particularities, proving that any prejudicial classification is flawed. There is one element, however, that unites them: their awareness of facing a momentous crisis and a generational challenge. This means that all their efforts will be directed at taking full advantage of this (hopefully not) one-shot fund, which is their last chance to restore their competitiveness and to catch up with the EU’s core. Should they manage to do so, it will benefit the whole union and help integration enter a new phase.

Zsombor Szabolcs Pál—Editor-in-Chief

Alessandro D’Onofrio—Editor WELCOMING WORDS

INTRODUCTION AND INTERVIEWS

MEDITERRANEAN EUROPE

FRANCE

PORTUGAL

SPAIN

FRANCE

ITALY

TURK GREECE

MALTA MALTA

GREECE

4 22

,48

8 100

MEDIAN AGE (YEARS, 2020)3

44.9

46.2

42.6

47.3

45.6

42.3

42.5

-2

AREA (KM2, 2021)1

% = percent of the total EU-27 area

PERCENTAGE OF UNEMPLOYED (AUGUST 2021)2

6.8%

7.5%

8.0%

13.2%

9.3%

POPULATION (2020)2

3.2%

6.4%

The World Factbook

Eurostat

Worldometer

World Bank

World Heritage List Statistics

European Patent Office

EU Euro area Europe France 67,439,599 15.09%

10,682,547 2.39%

59,257,566 13.26%

516,100 0.12%

10,298,252 2.30%

EU-27: 447,007,596 100% % = percent of the total EU-27 popultaion

47,394,223 10.60%

14.0%

Greece Italy Malta Portugal Spain

GDP (CURRENT USD BILLION, 2020)4

15,192.65

12,933.36

2,603.00

189.41

1,886.45 14.65

231.26

1,281.20

VOLUME INDICES OF GDP PER CAPITA (2020)2

100

105

103

$ NUMBER OF UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE SITES (2021)5

PATENT APPLICATIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE (2021)6

249

1,791 10,554

4,600

Europe: 545

136

Mediterranean Europe 17,395

Europe: 65,854

SPAIN, EUROPE, AND THE WORLD—INTERVIEW WITH HE ANUNCIADA FERNÁNDEZ DE CÓRDOVA, THE AMBASSADOR OF SPAIN TO HUNGARY Alessandro D’Onofrio–Zsombor Szabolcs Pál, Budapest, 28 January 2021 The interview was conducted in Spanish and translated by Zsombor Szabolcs Pál.

Spain has become one of the most-affected countries since COVID-19 arrived in Europe. The Spanish government was among the first to propose an EU-level recovery fund for tackling the consequences of the pandemic and, thus, was vocal in making Next Generation EU a reality. Do you think that this could be the beginning of a new Europe and a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for Spain to undertake fundamental reforms? What are the main takeaways for Spain after the MFF negotiations? Under extremely difficult circumstances, the European Union exceeded all reasonable expectations in the face of an unprecedented series of events. The Next Generation EU Fund is a giant step towards strengthening our strategic autonomy and demonstrating that we are a powerful Europe. In April 2020, when 12

INTERVIEWS

there was an intense debate in the European Union, Spain presented a document that had an element of risk, for we did not know what reaction it would meet, but contributed to forging consensus, as could be seen later on. When nobody believed in it, the Spanish president of the government, Pedro Sánchez, was the first who spoke of the need for a recovery fund to get out of the socio-economic pit the pandemic has pushed us into. Reaching an agreement at the European Council meeting in December 2020 was the only way to make the resolution on both the multiannual financial framework and on our own resources come into effect from 1 January. We indeed are one of the main beneficiaries—just as Hungary is one of the main net beneficiaries of the cohesion and other funds and the multiannual financial framework. European funds are very important to our two countries—in fact, they form a substantial part of the budget approved in Spain for 2021. The Next Generation EU is an instrument that amounts to a total of EUR 750 billion. It is unique and unprecedented instrument not only due to its volume but also because it is the first time that the EU can mobilise the necessary resources, using the guarantees the member states must provide the European Commission with so that it can obtain funding on the financial markets. On 18 January 2021, Spain, which is expected to obtain approximately EUR 140 billion, presented the Economic and Financial Affairs Council with the first draft version of the recovery plan that it submitted to Brussels in April. Besides the planned investments, this document also contains an important

agenda for structural reforms aiming to achieve a more modern and resilient economy, to increase productivity, competitiveness as well as the capacity for future growth and for creating quality jobs throughout the country, to strengthen the welfare state, and to reduce the social and gender gaps that have been widening since the financial crisis. Spain and other southern member states, such as Greece, Portugal, or Italy, will receive the highest amount of financial aids by means of the new recovery plan. There are doubts, however, whether these member states, often considered fiscally too relaxed (or even fiscally irresponsible) by other EU countries, will be able to develop a clear strategy to spend these funds. Do you believe that this is a true or false narrative? Which are the most important points on the Spanish agenda for using the EU instruments? On 15 October last year, Spain sent its 2021 budget plan to the European Commission, which also contained its Recovery, Transformation, and Resilience Plan with concrete proposals for a EUR 72 billion investment between 2021 and 2023. This plan rests on four cross-cutting pillars: ecological transition, digital transformation, territorial and social cohesion, and gender equality. It has a set of reforms to bring economic modernisation to the country through the above four elements. The government is planning to allocate 37% of the funds to energy transition and 33% to digital transition programmes. Albeit very beneficial in the long term, these will have no direct effect in the short term, limiting the European funds’ positive multiplier effect. The Spanish economy, highly specialised in services and tourism, is particularly vulnerable to the effects of the pandemic. Estimates by the Bank of Spain, which are quite consistent with those of the International Monetary Fund, predict that economic growth in Spain will range between 4.1% and 7.3% in 2021. The government calculates that the Next Generation EU’s European funds will have a 1.2 fiscal multiplier effect.

THE NEXT GENERATION EU FUND IS A GIANT STEP TOWARDS STRENGTHENING OUR STRATEGIC AUTONOMY AND DEMONSTRATING THAT WE ARE A POWERFUL EUROPE. Here, I would like to underscore three points: First, the crisis has shown that the European single market is essential for recovery. Second, Europe needs to increase its industrial autonomy and identify its strategic sectors. Third, the COVID-19 crisis has fuelled the debate on state aid: Spain supports the flexibility introduced by the temporary framework, but this cannot jeopardise having a level playing field, as we must avoid distortions in the internal market. Moreover, within the single market, we must address unfair tax practices existing in some areas, especially in corporate taxation. We must also bear in mind that increased support for Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI) needs to ensure that all member states can participate. Consequently, the pillars of these projects must be transparency and open participation. Digitalisation and green transformation are two of the main priorities of the EU’s plans for the future. Where is Spain, in your opinion, positioned regarding this global transformation? Which can be the sectors in the Spanish economy that can help secure a leading role in this change, and, on INTERVIEWS

THE CLIMATE TRANSITION CREATES NEW OPPORTUNITIES BUT ALSO POSES MAJOR CHALLENGES TO THE INDUSTRY AND EQUITY. the flip side, which are the main elements that might slow this modernisation down? In December 2019, the European Council set the goal of achieving climate neutrality in 2050, thus fulfilling the most ambitious aspirations of the Paris Agreement. By 2030, halfway through the process, the goal of reducing emissions by at least 55% has been established, and this commitment has also been included in the proposed European Climate Law, which will provide the framework for making progress in the fight against climate change. The climate transition creates new opportunities but also poses major challenges to the industry and equity. Therefore, emission reduction should be achieved at the lowest possible cost, counting on the participation of all member states and taking into account the criteria of solidarity, justice, and the preservation of competitiveness. Funding will be key to both the development of technological innovation and its subsequent deployment. It will be necessary to make the best possible use of the multiannual financial framework and the Next Generation EU instrument, for which a cross-cutting spending target of at least 30% in the framework of the Just Transition Fund is asked. The creation of an EU green bond and the strengthening of the EU Emissions Trading System are two relevant proposals. We must keep our eyes on the upcoming COP 26 in Glasgow in the autumn. 14

INTERVIEWS

Europe is in a leading position now, and the sooner we initiate the change, the lower the economic and environmental costs and the greater the economic opportunities caused by the climate transition in employment and the modernisation of the business fabric will be. It is an opportunity to place Spain and the European Union at the forefront of technological sectors that will have a bearing on the coming decades. Digital transformation is another major challenge to Europe, and the setup of 5G networks is particularly relevant in this context. Spain believes that the European Commission and the member states should develop a joint approach to defining the criteria for the identification of high-risk providers. The European Commission should also quickly update the state aid framework for deploying 5G. Spain has always been a very pro-European country, but, from time to time, with a very strong transatlantic orientation for geographical and and historical reasons. Taking into account this twofold tradition, what is your country’s take on big European issues, such as the future of cooperation with the US, further enlargement, and common defence vs NATO? Among the non-founding member states, Spain is the one that has most assiduously made contributions which took into account not only how the European project can benefit us but also how these contributions can benefit the European project. There is basic consensus on the European agenda in my country, which is one of our great assets to have a growing role in the EU. Strengthening our capabilities certainly con tributes to a situation where close partnership with the European Union can become more attractive to our main ally, the United States. With the European Council meeting in mind, a new EU–US Agenda for Global Change was presented, which is one of the focal points of the debate on strategic autonomy. It identifies four priorities: a healthier world during COVID-19 and beyond, with necessary WHO

reform; protecting our planet and prosperity; technology, trade, and standards; and a safer, more prosperous, and more democratic world. There is also a mention of a comprehensive new transatlantic green agenda that includes trade and technology, as well as greater coordination in the fight against deforestation and in the protection of the oceans. In technology, trade, and standards, there is room for closer coordination, as the two sides of the Atlantic have many values in common, account for about one-third of global trade, and exercise strong regulatory leadership. The European proposals are along the lines of pushing for the unavoidable reform of the World Trade Organization, having a dialogue on the social and fiscal responsibility of big tech companies, and establishing a new EU–US Trade and Technology Council. Connectivity should be at the top of our agenda, as we should be able to provide the world with alternatives to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. Similarly, we need to engage with the new Biden Administration to find common ground the digital economy (including the hardto-crack nut of the digital services tax). Finally, there are US trade negotiations with third parties to consider. Against the backdrop of Brexit, US–UK negotiations with all their variables, including how Biden repeatedly defended

SPAIN, A FULL MEMBER OF BOTH THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, CONSIDERS THAT THERE IS NO CHOICE BETWEEN THE TWO.

the Good Friday Agreement, are particularly important to the EU. As for NATO, Spain, a full member of both the Atlantic alliance and the European Union, considers that there is no choice between the two. The security of our country, the promotion and defence of our interests, and our contribution to the security of our allies depend on a strong NATO and a Europe based on solid defence. Spain is in favour of a Europe with defence capable of responding to the threats and challenges posed by the security and defence landscape in the terms already pointed out in the 2016 EU Global Strategy, the implementation of which has given rise to initiatives from PESCO to the European Defence Fund, which are under development today. As most of the EU member states are also NATO members and are committed to transatlantic relations, the EU’s defence ambition is compatible with the basic principles and objectives of the Washington Treaty because we believe that a Europe with strong defence can strengthen NATO, and vice versa. Reinforcing the cooperation between the EU and NATO is essential. Both organisations must reinforce each other and develop synergies while respecting autonomy in decision making. Regarding the Eastern Neighbourhood Policy, we must act with greater resolution and have a leading role to be able to claim and exercise a prominent position while reviewing its policy priorities and requesting additional resources for the south. The European Neighbourhood Policy can become more effective if we put greater emphasis on the horizontality of the programmes and their alignment with the 2030 agenda instead of increasing differentiation and bilateralism in the relations with our southern neighbours. Spanish prime ministers have most of the time been very active in proposing reforms to the EU, and Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez is no exception. Could you elaborate on how he imagines the future of Europe and how he sees the multi-speed (or variable geometry) concept of the EU he is also supporting? INTERVIEWS

Global governance had to deal with some dysfunctionalities already before the crisis, but the pandemic has accelerated this process. The Conference on the Future of Europe has put citizens at the heart of this exercise of reflection. It should produce concrete results in several areas: in the Economic and Monetary Union, Research, Development, and Innovation, the healthcare sector—although the EU only has coordinating competencies in health, our response to the pandemic has shown that many results can be achieved jointly—mobility and tourism, migration policy, or European citizenship. Spain has presented a proposal that begins with defending multilateralism: the EU must continue to promote multilateralism without abandoning the goal of greater autonomy. Four priority areas can be identified to overcome the present crisis: health, mobility, global value chains, and technological governance. Talking about the healthcare sector, no one is out of danger as long as the virus remains active somewhere. This requires mobilising the WHO, especially in data sharing and resource mobilisation. The EU and its member states could create the necessary political will at the global level, including the G7 and G20. Speaking of mobility, Europe accounts for half of all international tourist arrivals and

THERE IS BASIC CONSENSUS ON THE EUROPEAN AGENDA IN MY COUNTRY, WHICH IS ONE OF OUR GREAT ASSETS TO HAVE A GROWING ROLE IN THE EU. 16

INTERVIEWS

is the major global tourist-issuing market. The pandemic hit the main European tourist destinations, including my country, the hardest. The most advisable way to avoid distortions in the single market is to agree on common standard operating procedures. The EU is moving towards a more strategic approach to value chains and European dependence in certain sectors, such as anti biotics, protective materials, analgesics, or raw materials for the chemical industry. Some of these companies can relocate to the EU, which requires collaboration with the private sector, as companies must remain competitive. As for technology and data, the pandemic has reinforced surveillance in the public health arena. We must cooperate to develop technology standards that can ensure privacy while also enabling innovation. Digital transition will be necessary to guarantee recovery, and the EU could have a leading role in the way the digital word order transforms. There is no point in talking about strategic autonomy without ensuring European digital autonomy minimally and reducing technological dependence. What is Spain’s position on the many potential outward threats, such as migration or climate change, which have proved to be very divisive among EU member states in recent times? Since the 2006 cayucos crisis, Spain has been a model in Europe for how it managed migration at a national level, with a clear differentiation between various elements which also have to be complementary: the fight against irregular immigration, especially against human traffickers, and the simultaneous need for integrating immigrants who are granted regular status in Spain. It is also a model for opening channels for legal immigration where our labour market requires it, for its cooperative support for development, and for establishing cooperative relations with our law enforcement and security forces. The dossier on migration policy is among the most sensitive ones, and that is why we believe that areas of consensus on, for example, the

SINCE THE 2006 CAYUCOS CRISIS, SPAIN HAS BEEN A MODEL IN EUROPE FOR HOW IT MANAGED MIGRATION AT A NATIONAL LEVEL. external dimension of the problem or a solution to its operational issues, must be sought. Points of convergence between Hungary, the Visegrad countries, and Spain are the “package approach” to the negotiation over the Pact on Migration and Asylum and the importance we attach to the external dimension, although the standpoint we share as a country with external EU borders does not lead to converging positions. Imbalances between solidarity and responsibility must be redressed: it is not a viable option to have strict rules for the states of first entry and flexible solidarity for the rest—and the states of first entry cannot cope with the migratory pressure in place of the whole of the union. However, we are also concerned about some countries’ insistence on the creation of detention centres on our borders: neither is it a solution—as it is demonstrated by how camps in Greece perpetuate—nor does it comply with our legislation. Moreover, it would also be politically indigestible. The situation on the Canary Islands reaffirms our preference for adding an external dimension that is given substance and provided with material resources to the pact. We launched an initiative on migration in Africa into which the necessary funding can be channelled. Just like us, the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood also feel the demographic

pressure, which, in their case, comes from the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa. If there is no economic recovery, the youth of these countries will seek a better life on the other side of the Mediterranean. To answer the second part of your question, Politico, a prestigious digital newspaper on EU issues, put a vice-president of the Spanish government, Teresa Ribera, on its list of the twenty-eight most powerful personalities in Europe, recognising that a southern European country is at the forefront of the ecological transition. Spain is aligned with the European Commission and the most progressive member states. It is necessary to know how to combine two goals: achieving environmental neutrality and guaranteeing that this process will be realised in a way that those who need to make a greater effort to adapt or could suffer damages may be supported. This requires financing, which will come from the recovery fund: the latter will fund up to 30% of the activities related to ecological transition. The European Climate Law will be fundamental to tie the goal of climate neutrality to 2050 as a cross-cutting guide for all European policies and a demonstration of the EU’s global leadership vis-à-vis third countries. It must recognise the importance of adaptation measures and the integration of climate risks in water management to mitigate the worsening water stress. We will support the maximum ambition level of the climate law, as it produces synergies between creating sustainable jobs, combating the risks of climate change (and biodiversity loss), and improving the health and well-being of citizens. Moreover, we will monitor the Just Transition Fund to ensure that it is indeed fair and recognises the restructuring effort already made by Spain. How do you evaluate the foreign policy directions traditionally important to Spain within the European context of the next decades? How do you see the future of the EU–Mercosur Trade Agreement and further possible cooperation with Latin America? Do you think that North Africa INTERVIEWS

will continue to increase in importance, especially now, being one of the main sources of immigration to Europe and that Spain can have a leading role as an intermediary between the two continents? Due to its geographical location, Spain is a nodal country for the EU in two dimensions: towards Latin America and the South Mediterranean Neighbourhood. Latin America and Africa, especially the Sahel and the Mediterranean, are priority regions for Spanish foreign policy. International cooperation with Africa entails the risk of Latin America being put on the back burner, and, for this reason, Spain tries to seek a balance. As for Latin America, the Portuguese presidency showed an interest in “revitalising bilateral relations” and “promoting relations with subregional groups in areas of common interest.” Spain believes that there is a need for greater political dialogue between the EU and Latin America—“de facto,” we are the former’s intermediary in EU institutions—which may also promote the EU’s greater presence as a global actor. The EU–Mercosur agreement is under legal review and being translated. It is yet to be approved by the European Council and signed by the EU member states and the Mercosur countries. It also needs to be approved by national parliaments after being given the goahead by the European Parliament. However, several countries have displayed reluctance to sign it, especially because of its environmental aspects—an attitude that may cloak agricultural protectionism. Nonetheless, the EU–Mercosur agreement is going to raise the standards of environmental protection in trade relations. It is, therefore, necessary to speed up the ratification of an agreement that has global benefits. In the current geopolitical context, non-ratification could bring discredit on the EU, while the vacuum it leaves could be filled by other powers (especially China). The Southern Neighbourhood is also a priority for my country, and the health emergency makes it more necessary than ever for the EU not to stop paying attention to it: Egypt alone 18

INTERVIEWS

THE EU MUST CONTINUE TO PROMOTE MULTILATERALISM WITHOUT ABANDONING THE GOAL OF GREATER AUTONOMY. has a larger population than the six countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood combined. We want the same degree of development for the Southern Neighbourhood that has been achieved with the Eastern Partnership, aligning these countries with the new priorities of the European agenda (digitalisation, green agenda, connectivity, etc.). Twenty-five years ago, Spain fostered new relations between the European Union and the Mediterranean countries. Thus, the Barcelona Process emerged, from which the Union for the Mediterranean—a forum with forty-two members, among them the EU countries, many Arab states, Turkey, and Israel—was born in 2008. In 2015, Spain promoted the first EU– Southern Neighbourhood Ministerial Meeting. On 26 November last year, a meeting between EU ministers and our partners in the Southern Neighbourhood took place in Barcelona, and, on 27 November, the V Regional Forum of the Union for the Mediterranean was held on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Barcelona Process’s launch. This initiative brought the Southern Neighbourhood into the European debate at a key moment, when the new multi annual financial framework should boost the creation of a common business ecosystem, fostering a high degree of connectivity. Besides, we must have a frank and constructive

dialogue on migration, a phenomenon which has appeared to be so fundamental—but this requires a strong political will. The balance of power inside the EU is markedly changing this year after Brexit. Many think that the UK’s exit and Poland’s aloofness towards the EU are a prime opportunity for Spain to have a leading role in important EU decisions and to punch above its weight. Do you think that Spain can be a new pole in the EU, just as important as Germany or France? Considering that relations between Madrid and London have traditionally been strong, do you think that your country can act as an intermediary between the UK and the EU? After the UK left the EU, Spain is the fourthlargest economy in not only the eurozone but also the whole union, which means that we are required to play an essential role in it. However, my country, committed to the European project for almost four decades, can opt for flexible alliances: it can ally itself with the Paris–Berlin axis if occasion allows it or take advantage of the vacuum left by Brexit and of the chance to be a third pillar of the core of power in the EU, turning to alliances with partners such as Hungary or the V4 when there is convergence among our interests. Spain’s relations with the United Kingdom are very intense in the economic sphere, both commercially and in terms of reciprocal investment—the United Kingdom has the second-largest stock of foreign direct investment in my country, and, in terms of GDP, foreign direct investment between Spain and the United Kingdom is greater than that of Germany, France, or Italy. Speaking about civil society, it is not only the importance of tourism between us but also the number of both countries’ residents in each other’s territories which is particularly notable: more than 260,000 Spanish residents live in the UK, while there are more than 400,000 British residents in Spain. Spain has the greatest interest in maintaining the best possible relations with the United Kingdom, and, if the strength of our ties

is useful for the union as a whole, we will be delighted to contribute. A complex negotiation between the EU and the United Kingdom was concluded on 24 December last year—priority was given to citizens there, and the European Union and its member states could preserve their unity. Spain maintained a high profile in chapters of particular interest to us, such as fishing, agrifood products, air transport, and Gibraltar. We would have preferred to have a more ambitious agreement; still, sections about agriculture, and especially fishing, as well as trade and aviation that are important to Spain were included in it. The agreement, which provisionally came into force on 1 January, does not freeze UK–EU relations: it should be seen as the foundation from which we can rebuild them. We will have to put all our efforts into developing our relations with the UK, a great political and economic power which is very close to our country and has enormous importance to Spain. How does Spain see Hungary and the Visegrad Group? Is there any kind of cooperation with these countries besides the one we could witness during the negotiations on the multiannual financial framework within the Friends of Cohesion group? Spain considers Hungary and the Visegrad Group (V4) as relevant partners in both the EU and NATO. In the Visegrad countries, a certain interest can be noticed in balancing German assertiveness at the European level: although there is prestige in joining the Franco-German engine, they also have an interest in seeking

AFTER THE UK LEFT THE EU, MY COUNTRY CAN OPT FOR FLEXIBLE ALLIANCES. INTERVIEWS

alternatives for the guidelines coming from Brussels–Berlin. Brexit is a tragedy for the V4, and there is a wish we share to forge new and different alliances, depending on the issue at hand. There is a satisfactory political dialogue between Spain and the V4, but there is room for strengthening our bilateral relations with both the V4 members and the V4 as a whole. The Spanish government talks to all EU governments: it is important to distinguish ideological affinity from the importance of country-to-country relations. On 2 December last year, the Spanish secretary of state for the EU met his four counterparts from the Visegrad Group. This was the first V4 + 1 format meeting in which Spain had participated. This was a sign of our interest in expanding our dialogue at a crucial moment for the EU before the European Council was to approve the recovery fund and the financial framework and at the moment of Hungary and Poland’s vetoing the agreement. Spain, as the fourth-largest EU member state and one of the main architects of the agreement, conveyed a positive message to the representatives of the Hungarian and Polish people, with whom we have ties of all kinds, about the urgency we all have to face to unblock the fund and the budget and to promote economic recovery. The coronavirus crisis demonstrated the need for counting on very diverse actors, public and private, local, national, and international.

SPAIN CONSIDERS HUNGARY AND THE VISEGRAD GROUP AS RELEVANT PARTNERS IN BOTH THE EU AND NATO. 20

INTERVIEWS

No doubt, we can work in this direction with our friends in the Visegrad Group and take on a greater role in the eastern neighbourhood, perhaps co-leading some initiative where we can contribute with Spanish added value (e.g., with our experience in Latin America) working together with a partner very close to the eastern neighbourhood. What are the business relations between your country and the Visegrad Group in general and Hungary in particular? How can they be improved in the future? Trade relations between Spain and the Visegrad Group countries are dense. In the first eleven months of 2020, exports to these countries exceeded EUR 10,000 million and imports EUR 12,000 million. Looking at bilateral trade relations, it should be noted that Spain is Poland’s twelfth-largest customer and ninthlargest supplier and there are more than 130 Spanish companies in the Czech Republic in sectors such as the car industry, tourism, or infrastructure, or that we are among the top ten trading partners of Slovakia. Based on these solid foundations, the Spanish government keeps working to ensure that our business enterprises accompany the V4 countries in their long-term growth and to attract investment from these countries, for Spain, being a very open economy, is committed to strengthening its economic and commercial exchanges. Spanish exports to Hungary reached EUR 1,808 million, and imports from Hungary EUR 2,963 million, in 2019. Although the trade balance is in deficit for Spain with a 61% trade coverage ratio, bilateral trade has shown some progress, increasing the volume of both exports and imports. Spain is Hungary’s tenth-largest customer, preceding Croatia, Belgium, and Sweden, and its fourteenth-largest supplier, preceding the United States, Ukraine, and Slovenia. Spain’s investment stock position in Hungary was EUR 1,126 million in 2018, and is concentrated in the electrical and automotive sectors (metallurgy and machinery, motor vehicles, and other transport-equipment

THERE IS A SATISFACTORY POLITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN SPAIN AND THE V4, BUT THERE IS ROOM FOR STRENGTHENING OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE V4.

As for the possibilities of improving our relations, ministerial-level political contacts in the recent years have undoubtedly contributed to oiling the wheels. I always underscore the Spanish companies’ skills in infrastructure development, and I am confident that tourist exchanges between our two countries (twelve direct destinations have been re-established) will pick up the pace once the COVID-19 crisis and the restrictions on mobility have been overcome and that the popularity of Spanish—a language spoken by more than 500 million people—keeps growing in Hungary. I am also convinced that Brexit opens new windows of opportunity and that we can be reliable partners in various matters in the EU at a crucial moment of its existence.

manufacturing). Most of the investments in recent years have gone to the operations of companies established in the country. The Hungarian investment in Spain amounted to EUR 27,000 in 2019 and was mainly realised in the industrial sector. In short, Spanish business presence in Hungary is significant: Spanish companies are here from the automotive to the agri-food industry, from hotels to trams in Budapest or Debrecen. And it is enough to take a stroll in Váci utca and its neighbourhood to buy Spanish products. I would like to conclude with a few general words about our traditionally good relations. Tourism between our countries, with fourteen direct destinations linking us, was thriving before the pandemic. In 2018, more than 286,000 Hungarian tourists arrived in Spain, while 186,000 Spanish tourists visited Hungary—our country was one of the top five destinations for Hungarian tourists. There is a growing interest in the Spanish language here: it can now be studied in primary education, seven bilingual secondary schools, and the departments of Hispanic philology at four universities. The Instituto Cervantes does a remarkable activity both in language teaching and in offering cultural programmes. INTERVIEWS

THE FUTURE AHEAD OF US: THE EDUCATION, INNOVATION, AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF ITALY AND SOUTHERN EUROPE—INTERVIEW WITH MARCO DEL PANTA RIDOLFI, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE

Alessandro D’Onofrio, 4 March 2021 The interview was conducted in Italian and translated by Alessandro D’Onofrio.

The European Union is now entering a new stage of integration. The Next Generation EU (NGEU) represents a historical solution devised to tackle the direst effects of the coronavirus pandemic–related crisis and to create a sort of debt mutualisation on a European level. As a former diplomat and the head of an important educational institution, which current priorities do you think Italy and the other Southern European states should focus on in their NGEU plans? The NGEU represents a historical opportunity for all the EU member states, especially for those countries that suffered the pandemic the 22

INTERVIEWS

most at its early stage. These countries are the southern member states and, in particular, Italy and Spain. This situation, however, also creates a good chance to revise the executives’ priorities because—and I mostly refer to Italy here— intervention and economic policies have so far been based on short-term plans. As we know, this attitude, together with the instability of the Italian political system, could not guarantee the continuity of government action. Therefore, relying on short-term policies means focussing on measures which may have positive effects on the economy merely for a few months or, at most, a few years, not taking, however, long-term growth into consideration. The EU now provides member states with the means to concentrate on long-term policies, which is the only way of maintaining sustainable growth and meeting requirements for the management of high public debt. Only long-term growth can empower a state to manage its large and growing public debt. This is the first time in the EU’s history that its member states have obtained a funding system which could revert the foregoing tendency and favour investing in long-term growth. It is the result of the new EU programme, which showed an incredible willingness to react to the crisis by partially pooling the management of debt instruments. Therefore, we are at a fundamental and historic turning point and, if we are able to seize this opportunity offered by the EU, we have a great chance to stop this

short-sightedness which produced the results we all know. It is not a coincidence that Italy’s economy has not been growing—or that it has not been growing as fast as that of its EU partners—for the last twenty years. Do you think NGEU could help southern member states make a huge leap forward in education and innovation? Can they ever catch up with the parts of Europe that are more developed in these areas? I would say yes and, above all, I hope so. What I mean is that these countries now have the resources to do so. Of course, money in itself is not enough, and every member state needs a strategy that will allow it to make proper use of these funds. So, in the case of education, research, and innovation, we not only need a favourable economic context but also a favourable cultural one. When we look at Italy, we can see that the economic context is certainly there. The country has one of the largest production structures in Europe, and it is no coincidence that it is the second-largest manufacturing country in the continent. So the first element is present; innovation, however, does not come by itself, it must certainly be supported. Unfortunately, it was this kind of support that has been a bit lacking in recent years. As for education and research, Italy needs to create a more meritocratic environment. Recently, this recognition has also started to take root here, but we should aim for it with greater determination. For example, it is a very good sign that one of the ministers of the current government is Roberto Cingolani, who was the scientific director at the Italian Institute of Technology from 2005 to 2019. Under his guidance, the institute was a very good example of the efficient and meritocratic management of research funds, and I am sure that he will also apply these criteria to his government activity. It is only when we have all the above-mentioned elements—production structure, meritocratic environment, and resources which are mostly granted by the European Union—that this relaunch can happen. As I said before, the

recovery is highly desired because, otherwise, a country like Italy becomes stuck in a situation where productivity does not grow and public debt becomes unsustainable. What do you think Italy’s weaknesses are from an R&D and educational point of view? And what are its strengths? I would say that Italy has excellent capacities for R&D in almost all sectors. Just think of the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (National Research Council), which has remarkable performance ratings for its activities despite the persistent lack of funds, or the Italian pharmaceutical industry, which is the first in Europe for investment in research and production. Or just consider that Italy outclasses its competitors in various sectors such as the productivity of researchers and basic research. What I see as a weakness from this perspective is the partial inability to channel these research results into the business sector and those R&D-related activities that are more connected to the manufacturing sector. These are, in my opinion, the areas where intervention would be needed, and these are also the sectors where, hopefully, the European funds of the Next Generation EU will be able to help reverse the current trend. To achieve its goals, however, Italy must undertake some crucial structural reforms that have so far been continuously postponed but have now become of absolute priority. From my point of view, there are two main issues to be solved: an institutional one and one that relates to the country’s production structure. Institutionally, we have an overly fragmented political system which renders continuity in government action impossible. Investing in innovation—and

ITALY NEEDS TO CREATE A MORE MERITOCRATIC ENVIRONMENT. INTERVIEWS

even more in research—can only produce tangible outcomes in the long run, in ten or twenty years from now. That cannot, however, harmonise with Italian political mentality, since no government could benefit from the fruits of these significant investments in the short term. The second fact is that Italy has a very “fragmented” production system, mostly made up of small and medium-sized companies. It is good that Italy has a high number of SMEs, much higher than its competitors, and many of these companies have proved to be very efficient, capable of innovating and exporting. Suffice to say that the Italian economy has in recent years resisted thanks to the presence of a large number of SMEs (around 200 or 250 thousand) that have shown great resilience and great export capacities. However, it is also true that many of them are not able to innovate due to, especially, their small dimensions. As a result, Italian production system also has a problem of scale, since it is a fact that, below a certain size, a company hardly has the capacity to invest in innovation. If we put these two elements together, we can understand why Italy lags a little bit in the ranking of the most innovative countries even if it remains a global industrial power. I would conclude by saying it is important that the NGEU funds will be directed to not only maintaining the sectors where Italy is already strong but also assisting companies that operate in sectors where there is less capacity for innovation. The EU is planning to spend more on research and science. How does your university plan to reap the benefits of this new trend? Our institute has traditionally been very effective in seizing funding opportunities and exploiting EU funds. We have won various grants from the European Research Council, so I can assume we have a long tradition of successfully competing at a European level when it comes to accessing funds offered by the union. Now, we are also getting ready on an internal governance level to improve our competitiveness on the upcoming European tenders. We have been very active 24

INTERVIEWS

ITALY HAS ONE OF THE LARGEST PRODUCTION STRUCTURES IN EUROPE, AND IT IS THE SECOND-LARGEST MANUFACTURING COUNTRY IN THE CONTINENT. in social sciences; therefore, we have a long tradition of competing in EU tenders. How do you see the EU’s R&D and universities in a global context? Can they withstand the competition? What should be changed so that they can compete more effectively with leading Asian and US universities? This has been one of the biggest challenges facing the European Union since its first research-funding programme was launched at the beginning of the 1980s. Europeans were aware of the need to compete with other major international players, which, at the time, were mostly the United States and Japan. Accordingly, the goal was to create new research facilities in order to reach their rivals’ level. China has since also entered the race, and its institutes are very competitive on this front. However, European researchsupport programmes have emerged, too, with increasing vigour over the years. At the beginning, the aim was to establish and finance connections between European research centres, so joint projects were supported. After that, the focus shifted to

individual projects and researchers in the belief that there would be a European added value to the extent that the competition could move from a national to a community level. Tenders, therefore, were launched at an EU level, encouraging greater competition, which eventually resulted in creating a truly European added value. Subsequently, networks between research centres also began to be financed, and, then, networks between universities and, later, technological platforms were created as well. All of these actions can be considered very effective if we take into account the small budget the EU has at its disposal and compare it with that of its member states. It is also true that the European Union invests a lot more in sectors other than research. All the above help us conclude that, notwithstanding the limited means available, European institutions have been very effective and able to compete at an international level in most sectors. The EU has also maintained a production system that is one of the most competitive ones globally, and,

BRAIN DRAIN IS PRECISELY ONE OF THE STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED IF WE WANT TO CLOSE THE GAP BETWEEN US AND THE MOST PRODUCTIVE COUNTRIES.

in recent years, the European economy has shown signs of notable development. To conclude, I would say that European research-funding programmes are basically a success story but they need to be sustained and reinforced because competition is growing fiercer. If we want to remain competitive and maintain an economy with high added value, we have to invest in research and innovation. Europe is lagging in computer and data sciences and also in services connected to the cloud, while it is stronger in more traditional sectors like the automotive industry. Do you think that urging the sustainable development and greening agenda could be a way to get into the forefront again? I would say yes, and that is what I hope, too. However, let us not forget that, in Europe, there are several sectors with a long tradition which are, nevertheless, connected to the so-called “data industry.” If you think of the automotive industry, that is particularly strong in countries such as Germany, Italy, and, to some extent, France, too. It represents one of the leading industrial sectors in the EU which requires increasingly sophisticated technologies to be deployed. However, a production structure cannot be changed overnight, and we should also take into account that even industries such as the automotive industry have very high-tech elements. Let us just consider all the new developments in mobility. In this context, European funds, which focus mainly on information technology and the environment, can also contribute to the establishment of a stronger tie among these industrial sectors and encourage ecological transition. You have talked a lot about Italy as a highly industrialised country, but there is often a perception abroad that it is a country that relies mainly on other sectors, for instance, tourism. You also served as a city councillor in Florence, an emblematic case in point. What can you tell us about Florence’s economic reality? What was INTERVIEWS

the reaction of the city administration to the possibility of having European development funds? After European funds had been made available, all member states took their needs into account at not only national but also local levels. At the time when I served in the city council, the need for developing and supporting an alternative to the model of mass tourism became a priority in Florence. It is not that, before the introduction of the NGEU, we had not already been working to make it come true. Contrary to popular belief, widespread not only outside Italian territory, Florence is more of an industrial than a touristic city. The manufacturing industry accounts for 20% of the GDP in the metropolitan area, while tourism only accounts for 12%. For this reason, Florence’s industrial tradition must be protected and strengthened, and it is necessary to implement a development model that can ensure production based on greater added value. During my time as a counsellor, I supported an initiative called “Higher Education Florence” precisely to make it clear how this industrial structure can be maintained and made prosperous only by investing in education, research, and innovation in the years to come. In your opinion, what are the other elements that could help Southern Europe to close the productivity and employment gap between themselves and the northern countries in the medium and long term? I would say that it is necessary to invest in all sectors, even in those that are not directly connected to the productive ones, and, most of all, in human capital at every level. Only by investing in the education and formation of younger generations is it possible to ensure an efficient economic system capable of sustainable growth in the long term. One of the reasons why Italy has grown less than its partners for the last twenty years is exactly this productivity gap. In order to close that, it is necessary to invest in the most productive factors, namely, capital and labour. Therefore, while, on the one hand, there is a need to make an effort to support investments in 26

INTERVIEWS

THE PANDEMIC HAS MADE US UNDERSTAND HOW, GLOBALISATION HAS LED TO EXCESSES THAT NEED TO BE REVISED. infrastructure, on the other hand, the education of a workforce that is more prepared for new technologies is also needed. No matter how you look at it, investment in human capital is essential to grow and to close the gap that has widened in recent years. Unfortunately, the Italian production system currently does not require a sufficiently high number of highly educated workforce, so many young people are forced to leave the country and to work abroad, generating wealth and knowledge there. This would not be a problem in itself if there were a higher inflow of foreigners, but, unfortunately, Italy is not good enough at attracting highly qualified people. This brain drain is precisely one of the structural problems that must be addressed if we want to close the gap between us and the most productive countries. What are the takeaways of the global pandemic for European higher education, science, and innovation? During the pandemic, the continuity of education, among other fields, has been ensured by the use of a series of technological tools. I refer to those computer systems that have made distance teaching or even the organisation of conferences or working activities possible. Despite the utility of these tools, I think that they represent a serious setback and they cannot substitute in any way the effectiveness of in-person teaching

or on-site activities. Being in contact with professors and other students is definitely a more formative experience than using an IT intermediary. Surely, these tools will keep being used in the future, since they are convenient when someone wants to hold a conference involving speakers from all over the world and to reach out to a growing audience. I think, however, that the personal factor is important, and I hope that we will find the right balance in the future, using perhaps hybrid formulas. Losing the factor of personal interaction would do massive anthropological damage. Do you agree that the pandemic has shown that we should reverse globalisation and concentrate on our local resources? It is difficult to express a unequivocal view. Globalisation has had many positive effects in terms of global growth, and it helped many areas of the planet grow much faster than the assistance and intervention by more developed countries did. Globalisation is, therefore, an extraordinary motor of growth and progress, but, like everything in this world, it also has negative effects that must be balanced out. The pandemic certainly represents a moment of pause in this process and has made us understand how, in some respects, globalisation has led to excesses that need to be revised. However, the globalisation process will continue—and we hope it will do—even if in a more temperate way, taking the experience of these years into account. As I know, you had great ideas for tourism when you decided to run for Florence’s city council. Florence is one of the most important touristic destinations in the world, but we often hear how cities struggle to attract “quality tourism.” How do you see the future of the tourism sector in the post-coronavirus world? What kind of strategies should the EU implement to switch to more sustainable tourism? During my campaign for the city council elections, my motto was “fewer tourists in slippers and more students and researchers,”

which is a folkloristic way to say that, even if tourism is an essential sector of its economy, the city cannot focus only on that. It was the year before the pandemic, so no one could have predicted what would happen one year later, Unfortunately, the pandemic showed us in a very unfriendly way that cities cannot rely on low-quality “hit-and-run” tourism—but, at least, we know that now. Of course, no one has the magic recipe for making tourism more “compatible” with the cities’ needs. It is certain, however, that past anomalies must be addressed and regulation is needed. For example, let us think of the phenomenon of short-term renting. It should not be demonised, because tourists using this service many times stay longer than those who go to hotels. However, it is important to achieve a balance and put this phenomenon in a wider context of how the city and the community can thrive. The main focus should, anyway, be on quality tourism and on how to attract it. For example, touristic offerings should move more towards sectors with higher cultural or economic content. I am referring to strengthening the quality of cultural programmes, by, e.g., building a solid network of smaller museums and creating more opportunities for outdoor and sports tourism or strengthening slow tourism like walking or cycling. It is also important to aim at congress tourism because it has been shown that this type of tourism is generally of higher quality, with more spending and longer stays than the average. So we need to focus on these aspects which require more investment in infrastructure, such as cycle lanes, airports, or conference centres. All these things are slowly being done in Florence, and I hope that, over time, they would lead to a kind of tourism that is more attentive to the values this city is the bearer of and to the needs of the community itself.

INTERVIEWS

POLITICS

GEOPOLITICS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: GEOGRAPHICAL AND IDENTITY REALITIES IN AND BEYOND THE MARE NOSTRUM Nuno Morgado INTRODUCTION This article zooms in on the Mediterranean region with the objective of describing a set of geographical and identity realities which impact the foreign policy conduct of European countries located in the area. Knowing these realities means, therefore, a better understanding of the considered states’ behaviour. The structure of the text is circular, inspired by the outlines of the Mediterranean Sea resembling a very imperfect oval shape. The article starts with Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean and then covers the west, Greece, Italy, Malta, France, Spain, and Portugal. These countries form the EuroMed 7 Group, an informal alliance within the European Union. However, the text also includes a reference to the UK, a country with bases in both Gibraltar and Cyprus, thus returning the reader to the east of the sea. The article is a collection of case studies, unified by the theoretical–methodological framework of neoclassical geopolitics.1

Member states of the EuroMed 7 Group

FRANCE PORTUGAL ITALY SPAIN

GREECE Mediterranean Sea

MALTA

POLITICS

CYPRUS

CYPRUS Among the EU countries located in the Mediterranean, Cyprus is the one that seems to deal with the most severe problems from the point of view of political and military stability. The “far eastern” position of that island on the sea, in a transition area between Europe and the Middle East, certainly contributed—and still does—to that fact. The island—located in a place that was under the consecutive control of the Roman and Byzantine Emperors, the Crusaders and the King of Jerusalem, the Ottoman sultan, and the British Crown—is today divided into two “countries”: the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (recognised only by Turkey). This division was a result of the persistent resentment between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots—brother communities in a sole nation that speaks two languages and practices two religions—which was worsened by fratricide attacks during the 1960s and 1970s and subsequent evictions and population exchanges between the north and south. The resentment out of all these tragic events still persists, blocking the path to the island’s reunification, and, all things being equal, they do not seem to give any sign of disappearing in the next years. Consequently, there could not be too much expectation about recent efforts by UN Secretary-General António Guterres in this respect. 2 Moreover, the island also needs to deal with further complications, meaning that roughly 35% of its territory is occupied by the Turkish army, which backs up the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), and, thus, the island keeps facing major struggles to achieve political and social stability. 3 Nicosia remains the last divided capital

The division of Cyprus and the British air bases in its territory

KYRENIA Kyrenia Nicosia

FAMAGUSTA Famagusta

NICOSIA Larnaca

PAPHOS Paphos

LARNACA LIMASSOL Limassol Akrotiri (UK)

of Europe as both a material and a symbolic result of this conflict. Cyprus joined the EU in 2004. Although the whole of the island, including the UN buffer zone, the exclaves, and all the territories with complex issues, joined on paper, the control over the north-east of the island is de facto exercised directly by the TRNC and indirectly by Turkey. As a geographical reality, Cyprus balances between Greece and the EU (and, consequently, NATO and the US); Turkey, the Middle East, and the Gulf states; and Russia and the Eurasian landmass. It, thus, represents one of the most interesting cases from the angle of geopolitical studies. Concerning Russia, it is noteworthy that Cyprus has ties with this country through Orthodoxy, cultural sympathies involving businesses, financial transactions, and citizenship rights, in addition to a somehow left-wing solidarity (e.g., until 2013, the president of Cyprus was the proRussia communist, Demetris Christofias). One of the priorities for Cyprus is certainly to influence the EU agenda by laying Eastern Mediterranean issues—on the table, especially the ongoing dispute between Cyprus and Turkey on the exploration of oil and gas in Cyprus’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

Dhekelia (UK) The area administered by Greek Cypriots The area administered by Turkish Cypriots United Kingdom Sovereign Base Areas United Nations-administered buffer zone (Green Line)

GREECE Similarly to Cyprus, Greece, one of Europe’s cultural birthplaces, is also located in the eastern Mediterranean and, therefore, suffered a centuries-long Ottoman occupation, too. The Hellenic sphere lost some territories with much significance to the Ottoman Empire, the most important of which is perhaps the old city of Constantinople (Istanbul). Both of these geographical and historical facts predetermine tense relations between modern Greece and Turkey, justifying why Athens spends 2.6% of its GDP on defence;4 all this in a context where Greece and Turkey are member states of the same politico-military alliance, NATO. Greece is a mountainous country, a condition that complicates domestic power projection, communication and transportation, and agricultural production. The country also has an unusual geographical configuration, for it controls roughly 6,000 islands and islets and has an impressive 13,676-kilometre coastline—a geographical beauty and, at the same time, a defence nightmare. Nevertheless, the fact that the Greek is among the most powerful navies in Europe may help dissuade military adventures. In addition, the Greek merchant navy capacity POLITICS

is in the world’s top ten. Greek defence can be visualised in two concentric circles: a narrower one in the Aegean Sea, with Athens in its very centre, and a wider one extending over the eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, Greece not only used to be a conventional sea power built upon a maritime culture, it still is. The country’s geographical position makes it a gateway from the African and Middle Eastern regions to Europe. Unsurprisingly, Greece has been in the front line of receiving thousands of illegal immigrants coming from the south and the east since 2015. The EU depends on Greece, just as on other Mediterranean countries, to enforce the law and protect EU borders from any disturbance originating from the mentioned geographical directions. Greece has been haunted by serious economic problems due to weak economic and land transportation structures, a huge public sector, and a tendency for overspending. The country has received international bailouts but does not seem to be able to overcome its economic fragilities. These problems certainly limit the potential of the state and, consequently, Greece’s international position. The idea of abandoning the EU has been sporadically mooted, but Greece does not seem to have an alternative to membership, given its regional context and the threats it faces.

Greece’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ)

GREECE

Delimitation agreements between Greece and Italy (1977/2020) Delimitation agreements between Greece and Egypt (2020)

Greek continental shelf

Mediterranean Sea

Greek EEZ The vast Greek exclusive economic zone surrounding its islands—one of the reasons for its high defence budget 32

POLITICS

ITALY Unlike the Byzantine Peninsula or the Iberian Peninsula, the Italian Peninsula is unified into a single country. To this fact, constituting an important element of unity, another one can be added—Italy enjoys religious homogeneity, as most of the Italians are Roman Catholic. On the other hand, Italy struggles with very strong regional identities (e.g., that of Lazio, Lombardy, Piemont, Tuscany, Umbria, Veneto), which create centrifugal forces that weaken political unity. Mafia groups and organised crime also have a role at this level, opposing, therefore, any force for centralisation (i.e., the one coming from Rome). This trait can easily be explained by the Italian Peninsula’s long history of fragmentation following the collapse of the Western Roman Empire. It was a history of small Italian states, Papal states, the Republic of San Marino (for some, the oldest country of Europe), and wars and conflicts among them. Italy was unified only in 1871, in the same year when the Unification of Germany into the German Empire took place. Interactions between diverse regional identities certainly reflect the aspects of Italy’s geographical setting—the country is mostly rocky (because of the Apennines, the Alps, etc.) but with various other topographical features (an alpine north and a very dry south). The physical geography of the territory also correlates with different economic realities—the industrialised and rich north stands in contrast with the agrarian and poor south. The Po Plain in northern Italy, for example, with its industrial production, can certainly be considered the Italian state’s ecumene.5 Italy boasts a long coastline of 7,600 kilometres and the two largest islands in the Mediterranean: Sicily and Sardinia. The country has a central position in the Mediterranean Sea. This position can largely explain the success and longevity of the Roman Empire, which controlled not only the whole of southern and western Europe but also the north of Africa, the Anatolian peninsula, and the Fertile Crescent in the Middle East. It is, therefore, unsurprising that one can still find ideas about “the enlarged Mediterranean” along with a commitment to Europeanism and Atlanticism in Italy’s foreign policy.

Trentino Alto Adige Valle Daosta

Lombardy

The north–south divide in Italy represented by regional per capita GDP in 2015

FriuliVenezia Giulia

Veneto

Piedmont

Emilia-Romagna Liguria

Tuscany

Marche Umbria

Abruzzo Lazio Molise

Ampania

Puglia Basilicata

Sardegna

Calabria

> 35,000 30,001–35,000

Sicilia

25,001–30,000 20,001–25,000 ≤ 20,000

Although Italy is the third-largest economy in the eurozone, the Italian economy has an exceptionally high public debt, a weak banking sector, and other structural problems. Still, Italian brands and high-quality goods continue to be in demand, especially in the luxury market. MALTA Like Italy, Malta is also located in the very centre of the Mediterranean Sea. Consequently, control

over the Maltese archipelago has been of crucial importance to the maritime dominance of the entire sea by different peoples (e.g., Carthaginians, Greeks, Romans, Saracens and Moors, the Knights of the Order of Malta, the Spanish, the French, the British) throughout history. Their location also makes the Maltese islands, and especially the Malta Freeport, an important trans-shipment point. With its small area of 316 square kilometres, Malta’s terrain is mostly rocky and has many POLITICS

coastal cliffs, which are of great splendour and a help in defence, too. Yet, they create natural difficulties in establishing additional ports and, thus, forming part of international sea lines of communication and shipment more. The Maltese merchant navy is also in the world’s top ten, with a total of 2,207 ships, which makes it larger than the Greek or the British ones. Malta became independent from the UK in 1964 and joined the EU in 2004 and the eurozone in 2008. Like that of Cyprus, Malta’s core foreign policy also includes bringing the Mediterranean vocation to the centres of the EU. The country is a financial centre, a film production spot, and an ideal tourist destination due to its beauty and warm climate. FRANCE France can be considered as a country having a privileged position for a set of reasons: it is the only European state regarded as both a Northern and a Southern European country, and it is surrounded by buffer zones and “protected” areas that make the “French fortress”: the Atlantic Ocean in the west, the North Sea in the north, the English Channel in the northeast, the Rhine and the mountains of the Ardennes, the Vosges, and the Jura in the east, the Alps in the southeast, the Mediterranean Sea in the south, and the Pyrenees in the southwest. The weak point in this geographical “fortress” is the northeast—the border with Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany—from where the invasions of France, notably, the German invasions in the Franco-Prussian War (1870– 1871), World War I (1914–1918), and World War II (1939–1945), traditionally came. In this way, expanding and controlling territories to the east (in the areas of the old Lotharingia and the Holy Roman Empire) has been, unsurprisingly, a geopolitical continuity in French grand strategy throughout the centuries. Furthermore, the capital, Paris, is located at the intersection of the Seine and Marne, thus having a central position and making the projection of power to the rest of the country easier. Aymeric Chauprade described this setting as “a strong political centre and weak peripheries,”6 which can certainly explain why 34

POLITICS

France was one of the first European countries to develop into not only a nation state but also a highly centralised country. Apart from its excellent position, France retains a dense, 8,500-kilometre network of navigable rivers. The Rhine, Meuse, Marne, Seine, Loire, Rhone, Dordogne, Garonne, and many other rivers allow easy fluvial transportation and economic development, making refinement to political control possible. Furthermore, the network of rivers provides freshwater, which, together with its fertile soils and good climate conditions, makes France one of the world’s leading agricultural powers, having more capacity to produce food than any other western or southern European country. The French terrain is comprised of flat plains with some hills in the north and the west and more mountains in the south. France is the largest of all EU member states by total land area, and its more than 68 million people make it the most populous country of the EuroMed 7 Group. Metropolitan France includes various coastal islands, among which the largest is Corsica (where Bonaparte was from), and the country still enjoys sovereignty over five overseas regions—French Guiana in South America, Guadeloupe and Martinique in the Caribbean, Mayotte in Africa, and Réunion in the Indian Ocean. In addition to these, France possesses other territories and collectivities around the world (e.g., Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Saint Martin, Saint Barthélemy, French Polynesia, the Kerguelen Islands, Adélie Land) providing an example of continuity of its territorial integrity. The EU as a political structure serves as a tool for France to contain Germany’s power (also meaning that it helps secure the geographical weakness of the north-eastern and eastern borders) and, at the same time, to reinforce the French aspirations and ambitions on the international chessboard: moving the Mediterranean from the periphery to the centre of the Euro-Atlantic concerns is an important goal of Paris since its return to NATO (let us remember, e.g., the case of Libya). France is the only country of the EuroMed 7 Group that has a permanent seat at the UN Security Council.

France’s navigable waterways

Escault

Rouen

Amiens Reims

Seine

Moselle

Nancy

Paris

Rhine

Dijon

Loire Nantes

Available draught (m) ≥2.50 1.80

Lyon

1.60 1.50 1.40 1.20 1.00

Bordeaux

Rhone Garonne

Avignon

No through navigation Toulouse Canal du Midi

SPAIN Spain’s access to both the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea can be considered an incentive from geography to maritime expansion. This is a common trait of Spain and France; the Spanish colonial empire, however, chronologically preceded the French, the former reaching its apogee in the 16th and 17th centuries (ending with the War of the Spanish Succession), and the latter in the 17th and 18th centuries (finishing with the Seven Years’ War). Located at the entrance of the Mediterranean Sea, surrounded by the Pyrenees and France in the east, the Atlantic Ocean in the north, Portugal in the west, and a few kilometres away

Montpellier Marseille

from Africa, Spain is in a region that contains one of the world’s most important choke points— the Strait of Gibraltar. This spot served as the gateway to the invasion of the Iberian Peninsula by the Moors, the Islamic-military force that occupied the region from 711 until 1492. The rock of Gibraltar has been under British rule since 1704, which allows the UK control over the only natural entrance to the Mediterranean Sea. In this distribution of capabilities, Spain controls two autonomous cities in Africa—Ceuta and Melilla—which are part of the Strait of Gibraltar’s security complex, in addition to other seventeen autonomous communities, including the Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands. POLITICS

Within its Iberian territory—Spain is actually the second-largest state in the EU—the country struggles with topographical features that have political consequences, to some extent, in a similar way to Italy. The dissected plateau surrounded by rugged hills creates regional autonomies, linguistic variation, the diversification of interests, and separatist ambitions that make communications and central control difficult and fragile. The relocation of the Spanish capital from Toledo to Madrid in the 16th century certainly tried to tackle this problem that has continued to our days, as one can observe in the domestic turmoil of recent years caused by the independence movement of Catalonia, in addition to the Basque Country’s long-term aspirations for independence. Despite the mentioned problems, Spain is the eurozone’s fourth-largest economy and rules over the ports of Valencia and Algeciras, two of the top-five container ports in the Mediterranean Sea. PORTUGAL As Políbio Valente de Almeida summarised it, “Portugal is geoblocked by Spain.”7 Therefore, the country has been constrained to look overseas for allies and support in order to balance the continental menace since its independence—not only a geographical but a demographic, political, and military threat. Among those allies, England

Portugal’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ)

Extended continental shelf (submitted)

PORTUGAL Azores EEZ

Continental Portugal EEZ Madeira EEZ

Portuguese continental shelf Portuguese EEZ

POLITICS

(the UK) is the most important. As for the other type of counterbalance it found overseas, the most important one was the creation of the Portuguese sea power (the first world-scale sea power in human history) with the country’s strategic efforts in Asia in the 16th century, in South America from the 17th to the 19th centuries, and in Africa from the 19th to the 20th centuries. These grand strategies that created a pluri-continental state and a multiracial nation ended with a left-wing coup d’état in 1974, after which the country suffered a radical foreign policy shift from having a sea-power orientation to becoming an EU member state—a reality studied elsewhere by the author.8 Even though some literature claims that Portugal balances between the Atlantic and Europe—the Atlantic component in this context means that the country maintains special relations with Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, among others, and also keeps the Anglo-Portuguese alliance and the partnership with the USA, coupled with the NATO membership, going—the fact is that Portuguese key policy documents like its National Strategic Concept assert that Portugal has its primary interests in Europe and that its European identity comes first.9 It is a logical evolution of its post1974 choices, which boil down to the fact that Portugal is a “norm taker” regarding Brussels’ decisions. In terms of space as a geopolitical factor, the two most important rivers of Portugal (the Tagus and the Douro) flow from east to west orienting the geographical setting to the ocean (from the lands generally higher in the interior to the lower places by the sandy beaches in the coastline). The same orientation exists in Portuguese identity due to historical traditions, culture, and seaside habits, together with aspirations for sea power-oriented foreign relations. The country has homogeneity in language, culture, and religion. Apart from its mainland in the Iberian Peninsula, Portugal has two archipelagos in the Atlantic Ocean: the Azores and Madeira. The three parts of the territory form a triangle that creates a 1,727,408-square-kilometre EEZ, one of the largest in the world, giving the country strategic depth with maritime space. However, Portugal is also characterised by its fragile economy and

dependence on energy resources, which cause high levels of emigration and energy security concerns. THE UK Although the UK is relatively far away from the Mediterranean Sea, appearances can be deceiving. The country possesses several bases in the region, which are essential to exert control over the sea lines of communication. Examining these choke points from the west to the east seems to be an appropriate logical exercise to conclude the text. As mentioned in the section about Spain, the UK dominates the peninsula of Gibraltar, which is a British dependent territory with a Permanent Joint Operating Base.10 The Port of Gibraltar located within is used as a training area, ship repair, and includes an RAF airbase. With its control over Gibraltar, the UK owns a share of power in the only natural connection between the Mediterranean Sea and the open oceans. The other entrance to the Mediterranean Sea from the open oceans—an artificial one via the Suez Canal—also has British forces nearby. The British military presence in Cyprus continues until the present day. The British Forces Cyprus constitutes a Permanent Joint Operating Base11 in Akrotiri (Western Sovereign Base Area) and Dhekelia (Eastern Sovereign Base Area). The territories, like Gibraltar, are British dependent ones and have RAF airbases, too. Apart from the above-mentioned advantages, control over these territories guarantees the UK not only infantry presence, ways of supply, surveillance, and military communication but, in case of war, some power to cut off or to regulate the passages in or out of the Mediterranean Sea.

in facing economic problems and migration pressures, among other problems and threats. Finally, a short note on the region that balances between two vital world choke points, the Strait of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal: as this brief study showed, no matter the technological advances, the re-arrangement of political alliances, and identity and demographic transformations, geography seems to continue having a word to say in politics. This study was supported by the Social Futuring Center of the Corvinus University of Budapest.

ENDNOTES 1 Nuno Morgado: Neoclassical Geopolitics: Preliminary Theoretical Principles and Methodological Guidelines. Među narodni problemi–International Problems. 2020/1. 129–157. 2 Time to engage again for peace in Cyprus. European External Action Service. 8 March 2021. <https://bit.ly/3o0Lg4E > 3 Goals and Objectives. Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. <https://bit.ly/3f6CQod > Accessed: 17 February 2021. 4 Military expenditure (% of the GDP). World Bank. <https://bit. ly/2SAc5kl > Accessed: 18 February 2021. 5 “A country’s area with the highest density of population and the thickest network of communications and transports.” Nuno Morgado: Towards the New World Order? A Geopolitical Study of Neo-Eurasianism and Meridionalism. PhD thesis. Charles University, Prague, 2017. See also Saul B. Cohen: Geopolitics. The Geography of International Relations. Rowan & Littlefield, Lanham, 2009. 171–172. 6 Chauprade Aymeric: Constants, Strengths and Weaknesses of French Geopolitical Designs. In: Geopolitics in the TwentyFirst Century. Territories, Identities, and Foreign Policies, edited by Nuno Morgado. Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2021. 91–93. 7 Políbio Valente de Almeida: Do Poder do Pequeno Estado. Enquadramento geopolítico da hierarquia das potências. Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas, Lisbon, 2012. 402.

CONCLUSION This article offers insights into and empirical evidence about the countries of the EuroMed 7 Group and the UK from the perspective of neoclassical geopolitics. The countries of the east Mediterranean (Cyprus and Greece), central Mediterranean (Italy, Malta, and France), and western Mediterranean (Spain and—for the purpose of this paper—Portugal) are gathered

8 Nuno Morgado: Portugal as an old Sea Power: exploring the EU Membership as Geopolitical Design. Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies. 2021/2. 59–73. 9 Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional. República Portuguesa, XXI Governo Constitucional. <https://bit. ly/3tIOtXX > Accessed: 19 February 2021. 10 Approx. 570, see United Kingdom. The World Factbook, CIA. <https://bit.ly/3o6do6h > Accessed: 30 April 2021. 11 Approx. 2.200. Ibidem. POLITICS

A POPULIST DECADE IN THE EUROPEAN SOUTH Arthur Borriello Over the past decade, the south of Europe has proven to be a fertile ground for populist and radical-right parties alike. In the wake of the Great Recession, a political storm hit the Old Continent on its Mediterranean shore. From Syriza and the Northern League through Vox, La France insoumise (Unbowed France) to the Five Star Movement and Podemos (We Can), the 2010s saw the established parties of many South European countries be challenged by the rise of new contenders or the sudden strengthening of previously marginal ones.1 The political cycle opened by the euro crisis fades away to be replaced by a new context overdetermined by the COVID-19 pandemic, but the conceptual confusion still clouds our understanding of the so-called “populist decade.” The dominant media discourse provides a simplistic reading of this decade insofar, as it conflates radically distinct phenomena into the undifferentiated category of populism, the upsurge of which is lazily explained by an economic or cultural backlash from the “losers of globalisation.” This paper aims at providing some conceptual clarification to distinguish between the authentic populist upsurge and adjacent phenomena, such as radical right and technocracy, while also explaining more precisely the factors that underpinned their ascent, as well as showing how these factors can also account for their more recent developments. SEMANTIC INFLATION AND MISLEADING PRECONCEPTIONS The semantic inflation of the P-word over the past years is before everyone’s eyes. Yet, we are still in trouble when it comes to defining it or identifying unambiguously what it refers to, for almost every political phenomenon in recent years has something to do with populism—or so we are told. The Cambridge Dictionary’s 2017 Word of the Year is said to apply to Brexit, the election of 38

POLITICS

Donald Trump, the presence of the Front national (National Front) in the second round of the French presidential election, the electoral breakthroughs of Podemos and La France insoumise, and the authoritarian turn of the Hungarian government under Viktor Orbán. Even when observers refrain from naming the concept, political actors take care of it themselves, always willing to use the word as a means of invective or, on the contrary, to claim it for themselves. To complicate matters further, some notorious populists suddenly find themselves presented as the best bulwarks against populism: ironically, this is how Angela Merkel seems to perceive Silvio Berlusconi nowadays.2 Conversely, the most unlikely personalities are sometimes suspected of populism: Macron, for instance, is, at the same time, described as an antipopulist or as a “populist of the radical centre.” Anti-populist, because he poses as an explicit opponent of populism and its embodiment by the Front national or La France insoumise, because he promotes “sound” economic policies and embodies the French economic and intellectual elite against the “herd mentality” of the popular classes. Populist, because he shows a certain resemblance to political actors or movements that are unequivocally identified as populist: his personalisation of power, excessive media coverage, outsider status, and direct modes of communication. By using the concept of populism indiscriminately, however, we risk giving rise to paradoxes that border on the absurd. What can be the point of a concept that is confused with its opposite? More problematically, most pundits tend to add their preconceptions to this conceptual stretching: elements that are not specific to populism (the presence of a strong leader, demagoguery, weak party organisation, protototalitarian and xenophobic tendencies) are then grafted onto the concept of populism

THE RISE OF POPULISM IN EUROPE Results of far-right parties in most recent legislative elections between 2015 and 2019 (share of vote)

> 30% 25–30% 20–25% 15–20% 10–15% < 10% Year

Country

Party

2017

Austria

Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ)

2017

Bulgaria

United Patriots (Обединени Патриоти, Obedineni Patrioti, OP)

2016

Cyprus

National Popular Front (Εθνικό Λαϊκό Μέτωπο, Ethniko Laiko Metopo, ELAM)

2017

Czechia

Freedom and Direct Democracy (Svoboda a přímá demokracie, SPD)

10.6%

2015

Denmark

Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF)

21.1%

2015

Finland

Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset/Sannfinländarna, PS/Sannf.)

17.7%

2017

France

National Front (Front national, FN), from 2018: National Rally (Rassemblement national, RN)

Share of vote 26.0% 9.0% 3.7%

13.2%

2017

Germany

Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD)

2015

Greece

Golden Dawn (Χρυσή Αυγή, Chrysí Avgí, XA)

2018

Hungary

Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom)

19.1%

2018

Italy

Northern League (Lega Nord, LN)

17.4%

2015

Poland

Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS)

37.6%

2016

Slovakia

People's Party—Our Slovakia (Ľudová strana—Naše Slovensko, ĽSNS)

2019

Spain

Vox

10.3%

2018

Sweden

Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD)

17.5%

2015

Switzerland Swiss People's Party/Democratic Union of the Centre (Schweizerische Volkspartei, Partida populara Svizra/Union

12.6% 7.0%

8.0%

29.4%

démocratique du centre, Unione Democratica di Centro, SVP, PPS/UDC) 2017

UK Independence Party (UKIP)

1.8%

POLITICS

implicitly or explicitly. In this way, populism has innocently become the name of something other than itself: it has come to designate a broad set of transformations, generally perceived as negative, which our contemporary societies are going through. While populism has primarily manifested itself historically as a movement aiming at extending or defending democracy against oligarchic abuses, the confusion in contemporary debates has ended up completely reversing its meaning, to the point of making it the perfect scapegoat for the anti-democratic abuses that our societies experience.3 To understand our current historical moment, it is necessary to redefine the nature of those antidemocratic trends and the relationship that “authentic” populism has with them. In that regard, we must both scrutinise the link between the 2008 economic recession and the populist upsurge, on the one hand, and some more structural transformations that the crisis has catalysed, on the other. POPULISM AND CRISIS The populist newborns in the south of Europe are undoubtedly the children of the Great Recession. But what is the exact nature of their relationship with their mother? To paraphrase Mark Blyth, neither social structures nor their implosion come with an instruction sheet: there is nothing obvious or automatic between the euro crisis and the rise of populist forces.4 When the euro area entered recession after the 2008 financial crash, nobody knew that it would spur the outburst of a “populist moment” across the continent. Things could have unfolded differently. The recession could have caused a paradigm shift within the political and academic elites, taking them away from neoliberal economics and generating a new consensus around neo-Keynesian policies (the regulation of financial activity, public investment, expansionary monetary policy, etc.). It could have unleashed expressions of authoritarian, nationalist, and xenophobic sentiments among the population—and, to a certain extent, it did. Its main political consequence, however, was quite another: it sparked the coming of age of social and political movements praising the 40

POLITICS

common man, condemning the elites’ betrayal, reclaiming the state in the name of its citizen, and calling for regeneration of democracy. However, this could hardly be the automatic result of any economic recession. In Southern Europe, a particularly harsh combination of skyrocketing inequalities, loss of sovereignty, and discrediting of the governing parties paved the way for new political actors to frame the situation as an oligarchic takeover of democracy. For crises are always politically and discursively mediated: they exist only insofar as a “shock” or “failure” is perceived as a crisis and triggers a political struggle between competing interpretations of the situation. Populism, in that regard, represented a specific reading and framing of the 2008 crisis and its aftermath, articulated around the people as the political subject par excellence being fooled by a conglomerate of economic and political elites acting against the interest of the many. As such, it drew on a historical tradition of plebeian uprisings in reaction to the oligarchising tendencies of democratic societies and aiming at the social and political inclusion of previously excluded popular sectors. More than the economic recession and austerity measures per se, therefore, it was the perceived convergence of political elites around the latter that opened an unbridgeable breach between a large part of the citizenry and its representatives. Crucial, in that respect, was the commitment of centreleft parties to neoliberal policies and discourse. In national contexts where this association of social democratic parties with austerity proved indelible, they virtually disappeared (Greece, France) or seriously risked doing so (Italy, Spain) and saw the irruption of one or several populist insurgents (Syriza, Podemos, La France insoumise, Five Star Movement). Such a restrictive definition of populism, however, implies a major commitment: populism and radical right should cease to be viewed as near-synonyms, if only for the sake of dispelling one of the most important geographical bias in populism studies, characterised by a fierce Eurocentrism.5 The “populist radical right” category is not only misleading: it is a dangerous

countersense. For the alleged “populism” of the far right is, at best, a peripheral and opportunistic trait of these political forces and, at worst, the projection of the analysts’ negative preconceptions about populism. Radicalising this claim, we could go as far as to provocatively argue that there is no such thing as a populist right. Radical right movements tend to frame crises in a significantly different way than populism (pointing at threats to cultural homogeneity and territorial integrity) and to promote exclusive policies and oligarchic affects at odds with populism’s spirit. The desire to keep one’s privileges against subaltern categories (women, migrants, minorities, etc.), rather than an authentic egalitarian, anti-oligarchic impulse, is the true fuel of the radical-right engine. The P-word, in this case, can only obscure and euphemise the much bigger threats that plague advanced democracies while offering them an undeserved anti-establishment unction. Unsurprisingly, this confusion is welcomed with open arms by radical-right forces themselves. For reactionary, nationalist, and neo-fascists actors—often appearing under the mask of successful businessmen—it is quite a bargain to be depicted as the defenders of the common man against the parasitical elites of late global capitalism. Nothing to be ashamed of for the wolf to be called a lamb. THE HOLLOWING OUT OF PARTY DEMOCRACY It is true, however, that contemporary populist movements and radical-right parties display troubling common features: reliance on strong and charismatic leaders, the weakness of party structures, anti-establishment rhetoric, and the importance of digital communication. However, these do not characterise them as populists or as neo-fascists. Rather, these are general traits shared by any new political contender in current times, including liberal–technocratic centrists who present themselves as the shield against populism—think of Emmanuel Macron and Matteo Renzi, for instance. For the ascent of any challenger occurs against a broader structural backdrop that shapes most of their formal

characteristics, which the Great Recession only catalysed further. What gives these movements their air de famille is the fact that, developing in the same new political environment, they all must adapt to this environment by adopting certain modes of organising and communicating. All these actors try, each in its own way, to fill in a representative gap that predates the financial crash and that has been widening throughout almost all advanced democracies over the past forty years. Traditional political parties did not lose their stock of legitimacy and grip on society all of a sudden in the middle of the euro crisis. Rather, this process started in the mid-1970s and accelerated in the 1990s. The decline of the mass party model of organisation has been famously described by Peter Mair as a twofold process of elite and popular disengagement, resulting in the creation of a representative void.6 While electoral participation, party membership, and partisan loyalties were declining, political parties were increasingly turned into “catch-all” and “cartelised” electoral machines—no longer rooted in a specific sociological segment of the population while becoming growingly dependent on state institutions for their subsistence. In the spaces left vacant, new political formations flourished, seeking to reshape the political identities of a partially disaffiliated and atomised electorate. It should come as no surprise that all these new contenders rely on anti-establishment rhetoric, strong leadership, plebiscitarian modes of decision, direct channels of communication, and weak party structures: it is the condition for them to thrive in this new, disintermediated environment. In these circumstances, attributing responsibility for the democratic deterioration in Europe to “populism” is particularly misleading. Our critique should rather focus on the underlying socio-political transformations that advanced democracies are going through, which, when taken together, form a system: the technocratic confiscation of a part of the political decisionmaking process (especially in terms of economic orientation), the loss of power of legislative assemblies, the deregulation of financial activities and the unravelling of welfare states, the POLITICS

professionalisation of political life, the ideological convergence of the main political organisations, and the decline of conventional forms of political participation. Rather than castigating populism and seeing it as a threat to democracy, the question to be asked should be about its real potential for democratisation, given the context of its emergence and the strategies it develops. CLOSING WORDS Authentic populist movements burst onto the European scene relatively recently, mostly in the south: the Five Star Movement in Italy, Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, and La France insoumise in France. Yet, in many ways, the European populist moment opened by the economic recession seems to have already come to an end. In most cases, these movements undergo a rapid process of normalisation and institutionalisation, losing much of their initial momentum. The context in which they evolve, moreover, is no longer one of rapid and unexpected upheaval in political alignments. In Spain, partisan competition has reorganised itself around a left–right axis, simply more fragmented than before, in which Podemos now plays the role of a renewed radical left. In Greece, Syriza has eventually taken the place of historical social democracy and its clientele system. In Italy, the Five Star Movement has normalised itself to the point of becoming a potential partner in government for both the radical right (Lega) and the centre left (Partito Democratico). In France, Mélenchon did not build on the momentum of the 2017 presidential election and proved unable, so far, to disturb the two-player game between the liberals and the radical right. At the end of the political cycle initiated by the Great Recession, therefore, the balance sheet of these experiences remains mixed. While populism has succeeded in partially transforming the party system in several national contexts, nowhere has it seriously shaken the neoliberal hegemony. Above all, while its strategies have enabled it to achieve remarkable electoral results in the short term, they have by no means responded to the magnitude of the democratic challenge posed by disintermediation. Ideological malleability is 42

POLITICS

ideal for adapting to the fluidity of a period of crisis, but it is not enough to win the loyalty of an electorate. What is more, it sometimes leads to bitter disappointment, like the one caused by the Five Star Movement’s alliance with the Lega among the movement’s left-wing activists. The rapid construction of a political formation around a charismatic leader makes a quick electoral blitz possible, but it does not replace the patient work of supervising and organising the working classes. The populist experiences, however, considering both their contributions and limitations, are crucial insofar as they outline the conditions for a successful democratic renewal. Future democratising forces must be capable of uniting the working and middle classes, playing with the codes of contemporary communication without falling into superficial political marketing, on the one hand, and of innovating in organisational matters without neglecting to take root in welldefined territories and social strata, on the other. Populism might not be up to the complexity of contemporary challenges; let us not mistake, however, the unsatisfactory solution for the problem itself.

ENDNOTES 1 See Arthur Borriello: Beyond the Wave, the Sea: ReAssessing the Southern Europe’s Populist Upsurge. Krisis. Journal for Contemporary Philosophy. 2021/1. 24-44. 2

Goffredo De Marchis: “Silvio, pensaci tu”. Merkel e

Berlusconi, l’asse anti-populisti. La Repubblica. 18 August 2017. <https://bit.ly/3g8nMa6 > 3

This is at least the case of the most canonical examples

of populism in the past, such as the American People’s Party at the end of the 19 th century, Russian Narodniks, and Argentinian Peronism. (See Federico Tarragoni: L’Esprit démocratique du populisme. La Découverte, Paris. 2019. Amazon e-book.). 4

Mark Blyth: Structures Do Not Come with an Instruction

Sheet: Interests, Ideas, and Progress in Political Science. Perspectives on Politics. 2003/4. 695–706. 5

See Paris Aslanidis: Avoiding Bias in the Study of

Populism. Chinese Political Science Review. 2017/2. 266–287. 6

Peter Mair: Ruling the Void. The Hollowing out of Western

Democracy. Verso, 2013, London.

WHEN SOUTHERN EUROPE BECAME A DISTINCTIVE PART OF THE EU István Szilágyi HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND GLOBALISATION The European Union (EU), as a sui generis political system, is a multifaceted entity. It is a macroregion linking several regions, areas, systems, and countries to the notion of Europe, within which there are significant political, economic, social, cultural, linguistic, and foreign policy tradition differences, manifesting themselves in various priorities. It is intergovernmentalism that fundamentally characterises the union’s foreign and security policy, its ties to the other parts of the world, as well as its actions to resolve international conflicts. The formation of this foreign policy system is highly influenced by the eastern enlargement,1 the Barcelona Process launched in November 1995,2 and the European Neighbourhood Policy introduced in 2003.3 Links between the EU’s Mediterranean countries and the so-called Third World date back half a millennium; however, when examining the European Union’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean,4 we must consider the changes that occurred after the end of the bipolar world (c. 1991), while the emergence of a multiplayer, global political system has also brought significant changes to it. In the last third of the 20th century, the termination of organised East–West conflicts, combined with the significant shift of focus in international relations, resulted in the fact that foreign policies, political actions, and the room to manouvre for states, intergovernmental organisations, and regional integrations are now increasingly dominated by non-traditional forms and means of international relations. Within the extended framework of a “transnational foreign policy,” the role of “civilisations” is enhanced,

and the network of relations, virtual or real, between regional and subregional entities is extended. The importance of non-national, non-governmental social actors, institutions, organisations, and movements in foreign policy is growing. Globalisation and the influence of civilisations on foreign policy are not new. Joaquím Aguiar, in line with Immanuel Wallerstein’s concept, links the first wave of globalisation to the great European expansion of the 16th–17th centuries.5 The trade of various products in this world system transcended national and European borders early on; internationalisation and global contact as a process linked regions with the sphere of cultures and civilisations. The second wave of globalisation, stretching from the second half of the 19th to the first half of the 20th century, witnessed the circulation of capital and the emergence of US hegemony. “The present type of globalisation, however,” according to Aguiar, “which, from the 20th, leads up to the 21st century, manifests itself as a higher-level synthesis of the previous two: as a network of eternal changes and movements, a neverending and uninterrupted circulation of products and capitals.”6 In this era of postnational globalisation, politics, and foreign policy, the territorial fundamentals of power are largely replaced with a web of processes, networks, currents, as well as control over cyberspace. Despite global movements of a transnational nature, collective existence in the 21st century has several divergent modalities and forms. Geographical factors, borders symbolising territoriality, as well as classic nation states, ethnic, cultural, and civilisational differences behind integration and disintegration tendencies, and strategic cooperation representing the new regionalism of continental–integrational POLITICS

Members of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)

EU members EU members on the Mediterranean Other members Suspended members Observers

The institutional structure of UfM

Co-presidency

Political/security policy basket

Secretariat

6 projects Depollution of the Mediterranean Sea

Financial/economic basket

Cultural basket

The establishment of maritime and land highways Civil protection in natural and man-made disasters Mediterranean solar energy plan The Euro-Mediterranean University in Slovenia Mediterranean Business Development Initiative focussing on micro, small and medium-sized enterprises [to complement and not to duplicate]

POLITICS

cooperations are all present in the network of international relations at the same time, and they are all tightly linked to one another. THE ROLE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA IN THE EUROPEAN UNION The Mediterranean area has always played a significant role in the history of Europe and the whole world. The Mediterranean Sea extends over more than 2.5 million square kilometres and stretches over the territories of three continents, which are known as the meeting point and the cradle of the three monotheistic world religions and various cultures. Thus, the Mediterranean area is an inseparable part of Europe, European culture, and civilisation. The Mediterranean area has also played a significant role in the external relations of the European integration, as the events that occur there affect the life of the Southern European states: the safety of Europe and the European Union have been threatened by recurring social upheavals, unemployment, together with crucial social problems, migration waves, and Islamic fundamentalism. The political weight of the Mediterranean area has been increased by the extension of the European integration, and, in turn, strengthening the southern wing of the European Union has also increased the Mediterranean area’s role in and influence on the European project. It is a well-known fact that a strongly Mediterranean-focussed yet far from unified group was formed in the European Community with the participation of two founding members, Italy and France. It was later complemented by Greece in 1981 and, then, by Portugal and Spain in 1985 upon these countries’ accession to the EU. Due to the complexity of the issue, this paper will principally focus on the Mediterraneanrelated policies of Spain and the allied Portugal, which significantly affects the EU’s foreign policy decision making, partly as a result of the 2010–2011 Spanish–Belgian–Hungarian team presidency. Both Portugal and Spain have their own, divergent interests in European integration. These differences are partly connected to the foreign policy ties of the two countries.

Portuguese foreign policy has had three priorities since the beginning of the 1960s: the Atlantic alignment, the European orientation, and the creation of the Lusitanian unity. As a mediumsize continental power, Spain focussed on Latin America, Europe, and, in the Mediterranean region, the Maghreb countries. Spain has been striving to deepen and develop the network of connections linking the Mediterranean region to the European Community. At the beginning of the 1990s, this led to the emergence of the opposing northern and southern poles, and, later, as the Eastern enlargement was put on the agenda, the east–south contrast also became manifest. It was Spain that played the most important role in pursuing and representing this line of policy. THE BARCELONA PROCESS AND UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN At the time the northern enlargement appeared on the EU’s agenda, Spain and Portugal conducted a campaign of increasing intensity to direct the community’s attention to the Mediterranean region. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the Spanish foreign policy made enormous efforts to deepen Euro-Mediterranean ties and to integrate Mediterranean countries into the organisation’s system. The Spanish presidencies of the first half of 1989 and the second half of 1995 provided excellent occasions for these endeavours. As a final event of the latter period, the first EuroMediterranean conference was convened in the Catalan capital, composing and issuing a joint declaration and launching the Barcelona Process, which put Mediterranean links at the forefront of the union’s policy. The meeting organised between 27 and 28 November 1995 was in itself the peak of a years-long series of preliminary talks and negotiations, where the Spanish–Portuguese efforts finally yielded results. The Euro-Mediterranean Declaration was issued, and a work programme was also accepted. The declaration contained plans for wide-ranging political, economic, security, and cultural cooperation that extended until 2010 and was supported by fourteen EU member states and eleven countries from Africa and the Mediterranean (Israel, Algeria, Cyprus, POLITICS

Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey). The document published in the Catalan capital became the foundation for the Barcelona Process, with which the two states of the Iberian Peninsula pressed ahead. The declaration consists of four major parts. The first chapter (“Political and security partnership: Establishing a common area of peace and stability”) discusses the issues of political and security cooperation and outlines the common space for peace and stability. The declaration establishes the principles of dialogue between the signing parties, promises respect for human rights, rule of law, political democracy and fundamental rights for freedom, exchange of information, tolerance, measures against xenophobia and racism, the acknowledgement of equality and sovereignty, respect for the autonomy of nations, noninterference, upholding the norms of international law, respect for territorial integrity, the peaceful settlement of debates, common action against terrorism and crime, the preservation of regional security, and the maintenance of the nuclear weapons–free zone. The second part, which sets the rules for economic and financial cooperation (“Economic and financial partnership: Creating an area of shared prosperity”) shows commitment to sustainable and balanced economic growth, declaring, at the same time, that the EU’s financial presence in the region will greatly increase. It also claims that a free-trade zone will be created until 2010. The third section (“Partnership in social, cultural and Human affairs: Developing human resources, promoting understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies”) details the issues of cooperation between social, cultural, and human spheres and civil societies. Finally, the fourth chapter (“Follow-up to the conference”) contains the follow-up measures of the conference. The “Work Programme” appended records the practical measures to be taken in connection with the principles and fields described in the declaration. In summary, it may be stated that the Barcelona Process spearheaded by Spain has worked towards the institutionalisation of the 46

POLITICS

complex system of ties linking the European Union and the Southern Mediterranean and gives a new meaning to the notion of security. The principle of the free-trade zone creates an opportunity for partner countries to acquire a partnership status similar to the one EastCentral European countries enjoyed in 1995. Therefore, the conference set a broad framework for political, economic, and social relations between the EU member states and their partners in the Southern Mediterranean. The EU enlargement on 1 May 2004 and 1 January 2007, respectively, brought two Mediterranean partners (Cyprus and Malta) into the European Union, while adding a total of ten new members to it. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership thus comprises thirty-seven members, twenty-seven of which are the member states of the EU and ten are their Mediterranean partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestine Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey), while Libya has an observer status. As already emphasised, the partnership established three main objectives. First, the definition of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue. Second, the construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area. And third, the rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural, and human partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies. Besides, the partnership also comprises two complementary dimensions: the bilateral and the regional dimensions. In the framework of the bilateral dimension, the EU carries out a number of activities with each country bilaterally. The most important ones of them are the EuroMediterranean Association Agreements that the union negotiates with each Mediterranean partner individually. The regional dimension represents one of the most innovative aspects of the partnership, covering the political, economic, and cultural fields simultaneously, and has a considerable strategic impact, as it deals with problems that are common to many

Mediterranean partners it also emphasises the national complementaries. The Barcelona Process has created a tradition and become institutionalised during the past twenty-eight years, and Euro-Mediterranean conferences have also been carried on. Eight years later, on 3 December 2003, by the decision of the ministerial conference of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in Naples, the parties agreed to set up the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA), which held its first session in Cairo between 12 and 15 May 2005. The EMPA’s Final Declaration “emphasizes the centrality of the Barcelona Process as the main instrument for partnership and dialogue between the Euro-Mediterranean Partners.”7

The European Union’s European Neighbour hood Policy launched in 2003 was also acclaimed, as the participants “[w]elcome[d] the progress made in developing the European Neighbourhood Policy, as a policy to enhance the Barcelona Process, provided it does not eclipse either the principles—equality, coresponsibility, mutual respect, solidarity, and cooperation—or the multilateral framework of Barcelona.” 8 They also “[u]nderline[d] the principle of co-ownership of the Barcelona Process and the often-repeated request of Mediterranean partners to participate fully in the formulation and implementation of policies and programmes within the framework of the Barcelona Process.” 9

Migration routes to Spain and the fight against migration ITALY LAMPEDUSA (ITALY)

SPAIN

CANARY ISLANDS (SPAIN)

MOROCCO

Algiers Melilla (SPAIN)

SYRIA

TUNISIA

LESBOS (GREECE)

ALGERIA WESTERN SAHARA Nouakchott

TURKEY

GREECE

EGYPT LIBYA

MAURITANIA MALI

NIGERIA

SENEGAL

CAMEROON

2006: The route through the Canary Islands (Spain). 2007: As the route through the Canary Islands was closed, migrants from Africa tried to get to Europe through Italy. 2011–2012: After the Arab Spring, Syrians and Libyans also wanted to enter Europe through Italy and through Greece. 2012–2015: Syrian refugees also tried to get to Europe through Melilla (Spain).

POLITICS

The EMPA has played a consultative role and it has provided the parliamentary impetus, input, and support for the consolidation and development of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It expresses its views on all issues relating to the partnership, including the implementation of association agreements. It adopts resolutions or recommendations, which are legally non-binding, addressed to the EuroMediterranean conference. It consists of a maximum of 240 members, 120 of which are Europeans (75 from the EU national parliaments and 45 from the European Parliament) and 120 are from the ten Mediterranean partners, thus guaranteeing the North–South parity. At the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean in 2008, EU member states and their Mediterranean partners (the representatives of forty-three countries) decided to draw up an institutional framework called The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean based on the Barcelona Declaration. The Barcelona Process remained the predecessor of the Union for the Mediterranean. In November 2008, the Marseille meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean ministers of foreign affairs introduced a new institutional structure, including the co-presidency that represented the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries. In 2021, more than twenty-eight years after the Barcelona Process was launched, “it is obvious that European stability cannot be separated from the regional security, political stability, and sustainable economic development of the Mediterranean area. Europe is under pressure due to migration crises in the Mediterranean area, and fragile and quasi-failing states (Syria, Libya) and even religious extremism (ISIS) have posed serious challenges for the EU foreign policy. It is not surprising, therefore, that after the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2015, there has been a greater emphasis on stability in the relations between the EU and its neighbours.”10 THE EUROPEAN UNION AND LATIN AMERICA: A BI-REGIONAL STRATEGIC ALLIANCE In the reference frame of global relations, connections between the European Union, 48

POLITICS

on the one hand, and Latin America and the Caribbean, on the other, have intensified over the last quarter century.11 In this process, the EU’s Mediterranean countries—mainly Spain and Portugal—played a fundamental role. In the 1980s, the European Parliament declared the strategic importance of cooperation with the Third World, and especially the South American continent. Following the accession of Spain and Portugal to the European Community, this dimension primarily came to focus on tightening political, economic, and cultural ties to achieve a status of associate membership through predominantly Spanish mediation. Intensifying and deepening contacts led to the first summit of heads of state and government held in Rio de Janeiro in 1999. The regular highest-level meetings, the joint sessions of Latin American parliaments and European Parliamentary representatives, cooperation between various subregional integration organisations (Andean Community, Mercosur, The Union of South American Nations) and interregional actors (Ibero-American Community of Nations), and the jointly launched development programmes led to the institutionalisation of the strategic alliance between the European Union and Latin America. The foundation of this partnership lies in a common historical past, values, and culture, the defence of democracy, a wish to create a multipolar international system, and identical political objectives. The ambition to terminate the asymmetrical economic relationship prevalent among the parties to the present day plays a major role in shaping the political partnership. Strengthening the partnership between the two regions has a significant influence on changes within the system of international relations. ISLAM AND MIGRATION IN SOUTHERN EUROPE AND THE EXPERIENCES OF THE IBERIAN PENINSULA The political entities of the Iberian Peninsula, which form a significant part of the Mediterranean world, often occupied an active history-forming role in regional and, in certain periods, global economic and social processes. The Mediterranean is a geographic region that

connects and separates cultural fault lines. Traditionally, it has such an empire-forming and migration-attracting potential that should not be ignored in any historical period. The region as the geographical backdrop to ethnic and demographic mobility—the peninsula itself also forming its part—is the scene of different, simultaneously existing cultural identities, where the 21st-century dilemmas and questions about the arrival of Islam are waiting for answers and social, economic, and political reactions. The history of the area is organically connected with the rise and fall of empires, migration waves, and movements of people. Great migrations have been well-known phenomena throughout history. There can be several reasons (push factors) behind them such as political (the fall of empires, wars, failed states), economic (crises, environmental degradation, catastrophes, epidemics), and other intellectual, religious, and cultural factors. Migration raises several questions, among others, how civilisations encounter and clash and what the chances of different identities’ coexistence are. Today, in the period of migratory waves also coming from the Islamic area, these questions acquire increasing significance. There are three distinctive historical periods in the relations between the peninsula and the Islamic world, and each of them brought about significant social changes in the life of the Mediterranean area. Nowadays, 5.6 million immigrants live in Spain, which makes up 12% of the whole population. There is a well-organised 2 million-strong Islamic community in the country, a part of which has also radicalised. With the terrorist attack at Madrid Atocha railway station, jihadist terrorism also appeared in Spain on 11 March 2004.12 At the same time, migration has also con tri b uted to the economic development of the country. The majority of the immigrants have found employment in the construction industry, as well as tourism and agriculture. Multiculturalism has appeared, and so-called parallel societies have been formed, as Musulmans coming from the Western Sahara, Morocco, and other parts of Africa (after 1995)13 and a larger number

of immigrants from the Arab countries, as a consequence of the Arab Spring in 2011, have settled down in Spain. This phenomenon can be observed in the autonomous communities of the Levante—Catalonia, Valencia, Murcia—and Andalusia. Migration waves coming from the central and Sub-Saharan part of Africa, home to grave political crises, and also arriving from Syria and Iraq since 2012, supported by Mauritania and Algeria, have been hung up in Ceuta and Melilla, two autonomous Spanish cities on the northern shores of Morocco. The Spanish government also blocked the illegal migrational route via the Canary Islands in 2007. As a consequence, migration waves coming from the Islamic countries have been directed towards Italy and Greece. As mentioned above, Melilla became a destination for migration again after 2012. In response to the migration pressure or crisis (as it was referred by many), which has nearly become the migration of nations, the Spanish government built a much more fortified fence system. Portugal, the other country of the Iberian Peninsula, has run parallel and been interwoven with the development of Spain in many aspects, albeit the many differences between them. Until the middle of the 1970s, Portugal could be characterised by emigration, not immigration. From 1958 to 1974, one and a half million people left the country. The majority of these emigrants settled down in Brazil, the US, Argentina, Venezuela, Canada, and the developed countries of Western Europe. The main reasons behind this emigration were bread-and-butter issues, economic difficulties, unemployment, and a refusal to live in a dictatorial system. Later, from the second half of the 1960s, avoiding conscription for Portugal’s colonial war became the leading reason for emigrating to other countries.14 As it also happened in Spain, these tendencies in Portugal also changed after the country had joined the European Community in 1986. Portugal, the land of emigrants, became the country of immigrants. The first big group of immigrants was that of those people who returned to Portugal from Western Europe. POLITICS

The largest immigrant communities in Portugal in 2019 UK

34,358

UKRAINE

29,718

5.8%

CHINA

5.0%

27,839

FRANCE

4.7%

23,125

ROMANIA

3.9%

31,065 5.3%

CAPE VERDE

37,436

BRAZIL

151,314

6.3%

ITALY

25,408 4.3%

25.6% GUINEA-BISSAU

ANGOLA

18,886

22,691

3.2%

3.8%

OTHER

188,518 31.9% Legend 151,314

Number of residents

25.6%

% relative to the total

After the fall of the dictatorship, the emigrants who had left their motherland for economic or political reasons and the colonial war finally got back home. The second group of immigrants was that of the white inhabitants of the former Portuguese colonies. Approximately 600,000 people from the countries which had just gained independence, such as Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Cape Verde, flooded back into European Portugal. The third group of immigrants arrived from Brasil. After the middle of the 1990s, as the relation between the former motherland and its erstwhile African colonies had normalised, a new wave of immigration from the Portuguese-speaking African countries (Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa) started. After 1999, migration from Eastern and Central Europe also accelerated. The latter wave can be subdivided into two parts: that of “the Slavs” who come from Ukraine, Russia, and Bulgaria and that of the “Eastern European 50

POLITICS

Latins,” i.e., Romanians and Moldovians. Since the beginning of the second millennium, the number of Asian immigrants has also significantly increased. Most of them are from India, China, and Pakistan. As a result of all the above, the 2015 number of legal settlers in Portugal exceeded 500,000, which equals 5% of the country’s population. In contrast to Spain, Portuguese multi culturalism does not lead to parallel societies. The vast majority of immigrants coming from four continents—Europe, Africa, America, and Asia—are from cultures rooted in the European civilisation. According to the Portuguese National Institute for Statistics, the Muslim population in Portugal amounted to 40,000 in 2011. A part of it arrived from the former overseas territories of Portugal, namely Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Southern Asia. There is no indication that they have connections to the Islamic State or

hold extreme views. Unlike Spain, Portugal has not had to face Islamist terrorist attacks so far, or, as mentioned above, challenges arising from parallel societies.15

and Latin America: A Bi-regional Strategic Alliance. History Research. 2020/2. 33–47. 5 Joaquím Aguiar: Modelos de Globalização. In: O Interesse Nacional e a Globalização, edited by Nuno Severiano Teixeira– José Cervaens Rodrigues–Isabel Ferreira Nunes. Edições

SUMMARY Since the 1990s, the Southern European region has become a distinctive part of the European Union. This fact has been explained with political and economic turning points, political crises, the appearance of new difficulties, and the emergence of populism. The first important moment when the Mediterranean area had an impact on the European Union was the announcement of the Barcelona Process, which later continued as the Union for the Mediterranean. Creating the bi-regional strategic alliance between the European Union and Latin America, as well as the Caribbean can be considered the second moment of this kind. There is also a third significant element, migration, for which the region should be observed. The roles taken on by both Portugal and Spain in how the three above-mentioned processes evolve deserve special attention.

Cosmos, Lisbon, 2000. See also Immanuel Wallerstein: A modern világgazdasági rendszer kialakulása. Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 1983. 6 Aguiar. 7 Conclusions of the First Session of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly. Resolution of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly on the assessment of the Barcelona Process on the eve of its tenth anniversary adopted on 15 March 2005 in Cairo based on the resolution tabled by Mrs Tokia Saïfi, Chairperson, on behalf of the Committee on Political, Security and Human Rights Issues. Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean. 12–15 March 2005. 4. <https://bit.ly/3eSxMUz > 8 Idem, 4. 9 Idem, 5–6. 10 Anna Molnár: The EU and the Mediterranean Region. In: Regional and Bilateral Relations of the European Union, edited by Zoltán Gálik–Anna Molnár. Dialóg Campus, Budapest, 2019. 29. 11 Szilágyi (2019), 185–209; Szilágyi (2020), 33–47. 12 Szilágyi István: Iszlám és migráció az Ibériai-félszigeten. In: Európa és a migráció, edited by Besenyő János–Miletics

ENDNOTES

Péter–Orbán Balázs. Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest, 2019. 540–561.

1 Szilágyi István: Az Európai Unió „harmadik világ” politikája

13 Large immigration flows during the 1995–2007 period in-

és a keleti bővítés. Comitatus. 2004/7–8. 7–21. See also István

creased the weight of foreigners living in Spain to 12% of the

Szilágyi: Política exterior y la ampliación de la Unión Europea.

total population. Mario Izquierdo–Juan F. Jimeno–Aitor

Las enseñanzas mediterráneas y húngaras. Veszprémi Humán

Lacuesta: Spain: from massive immigration to vast emigration?

Tudományokért Alapítvány, Veszprém, 2007.

IZA Journal of Development and Migration. 2016/5. <https://

2 István Szilágyi: The Barcelona Process Revisited in the SBH

doi.org/10.1186/s40176-016-0058-y >

Presidency. In: New Perspectives for the Team Presidencies:

14 Fernando Rosas–Pedro Aires Oliveira: A Transição falhada.

New Members, New Candidates and New Neighbours, edited

O marcelismo e o fim do Estado Novo (1968–1974). Editorial

by Attila Ágh–Judit Kis-Varga. Together for Europe Research

Notícias, Lisbon, 2004.; Murányi Kata: A gyarmati háborúk

Center, Budapest, 2008. 423–443. See also Szilágyi István:

migrációinak hatása a portugál kultúrára a kreatív városok ko-

Barcelonától Barcelonáig – az Euro-mediterrán partnerség ti-

rában. Mediterrán Világ. 2016/37–38. 110–121.; Szilágyi

zenöt éve. Mediterrán Világ. 2012/24. 3–21.

István: Portugália a huszadik században. L’Harmattan Kiadó,

3 Communication from the Commission to the European

Budapest, 2015.

Parliament and the Council. A Strong European Neighbourhood

15 Beatriz Padilla–Alejandra Ortiz: Fluxos migratórios em

Policy.

Portugal: do boom migratório à desaceleração no contexto de

EUR-Lex.

December

2007.

<https://bit.

ly/32VPrFa >

crise. Balanços e desafios. Revista Interdisciplinar de

4 István Szilágyi: The European Union and South America. In:

Mobilidade Humana. 2012/39. 180.

Regional and Bilateral Relations of the European Union, edited by Zoltán Gálik–Anna Molnár. Dialóg Campus, Budapest, 2019. 185–208. See also István Szilágyi: The European Union POLITICS

WHOSE MARE NOSTRUM?—ITALIAN AND FRENCH RIVALRY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN Fanni Korpics–Lukács Krajcsír “Italy’s focus on trans-Mediterranean commercial connectivity has achieved something akin to a Mediterranean version of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, with Italy at the centre,” as Michaël Tanchum and Dimitar Bechev wrote in their joint article, which was published in Foreign Policy at the beginning of this year.1 At first, their opinion may seem far-fetched, but the Italian leadership indeed put a lot of effort into establishing its own “BRI network” in the region. Since 2011, regardless of the identity of the Italian prime minister and/or of the composition of the government, every administration wanted to eliminate—or at least reduce—the negative effects of the so-called Arab Spring and to protect Italy’s geopolitical, economic, and energy interests. From Rome’s perspective, there is too much at stake: Italy must follow a more direct and, in some cases, confrontational policy in the Mediterranean, even if it leads to conflict with other regional states—especially with France, which also considers itself as one of the “major players” in the Mare Nostrum. Indeed, the Mediterranean Sea is of strategic importance for France, as it is an economic and political crossroads between the European, African, and Asian continents. It is a semiclosed sea, which makes power struggles even more significant, as there are several, sometimes overlapping zones of interest. 2 The French security vision considers the wider Mediterranean region as one socio-political area that cannot become a buffer zone between conflicting parties. Moreover, the Mediterranean is an important bridge connecting France with its zone of influence in Africa. In this study, we will analyse both nations’ respective Mediterranean policy and take a closer look at the French–Italian rivalry across the region. 52

POLITICS

THE MEDITERRANEO ALLARGATO POLICY “No one is called to choose between being in Europe and being in the Mediterranean, since the whole of Europe is in the Mediterranean,” the two-time ex–prime minister Aldo Moro pointed out during a debate among Italian foreign policy makers who argued about which “line” they should follow.3 Indeed, choosing a foreign policy priority has always been a controversial issue in the South European country since World War II, with the constant question being which one of the following concentric circles should be placed in the centre: Europe, the transatlantic (mostly the NATO and United States) region, or the so-called Mediterraneo allargato (the enlarged Mediterranean). 4 Rome paid, however, less attention to the North African countries—especially to the Maghreb— after the Cold War than to strengthening the pillars of “Atlanticism and Europeanism.”5 Therefore, it is no wonder that, when it swept through the Middle East and North Africa, the Arab Spring hit Italy as a bolt from the blue. The Italian leadership was unprepared and reacted more slowly than that of other European states like France and Great Britain. First, Rome tried to reduce the economic and geopolitical damage that the fall of the local regimes caused to Italy’s interests. A few years later, however, the Italian leadership faced other kinds of problems, which led to the assignment of new objectives in the South Mediterranean: ensuring security in the region, as well as reducing the incoming migration from and stabilising economic and energy relations with the Maghreb. “The heart of our interventions is il Mediterraneo allargato, from the Balkans to the Sahel, to the Horn of Africa”—the then Italian defence minister Roberta Pinotti’s words marked the shift in Italian foreign and security

The Turkey–Italy–Tunisia commercial corridor

The Turkey–Italy–Tunisia commercial corridor Highway link Rail link

GERMANY Frankfurt Basel Milan

ITALY Taranto Aliağa (Izmir) Algiers

TURKEY

Bizerte Tunis MALTA

ALGERIA

Tripoli TUNISIA

Cairo–Dakar Highway (TAH 1) EGYPT

Trans-Saharan Highway (TAH 2)

Cairo

LIBYA

policy.6 As a middle power in the region, Italy used its “hard-power” capabilities more often after 2011 than before. Rome started to play a much bigger role in conflict management and peacekeeping missions: the South European country soon became the eighth-largest contributor to the United Nations’ budget between 2016 and 2018, sending just over 1,000 soldiers and policemen to participate in twenty-two peace missions across the world. 7 The Italian Navy played a leading role in the joint naval and air operations in the Mediterranean, such as the Mare Nostrum, Sophia, Triton, Themis, and Sea Guardian, carried out with

NATO and Frontex, i.e., the EU’s border security agency. The objectives of these missions were to deal effectively with the issue of human trafficking, to reduce arms smuggling, and to prevent the spread of terrorism. One of the main Italian goals was achieved when, on the occasion of the NATO summit in Warsaw in July 2016, the Framework for the South was approved. This included the establishment of the Joint Force Command (JFC) in Naples but also meant more resources and weapons for the Forze armate italiane (the Italian Armed Forces). In parallel, Italy also started to build strong security cooperation outside POLITICS

the framework of the EU and NATO—mostly with North African countries. It established the OSCE Mediterranean Contact Group, which includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt. Military relations between Italy and the Maghreb could also be described as very fruitful: military exercises, naval drills, arms purchases, and information sharing became more frequent practice among them. Moreover, Italy could maintain a good military relationship with even the opposing parties of the region. For example, Rome participated in the military exercise Eunomia with Cyprus and Greece while also organising the Mediterranean Shield submarine drill with Turkey.8 Besides, the economic dimension also holds a special place in Rome’s Maghreb policy. Last year, the volume of total Italian trade with the North African countries reached EUR 70 billion, in which exports reached nearly EUR 40 billion—this also means that Italy is the region’s fourth-largest trade partner after the United States, China, and Germany. The South European country invested EUR 6.5 billion in Algeria, EUR 5.7 billion in Libya, and EUR 1.6 billion in Tunisia. Out of 756 contracts obtained by Italian companies abroad in 2014–2015 with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, 358 (47.3%) were in countries situated in North Africa, totalling EUR 26 billion. 9 Most of the Italian investments and trade agreements are related to the energy sector. Although the majority of the oil imported by Italy comes from Azerbaijan, Iraq, and Russia, the Maghreb also provides a significant quantity of black gold: in the first quarter of 2020, Italy bought 665,114 tonnes of crude oil from Libya and 331,000 tons from Algeria. When it comes to gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG), however, the share of North African states is much higher. In 2019, Algeria’s share in Italy’s gas import reached almost 30% (13.4 million cubic metres), and—despite the chaos in the country—Libya’s part is still 7% (5.7 million cubic metres).10 From the dozens of Italian energy companies, the Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (National Hydrocarbons Board, 54

POLITICS

Eni) became the flagship in the Mediterranean. The energy giant holds 50% of many local enterprises (for example: Libyan National Oil Company, SEGA Holding, Algerian Sonatrach), while it is the majority owner and operator of natural gas fields such as Zohr and West Baltim in Egypt, Calypso in Cyprus, and Bouri in Libya. 11 One of the biggest achievements in Italy’s energy policy was when Rome joined the Eastern Mediterranean (EastMed) Gas Forum in 2020—and, now, Eni has the proper legal and international background for wider and more intensive undersea extractions.12 Also, Italy takes the leading role in the EU when it comes to renewables, such as hydrogen, solar, and wind power in North Africa. This is because— according to some studies—the region’s “green energy resources” could account for 23% of Italian energy demand by 2050, while the green industry could generate revenues up to EUR 1.5 trillion and create more than half a million new jobs.13 FRANCE Among France’s main zones of interest, the Maghreb has always been at the heart of Paris’ strategy regarding the MENA region besides Syria and Lebanon. As an example, 30% of

Table 1: Terrorist incidents in France after 2011 Year

Number of incidents

Deaths

Injuries

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

161

300

2016

451

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

all French FDI was destined to North Africa in 2017.14 As President Chirac put it, the stability and development of the Maghreb is a priority for France,15 but French policy makers had to realise that France could not stand on its own even in this region. An unfortunate tendency was, however, the personalisation of relations with the authoritarian leaders of partner states in the region, which saw French presidents favouring highly confidential diplomatic 16 relations. Yet, France and the EU have the assets to bring relevant actors to the negotiating table while appearing credible in the eyes of the local people. At the moment, French diplomatic strategy towards the region could be defined as “pragmatic bilateralism,” which reduces the country’s chance to promote a comprehensive policy at an EU level. Still, a change is not likely to happen in this bilateral attitude, especially in the Maghreb, where Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia require completely different approaches.17 President Nicolas Sarkozy’s government had already expected to raise France’s international status by heading an African–European “cluster of countries” and initiating the idea of the Union for the Mediterranean, but President François Hollande preferred to align his position more with that of Germany and the US after he had come into power. 18 Although the Élysée had been surprised by the Arab uprisings at the beginning of 2011, it soon started to work out favourable scenarios for when it is over. In fact, France tried to find a resolution to the instability and extremism born from the chaos following the Arab Spring. In 2011, the UN-authorised NATO military intervention’s objective was merely to protect the civilian population in Libya; however, some countries—France among them—went further by setting a new goal: replacing the regime. The collapse of the Libyan state and the lack of border control contributed to the spread of terrorism in Europe, especially in France: after 2011, more than twenty attacks were conducted on French territory, and a great number of attackers came from former French colonies, such as Tunisia. Military control over the Mediterranean is also essential for

The countries participating in the 2019 Summit of the Two Shores

Azores (Portugal)

FRANCE PORTUGAL

ITALY

SPAIN Madeira (Portugal)

MOROCCO

TUNISIA ALGERIA

MALTA LIBYA

Canary Islands (Spain)

MAURITANIA

Paris because, strategically, it is considered a bridge to Africa, especially the Sahel, where French operations are the most active. For example, France has been present in Chad ever since 1980—and, in Mali, since 2013—in its attempt to prevent a terrorist spillover.19 In January 2021, there were 5,100 French troops deployed in Operation Barkhane in the Sahel region, while further 740 troops were deployed all over the African continent under the aegis of the UN.20 Besides a global ambition, French engagement in the Mediterranean is also fuelled by domestic pressure from its population of African descent. France cannot afford not to deal with the consequences of the Arab Spring, as it has the largest Muslim community in Europe, an estimated five million people from a total population of sixty-seven million.21 French society’s demographic constitution has several social and human ties with countries along the Mediterranean seaboard, especially with those in the Maghreb. Because of these constraining ties, the ambitious and young French president, Emmanuel Macron, volunteered to recalibrate the slightly rusty European compass.22 Frenchspeaking African populations are expected to grow to 500 million by 2030. The acceleration of climate change, the negative effects of POLITICS

French military interventions after 2001

FRANCE

SYRIA

AFGHANISTAN IRAQ

LIBYA

MAURITANIA

MALI CHAD

IVORY COAST

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

mass urbanisation, and terrorist movements prospering in the least developed communities are the main risks to the security of local populations. On the other hand, President Macron expressed on the 2017 Ambassadors’ Week that he considered Africa to be “the continent of the future.”23 In order for France to minimise the risks coming from sub-Saharan Africa, it is essential to handle the issues in the Southern Mediterranean first. From a geopolitical perspective, we might even say that the Mediterranean countries are a true interface between the two continents. From the mid2010s, France has started to direct its attention specifically to the Sahel due to multiple terrorist attempts, keeping the Mediterranean an overarching focal point of French diplomacy. 24 Currently, one of the main obstacles for a common EU policy towards the Mediterranean is that Mediterranean countries in the union have started to shift towards the renationalisation and de-Europeanisation of their national foreign 56

POLITICS

SOMALIA

policies. Despite the framework granted by the Barcelona Process and the Neighbourhood Policy, Europe still does not have a united position vis-á-vis the MENA countries. 25 No EU member country has had the capabilities to interfere in North Africa following the destabilising consequences of the 2011 uprisings and the Libyan intervention thereafter. Since 2017, President Macron has been calling for stronger security cooperation within the European Union, although he does not hesitate to bilateralise France’s MENA relations when he sees it convenient. In order to achieve cooperation, France will have to agree on giving up some of its strategic independence. France needs the EU’s diplomatic room for manoeuvre, international credibility, and financial resources, but it will not be content in the role of policy taker. 26 It wants to assume leadership in security issues; however, it will have to face competition from within and outside the EU, most importantly from Italy and Turkey.

The EU has so far taken a reactive stance by only engaging in conflict management, negotiating ceasefires, granting emergency humanitarian aid, or initiating dialogue between conflicting parties.27 President Macron, however, has expressed his determination to democratically “reconquest” the French neighbourhoods. He set three objectives for his county to achieve in the Mare Nostrum. The first and most important was to re-establish France as the main power of the sea, the second was to seize leadership in EU policies towards the region, and the third was never to let Turkey become a member of the EU. Macron presents himself as a leader devoted to the success of European integration, while he also clings to the idea of the French grandeur and, therefore, works for strengthening national foreign policy.28 He believes that Mediterranean countries should have more say in the decision making about the Mediterranean than other EU members. Keeping in mind that Germany would never allow to be excluded from Mediterranean policy making, Macron has recently seen a window of opportunity for France to become a policy shaper once again in the region, with the US retreating from the Mediterranean and the UK leaving the EU.29 In line with his ambitions, in 2020, France chaired the 7th Med7 Summit, an informal forum established in 2013.30 On this occasion, France expressed its determination to defend European independence in the Mediterranean.31 The Trump administration did not prioritise presence in the Mediterranean, providing leverage for emerging regional stakeholders, such as France, Turkey, China, or Russia. Even if NATO still has a major military presence in the Mediterranean basin, it seems to lose relevance gradually.32 France prefers working through the EU and in tandem with Germany instead of NATO, and President Macron believes that Europe’s future depends on that of Africa, finding it, therefore, crucial that he supports the continent’s sustainable development. In 2018, he put forward the idea of the Summit of the Two Shores with the aim of encouraging dialogue between the leaders of countries across the Mediterranean. The Summit of the Two Shores

Gas pipelines across the Mediterranean and the Sahara North Atlantic Ocean

FRANCE

ITALY

Piombino SPAIN Cordoba Almeria

Mediterranean Sea Mazara del Vallo Koudiet Ed-Draouach El Haouaria

Beni Saf

MOROCCO Hassi R'Mel

TUNISIA

Gela

Mellitah

Wafa LIBYA ALGERIA

NIGER

Trans-Saharan

NIGERIA

Maghreb–Europe Medgaz Warry

Galsi Trans-Mediterranean Greenstream Others

South Atlantic Ocean

is restricted to a 5 + 5 format, where—with the involvement of civil society—projects are launched focussing on knowledge, mobility, sustainability, multiculturalism, innovation, digitalisation, and urbanisation.33 After Brexit, France became the main military power in the EU, a fact which helped enhance the country’s influence within the bloc. Indeed, France has remarkable military capacities— more than 30,000 troops to employ in crises— and spends a relatively high amount of money on military interventions in its sphere of interest. In addition, the French military has always been active in the fight against terrorism in the MENA region and Africa, and it has been conducting POLITICS

Chart 1: The French–Maghreb trade between 2010 and 2018 French exports to Maghreb (products, thousand USD) 9,000,000 8,000,000 7,000,000 6,000,000 5,000,000 4,000,000 3,000,000 2,000,000 1,000,000 0

2010

2011

Algeria Morocco

2012 Libya Tunisia

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2016

2017

2018

Mauritania Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic

French imports from Maghreb (products, thousand USD) 7,000,000

6,000,000

5,000,000

4,000,000

3,000,000

2,000,000

1,000,000

2010

2011

2012 Algeria Morocco

POLITICS

2013 Libya Tunisia

2014

2015

Mauritania Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic

Chart 2: The Italian–Maghreb trade between 2010 and 2018 Italian exports to Maghreb (products, thousand USD) 7,000,000

6,000,000

5,000,000

4,000,000

3,000,000

2,000,000

1,000,000

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Algeria Libya Mauritania Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic: N/A

2015 Morocco

2016

2017

2018

2017

2018

Tunisia

Italian imports from Maghreb (products, thousand USD) 18,000,000 16,000,000 14,000,000 12,000,000 10,000,000 8,000,000 6,000,000 4,000,000 2,000,000 0

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Algeria Libya Mauritania Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic: N/A

2015 Morocco

2016 Tunisia

POLITICS

several joint exercises with Greece, the US, Tunisia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. The French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, a nuclear-powered surface vessel and the flagship of the French Navy (Marine Nationale), is currently deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean.34 A military-wise active French president may have more leverage than many of his counterparts, as article fifteen of the constitution allows him to launch military operations without consulting a legislative body, since parliamentary authorisation is only necessary if a mission lasts longer than four months.35 What is more, Brexit now presents a unique opportunity for France to rearticulate its strategic priorities. The renewed policy will have to focus on security, avoiding regional polarisation. The new strategic plan should use principles consistently, tackle the causes of conflicts, and try to involve civil society more.36 GAME OF THRONES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN Thanks to its more intensive Mediterraneo allargato policy, Rome was able to take over some very significant and/or traditional French positions in the Maghreb. Italy is now Algeria’s largest trade partner, as well as the largest export market.37 In 2019, Ankara and Rome agreed to form a Turkey–Italy–Tunisia transportation network, where direct container transport service

The countries of the Mediterraneo allargato

POLITICS

already began in the middle of 2020. Algerian and Italian energy companies co-own the TransMediterranean pipeline that takes gas through Tunisia to Italy. Moreover, Eni and Sonatrach started joint exploration in 2020, while Algerian authorities blocked French energy giant Total AS’s acquisition of the assets that were part of a USD 8.8 billion deal.38 Even so, France’s main economic partner in the region is Algeria with a total trade volume of over EUR 8 billion, followed by Morocco as France’s 20th-biggest trade client worldwide. Interestingly, its trade relations with Tunisia and Libya are in deficit because of the energy sources—worth USD 205 million and USD 1,584 million, respectively, in 2019— imported.39 In addition, France is also a major job creator in the region with nearly 470,000 jobs provided by French firms.40 The French–Italian rivalry is nowhere more obvious than in Libya. Their competition in the North African country dates back decades, but the Western intervention and Muammar Qaddafi’s fall widened the rift between Paris and Rome. Before the uprisings, France loosened its ties with Gaddafi’s regime, leaving more room for Italian influence, and that is a reason why Paris considered the 2011 events to be a rare opportunity to return to Libya’s political map. Meanwhile, the Italian leadership always held that the French (and British) military action was some kind of attempt to take their role in Libya both economically and politically. Later events, such as the rise of terrorist organisations (e.g., ISIS) and the outbreak of the Second Libyan Civil War, also caused a lot of controversy in the South European country. Above all, there was an increasing migration pressure from Libya: between 2015 and 2020, a total of 492,841 refugees and migrants arrived in Italy by boat, while 10,000 people have drowned since 2015.41 The same tendency is present in France as well, where a total of 337,143 refugees arrived until 2017.42 Consequently, there was no other choice for Rome but to start playing a “bigger game” in Libya. In the civil war, Italy allied with the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA), which controls the western part of

Countries of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue

NATO members Mediterranean Dialogue countries

Libya—where Eni’s considerable energy assets are concentrated. In 2017, the two parties concluded an agreement: the Italian Navy assisted Libya’s maritime authorities in stopping migrant’s boats and returning people to detention centres.43 Italy also trained and equipped the GNA forces, supporting them with arms, nonlethal equipment, and military information alike. Despite the fact that Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) imposed an energy blockade on Libya, Eni still controls around 45% of the Libyan oil and gas production. Moreover, Italy could import 5.4 billion cubic metres of natural gas in 2019.44 In 2020, with support from Italy, the EU launched Operation IRINI to enforce the UN arms embargo on Libya.45 Even during the global COVID-19 pandemic, Libya’s importance did not change in Italian foreign policy. The new prime minister, Mario Draghi, chose the North African country for his first foreign trip overseas. In Tripoli, he engaged in talks with the members of the GNA and promised stronger cooperation in health, infrastructure, migration, and security. Also, Draghi was the first European leader who met Libyan representatives after the civil war’s two sides had signed a ceasefire last October.46 Moreover, Rome could also find some “unusual” allies in Libya and other Maghreb countries. While Turkey has tense relations with

other European countries (for example, with France or Greece), Italy could develop mutually beneficial relations with the country, which has concurrently sought to increase its influence in Africa. Indeed, Italy and Turkey have very strong bilateral relations: after Germany, for example, Italy represents the largest European market for Turkish exports (amounting to USD 9.56 billion). Remarkably, Ankara and Rome also have a lot of common interests across the wider Mediterranean basin from the Maghreb to the Balkans—and, despite some personal conflicts (see in endnote), they are still working together in many cases.47 Libya was but one illuminating example of cooperation between the countries, as they both supported the GNA. Things got more complicated, however, when, due to the increasingly intensive Turkish military support in Libya, the Tripoli-based government forced LNA to retreat, as he was supported by Egypt, Russia, Saudi Arabia and—France. In 2011, President Sarkozy supported the military intervention, while the following Hollande presidency engaged in a more multilateral approach. French attitude was yet again adjusted by Emmanuel Macron and his minister of foreign affairs, Yves Le Drian, who put more emphasis on stabilisation as part of the “securityfirst” strategy. While Great Britain and Italy POLITICS

Table 2: Italian peace-keeping deployments by region Africa

1,513

Europe

882

Mediterranean Sea

1,293

Middle East and Asia

3,272

Other

528

Total

7,488

largely supported the GNA, France found itself shifting towards supporting Haftar.48 France’s main security strategy regarding the country is to ensure stability, which is also the main reason for supporting General Khalifa Haftar. By helping him, the French—just as the Egyptian, Russian, and Saudi—diplomacy defies the international community, as the UN-led coalition backs the Tripoli-based GNA. Paris is aware of Libya’s importance in maintaining France’s national security, and there are also strong economic ties between the two countries, with France importing commodities worth USD 2.87 billion from Libya in 2018.49 After the chaos brought on by the Arab Spring, France saw an opportunity

to help establish a friendly government in Libya in favour of French economic, security, and regional policy-making interests. In 2011, France deployed special forces in Libya besides providing key military expertise complementing French counterterrorism efforts, mostly made in the Sahel, a region that has many ties to North Africa, making it a key component of the wider security architecture France is building in its believed-to-be southern backyard.50 While the new Italian prime minister, Mario Draghi, paid his first visit to Tripoli, Paris also decided to reopen its embassy in the capital of Libya51 as a sign of its willingness to renew cooperation with this civil war–torn country, which traditionally belonged rather to Rome’s zone of influence. Similarly to the Italian approach, France also aims to be part of the reconstruction in Libya for economic and geopolitical reasons. A NEVER-ENDING RIVALRY? The EU might be able to better cooperate with the US in the region now that the Biden administration means to improve Euro-Atlantic

FRANCE

ITALY

GREECE CYPRUS

ISRAEL PALESTINE JORDAN

Members states of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) Permanent obeservers are the EU and the US. 62

POLITICS

EGYPT

relations, and France can serve as a bridge between the two parties. France’s strategic interests, however, do not always coincide with those of the European Union. Their geostrategic interests may collide, preventing France from emerging as the EU’s principal sea base, because other European stakeholders might fear French military dominance on the sea. Despite French rhetoric on channelling its national foreign policy into the European Common Foreign and Security Policy, we can sometimes witness the renationalisation of the country’s policies.52 France struggles with several domestic societal issues as well, so, in order to gain greater diplomatic weight, it has to be aggressive in its foreign relations. This behaviour also entails approaching extra-EU partners seeking cooperation. But what will the above mean for Italy? How does the Biden administration view the current situation in the South European country? Does the new cabinet see it as a more important and reliable partner than France? Or, on the contrary, do they regard the Italians as a risk and not a cooperative partner? As of the writing of this article, there are still no reassuring answers to these questions. However, it is obvious for both the EU and the Biden administration that they need both France and Italy to stabilise the Mare Nostrum and to reduce the tension in the region. As a conclusion, it should not be forgotten that Paris and Rome are traditional competitors in the Mediterranean region, yet there is much more to unite than to divide them: migration, dependence on energy resources, and terrorism—and, in order to successfully solve these challenges, they need to cooperate on a much bigger scale than before.

3 The whole of Europe is in the Mediterranean. Web 24 News. 11 September 2020. <https://bit.ly/3eTGOlc > 4 Amadori Maria Elena: Italy: the Three Circles Approach of Foreign Policy. Mediterranean Affairs. 19 July 2016. <https:// bit.ly/3toAtny > 5 The word Maghreb means “the West,” and it means the western part of North Africa: Morocco, the disputed Western Sahara region, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. 6 Tanchum–Bechev. 7 Rakesh Dubbudu: How Much Do Various Countries Contribute to the UN Budget? Factly. 13 December 2016. <https://bit.ly/33LjOi2 > 8 Jana Puglieren [et al.]: Views from the capitals: Gas conflict in the eastern Mediterranean. European Council on Foreign Relations. 16 September 2020. <https://bit.ly/3uVHfkq > 9 The Italian Strategy in the Mediterranean. Stabilising the Crises and Building a Positive Agenda for the Region. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. 2017. 32–34. <https://bit.ly/3uVHzzE > 10 N. Sönnichsen: Gross imports of natural gas in Italy in 2019, by country of origin (in G(m3)). Statista. 27 January 2021. <https://bit.ly/3hswClq > 11 John V. Bowlus: Eastern Mediterranean gas: Testing the field. European Council on Foreign Relations. May 2020. <https://bit.ly/2RWXa3E > 12 The other members of the so-called “OPEC of Mediterranean gas” are Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, while France, the EU, and the Emirates wish to join as permanent observers. The organisation’s headquarters are located in Cairo. The EastMed respects the right of the member states to resource extraction, declares a common fight against “illegal drillings and mining” of other countries (e.g., Turkey), and strengthens the energy cooperation (for example, by building gas pipelines) among its members. 13 Italy can be clean energy hub with hydrogen imports from Africa, study says. Reuters. 5 September 2020. <https://reut. rs/33O4e55 > 14 Economic relations between France and Africa. Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Étrangère. Last update: February 2019. <https://bit.ly/2SUnD2e > Accessed: 17 March 2021.

ENDNOTES

15 Verónica Martins: Towards a Europeanisation of French

1 Michaël Tanchum–Dimitar Bechev: Italy’s Mediterranean

Mediterranean Politics? L’Europe en Formation. 2013/2.

Belt and Road. Foreign Policy. 21 January 2021. <https://bit.

223–240.

ly/2Qnd9r8 >

16 Martins.

2 Henry J. Barkey: France vs. Turkey: A Showdown in the

17 Sébastien Abis: For France: Europe, the Mediterranean or

Mediterranean is Brewing. The National Interest. 16 September

Africa? IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2017. 172–175.

2020. <https://bit.ly/3frejdw >

<https://bit.ly/2Rs2aNw > POLITICS

18 Sébastien Abis–Jean-François Coustillière: François

37 Algeria Exports By Country. Trading Economics. <https://

Hollande and the Mediterranean Region. IEMed. Mediterranean

bit.ly/3wp3YWL > Accessed: 1 February 2021.

Yearbook 2013. 159–162.

38 Total told it cannot acquire Anadarko Algeria assets.

19 George Joffé: Insecurity in North Africa and the

Reuters. 5 May 2020. <https://reut.rs/3tUz7j5 >

Mediterranean. NATO Defense College, Research Paper No.

39 Commerce International. Société Générale. <https://bit.

135. January 2017. <https://bit.ly/3uV0H0W >

ly/3tUHURQ > Accessed: 17 March 2021.

20 Point de situation des opérations du 1er au 7 janvier 2021.

40 Economic relations between France and Africa.

Ministère des Armées. 8 January 2021. <https://bit.

41 Ramy Aziz: Italy, Libya, and the Threat of Coronavirus. Fikra

ly/3fouY1x >

Forum. 6 April 2020. <https://bit.ly/3eSjx2W >

21 Alassane Dembele: The French Intervention in Syria.

42 Total number of refugee arrivals in France from 2007 to

Perspectives on Global Issues. 2016/Spring. 38–44.

2017. Statista. 12 May 2020. <https://bit.ly/3ePaxfc >

22 Abis.

43 Arturo Varvelli–Matteo Villa: Italy’s Libyan Conundrum: The

23 Speech by President Emmanuel Macron – Ambassadors’

Risks of Short-Term Thinking. Istituto per gli Studi di Politica

Week, 2017. <https://bit.ly/3frAX5C > Accessed: 3 May 2021.

Internazionale. 26 November 2019. <https://bit.ly/33PtyYI >

24 Abis–Coustillière.

44 Stuart Elliott: Libyan gas exports to Italy unaffected so far

25 The Barcelona Process or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

by oil blockade. S&P Global Platts. 21 January 2020. <https://

was launched in 1995, laying the foundations of a new regional

bit.ly/3oyCL17 >

partnership with Southern Mediterranean neighbours and

45 EU launches Operation IRINI to enforce Libya arms

establishing a common area of peace and stability.

embargo. European Council, Council of the European Union.

26 Manuel Lafont Rapnouil: Alone in the Desert? How France

31 March 2020. <https://bit.ly/33RUmr0 >

can lead Europe in the Middle East. European Council on

46 Italy PM Draghi urges Libya to maintain ceasefire. Al

Foreign Relations. 10 April 2018. <https://bit.ly/2SZxGTP >

Jazeera. 6 April 2021. <https://bit.ly/2QqPYwc >

27 Silvia Colombo–Andrea Dessí: Collective Security and

47 In April 2021, Mario Draghi called Turkish president Recep

Multilateral Engagement in the Middle East: Pathways for EU

Tayyip Erdoğan a dictator. The Italian prime minister said that

Policy. IAI Papers 20|37. November 2020. <https://bit.

the Turkish president must apologise for the “humiliation” of

ly/3uXCZ4e >

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen after

28 Eckart Woertz–Eduard Soler i Lecha: Populism and Euro-

the so-called “sofagate.” Turkey summoned Italy’s ambassador

Mediterranean cooperation: The Barcelona Process 25 years

and demanded an official apology from Rome. While this did

after. Mediterranean Politics. Published online: 5 August 2020.

not happen, Erdoğan sent a message: Draghi should

<https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2020.1799165 >

“remember Italian history” and that “he has been nominated,

29 Martins.

not elected”. Also, in the same statement, Erdoğan reminded

30 Med7, Euro Med 7, or EU Med is an alliance among seven

that the relations between Ankara and Rome “had reached a

southern EU member states: France, Italy, Spain, Portugal,

very good level.”

Malta, Greece, and Cyprus. It was established in 2013.

48 Mattia Toaldo: Europe: Carving out a new role. In: Foreign

31 Update on the Mediterranean at the Med7 Summit.

Actors in Libya’s Crisis, edited by Karim Mezran–Arturo Varvelli.

Gouvernement.fr 10 September 2020. <https://bit.

LediPublishing, Milano, 2017. 57–72.

ly/3hww2D6 >

49 Libya. TrendEconomy. <https://bit.ly/3olvfq9 > Acessed: 17

32 Marc Pierini: New Power Struggles in the Mediterranean.

March 2021.

Carnegie Europe. 30 July 2020. <https://bit.ly/3bzenai >

50 Tarek Megerisi: Geostrategic Dimensions of Libya’s Civil

33 Didier Billion: France’s Mediterranean Policies. Ambitious

War. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. 18 May 2020.

Initiatives but Lack of Momentum? Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

<https://bit.ly/2QszHqC >

Anaysis. June 2020. 6. <https://bit.ly/3wbUFsZ >

51 France reopens Libya embassy after 7-year closure. Al

34 George N. Tzogopoulos: Coronavirus and Macron’s vision

Jazeera 29 March 2021. <https://bit.ly/2QpEQzJ >

for Europe. Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Mideast

52 Jakub Wodka: Union for the Mediterranean and Eastern

Security and Policy Studies No. 176. July 2020. <https://bit.

Partnership. Geopolitical Interests or Complementary

ly/2RqWhjR >

Concepts? Turkish Policy Quarterly. 2010/3. 147–156.

35 Dembele. 36 Lafont Rapnouil. 64

POLITICS

FRANCE AND THE EU: WHAT’S AFTER BREXIT? Fanni Korpics How relevant is France in the international system today? Could Brexit help this country balance power relations within the European Union (EU) in its favour? Historically, France represented a major diplomatic actor, a legacy still reflected in the country’s strong diplomatic presence in the world, with 160 embassies serving bilateral relations and sixteen permanent representations to multilateral bodies.1 Decolonisation resulted in Paris’s shrinking international relevance, settling it as a more modest power than before. Nonetheless, France is a member of the United Nations Security Council and still possesses overseas territories making it a truly globally present power. Yet, France’s relevance has declined even in Europe, as Germany became the true economic leader of the continent. France’s military importance, on the other hand, is unquestionable with its army widely deployed all over the world. France’s military leadership in the EU27 has become even more evident since the United Kingdom left the block. In addition to its army, France is also a numberone power in climate and environmental policies, making the French presence essential in all of the most important global fora. Despite domestic problems and economic imbalances within the country, mainly exogenous factors led to a declined French position in the world; therefore, a changing international scene might also reverse the process. 2 With the exit of the United Kingdom from the EU, power relations within the block will definitely change. It is no surprise that President Emmanuel Macron seizes this opportunity for French diplomacy to lead the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, immigration policy, and the agreement on and implementation of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery fund, an extraordinary financial and economic tool brought to life mainly thanks to French pressure on the European Council. In

order to gain a leading position in these fields, France should “Europeanise” its own foreign and economic policy, firstly, to project national preferences on an EU level, and, secondly, to accept the formal and informal rules of dealing with matters within the union, in addition to incorporating them in domestic discourse and policies.3 A RENEWED FRANCO-GERMAN TANDEM Since the United Kingdom left the European Union, all eyes have been on the Franco-German axis, which is the core of the entire European integration process. After the exit of the United Kingdom, France and Germany are, again, the only two main powers in Europe. While Berlin holds the economic clout, Paris holds the diplomatic and military ones. However, even if the departure of a key member state changed power relations within the union, resulting in a renewed Franco-German tandem, the leading role they intend to pursue is not going to be unchallenged, as many other member states count on their own increased weight in the new EU27 format. Brexit also altered the way Brussels negotiations look like, changing coalitions within the EU. From a macroeconomic point of view, France might take advantage of the United Kingdom’s being outside the EU to push its more dirigiste4 agenda, so far opposed by Germany in partnership with the British, which includes more state regulation in the economy with occasional government subsidies, tax harmonisation within the EU, eurozone reforms, and the creation of a eurozone finance minister post and a common eurozone budget. Brexit has also moved the geographic focal point of the EU more to the south, which can benefit Paris, as France is not only an Atlantic but also a Mediterranean country. This perspective, and Italy’s new active role in the EU, reduces the likelihood of an absolute German hegemony. POLITICS

France’s nuclear arsenal in context Global nuclear weapon stockpiles in 2019

RUSSIA

6,375 WARHEADS

215 WARHEADS

FRANCE USA

5,800 WARHEADS

290

NORTH KOREA

30-40

ISRAEL

WARHEADS

INDIA

150

WARHEADS

WARHEADS PAKISTAN

CHINA

WARHEADS

160

Brexit also removes one of the main obstacles for the implementation of the multi-speed Europe, negotiated for and supported mostly by France, although the lack of unanimity in the question still persists. In this context, France and Germany are likely to become the flagships of deeper integration, while other members will be allowed to follow at their own pace and according to their preferences. Nevertheless, other influential coalitions of EU member states, such as the Visegrad countries,5 might want to halt the tandem’s dynamism, and the Hanseatic League6 will also venture to pull apart the Franco-German alliance feared to be functional mostly for bigger countries against the smaller. 7 In fact, a multi-speed Europe might make coalition building too static in the future, as smaller countries will not be able to influence qualified majority–based decision making in opposition to whichever position the tandem supports. Besides being an economic tandem, the two main powers in the block are also expected to deepen cooperation in European security and defence. Currently, many of the EU’s southern and eastern neighbours are unstable, and the Trump administration was not a reliable ally when 66

POLITICS

320

it came to Europe’s defence. However, French and German public opinions diametrically differ on their respective countries’ role in European defence. On top of those differences, it is not at all certain that all EU members will welcome a Franco-German leadership in security matters. There is no doubt that most member countries accept Germany’s leading role in the economy, but they are yet in full acceptance of French military leadership, as they fear France would merely want to use the EU’s institutional framework to pursue its own selfish national ambitions. Nonetheless, President Macron is pushing for a common defence policy to escape from the stereotypes about France being a country with keen international ambitions but stuck in its internal problems at the time when Germany is considered an economic giant but a reluctant foreign policy actor. France has an interventionist strategic culture that sees the EU as a multiplier of its legitimacy and capacity, and its ultimate objective in European defence is to ensure that it is independent from the United States. President Macron has on many occasions stated that Europe can only advance if Germany and France speak with one voice. 8 However, now, with President Biden

in Washington and with the US abandoning Trump’s isolationist agenda, enthusiasm for European strategic autonomy has dampened— at least on the German side. A NEW ERA IN FRANCO-BRITISH RELATIONS France, without a doubt, is going to be very much affected by Brexit. The United Kingdom and France not only share a long history of foreign and security policy cooperation but also have a similar world view on various issues and a range of common national security interests. Despite that, President Macron’s wellarticulated objective is to build a more dynamic Europe based on the Franco-German axis. On the other hand, it can be expected that the two countries of the Channel will continue to cooperate on issues such as counterterrorism and cybersecurity. Building a strong EU–UK partnership is also in Paris’s interest from an economic point of view, given the substantial volume of trade with a USD 37 billion French export to the UK in 2020 9 and the immense migration of people between the two countries, with 191,000 French nationals living in the United Kingdom in 2018. 10 In spite of being part of a block, France will not refrain from bilateral partnerships on certain issues with London, especially when it comes to cooperation within the United Nations and NATO—even more so, as Paris has always insisted to act as a sovereign nation state in the UN Security Council, and not as a representative of the EU.11 Despite Brexit, the UK and France have to work together on security and defence; in this field, France might emerge as a bridge linking the EU and the UK. Paris and London agreed to set up joint military projects in the 2010 Lancaster House Treaties; moreover, the UK has also supported France in the logistics and execution of French operations in Africa on a bilateral basis, outside the scope of NATO. In addition to that, Macron, following the traditional Gaullist vision, laid out a defence plan based on a looser form of European cooperation and an EU core, and the UK might prove to be a strong ally to it. 12

Moreover, France and Britain, together with Germany, will further cooperate on security issues within the framework of the E3, a joint initiative originally established in 2003 to negotiate with Iran on its nuclear activities, as this security policy cooperation is likely to survive the divorce between the UK and the EU, allowing participating countries to set common foreign, security, and defence goals. In addition to the E3, French and German leaders have also suggested the creation of the European Security Council, which could bring together EU member states but would exclude existing EU institutions. In this framework, it would be possible to include London as a partner, too.13 FRENCH AMBITIONS The increase in France’s status within the EU, however, does not exclusively depend on external factors. In fact, the main challenges President Macron needs to face today present themselves at home in the form of the giletjaune (yellow-vest) movement 14 and the COVID-19 crisis. The latter prevented him altogether from delivering some of the longoverdue reforms he had promised back in 2017. France’s advantage, however, is that it remained the only nuclear power in the EU after Brexit. Therefore, President Macron is only right to assume that his country will be in a leading position in a possible close strategic defence cooperation. He emphasised that France had always considered nuclear power to be a deterrent against possible belligerent foes and that it was an important tool if Europe aimed to become independent in terms of defence policy. According to the French president, a common nuclear policy would prevent the EU from having to confine itself to a spectator role in an international environment dominated by the United States, China, and Russia. In addition, he claimed that the main problem was that the EU was yet to set a legal framework for using nuclear weapons. 15 In line with German preferences, the EU’s focus has so far been on economic matters. Now, in a more balanced format after the exit of the United Kingdom, President Macron may POLITICS

try to push a strategic geopolitical agenda more successfully, especially in relation to the Mediterranean and Africa. One of the French diplomacy’s great achievements was the Summit of the Two Shores held in Marseille in June 2019, where hundreds of civil society agents gathered from Portugal, Spain, Italy, Malta, and France, representing the EU side, and from Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritania, and Libya, representing the Mediterranean side of the 5 + 5 format. This forum gives hope for forging an alliance between the two shores—whose twenty-two coastal countries hold a population of 430 million, expected to grow to 520 million by 2025—facilitating economic development, ensuring security, and promoting a geocultural approach. Even the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen stressed her intention to outline an inclusive policy vis-á-vis the EU’s southern neighbourhood as a response to the predicted emergence of the African continent in the international arena and a measure to get into its vast market. In its foreign policy, France tends to push for multilateral engagement in North and West Africa and in the Sahara-Sahel

region, where Paris simultaneously exerts civil and military activities. Emmanuel Macron has been trying to put France’s Euro-Mediterranean ambition in the forefront of the EU’s common foreign policy ever since his election in 2017.16 The EU has turned towards becoming a geopolitical actor, a role where Germany cannot and will not take the lead, leaving it for France—a division of labour also supported by President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen. An attitude change is also needed in the EU because of the gradual but steady withdrawal of the United States and NATO from ensuring European security. This perception was first articulated by the French president in a provocative interview, where he called the organisation “brain dead.” 17 Macron stresses that NATO is only familiar with remedies used in the Cold War but those are not efficient any more in tackling the challenges of today. Therefore, he launched the European Intervention Initiative 18 to contribute to the goal of building Europe’s own defence in 2017. In this context, the Permanent Structured Cooperation has a similar role, which also involves non-EU partners in EU

Chart 1: French spending on defence in a European comparison (2019, % of GDP) 60.0

60.0 55.6 53.2

52.1

50.0

47.0

38.9

48.4 46.6

45.6

45.2 40.0

40.0

50.0

47.5

47.0

45.8

41.3 38.9

40.0

36.3

0.0 68

Ireland

Hungary

Greece

Germany

France*

Finland

Estonia

Denmark

Czechia

Cyprus

Croatia

Bulgaria

Belgium

20.0

Austria

EU 28 (2013–2020)

10.0

24.5 EU 27 (from 2020)

20.0

30.0 Euro area 19 (from 2015)

30.0

10.0

0.0 POLITICS

defence cooperation. However, the need for an autonomous European defence may not be that urgent if the new Biden administration is willing to reassume its role in guaranteeing the Old Continent’s security. President Macron also believes that Europe should consider the involvement of Russia in security matters and establish good relations with Putin’s regime. Consequently, he also wants to navigate the EU smoothly between the US and China in the new technological cold war. 19 THE REALITIES As mentioned above, in addition to exogenous factors, French global positions have also been undermined by a series of major domestic weaknesses. Both the EU and NATO would lose with a declining France, but France needs to undertake social and structural economic reforms to avoid continued erosion. France has by far the most capable military in the EU, with around 10,300 military personnel deployed abroad,20 and it has demonstrated several times its willingness to ensure global and regional security. Paris also has a global perspective and independent strategic thinking.

The renewed European tandem?

The main security issues for France nowadays seem to be domestic: the series of terrorist attacks carried out by French nationals on French soil and the surge of social polarisation as a response. Needless to say that Europe needs a strong France, as much as France needs a strong Europe. Even though Germany is the EU’s leading economic power, it does not want to stand alone. In order for France to move forward, it is essential to modernise its economy, a project once again delayed because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the following economic crisis. It is this economic weakness where the country’s

* provisional 60.0

60.0

51.5

50.0

49.3

48.6

42.2

40.0

42.0

41.8

42.7

42.5

42.3

50.0 41.0

43.8

42.1

40.0

38.4 36.2

34.6

32.7

United Kingdom

Switzerland

Norway

Iceland

Sweden

Spain*

Slovenia

Slovakia

Romania

Portugal*

Poland

Netherlands

Malta

10.0

Luxembourg

20.0

Lithuania

20.0

Latvia

30.0

Italy

30.0

0.0

10.0

0.0 POLITICS

France's overseas possessions as of 2020 France is still present in many parts of the world.

FRANCE SAINT PIERRE AND MIQUELON SAINT MARTIN CLIPPERTON ISLAND

SAINT BARTHÉLEMY GUADELOUPE MARTINIQUE

FRENCH GUIANA

FRENCH POLYNESIA

current political fragility derives from. The relaunch of the economy, on the other hand, provides an outstanding opportunity for Paris to fund reforms. The France Relance recovery plan allocates EUR 100 billion, EUR 40 billion of which is provided by the EU, to achieve this goal. At least EUR 30 billion is set to be spent on the ecological transition; therefore, 70

POLITICS

the objective is to make the economy greener and more resilient. 21 Even in economic matters, France seems to be more flexible than most of its European counterparts; however, calling for greater solidarity, boosting investment, and supporting sustainable growth are considered important priorities for the country. Assuming leadership, President Macron called for

WALLIS AND FUTUNA

MAYOTTE

RÉUNION NEW CALEDONIA FRENCH SOUTHERN AND ANTARCTIC LANDS

European solidarity in tackling the economic crisis brought on by the pandemic, the very result of which is the Next Generation EU, an unprecedented common European tool for crisis management. France is the world’s seventh-largest economy, with a nominal GDP worth USD 2,715,518 million in 2019.22 Yet, its economic performance

is one of the weakest in the EU: in 2019, its annual GDP growth was only 1.3%, which is below the EU average of 1.5%.23 In addition to that, the country suffers from persistently high annual deficits, and these factors have so far prevented France from becoming truly equal to Germany. However, with the implementation of the newly adopted NGEU, this tendency might POLITICS

Macron wants good relations with other international actors, too.

now change slightly, as Germany has eased up on its strict views regarding deficit and also agreed to debt mutualisation as a response to the economic crisis caused by the pandemic. This new instrument, worth EUR 750 billion, favours French interests, as it introduces a joint funding model to support government spending, a historically serious issue in France. Macron also welcomed the new measures pointing towards closer fiscal cooperation, which has long been on the French EU agenda.24 Nevertheless, the French administration will have to reduce the size of the state and curb public spending as a share of GDP. General government spending in France hit the world record with 55.9% of the GDP in 2018.25 The French state is a major stakeholder in the French economy as well as in international trade despite the fact that its authority has been constantly weakening. In addition to the economic difficulties, France struggles with societal problems as well, deriving from the fact that it has the largest Muslim population in Europe, an estimated 5 million people from the total population of 67 million, and their integration is far from 72

POLITICS

complete. Of course, multicultural society can be an asset to Paris if it wants to lead the supranational EU drawing on its great diversity. If France can adequately address the issue of extremism at home, it will have good credibility to steer the EU’s migration policies. Building good relations with major powers is a priority for French foreign policy, and the République can bring its already-existing foreign ties into the EU structure more freely after Brexit, balancing the EU’s relations with the United States, China, and Russia each. It will also be very interesting to see how President Macron will perform in the next presidential elections in France, especially because his popularity is susceptible to quick changes, from 46% right after his election in May 2017, to 41% in March 2021, with the lowest point in between in December 2018 with 20%.26 There are three possible roads France can take in the post-Brexit international scenario. It can give in to nationalism in the next elections of 2022 and refrain from international activism altogether, it can accept the status quo by undertaking mild reforms, or it can seize the opportunity to rise again by conducting major

reforms, reaping the benefits that can derive from the NGEU, and increasing diplomatic activism.27 France, without doubt, had a central role in the NGEU negotiations calling for greater European solidarity and debt mutualisation, an achievement that would not have been possible in an EU-28 format.

14 French social movement taking its name after the highvisibility vests its participants wear. It started protests against raising fuel taxes in November 2018 but later engaged in protests over other socio-economic issues as well. 15 Thomas Adamson: France seeks lead post-Brexit role in EU nuclear strategy. Associated Press News. 7 February 2020. <https://bit.ly/3xRhUu0 > 16 Emmanuel Dupuy: Emmanuel Macron: A Mediterranean

ENDNOTES

Leader? French Policy towards the Mediterranean. IEMed.

Mediterranean Yearbook 2020. 192–196.

Missions and Structure. Ministère de l’europe et des

affaires étrangères. <https://bit.ly/3h0oet1 > Accessed: 15

17 Judy Dempsey: Judy Asks: Is NATO Brain-Dead?

February 2021.

Carnegie Europe. 28 November 2019. <ht tps://bit.

ly/2UTNR5U >

Sophie Meunier: Is France Still Relevant? French

Politics, Culture & Society. 2017/2. 59–75.

18 The European Intervention Initiative was launched on 15

Verónica Martins: Towards a Europeanisation of French

June 2018 with the aim of facilitating the emergence of a

Mediterranean Politics? L’Europe en Formation. 2013/2.

European strategic culture and the creation of a basis for

223–240.

jointly co-ordinated future commitments.

19 George N. Tzogopoulos: Coronavirus and Macron’s

An economic system where the government exerts

considerable control over the country’s economy.

Vision for Europe. Mideast Security and Policy Studies No.

Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia

176. 153–156.

Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania,

20 French military forces deployed in operations abroad.

The Netherlands, and Sweden

Gouvernement.fr. <https://bit.ly/3elpnts > Accessed: 15

February 2021.

Ros Taylor: Only France and Germany could lead the EU

after Brexit – but they won’t go unchallenged. London

21 France Relance recovery plan: building the France of

School of Economics and Political Science. 28 January

2030. Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères.

2019. <https://bit.ly/3ulyMac >

<https://bit.ly/3etlhzP > Accessed: 5 May 2021.

Dr Nicole Koenig–Marie Walter-Franke: France and

22 GDP (World). The World Bank. <https://bit.ly/33ieBhk >

Germany: Spearheading a European Security and Defence

Accessed: 15 February 2021.

Union? Jaques Delors Institute, Policy Paper 202. 19 July

23 D. Clark: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate in

2017. <https://bit.ly/3eSolV6 >

European Union countries in 2019. Statista. 28 January

2021. <https://bit.ly/3nRrJDH >

Daniel Workman: France’s Top Trading Partners. World’s

Top Exports. <https://bit.ly/3vM6mGI > Accessed: 16 March

24 Recover y plan for Europe. European Commission.

2021

<https://bit.ly/3toK3Fl > Accessed: 16 March 2021.

10 D. Clark: French population of the United Kingdom (UK)

25 General government spending. OECD. <https://bit.

from January 2008 to June 2020. Statista. 17 March 2021.

ly/3eqLKho > Accessed: 15 February 2021.

<https://bit.ly/3nWDxo3 >

26 Baromètre politique Ipsos–Le Point : la popularité

11 Peter Ricketts: National Security Relations with France

d’Emmanuel Macron progresse nettement. IPSOS. 10

after Brexit. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and

March 2021. <https://bit.ly/3nRd9Mx >

Security Studies, Briefing Paper. January 2018. <https://bit.

27 Jérémie Gallon – Jef f Lightfoot: Spotlight France:

ly/3vFJQyU >

Europe’s Swing State. Foreign Policy Begins at Home.

12 John Lichfield: Never mind Brexit. Britain and France are

Atlantic Council. 13 December 2016. <ht tps://bit.

condemned to work together. Politico. 29 December 2020.

ly/3uCiWI4 >

<https://politi.co/3h61KqQ > 13 Alice Billon-Galland –Thomas Raines – Richard G. Whitman: The Future of the E3, Post-Brexit Cooperation between the UK, France and Germany. Chatham House, Research Paper. 27 July 2020. <https://bit.ly/2RsGj8D > POLITICS

ITALY AND THE HARD POST-CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC RECOVERY Alessandro D’Onofrio The debate around the European recovery fund (Next Generation EU, NGEU) had the effect of creating new divisions among the EU member states besides the existing ones. Not only did the rift between some Eastern European countries and the rest of the EU27 over the rule of law came into prominence, but also the traditional divide between northern and southern member states got into the spotlight again. Just as at the time of the eurozone crisis, this latter clash shaped the form and the substance of the recovery fund and, in all likelihood, the conflict could re-emerge when the bulk of the resources will be disbursed in the following months. Traditionally, the richer and more competitive countries in the north are the bearers of values such as fiscal discipline, prudent savings (often called frugality), and fiscal stability. However, southern economies, but also Belgium and, to some extent, Ireland, have criticised them for their lack of solidarity, as the latter are in favour of fiscal transfers within the EU to correct internal imbalances and have advocated ideas about adopting joint debt instruments to finance the union’s economic downturns. While the “frugals” could set the agenda for the decade after the 2008 financial crisis, the position of the southern countries has recently been reinforced with the COVID-19 outbreak, as all member states without distinction have suffered the dreadful consequences of the pandemic. Crucially, a country that has traditionally opposed debt sharing, Germany, has also been brought to side with the advocates for more fiscal integration, which has notable implications for the success of the recovery programme. The coronavirus pandemic showed that, if there is an asymmetric shock where no single country bears responsibility for the crisis, inflexible fiscal rules do not provide a solution. With that in mind 74

POLITICS

and in order to avoid the collapse of the common market, the European Commission has this time reacted in a very innovative way, putting a risksharing mechanism in place.1 In this framework, countries such as France, Italy, and Spain have played a fundamental role and have successfully developed the narrative about the crisis, making EU institutions commit themselves to supporting the revolutionary recovery fund. Being the country the pandemic hit first—and, therefore, experiencing a higher level of shock than the others—Italy was particularly interested in the success of this plan. During the turbulent spring of 2020, the Italian government attracted public sympathy by framing its economic troubles as being primarily caused by the extraordinary circumstances and attributing the possible collapse of the EU as a whole to the unsupportive northern member states, particularly the Netherlands. Rome’s communicative success suddenly put the country at the core of the EU negotiation process, whose final result can be considered relatively positive for Italian diplomacy, since Italy will benefit from the resources made available by the NGEU more than the others. Although coming under criticism for not being sufficient to address the new crisis commensurately, NGEU represents a milestone in the process of European integration. Surely, an arrangement as such would have never been found without the member states being eventually convinced of putting their primary diffidence about any sort of pan-EU debt “mutualisation” aside and without cooperating to tackle the worst effects of the pandemic.2 As mentioned above, the fact that Italy and Southern European member states are the biggest beneficiaries of both its loans and grants stands out among the many aspects of

the NGEU. The allocation of the funds has been calculated according to the loss-to-GDP ratio and each economy’s capacity for mobilising resources to tackle this unprecedented shock. Most importantly, however, NGEU symbolised the much-awaited change of approach in the EU institutions’ crisis management strategy.3 The EU based its response to the 2008 global financial crisis and the 2011–2012 public debt crisis primarily on austerity policies, and financial support was linked to very strict conditions. This approach, consequently, had the effect of increasing the public debt in already deeply indebted countries (here, the Italian situation once again stood out), while public spending cuts and tax rises brought these economies to their knees. The above strategy eventually proved not only wrong but also dangerous for the stability of the eurozone and the EU in general, and caused the Italian government to be in open conflict with

Brussels until recently. When the coronavirus hit Europe, EU institutions were still entrenched in this old logic, but it soon became evident that the common market threatened to implode without a different approach. Moreover, the initial lack of solidarity towards Italy and the EU’s late response not only carried the risk of irremediably wrecking the Italian economy—which is the third-largest in the EU27—but could also have proved far more dangerous politically and socially. Even if, traditionally, Italy was the most Europhile country among the founding members, recent years have seen a sharp turnabout in this sentiment, which reached its lowest lows during the coronavirus crisis. After the health emergency had started, the Italian government and its citizens claimed that Europe had “abandoned” them to their fate. The disaffection with EU institutions helped strengthen the right-wing and populist parties, while antagonising Brussels and other

The budget alliances in Europe during 2020: the so-called Frugal Four and the Friends of Cohesion with Italy among them

SWEDEN

ESTONIA

LATVIA DENMARK

LITHUANIA

NETHERLANDS

POLAND SLOVAKIA

CZECHIA PORTUGAL

AUSTRIA SLOVENIA

HUNGARY

ITALY CROATIA SPAIN

ROMANIA BULGARIA

GREECE

Frugal Four Friends of Cohesion

POLITICS

How much NGEU money does the Italian government want to allocate to the six key areas of its recovery plan?

12%

31%

BILLION

green revolution and ecological transition digitalisation, innovation, competitiveness, and culture

13% 14%

223.91

TOTAL

sustainable mobility infrastructure

21%

education and research inclusion and cohesion health

EU countries was a good way for Italy’s weak executive at the time to gain political support and hide some of its failures to manage the crisis.4 According to a survey published at the beginning of the pandemic by the Italian think tank, called Institute for International Political Studies, 35% of Italians perceived Germany, Italy’s most important partner in Europe, as the biggest threat to its national interests. Interestingly, 27% of the respondents considered the Netherlands, the staunchest opponent of the debt-sharing mechanism, a rival, although the country was not even mentioned by the surveyees in 2019.5 The fear that the Italians’ growing disaffection with their traditional allies may foster the growth of right-wing populist parties who want Italy to leave the EU finally became reality last year. According to another survey conducted by the Italian Institute of International Affairs prior to the introduction of NGEU, 48% of Italians agreed with the statement that leaving the EU would be beneficial for Italy, while 44% thought that the country must unquestionably stay in the union.6 An “Italexit” scenario would have surely disastrous effects on the country, with the government likely to be buried under its unsustainable public debt and forced to declare itself bankrupt, while the renegotiation of a new trade agreement with the rest of the EU would set utterly unbeneficial terms for the country. However, things would not be better in the EU without Italy either, since the withdrawal of the EU’s third-largest economy and 76

POLITICS

second-largest manufacturer, which is also one of the largest net contributors to the EU budget, would have a destabilising effect on the European and the global financial system. As an immediate consequence, the eurozone would suffer a further decline in its economic activity, and some export-dependent countries, such as Germany or Austria—and especially the Netherlands— would be particularly affected. And we have not talked about the implications the Italexit would have for the European integration’s decades-long process.7 Fortunately, Italy’s divorce from the EU appears a remote possibility, and the appointment of Draghi’s cabinet has restored both Italy’s confidence in the EU and Brussels’ trust in the Mediterranean country. Italy’s problems, however, probably have not completely vanished. Since the NGEU funds come with conditionalities and are dependent upon the presentation of welldesigned recovery and reform plans, all eyes— especially those of the so-called “frugals”—are on Italy now, which is trying to show its European counterparts its ability to make proper use of these vast resources. However, the EU’s worstperforming economy has a poor track record of realising productive investment and using EU funds efficiently. Despite some beliefs that these resources will help fix entrenched economic problems and close the decades-old growth gap between Italy and the rest of the bloc, doubts remain over how successfully Italy can carry out

Table 1: The pay-out rates of the EU regional development and funds between 2014 and 2020 Country

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Austria

0.90

1.90

4.70

11.50

20.00

35.40

39.40

Belgium

0.80

1.90

4.70

9.00

16.60

32.00

40.60

Bulgaria

0.00

1.90

8.40

15.20

23.40

33.50

48.90

Croatia

0.90

1.90

4.70

9.20

11.00

25.70

38.60

Cyprus

1.40

2.80

6.10

20.70

39.70

47.20

51.80

Czechia

N/A

1.90

5.00

12.50

22.20

37.40

54.40

Denmark

0.90

1.90

5.10

14.10

22.90

34.90

48.40

Estonia

0.90

2.30

10.90

19.70

32.10

46.50

61.90

Finland

0.90

1.90

11.90

22.60

36.70

49.30

59.60

France

0.60

1.90

5.60

12.10

21.30

32.70

41.30

Germany

0.70

1.90

6.00

12.10

20.80

32.40

40.60

Greece

0.60

6.10

16.10

23.20

29.50

39.00

60.00

Hungary

N/A

1.90

7.90

19.10

33.80

43.60

59.20

Interreg

1.00

2.00

5.30

8.30

16.40

29.40

45.00

Ireland

1.40

2.30

5.20

10.90

23.90

29.90

38.60

Italy

0.00

1.90

4.80

7.30

16.60

26.00

38.50

Latvia

0.90

1.90

8.50

12.60

20.40

37.30

55.70

Lithuania

0.90

1.90

9.20

16.60

30.00

36.90

66.90

Luxembourg

0.90

1.90

6.30

13.40

36.10

40.00

54.30

Malta

0.90

1.90

6.80

12.50

20.40

33.90

47.00

Netherlands

0.90

1.90

4.70

10.90

21.10

31.30

37.80

Poland

0.30

1.90

8.60

15.30

28.50

42.80

57.60

Portugal

0.60

2.40

9.10

19.10

31.10

44.10

57.60

Romania

0.00

2.80

5.60

12.30

19.00

29.00

39.30

Slovakia

0.80

1.90

7.40

12.20

22.30

29.50

39.20

Slovenia

0.00

1.90

5.80

11.30

18.80

35.50

52.90

Spain

1.40

5.90

10.70

10.90

19.80

28.80

35.30

Sweden

0.70

1.90

9.40

19.50

35.60

43.50

59.90

0.90

1.90

5.80

10.50

22.40

31.50

42.00

EU-28

0.60

2.40

7.70

13.80

24.20

35.90

49.50

POLITICS

Would you like to leave the eurozone and the EU?

7.7%

39.3%

X 40.9% EU

Eurozone

7.5%

? 4.6% Both of them

Neither of them

Unsure

Last year, anti-EU sentiment become dominant in Italy as the results of a poll by Termometro Politico also suggest.

structural reforms. Just to give you an idea, during the 2014–2020 period, the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) absorption rate was only 40% in the country, well below the EU average. In the last MFF, this percentage was way higher with most of the funds used just in the last six months of 2020 in order to fight the worst effects of the pandemic.8 In the following years, Italy will have to absorb the “standard” 2021–2027 multiannual financial framework funds, as well as the funds made available under NGEU and the remaining portions of the previous EU budget. The NGEU fund is providing Italy with EUR 85 billion as grants and EUR 124 billion as low-interest loans. Interestingly, in the budget proposal for 2021 that Italy submitted to the European Commission, 78

POLITICS

the Italian government planned to fully use the allocated grants, and loans.9 The Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance estimates that subsidies will be used in the first phase of the reconstruction fund between 2021 and 2023 (70% of the total of the plan), and the rest during the following three years. To do so, the Italian government has prepared recovery plans in six macro-areas: digitalisation, green revolution, education and training, equality, mobility infrastructure, and health. Green policy and digitalisation will be central, and estimates say that these macro-fields will receive 40% and 20% of the total amount of allocations, respectively. The first portion of subsidies (approximately 10% of the total amount of subsidies) is to be paid this year, and, if things go as planned, the remaining

sums will be approved every six months thereafter. If used correctly, these resources will surely have a strong impact on Italy’s economic growth and GDP, which plunged to 1998 levels in 2020, while the country’s public debt, currently at its historical peak of 158%, which equals to EUR 2.5 trillion, is the second-highest in the EU.10 In the Italian case, higher spending is necessary to boost long-term growth, but it is also crucial that this spending should be accompanied by genuine reforms to improve its effectiveness by enhancing the infrastructure governance framework, expediting project delivery, and improving project quality.11 It is not a secret that the comparatively more open economies of Northern Europe have so far managed to obtain a large share of the EU funds’ positive economic effects through not only their intense trading relations with the rest of the EU but also their more favourable governance and industrial structure that allows them to capture demand for investment goods. Unfortunately, the Italian government has a poor planning capacity, a very low rate of government investment, and low institutional quality compared to the northern countries. In addition, despite some feeble attempts at reform, Italy may continue struggling to use EU funds, given its omnipresent red tape and the growing government intervention in the economy.12 Even if the last decades saw a quite encouraging wave of liberalisation and some crucial privatisation programmes in Italy, a more “dirigiste” attitude has also emerged in the country over recent years, which could further hamper competitiveness and discourage foreign investors to invest in the country. As a consequence, there is a real danger that the Italian reconstruction programme will only inflate the state sector and the social benefits without bringing the country the much-awaited structural reforms that it needs.13 Despite Italy’s not-so-encouraging record and the Italian government’s problematic approach, there are many reasons to be optimistic, and, if estimates are correct and the money is invested well, NGEU can generate a vast expansion of up to 3.5% of the GDP in Italy. Moreover, NGEU grants could successfully reduce the public debtto-GDP ratio by more than 5% until 2026.14

The fall of the second Conte cabinet in February 2021 can also serve as an example of the irreconcilable differences over the role of the state among the coalition parties. Eventually, the political turmoil resulted in the formation of the most pro-European government ever, led by former president of the European Central Bank Mario Draghi. The new government immediately took a new direction and adopted a more liberal attitude, according to which even increasing the public debt is not something to stigmatise.15 Most importantly, a revived Italian economy will be reflected in the strengthening of the country system as a whole. The economic recovery will translate into Italy’s increased activism from a geopolitical point of view, a fact that will bring substantial benefits to not only the EU but also the transatlantic partnership as a whole. A strong Italy in a strong EU is, therefore, the desire of many not only within but also without Europe. With the United Kingdom’s being out of the EU, Italy has the opportunity to become the German–French tandem’s most important partner, but also a counterbalance to their influence over the union. Italy’s role as medium power could even be reassumed with the creation of some new regional alliances, especially in Eastern Europe. Traditionally, Rome’s foreign policy rests on three main pillars: Europeanism, Atlanticism, and Mediterraneanism, and strengthening the connection with its maritime neighbourhood has become Italy’s main strategical objective in recent years. In a meaningful move to work on the idea of an “enlarged Mediterranean” (Mediterraneo allargato), the Italian government reassigned its troops deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan to missions in Libya and Niger in 2018, attempting to reinforce its ties with—and presence in—North Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean but also the Balkans.16 The Italian government’s approach helped create stronger economic relations with these regions and, today, most of Italy’s industrial output is directed towards the Mediterranean countries.17 Furthermore, it is important to underline that Italian exports to these areas currently outstrip those of either the United States or China.18 POLITICS

Italian multinational oil and gas company Eni’s stakes in Eastern Mediterranean gas as of spring 2020

ITALYITALY

GREECE GREECE

MALTA MALTA

Bouri Bouri 50%

50%

TUNISIA TUNISIA Zawiya

LIBYA LIBYA

Marsa El Brega

Proposed gas pipelines Maritime boundary Boundary of Turkish continental shelf, according to Turkey Claimed by both Cyprus and Turkey Claimed by both the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Cyprus block Gas discovery

Lebanon block LNG terminal

Eni’s stakes in Eastern Mediterranean gas

POLITICS

Gas fields

TURKEY TURKEY

3 2

50% 60%

SYRIASYRIA

Cuttlefish prospect

CYPRUS CYPRUS

2 4

Cuttlefish Cuttlefish 40% 40% 40% 5 6 13 prospect 7 prospect 8 9 50% 50% 50% 60% 50% 60% 60% LEBANON LEBANON 10 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 40% 40% 40% 10 11 12 50% 50% 50%

Calypso Calypso Calypso 5 6 7

50% Zohr50% 50%

Mediterranean Mediterranean Sea Sea

Zohr Zohr Nour Nour

Idku

50% 40% 40% 50% 50% 50% 75% Nooros 75% 75% Nooros Nooros Baltim Baltim Baltim ISRAEL ISRAEL Idku Damietta Damietta

EGYPTEGYPT

POLITICS

The Mediterranean dimension has been further strengthened by PM Draghi, who symbolically chose Libya as the destination of his first international visit and adopted a more resolute attitude towards Turkey, its fierce competitor in the region. Beyond extending its trade interests in the Mediterranean, Italy, as a resource-poor country, also tries to establish an energy stronghold in North Africa. Italy’s multinational oil and gas company, Eni, whose largest shareholder is the Italian government, currently controls about 45% of Libya’s oil and gas production, 50% of Egypt’s massive Zohr offshore natural gas field, the biggest in the Eastern Mediterranean, and is one of leading foreign partners to Algeria, Africa’s most important natural gas producer.19 Italy is also an important actor in energy matters on the northern side of the Mediterranean, with its influence extending over the Trans Adriatic Pipeline and being the main trading partner of many South East European countries. On the other hand, Italy has not yet been able to present a clear political strategy in the region but develop trading relations, making the country vulnerable to other major actors’ activities. Apart from the century-old cooperative rivalry with France, its historical challenger in the region, Italy is also facing the rise of global powers, such as Russia, China, and regional powers, like the already mentioned Turkey, which have increased their efforts to expand their influence in the wider Mediterranean area.

The Trans-Adriatic Gas Pipeline (TAP) ALBANIA

BULGARIA

ITALY Brindisi

Fier

San Foca

Kipoi Thessaloniki

GREECE TURKEY

POLITICS

Of all its relations with the above contenders, Rome’s ties to China are probably the most controversial. In fact, the Italian Mediterranean strategy shares some common points with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is obvious if we think of the Western Balkans and the southeast of Europe. In March 2019, Italy became the first major European country to formally sign up for the BRI, a decision which raised many doubts among Rome’s western partners about its reliability in the wider Euro-Atlantic partnership (which, in turn, is also a questionable attitude, since the EU, thanks to the efforts by Germany’s presidency of the Council of the European Union, signed the so-called Comprehensive Agreement on Investments on 30 December 2020, which will assume a critical role in Chinese–EU relations and will permit Chinese companies to enter European markets easily).20 The definition of the Sino-Italian relationship will be a crucial political point in the next months, mostly considering Rome’s desire to reinforce its connections with the US, its traditional ally. Atlanticism is an indisputable element of the Italian political strategy, although the rise to government of the populist Five Star Movement, which supported the Chinese connection, and Trump’s administration that destabilised transatlantic relations complicated the US–Italian bond in the last few years. From the US’s perspective, the Beijing–Rome connection will be a central issue to decide which form bilateral Italy–US relations should take under the new Biden administration. The creation of the new Draghi cabinet was surely welcome in Washington, which would like to count on Italy as part of its Mediterranean strategy. Yet, the US administration is still very suspicious of the populist Five Star Movement, which is still the largest force in the Italian parliament and has never come to terms with its original Euroscepticism and anti-Atlanticism. In addition, if Italy were to vote tomorrow, the centre-right coalition would probably win the majority thanks to the League, whose leader, Matteo Salvini, is known for being a fan of Vladimir Putin in Washington. Therefore, the unreliability of Italy’s main political forces in the US administration’s eyes could, in the future, endanger the strategic

President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte before signing a memorandum of understanding in 2019

importance of the country and reduce its weight on the European and world stage. In the last months, the Italian government has, however, taken a different attitude towards China, and this was only partly due to the change of government. At the beginning of the year, the Italian government decided, for example, to side with the US in the 5G development by the Chinese and restricted the Asian country’s access to its network infrastructure, citing security concerns. In the meantime, the Italian prime minister also issued a new decree extending the industries belonging to the so-called “golden power” (i.e., the national strategic industries), thus, de facto, curbing Chinese activities in national strategic industries. Beijing–Rome relations became even tenser later, when the Chinese Communist Party levelled false accusations of Italy being the original epicentre of the coronavirus pandemic at the Mediterranean country. There are also signs of a more pragmatic approach towards these sensitive issues in the populist Five Star Movement and, to a lesser extent, in the League, which, in January, voted to extend sanctions against Russia following Aleksej

Navalnyj’s arrest.21 A declaration by Luigi Di Maio, Italy’s Foreign Minister at the time, in which he condemned the Chinese government for human rights violation in Hong Kong and distanced himself and the Five Star Movement from Beijing, is also a case in point.22 Recently, the great commitment of Italian prime minister, Mario Draghi, has helped the Italian political parties understand that the European and Atlantic alignment are essential to the country. It is also important to Italy, however, that these alignments should be part of a wider and multilateral context that goes beyond the traditional organically developed and already defined reference framework. Bearing this in mind, Italy has the opportunity to play a prominent role in the global redefinition and, thanks to its soft-power skills, to accommodate the interests of the world’s biggest actors. Surely, a foreign policy that is more aware of Italy’s values and responsibilities in the world, especially in some key regions such as the Mediterranean, can lay the foundations for a new chapter in the country’s transatlantic relations, which may prove much more fruitful than in recent years. POLITICS

The first occasion to test the waters for such a foreign policy will arrive with Italy’s G20 presidency, during which the Italian government should try to reconcile the positions of the developed and the emerging countries on crucial global subjects, such as climate change, trade, technological progress, international rules, the fight against the pandemic, while it should also attempt to reconnect Washington and Beijing.23 Italy will also have to spend its political capital as a “balancing power” inside the EU: acting as a counterbalance to the German–French tandem and as a possible bridge between the EU’s biggest and smallest countries while also trying to exert its influence in the Mediterranean and the Balkans, the latter being a priority now, as it is at the core of Italian interests and security policy today.

10 Commission Opinion of 18.11.2020 on the Draft Budgetary Plan of Italy. European Commission. 18 November 2020. <https://bit.ly/3eTesYf > 11 Eugenio Gaiotti: Audizione preliminare all’esame della manovra economica per il triennio 2021–2023. Banca d’Italia. 24 November 2020. <https://bit.ly/3hyrWKW > 12 Maddalena Martini: Why Italy and Spain will struggle to spend key EU funds. Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale.

November

2020.

<https://bit.

ly/3bwDdYq > 13 Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the 2020 National Reform Programme of Italy and delivering a Council opinion on the 2020 Stability Programme of Italy. European Commission. 20 May 2020. <https://bit. ly/33T61WJ > 14 A commitment to the recovery. Speech by Fabio Panetta, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Rome Investment Forum 2020. European Central Bank. 14 December 2020. <https://bit.ly/3fiJhok >

ENDNOTES

15 Mario Draghi: We face a war against coronavirus and must

1 André Sapir: Why has COVID-19 hit different European

mobilise accordingly. Financial Times. 25 March 2020. <htt-

Union economies so differently? Bruegel, Policy Contribution,

ps://on.ft.com/3hxIbHS >

Issue no 18. September 2020. <https://bit.ly/33Me1sy >

16 Valeria Di Cecco: Un “grande Medio Oriente”o un

2 Nicoletta Pirozzi: Beyond Coronabonds: A New Constituent

“Mediterraneo allargato.” Informazioni della Difesa. 2004/2.

for Europe. IAI Commentaries 20. 26 April 2020. <https://bit.

30–34.

ly/3yhyvaA >

17 Matteo Colombo–Valerio Vignoli: Italy in the Eastern

3 Oliver Picek: Spillover Effects From Next Generation EU.

Mediterranean: Between Continuity and New Challenges.

Intereconomics. 2020/5. 325–331.

Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale. 10 September

4 Franca Lower–Michele Mioni: “European Solidarity” in the

2020. <https://bit.ly/3tTlGzK >

Covid-crisis : Italy and the discursive dimension of the

18 The Italian Strategy in the Mediterranean. Stabilising the

European public space. Politique Européenne. 30 October

Crises and Building a Positive Agenda for the Region. Ministero

2020. <https://bit.ly/3wcEYlj >

degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale. 2017.

5 Sondaggio ISPI 2020. Gli Italiani e la politica internazionale.

32–34. <https://bit.ly/3uVHzzE >

Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale. 25 December

19 Michaël Tanchum–Dimitar Bechev: Italy’s Mediterranean

2020. <https://bit.ly/3bxtuRt >

Belt and Road. Foreign Policy. 21 January 2021. <https://bit.

6 Gli Italiani e l’Unione Europea. Indagine di Opinione di

ly/2Qnd9r8 >

DISPOC/LAPS (Università di Siena) e IAI. Istituto Affari

20 EU–China investment negotiations. European Commission.

Internazionali. November 2020. 3. <https://bit.ly/3uTKcSL >

22 January 2021. <https://bit.ly/3tREdML >

7 Philipp Heimberger–Nikolaus Kowall: Why distorted pictures

21 Stefano Rizzuti: La Lega scarica Putin, in Ue arriva condan-

of Italy are poison for European policy debates. Wiener Institut

na su caso Navalny: “Inaccettabili attentati politici.” Fanpage.

für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche. 24 July 2020. <https://

19 January 2021. <https://bit.ly/3bAggTU>

bit.ly/3bxFhiG >

22 Otto Lanzavecchia: Italy stands up for Hong Kong, Foreign

8 Zsolt Darvas: Will European Union countries be able to ab-

Minister Di Maio tells China. Formiche. 25 August 2020. <htt-

sorb and spend well the bloc’s recovery funding? Bruegel. 24

ps://bit.ly/3ygBjod >

September 2020. <https://bit.ly/3yjHFDm >

23 Giampiero Massolo: L’Italia e l’America di Joe Biden. Istituto

9 Italy’s Draft Budgetary Plan 2021. Italian Government,

per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale. 20 January 2021. <htt-

Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze. 19 October 2020.

ps://bit.ly/3yle3ps >

<https://bit.ly/3eQfdRQ > 84

POLITICS

AT THE EDGE OF TWO WORLDS—THE FUTURE OF PORTUGAL’S ATLANTICISM Zsombor Szabolcs Pál Portugal has a unique position in Europe: most people consider it part of the Mediterranean world; however, it is more than that, being at least as much influenced by the Atlantic Ocean as the Mediterranean Sea. As Pequito Rebelo and, later, Orlando Ribeiro famously put it: “Portugal is Mediterranean by nature but Atlantic by its position.”1 This claim holds water not only geographically but also historically, as Portugal’s Atlantic orientation has always been a distinctive trait throughout the centuries. Of course, this disposition can also be traced back to geography, as the country is open to the ocean, while connected to—and separated from—the rest of Europe only by Spain. This is also a duality led to a dichotomy between the country’s European and Atlantic orientation.2 Portugal’s Atlantic orientation was primarily manifest in the way it extended into the ocean, being in the vanguard of great discoveries, and, as a result, created one of the world history’s longest-lived colonial empires, which started in the 15th and finished only towards the end of the 20th century. The propaganda of António Oliveria de Salazar’s authoritarian state—ruling over the country from the 1930s to the mid-1970s— made this Atlantic vocation outright, calling Portugal a large entity that stretched across

three continents3—although it denied that the country would be an empire, rather labelling it a “pluricontinental” state which did not need decolonisation, as its different territories were said to be an integral part of the nation as a whole.4 Besides, the Salazarist regime also pressed home that the European part of the country had always had a mission in its overseas territories,5 and it indoctrinated its citizens that Portugal was not a small nation, as its vast lands (mostly in Africa) made it larger than any other European country. Therefore, the Atlantic Ocean seemed an essential axis of Portuguese policy making and identity. Portugal’s Atlantic orientation was also palpable in its alliances. It has had special ties to Great Britain through the centuries: they signed the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty in 1373, which is still in effect today, becoming the longeststanding alliance in world history—or at least this is how it seeped into the Portuguese collective consciousness.6 This treaty and its reiterations also came to make London one of Lisbon’s most important allies, the guarantor of Portuguese independence, its principal trade partner, and, overall, a point of reference for its foreign policy. Small wonder the British vision about the economic cooperation in Europe also influenced

The US air base on Lajes, Azores, during World War II and today POLITICS

Portugal’s accession to the EFTA and its relations with the European Economic Community.7 After World War II, when London’s power and clout started to wane, Portugal held firm to its Atlantic orientation. This time, however, the US emerged as its main ally: it established an important military base on the Portugueseowned Azores after pressuring Lisbon in cooperation, but also in rivalry for influence, with London to sign the Azores Agreement against the will of Salazar, who tried to preserve neutrality in the global conflict.8 The agreement, but also the regime’s staunch anticommunism, had a part to play when Portugal was invited to become the founding member of NATO in 1949. This was a diplomatic victory and a remarkable success for the right-wing authoritarian regime the country remained after the war and, thus, helped consolidate its domestic power, too. Stepping into London’s previous role, from that time forward, the US became the main guarantor of Portugal’s security, but, withal, there were no changes in the country’s Atlantic orientation—it remained important for the Portuguese foreign policy to maintain its empire, although the wave of decolonisation and Salazar’s unyielding approach to the matter had a bearing on its alliances from the 1960s on.9 After Salazar had become incapacitated and his former protégé, Marcelo Caetano, had taken over the reins, some political forces with a growing predilection for Europe emerged on the fringes of the country’s political spectrum, heralding that a change might come. Portugal began to turn towards Europe and the continental powers, and the importance of the Atlantic fell into the background for a while. When the regime was overthrown in 1974, it also entailed the victory of the European orientation and the beginning of the groundwork for Portugal’s 1986 accession to the European Communities.10 Still, becoming part of the European family does not at all mean that the importance attached to the Atlantic ebbed away in Portugal. The country, following the British bearings, first kept a bit aloof from the European project and thought it needed its Atlantic links to counterbalance its new European orientation. 86

POLITICS

After a while, it realised, however, that, as a small state, aligning with Brussels is the best way to protect its interests.11 Its reserved attitude started to soften after Lisbon’s first presidency of the Council of the European Union in 1992 and the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty.12 However, the country’s traditionally multidimensional foreign policy, which always looked at several directions without Europe and encompassed many continents, never ceased. Since the early times of their accession, the Portuguese have sought to open the EU up to the outside world and act as a bridge between the two while, riding on the back of the union, they have also hoped to reinforce their international influence and authority, especially in the directions they were historically interested in.13 Meanwhile, by the early years of the 2000s, they came to the realisation that they wanted to play a leading role in strengthening the EU’s integration process, too.14 During the second decade of the present millennium, the country’s Atlantic orientation faced new challenges. One of these was Brexit, which entailed a certain mismatch between the two Portuguese attitudes, i.e., maintaining the importance of their traditional alliance on the one hand and increasing the country’s EU orientation while striving for becoming an active part of deeper European integration on the other. This conflict between the country’s foreign policy wonts also became tangible in the early reactions to the British choice by Lisbon. Portuguese politicians saw Brexit as a threat that negatively affected further integration at large and might create fragmentation in the union, while they were also unhappy with the prospect of their traditional ally’s departure lest that it would upset their Atlanticist policies. How they felt was also clear from their stance on the British efforts to renegotiate the EU treaties: they would have wanted the UK to remain part of the EU, but not at all costs. They showed openness towards British proposals for reforming the union, especially its elements about the enlargement of the common market, deregulation, EU trade policies to be more directed towards the outside world, or the increased role

Prime Minister Mário Soares, Deputy Prime Minister Rui Machete, and Minister for Foreign Affairs Jaime Gama, signing the accession treaty of Portugal in 1985

of national parliaments,15 but they also made it clear they did not support anything that would affect EU core values.16 Accordingly, the prime minister’s official statement after the Brexit vote also underscored that the British decision could not in any way mean that the EU should not be further developed, although he also added that bilateral relations between their countries would carry on the circumstances notwithstanding.17 This tone was true of the whole negotiation process, since Portugal always asserted that the UK should not be punished for its decision and Brexit should not end up having a bearing on either the good relations between Lisbon and London or on the EU and the integration process. Portugal, therefore, wanted to facilitate Brexit negotiations while Prime Minister António Costa also used the prospective event as an argument justifying his plans for EU reforms.18 Lisbon’s order of priority and a firm commitment to Europe was, however, clear from Costa’s reaction. When Boris Johnson proposed that their countries should start bilateral talks in parallel with the EU Brexit negotiations, he ruled out the possibility, saying that the EU could only be successful in the negotiations if it remained united.19

In an ironic turn of events, Portugal took over the presidency of the Council of European Union from January 2021 after the Brexit trade and cooperation agreement had been concluded at the end of December 2020. Therefore, Lisbon had to conduct negotiations on matters which still needed to be worked out, and it must start to implement the agreement. Getting the European Parliament’s seal of approval was also on the Portuguese agenda, and PM António Costa said they were “proud to contribute to developing a strong partnership with this fundamental neighbour, friend, ally, and partner” when the EP voted in favour of the deal in April.20 Minister of Foreign Affairs Augusto Santos Silva also claimed the agreement was very important for Europe but it was “particularly pleasant” for Portugal to have it implemented and approved under their presidency, which he explained, citing reasons of history and Portugal’s Atlantic outlook: “Portugal is . . . a European country, the area we are historically inserted into is Europe, but we are at the same time an Atlantic country and our historical relations with the United Kingdom are also very deep.”21 Understandably, the Portuguese intend to continue cooperation POLITICS

with the UK, especially on defence and security policy.22 The other challenge to Portugal’s—just as to every other European country’s—Atlanticism was the four years of the Trump administration. As it was mentioned before, Portugal was a founding member of NATO, which remains one of its main ties to the US. When the alliance set out to find a new role after the Cold War, Lisbon

proved ready to take part even in out-of-area missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Mediterranean Sea23 and insisted that the organisation was still important and Portugal would find it a disaster if its role diminished.24 Clearly, this military alliance is important for the country to maintain and secure the Atlantic vector of its foreign policy and its vast exclusive economic zone in the ocean.25

NATO missions Portugal has been involved in STANDING NATO MARITIME GROUP 1 (SNMG1) NORTH ATLANTIC, NORTH SEA, BALTIC SEA 2005–PRESENT

ICELANDIC AIR POLICING ICELAND 2012

NATO ASSURANCE MEASURES

BALTIC AIR POLICING ESTONIA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA 2007–PRESENT

LITHUANIA 2019–PRESENT

IFOR/SFOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 1996–2004

STANDING NATOMINE COUNTERMEASURES GROUP 1 (SNMCMG1) NORTH SEA, BALTIC SEA, ENGLISH CHANNEL 2018–2020

TAILORED NATO FORWARD ASSURANCE PRESENCE MEASURES ROMANIA 2021

KFOR AFOR

KOSOVO 1998–2017

ALBANIA 1999

ROMANIA 2015–PRESENT

NATO TRAINING MISSION-IRAQ (NTM-I) IRAQ 2005–2011

NATO MACEDONIA OPERATION SEA GUARDIAN MEDITERRANEAN SEA 2016–PRESENT

OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR MEDITERRANEAN SEA 2001–2016

STANDING NATO MARITIME GROUP 2 (SNMG2) MEDITERRANEAN SEA 2012–2014

(NORTH) MACEDONIA 2001–2002

ISAF AFGHANISTAN 2002–2014

RESOLUTE SUPPORT MISSION AFGHANISTAN 2018–2021

Portuguese Army (Exército Português) Portuguese Navy (Marinha Portuguesa) Portuguese Air Force (Força Aérea Portuguesa, FAP)

POLITICS

Of course, European common defence has also been important to Lisbon, which has been an active facilitator of and participant in the EU’s defence integration process from the outset,26 but this does not at all mean it would like to give up NATO, which it still finds an essential part of its national security.27 Portuguese politicians do not agree with other European voices that find NATO “brain dead,” either; rather, they think it is still “very much alive and present,” although they acknowledge that cooperation between the two parts of the Atlantic has not been the smoothest in the last few years and its priorities for the future need to be thought over.28 The above claim also signals that Portugal’s alignment with the US did not go unaffected in the last years, especially under the Trump administration’s internationally less committed America First policy, which tended to renege on many of Washington’s earlier engagements. It was not helping either that Portugal unexpectedly found itself being part of a geopolitical threesome with China and the US playing the most important roles. China has

The Port of Sines in Portugal has an excellent location CORVO

AZORES

VIANA DO CASTELO

FLORES GRACIOSA SAO JORGE FAIAL

PICO

VILA REAL BRAGA

TERCEIRA SAO MIGUEL

Porto

FORMIGAS SANTA MARIA

BRAGANÇA

PORTO AVEIRO VISEU

MADEIRA PORTO SANTO MADEIRA DESERTAS

GUARDA

COIMBRA

SELVAGENS CASTELO BRANCO

LEIRIA

SANTARÉM PORTALEGRE LISBON

Lisbon ÉVORA

SETÚBAL

Sines

BEJA

FARO

Faro

become a major investor in Portugal after the 2007–2008 financial crisis, getting important positions in the Iberian country’s energy market but also in its insurance, banking, and financial sector and its media and air transport,29 and all these investments and acquisitions have been looked upon with a friendly eye by the present government and Prime Minister Costa.30 The Chinese also set their sights on the deepwater port Sines, Portugal’s main harbour on the Atlantic just around one hundred kilometres away from Lisbon. They aim to build a container port there that is supposed to be an important element of their Belt and Road Initiative.31 In the meantime, the US also aims to win the concession in the port and to make it an important part of its plans to supply Europe with LNG, thus reducing Russian dominance in the continent’s gas imports and breaking into its market. Consequently, Washington placed Lisbon under pressure, making it part of its global contest against China.32 Although having a memorandum of understanding with Beijing about cooperation on the Belt and Road Initiative,33 Lisbon rejected accusations that it was a special friend to the Asian country, claiming it only wanted to make the best out of the concession in question.34 The diplomatic argy-bargy did not stop at that point, as the US also started to bring pressure to bear on Lisbon for not excluding Huawei completely from its 5G development plans,35 with the message and threat that Portugal should choose between its ally and its new economic partner and that some Portuguese companies might even face economic sanctions while security and defence cooperation between the two countries could also come to harm.36 The Portuguese, however, seem unrelenting,37 whereas they also say they know who their allies are but they also need to do what is best for their country. As the minister of national defence of Portugal earlier put it, Lisbon sees China as a partner in many issues, but it does not consider it as an ally. According to him, however, Western countries cannot handle the communist country the way they handled the Soviet Union in the 1940s.38 Anyhow, a change POLITICS

at the helm of the White House might have come as a relief to Portuguese diplomacy, too, since optimism had earlier prevailed among them that the new administration can spawn the rebirth of transatlantic relations and ease the conflict between the two superpowers.39 Unarguably, the new US administration will keep a tough stance on China but have a different approach to multilateralism and its allies, which can bring grist to Lisbon’s mill. Portugal’s leaders also pinned their hopes on their country’s EU presidency, striving for being instrumental in strengthening the weakened transatlantic ties40 and working hard to make the first Biden visit to Europe a reality during their tenure.41 Despite the not at all unfunded high hopes for better relations between Portugal and the US, it is also true that there has been a discernible shift in the former’s inclination towards the timehonoured transatlantic alliance. In 2020, a poll by YouGov showed that a high percentage of Portuguese people—the highest among all enquired countries—had affirmed that their perception of the US had worsened and that they had wanted more cooperation at an EU level, while most of those whose appreciation of

the United States was unchanged also wanted more EU-wide cooperation.42 Figures also show that 40% of Portuguese today see Germany, the largest foreign investor in the country, the most important country to have good relations with, while the US and the UK ranked second and third with 25% and 15%, respectively. Most of the Portuguese also think that China will be stronger than the US in ten years, although they do not trust Beijing, either.43 Obviously, Portuguese foreign policy continues to have more than a European dimension even today, and the Atlantic Ocean is still one of the most important channels through which it can be articulated: it is the link that connects the country with its autonomous regions and its erstwhile colonies located in South America, Africa, and Asia and now gathered into the Community of Portuguese Language Countries. As a small nation, Portugal can also better promote its interest with a multilateralist foreign policy and being part of strong alliances. Despite the above, it is also clear that there has been a marked trend in Portuguese foreign policy (re)orientation since the revolution and democratisation in 1974: Europe has come to the fore, while transatlantic relations

The Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP)

PORTUGAL AZORES (PORTUGAL) MADEIRA (PORTUGAL) CAPE VERDE GUINEA-BISSAU EQUATORIAL GUINEA BRAZIL

EAST TIMOR (TIMOR LESTE)

SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE ANGOLA MOZAMBIQUE

POLITICS

were relegated to the second place. This is also attested in its prime minister’s vision of the EU: he advocates a more united, more deeply integrated union44 and wants Portugal to play a starring role in its realisation, as it also became articulated in Portugal’s programme for the EU presidency it held in the first six months this year.45 On the other hand, less interest in transatlantic relations is also the consequence of the last few years’ US foreign policy and increasing geopolitical frictions. The former has made Portugal unsure of its once most important ally, while the latter is something it would prefer to stay away from, as it does not appear to serve its interest—what is more, it acts against it. That is why only one-fifth of the Portuguese would like to help its strategic ally in a Chinese–US conflict.46 It is no surprise that now, with the UK going separate ways, the Portuguese have more faith in beefing the EU as an international actor up than in any other options they have traditionally had. However, they must also figure out how to solve the conundrum of counterbalancing the EU’s eastern orientation without their powerful ally. The coming years will tell how Portugal can succeed in this and in promoting its other ideas in European politics, what new bilateral relations the country can build with the UK, being part of the European bloc, and if Biden’s foreign policy can help regain the confidence of Portuguese people and politics alike.

speech on 14 August 1935, and Salazar’s speech on 8 June 1936. See Mendo Castro Henriques–Gonçalo de Sampaio e Mello: Salazar. Pensamento de Doutrina Política. Textos antológicos. Editorial Verbo, Lisbon–São Paulo, 2007. 234– 237. See also Jorge Miranda: As Constituições Portugueses. Livraria Petrony, Lisbon, 1997. 312. 6 O Tratado de Windsor, a mais antiga aliança diplomática do mundo. RTP Ensina. 2017. <https://bit.ly/3tkaEnN > 7 António Raimundo: Por tugal face ao Brexit: um europeísmo perseverante, mas sob pressão acrescida. Relações Internacionais (R:I). 2017/56. 117. <https://doi. org/10.23906/ri2017.56a07 > 8 Alexandre Luís Moreli Rocha: As pressões dos Aliados e a evolução da política externa portuguesa entre 1942 e 1943: da neutralidade à colaboração. Revista de História. 2009/161. 114—144.

<ht tps://doi.org /10.116 0 6/ issn.2316 -9141.

v0i161p113-144 > 9 Nuno Severiano Teixeira: Portugal e NATO: 1949–1999. Nação e Defesa. 1999/89. 26. 10 Atlantismo ou europeísmo? 11 Atlantismo ou europeísmo? 12 Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira: Portugal e a presidência da União Europeia (1992–2007). Relações Internacionais (R:I). 2008/20. 131–43. 13 Ferreira-Pereira, 133–134. 14 Aníbal Cavaco Silva: Portugal and the Future of the European Union. Brown Journal of World Affairs. 2018/2. 9–12. 15 European Views on the UK’s Renegotiation: Ireland, Portugal, Austria and Croatia. London School of Economics and Political Science. 21 October 2015. <https://bit. ly/3y15oIw > 16 Lívia Franco: Portugal and Brexit: Old Alliance, New

ENDNOTES

Government. European Council on Foreign Relations. 29

1 Pequito Rebelo: A Terra Portuguesa. [s.n.], Lisbon, 1929.

October 2015. <https://bit.ly/33s7Zgs >

55. Quoted in Orlando Ribeiro: Portugal, o Mediterrâneo e o

17 Declaração do Primeiro-Ministro sobre a saída do Reino

Atlântico. Coimbra Editora, Coimbra, [1945]. 58.

Unido da União Europeia. República Portuguesa, XXI

2 Atlantismo ou europeísmo? Janus. 2002. Available at

Governo Constitucional. 24 June 2016. <https://bit.

Janus Anuário <https://bit.ly/3uQLSw1 >

ly/3o9DFAL >

3 Adolfo Cueto Rodriguez: La nación pluricontinental: La

18 António Raimundo: Por tugal face ao Brexit: um

entelequia colonial del Estado Novo (1930–1974). Espacio,

europeísmo perseverante, mas sob pressão acrescida.

tiempo y Forma, Serie V, Historia Contemporánea. 2013/25.

Relações Internacionais (R:I). 2017/56. 117.

111–130. <https://doi.org/10.5944/etfv.25.2013.12191 >

19 Acordo pós-Brexit. Costa rejeita negociações paralelas

4 Norrie MacQueen: Portugal. Decolonization without

com Boris Johnson. Sic Notícias. 15 December 2020.

Agency. In: The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire,

<https://bit.ly/3y4mxAQ >

edited by Martin Thomas–Andres Thompson. Oxford

20 Brexit: Costa salienta papel da presidência portuguesa

University Press, Oxford, 2018. 163.

para “parceria forte” com o Reino Unido. TVI24. 28 April

5 Cf., e.g., Salazar’s speech on 28 April 1934, Salazar’s

2021. <https://bit.ly/2Rbdu0x > POLITICS

21 Brexit: Acordo aprovado na presidência portuguesa é

‘special friend’ in EU. Financial Times. 20 January 2020.

“particularmente saboroso” – MNE. Visão. 28 April 2021.

<https://on.ft.com/3wkusbK >

<https://bit.ly/3vXkfBQ >

35 Filipa Soares: Why Portugal fears a backlash if Trump is

22 Joana Gomes: Portugal wants EU defence, security

re-elected US president. Euronews. 3 November 2020.

partnership with UK. EURACTIV. 22 February 2021. <https://

<https://bit.ly/2RT9y4H >

bit.ly/3odvJP9 >

36 Patricia Cunha: US or China? Americans call on Portugal

23 Rui Pedro Matos Tendeiro–João Manuel Pires–Daniel

to choose. EURACTIV. 29 September 2020. <https://bit.

Américo Rosa Menezes: As novas missões no quadro da

ly/3yfqaE6 >

OTAN. Trabalho de Investigação de Grupo do CPOG

37 Patricia Cunha: Portugal: Executive reacts to US demand

2016/2017. Instituto Universitário Militar, Departamento de

of ‘friends, allies’ choice. LUSA. 28 September 2020.

Estudos Pós-Graduados, Pedrouços, 2017. 18–19. <https://

<https://bit.ly/3eMnsyd >

bit.ly/33v3Hoy >

38 Center for Strategic & International Studies: A

24 Tendeiro–Pires–Menezes, 23.

Conversation with Minister of National Defense of Portugal

25 Maria Sousa Galito: Ensaio sobre política externa

João Gomes Cravinho. YouTube. 14 June 2019. <https://

por tugue sa.

youtu.be/xTl8lfw5q2A >

Ce ntro

Estudos

sobre

Áfric a

Desenvolvimento, Working Paper CEsA CSG 176/2019.

39 Costa espera de Joe Biden regresso da relação

<https://bit.ly/3uC0AqZ >

transatlântica e do multilateralismo. Jornal de Negócios. 9

26 Vítor Rodrigues Viana [et al.]: Portugal e a Defesa

November 2020. <https://bit.ly/3eKBb8W > See also Hélder

Europeia. Instituto da Defesa Nacional, Policy Paper 6/2014.

Gomes: Portugal espera um alívio entre EUA e China.

3. <https://bit.ly/3hnyvzY >

Expresso. 13 November 2020. <https://bit.ly/3w8E49g >

27 Peter Leffler: “Quo vadis UE?” Reflexões sobre uma

40 Nicoletta Pirozzi–Funda Tekin–Ilke Toygür: La Presidencia

política comum de segurança e defesa da União Europeia.

portuguesa: encontrando el equilibrio entre atender asuntos

Trabalho de Investigação Individual do CEMC2017/18.

pendientes y dejar su propia huella. Comentario Elcano

Instituto Universitário Militar, Departamento de Estudos Pós-

1/2021. 4 January 2021. <https://bit.ly/3ohCak5 >

Graduados, Pedrouços, 2018. 27. <https://bit.ly/2RLPdOw >

41 EU/Presidency: EC expects ‘close cooperation’ from

28 Jacopo Barigazzi: Portuguese defense minister: Macron

Portugal on Biden. LUSA. 16 January 2021. <https://bit.

is wrong on NATO (despite Trump). Politico. 18 June 2020.

ly/3eMazEs >

<https://politi.co/2SQswtf > See also Gomes.

42 Susi Dennison–Lívia Franco: Presidência de crise: como

29 Philippe Le Corre: Chinese Investments in European

a liderança portuguesa pode guiar a UE na era pós-covid.

Countries: Experiences and Lessons for the “Belt and Road”

European Council on Foreign Relations. 27 October 2020.

Initiative. In: Rethinking the Silk Road. China’s Belt and Road

<https://bit.ly/2RpUHyu >

Initiative and Emerging Eurasian Relations, edited by

43 Lívia Franco: Edge of the Atlantic: Portugal’s presidency

Maximilian Mayer. Palgrave Macmillan, [s.l.], 2018. 169. See

of the EU Council. European Council on Foreign Relations. 26

also Hugo Neutel: Banca, energia, seguros e aviação: os

February 2021. <https://bit.ly/3hvuM33 >

grandes investimentos chineses em Portugal. TSF Rádio

44 Intervenção de António Costa no debate sobre “O futuro

Notícias. 4 December 2018. <https://bit.ly/3w1Zll2 >

da Europa.” Partido Socialista. 14 March 2018. <https://bit.

30 Jochen Faget: Portugal: A China-friendly EU nation driven

ly/3ybKK8J > See also Retomar a convergência, fortalecer a

by need. DW. 12 March 2019. <https://p.dw.com/p/3ErqQ >

Europa. Discurso do Primeiro-Ministro, António Costa, por

31 Porto de Sines pode representar uma nova era na relação

ocasião da abertura do ano académico 2017–2018 do

entre Portugal e China. República Portuguesa, XXI Governo

Colégio da Europa Bruges, 15 de setembro de 2017.

Constitucional. 22 May 2019. <https://bit.ly/3ylw7zN >

República Portuguesa, XXI Governo. 15 September 2017.

32 Margarida Cardoso: Concessão do Porto de Sines

<https://bit.ly/3uO2bdf >

apanhada na guerra comercial EUA–China. Expresso. 21

45 Jorge Valero: Portuguese presidency wants to strengthen

September 2019. <https://bit.ly/3eLTElm >

trust in EU social model. EURACTIV. 1 December 2020.

33 Os 17 acordos bilaterais entre Portugal e a China com

<https://bit.ly/33KUtVp > See also Dennison–Franco.

destaque para cooperação económica. Observador. 5

46 Franco.

December 2018. <https://bit.ly/3fhl9Cx > 34 Peter Wise: Lisbon rebuffs claims Portugal is China’s 92

POLITICS

SPAIN IS BACK—AGAIN Cameron Vaské On 13 January 2020, Arancha González Laya boldly declared in her first, albeit brief, speech as Spain’s new foreign minister, “Spain is back, Spain is here to stay.”1 The statement, relayed in English, was a signal to Spain’s partners that Madrid was ready to return its attention to the global stage and to assume a more proactive foreign policy both within Europe and further abroad. More than merely ceremonial pontification, Foreign Minister González Laya’s statement is as much an affirmation of Spain’s ambition to play a pivotal role within Europe as it is a reflection of the seemingly never-ending domestic political quagmire which continues to hold it back. INTRODUCTION Despite joining the European Communities more than a quarter century after their inception, Spain remains one of the most ardently proEuropean countries in the European Union (EU). In the 2019 European Parliament election— which was then seen as a potential turning point for Eurosceptics across Europe—Spaniards heavily backed pro-European political parties. 2 The current government, headed by Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez of the pro-EU Partido Socialista de Obreros Españoles (Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party, PSOE), has been a vocal advocate of European integration efforts across some of Europe’s most challenging issues, most recently proposing collectiveaction reforms to EU migration policies3 and COVID-19 response–funding measures.4 Boasting the fifth-largest population and the fourth-largest economy in the European Union, Spain would seem to have the political support, economic weight, and courageous leadership to play a pivotal role in EU policy making. However, Spain today finds itself present within a Europe unable to overcome the multilaterally fractured nature of internal

EU politics. Criss-crossing and overlapping political fault lines drawn over the course of the 2009–2014 European debt crisis, the European migrant crisis starting in 2014, and, most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic solidified in the face of seemingly irreconcilable differences over the depth and speed at which Europe pursues an “ever-closer union.” From the political chaos that followed each of these crises, non-traditional and populist parties have arisen to challenge the domestic political establishment, capitalising in equal measure on popular disillusion, fear, and uncertainty and on renewed hope, shared adversity, and a deepseated desire for change. The result is a Europe of layers—local, national, pan-European, and global—each dependent upon the stability of the layer that precedes it. When local politics remains incoherent and disruptive for an extended period of time, it tends to have an escalatory, destabilising effect on national politics. In the same vein, when national politics continues to be unstable, it undermines regional cohesion, and so forth. This is particularly evident in the modern era, where widespread access to all kinds of media permeates the political environment, accelerating both the speed at which political discourse takes place and the spread of misinformation. Each of the foregoing is a factor which serves to demand the attention of elected and appointed officials, diminishing the time, and, therefore, the capacity to dedicate themselves to governance and public policy.5 A FRACTURED SPAIN The paralysing effects produced on national policy making when the above patterns converge is perhaps nowhere more evident than in Spain. Since the foundation of Ciudadanos (Citizens) 6 in 2006—the first of what are POLITICS

Arancha González Laya, the foreign minister of Spain

now three major, nationally competitive nonestablishment parties in Spain—local political movements, events, and fragmentation have had an outsized effect on the stability of the Spanish central government in La Moncloa. Today, Spain is split across five major political parties: the senior and junior governing coalition partners, i.e., the establishment-left PSOE and the far-left Podemos (We Can), which form a minority government, and the centre-right Ciudadanos (Citizens–Party of the Citizenry, C’s), the establishment-right Partido Popular (Popular Party, PP), and the far-right Vox (from the Latin “voice”) in their opposition. To some, the development of new parties beyond the traditional PSOE–PP tandem in Spain may appear a healthy adjustment that, having broken the binary choice pattern, fosters greater diversity of public opinion and governing coalitions. This is valid, but only to a point. It is true that the development of multiple parties has greatly diversified the Spanish political landscape and broken the dominance of the two establishment parties, but it has come at a cost. Spain’s multiparty parliamentary model would seem to hope that parties gain the favour of voters who most agree with them on the basis of their ideas and, therefore, expand 94

POLITICS

their representation in regional and national parliaments with each election. In the era of memes and social media, that complex has broken down. Each of the five parties now jostles with the others, as much through online political smear campaigns as through traditional debasing. In a bid to expand their voter share, parties continually undermine and discredit one another around election cycles to expand their political clout at regional and national levels.7 It is an effective campaign strategy, but one which has repeatedly left the victorious party unable to form a coalition following the harsh rhetoric, red lines, and public smearing born out of the campaign, to say nothing of genuine differences in policy making. This stands in contrast to two-party systems, which are relatively stable, as only one victor will arise with a majority in parliament, and, therefore, the mandate to govern. In Spain’s present parliamentary system, however, a coalition must be formed to credibly govern across a majority. This reality played out vividly in 2019, as two back-toback elections produced no politically viable majority coalitions through which a government can be formed, marking four elections in four years which failed to accomplish the same.8 Despite significant electoral gains from PSOE after Pedro Sánchez’s successful ouster of former PP prime minister Mariano Rajoy in 2018, the PSOE and Podemos now run a complex minority government, which relies on the support of regional independentist parties.9 More recently, as part of its ongoing campaign to displace PP as the primary centre-right party, Ciudadanos joined with the PSOE to pass a motion of no confidence in a PP government in Murcia. The move unleashed a chain reaction of counter-responses which brought down the PP–Ciudadanos coalition governments of Andalusia and Castilla y León, prompting the regional premier in Madrid to boot her Ciudadanos partners out as well, and call for snap elections to prevent the same. The open seat in Madrid and an uneasy partnership with Sánchez’ government led Deputy Prime Minister Pablo Iglesias (now former head of Podemos)

to leave the national government to run in the hotly contested snap elections. Worse, the elections which took place on 8 May have become a frenzied centre-stage battleground of Spain’s ongoing culture wars over questions of Catalonian independence, the response to COVID-19, and a litany of other issues.10 The individual and combined forces of these dynamics have a crippling effect on Spain’s capacity and credibility to maintain steady and reliable dialogue at a European level. Volatile local and regional politics frequently escalates to a national level, as it distracts Spanish leaders from their foreign policy initiatives, degrades their domestic political support to retain office and carry out such initiatives, and, ultimately, erodes their credibility to bargain on behalf of Spain within the European Union. A SLEEPING GIANT’S AMBITION Since the onset of the 2009-2014 European debt crisis, Madrid has largely remained a proEU follower in EU policy making and debate, rising to speak first only when the issues most directly impacted the Spanish economy. It is rather because of the incessant volatility which now constantly besets Spanish domestic politics that Foreign Minister González Laya declared that “Spain is back,” and “Spain is here to stay.” Her statement was intended not only to signal the Sánchez administration’s intention to exercise Spain’s weight in foreign policy but as a reassurance to its European partners that Spain will remain engaged well into the future. The ambition of González Laya, and that of the Sánchez administration as a whole, is to rise above the domestic political fray and begin the long-term process of developing Spain’s capacity to serve as a conduit for European integration and policy making. In a friendly interview in March, the foreign minister reiterated her inaugural statement, articulating that, “after the 2008 economic crisis, Spain went into a phase of introspection” but that, now, “[t]he 2008 crisis is behind [the country,] and we want [Spain] to be fully associated with foreign policy and with action around the world.”11

The thirty-minute interview shed considerable light on how Spain believes it can exercise itself on the European stage. Speaking in direct terms, the foreign minister argued that Spain must not content itself with “letting others shape [the European Union] and following, but [Spain] has to have the ambition of shaping European integration.” She then proceeded to envision Madrid as a major partner in dialogue across Europe, arguing that Spain should earnestly seek to build bridges with Northern European and Eastern European countries, adopting a “nodal role in creating consensus in the European Union.”12 Further underscoring this point, González Laya likened the FrancoGerman alliance, which most often powers major European initiatives, to the “big heart that beats for European integration”, affirming, “[t] his is good and [Spain] want[s] to be part of this heart that beats for Europe—but, today, this is not enough.”13 The Spanish foreign minister’s rhetoric confirms that Spain sees itself as a “potentially” invaluable keystone in European policy making—a southern “artery” which guides the lifeblood of European integration pumped by the “big heart” of the Franco-German alliance across Europe. Indeed, in a Europe which finds itself in cardiac arrest over questions of migration, economic reform, and over how exactly the EU should pursue its global agenda, the presence of an influential, economically potent, and staunchly pro-EU orchestrator of

Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez during the European Parliament debate on the future of Europe in 2019 POLITICS

THE FRACTURED SPANISH CONGRESS OF DEPUTIES AND SENATE Political parties in Spain in the XIV legislature Aragonese Party (Partido Aragonés, PAR) Asturias Forum (Foro Asturias, FAC) Basque Country Gather (Euskal Herria Bildu, EH Bildu) Basque Nationalist Party (Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea, EAJ/Partido Nacionalista Vasco, PNV) Canarian Coalition (Coalición Canaria, CC) Catalan European Democratic Party (Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català, PDeCAT) Citizens (Ciudadanos, Cs) Galicia en Común (“Galicia in Common”) Galician Nationalist Bloc (Bloque Nacionalista Galego, BNG) Geroa Bai (GBai, “Yes to the Future”) Gomera Socialist Group (Agrupación Socialista Gomera, ASG) Más Madrid (MM, “More Madrid") Más País (MP, “More Country”) Més Compromís (MC, “More Commitment”) Més per Mallorca (Més, “More for Majorca”) Navarrese People's Union (Unión del Pueblo Navarro, UPN) New Canaries (Nueva Canarias, NCa) People’s Party (Partido Popular, PP) Popular Unity Candidacy (Candidatura d'Unitat Popular, CUP) Regionalist Party of Cantabria (Partido Regionalista de Cantabria, PRC) Republican Left of Catalonia–Sovereigntists (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya–Sobiranistes, ERC–Sobiranistes) Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE) Teruel Exists (Teruel Existe, TE) Together for Catalonia (Junts per Catalunya, Junts) Unidas Podemos coalition (UP, “United We Can”): Podemos (“We can”), En Comú Podem (ECP, “In Common We Can”), United Left (Izquierda Unida, IU) Vox

POLITICS

Composition and disposition of the Congress of Deputies of Spain in the XIV legislature in February 2020 Government:155 seats PSOE: 120 seats UP: 35 seats Supported by: 34 seats ERC–Sobiranistes: 13 seats EAJ/PNV: 6 seats EH Bildu: 5 seats Plural group (PDeCAT, MP, MC): 7 seats Mixed group (NCa, TE, PRC): 3 seats

Opposition: 161 seats PP: 88 seats Vox: 52 seats

350

Cs: 10 seats Plural group (Junts, BNG): 5 seats Mixed group (CUP, UPN, CC, FAC): 6 seats Ministers without seat Empty seats

Composition and disposition of the Spanish Senate in the XIV legislature in February 2020 Government: 115 seats PSOE: 113 seats Confederal Left group (UP): 2 seats Supported by: 34 seats ERC and EH Bildu: 15 seats EAJ/PNV: 10 seats Confederal Left group (Compromís, MM, MÉS, GBai, ASG): 5 seats Mixed group (TE, PRC, PAR): 4 seats

265

Opposition: 116 seats PP: 97 seats Cs: 9 seats Nationalist group (Junts, CC): 6 seats Mixed group (Vox, UPN): 4 seats POLITICS

Chart 1: Spain’s GDP between 2000 and 2020 (billion USD) 1,800 1,600 1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 0

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

200

Spain’s GDP during the last two decades in current USD—the pandemic’s impact was massive

European discourse outside the Brussels– Paris–Berlin circuit is sorely needed.14 To leverage its full weight within the EU, Spain seeks to elevate its status in other European capitals to the level of a partner of first resort on par with France and Germany, effectively crafting its own space in the “inner circle” with broad support from outside the Brussels bubble. The Sánchez government is well aware of this, evidenced by González Laya’s reiteration that “eastern European countries have to feel the same affinity to the southern neighbourhood that Spain feels to the [e]astern neighbourhood.” 15 Yet, for as much as Spain is newly ambitious in rhetoric, it is lacking in substance. According to the European Council on Foreign Relation’s EU Coalition Explorer (based on comprehensive surveys of leaders, policy makers, and experts from EU member states), Spain ranks first among countries punching below their weight in the European Union, eighth among the most contacted nations, and tenth among the most responsive. 16 Even on migration and fiscal policy, where Spain has already taken some initiative in dialogue over reform, it barely registers on the radar of northern and eastern member states. To accomplish its goal, the country must first overcome three major challenges: the present lack of preference for Spain being a leading partner in European policy making, the blocbased fragmentation of interstate European 98

POLITICS

policy priorities, and its domestic political instability. Without successfully addressing any of these challenges, Spain cannot realise its ambitions on the European stage and will continue to punch below its weight. IS SPAIN TRULY BACK?—AN OUTLOOK IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT Despite the anticipation that a post-COVID EU is nigh—prompted by the arrival of widespread vaccination campaigns—Spain is squarely in the midst of crisis as the fourth wave of coronavirus cases hits the country.17 When Spain exits the era of COVID-19, it will undoubtedly continue to grapple with staggering unemployment, which sits at 16.13%—a level not seen since 2016. 18 The country suffered severe economic pain over the course of 2020 after foreign tourism, upon which much of the economy relies, had come to a standstill. Official data shows that the Spanish economy contracted a full 10.8% in 2020, and indicators for when its recovery would come were still mixed in the first quarter of 2021.19 Despite the Sánchez administrations’ earnest pleas to the contrary, Madrid will necessarily require a great deal of time and political bandwidth to, once again, tend to the restoration of an economy beset by public debt and unemployment. The dire economic situation will undoubtedly severely limit its capacity to pursue policies which require the sustained expenditure of precious time and political capital to pursue

Pablo Iglesias, second deputy prime minister of Spain between January 2020 and March 2021

European integration projects or expand upon its foreign policy ambitions. Moreover, the results of the Madrid regional elections and the political miasma that surrounds them may have profound impacts on not only the direction of the Spanish economic reform but also on the composition of its national and regional governments. The forecast remains hidden beneath a fog of political uncertainty from which any number of figures could emerge as a victor. If Spain achieves a rapid recovery—hastened perhaps by a surge in the recovery and development of the manufacturing sector20— it stands a better chance of returning to a more proactive policy of engagement with its partners across Southern Europe and beyond for the advancement of reforms in migration and collective fiscal policy. Nonetheless, for the time being, Spain will remain a sleeping giant.

9 Diego Torres: Spain’s Rajoy ousted in no-confidence vote. Politico. 1 June 2018. <https://politi.co/3wCnr6r > 10 Jennifer O’Mahony: Spain’s Post-Lockdown Culture War Has Only Just Begun. Foreign Policy. 11 June 2020. <https://bit.ly/3hJeLa7 > 11 José Ignacio Torreblanca:“Spain is back”: An interview with Arancha González Laya. European Council on Foreign Relations. 9 March 2021. <https://bit.ly/3hKZRjE > 12 Ibidem. 13 Ibidem. 14 Paula Lamoso: La Unión Europea, actor diplomático supraestatal. Política Exterior. 1 November 2020. <https:// bit.ly/3wnl9HT > 15 “Spain is back”: An interview with Arancha González Laya. 16 Claire Busse [et al.]: EU Coalition Explorer. European Council on Foreign Relations. 8 July 2020. <https://bit. ly/2Td5TPT > 17 Emilio Sánchez Hidalgo: Fourth coronavirus wave continues to grow in Spain. El País. 9 April 2021. <https://bit. ly/3fBQmAv > 18 Fernando Heller: Spain records over 4 million unem-

ENDNOTES

ployed for first time since 2016. EURACTIV. 3 March 2021.

1 Lucía Abellán: Exteriores se renueva con el equipo con

<https://bit.ly/3bFfrJJ >

mayor presencia de mujeres en su cúpula. El País. 3

19 Consumption in Spain. FocusEconomics. <https://bit.

February 2020. <https://bit.ly/2ScXLOP >

ly/3hKLH1F > Accessed: 11 April 2021.

2 Lucía Abellán: Socialist Party wins the European elections

20 Massimo Bassetti: Spain: Composite PMI moves to ex-

in Spain. El País. 27 May 2019. <https://bit.ly/3u8Lfx5 >

pansionary terrain in March for first time in eight months.

3 Shoshana Fine – José Ignacio Torreblanca: Border

FocusEconomics. 7 April 2021. <https://bit.ly/3bGvzdJ >

games: Has Spain found an answer to the populist challenge on migration? European Council on Foreign Relations. 3 September 2019. <https://bit.ly/3vcZ3Ie > 4 Susi Dennison: Spain goes Eisenhower: Coronavirus, cohesion, and the return of MFF talks. European Council on Foreign Relations. 23 April 2020. <https://bit.ly/3v8lyhl > 5 Filippo Menczer–Thomas Hills: Information Overload Helps Fake News Spread, and Social Media Knows It. Scientific American. 1 December 2020. <https://bit. ly/341PMGH > 6 Albert Rivera, elegido presidente del nuevo partido político Ciutadans-Partit de la Ciutadania. La Vanguardia. 10 July 2006. <https://bit.ly/3vesOIw > 7 Fernando Peinado: Spain’s social media provocateurs gear up for digital war ahead of Madrid election. El País. 25 March 2021. <https://bit.ly/3469OQG > 8 Carlos Delclós: Spain has a democratic problem – the people have outgrown its political system. The Guardian. 26 September 2019. <https://bit.ly/3ywMPMi > POLITICS

RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN SOUTHERN EUROPE Anton Bendarzsevszkij In the last years, alarm bells have started to ring among Western organisations: Russia is gaining influence in Southern Europe—mostly in the Balkans—challenging European values, leading massive disinformation campaigns, and destabilising the political situation in the countries in question. These worries are partly true: in the last fifteen years, Russia has tightened its grip on the region, successfully infiltrating the Balkans through large-scale investments and the energy sector and by using the toolkit of soft power and political ties. On the other hand, Russia has faced a series of failures in Southern Europe in the last years: recent NATO enlargements and the ongoing Eurointegration process in the region significantly reduced its room for manoeuvre. Moscow cannot compete with the European Union (EU) and NATO in terms of financial opportunities and security, while the Balkans, especially, are a ground of high competition among regional and great powers. Thus, the main strategies of Russia currently consist of preventing the further expansion of NATO and slowing down the region’s accession to the European Union. STRATEGIC INTERESTS Traditionally, Russia maintains good relations with Italy; still, in Southern Europe, the main area of Russia’s interests is the Balkans. It is an important region, based on numerous strategic, geopolitical, cultural, and economic reasons. Strategically, it connects the Black Sea with the Mediterranean region, while its geopolitical importance consists of its access to the Adriatic Sea (the Soviet Union once had an access to this arm of the Mediterranean Sea through a military port in Albania, but it was lost in the 1960s). It is also a meeting point between Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Recently, the region has also been playing a role as the transit area of trade and energy flows, a characteristic which becomes more important 100

POLITICS

than ever due to the increasing role of the Gulf states and the global project of China, called the Belt and Road initiative. For Moscow, the Balkans also have a cultural and ethnic role because of the historical ties between Russia and the region and also because of the large Slavic population living there and the influence the Orthodox Church has on most of their countries. The stakes are high for reasons of defence: in the last years, the expansion of the NATO has accelerated, and, now, there are only two countries left in the region which are not (yet) part of the military block: Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter: Bosnia). In the meantime, Russia tries hard to prevent, or at least to slow down, the expansion of the block. The Balkans are also a problematic region: the issues of migration flows, drug trafficking, and organised crime cause headaches not only for Russia but even more for the European Union. Russia would probably be happy to have the area as a buffer zone, and, currently, it is de facto operating as such for the EU, as well. However, we can also conclude that Russia plays only a secondary role in Southern Europe, trying to keep (and, if possible, to improve) its positions on the energy market, and in some other sectors of the local economy, by building on the cultural and religious ties of the past and by slowing down the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Balkans. For Russia, the region is also secondary, coming after the post-Soviet countries. Its room for manoeuvre in Southern Europe is limited, and the region can mostly be considered as an arena of Russian power projection. THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN SOUTHERN EUROPE In the Balkans, Serbia can be considered the main outpost of Russian positions, from where it embarks on expansion in the region. Belgrade

has been called a “key partner” in South East Europe by Russian leaders several times.1 Russia is generally viewed as favourable in the Balkans, as the region has not had any negative historical experience with the country. This is a solid base for Moscow, which it tries to exploit. To reach its goals, Russia has been using a mix of financial incentives and investments, the influence of its media outlets, and an arsenal of soft power. Serbia and Russia have signed a free trade agreement in 2000, which was “upgraded” to include the other four countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in 2019. Thus, Serbia is currently the only country in Europe which has full access to the markets of the EEU under favourable conditions. Since 2008, the two countries have mutually introduced a visa-free travel regime. Serbia is also the biggest importer

of Russian military equipment in the Balkans and maintains strong military cooperation with Moscow. Since 2015, Serbia has been taking part in the annual Russian military exercise called Slavic Brotherhood together with Belarus. Last year, however, the country cancelled its participation due to strong pressure from the European Union.2 In 2016, Russia and Serbia signed a military– technical assistance agreement, and, in October 2020, Belgrade announced that it would open the local office of the Russian Ministry of Defence, which had been unprecedented in the region.3 The Serbian–Russian defence cooperation is easy to explain: the Balkan country’s population generally has negative attitudes to NATO, following the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 and, due to the issue concerning Kosovo’s status,

Map of the Orthodox Church in Europe based on censuses between 2009 and 2020

<1 1–5% 5–20% 20–50% 50–80% >80

POLITICS

101

which, even today, remains a sensitive political question. Russia opposed both the bombing and the separation of Kosovo, and, currently, Moscow is perceived as the only global player which can guarantee Serbia’s security. It is also true for securing energy supplies. In 2008, the Russian state-owned Gazprom Neft purchased over 56% of the shares of the biggest Serbian oil and gas company, Naftna Industrija Srbije, for USD 450 million,4 and it is in Russian ownership even today. Gazprom Neft has actively been expanding in the region, building and buying gas stations and storage facilities, gaining drilling and exploratory rights, and opening representative offices in Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia. In 2007, Russian Zarubezhneft also purchased the two oil refineries of Bosnia, located in the cities of Brod and Modriča.5 Russia is currently present in many key sectors of the Balkans: their energy sector, as mentioned above, financial sector (through Volksbank operating in the region and acquired by Sberbank in 2012), metallurgy, infrastructure, and real estate—in Montenegro, e.g., onethird of the country’s GDP comes from Russian investments in real estate.6 In 2013, Serbia received a USD 800 million Russian credit for expanding its railway infrastructure,7 while Russian investments in Republica Srpska made Russia the fifth-largest investor in Bosnia.8 In some cases, Moscow has shown its teeth: a group of Russian Cossacks appeared in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska in 2014, just a few days before an important election, making a close parallel with the Russian forces’ appearing in Crimea in February 2014. The other example is the unsuccessful coup in Montenegro in 2016, which involved Serbian and Russian nationals and was probably organised by the Russian foreign military intelligence agency, GRU. Soft Power Since the beginning of the 2000s, Russia has gradually returned to the Balkans, expanding its influence through elements of soft power. This strategy was based on cultural ties, Russian NGOs, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the activities of Russian business magnates. 102

POLITICS

As part of the Russian soft-power toolbox, the Russkiy Mir Foundation was established in 2007 in order to promote the Russian language worldwide, especially in the post-Soviet countries and in Moscow’s zone of influence. In Serbia and Montenegro, the organisation began to popularise the Russian language, and new cultural centres were opened in Novi Sad, Serbia, at Belgrade University, and at the University of Montenegro.9 Russia sponsored the renovation of local monuments, while Russian NGOs organised a series of conferences and events in the Balkans, such as the Balkan Dialogue conference convened by the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund. Russian companies operating in these countries also sponsor local schools, football teams, and other sports associations. In 2012, the Russian–Serbian Humanitarian Center was opened in Niš, with the task of offering humanitarian aid and help in case there are natural disasters or fire and of supporting regional activities in removing explosives left behind after the NATO bombings. The centre also operates in the broader region outside Serbian borders.10 It is also important to note the influence of Russian business magnates, such as Ivan Savvidis (who has significant relations with the Greek right wing) or Konstantin Malofeev. The latter businessman promotes pan-Orthodox ideologies through its think tank, named Katehon and the Tsargrad TV. He is currently under EU sanctions, and he was also supposedly involved in planning the 2016 coup in Montenegro.11 Russian Disinformation Russia is considered to be the leading source of misinformation in the region: in December 2020, NATO accused Russia of running a malignant, anti-EU and anti-NATO disinformation campaign in the Balkans, mostly in Serbia, Bosnia, and Montenegro, which demonised the US and NATO and presented the EU as weak and divided.12 The misinformation was spread through Russian media (mainly the news agency called Sputnik), the Russian Orthodox Church, and Russian business magnates.13

Moscow’s narrative about the Balkans shared by Russian media outlets and experts can be summarised as follows: The United States and the West left huge destruction in the region after their intervention. Russia helped the restoration with its investments (mainly in Serbia and Republika Srpska). Slavs living in the Balkans are “Russian brothers,” tied to Moscow with their deep cultural, ethnic, and religious roots. Moscow also emphasised that, although European integration seemed the only viable option for these countries up until 2008, it has not any more been unequivocal since the global economic crisis. Therefore, as the Russian narrative goes on, these countries should think about other alternatives and consider joining the Eurasian Economic Union, launched by Russia in 2015. These narratives are sown into fertile ground: many can feel that their economic situation has not improved in the last decades after the devastating war and Western countries left people out in the cold. Russia, however, is now giving them a hand in exchange for their loyalty. Russian news agencies, in many cases, provide their content to these countries for free, which gives a huge incentive for the local media outlets to use content provided by Moscow. Research done by the National Endowment for Democracy found that Russia had used the toolset of disinformation to influence important political decisions in the region.14 In 2018, for example, Macedonia agreed to change its name in order to proceed with its NATO and Chart 1: Top 10 importers of Russian gas in Europe in 2020 (billion m3) 60 57.01 50 40 30 22.10

16.28 15.51 14.07

11.26 10.32 9.73

8.87

8.11

hia

s nd

ec Cz

rla

lan Po

the Ne

ar ng Hu

Fra n

Tu rk

ly It a

s tr Au

EU accession blocked by Greece. National referendum was called for 30 September 2018 to support the decision, and the time preceding the referendum was marked by a massive boycott campaign supported by Macedonian opposition groups and Russian sources. A large amount of new Facebook pages and Twitter accounts emerged to support the boycott against the referendum. They distributed false information about the West, spreading rumours about police violence, connecting NATO with fascists, portraying German chancellor Angela Merkel with a Hitler-style moustache, and claiming that all the former are the moral enemies of the Orthodox Christian Slavic people.15 As a result, only 37% of the population participated in the referendum. Nevertheless, the Macedonian parliament voted for the name change in February 2019. The situation looks paradoxical: while Russia is generally interested in stabilising the region and stopping drug trafficking and organised crime, regional instability can also slow the Balkans’ Euro-Atlantic integration and divide political actors, which help Moscow keep its influence. Italy Italy is a different story. The country is one of Russia’s closest partners in Europe, as claimed by the Kremlin. Currently, Italy remains among the country’s top trading partners, and it is the second-biggest importer of Russian gas. Besides, the two countries have a very long relationship. During the Cold War, Italy managed to maintain pragmatic economic relations with the Soviet Union, supplying it with Western technology (the Russian car Zhiguli was made under the license by Italian Fiat, granted in 1966). In 1969, Italy became the first Western country to sign a long-term contract for natural gas with the Soviet Union. In 1994, Silvio Berlusconi, Italy’s prime minister at the time, suggested inviting Russia to G7 meetings—this format, thus, later evolved into G8. Berlusconi returned to power between 2001 and 2006 and 2008 and 2011 while he also became a close friend to Russian president Vladimir Putin. Berlusconi was often called “Putin’s ambassador” in Europe, mediating between the West and POLITICS

103

51%

14%

30% 10%

63% 29%

40% 20%

85%

87% 64%

75%

68%

58%

64%

84%

87% 70% 56%

52%

48%

60% 50%

49%

70%

60%

65%

80%

74%

90%

80%

94%

100%

91%

Chart 2: The Balkan states’ favourable opinion about third states in 2020

Kosovo

Bosnia and Herzegovina

North Macedonia

Montenegro

Serbia

 Russia  USA  Germany  China  Turkey Russia even after the two politicians’ relations started to deteriorate. Before the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014, Italy was Russia’s third-largest trade partner in the European Union, and fourth-largest worldwide, generating USD 53.9 billion trade flow in 201316. However, mutual trade decreased by 35% in 2014 after European sanctions against Russia and Russian counter-sanctions, while the number of Russian tourists coming to Italy reduced by 50% after 2015. Because of these figures, Italy has become the main advocate against European sanctions in the last years. In the meantime, Vladimir Putin visited the country in 2015 and 2019, and former prime minister Silvio Berlusconi even went to the occupied Crimea in 2015 (being the only high-ranking European politician to visit Crimea after the Russian annexation). At the same time, with 22.1 billion cubic metres of gas purchased from Gazprom in 2019, Italy remains the second-biggest importer of Russian natural gas in the world.17 New Opportunities Emerged in 2020 The COVID-19 pandemic gave another boost to Russian geopolitical efforts. While the European Union and the US were busy seeing to their own problems, Moscow offered immediate support: Russian military medicals were sent to help Italy, while the country provided medical equipment, masks, and sanitisers to Italy and the Balkans. 104

POLITICS

After the August 2020 approval of the Russian Sputnik V vaccine against COVID-19, Russian soft power marked by vaccine diplomacy reached new levels. Serbia was the fourth country that approved the Russian vaccine in December 2020 and started vaccination with Sputnik V already on 5 January 2021. Other Balkan countries followed suit: the Russian vaccine was officially approved in Republika Srpska (Bosnia) in February 2021, in Montenegro in February 2021, and in North Macedonia in March 2021. Italy announced its plans to produce Sputnik V from summer 2021,18 while, on 5 April, Serbia signed a deal with Russia to start the production of the vaccine already in May 2021.19 CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF RUSSIAN PRESENCE IN SOUTHERN EUROPE Despite Moscow’s efforts in the last two decades to extend, or at least maintain, influence in Southern Europe, especially in the Balkans, the Russians failed in many ways. Their influence has been shrinking, and, even if Moscow may have slowed down the Euro-Atlantic integration of the region a bit, it could not prevent it. At the same time, there is a major power rivalry in the region, and Russia has been losing ground not only to the EU or the US but to China, Turkey, and the Gulf states as well. Soft-power efforts by Moscow have not produced significant results either: opinion polls conducted in the Balkans about foreign relations

at the beginning of 2020 show that Russia is losing everywhere except for Serbia. One of the reasons of its failure in the Balkans is to be found in its too direct and tough actions— disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining central power, support for local forces opposing the respected countries’ EU accession might have gained some popularity among local population but alienated the region’s political elites. The allegedly Russian-backed coup attempt in Montenegro in 2016 was a case when alarm bells particularly started to ring among local political elites. The occupation of Crimea in 2014 and the support of pro-Russian separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine marked another failure of Moscow’s geopolitical efforts. Before 2014,

many leaders in the Balkans had tried to carefully balance between Russia and the West, but Moscow’s actions in Ukraine made it practically impossible.20 The Orthodox Church, one of the main backbones of Russia in the Balkans, has also suffered a major failure in the region: in October 2018, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople granted autocephaly (independence) to the Eastern Orthodox Church in Ukraine. Moscow heavily criticised the decision, attacking the patriarchate. Orthodox Churches in the Balkans were caught in the middle, but, in the long run, this split will weaken the positions of the Russian Orthodox Church in the region. Energy has been the primary toolkit of Moscow in Europe, but Russia has also faced fiascos in

NATO enlargement after 2004

2017 2009

Before 2004 After 2004

2009 2020

2009: year of accession

POLITICS

105

this field: the South Stream project backed by Russia which was met with strong resistance from the EU was finally cancelled in 2014. The Turkish Stream, intended to replace the South Stream, was completed in 2020, but it faces competition now, mainly from the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which was also commissioned in 2020 and brings natural gas to Southern Europe from Azerbaijan, and from the LNG terminal on the island of Krk, Croatia, which started operation in January 2021.21 The latter will feed Qatari gas to the Croatian network, which is connected with Italian, Slovenian, Hungarian, Serbian, and Montenegrin networks.22 Strategically, if Russia’s goal in the Balkans was to prevent NATO enlargement, it also failed: Albania and Croatia entered the organisation in 2009, Montenegro joined in 2017, and North Macedonia in March 2020, which has so far been the last member admitted. There are only two countries in Southern Europe which are not part of NATO now: Bosnia and Serbia. In September 2020, President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić travelled to Washington to sign the agreements on economic normalisation with Kosovo. The deal was needed for the country to proceed on its road to European integration, but it also puts Moscow in a difficult situation: when Serbia joins the European Union (and that moment is getting closer and closer), the freetrade and visa-free agreements between the countries will be gone, just as their close military cooperation. As a result, Russia will lose its closest ally in the region, and it cannot prevent that from happening. At the same time, Serbia is improving its relations with the US and trying to balance between Russia and the West. In 2016, NATO forces were also granted diplomatic immunity and freedom of movement, something which has long been requested by the Russian humanitarian forces in Niš but has never been granted.23

2 Slavic Brotherhood Joint Drills Overshadowed by a Crisis.

Warsaw Institute. 15 September 2020. <https://bit. ly/2RI5dla >

3 Россия зайдет на Балканы по-сербски. Сергей Лавров отправляется в балканское турне. Коммерсантъ. 26 October 2020. <https://bit.ly/3bTYOtO >

4 Paul Stronski–Annie Himes: Russia’s Game in the Balkans. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 6 February 2020. <https://bit.ly/2RNGueY > 5 Stronski–Himes.

6 Данила Гальперович: Вмешательство России на

Балканах: стратегия и тактика. Голос Америки. 23 January 2020. <https://bit.ly/3hWTvh3 >

7 Мария Максакова: Возвращение России на Балканы. Обозреватель–Observer. 2014/9. 50–63. 8 Stronski–Himes.

9 Дмитрий Сурков: Мягкая сила России на Балканах.

Rethinking Russia. 18 November 2016. <https://bit. ly/3mAoG24 >

10 Кириллова.

11 Stronski–Himes.

12 НАТО обвинило РФ в дезинформационных кампаниях

на Балканах. Интерфакс. 21 December 2020. <https://bit. ly/3iaLDJ9 >

13 Samuel Woolley–Katie Joseff: Demand for Deceit. How the Way We Think Drives Disinformation. National Endowment for Democracy. 8 January 2020. <https://bit.ly/3fRQqw3 > 14 Woolley–Joseff. 15 Woolley–Joseff.

16 Data from Federal State Statistics Service of Russia

(ROSSTAT).

17 Статистика поставок. Динамика реализации газа в

Европу. Газпром экспорт. <https://bit.ly/3i2qeSc > Accessed: 8 April 2021.

18 COVID vaccine: Italy to be first EU country to make Russian

Sputnik V jab. Euronews. 9 March 2021. <https://bit. ly/3fRonwN >

19 Serbia signs contract to produce Russian Sputnik V vacci-

ne. N1. 5 April 2021. <https://bit.ly/3c0AvKF >

20 Stronski–Himes.

21 First Croatian LNG terminal officially inaugurated in Krk is-

land. European Commission. 29 January 2021. <https://bit. ly/2SJleHC >

22 Krk LNG Terminal. Global Energy Monitor Wiki <https://bit.

ENDNOTES

ly/3pduu2U > Accessed: 14 April 2021.

на Балканах? Rahvusvaheline Kaitseuuringute Keskus. 5

NATO and Russia a Struggle. BalkanInsight. 14 March 2016.

1 Ксения Кириллова: Снижается ли влияние России February 2021. <https://bit.ly/3wBNnij > 106

POLITICS

23 Dusica Tomovic–Sasa Dragoljo: Serbia Finds Juggling <https://bit.ly/3p3v3fB >

CHINA AND SOUTHERN EUROPE Zsófia Gulyás–Noémi Szőke–Norbert Miklós China’s rising role in international politics has become a problematic issue for many Western nations during the last decade: the emergence of an Asian nation to become the second-largest country by nominal GDP has certainly caused the US leadership to feel uncomfortable. This unease has also manifested itself in US foreign policies since the beginning of the 2010s, when President Barack Obama launched the “Pivot and Rebalance” (or “Pivot to Asia”) strategy, later to be abandoned by President Donald Trump, who, in turn, introduced his concept called “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” 1 The new president, Joe Biden, has so far seemed to keep a close eye on China, just as his predecessors, as the global race for supremacy has already begun and the divide between Washington and Beijing has been widening. The clash of rhetoric and the fight for political and economic influence keeps on surfacing almost all around the world from the East Asian theatre to the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. A key piece of this jigsaw puzzle is, of course, Europe. As the Central and Eastern European bloc began its closer cooperation with China in the last decade and the Belt and Road Initiative’s construction works broke ground, Europe now finds itself between two superpowers, which are both vying for influence in the continent. One of the most important regions in this competition for influence in Europe is the Mediterranean Sea, as it could play a substantial part during the new era of strategic competition. That is why this article aims to take into account some of the most significant regional nations and how Chinese influence is growing over these countries, traditionally allied to the US. It focusses on three different parts of the Mediterranean: The Iberian Peninsula, Italy, and Greece and shows how Chinese political and economic capital set foot and grew in importance in the region.

ITALY According to historical records, the first diplomatic exchanges between China and Italy took place in ancient times, when the Han Empire and the Roman Empire laid the foundation for what later became known as Sino-Roman relations. In the following centuries and, after the fall of the Roman Empire, Italian merchants, travellers, and missionaries, such as Marco Polo, Giovanni da Montecorvino, and Matteo Ricci, deepened relations through the ancient Silk Road. In modern times, the legal predecessors of contemporary Italy and China gradually developed their political and economic ties, and the Italian Republic and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) finally established formal diplomatic relations on 6 November 1970, almost five years before the European Community recognised the latter. As Italy is one of the founding members of the European Union (EU) and a member of the Group of Seven, which comprises the world’s most advanced economies, the Mediterranean state has been of paramount importance to China over the past fifty-plus years. Until the early 1990s, bilateral relations between the two countries developed dynamically, with Italy and the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI) serving as China’s gateway to the Western world. Although economic ties continued to develop in the following years, diplomatic relations came to a halt when the PCI, which maintained good relations with the Communist Party of China (CPC), split after the fall of the Soviet Union. 2 After more than a decade of no significant progress in the development of bilateral ties, the governments of Italy and China issued a joint communiqué in 2004 to improve Chinese–Italian diplomatic relations. The document underscored the importance of close dialogue on antiterrorism and human POLITICS

107

Trade connection between the Roman and the Han empire Rome

Constantinople

Kashgar Samarkand

Alexandria

Antioch Tyre Ctesiphon

Barbaricon

Duanhuang Hotan

Mathura

Chang’an

Luoyang

Shu Guangzhou

Han empire Roman empire Major trading city Silk Road trade route Other major trade routes

rights and of cooperation between international organisations. Silvio Berlusconi and Wen Jiabao, the then prime ministers of the two countries, agreed to establish a comprehensive strategic partnership for long-term and sustainable relations.3 This mutual understanding provided a solid basis for renewing the two country’s bilateral relations, especially at the beginning of the 21 st century, when disappointments marred the initially promising political and security ties between China and the EU due to excessive expectations of each other. Within the strategic partnership framework, the heads of the two governments decided to set up an inter-ministerial committee, led by the Italian and Chinese ministers of foreign affairs, to boost specific types of cooperation between their states. As this high-level coordination body was the first that China established with a foreign country, it represents a milestone in Sino-European relations, too.4 One of the most significant ordeals of the last almost one and a half decades was the global financial and economic crisis that erupted in 2008, the negative consequences of which were felt for years to come. The Italian economy was hit extremely hard by this downturn. The European sovereign debt crisis, which began in 2009, when several eurozone member states 108

POLITICS

failed to get their sovereign debt under control, plunged the country into severe political turmoil in the early 2010s. Italian economic indicators deteriorated sharply, and the country officially re-entered recession in 2011, despite measures taken to address the crisis. In addition to its long-standing structural weaknesses, Italy’s declining competitiveness and lack of growth became increasingly serious. 5 The economic crisis was exacerbated by intensifying mass immigration as a result of the Libyan civil war. To interpret the Italian–Chinese rapprochement of the 2010s, it is essential to take these circumstances into account.6 After the economic crisis, the first important step in developing bilateral relations was Premier Li Keqiang’s official visit to Italy in the fall of 2014. At the time, two-way trade between the two countries exceeded EUR 60 billion, and the East Asian global power was Italy’s third most important commercial partner ahead of the United States. Italy, however, already had a massive trade deficit with China. The main objective of the diplomatic visit was, above all, to promote mutual investment and to establish trade balance by signing several trade agreements. While in Italy, Li Keqiang also attended the 10 th biennial summit of the Asia–Europe Meeting, held that year in Milan,

where then Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi expressed support for negotiations on a possible future free-trade agreement between Italy and China. The growing Chinese presence in the Mediterranean country is well illustrated by strategic investment in the Italian energy sector realised by companies such as the Shanghai Electric Group and the State Grid Corporation of China realised. One of the key investors in the eight most prominent Italian companies, including Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, is the People’s Bank of China. Italy initiated a business forum in 2015 to smooth the cooperation between Chinese and Italian small and medium-sized enterprises and attract more Chinese foreign direct investment.7 As maritime transport is of the greatest importance for trade between China and the EU, the Chinese COSCO Shipping’s takeover of 67% of the Port of Piraeus was strategic loss from Italy’s point of view. As a result, the trade share of Italy’s largest port, Gioia Tauro, fell by 30% between 2008 and 2015.8 Italians realised that the challenging economic situation of that time was only exacerbated by the underutilisation of their ports and railroads to ship to Central and Eastern Europe, since the country could, thus, not serve as a central hub for trade from China via the so-called 21st-Century Maritime Silkroad.9 The Trump administration’s 2016 withdrawal from the proposed EU–US trade agreement, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership,10 also steered

Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi and Chinese premier Li Kequian in 2014

Italy towards the Belt and Road Initiative, the only global trade and infrastructure initiative connecting Europe and Asia. Moreover, Italian–Chinese trade indicators became increasingly unfavourable to the Mediterranean country in the 2010s. Compared to the period from the early 2000s to 2008— when the volume of trade between the two economies increased by about five times—data for 2009 showed a significant decline in trade figures. Although trade volumes exceeded pre-crisis levels at the beginning of the next decade, the following years were characterised by stagnation. 11 These factors made Italy the only major European economy so far to sign a bilateral memorandum of understanding with China on the BRI, which happened during President Xi Jinping’s official visit to Italy in March 2019. However, Italy’s engagement with the East Asian global power has created distrust among its traditional Western allies. As a result of subsequent US efforts to prevent China from further expanding its influence, joint projects between the two country’s agencies, such as the Italian Space Agency and the China National Space Administration, failed, and Huawei was barred from participating in the deployment of Italy’s 5G network. As far as bilateral relations between Rome and Beijing are concerned, health and economic cooperation during the coronavirus pandemic— and its possible international repercussions—is of historic importance. The spring of last year was a critical time for Italians. Daily new cases and mortality were strikingly high in the country, and the pandemic hit some regions and provinces particularly hard. The most notorious example is probably the province of Bergamo, with more than one million inhabitants, where there were almost 6,000 deaths in March 2020 alone. 12 For China, a contender for the position of the world’s leading superpower, it was an excellent opportunity to demonstrate its crisismanagement skills and reliability. The East Asian country was one of the first to send medical aid to Italy, mainly in the form of doctors, experts, and medical supplies. POLITICS

109

However, a significant part of the international community and the Italian inhabitants saw this assistance as a means of Chinese propaganda disguised as an instrument of solidarity. The term “mask diplomacy” took on a negative connotation after official Chinese government aid was mixed up with poor quality medical equipment offered by Chinese companies in exchange for high profits. However, the proChina narrative about the outbreak, spread, and global management of the pandemic, enforced globally by the CPC through all existing official and informal channels, also played a crucial role in the fact that the term has become widely known in this pejorative sense. Italy and the Italian public have obviously turned into an excellent target for Beijing’s communication efforts to replace the term “Chinese virus” with “Chinese aid.” One of Italy’s biggest news agencies, the state-run ANSA, came to be the main outlet in Italy to diffuse information from the Chinese Xinhua news service thanks to a collaboration agreement signed in 2019. 13 Xinhua, which is taking responsibility for its content referenced by ANSA, is close to the Chinese government and it is considered one of the main tools of propaganda of China in the country. Under these circumstances, Italy is a weak link for the EU because of its deepening economic and diplomatic relations with the East Asian country. The EU interprets China’s growing presence in the Mediterranean country as a serious threat to the unity of its member states. For China, Italy is a strategic base in Europe with a long history and significant cultural heritage in a geostrategically advantageous location. Besides, it represents a sizeable market and welcomes Chinese foreign direct investment, while it is also an excellent promotional tool for the “benevolent superpower” to underline its competence and credibility internationally. Italy, therefore, plays a significant role in China’s efforts to expand its economic and political influence. Although China is a key partner for the Italians, indispensable for their country’s economic development—especially during recessions and crises—it must also be stressed 110

POLITICS

that this relationship is at least as beneficial for China as for Italy, if not more so. THE IBERIAN STATES AND CHINA Portugal Portuguese−Chinese relations have a long and eventful history, which started during the Age of Discovery in the 16th century and continues to impact the varied cooperation between the two states even today. Modern-day connections between them began in 1979, when Portugal established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. In the 1980s and 1990s, their ties were mostly determined by the question of the former Portuguese colony Macau’s status and the process of reuniting the island with China. This period, which concluded in 1999, lacked any major tensions, and the Chinese leadership, to this day, sees it as an example to settle the country’s other, still unresolved, territorial issues. Portuguese–Chinese bilateral economic relations started to develop in the 2000s: in 2005, the two countries signed a treaty on global strategic partnership, which was developed further into a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2010. Their trade relations have also been increasing since the early 2000s. In this framework, decisions were made to sign several cooperation agreements on issues such as culture, tourism, technology, finance, telecommunications, or electric power. The 2007–2009 Great Recession and the ensuing financial crisis had a decisive role in the development of economic relations between Beijing and Lisbon, as it impacted the economy of the Mediterranean states, Portugal among them, particularly heavily and the Portuguese government was happy to welcome Chinese investors who showed increased interest in the country thanks to the decades-long good and balanced political relations between the two states. Consequently, Chinese investment in Portugal has started to increase dynamically from 2010. It mostly consisted of acquisitions during a privatisation process which gained great momentum in the Iberian country

The container port in Sines

following the economic crisis. Until the mid2010s, most purchases were made by Chinese state enterprises, and the proportion of greenfield investments was very low. One of the most ambitious buys was the EUR 2.7 billion acquisition of the state electricity supplier Energias de Portugal, which was followed by other deals in Portuguese strategic sectors, e.g., energy, finance and insurance, and infrastructure. Portugal continues to be an important target for Chinese money in Europe: the country netted EUR 6 billion Chinese investment by 2019, the eighth-biggest sum within the EU. These figures are particularly noteworthy, considering that Portugal’s population is not very large. However, there was a remarkable change in the last two or three years, as, in keeping with wider European trends, Chinese investment increasingly started to come from private rather than state enterprises. China devotes special attention to Portugal for several reasons. One of them is their abovementioned traditionally well-functioning political relations, while another one is the fact that Portugal is a member of the EU, which creates good opportunities for Chinese investors

and entrepreneurs to enter the EU market through the Iberian state. This advantage is very much furthered by a programme called Golden Residence Permit for Investment Activity, launched in 2012, as it enabled foreign nationals, among them many Chinese, to apply for residence permits in exchange for a set amount of capital and/or investment with an abbreviated procedure, allowing them to move freely within Schengen borders. However, China considers Portugal an important partner owing to not only its European connections but also its global ones: through its former colonies, Brazil, Angola, and Mozambique, Portugal plays a middleman-like role in South America and Africa. Even though Portuguese leadership is criticised for both its home and foreign policy allowing too much room for Chinese investors to buy into the country’s strategic and other sensitive sectors by Brussels and Washington alike, it seems that this criticism has not yet succeeded in undermining Portuguese− Chinese relations, and the small Iberian state intends to carry on with the cooperation. This intention is also clear from a memorandum of understanding between the two parties, POLITICS

111

signed at the end of 2018, in which Portugal expressed its desire to cooperate with China in the latter’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Portuguese government has an actual plan for this: they have already started to negotiate the large-scale project of enlarging the Southern Portuguese freight container port of Sines with the Chinese. Besides, Portugal was the first eurozone country to announce that it would also issue the so-called “panda bonds,” denominated in renminbi. Therefore, it seems today that Portuguese−Chinese relations still have a lot of potential. Spain Relations between Spain and China, like those between China and Portugal, have a long history and date back to the Age of Discovery. Spain established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in 1973, and the two countries’ political relations have

The location of Macau within China

MACAU

112

POLITICS

HONG KONG

since been developing in a balanced way, just as they have done in the case of Portugal. No matter what party has ruled the county, Spanish governments have always aimed for good relations with China and have stood behind Chinese interests in European politics, too. After the 1989 events on Tienanmen Square, Spain was the first EU member state whose foreign minister visited China, and the Spanish government has always refrained from taking a stance on political questions sensitive for China, such as the question of Taiwan or Tibet, also suggesting that the EU should lift the embargo on arms trading against China in 2010. The Chinese leadership appreciated the Spanish commitment to maintaining good relations, and, at the beginning of the 2000s, referred to Spain as “China’s greatest European friend. country’s” While their political ties are balanced and good, the two countries’ economic relations are more controversial. Similarly to other EU member states, trade relations between Spain and China have developed dynamically since the early 2000s. The financial crisis, which heavily impacted the Spanish economy, opened the way for Chinese capital. China bought up a significant part of the Spanish national debt and became the country’s second-largest foreign creditor. Chinese investment in Spain started to increase after 2012, but, in keeping with the trend elsewhere in Europe, it mostly consisted of acquisitions instead of greenfield investments. In Spain, the most important target sectors for Chinese investment are real estate, telecommunications, renewable energy (wind and solar), and leisure and tourism—a good example of the latter is when Chinese investors bought a share in the football club Atlético Madrid. Although Chinese investment reached a total of around EUR 4.6 billion by 2019 (which is the ninth-highest amount among the EU member states), it still fell short of Spanish expectations (by comparison, Portugal, whose population is only one-quarter of that of Spain, received EUR 1.4 billion more of Chinese investment). Spain also launched

an investor-visa programme in autumn 2013, which became equally popular among Chinese nationals. Yet another similarity between the two countries is that Spain not only provides access to European markets, but acts as an intermediary through its former colonies, most importantly in Latin America. A remarkable investment was when Sinopec purchased a 40% share in Repsol Brazil, an earlier Spanishowned oil exploration and extraction company, which operates in the biggest Latin American country. Similarly to Portugal, China is also interested in Spain itself because of its excellent location for sea trade. A Chinese shipping company, COSCO Shipping, acquired a 51% share in the freight container ports of Bilbao and Valencia in 2017. The Spanish public often voices strong criticism over Chinese economic activity, and— unlike in Portugal—the Spanish government has in recent years adopted a somewhat more cautious stance towards it because of the imbalances in Chinese−Spanish economic relations. Spain has been considerably more active than its Iberian neighbour in EU negotiations on regulating Chinese investment and trade, as it wanted to create a more advantageous investment and trade climate for the country in its relations with China. Spain did not sign any BRI memorandum of understanding either, since the government claimed it was not clear whether the country’s economy could profit from this cooperation. Chart 1: Chinese investment in Spain between 2005 and March 2020 (gross investment flows, EUR thousands) 400,000 350,000 300,000 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000

2018

2019 2020

2015 2016 2017

2012

2013 2014

2008 2009 2010 2011

2005 2006 2007

50,000

Felipe González and Deng Xiaoping in 1985

Finally, the Spanish prime minister also actively supported the European Commission’s new China strategy in 2019, which identified the Far Eastern country as a challenger to the EU for cutting-edge technology and a systemic rival, promoting an alternative governmental model. Yet, all this meant no sharp turn in Chinese− Spanish relations. Overall, both Iberian countries maintain excellent political relations with China, and both have been important targets for Chinese capital in the last decade. In Spain, there is, however, a certain shift towards policies that intend to represent the country’s economic interests better and put Chinese economic activity in a more critical light. GREECE, CHINA, AND THE PORT OF PIRAEUS The Chinese–Greek bilateral relations have been on a steady rise since 2006, when the two nations upgraded their multilevel cooperation to a strategic partnership. This led to strengthened bilateral cooperation and a series of high-level visits by both countries’ top officials.14 Fitting into this pattern, Greece has in recent years joined the 17 + 1 framework and the Belt and Road Initiative after the Port of Piraeus became a major target for Chinese investment during the last decade. With deepened cooperation, both sides hope for successful synergy that extends into the future. Although the constant enhancement of bilateral ties has certainly produced remarkable results, the increased Chinese presence in the Mediterranean country POLITICS

113

led to retaliation from the US and the EU (albeit only in recent years) and, in some cases, to harsher rhetoric on Greece’s political and economic closeness to the Asian country. But how did improving ties become a problem for the West, and in what ways was the economic cooperation enhanced? To put these questions into perspective, one must first look at the aftermath of the 2007– 2009 global financial crisis, which pushed Greece into a sovereign debt crisis in late 2009. For these reasons, the government had to take certain steps to overcome its EUR 300 billion debt (reaching a debt-to-GDP ratio of 179%, the highest among countries in the eurozone) to survive financially. 15 The European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank, a trio at the time referred to as the “troika” by the media, persuaded the Greek government to start to privatise certain assets. This kind of revenue generation began by selling shares of companies and rights of operation in certain sectors. One of the most important sectors in question was the Greek shipping and container industry. That is why the Port of Piraeus has become so important in recent years, and that is how the Chinese economic presence in Greece started

COSCO Shipping’s container terminal in Piraeus 114

POLITICS

to increase. With tightening economic and political ties between the two countries, Piraeus has become the most important container hub in the Mediterranean region, creating more than a thousand new workplaces, after COSCO—a Chinese government-owned shipping and logistics services supplier company, which became COSCO Shipping following a merger in 2016—acquired the rights of operation for one of the container terminals in Piraeus in 2009. 16 Its quadruped container, throughput in less than five years, shows that the terminal could see an almost immediate boost in competitiveness.17 However, the Greek government needed much more liquidity in order to limit the damage caused by falling GDP figures.18 For this reason, China established itself as one of the most important trading partners for Greece in the following years, and, as it usually happens, the more capital Beijing invested, the more influence it started to gain over the country. The question about China’s possible long-time strategy in the region started to be viewed with some scepticism as early as the first years of the 2010s, but, in 2013, many experts concluded that the growing Chinese economic presence in Greece did not represent a “major concern with regards to Greece’s international

Talks between Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and President Xi Jinping in 2019

position”.19 Therefore, the possible reason for enhancing ties could be that Athens hoped for mutually beneficial economic cooperation and the continuation of the steady rise of bilateral trade that started at the beginning of the 2010s. In 2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping announced the Belt and Road Initiative, which would serve as the New Silk Road (and New Maritime Silk Road) running along the lines of the ancient Silk Road and connecting Europe with Asia and Africa in an ambitious framework. In the meantime, Greece became a major hub for Chinese economic relations in the Mediterranean region. Until 2013, COSCO invested approximately EUR 570 million in the Port of Piraeus with the promise of additional investments in the future. As the EU’s bailout package was not sufficient to overcome the downward spiral that the Greek economy got itself into, the continuous waves of privatisation led China to capitalise on the situation by increasing the role of COSCO in the port. Because of COSCO’s increased involvement, Piraeus soon became the world’s fastestgrowing container port, and its increased relevance led some analysts to conclude that Chinese investment in Southeastern European transport infrastructure could lessen the trade flow facilitated by Western Europe between Central Europe and Asia.20 The investment, of course, was more than welcomed by the Greek government at the time, which was still struggling and was in desperate need of foreign capital. While some certainly hoped that the

new investment would help the Greek economy overcome instability, others continued to fear the increasing Chinese foothold in Southern Europe. The new maritime-infrastructure construction led by China also made the EU start taking into account the consequences of a more visible Chinese presence at its doorstep. Some even feared that China might gain too much leverage over trade with the EU, which adopted a more cautious stance as the enormous BRI projects were announced.21 The geopolitical implications of the Chinese–Greek relations still lingered, and the need for increased investment and the promise of further development plans made the risks associated with growing Chinese influence much less important for the Greek government. This did not mean that there were immediate risks stemming from the improvement of economic and political relations with Beijing—some experts even stated that “this development should not cause serious concerns at a European or transatlantic level” as long as the foreign or security policy dimensions of the Southern European nation are not harmed. 22 Positive views on this new wave of Chinese investment included the redefinition of the Mediterranean region as an important strategic area for China, which not only helped boost the Greek GDP but also played a crucial role in facilitating and redefining geopolitical relations in Europe. This meant that the increasing attention of China might also arouse the interest of regional, continental, and even global actors, which could lead to some sort of competition in certain areas. This might ultimately result in increased investments and enhanced relationships with other nations in the long term. The people who saw the growing Chinese presence as a negative phenomenon when the investments started flowing into Greece did so because they feared that the Chinese strategy would exploit “European weakness” and “hinder the process of integration.”23 China not only signed another investment deal worth roughly EUR 216.8 million in 2013 but also invested almost USD 8 billion (i.e., more than EUR 6.6 billion) in upgrading the Athens POLITICS

115

airport and constructing the Crete airport.24 This spending helped build up Geeks’ trust in China, which ultimately led to an additional EUR 368.5 million investment from COSCO Shipping in the port of Piraeus in April 2016. The same investment deal entailed the arrival of the second wave of capital worth more than EUR 280 million, by which the company could acquire 51% ownership in the Greek port. The Chinese company also promised an additional EUR 88 million investment, which would mean acquiring a further 16% of the port’s shares in a five-year period.25 By taking the majority ownership of the port, China officially entered the doorstep of Europe. Soon after the investment had been signed, Greece officially joined the Belt and Road Initiative during the summer of 2018, when Greek foreign minister Nikos Kotzais, signed a memorandum with China. This document included the further deepening of the two country’s relations by highlighting that the Chinese initiatives were aimed at promoting investment in infrastructure, connectivity, and economic cooperation in general.26 At the same time, Chinese investment did not stop in Greece but also arrived at the most important European ports. Chinese companies managed to exert control over one-tenth of the total European container traffic: their position was made even stronger after acquiring Zeebrugge, the second-largest Belgian port, 51% of the Port of Valencia, and some smaller Northern European ports, too, until 2017.27 With these investments, China acquired some stakes in twelve European ports until 2019, including Dunkirk, Istanbul, Rotterdam, Marseilles, and Bilbao.28 Following the increasing Chinese presence and ownership in the above-mentioned European ports, and Italy joining the BRI at around the same time, French president Emmanuel Macron said in 2019 that “the period of European naiv[i]t[y] is over,” while German chancellor Angela Merkel highlighted that “although China is a partner, it is also a competitor with a different political system.” All this happened just after the 17 + 1 cooperation and Greece’s participation in BRI had been 116

POLITICS

strengthened again, with the Port of Piraeus being gradually expanded by an additional wave of investments in November 2019, which had been worth EUR 600 million and had been designed to improve the port and its surrounding infrastructure. 29 Some experts also warned about the possibility of a debt trap along the lines of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, including the port of Piraeus, too.30 A year later, the US also expressed concerns about the possibility that China might use the port for military purposes, and Washington even tried to push Greece to stop acting as

Member states of the 17+1 cooperation in 2020

+CHINA

EU member states’ participating in the 17+1 Non-EU member states’ participation in the 17+1

China’s “head of the dragon” in Europe31—and expression coming from Xi Jinping, who called the port so during his visit to Greece.32 Criticism from the Western nations did not hinder the Greek government’s cooperation with China. This was made clear in the summer of 2020, when Adonis Georgiadis, the Greek development and investment minister, said during an online investment forum that his government was “very happy with the Chinese presence in Greece, very proud of [the] cooperation in Piraeus port” and that Athens “want[ed] to go forward with the master plan of the upgrade of Greece’s largest harbour.” 33 Besides the above mentioned factors, the cooperation between Greece and China during the pandemic—especially during its initial phase—is another important reason that explains the Greek government’s increased openness towards Chinese investments. China delivered eighteen tons of medical supplies to the Greek government, which, in turn, decided to strengthen the partnership between the two nations even further and developed a more positive China policy, supported by the new Greek prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, who was elected in July 2019. Unlike the former government, which adopted a more cautious approach towards China, the Mitsotakis cabinet thinks that inviting more Chinese investment is an entirely positive step. The previous government’s approach towards China, which stopped additional Chinese investments in the Port of Piraeus, was among the reasons why it got fewer votes than Mitsotakis’s party, as the current prime minister voiced his concerns about the slow economic improvement during his campaign. 34 The new Greek government approved the investment plans for the next stage of development in Piraeus just a couple of months after taking office, but selling the previously promised further 16% stake to COSCO Shipping has not yet been authorised. Although the port’s promised additional expansion by the Chinese company should have been completed by January 2021, COSCO wanted to acquire further stakes, even before fulfilling the previous agreement, which

would mean more money invested in the port. Meanwhile, the Piraeus’s chamber of commerce and the Greek shipping chamber managed to prevent COSCO Shipping from holding operational control over a new electronic portaccess system by joining the protest against the Chinese company, which has been started by the workers at the port.35 These actions made some Greek politicians and a part of the population question the overall success of the investment programme—just as the rest of the EU does, where doubts have also risen about the Chinese company’s real ambitions.36 The EU Chamber of Commerce in China examined the basic premises and business model of COSCO Shipping in Piraeus and found that “the rapid growth of both capacity and actual throughput ha[d] largely been achieved by COSCO using Piraeus as a hub for international relay.” 37 Another report stated that, in China, “international relay may only be carried out by Chinese-flagged vessels operated by wholly-owned Chinese companies,” 38 which ultimately creates an awkward disparity between the EU and China within the framework of international trade. This disadvantageous situation eventually led the Danish shipping company Maersk, a rival to COSCO Shipping in Europe, to propose that Brussels should consider “blocking nonEU ships from relay services” 39 in order to achieve reciprocity with Beijing in the area, even considering the 17% growth of freight throughput in Piraeus in 2019. Since Piraeus is the only port in the EU where a single company has a controlling stake in the overall port and not in just one or more terminals, some experts have set off alarm bells because of the potential dangers of a single company controlling such a strategically important piece of infrastructure.40 All in all, the increased Chinese involvement in the Greek economy, especially in the Port of Piraeus, led to stronger bilateral ties between the two countries, which tightened considerably, in particular after the 2019 election of the Mitsotakis government. With Mitsotakis as the Greek prime minister, a supporter of Chinese investment in the country, it seems that Athens POLITICS

117

will continue inching closer to China in hopes of overcoming Greece’s financial difficulties. This intention was also confirmed by the announcement that 2021 would be the China– Greece Year of Culture and Tourism, aimed at restarting the country’s tourism sector, which has, by far, the largest share in the Greek economy. Following the trends of the latest years, it seems that a real win-win situation is emerging from the cooperation between Beijing and Athens, although Chinese capital comes to Greece in the form of loans and acquisitions in different sectors of the Greek economy. While some Western critics claimed that a debt trap was forming in the Mediterranean country, its overall economy has, so far, seen a great improvement as a result of the increased amount of Chinese investment. From a Greek perspective, the gradually growing amount of investment from China gives hope for a faster recovery, while, from a Chinese perspective, if the New Maritime Silk Road becomes a success, the Port of Piraeus will be a stronghold for exporting Chinese goods to Europe. With the EU becoming more conscious about the risks associated with Chinese strategies and with the growing confrontation between the West and China, the EU, with France and Germany at its helm, and also the US, will have to provide Greece (as well as the other European countries in the 17 + 1 cooperation) with some viable alternatives to Chinese investment. If such steps were taken, they might help balance the role of the Asian country and the Western nations, and, therefore, prevent the Southern European country from becoming a stronghold of Chinese influence. Strengthening bilateral ties and the medical aid provided by China during the pandemic to those European countries it has closer ties with certainly did not help the Western strategic positions in Greece and, more widely, in Eastern and Southern Europe. In 2021 and the coming years, the greatest task of the EU and the US is to provide Greece with the tools to tackle the pandemic and to restart its economy and to make it more sustainable and resilient in order to finally 118

POLITICS

overcome the spiral of crises from where the Southern European country has not been able to get out of for more than a decade now.

ENDNOTES 1 A Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Advancing a Shared Vision. U.S. Depar tment of State. 4 November 2019. <https://bit.ly/2SMyQlE > 2 Seamus Taggart: Italian Relations with China 1978–1992: The Long Carnival Decade—Burgeoning Trade and Diplomatic Kudos. Cahiers de la Méditerranée. 2014/88. 113–134. <https://doi.org/10.4000/cdlm.7512 > 3 China, Italy to Establish Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. China Internet Information Center. 8 May 2004. <https://on.china.cn/36neFxG > 4 Nicola Casarini– Marco Sanfilippo: Italy and China: Investing in each other. In: Mapping Europe – China Relations. A Bottom-Up Approach. A report by the European Think-tank Network on China (ETNC), edited by Mikko Huotari [et al.]. October 2015. 46. <https://bit.ly/3wmFhtt > 5 Elisa Cencig: Italy’s economy in the euro zone crisis and Monti’s reform agenda. SWP Working Paper FG 1, 2012/05. September 2012. <https://bit.ly/3whEg61 > 6 Federiga Bindi: Of Italy and China, and Historical Ties (and Some Convenient Amnesia). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 21 March 2019. <https://bit.ly/3hjteJ9 > 7 Casarini–Sanfilippo, 46–49. 8 Bindi, 2019. 9 Federiga Bindi: Why Did Italy Embrace the Belt and Road Initiative. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 20 May 2019. <https://bit.ly/2UuwqIM > 10 The Council of the European Union formally concluded negotiations in 2019, based on the following document: Council decision authorising the opening of negotiations with the United States of America for an agreement on the elimination of tariffs for industrial goods. European Council, Council of the European Union. 9 April 2019. <https://bit. ly/3qRuWEB > 11 For detailed data, see Trade Statistics. UN Comtrade. <https://bit.ly/3qOld20 > 12 A year on, Italy’s Bergamo still traumatised by onslaught of Covid-19. France 24. 18 March 2021. <https://bit. ly/3qSWGcf > 13 ANSA–Xinhua collaboration accord signed. ANSA. 22 March 2019. <https://bit.ly/3qPJvbK > 14 China. Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. <https://bit.ly/3eiCBav > Accessed: 26 March 2021.

15 Kimberly Amadeo: Greek Debt Crisis Explained. The

34 Greek elections: Mitsotakis promises change after New

Balance. 18 May 2020. <https://bit.ly/3elgwb8 >

Democracy win. BBC. 8 July 2019. <ht tps://bbc.

16 Port of Piraeus Ups Global Position. Greece Investor

in/3D0k8JW >

Guide. 21 February 2020. <https://bit.ly/3xHx1WK >

35 Angeliki Koutantou: Workers protest as Greece sells

17 George Georgiopoulos: China’s Cosco acquires 51 pct

Piraeus Port to China COSCO. Reuters. 8 April 2016.

stake in Greece’s Piraeus Port. Reuters. 10 August 2016.

<https://reut.rs/3mkAWFA >

<https://reut.rs/3h0asqs >

36 David Glass: Cosco in move to acquire additional stake

18 GDP growth (annual %) – Greece. The World Bank.

in Piraeus Port Authority. Seatrade Maritime News. 2

<https://bit.ly/2Sixy15 > Accessed: 26 March 2021.

December 2020. <https://bit.ly/3xNF0l3 >

19 Thanos Dokos: The Geopolitical Implications of Sino-

37 Jens Kastner–Giannis Seferiadis: COSCO faces backlash

Greek Relations. Clingendael Netherlands Institute of

as it moves to tighten grip on Greek port. Nikkei Asia. 29

International Relations. 10 July 2013. <ht tps://bit.

December 2020. <https://s.nikkei.com/3ejuUAI >

ly/3nPx5ze >

38 Kastner–Seferiadis.

20 Frans-Paul van der Putten: Chinese Investment in the

39 Kastner–Seferiadis.

Port of Piraeus, Greece: The Relevance for the EU and the

40 Kastner–Seferiadis.

Netherlands. Clingendael Repor t. 14 Februar y 2014. <https://bit.ly/3AIjG1M > 21 Frans-Paul van der Putten–Minke Meijnders: China, Europe and The Maritime Silk Road. Clingendael Report. March 2015. <https://bit.ly/3xurm5V > 22 Dokos. 23 Gian Luca Atzori: Can China’s New Silk Road Save the Greek Economy? The Diplomat. 21 January 2016. <https:// bit.ly/3vKhkfA > 24 Atzori. 25 Momoko Kidera–Shin Watanabe: China bolsters Europe foothold with Belt and Road expansion. Nikkei Asia. 14 November 2019. <https://s.nikkei.com/2Rt7a46 > 26 Greece of ficially joins the BRI. OBOReurope. 4 September 2018. <https://bit.ly/3unexc9 > 27 Bucsky Péter: A Budapest–Belgrád vasútvonal miatt fontos Pireusz csak egy bábu a kínai sakktáblán. G7. 14 April 2018. <https://bit.ly/3kdEKb1 > 28 Szabó Anna: Kína már az európai kikötőket vásárolja fel. Novekedes.hu. 7 March 2019. <https://bit.ly/3h0ZaSH > 29 Kidera–Watanabe. 30 Katsuji Nakazawa: China’s new Great Wall rises in the heart of Europe. Nikkei Asia. 24 October 2019. <https://s. nikkei.com/3tjThCz > 31 Stuart Lau: US pushes Greece to stop acting as China’s ‘dragon’s head’ into Europe. South China Morning Post. 3 November 2020. <https://bit.ly/3hh1Fkf > 32 Despina Papageorgiou: The “Dragon’s Head.” Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. 12 September 2020. <https://bit. ly/3ANW5Nc > 33 Khushnam P N: China–Greece Relation in an Unabated Momentum. Modern Diplomacy. 18 June 2020. <https://bit. ly/3faVxaz > POLITICS

119

ON THE FRONT LINE—THE ROLE OF SPAIN, GREECE, AND ITALY IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION MANAGEMENT Bianka Restás INTRODUCTION International migration is a particularly complex phenomenon triggered by numerous social, economic, political, and even environmental circumstances. While some people decide to migrate voluntarily, others are forced to leave their countries of origin due to various push factors that prevent them from living in safe and secure conditions. Even if the number of arrivals in Europe is currently far below the numbers registered at the peak of the refugee crisis in 2015, the issue of migration has been one of the most divisive questions among the European Union (EU) member states in recent years. Given the heterogeneous nature of the phenomenon and the significantly diverse national interests of the EU member states, it proved to be remarkably challenging to design a sustainable system at an EU level and to tackle the question effectively. Despite previous attempts to create an equal system based on policies that provide answers to both security and human rights challenges, ongoing debates constantly emphasise the unequal levels of national contribution to deal with migration and, consequently, the lack of solidarity, responsibility, and burden sharing. The underlying reason for the existing disputes is the fact that examining the asylum claims of new arrivals predominantly falls under the responsibility of front-line member states as per the “first country of entry” criterion of the current Dublin III Regulation.1 In practice, this means that a small number of member states bear the responsibility for processing the majority of asylum claims. For this reason, the countries of first arrival have repeatedly pointed out the disproportionate responsibilities that the Dublin Regulation imposes on their domestic asylum system.2 120

POLITICS

Their proximity to the Mediterranean basin and the countries of North Africa and the Levant is a geographical characteristic shared by most Southern European countries, which, consequently, have always been exposed to social, political, and economic developments in the above-mentioned two regions. Due to their geographic position, Spain, Italy, and Greece have heavily been affected by migration flows in recent years and still maintain a crucial role in the protection of the EU external borders and the initial reception, identification, and registration of asylum seekers and migrants. In many cases, this has created not only logistical and economic hardships for these countries but has also raised human rights and humanitarian concerns. The present article aims to seek answers to three interrelated questions. Firstly, why do “front-line” member states have a crucial role in the management of international migration in the southern shores of Europe? Secondly, what are the key problems and tendencies deriving from the current logic of the European migration and asylum system? And, finally, what kind of challenges have these Southern European countries faced in recent years, and by which approaches and measures have they responded to the phenomenon? MIGRATION TRENDS ON THE MAIN MIGRATORY ROUTES TO EUROPE The Mediterranean consists of three major migratory sea routes frequented by many undocumented migrants and asylum seekers to reach Europe irregularly. The Central Mediterranean route refers to the sea journey from North and sub-Saharan Africa to Italy

Table 1: The Mediterranean migration in numbers Area Italy sea

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

(as of 25–26 April)

170,100

153,842

181,436

119,369

23,370

11,471

34,154

8,834

Spain sea

4,632

5,312

8,162

22,103

58,569

26,168

40,326

7,611

Spain land

7,084

11,624

6,443

6,246

6,814

6,345

1,535

246

Spain and Canary Islands all

11,716

16,936

14,605

28,349

65,383

32,513

41,861

7,857

Greece sea

41,038

856,723

173,450

29,718

32,494

59,726

9,714

993

Greece land

2,280

4,907

3,784

6,592

18,014

14,887

5,982

1,327

43,318

861,630

177,234

36,310

50,508

74,613

15,696

2,320

225,455

1,032,408

373,652

185,139

141,472

123,663

95,031

19,574

Greece all All in the Mediterranean

and Malta, the Eastern Mediterranean route leads to Greece, Cyprus, and Bulgaria through Turkey and the Middle East, while the Western Mediterranean route refers to the departures from Morocco and Algeria via the Mediterranean Sea to mainland Spain and, by land, to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. 3 Additionally, the Western African route should also be mentioned, which refers to arrivals in the Canary Islands in the Atlantic Ocean.4 Taking a look at the numbers, the data highlight that there have been various changes in activity levels—i.e., decrease and increase in the number of arrivals—on the three main routes in recent years. These shifts can be attributed to various factors. Among others, changed security circumstances in origin and transit countries, restrictive government measures in Europe (e.g., policies and laws on migration, reception, asylum, and border protection), additional movement restrictions introduced in order to fight the COVID-19 pandemic, bilateral and multilateral collaboration with third states, measures implemented by North African states (from Libya to Morocco and Algeria), or the availability of smuggling networks all had an impact on these tendencies. The numbers in Table 1 show that, in 2014, 2016, and 2017, Italy received the highest number of arrivals, while, in 2015 and 2019, Greece did, and, in 2018 and 2020, Spain

became the most affected front-line member state. In the first four months of 2021, Italy and Spain faced a similar number of arrivals, while Greece was less affected. At the same time, the data also make it evident that the number of arrivals in the EU was unprecedented in 2015, making it particularly challenging for the affected member states to respond to the logistical, financial, social, and political consequences of the phenomenon. In 2015, 56.1% of all sea arrivals in Greece were from the Syrian Arab Republic, 5 and, in 2016, the proportion of Syrians in all sea arrivals was still 47%.6 Given the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean route—described by many as an emergency or a crisis—the EU initiated cooperation with Turkey (laid down in the EU– Turkey statement of 18 March 2016), 7 which primarily aimed at controlling and reducing the number of arrivals in Greece. According to the Council of the European Union, the implementation of the EU–Turkey statement has played a key role in reducing irregular arrivals through Turkey in recent years: in 2019, arrivals through this route were 90% lower than in 2015, and a further decline was observed in 2020.8 However, when we take a look at these numbers, we should bear in mind that other factors could also have an impact on the POLITICS

121

patterns of migration intentions. Among others, COVID-19 and the relevant restrictive measures made it extremely difficult to move across and within countries and especially across continents in 2020. Since the governments’ main priority was to contain the spread of the virus, every single country in the world imposed restrictions on border crossing, and the majority of them introduced severe ones on the movement of citizens even within their own country. As a result of these travel bans and restrictions, cross-border movements have dropped significantly. The mobility of nearly three million migrants—including those who lost their jobs from one day to another due to the closure of a particular business or sector in which they were employed—was practically blocked in a way that they were unable to return home.9 Looking at the impacts of the EU–Turkish statement, it is also worth noting that, despite the practical results and advancements that the EU could achieve through the implementation of the agreement, this collaboration has not lacked problems. In an article published in the previous issue of In Focus, I pointed out some of the human rights concerns it had raised and that this collaboration had been easily influenced by changing geopolitical circumstances and had become a tool for political bargaining. Events at the Turkish–Greek border in February and March 2019 serve as a perfect example of its fragility: due to rising geopolitical tensions, Turkey announced that it would no longer prevent Syrian refugees from entering Europe in this period. 10 GREECE In response to the increased number of migrants reaching the country, the Greek government— led by Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ New Democracy party (Néa Dimokratía, ND)—has taken a hard-line approach to migration policy since coming to office in July 2019 and also passed a new law to more efficiently regulate and control the activity of NGOs that are involved in the sea and rescue operations in Greece.11 International organisations12 and media13 122

POLITICS

have repeatedly emphasised that pushbacks (collective expulsions) of migrants and asylum seekers are part of the Greek government’s approach as a response to the phenomenon. In this context, many raised concerns that collective expulsions are not only prohibited by the European Convention on Human Rights14 but also stand in contrast to the principle of non-refoulement,15 which is a vital part of international refugee law. 16 Greece’s minister of migration and asylum, Notis Mitarachi, fiercely denied that any pushbacks had taken place, describing the operations of the Greek coast guard and navy as a matter of “national security.” 17 Taking a look at the data published by the National Coordination Centre for Border Control, Immigration, and Asylum of the Ministry of the Citizen Protection of Greece, we can observe that, in certain periods, the reception and identification centres in Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Leros, and Kos were particularly overburdened. This was exactly the case in May 2020, when 23,474 people were hosted in these centres, four times more than their total capacity (6,095).18 It is worth noting that not only Greece but other front-line states have also adopted restrictive measures for and/ or took hard-line approaches to both easing the pressure on their reception system and to calling for more effective European solidarity. However, these measures have in certain cases been implemented without respecting international law and human rights. Another fact that deserves attention in this context is that, due to the capacity problems that front-line member states face in more intense periods of arrivals, reception centres are frequently unable to provide adequate conditions—e.g., clean water, sanitation facilities, infrastructure, and safe accommodation—for asylum seekers, even though this would be a crucial element of international protection. The refugee camps in Lesbos (the Moria camp, and after it burned down, the so-called “Moria 2.0” or Kara Tepe)19 are visible examples of this phenomenon, and it should also be noted that the lack of

The Moria camp in 2018

appropriate reception and protection seems to be a recurrent tendency in front-line member states. Concerning the New Pact on Migration and Asylum,20 Mitarachi underlined last year that the pact must provide a basis for the fair redistribution of asylum seekers among the EU members states or it was destined to fail.21 Europe has come under renewed criticism this year because of the insufficient security and reception conditions of migrants in Greece.22 Even though the number of arrivals has decreased significantly in 2021 (925 people arrived in Lesbos and the other Greek Aegean Islands between 1 January and 11 April this year, while 7,591 people arrived during the same period in 2020),23 human rights concerns and the lack of transparency and adequate accommodation have remained unsolved issues on Lesbos.24 ITALY Italy has also faced significant levels of migrant arrivals in recent years. The highest number of arrivals on Italian shores was registered in 2016 and 2017, prompting previous governments to introduce new measures aimed at tackling

the challenge more effectively and at pushing the European discourse towards increased European solidarity. During April 2016, the Italian media discussed daily that, as a result of the closure of the Western Balkans migration route and the agreement between the European Union and Turkey, Italy, as a front-line country, would play a key role in the management of the refugee crisis again. Indeed, the Central Mediterranean migration route became more popular: as was previously expected, the Italian migrant reception system faced significant pressure in May and June 2020, and the management of the migratory flows became more and more challenging for the responsible bodies. The code of conduct25 adopted by the Italian government in July 2017,26 the increasing cooperation with the Libyan government, and new provisions adopted by Libya all intended to reduce the number of arrivals and—similarly to Greece—to regulate more efficiently the activity of the NGOs that were participating in the official humanitarian and rescue operations in the Mediterranean.27 The first Conte government between June 2018 and September 2019—also involving POLITICS

123

Matteo Salvini’s League (Lega)—had a stricter approach to migration, making it clear that seeking a balance between the responsibility of front-line states and the solidarity of the rest of the member states was a priority for the country, just as finding common European solutions to handle the phenomenon in a more equal manner. One further aspect deserving attention in this context is that, while there were 15,000 asylum applications to be investigated in Italy in January 2014, these cases exceeded 150,000 at the beginning of 2018.28 Due to the high number of people who had accumulated in previous years—650,000 persons arrived in Italy in five years between 2014 and 2018 29—the evaluation of the asylum applications and the sustainability of the reception systems became a considerable challenge in the country. Former interior minister Matteo Salvini took a hard-line stance on migration, interpreting the problem as a question of national security, and, thus, his name is linked to two significant measures against migration, the policy of “closed ports” 30 and the so-called “security decrees.” Besides

strict restrictive measures against immigration, these also included a strong regulatory system to control the search and rescue activities of NGOs.31 Concerning the legal and humanitarian implications of closing Italian ports, it is important to point out that, although this decision was not illegal under maritime and European law, it had problematic consequences.32 For this reason, reforming and modifying the strict rules and laws introduced by Salvini—particularly those that envisaged serious fines for rescue and aid boats participating in the search and rescue operations—was one of the stated priorities of the second Conte government after it had taken office in September 2019 until its fall in February 2021.33 It is worth noting that recent statements from Italy’s new prime minister, Mario Draghi, suggest that the new government would also adopt a solidaritybased approach and an obligatory mechanism for the redistribution of immigrants, similarly to the idea of Greece’s minister of migration and asylum. 34

The Aquarius rescue ship a few days after it was welcomed in Spain in 2018 124

POLITICS

SPAIN AND THE CANARY ISLANDS In recent years, the number of irregular migrants has also increased significantly on the Western Mediterranean route. In 2018, the Western Mediterranean became the most frequently used route towards Europe.35 Similarly to Greece and Italy, Spain has also experienced various challenges on several levels due to migration flows in the past few years. In 2018, irregular entries rocketed by more than 64,000, and, a year later, the number of asylum applications rose to 118,000, putting significant pressure on the asylum system.36 In June 2018, the case of the Aquarius rescue ship served as an excellent example of the current debate in Europe when both Malta and Italy made it clear that they would not let the ship and its passengers disembark on their territory, while the Spanish government allowed the rescue vessel—and the two Italian ships that provided support for it during the journey—to dock in Valencia. 37 The example of the Aquarius vessel high lighted two contradictory approaches in the European political debate on migration. One that lacks effective solidarity, and another that puts the humanitarian aspect of the problem in the forefront. Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez’s gesture, in this case, could be interpreted as a positive message of solidarity sent by Spain to the EU and its member states. However, various steps have been made by Spain since that incident that signalled the country’s intention to adopt a stricter approach towards migration and, at the same time, to voice the country’s discontent with current European policies. Among others, Spain expressed its dissatisfaction with the new European migration plan last year, as it does not include the mandatory relocation quotas of migrants across EU member states. Madrid emphasised that, without such a measure, the new New Pact on Migration and Asylum designed by the EU Commission would place an even heavier burden on frontline countries. 38 Amidst the coronavirus pandemic in 2020, the Canary Islands faced significant pressure due to substantial increase in the number of arrivals.

In 2020, a huge number of 23,023 arrivals were registered in the Canary Islands according to data by the UNHCR. 39 Among other reasons, increased border control by the government of Morocco and strengthened cooperation between Morocco and Spain contributed to this growth, prompting smuggling networks to switch their focus of attention to the Western African route.40 The UNHCR pointed out that insecurity and persecution in the Sahel, extreme poverty, the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, food insecurity, and climate change could all be mentioned among the main drivers of the recent migration flows in the Canary Islands. 41 Similarly to the situation in Lesbos, the lack of basic necessities, clean water, sanitary conditions, and adequate reception have also become a serious concern there, leaving resources and infrastructure strained and, therefore, creating a significant challenge for the responsible bodies to increase their reception capacities.42 In 2020 and 2021, travel restrictions have further increased existing difficulties and heightened tensions in the islands of Gran Canaria, Tenerife, and Fuerteventura and also led to anti-immigration demonstrations. At the same time, due to constant pressure on the Spanish borders in recent years, Spain emphasised the necessity of allocating more EU funds to countries in North Africa, Western Africa, and the Sahel area to support these countries in tackling the “so-called” root causes of migration. 43 CONCLUSION The aforementioned three cases enable us to identify some parallel key tendencies in Europe. Given the significant number of arrivals on European shores in certain periods, frontline states have a crucial responsibility in managing migration and receiving migrants and asylum seekers in Europe. For this reason, the countries of first arrival have repeatedly pointed out the disproportionate responsibilities that the Dublin regulation imposes on their domestic asylum system and their desire to create a more adequate and equitable solution. It is a visible tendency that, in recent years, POLITICS

125

the governments of these countries have been seeking solutions for the phenomenon partly by implementing restrictive measures and/or applying hard-line approaches that, in certain cases, do not entirely respect human rights, humanitarian standards, and international law. It should also be underlined that serious flaws can be identified in the current European reception system, and the gaps can easily induce humanitarian emergency when the protection of migrants and asylum seekers are not or only partly guaranteed. For this reason, it would be reasonable to support front-line member states in strengthening their capacity and infrastructure, enabling them to effectively respond to emergencies similar to the presented cases. A more effective and equitable European approach, proposed also by the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, could mitigate the existing gaps and challenges. However, member states are bound to play different roles in asylum and migration management due to their differences in geography, history, cultural links with origin and transit countries, and diverse priorities in relation to migration. This explains why migration has become an underlying reason for political battles and deep divisions at a European level, thwarting the realisation of real dialogue, fruitful debates, and the creation of effective, long-term solutions.

Europe refugees & migrants emergency response.

Nationality of arrivals to Greece, Italy, and Spain. UNHCR. The UN Refugee Agency. 31 December 2015. <https://bit. ly/3vFfQmR > 6

Refugees & migrants sea arrivals in Europe. UNHCR. The

UN Refugee Agency. December 2016. <https://bit. ly/3xOojX0 > 7

EU–Turkey statement. European Commission. 16 March

2016. <https://bit.ly/33cRdSj > 8

Eastern Mediterranean route. European Council, Council

of the European Union. Updated on 6 January 2021. <https:// bit.ly/3tjNRHT> 9

Hanne Beirens: Migrazioni: Pronti per una nuova ondata?

Instituto per gli studi di politica internazionale. 24 January 2021. <https://bit.ly/3vGCL1b > 10 Zia Weis: Turkey says it will no longer stop refugees from entering Europe. Politico. 27 February 2020. <https://politi. co/3b39CVU> 11 Theodore Karaoulanis: Greece passes new law to better monitor NGOs dealing with migration. EURACTIVE. 5 February 2020. <https://bit.ly/3eYSHoZ > 12 Eva Cossé: Greece Is Still Denying Migrant Pushbacks. Human Rights Watch. 21 August 2020. <https://bit. ly/3b2NxXO > 13 Kostas Kallergis: Pushbacks: Migrants accuse Greece of sending them back out to sea. BBC. 12 December 2020. <https://bbc.in/3eSwdWs > 14 Sarah Souli: Greece’s ‘new tactic’ of migrant expulsion from deep inside its land borders. The New Humanitarian. 7 October 2020. <https://bit.ly/3eSpVGh > 15 Under international human rights law, the principle of nonrefoulement guarantees that no one should be returned to a country where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman, or

ENDNOTES

degrading treatment or punishment, and other irreparable harm.

Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament

16 The principle of non-refoulement under international

and of the Council of 26 June 2013. EUR-Lex. 29 June 2013.

human rights law. Office of the United Nations High

<https://bit.ly/3h1zBBc >

Commissioner for Human Rights. <https://bit.ly/3uk3HU7 >

Accessed: 25 April 2021.

For more, see Bianka Restás: Towards a more sustainable

and effective migration management? (Ursula von der Leyen’s

17 Nektaria Stamouli: EU migration plan doomed to fail

proposals to rethink migration and asylum policies in Europe).

without solidarity, Greece says. Politico. 7 October 2020.

AJRC-Analyses, 2020E12. 19 May 2020. 1. <https://bit.

<https://politi.co/3eVZijM >

ly/39BbK7I >

18 National Situational Picture Regarding the Islands at

Mediterranean Situation. UNHCR. The UN Refugee

Eastern Aegean Sea (7/9/2020). General Secretary for

Agency. <https://bit.ly/2RowNTE > Accessed: 25 January

Information and Communication, Greece. 8 September 2020.

2021.

<https://bit.ly/3xJRiuS >

Western Mediterranean and Western African routes.

19 Lesbos: Greek police move migrants to new camp after

European Council, Council of the European Union. Updated

Moria fire. BBC. 17 September 2020. <https://bbc.

on 6 January 2021. <https://bit.ly/3ehCVpX >

in/3eWH8P7 >

126

POLITICS

20 New Pact on Migration and Asylum. European Commission.

36 Maria Martin: The Spanish prime minister’s migration

<https://bit.ly/3eNgY10 > Accessed: 25 April 2021.

journey. El País. 30 December 2020. <https://bit.ly/33iFstz >

21 Stamouli.

Accessed: 25 April 2021.

22 DW News: Europe under fire for treatment of migrants in

37 Aquarius in Valencia: Spain welcomes migrants from

Greece. YouTube. 1 April 2021. <https://youtu.be/

disputed ship. BBC. 17 June 2018. <https://bbc.

GavAy9V1ZGI >

in/3tkdNmL >

23 More migrants are leaving than arriving, says Greek

38 Bernando de Miguel–Maria Martin: Spain rejects EU

minister. InfoMigrants. 19 April 2021. <https://bit.ly/3tfpN9a >

migration plan for not including relocation quotas. El País. 23

24 Florian Schmitz: Greece: Despite EU funds, migrant

June 2020. <https://bit.ly/3nW8FEo >

conditions still lacking. DW News. 30 March 2021. <https://p.

39 Europe situations: data and trends. Arrivals and displaced

dw.com/p/3rNl0 >

populations. Figures as of 31 December 2020. UNHCR. The

25 Migranti: i 13 impegni del Viminale per le Ong. La

UN Refugee Agency. 27 January 2021. <https://bit.ly/3tlYslJ >

Repubblica. 31 July 2017. <https://bit.ly/3ui0415 >

40 Al Jazeera English: Is a migrant crisis unfolding off West

26 The code of conduct imposed several limitations on

Africa’s Atlantic coast? | Inside Story. YouTube. 18 November

rescuing operations and envisaged the closure of Italian ports

2020. <https://youtu.be/UHJXRFUukPc >

to non-signatory organisations.

41 IOM and UNHCR carry out a joint visit to the Canary

27 Bianka Restás: Has Mediterranean Migration Been

Islands amid increasing arrivals. UNHCR. The UN Refugee

Diminishing?—Impacts and Prospects of Italy’s New Code of

Agency. 16 November 2020. <https://bit.ly/3td1RmR >

Conduct and the Libyan Provisions/Restrictions. Antall József

42 Sam Jones: Canary Islands under pressure as 11,000

Knowledge Centre. October 2017. <https://bit.ly/33er85C >

migrants arrive in 2020. The Guardian. 29 October 2020.

28 Bianka Restás: “L’ITALIA NON PUÒ ESSERE LASCIATA

<https://bit.ly/3thyAYe >

SOLA…” Towards a New European Approach to Manage

43 María Martin–Claudí Pérez: Tensions rising in Spain’s

Migration? Antall József Knowledge Centre. 8 August 2018.

Canary Islands over irregular immigration. El País. 1 February

<https://bit.ly/3kjxZUg >

2021. <https://bit.ly/3xEFdHg >

29 Paolo Magri–Matteo Villa: Gestire le migrazioni. In: Politica estera del’Italia: 6 priorità per il nuovo governo. Instituto per gli studi di politica internazionale. 26 February 2018. <https:// bit.ly/3b2yey9 > 30 In June 2018, Matteo Salvini declared that Italian ports would be closed to NGO ships and foreign-flagged merchant vessels carrying migrants rescued off the shore of Libya. 31 Bianka Restás: The Future of Salvini’s “Closed Ports” Policy in Light of the PD–Five Star Movement Coalition Deal. Antall József Knowledge Centre. September 2019. <https:// bit.ly/33e8hYe > 32 Eugenio Cusumano–Kristof Gombeer: In deep waters: The legal, humanitarian, and political implications of closing Italian ports to migrant rescuers. Mediterranean Politics. 2020/2. 245–253. 33 Angelo Amante: Italy loosens migration rules to dismay of hardliner Salvini. Reuters. 6 October 2020. <https://reut. rs/3egAUu8 > 34 Draghi e la politca estera. 17 February 2021. Instituto per gli studi di politica internazionale. 17 February 2021. <https:// bit.ly/3nQkpId > 35 Migratory Routes. Western Mediterranean Route. European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). <http:// bitly.ws/ckb3 > POLITICS

127

ECONOMY

PRODUCTIVITY, THE TWIN TRANSITIONS, AND THE EUROPEAN DIVIDE(S) Roberto Martino This paper assesses the performance of Southern European countries—Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain—in their journey to narrow the gap between their European peers and themselves. In doing so, it focusses on productivity growth and research and innovation investments as enablers of prosperity and transformation in the post-COVID-19 world. The analysis is set within the twin—green and digital—transition framework at the forefront of the renewed policy landscape of the European Union.

PRODUCTIVITY, CONVERGENCE, AND THE NEED FOR TRANSFORMATION IN THE POST-COVID-19 EUROPE The COVID-19 pandemic had a dramatic impact on European economies and societies. Since the outbreak of the virus in Europe at the beginning of 2020, governments have been faced with the challenge of devising and implementing policy measures in an attempt to contain the pandemic while providing the needed support to their people and economies.

Figure 1: Labour productivity trend in Southern Europe between 1995 and 2019 (gross value added per hour worked, 2015 = 100) 125 125

120 120 115

110 110

105 105 100 100

95 95 90 90

85 85

80 80 75 75

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Greece

86.34

89.37

93.83

93.34

96.37

99.67

103.72

105.64

110.34

113.65

110.45

115.18

Italy

93.77

93.88

95.61

95.68

96.35

99.12

99.78

99.00

98.30

99.12

99.57

99.35

Portugal

79.43

80.82

82.41

83.34

85.18

86.14

87.04

87.67

88.06

89.96

90.98

92.67

Spain

86.40

87.36

87.21

86.80

86.49

86.90

87.03

87.17

87.43

87.71

88.05

88.57

EU-27

76.25

77.23

78.73

80.10

81.80

84.44

86.18

87.87

88.69

90.12

91.14

92.64

130

ECONOMY

2007

2008

Although the definitive figures of the overall economic and social impact of the COVID-19 pandemic are not available yet, estimates suggest that global output may have declined by around 5.4% in 2020. 1 The several shutdowns put in place worldwide have particularly hit sectors less or not at all adaptable to remote work, such as tourism and travel industries, 2 and social groups such as young people and women, undermining the latter’s already fragile long-term employment and career prospects.3 In the European Union (EU), the pandemic hit an already multifaceted scenario, in which different member states had been on diverse economic trajectories since the last decade of the 20 th century. Therefore, Europe faces the COVID-19 crisis as a heterogeneous economy, the different segments of which have been moving at different speeds and achieved



Greece



Italy



different levels of well-being. In broad terms, it is possible to identify three main blocks within the EU: Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (CESEE), Southern Europe, and the “rest.” Each of them is characterised by different levels of development and productivity and by different productivity growth patterns. While the CESEE economies have been experiencing high productivity growth, starting from low(er) levels, and the “rest” has, on average, higher levels of prosperity and heterogeneous rates of productivity growth, the south of Europe is trapped in a low-low regime.4 Indeed, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Italy have relatively low productivity levels and have also performed weakly in terms of productivity growth. If we use labour productivity—defined as gross value added per employee or hour worked—as a measure of an economy’s

Portugal



Spain



EU–27 125 125

120 120

115 115

110 110

105 105 100 100

95 95

90 90

85 85

80 80

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

118.18

116.58

113.50

113.43

105.55

101.25

98.85

99.27

98.71

96.74

98.94

99.61

99.07

99.86

94.12

94.72

94.33

97.19

98.68

99.63

89.55

89.78

91.94

94.28

95.67

97.51

93.50

93.20

92.11

94.85

96.55

97.07

2007

2008

2009

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2015

2016

97.96

100.00

96.29

97.32

97.52

98.46

99.94

100.00

99.69

100.34

100.38

101.04

100.01

100.00

100.11

100.90

101.72

103.63

98.92

99.22

100.00

100.45

101.33

101.09

101.48

97.96

98.63

100.00

100.46

102.20

103.01

103.90

75 75

2019

ECONOMY

131

Figure 2: Labour productivity in the European Union in 2018 (gross value added per worker) Darker colour indicates more productive countries.

> 80% 60–80% 40–60% 20–40% < 20%

capacity to create wealth in an efficient way, the recent trends reveal that Southern European states did not keep pace with their European peers (see figure 1). Italian productivity was almost flat at the beginning of the 2000s and has remained virtually unchanged for the last two decades, flagging the worrying inadequacy of its economic system to thrive and adapt in an increasingly digital and innovative global landscape. Greece’s performance has yet to recover from the dramatic aftermath of the economic and financial crisis in 2008 despite years of policies aimed to “fix” the Greek economy. However, the pattern of Portugal and Spain is somewhat different. Spanish productivity growth picked up steam in the last decade. Portugal’s performance has been positive over the last twenty years: it could keep up with the EU27 average and improve its position relative to the other southern member states. A similar tendency can be observed about post-2008 Spain, although figures are more moderate in its case (see figure 2). Against this background 132

ECONOMY

of subdued productivity growth, the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated the process of change already in motion, bringing it to the forefront of policy discussion. The first element of this process was that, in the aftermath of the economic and financial crisis in 2008 and the increasing inequalities across and within countries, there were calls for fairer economic systems, more inclusive of people and territories. Failing to carry them through may have deep political and social consequences, especially in regions “left behind” by the current technological revolution. 5 The second element was that civil movements and scientists worldwide have long demanded that policies be implemented that can stop and reverse the impacts of the global economic model on the environment, its natural resources, and climate change. 6 All in all, a new paradigm has emerged across academia and policy making, promoting the view that the future development of Europe needs to strike a balance between

social inclusion, the preservation of the planet boundaries, and increased productivity to improve people’s living standards and the cohesion of European regions.7 This new8 sustainability paradigm bridges the economic, social, and environmental dimensions in a unique framework aiming for fair and inclusive sustainable development.9 This will be the foundation of the future of Europe.10 From the perspective of Southern European countries, this represents both an unparalleled opportunity and a challenge of boosting their productivity prospects while deeply transforming their economic systems and societies. Such a transformation is very much needed and inevitable, as technological change and innovations have been changing the way societies produce and live—both happening at an unprecedented speed, at the crossroads of the physical and digital domains.11 This brings research and innovation (R&I) investments once more into the focus of policy making. While the traditional paradigm sees R&I as an enabler of

economic growth, within the new sustainable paradigm, it is the engine of both productivity growth and transformation. Therefore, consistently with the European Green Deal, R&I is at the core of national strategies, now more than ever. This is particularly relevant for the Southern European member states, which neither can rely on a model based on lower costs of production as the CESEE countries do nor are they at the frontier(s) of technology. 12 Scaling up their investment in R&I is key to boosting their productivity prospects, reducing the gap with their European peers, and transforming their economies to “address the twin challenge of the green and digital transitions to become . . . modern, resourceefficient and competitive econom[ies].”13 TECHNOLOGY, INVESTMENTS, AND THE TWIN TRANSITIONS IN THE SOUTHERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND REGIONS The twin transitions are at the core of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), set

Figure 3: R&D intensity in European countries in 2018 R&D intensity is calculated according to the R&D investment share of GDP in 2018.

> 3% 2–3% 1.5–2% 1–1.5% < 1%

ECONOMY

133

Figure 4: Average labour productivity growth in European regions between 1999 and 2018

> 80% 60–80% 40–60% 20–40% < 20%

up by the European Commission to support member states in offsetting the economic and social impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and making Europe more sustainable and resilient for long-term prosperity. Member states are required to allocate at least 37% of their expenditure in their recovery plans for climate investments and reforms and 20% for fostering digital transition.14 Needless to say, R&I is at the core of both processes; thus, the European R&I policy needs to provide direction on how the transition towards multidimensional sustainability should happen and to ensure that economies are more productive so that they can meet their citizens’ needs.15 134

ECONOMY

With this in mind, it is useful to see the state of play in Southern European countries when it comes to research and innovation performance and investments. Research and development (R&D) intensity—i.e., R&D investment share in the gross domestic product (GDP)—is usually used as a reference indicator to quantify countries’ efforts to improve their innovation and research base. Already in 2000, the Lisbon Strategy established a European target of 3% of R&D intensity to be reached by 2010, aiming at transforming Europe into the most dynamic and knowledge-based competitive economy in the world. The sustainability and transformative aspects discussed above were mostly missing

Figure 5: R&D intensity (left) and R&D intensity growth (right) in 2018 and between 2010 and 2018, respective < 20%

< 20%

20–40%

40–60 %

40–60%

60–80%

> 80%

Note: R&D intensity of AT, DE, DK, SE: 2017; BE, IE: 2015; FR: 2013. Growth rates of EL, NL: 2011–2018; AT, DE, SE: 2011–2017; BE, IE: 2010–2015; FR: 2010–2013, DK: 2010–2017.

in policy discourse at the time, but the key role played by knowledge and innovation in generating better jobs and productivity growth was clearly there. The 3% target has no intrinsic economic or technical meaning but clear strategic mobilising effect, providing a sort of policy guidance to EU member states. As such, it was also confirmed and renewed as part of the European vision.16 However, today—eleven years after the original deadline—Europe has not met this 3% target: while some countries— namely, Denmark, Germany, Austria, and Sweden—have achieved it and others, such as Belgium and Finland, are getting close to it, many are lagging. The CESEE economies and Southern Europe fall into this third category (see figure 3). While, in the former case, this position can be understood as a stage of their transitional development process where research investments still play a limited role, 17 just as we have already discussed, it constitutes a drag force for the latter, as southern countries cannot make use of cost advantages. They would rather benefit from increased specialisation in knowledge-

based activities and the upskilling of their labour force. Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain have an R&D intensity below 1.5% and are quite far from countries such as France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, which all enjoy R&D intensity rates as high as 2% or above. These figures flag potentially subdued productivity growth and difficulties for the southern countries to transform their economies. As Marco Buti and Marcello Messori point out in the specific case of Italy, policy action must be taken to “convince [businesses, workers organisations and civil societies] that innovation and increased productivity need to be the engines of the competitiveness of the Italian economic system, rather than wage compression” and low-technology activities.18 Innovating in existing sectors and encouraging new businesses to thrive in new domains is key to ensure increased prosperity, especially for the regions left behind. The resources coming with the Recovery and Resilience Facility are an unmissable opportunity in this respect. 19 With the due differences and nuances stemming from country specificities and different ECONOMY

135

development trajectories, an argument of this kind could be equally applied to Greece, Portugal, and Spain. It is still worth pointing out that such differences may be quite substantial in some specific cases. For instance, Portugal has been increasing its specialisation in hightech-knowledge-intensive services since 2000, while Spain has done the same in medium and high-tech manufacturing. Differently, Italy has performed poorly across the board, in particular by reducing the knowledge base of its manufacturing sectors.20 While the foregoing discussion has so far focussed on national patterns, the driving forces of economic and social dynamics in Europe are characterised by a strong regional component. Subnational differences reveal a heterogeneous situation within countries, which the division into the three blocks proposed above is inadequate to capture. As highlighted by Andrés RodriguezPose and Lewis Dijkstra and his colleagues, regional divergence and the decline of formerly prosperous areas have caused social and political distress, a phenomenon that can be referred to as the “geography of discontent.”21 Regional inequality represents a key challenge for development (and R&I) policy in Europe in the years to come, especially in the postCOVID-19 era of transformation.22 European structural funds have as their key objective to reduce regional disparities across European regions and promote cohesion. However, convergence has not been fully successful, and it came to a halt following the crisis in 2008. On the one hand, the general national trend is somehow confirmed by regional trends. Greek and Italian regions have been lagging behind the “core” of Europe and are outsped by the converging regions of the CESEE countries, while the Spanish and Portuguese ones have performed better on average. On the other hand, there are also diverging subnational dynamics at play. Regional disparities increase due to the concentration of economic activities and innovation hubs in capital and metropolitan areas (see figure 4). It is worth flagging the extremely poor and mostly homogeneous performance of Italian and Greek 136

ECONOMY

regions, the labour productivity of which grew the least, if any, in the last two decades. A similar picture emerges when considering the regional geography of R&I, as shown in figure 5.23 Research and development (R&D) investments are highly concentrated in a small group of regions, mostly in areas with a high level of urbanisation like capitals. R&D intensity is relatively low in regions in Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, with the exception being, again, their capital regions and, in the Italian case, a few regions in central north, which confirms that the historical Italian dualism also exists in R&I. Evidence suggests high concentration in business R&D 24 and across firms as well. 25 A convergence trend in R&D intensity can be observed in some regions in Portugal and Greece, just as in the CESEE economies (see the right panel of figure 5), and it is also confirmed when considering other innovation indicators, for instance, patents. 26 Nevertheless, the latest evidence suggests the persisting concentration of R&D expenditure in more developed central locations, most notably, when1 performed by the business sector. THE WAY FORWARD: COHESION AND TRANSFORMATION Upscaling innovative investments has become one of the main priorities for European and national policies. The question arises, in which areas? The outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis seems to have made the answer clear, as it accelerated a policy shift towards green and digital transition. Provided this claim is true, R&I policy will be key for such a transformation of European economies and societies to happen. 27 The process has already been in motion for a few years: “traditional” fiscal, labour-market, and regulation-policy recommendations have seen a slow and steady rise in the importance of policies addressing skills, innovation, and knowledge creation and diffusion. This is particularly relevant for Southern European countries, whose “endowment” in such “assets” is lower than that of the most productive member states.

Table 1. R&I and its transformational impact on the country-specific recommendations Greece

Italy

2019

2020

2. Focus investmentrelated economic policy on . . . digital technologies, research and development, education, skills, employability, health, and the renewal of urban areas, taking into account regional disparities and the need to ensure social inclusion.

3. Focus investment on the green and digital transition, in particular on safe and sustainable transport and logistics, clean and efficient production and use of energy, environmental infrastructure and very-high capacity digital infrastructure and skills. Improve the effectiveness and digitalisation of the public administration and promote digital transformation of businesses.

Spain

3. Improve the access to capital, for start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises.

2. Increase labour market relevance of tertiary education.

4. Foster research, innovation, digital skills, and infrastructure through better-targeted investment and increase participation in vocational-oriented tertiary education.

2. Increase the skills level of the adult population, including digital literacy, by strengthening and broadening the coverage of the training component in adult qualification programmes. Improve higher education uptake, namely in science and technology fields.

3. Increase public investment in research and innovation and systematically carry out evaluations of support policies in this area to ensure their effectiveness. Increase cooperation between education and businesses with a view to mitigating existing skills mismatches.

2. Improve educational outcomes, also through adequate and targeted investment, and foster upskilling, including by strengthening digital skills.

2. Improve the skills level of the population, in particular their digital literacy, by making adult learning more relevant to the needs of the labour market. Increase the number of higher education graduates, particularly in science and information technology.

2. Increase cooperation between education and businesses with a view to improving the provision of labour market relevant skills and qualifications, in particular for information and communication technologies.

2017

2018

Portugal

3. Focus investment-related economic policy on research and innovation, and the quality of infrastructure, taking into account regional disparities. Improve the effectiveness of public administration, including by investing in the skills of public employees, by accelerating digitalisation. 2. Strengthen distance learning and skills, including digital ones. 3. Focus investment on the green and digital transition, in particular on clean and efficient production and use of energy, research and innovation, sustainable public transport, waste and water management as well as reinforced digital infrastructure to ensure the provision of essential services.

3. Focus investmentrelated economic policy on research and innovation, railway transport and port infrastructure, low carbon and energy transition.

2. Support the use of digital technologies to ensure equal access to quality education and training and to boost firms’ competitiveness. 3. Focus investment on the green and digital transition, in particular on clean and efficient production and use of energy, rail infrastructure and innovation.

3. Focus investmentrelated economic policy on fostering innovation, resource and energy efficiency . . . Enhance the effectiveness of policies supporting research and innovation

3. Focus investment on the green and digital transition, in particular on fostering research and innovation, clean and efficient production and use of energy, energy infrastructure, water and waste management and sustainable transport.

ECONOMY

137

The evolution of the country-specific recommendations (CSRs) prepared by the Council of the European Union for the member states in the context of the European Semester is quite telling in this regard. The European Semester is a yearly process carried out by the European Commission, providing a comprehensive analysis of the economic policy and the overall socio-economic situation of the member states. A so-called country report is prepared for each member state every year at the end of the process, based on which the council provides specific policy recommendations. Table 1 reports the number of cases in which R&I and related policy actions are included in the set of recommendations for Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. It can be seen how there were only two R&I-related CSRs in 2017, one each for Portugal and Spain. Furthermore, the focus was broadly on access to capital for startups (in Portugal) and on the relevance of tertiary education in the labour market (in Spain). By 2018, research, innovation, education, and digital-related recommendations had made their way more prominently to the council’s CSRs, increasingly so in the last couple of years. They include increasing the digital skills of the labour force, stepping up public investment in research because of its intrinsic characteristics benefitting society and economy as a whole, and improving cooperation between academia and businesses as a driver for innovation diffusion and take-up.28 The CSRs for the years 2019 and 2020 are the most revealing cases in point. In 2019, R&I appears across the board and, while maintaining a higher profile due to the general nature of the CSRs, it got more specific and detailed, with a few references to their potential impact on the economy. In 2020, following the outbreak of COVID-19, each country has one CSR explicitly setting twin transition— “Focus investment on the green and digital transition”—as the main target of investment and reform. As the European Semester process contributes to shaping reforms and policies in member states, the “institutionalisation” of R&I 138

ECONOMY

as the engine of productivity growth, resilience, and transformation in the CSRs can be taken as the sign of a paradigm shift. All of this is especially important for Southern European countries in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis and with the 2021–2027 programming period of the European funds on the horizon. These states’ relative position in the European landscape and their subdued productivity performance require swift action not just to finally narrow the gap between the most productive member states and themselves but also to transform their economies and societies into something more innovative, resilient, planet-friendly, and inclusive—both for the present generation and the generations to come. To meet this objective, audacious R&I policies are needed and the RRF represents a unique opportunity not to be missed. The author would like to thank Lukas Borunsky (working at the Directorate General for Research and Innovation of the European Commission at the time of writing) for his comments and suggestions on a previous draft of this contribution.

ENDNOTES 1 Global Economic Prospects, January 2021. A World Bank Group Flagship Report. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Washington, 2021. <https://bit.ly/355tVyL > 2 Policy Brief: COVID-19 and Transforming Tourism. United Nations World Tourist Organization. August 2020. <https:// bit.ly/3g2kHd2 > 3 Youth and Covid-19: Impacts on Jobs, Education, Rights and Mental Well-Being. Survey Report 2020. International Labour Organization, Geneva, 2020. <https://bit.ly/2ShjKo1 > 4 Ana Correia [et al.]: Innovation investment in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe: Building future prosperity and setting the ground for sustainable upward convergence. EIB Regional study. Publications Office of the European Union. December 2018. <https://bit.ly/2TaTX0Y > 5 Lewis Dijkstra–Hugo Poelman–Andrés Rodríguez-Pose: The Geography of EU Discontent. European Commission, Directorate-General for Regionaland Urban Policy, WP 12/2018. <https://bit.ly/3za6Clg > See also Andrés Rodríguez-Pose: The

revenge of the places that don’t matter (and what to do about

19 Buti–Messori.

it). Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society.

20 A more detailed discussion can be found in European

2018/1. 189–209. <https://doi.org/10.1093/cjres/rsx024 >

Commission: Science, Research and Innovation Performance

6 Kate Raworth: Doughnut Economics. Seven Ways to Think

of the EU. See particularly Chapter 3 and Figures 3-2.4 and

Like a 21 st Century Economist. Random House Business

3-2.6.

Books, London, 2017.

21 Rodriguez-Pose (2018) and Djikstra.

7 European Commission: Scie nce, Rese arch and

22 European Commission: Science, Research and Innovation

Innovation Performance of the EU, 2020. A fair, green and

Performance of the EU. See also Lukas Bounsky [et al.]: The

digital Europe. Publications Office of the European Union,

Geography of R&I and Productivity: Regional Disparities and

Luxembourg, 2020. <doi.org/10.2777/890488 > See also

Dynamics. Publications Office of the European Union,

European Commission: A New ERA for Research and

Luxembourg, 2020. <doi.org/10.2777/10591 >

Innovation. Staff Working Document. Publications Office of

23 Borunsky.

the European Union, Luxembourg, 2020. <doi.org/10.2777/

24 Borunsky.

605834 >

25 European Commission: Science, Research and Innovation

8 The sustainability paradigm is not new, as it dates back at

Performance of the EU 2020. See also Dan Andrews–Chiara

least to the publication of the report The Limits to Growth by

Criscuolo–Peter Gal: The Global Productivity Slowdown,

the Club of Rome in 1972, which mostly focussed on

Technology Divergence and Public Policy: A Firm Level

environmental sustainability. Over time, the framework

Perspective. OECD Background Paper. September 2016

evolved into its more recent multidimensional interpretation.

<https://bit.ly/2Sl1FFE >

For a historical and conceptual overview within the European

26 Borunsky. See also Andrés Rodriguez-Pose: The research

landscape, see, among others, Mario Biggeri–Andrea

and innovation divide in the EU and its economic

Ferrannini: Framing R&I for transformative change towards

consequences. Publications Office of the European Union,

sustainable development in the European Union. Independent

Luxembourg, 2020. <doi.org/10.2777/724313 >

Expert Report. Publications Office of the European Union,

27 European Commission: A New ERA for Research and

Luxembourg, 2020. <doi.org/10.2777/503127 >

Innovation.

9 Biggeri–Ferrannini.

28 Daniele Archibugi–Andrea Filippetti: The retreat of public

10 See also Special meeting of the European Council (17, 18,

research and its adverse consequences on innovation.

19, 20 and 21 July 2020)—Conclusions. EUCO 10/20.

Technological Forecasting and Social Change. 2018/

European Council, Council of the European Union. 21 July

February. 97–111. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2017.

2020. <https://bit.ly/3cpVPd1 >

05.022 >

11 European Commission: Science, Research and Innovation Performance of the EU. 12 Correia. 13 European Commission: Science, Research and Innovation Performance of the EU. 14 See Recovery and Resilience Facility. European Commission. <https://bit.ly/3pB4XAJ > Accessed: 9 June 2021. 15 European Commission: A New ERA for Research and Innovation. 16 Ibidem. 17 This does not mean that knowledge and innovation do not play or do not need to play a key role in a sustained productivity path in the long term as outlined, for instance, by Ana Correia and her colleagues in their above-cited working paper. 18 Marco Buti–Marcello Messori: Questa volta l’Italia non puo’ sbagliare. Luiss School of European Political Economy, Policy Brief 34/2020. 21 August 2020. <https://bit.ly/3g3R62D > ECONOMY

139

“FRIENDS OF COHESION” AND REGIONAL DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE SOUTH AND THE EAST OF THE EU Ágnes Vass The regional policy of the European Union (EU) plays a crucial role in addressing regional economic imbalances within the latter’s territory. After the enlargement waves in the early 2000s, a demand for a more consistent cohesion policy in the EU also emerged. The reason for this was that the 2004 and the subsequent enlargements were different from earlier accessions to the EU: the disparity of income between the “old” and the “new” member states was higher than following any previous round. The 2009 Treaty of Lisbon introduced territorial, economic, and social cohesion as one of its main objectives, and the chief aim of the cohesion policy became to support poorer regions and to make it possible for them to catch up with more developed ones. Cohesion policies are part of the multiannual financial framework (MFF), which determines the EU’s budget for a period of seven years. The cohesion policy for the 2021–2027 period allocates funds to all regions based on a division into three main categories: less developed, transitioning, and more developed regions. The allocation of these funds is mostly based on the GDP per capita of the given region. Looking at the development levels of the EU regions more closely, it is apparent that the difference between the “old south” and the new member states that joined the EU after 2004 is significant. The same is true for the impact of the cohesion funds on the regions in Southern and Central Europe. The reason for this difference is not only the lower GDP level at the latter area but also the smaller size of its countries’ national budgets. In the Central European member states, the EU has co-founded around half of all public spending on infrastructure. This ratio in Poland was around 60%, while, in Italy, it is around 12%, as the latter country has a relatively high GDP per capita. On the other hand, the highest relative EU contribution to public 140

ECONOMY

sector infrastructure development can be found in Portugal. These numbers refer to a national level, if we have a closer look at the less developed regions, however, figures are much higher. The effectiveness of the EU Cohesion Fund is a widely discussed topic, especially in the case of the EU15 (i.e., in the countries that became members prior to the 2004 enlargement round). The reason for this is that many regions in the “old” member states, mainly in the southern countries, have received structural funds for more than twentyfive years but have not yet converged with the regions of the northern member states.1 This claim is especially true for countries like Greece that went through different crises. Portuguese regions have also dropped back but not as significantly as some Greek regions. Italy is in a special situation in this regard, as, unlike Greece, it did not need to apply for funding from the financial stabilisation instruments during the financial crisis. Although most of the regions within the Visegrad Four (V4) were less developed at the time of their accession, all countries of the group have been able to converge since then, in contrast to those countries which accessed earlier and, therefore, have been receiving these funds for a longer period.2 Some of the member states are net contributors to the Cohesion Fund, while others—in fact, the majority of the member states—are its net beneficiaries; consequently, approaches towards the MFF and the cohesion fund money differ largely. The MFF includes the overall budget and spending priorities for a seven-year period and has to be agreed upon by all member states and approved by the European Parliament as well. Because of the complexity of the approval process, budgetary negotiations are always complicated, and sometimes it is not easy to reach an agreement. This complexity is increased by the existence of different factions and groupings among member

states, which is due to the abovementioned different priorities stemming from each country’s national net balance. During the negotiations of the MFF for the period of 2014–2020, Romania initiated the creation of the so-called “Friends of Cohesion” group, which included Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. The informal grouping’s main aim was to lobby for cohesion policy and prohibit further reductions in the cohesion policy.3 This aim created new alliances within the Southern and Central European member states: in 2012, for instance, the Portuguese and the Polish prime ministers teamed up to organise a summit in Brussels in order to avoid additional cuts in the 2014–2020 budget.4

Although both Southern and Central European countries are part of the “Friends of Cohesion” alliance, they are not invariably on the same page when it comes to finances. In 2010–2011, Slovakia, the only V4 country that is also a member of the eurozone, opted out of the first Greek bailout. It also became one of the main critics of eurozone bailouts, as Bratislava wanted to draw up stricter rules, and, in some cases, automatic sanctions against debtors. The background to this situation was that, after the 2009 Greek parliamentary elections and revelations about forged statistical data on budgetary deficits and public debts in the country, Athens was not able to obtain enough credit on the international market, which led to the need for its first bailout backed by the eurozone members. The

Gross domestic product (GDP) per inhabitant by NUTS 2 regions in 2008 (in percentage of EU-27 = 100)

<50 50–75 75–100 100–125 >125 Data not available

ECONOMY

141

recently elected Slovak government’s new minister of finance described the loan as a “moral gamble,” and the ruling parliamentary majority rejected a bilateral loan to Greece in August 2010.5 However, Greece was not alone with its situation, so eurozone member states agreed on the establishment of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The EFSF enabled emergency financial assistance to eurozone members hit hard by the financial crisis. The new Slovak government approved a EUR 4.37 billion Slovak contribution to the EFSF. It was also clear, however that this facility had to be made more far-reaching so that it could achieve its intended effective lending capacity. Obviously, that would have involved an increased Slovak contribution, which was deemed unacceptable by one of the coalition partners, so Slovakia ended up withdrawing its support for any temporary financial stabilisation mechanisms. Before the Slovak vote on the EFSF, Ireland, together with Portugal, also asked for financial aid, and a second Greek bailout was also expected in early 2011. These circumstances made the EFSF even less palatable to Slovakia, where a vote of confidence was called by the opposition, following the approval of the amendment of the EFSF. As one of the coalition parties abstained, the rest of the governing parties accepted support from the opposition party Smer in exchange for early elections. The amendment to the EFSF was approved, but the government eventually fell.6 Seven years later, in 2018, it was visible that, after Brexit, negotiations about the 2021–2027

budget would be even more complex than the previous ones. Brexit meant that its second-largest contributor had left the EU. When the European Commission presented the proposal for the new MFF in May 2018, the “Friends of Cohesion,” together with the European Parliament, supported a budget that was at least as large as the one proposed by the commission. The “Frugal Four,” on the other hand, required a budget of no more than 1% of the EU’s GNI: Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden wanted to avoid a higher contribution to the EU budget. These “rigid savers” wanted to operate within a “do-more-with-less” framework for the EU budget and were against any increase in the MFF. Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Finland, and Ireland mainly supported the modernisation of traditional expenditure policies and put emphasis on issues such as migration and border protection. Within this group of “moderate modernisers,” France supported the idea of increasing the MFF under certain circumstances, such as the introduction of a digital tax as a new source of own resources. Meanwhile, (former) net recipients from Southern and Central Europe were in favour of preserving the status quo. Their aim was to maintain agricultural and cohesion policy at the same level as it had been before.7 At the end of 2019, the Finnish presidency put forward a so-called negotiation box with proposals for further talks, but Charles Michel, the president of the European Council, also came up with his own bilateral consultations–based alternative. However, the member states united into

ECONOMY

Fi n

0.27

0.52

1.21

0.59

UK lan d Au s tr ia Sw ed Ne en th e r la nd s De Lu nma rk xe mb ou rg

2.20

29.40

32.16

42.52

44.84

44.86

an ia lan d La t vi a Hu ng ar y Slo va k Bu ia lga ria Ro ma nia Es to n Cz ia ec hia Gr ee ce Ma lta Slo ve nia Cy pru s Sp a in It a ly Ge rm an y Ire lan d Be lgi um Fra nc e

Lit

l ga

r tu

142

ti a

0.00

1.31

2.40

2.87

2.69

2.95

12.71

3.80

10.00

16.59

20.00

26.93

30.00

35.13

40.00

48.54

50.00

55.46

60.00

54.59

70.00

59.91

61.17

80.00

74.36

90.00

79.61

84.20

Chart 1: Percentage of cohesion policy funding in public investment per EU-28 member state between 2015 and 2017

two opposing groups: one of them was the group of the above mentioned “frugals,” who mainly supported areas such as innovation, science, and cyber defence, while the other was the “Friends of Cohesion” group, which, this time, also included Italy, whose aim was to maintain the sufficient level of resources for core areas of EU spending, such as the common agricultural policy and, obviously, cohesion policy.8 In November 2019, the seventeen members of the “Friends of Cohesion” group issued a joint declaration in Prague, in which they underlined that the EU budget for the next seven years should include the same level of cohesion funding as in the previous period but states should be given more flexibility in using these funds.9 The prime minister of Portugal played a leading role in the group by inviting all the leaders of the participating countries to Portugal in February 2020. Cohesion funds were important to Portugal, as more than 80% of public investment in the country was financed from them between 2015 and 2017. That was the highest share in the EU at the time. In the meantime, major net contributors suggested that the focus of EU finances should shift from traditional programmes to new priorities, given the fact that the EU has to face new global challenges, as also claimed by the von der Leyen Commission: cohesion funding would have been reduced by 10% in the commission’s original proposal, while the Finnish presidency put forward a 12% cut. The countries invited by Portugal, however, reaffirmed that they did not support the suggested slash in the 2021–2027 MFF, and they also highlighted the importance of the Cohesion Fund in the economic and social development of certain EU member states. Eventually, a joint declaration was signed by fifteen out of the seventeen participating states, more precisely, by all countries that joined the EU after 2004, as well as Greece, Portugal, and Spain.10 Croatia did not sign the declaration, as the country held the rotating presidency of the council at that time and wanted to keep a neutral stance. As we have seen, cohesion policy is crucial for both Southern and Central European countries, especially for those who are still struggling with the long-term effects of the economic crisis. The Visegrad Group has proved to be an effective basis

for consultation and cooperation and also has some valuable experiences in coordinating negotiations and consultations not only within its own group but together with other regional cooperation formats as well. Although the MFF is approved now, the experience of the “Friends of Cohesion” showed again the importance of regional cooperation and alliances that might play an even more important role in the future.

ENDNOTES 1 See Peter Berkowitz–Philipe Monfort–Jerzy Pieńkowski: Unpacking the growth impacts of European Union Cohesion Policy: transmission channels from Cohesion Policy into economic growth. Regional Studies. 2020/1. 60–71. <https://doi. org/10.1080/00343404.2019.1570491 >; Marco Percoco: Impact of European Cohesion Policy on regional growth: does local economic structure matter? Regional Studies. 2017/6. 833–843. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00343404. 2016. 1213382 >; Andrés Rodríguez-Pose–Lewis Dijkstra: Does Cohesion Policy reduce EU discontent and Euroscepticism? Regional Studies. 2021/2. 354– 369. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00343404.2020.1826040 > 2 Henry Goecke–Michael Hüther: Regional Convergence in Europe. Intereconomics. 2016/3. 165–171. <http://dx.doi. org/10.1007/s10272-016-0595-x > 3 Sessions of the “Friends of Cohesion” Group Conference on “EU Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–2020.” Governul României. 1 June 2012. <https://bit.ly/2OK75s3 > 4 Friends of Cohesion Policy meeting. Kancelarii Prezesa Rady Ministrów. 13 November 2012. <https://bit.ly/2PPrVH3 > 5 Ivan Mikloš: Grécko – kto to zaplatí a kto by mal. Aktuálně.cz. 13 May 2010. <https://bit.ly/3wTquI0 > 6 Grécko a euroval: Mal pád vlády Ivety Radičovej zmysel? EURACTIVE. 24 August 2018. <https://bit.ly/3wTA6Cy > 7 Peter Becker: A New Budget for the EU. Negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027. SWP Research Paper

2019/RP.

August

2019.

<https://doi.

org/10.18449/2019RP11 > 8 Alan Matthews: President Michel’s solution to the MFF conundrum. CAP Reform. 15 February 2020. <https://bit. ly/3a7pJBq > 9 Přátelé koheze: Společná deklarace k víceletému finančnímu rámci 2021–2027. Vláda České republiky. 5 November 2019. <https://bit.ly/3seAo3t > 10 Friends of Cohesion Joint Declaration on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027. República Portuguesa, XXII Governo. 1 February 2020. <https://bit.ly/3dTaGMU > ECONOMY

143

COMPANY SIZE IN ITALY, EXPORT PERFORMANCE, AND CHALLENGES TO DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION Michele Masulli THE ROOTS OF DOWNSIZING IN ITALIAN INDUSTRY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT Since World War II, a model of capitalism based on big business has been gradually spreading all over the world. It is a paradigm founded, among many reasons, on the technological superiority of large companies, which associated efficiency in modern industries with achieving important economies of scale. The expansion in size responded to the company’s need to increase its direct control over the widest possible range of activities, functionally linked to the core business, through a growing production verticalisation. On the other hand, diversification was the natural form of corporate risk reduction in a scenario of relatively repetitive and calculable events and a fairly stable market. The power of large corporations grew over both the demand for its products and the supply of the production factors necessary for its business. From the 1960s, the progressive concentration of productive activity into units of ever greater size and complexity seemed to be one of the immanent “laws” of industry development. It is no coincidence that, in the 1960s, the explanatory models of the functioning of large companies multiplied, attempting to provide a theoretical interpretation of the phenomenon. However, since the 1980s to the mid-1990s, the role of economies of scale in explaining industrial organisation has been radically reduced. At that time, the necessity arose to free the company from all those functions not allowing it to adapt to labour and capital inputs at the speed required by the market. Meanwhile, there was a need to concentrate resources on the company’s core business, which had already made it competitive in the 144

ECONOMY

market. For this reason, a path was taken which involved industry downsizing and restructuring in general. In recent decades, on the contrary, the pendulum has swung back again due to technological and market factors (on which we will not go into detail here), to support the reasons for big business. Throughout the period, however, Italy presented atypical features, compared to other European countries. At the beginning of the 1970s, the Italian manufacturing industry had a level of vertical production integration already much lower than that of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, de-verticalisation was clearly much stronger in the Italian industrial system than in other European countries. The limited size of its national market and the widespread persistence of locally concentrated markets, together with specialisation in sectors with high demand variability, actually favoured the strengthening of a large segment of smaller companies. Until the 1990s, the Italian industrial system had been marked by a robust public industry, complementary to the system of small and medium-sized private enterprises. Subsequently, with the wave of privatisation proceeding parallel to the process of European integration, the sale of public industries highlighted the problem of the dwarfism of Italian private companies. The end of public enterprises risked coinciding with that of large industry in Italy if large public enterprises were not to be replaced by large privately owned ones. It is in this period that the size question of Italian industry came to the fore in public debate. The myth of small business collapsed, and the conviction of “small is beautiful” vanished. The strengthening of intellectual property rights involved new forms of industrial

gigantism, and production around the world was divided into global value chains. The minimum-size threshold guaranteeing market competitiveness increased and, compared to the past, there arose a need for a greater ability to internally develop organisations, skills, and activities and to manage an increasingly complex market system. Small firms continued to play a role only when in synergy with large firms. Thus, confidence was also lost in the Italian model of industrial development, based on a system of small and medium-sized, often family-run, private enterprises. In fact, Italy has not followed either of the two main paths, the American or the German, which have led to building up managerial companies starting from family businesses. 1 Following different methods, internal management selection rules and mechanisms are formed in both of the above cases, while the role of the family becomes diluted as the shareholder base expands—or it is just reduced to a strategic management role. SMALL FIRMS AND PRODUCTIVITY On the one hand, the conjecture that small business is synonymous with inefficiency has been widely refuted, also by empirical research,

and, in the Italian case, for several decades. Some seminal contributions by Sebastiano Brusco had already warned that company size in terms of employees is not an adequate indicator for assessing company efficiency.2 Conversely, the technology standards of small firms can be similar to those of larger firms and lead to comparable levels of efficiency. Small businesses or small business systems can also be more efficient than large companies. Using the results of the permanent census on businesses, Roberto Monducci3 has recently revealed that the levels of labour productivity are much higher in small and medium-sized production units with a high or medium-high dynamism4 than those of larger firms with a lower degree of dynamism (see Chart 1). On the other hand, it appears clear that the lack of size growth in the Italian business system has a negative impact on productivity levels or, as we will see, on the export or adoption of ICT technologies. The Italian production structure has long suffered from a productivity malaise, being stagnant since the beginning of the early 2000s, and even turning into a decline in the period following the Great Recession. This is a widespread phenomenon, affecting a large part of the OECD countries. In the United States,

Chart 1: Labour productivity by level of dynamism and size class in Italy in 2019 (enterprises with ten or more employees, value added per p.e. in KEUR) 120

100

10–19

20–49

50–99

100–249

250+

Total

 Low  Medium-low  Medium  Medium-high  High ECONOMY

145

labour-productivity growth more than halved from 2.8% in 1995–2004 to 1.3% in 2005– 2015.5 A similar trend can be seen in twentynine out of thirty countries analysed in the same study, which shows an average contraction of 1.2 percentage points. The Italian picture is even more disappointing with the Italian slowdown in productivity actually being older and deeper. Between 1995 and 2015, Italian labour productivity, measured in terms of added value per hour of work, grew at a rate of only 0.3%, compared to an EU average of 1.6%. 6 Similarly, GDP also experienced a much lower growth trend than that of the EU average. Furthermore, differences in productivity growth among firms have widened with a few high-yielding companies increasing in terms of productivity, production, and sales, while most enterprises have stagnated. SMEs AND ITALIAN EXPORT PERFORMANCE At the same time, the Italian economy has a great strength in exports. Italy is the ninth exporter of goods in the world with USD 547 billion in goods sold abroad in 2018, and it is second only to Germany for trade balance surplus, with EUR 54.6 billion in 2019 (against the EUR 200 billion of Germany, the EUR 37.5 billion of Spain, and the EUR 23.7 billion deficit of France). In 2019, Italian goods exports made up 25.5% of the national income. This is higher than in France (22.2%) and Spain (23.6%) but lower when compared to Germany (37.9%). Besides, it should be noted that the percentage of exports in GDP would increase to 31.6% with the export of services included. In this case, the Italian figure is lower than that of the other major European countries, considering the lower weight the exports of services carry in proportion to the country’s economy. Moreover, the Italian export of goods has increased to a much greater extent than the country’s GDP over the last decade. Since 2010, the national product, calculated at chain-linked prices, has shown an average annual growth in the order of one-tenth of a percentage point. The export of goods, on the other hand, increased by 2.7% 146

ECONOMY

on an annual average between 2010 and 2019. Therefore, the share of exports of the GNP is also higher. 7 Italy has an essential share of small and medium-sized enterprises in its system of exporting enterprises. Eurostat data shows that 65% of Italian companies exporting goods have fewer than ten, and 28% between ten and forty-nine employees. By contrast, in Germany, companies with between ten and forty-nine employees make up 22% of all exporting companies, while, in Spain, 20%, and, in France, 25%. However, Italy, like Spain, shows a lower ratio of medium-sized enterprises (with 50 to 249 employees) among its exporting companies: only 6% against 9% in Germany and France. Similarly, Italy, one of the largest countries in Europe, has a smaller percentage of large companies involved in selling on foreign markets. These make up 1% in Italy, against 2% in Spain, 3% in Germany, and 4% in France. The picture, however, is reversed when we consider the share of exports in value by company size class. Although representing 65% of the total, microenterprises accounted for only 5% of Italian goods exports in 2018. Small enterprises, in turn, represented 17%, and medium enterprises 29%. Finally, large companies, despite the previously mentioned fact that they make up only 1% of the total, account for almost half (48%) of Italian exports. Nevertheless, even in this case, Italy has the highest figure in the class of small businesses, compared to its major European partners. Companies with between ten and forty-nine employees boast 6% of the export value in Germany, 7% in France, and 14% in Spain, against 17% in Italy. Therefore, in a European comparison, the small business segment is the specificity of the Italian export production system in terms of both the number of companies and its share in exports. Conversely, the greatest distance between Italy and France or Germany is in the role of large companies. Companies with over 249 employees account for 78% of exports from France and 77% from Germany, against 48% in Italy and 49% in Span (see Chart 2). 8

Chart 2: Value of goods exports by size class for exporting enterprises (%, 2018) 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Germany

France

Italy

Spain

 0–9 employees  10–49 employees  50–249 employees  more than 249 employees THE “EXPORT THRESHOLD” FOR ITALIAN ENTERPRISES From the data reported, it is clear that the relationship between company size, productivity, and exports affects the Italian economic context. This has been analysed extensively in economic literature.9 Numerous empirical studies have found a direct relationship between export and size. Exporting firms tend to be larger than non-exporting. 10 Therefore, the company size class is important to explain the ability to export. Here, it is necessary to investigate the main factors that favour sales performance in foreign markets and the extent to which they are correlated with company size. Among the factors internal to the company, we can include the quality of production input, research and development activities, the adoption of ICT technologies, the propensity for innovation, and the skills of managers.11 The availability of these factors can vary depending on the size of the firm.12 External factors may also be responsible for the heterogeneity between small and large firms.13 For example, larger sizes weaken the constraint represented by sunk costs. Larger companies can better cope with the many costs that working in foreign markets entails, and, being less subject to credit constraints, they have easier access to financing. The literature discusses the existence of some export thresholds underlying the explanation of the heterogeneity of firms. That is, only companies

that exceed a given level of productivity are able to export. 14 Export is also a source of learning (just think of the concept of learning by exporting). The literature shows that firms upgrade their technology and productivity after entering foreign markets.15 Stefano Costa and his colleagues worked out an “export threshold,” understood as the minimum combination of productivity and “economic size” (a broad measure of company size involving employment, age, turnover, and capital intensity), which corresponds to the transition zone between a non-exporter and an exporter.16 In addition, they analysed the potential discrepancy between the conditions required for a company to become an exporter and the pattern of technology adoption within the business sector. Therefore, a four-class taxonomy is derived, which qualifies the comparison between exporting and nonexporting firms on the basis of their technological level within the industrial sector (see Chart 3). Therefore, four groups of companies arise: • Natural exporters: high-tech enterprises that are productive and/or large enough to export. • Fragile exporters: low-tech companies that are productive and/or large enough to export. • Potential exporters: high-tech companies that are neither productive nor large enough to export. • Domestics: low-tech companies that are neither productive nor large enough to export. ECONOMY

147

According to them, Italian manufacturing is a polarised system. 17 The domestic group represents the majority of companies in almost all production sectors, but the natural exporters account for the lion’s share in terms of value added and turnover. There is a significant aspect linked to the size of the company—in all sectors, potential exporters are small businesses, with fewer than fifty employees. Therefore, this taxonomy class includes firms that are generally small (possibly undersized) and yet have an important economic dimension—perhaps due to relatively high levels of turnover and/or capital intensity, or because of long-term activity— and technological levels comparable to those of natural exporters. Furthermore, potential exporters are considerably smaller and more productive than fragile exporters in almost all sectors. On average, to ensure that potential exporters exceed the export threshold, a size

recovery appears to be more relevant than an increase in productivity. On the other hand, for fragile exporters to become natural exporters, the growth in productivity appears to be more important than an increase in size. SIZE AND ICT TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION Overall, it can be observed that the digitisation rate of Italian companies is still relatively low, showing progressive signs of improvement for some technologies, such as cloud computing, but low adoption values (even lower than in previous surveys) concerning the use of big data applications, enterprise resource planning (ERP) solutions, and customer relationship management (CRM) software for the management of marketing activities. Smaller companies are generally behind in adopting new technologies, thus constituting the least resistant segment and the most deserving for support and incentives.

Productivity

Chart 3: The taxonomy of firm export orientation

Economic size Technology Potential exporters

148

ECONOMY

Export

Export threshold (Ze)

Fragile exporters

Domestics

Technology line (Zt)

Natural exporters

Looking at specific technologies, a determining factor in cloud adoption is company size. The use of the cloud between 2016 and 2018 remained quite stable among small businesses (up to fifty employees), rising from 19.8% to 20.1%. Among medium-sized enterprises (50–249 employees), on the other hand, there was a growth from 29.9% to 37.2%. However, the band with the highest adoption rate is made up of larger companies (at least 250 employees), where it is well over half of the sample (56.4%). In 2018, only 5.8% of companies with fewer than fifty employees used big data services, down from 7.7% recorded in 2016. Decreasing use also emerges among medium-sized companies, where the utilisation rate dropped from 18.1% to 8.6%, while the adoption of big data services among larger companies was more stable (30.5% in 2018). Moreover, in 2019, ERP was adopted by 31.7% of small Italian companies, 62.8% of medium-sized companies, and 77% of large ones. CRM for marketing purposes was used by 15% of Italian companies. In detail, small enterprises made up 13.1%, medium 27.5%, and large 35.3% of its users.18 The full applicability of the digital transformation at all company levels can only be guaranteed through a constant enhancement of the employees’ technological skills. The percentage of enterprises having empleyees specialised in the ICT sector is strongly correlated to the number of employees and the size of the company, starting from 11.8% for small companies to 45% for medium-sized ones. Among large companies, almost three out of four (73.1%) have ICT specialists among their employees. Only 16.7% of small businesses had organised training courses to develop or to update these skills during the year, while 38.4% of medium-sized companies had done so. Instead, large companies display a percentage of trained employees that exceeds 60%.19 At the crossroads between exports and digital technologies lies the possibility of online sales abroad. E-commerce can offer a number of advantages, ranging from the ability to reach global markets, otherwise difficult to access,

and the reduction of trade barriers to significant cost savings, by virtue of the complete automation of the purchasing process (and the reduced need for additional staff) and increased cash flow. Currently, only 8.3% of Italian companies sell online and, where company size is concerned, this percentage drops to 8.2% for SMEs while increasing to 12.8% for large companies. CONCLUSIONS In this brief contribution, I have retraced the reasons for downsizing the Italian industrial system and its specific features compared to other major European countries. I have analysed how company size correlates with productivity, technological advancement, exports, and the adoption of digital technologies. For this reason, it appears that policy makers place initiatives promoting company size growth at the heart of their agenda. Therefore, drivers fostering the transition of companies towards profiles with greater growth potential must be identified. First of all, measures must be introduced to strengthen the capitalisation of small and medium-sized enterprises. Furthermore, horizontal industrial policies (as well as vertical interventions on particularly promising supply chains) need to be implemented. For these reasons, contextual measures, for instance, physical and digital infrastructures, access to the banking system, and support for cooperation between companies (through, e.g., network contracts or technological clusters) are essential. At the same time, it is useful to stimulate specific forms of investment such as in Industry 4.0 tools and enabling technologies. Moreover, the internationalisation of businesses should be encouraged through the provision of appropriate skills, tools, and capital. Innovation plays a key role in increasing company efficiency and production. Investments in innovation also allow for an efficiency recovery in those companies with stagnant productivity. Here, the incentive to invest in tangible and intangible capital, intramural R&D and external purchase, and ECONOMY

149

the acquisition of licenses and patents and software and data analysis services cannot be overlooked. Private investment in R&D must be accompanied by an increase in public spending in basic research and technology transfer, which is currently inadequate in Italy compared to European standards. On the other hand, investment in technology must be integrated with strengthening human capital, both in terms of employee know-how and skills and increase in management capabilities.

experience and export intensity in SMEs: A longitudinal approach to complex relationships. International Business Review. 2005/6. 719 –738. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j. ibusrev.2005.07.004 >; Juan A. Máñez-Castillejo–María Engracia Rochina Barrachina–Juan A. Sanchis-Llopis: Does Firm Size Affect Self-selection and Learning-by-Exporting? The World Economy. 2010/3. 315–346. <https://doi.org/10. 1111/j.1467-9701.2010.01258.x > 11 Chad Syverson: What Determines Productivity? Journal of Economic Literature. 2011/2. 326–365. 12 Danny Leung–Cesaire Meh–Yaz Terajima: Productivity in Canada: Does Firm Size Matter? Bank of Canada Review. 2008/Autumn. 7–16. <https://bit.ly/3iWhldp >

ENDNOTES

13 James R. Tybout: Manufacturing Firms in Developing

1 Ugo Pagano: Quale modello di capitalismo per l’Italia?

Countries: How Well Do They Do, and Why? Journal of

Intervento di Ugo Pagano. Pandora Rivista. 16 January

Economic Literature. 2000/1. 11–44.

2021. <https://bit.ly/3xigHus >

14 Marc J. Melitz: The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry

2 Sebastiano Brusco: Organiz za zione del lavoro e

Reallocations and Aggregate Industr y Productivit y.

decentramento produttivo nel settore metalmeccanico. In:

E c o n o m e t r i c a.

Sindacato e piccola impresa: strategia del capitale e azione

org/10.1111/1468-0262.00467 > See also Marc J. Melitz–

sindacale nel decentramento produttivo, edited by Flm di

Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano: Market Size, Trade, and

Bergamo. De Donato, Bergamo, 1974.

Productivity. The Review of Economic Studies. 2008/1.

3 Roberto Monducci: Nuove misurazioni della struttura,

<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00463.x >

compor tamenti e strategie delle imprese italiane.

15 Paula Bustos: Trade Liberalization, E xpor ts, and

Presentation at the event “Imprese che guardano al futuro.

Technology Upgrading: Evidence on the Impact of

I primi risultati del Censimento permanente del 2019,”

MERCOSUR on Argentinian Firms. American Economic

20 0 3 /6.

16 9 5 –1725.

<h t t p s: //d o i.

organised by Istituto Nazionale di Statistica in Milan on 7

Review. 2011/1. 304 – 340. <ht tps://doi.org /10.1257/

Februrary 2020.

aer.101.1.304 >

4 The degree of “dynamism” is a synthesis of their

16 Stefano Costa [et al.]: Tech on the ROC: Export Threshold

propensity to innovate, to invest in technologies, to digitise,

and Technology Adoption Interacted. LEM Working Paper

to train their staff (particularly ICT), to modernise their

Series 2019/38. 2019/December. <https://bit.ly/35J9YOw >

business organisation and production processes, and to

17 Costa.

pay attention to environmental sustainability and social

18 La trasformazione digitale per il Made in Italy. Sfide e

issues.

scenari in tempi di crisi. Istituto per la Competitività. 3

5 Chad Sy verson: Challenges to Mismeasurement

December 2020. <https://bit.ly/3zd5VXL >

Explanations for the US Productivity Slowdown. The Journal

19 Idem.

of Economic Perspectives. 2017/2. 165–186. 6 Based on data from Eurostat. 7 The author’s calculations based on Eurostat data. 8 The author’s calculations based on Eurostat data. 9 Joachim Wagne r: Inte r national trade a nd f ir m performance: a survey of empirical studies since 2006. Review of World Economics. 2012/2. 235–267. <https://doi. org/10.1007/s10290-011-0116-8 > 10 Joachim Wagner: Exports, Firm Size, and Firm Dynamics. Small Business Economics. 1995/1. 29–39. <https://doi. org/10.1007/BF01074314 >; Antonio Majocchi–Emanuele Bacchiocchi – Ulrike Mayrhofer: Firm size, business 150

ECONOMY

START-UPS AND COMPETITIVENESS IN MEDITERRANEAN EUROPE Giusy Massaro Start-ups are at the centre of policy interest because, although their projects are very risky, and their survival rates quite low, those that survive and succeed may have a large economic impact on a country’s economy. In Mediterranean Europe, starting a new business is not easy. Looking at the report Doing Business 2020, published by the World Bank,1 the score assigned to the “Starting a business” dimension—which involves dealing with procedures, as well as the time, cost, and paid-in minimum capital needed to start a limited liability company—ranks Italy as the secondworst performing country among the countries of the Mediterranean area (see chart 1). Its score is 86.8, just a little higher than that of Croatia (85.3). It lags behind New Zealand, the bestperforming country, by 13 points, and Greece, the best European performer, by 9 points.2 Italy’s main problem is its bureaucracy requiring seven procedural steps to set up a business (which, in Greece, only requires three). In addition, the whole process is time-consuming, taking eleven days on average, almost three times more than in Greece or France—and, above all, it is expensive. In Italy, 13.8% of the per capita income is needed to start a new business—the highest percentage within Mediterranean Europe—while it is 10.8% in Albania, and 0.7% in France, the best performer in this respect.3 Looking at the number of new enterprises set up between 2012 and 2018, the Italian trend appears quite stagnant: the number of the country’s start-ups increased by only 2.8% over these six years, which is barely better than in Croatia, a country that experienced a sudden decrease in 2014 but could then recover over the next four years (see chart 2). Spain, France, and Portugal, on the other hand, experienced significant growth in the number of new

enterprises, ranging from 30% in Spain to over 40% in Portugal over the same period.4 In 2014, under the so-called Horizon 2020 programme, the European Commission’s DirectorateGeneral for Communications Networks, Content and Technology launched the Startup Europe initiative, aimed to coordinate linking clusters and ecosystems across Europe and to make different EU initiatives more consistent. The beneficiaries of the six projects under the Startup Europe initiative—Digistart, Welcome, ePlus, Startup Scaleup, Twist, and Startup Europe Partnership—largely come from the Iberian Peninsula (almost 40% of them are from there), followed by Italy and Germany, each having some 10% of them. However, countries with the largest number of start-up beneficiaries (for instance, Spain) show the lowest rate of venture capital (VC) funding received. On the contrary, Northern European and Scandinavian start-ups are fewer in number but more appealing to VC investors. Moreover, the project also showed how beneficiaries suffered mainly from financial constraints and low VCfunding continuity, struggling to go beyond the first round. In addition, project beneficiaries— especially Portuguese, Italian, and Spanish— were mostly local start-ups with only a few becoming international scale-ups. Finally, nearly 90% of the founders were male, and this figure increases with the age and the development stage of the firms.5 THE START-UP ECOSYSTEM IN ITALY In Italy, the concept of innovative start-ups was introduced in Decree Law 179/2012, aimed at fostering the creation and growth of the country’s start-up ecosystem. An extensive package of incentives was laid out to support this type ECONOMY

151

of firms at all stages of its life cycle—from incorporation to expansion and to maturity— with the purpose to spur sustainable growth, enhance productivity, and spread an innovationdriven entrepreneurial culture across the entrepreneurial ecosystem as a whole, including small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), large corporations, incubators, accelerators, and academia. The incentives include free and digital incorporation, exemption from stamp duties and other fees to the Chambers of Commerce, exceptions to general company law, the extension of the deadline to cover losses, derogation from the rules on dummy companies and companies reporting systematic losses, exemption from the obligation to affix a conformity visa for VAT credits compensation, tailor-made labour regulations, the possibility of remunerating staff in a flexible way, remuneration through equity instruments, tax incentives for equity investors, fundraising through equity crowdfunding campaigns, simplified access to the SME Guarantee Fund, ad hoc services for the internationalisation of start-ups by the Italian Trade Agency, “fail fast” procedures, and conversion into an innovative SME. Other innovation policies have been introduced over time through several budget laws (research Chart 1: Starting a business score in Mediterranean Europe countries according to the World Bank in 2020 100.0 96.0 95.0

93.1 90.9

90.0 86.9

86.8 85.0

91.8

88.2

85.3

80.0

152

ECONOMY

ce Gr ee

Fra nc e

Po rtu ga l Alb an ia

Ma lta

Sp ain

Ita ly

Cr oa tia

75.0

and development tax credit, patent box, “startup sponsors” providing for the transfer of losses of new companies, a voucher for innovation managers) and by the National Plan for Industry 4.0 (hyper-depreciation for purchasing machinery and “Industry 4.0” technologies), as well as other initiatives. The 2019 Simplification Decree gave the platform a legal value. Thus, it can be helpful for VC funds and business angels looking for new high-potential investment opportunities and for established businesses, eager to establish new open-innovation partnerships. Today, the Italian start-up ecosystem numbers around 12,200 innovative start-ups. Most of them (approximately 3,200, i.e., 26% of the total) can be found in Lombardy in Northern Italy, which is the most developed region from an economic and entrepreneurial point of view. They are mainly involved in providing business— predominantly information and communication— services (78% of them are involved in these activities).6 THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON INNOVATIVE START-UPS The epidemiological emergency has not spared innovative start-ups either. Although these seem to have shown greater resilience than traditional businesses, some have faced a demand reduction and suffered from liquidity problems. In some cases, they have resorted to extreme measures such as salary reductions or payroll subsidies. In addition, there has also been a capital shock where, in many cases, fundraising activities were dramatically interrupted or decreased. Consequently, start-ups and venture capital funds have requested the government to intervene through direct and indirect subsidies, a reduction in bureaucracy, a specific tax regime, as well as specific labour laws which provide tax relief, work benefits, zero tax wedge, and a particular focus on remote working. Through the so-called Decreto Rilancio (literally “Recovery Decree”), the Italian Government has also introduced the following additional measures:

Chart 2: Newborn enterprises between 2012 and 2018 150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 2012

2013 Spain

2014 France

1. Non-repayable

grants to purchase development services (EUR 10 million) 2. Support for venture capital (EUR 200 million) 3. Tax credit to start-ups for extra muros R&D activities 4. EUR 200 million from the Central Guarantee Fund for SMEs, reserved to innovative startups and SMEs 5. Additional incentives to invest in innovative start-ups for national and foreign investors 6. An expansion in the benefits of the Smart&Start Italia Programme FEMALE AND YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN ITALIAN START-UPS In Italy, the rate of female participation is very low with only 12.5% of innovative start-ups having a female majority (i.e., a female percentage of shareholders and directors higher than 50%). Friuli-Venezia Giulia is the region with the lowest percentage of start-ups owned or managed by women (9.5%). It is below the national average by about three percentage points and very far from the rates recorded in the best-performing regions—which are all located in Southern Italy. Similarly, less than 10% of the start-ups

2015 Italy

2016 Portugal

2017

2018

Croatia

belong to this category in Trentino-Alto Adige, Piedmont, and Liguria.7 The situation is very similar as far as youthmajority start-ups are concerned, as they represent only 18% of national innovative start-ups. In this case, southern regions can be found both at the top (Molise and Sicily) and the bottom (Abruzzo) of the ranking. 8 It is interesting to note that northern regions tend to perform worse in having women and young people among start-up founders, a finding that runs contrary to general labour-market trends. This may partly be explained by the wider availability of public support schemes in Southern Italy. Besides, there is also evidence that gender and youth disparities in business are intertwined. Young women have a much lower entrepreneurial propensity than their male peers, and a look at the intersection between the two categories of start-ups provides interesting insights (see chart 3). Start-ups led by young women alarmingly represent only 2.8% of the total—compared to 15.2% led by young men—and all regions cluster around that value except for Molise (13%) and Basilicata ECONOMY

153

Chart 3: Innovative start-ups that have both a female majority and youth majority in March 2021 24.0% 22.0% 20.0% 18.0% 16.0% 14.0% 12.0% 10.0% 8.0% 6.0% 5.0% 2.0% y Ro E m mi a li Fr gna a iul iV Va .G ll e . d’A os ta

t Lo

ru Ab

ini

rd Sa

Ve n

Tr e

ino

It a

zi o

ar M

uli

Tu s

nia

ria

ia ur

lab

Lig

c il Si

ica

s il Ba

o li

0.0%

 Young female majority  Young male majority

(8%). Thus, the under-representation of young women in entrepreneurship is quite prevalent throughout the country.9 THE CONTRIBUTION OF ITALIAN INNOVATIVE START-UPS TO REVENUE AND JOB CREATION According to our estimates, the 12,200 innovative start-ups currently existing on a national level generate a value between EUR 1.5 and EUR 4.9 billion, a sum of which northern regions have about 60%, while the remaining part is evenly divided between Central and Southern Italian regions (see chart 4). These numbers are not very high in relative terms but still interesting.10 Furthermore, according to the data in the last report released by the Ministry of Economic Development, there were almost 17,000 people employed in innovative start-ups at the end of 2019, which means a 25% increase over the previous year and confirms a steady strengthening in terms of start-up-employment potential. Considering shareholders, too, there were about 61,500 jobs at stake in this sector in 2019, and, according to I-Com’s current estimates, the employment generated by the ecosystem of innovative start-ups could reach up to 80,000 jobs.11 154

ECONOMY

THE ITALIAN CHALLENGES Low productivity growth Italy has been suffering from a lack of productivity growth since the mid-1990s. In the country, there are several historical institutional frictions that have resulted in a fragmented productive system, where firms are smaller and older than their counterparts in other developed economies, and resources are less efficiently allocated. Italian enterprises display a limited aptitude for innovation and internationalisation, and poor management skills and financial vulnerability are prevalent among them. These firms did not benefit from the revolution in information and communication technology and were negatively impacted by the trends in globalisation between the 1990s and early 2000s. Because of their fragility, they suffered acutely from the credit crunch and demand shocks during the Great Recession between 2007 and 2009. Young innovative start-ups have particularly been affected by these frictions. In their case, effective contract enforcement and civil justice are important factors in explaining firm dynamics, while tax evasion and corruption prevent them from innovating and entering the market. As a result, young companies in Italy have a lower and shorter growth rate than those in other countries.

Demand for innovation In addition, the structural features of the Italian business sector tend to depress domestic demand for innovative goods or services, as small firms are less likely to acquire these because they lack resources to bear the risk of innovation. Moreover, most Italian SMEs are family owned, and family firms tend to make fewer efforts to innovate and are less inclined to turn to external sources. In the meantime, larger Italian corporations and business groups, instead of compensating for this, seem to be even less likely to acquire goods and services from innovative start-ups. Finally, the last actor that could potentially be an important acquirer of innovative goods and services is the public sector, as public procurement could be an important driver of innovation, especially in the health, defence, and education sectors and public administration. Nevertheless, Italian public authorities are often more focussed on expenditure reduction than on innovation, while the bureaucracy ties up procedures, which, consequently, prevents the public sector from taking on the role of an innovation driver. Entrepreneurial culture Probably the trickiest issue in Italy is the entrepreneurial culture. There are still too few entrepreneurs who invest in new innovative companies. In large firms, innovation is very difficult, because of the complicated and timeconsuming procedures and the lack of skills. Start-ups, on the other hand, know how to innovate—but they need capital. Based on the 360 Entrepreneurial Index,12 Italy ranked 19th out of the 28 EU countries in 2019, with a score of 52.5, behind France and Spain (which were the 12th and 17th with 78 and 58.1 scores) but ahead of Portugal (which was he 23rd with 41.1 scores) and Greece, the last in the ranking with a score of 17.2. In particular, Italy performs poorly in terms of the total amount of equity investments entering the business system to finance start-ups and larger investments typically aimed at financing the scale-up phase. The performance is paradoxically better concerning outcomes: despite the country’s

less mature ecosystem, the few investments in start-ups have turned out to be successful in terms of exits or unicorns.13 At the same time, countries traditionally recognised for their excellent performance in terms of investments in start-ups, France included, are in positions even lower than Italy’s as far as the above aspects concerned. Venture capital markets Finance is an essential component of start-up growth and scale-up. Innovative start-ups with high growth potential are generally considered more suited to seeking equity financing—mainly through venture capital investments—than asking for a loan. That is because equity can be used to support long-term development plans without the burden of high or changing interest rates and debt repayment on nascent businesses. In addition, VC investors are specialised in scouting the best investment opportunities, providing mentorship, advice, and a network of business contacts. Unfortunately, the venture capital market in Italy is still underdeveloped. In 2016, firms operating in Germany and France received roughly USD 1 billion and USD 894 million, respectively, while Italy received only USD 96 million in VC financing (see chart 5). In relative terms, Italy received the least amount of VC as a Chart 4: The contribution of Italian innovative start-ups to revenue creation by geographical area in March 2021 (EUR) 3,000,000 2,881,638 2,500,000 2,000,000 1,500,000 1,000,000

1,036,351

969,608 500,000 0

Northern Italy

Central Italy

Sothern Italy

ECONOMY

155

proportion of its GDP, while, for example, France received more than six times more (0.03% vs 0.005%). From 2010 to 2016, Germany, France, Spain, and Ireland saw an increase in VC investments, while Italy witnessed only a slight increase during this period.14 Considerable differences can also be found in the number of VC-backed companies across the EU and within its members themselves. France is ranked second with the highest number of VC-backed companies and saw an increase over the 2010–2016 period. While Spain and Italy also witnessed an increase in the number of firms backed by VCs, Spain markedly outperformed Italy in the period. In addition, French, Italian, and Spanish investors invest more in firms based in their own countries. However, firms in France and, to a lesser extent, Spain—despite the smaller size of its economy—attract more investments from the United States and the rest of the world than Italy, further illustrating the disparities in the size of the VC markets in these countries. As a result of these considerations, credit often becomes an alternative source of financing for innovative start-ups in Italy, although there are several reasons why it may not be the most appropriate source of capital. Innovative start-ups are generally seen as too

risky, and failure rates as too high, to meet the requirements of a bank’s lending portfolio. They often rely on intangible assets that are difficult to be used as collateral for lending, and they usually do not generate revenues early enough to meet interest rate payments and for the loan to be repaid. To strengthen the local VC market, the Italian Government launched the National Innovation Fund through the 2019 Budget Law, with about EUR 1 billion in funds and EUR 200 million allocated for start-ups. The fund is managed by the Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (Deposits and Loans Fund) and is supposed to bring together and multiply public and private resources for innovation. The operational tool of the National Fund is venture capital to support start-ups, scale-ups, and innovative SMEs. However, it is worth highlighting that the problem in Italy is not only a matter of the supply side of financing but also the different demand-side factors. Indeed, when it comes to the role of entrepreneurial ability in financing and investment decisions, entrepreneurs may not have the skills necessary to properly assess the pros and cons of different opportunities. This may be a particular problem in a country like Italy that is handicapped by the relatively low levels of financial education.

Chart 5: The VC market in Mediterranean European countries in 2010 and in 2016

156

ECONOMY

er th Ne

 2010  2016

ly It a

um lgi

lan

y an rm Ge

ly It a

lgi Be

lan er

lan

ed Sw

Ire

nc Fr a

an rm Ge

 2010  2016

0 en

100

0 d

200

100 a in

300

200

300

500 400

800

a in

700

800

Ire

800

700

900

800

1000

900

1000

Number of VC-backed companies

Fr a

VC investments (USD million)

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS There is a need to balance the support from equity and debt financing, even more so because, as was already mentioned, equity financing is more suited to high-growth and high-risk innovative start-ups. The significant provision for debt guarantees might induce highpotential start-ups to opt for a slower growth path based on debt financing instead of equity injections. Governments should also allocate their public resources more to investments in VC than to public guarantees so as to solve the persistent and striking underdevelopment of the VC market in Italy by overcoming the market failures of the private VC market and the lack of a “critical mass.” This should go hand in hand with complementary policies aimed at facilitating access to the market for high-potential start-ups. In addition, making innovative entrepreneurship also accessible to “outsiders,” for example, female, young, and foreign entrepreneurs, has become an urgency. Entrepreneurship can act as a powerful driver for social mobility and inclusiveness, which are particularly needed in Italy. Besides, academic entrepreneurship seems to be less developed in Italy than in other major European economies; therefore, actions aimed at further lowering entry barriers may help tackle this issue. Furthermore, it is foreseen that the Italian government is ready to put even more effort into reducing fiscal and bureaucratic burdens on start-ups in order to facilitate the experimentation and entrepreneurship of highly skilled individuals with no or little entrepreneurship experience. Finally, the policy debate in Italy seems to be much more responsive to the needs of established incumbents that undergo temporary distress than the problems of young companies. Therefore, leaving more room for advocacy groups of innovative entrepreneurship to become more influential in the public debate would probably be useful in the country. In conclusion, an effective start-up policy is not enough to create inn ovative entrepreneurship a supportive environment, while horizontal reforms that provide a more favourable business environment are also disproportionally beneficial for young and small businesses.

ENDNOTES 1 Doing Business 2020. Comparing Business Regulation in 190 Economies. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Washington, 2020. <doi. org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1440-2 > 2 Idem. See also Doing Business Data. The World Bank, Doing Business. <https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data > Accessed: 24 August 2020. 3 See Doing Business 2020 and Doing Business Data. 4 Data is compiled by the author based Eurostat figures. 5 Joint Research Centre—Annual Report 2018. European Commission, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2019. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2760/826410 > 6 Data elaborated by the author and InfoCamere. For the raw data, see The companies of Italian innovators (webpage) <https://bit.ly/3B54gnQ > 7 Data elaborated by the author and InfoCamere. 8 Data elaborated by the author and InfoCamere. 9 Data elaborated by the author and InfoCamere. 10 Data elaborated by the author and InfoCamere. 11 Data elaborated by the author and InfoCamere. 12 360 Entrepreneurial Index, La misura dell’efficacia degli ecosistemi delle startup in Europa. Digital 360, 2020. 13 Start-ups that reach a market valuation of USD 1 billion. 14 Carlo Menon [et al.] The evaluation of the Italian “Start-up Act.” OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers, No. 54. <https://doi.org/10.1787/02ab0eb7-en >

ECONOMY

157

SOCIETY

ALTO ADIGE/SÜDTIROL—THE GERMAN MINORITY IN ITALY Dalma Bodolay Alto Adige or Südtirol (South Tyrol) is a mountainous province in the north of Italy and, together with Sicily, Sardinia, the Aosta Valley, and Friuli Venezia Giulia, has a special statute and wider administrative autonomy. The peculiar status of this region is evident right after entering it, and it is also immediately clear to any visitor that this territory is unique within the Italian context. Street and municipality names, any traffic signs, and other signboards are written in not only Italian but also German, and both languages are used and understood in every bar, restaurant, or shop. In fact, 69.4% of the 520 thousand inhabitants in South Tyrol speak German as their main language, while only 26% speak Italian, and a tiny 4.5% Ladin, an old Romance language.1 After World War I and with the fall of the AustroHungarian Monarchy in 1919, the Treaty of SaintGermain-en-Laye assigned Alto Adige/Südtirol to the Kingdom of Italy, which was eager to secure its northernmost borders and considered the acquisition as the completion of its independence process. Therefore, the former region of Tyrol was divided into two, and, as a consequence, about 220 thousand German- and Ladin-speaking inhabitants got to belong to a new country. Peaceful coexistence between the Italian and German communities was not frictionless in the following years, and their relationship became even more strained with the advent of fascism, especially when the latter group had to face growing pressures to be assimilated and “Italianised.”2 German was not allowed to be taught, German surnames had to be “Italianised,” and the use of the Italian language became compulsory. The German-speaking citizens of the Italian Kingdom hoped that, with the advent of the National Socialist government in Germany and its nationalistic policies, they would be eased from the strict fascist repression. However, that 160

SOCIETY

did not happen due to an understanding between Hitler and Mussolini, and the German community in Italy was forced to make a hard decision—with the so-called Option for Germany (Option für Deutschland), German-speaking Italian citizens in Alto Adige/Südtirol were left with two alternatives only: to acquire German citizenship, accepting a forced exile to the neighbouring German Reich (Austria was annexed to Nazi Germany by the so-called Anschluss in 1938) or to remain in Italy, obliged to undergo assimilation and restrained from speaking their own language and cherishing their own culture. By 31 December 1939, the large majority of those pressurised to choose, about 80% of the German-speaking locals, had chosen expatriation, but only 75 thousand of them would effectively emigrate to Nazi Germany by 1943. Due to the invasion of Italy by the German Wehrmacht in 1943, the expatriation programme was put to a halt; still, the Option for Germany had the effect of creating strong divisions not only between the Italian- and German-speaking locals but also within the German-speaking community itself. The German community divided into two camps both criticising the decision of the other: on the one hand, those who had remained were accused of betraying their German national heritage, while, on the other, those who had left were often considered supporters of the Nazi regime and traitors of their homeland.3 After the end of World War II, the goal of the political elite in South Tyrol was to heal this division and to reunite all the Germans living there under a common political party advocating the rights of the whole German-speaking minority. As a result, the South Tyrolean People’s Party (Südtiroler Volkspartei, SVP) was formed in 1945. The goal of the new party was eventually achieved, and, around that time, 90% of the German speakers’ votes went to the SVP. Yet, defining the

characteristics of the German minority and how it belonged to the Italian state also remained an open question in the post-war period. While one wing tended to consider the German-speaking inhabitants of this area to be a distinct linguistic– cultural group in the region of Tyrol, divided between Austria and Italy, the other looked on this population as part of a larger German nation.4 With the 1946 Gruber–De Gasperi Agreement between Austria and Italy (named after the two foreign ministers: Karl Gruber of Austria and Alcide de Gasperi of Italy), the two countries agreed on a joint effort to protect the rights of the German-speaking minority and ensure South Tyrol’s autonomy within Italy. Yet, even if the region’s Autonomy Statute was introduced in 1948, its provisions were not implemented

accurately. Italian was still the main language used in public service, the mass migration of Italians from the rest of the country to South Tyrol was, to some extent, encouraged by institutions, and German-speaking inhabitants often did not have the opportunity to formulate their proposals even on issues affecting them directly.5 In this context, the SVP’s programme shifted focus mostly towards achieving larger autonomy for South Tyrol within the Italian state and towards guaranteeing that the region could have its own public institutions. The Republic of Austria and the state of Tyrol in western Austria also backed these demands, even if the Austrian government was careful not to get involved too much in this issue because it was often associated with Nazi Germany and its nationalist foreign policy.

The dissolution of Austria-Hungary in 1919 with the parts given to Italy RUSSIAN EMPIRE Prague

GERMAN EMPIRE

GERMANY

Salzburg

ITALY

SOVIET UNION

Vienna

AUSTRIA ITALY

POLAND Lviv

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

München

SWITZERLAND SWITZERLAND

Kraków

Bratislava THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE Sopron Budapest

HUNGARY

Ljubljana Trieste Rijeka Pula

ROMANIA Timișoara

Zagreb

ROMANIA Bucharest

Belgrade

KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES Sarajevo Zadar SERBIA Split Mostar MONTENEGRO

BULGARIA Sofia BULGARIA

Borders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1914

ALBANIA

New borders in 1920 ALBANIA The Austro-Hungarian Empire Austrian Empire Kingdom of Hungary Condominium of Bosnia and Herzegovina

SOCIETY

161

The Victory Gate in Bolzano

However, the road to autonomy was not without obstacles. The South Liberation Committee began a series of strikes and terrorist attacks in 1956, sometimes with bombs against the symbols of Italian state authority, monuments, and railway lines. The attacks culminated with the Night of Fire in June 1961, when thirty-seven electricity towers were blown up throughout South Tyrol.6 These attacks highlighted the extent of the problems concerning the region and called attention to South Tyrol in Italy and Europe alike. Finally, after prolonged negotiations with the SVP and the Austrian government, the Italian government signed an agreement in 1969, where the parties agreed to grant an extended territorial and institutional autonomy to the region. This Second Autonomy Statute was introduced in 1972, and its main goal was to assure the protection of the linguistic and cultural diversity in South Tyrol. It presented measures such as cultural autonomy, reserved positions for German speakers, and ensured proportionality in the executive and the public-service, as well as compulsory bilingualism for all public service employees.7 With the Second Autonomy Statue, the three linguistic groups also gained veto power in those cases when issues affecting them directly were discussed in the local assembly, while only people living for at least four years in the region were entitled to the right to vote in local elections. Commissions were also established whose job was to assess the progress made by the German community in 162

SOCIETY

exercising its right to autonomy.8 Nevertheless, the second statute’s full implementation took over twenty years, and the conflict was finally considered to be settled by Austria in 1992. Relations between the language groups in South Tyrol have since continued to improve, and the region could achieve not only political stability but also economic success. This process contributed to the collective identification of the local population as “South Tyroleans,” which proved to be very important in healing divisions within the community’s German-, Italian-, and Ladin-speaking parts. Despite these improvements, the region is still shaped by some conflicts. In 2018, rumours spread that Austria was ready to introduce a dual-citizenship law, granting Austrian citizenship to German- and Ladin-speaking inhabitants in South Tyrol. Reports about the possible introduction of such a law caused tensions between Rome and Vienna, and the issue showed that any agreement with Italy on such an initiative would likely to be problematic to accomplish in the future.9 Eventually, the Austrian government and Chancellor Sebastian Kurz denied the rumours and refuted the reports, as the Austria Press Agency reported that the date of the draft cannot be confirmed. A spokesperson for the Austrian Federal Ministry of Interior also told the press that there was no information regarding the date on which the draft was issues, underlining at the same time that any step in the issue would not happen without an agreement with Rome and Bolzano. A similar dispute came up in 2020, when the Austrian government proposed a plan for South Tyrol, which would have allowed the citizens of the region to have two—an Italian and an Austrian—passport. The idea did not appear in the programme of either the People’s Party or the Greens, and it was justified as an offer of “assistance for the victims of Nazism and their descendants in procedures to receive double citizenship.”10 Even if the Austrian People’s Party and the far-right FPÖ were supportive of this proposal, the passport plan had to be eventually dropped after the Social Democrats and the other parties in parliament voted against it, especially following the strong protests coming from Rome.

Tensions today re-emerge between not only Rome and Vienna but also the South Tyrolean local government and the Italian leadership. In October 2019, the Bolzano administration, following a proposal by the region’s separatist party, which was also backed by the ruling SVP, voted for a law that would have removed the term “Alto Adige” from the South Tyrolean

delegation’s Brussels office, leaving only the official German denomination. Nevertheless, article 116 of the Italian constitution says that the province of Bolzano is called Alto Adige/Südtirol, which means that using both names equally and without distinction is not a matter to be decided by a lower institution, such as the Bolzano local assembly. As this attempt to change the

SWITZERLAND

The map of the constituencies in South Tyrol where SVP won in 1953

AUSTRIA

ITALY VENETO LOMBARDY

South Tyrolean People's Party

TRENTINO-ALTO ADIGE/SÜDTIROL

(Südtiroler Volkspartei, SVP) Christian Democracy (Democrazia Cristiana, DC) No data available

Chart 1: The electoral results of SVP in South Tyrol between 1953 and 2018 70% 65% 60% 55% 50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 2020

2016

2012

2008

2004

2000

1996*

1992

1988

1984

1980

1976

1972

1968

1964

1960

1956

1952

20%

* This time SVP did not had a separate party list but was part of an other list together with other minor parties.

SOCIETY

163

region’s name almost pushed Italy to the brink of a constitutional crisis, the president of the Alto Adige/Südtirol, Arno Kompatscher, and the South Tyrol government had to step back. However, Kompatscher deemed the above constitutional interpretation to be an insult.11 The recent name controversy is not the only issue poisoning the relationship between Rome and Bolzano today. Some of the South Tyrol government’s grievances are directed towards some monuments still present in the region, which date back to the fascist period, and, therefore, the local administration would like them to be removed. One of them is the Victory Monument at an important intersection in Bolzano: it was made at the request of Mussolini himself. SVP spokesman Cristian Kollmann declared in 2017 that this monument “disturbs peaceful coexistence . . . you wouldn’t see any monument commissioned by Hitler still standing in Germany.” In addition, the fact that local taxpayers’ resources were used to renovate the monument provoked further criticism. As Kollmann also added, “Italian politicians aren’t ready to separate themselves from fascism,” and, even if “they distance themselves from the ideology,” they do not do so from the symbols.12

Even if most of its inhabitants speak both languages and schools and other institutions are completely bilingual, the region still cannot be considered an example of harmonious cultural coexistence. Both Italians and Germans tend to stick to their own language, culture, and kinship, reiterating that it is their right to decide where they would like to belong. Even after one hundred years, German inhabitants have not forgotten the times of fascism, an experience which is also deeply reflected in their cultural heritage. Moreover, even if South Tyrol is more successful economically and politically than the Italian average and its autonomous institutions grant it a higher degree of autonomy than to any other region, the division within its population will not disappear easily. Another example of this deep divide is the school system, which tends to separate the two communities from kindergarten to university. If there is an Italian and a German school in the same building, the contact between students and teachers belonging to the two different language groups is often reduced and, in some cases, even made more difficult by different timetables for lessons and breaks. Regardless of the greater career opportunities this kind of institutes can

The language distribution in South Tyrol in 2011

Italian majority

164

Ladin majority

German majority

70–80%

90–100%

55–70%

80–90%

Italian: 49.06%,

70–80%

German: 50.47%,

55–70%

Ladin: 0.47%

SOCIETY

Merano

identity often results in episodes of discrimination directed at Italians. The emergence of some radical right-wing formations using Nazi symbolism and slogans within the German community has also been of great concern in recent years. At the same time, some of the Italian population does not accept the regulations that protect the Germanspeaking people. Because of these problems in the region, South Tyrol continues to remain a partly unresolved issue of Italian politics.

ENDNOTES 1 Eine Autonomie für drei Sprachgruppen. Südtiroler Landesverwaltung. <https://bit.ly/35OT3KH >Accessed: 7 April 2021. 2 Stephen J. Larin–Marc Röggla: South Tyrol’s Autonomy

“South Tyrol is not Italian,” says a table at the Italian–Austrian border—this regional tension is still not fully resolved.

offer to its attendants, the introduction of bilingual schools is also opposed by Germans, as they fear that these would lead to their assimilation.13 Moreover, divisions can also be observed in the local media and press, both online and print. So, for example, the German-speaking newspaper, called Der Dolomiten, mostly reports on events and news which concern the German-speaking population, but there is also an Italian counterpart which addresses the Italian-speaking population. At the same time, many cultural organisations and even libraries work separately on an ethnic basis. Despite these relatively marginal issues, the model of autonomy in South Tyrol can still be considered as “one of the most successful cases of consociational conflict regulation in the world.”14 The German linguistic minority in the region enjoys the broadest protection within a nation state globally. Unlike other regions of Italy, South Tyrol has outstanding economic indicators, and the reason for this is its institutional policy and the successful cohabitation of the three linguistic groups. However, as the example shows, even these factors cannot be a complete guarantee of avoiding ethnic conflicts. Still, a small minority of German-speaking inhabitants aspired to secession and independence, and their strong sense of

Convention is not a breakthrough for participatory democracy – but it shows how power-sharing can transform conflicts. The London School of Economics and Political Science. 20 October 2016. <https://bit.ly/35PWAIm > 3 Alessandro Ambrosino: South Tyrol: Minority Identities beyond Linguistic. The Myth of Homogeneity. 30 November 2020. <https://bit.ly/35T2dWl > 4 Ambrosino. 5 Larin–Röggla. 6 The Struggle for Autonomy. Autonome Provinz Bozen – Südtirol—Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano – Aldo Adige— Provinzia Autonoma de Bulsan – Südtirol. <https://bit. ly/3gUUcXe > Accessed: 1 April 2021. 7 Larin–Röggla. 8 Elisabeth Alber–Carolin Zwilling: South Tyrol. Autonomy Arrangements in the World. January 2016. <https://bit. ly/3ddswe8 > 9 Cristina Burack: Italy and Austria spar over German-speaking South Tyrol dual citizenship rumors. DW. 25 July 2018. <https://p.dw.com/p/322AN > 10 Austria drops South Tyrol passport plan. ANSA. 2 January 2020. <https://bit.ly/3dc8gta > 11 Gerardo Fortuna: Italy’s German-speaking province makes U-turn on scrapping Italian name. EURACTIV. 16 October 2019. <https://bit.ly/3dg3OJS > 12 Elizabeth Schumacher: German-speaking Italy and the legacy of fascism. DW. 5 May 2017. <https://p.dw.com/p/2cUvp > 13 Oppe Orsolya: A Dél-tiroli német kisebbség törekvései. Acta Sociologica – Pécsi Szociológiai Szemle. 2013/1. 155. <https:// doi.org/10.15170/AS.2013.6.1.11 > 14 Larin–Röggla. SOCIETY

165

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN SOUTHERN EUROPE Dóra Jánoska The population in the European Union (more precisely, in the EU27, i.e., in the EU without the United Kingdom) has been ageing for the past decades, with birth rates falling short of reproduction levels, while its citizens are expected to live longer than ever before. Simultaneously, migration to Europe has been on the rise since the 1980s, exceeding the number of people leaving the EU and, thus, resulting in positive net migration. Based on data published by Eurostat, the population of the EU27 was estimated at 447.7 million in January 2020. In general, the EU’s population has been steadily increasing in recent years, with the exception of 2020, when it decreased by 12.8% due to the exit of the United Kingdom. Natural population change within the EU, however, has been negative since 2012 with more deaths than births recorded (there were 4.7 million deaths against 4.2 million births in 2019). On the other hand, in 2019, there were an estimated 2.7 million immigrants to the EU from non-EU countries. Therefore, migration has been the main determinant of the increase in the number of Europe’s inhabitants since 1992.1 In the meantime, the rising number of EU citizens over the age of 65, combined with low fertility rates, is transforming the EU’s age pyramid. The so-called “baby-boomer” generation, born after World War II, during a time when birth rates were higher, is nearing retirement age, which will elevate the pressing dependency on the working-age population and create new social and economic challenges in the member states.2 SOUTHERN EUROPEAN TRENDS Some of the largest member states by population size, such as Italy (60.4 million), France (67 million), and Spain (47 million) are located in the southern part of Europe. 166

SOCIETY

While the number of inhabitants in Portugal and Greece is lower (10.3 and 10.7 million, respectively), these five countries together represent a significant portion of the EU’s total population—combined, the first three amount to nearly 40% of the EU’s total.3 When taking a look at the ongoing European demographic trends, Southern Europe is no exception to the general tendencies. However, when it comes to the challenges of decreasing birth rates and ageing societies, Southern European countries are at the forefront. FERTILITY In the past years, the number of births in Europe has been decreasing. While the crude birth rate 4 in the EU was 16.4 in 1970, it was only 9.3 in 2019.5 The same year, the European average total fertility rate6 was 1.53 live births per woman, an improvement from the lowest data, 1.43, recorded in 2001. Despite the improvement, this number is far from the total fertility rate of around 2.1 live births per woman, the necessary “replacement level” that can keep the population size in developing countries constant without migration. 7 Fertility rates in Spain (1.23), Italy (1.27), Portugal (1.43), and Greece (1.34) are all below the European average.8 The reasons behind this negative trend are manifold, including an unfavourable economic environment, an increase in unemployment, a decreasing number of women of reproductive age, 9 and societal changes (such as the decision to have a family at a later age). The corollary of the first two factors, i.e., economic uncertainty, has a significant impact on fertility behaviour. Labour-market opportunities, for example, are an important influencing factor when it comes to family planning. Unemployment among people under the age of 25 is currently at 18% in the euro area,

Chart 1: Population in the EU states between 1960 and 2021 (at 1 January, million persons) 450 440 430 420 410 400 390 380 370 360 2018

2020

2014

2016

2012

2010

2008

2006

2002

2004

1998

2000

1996

1992

1994

1988

1990

1986

1982

1984

1978

1980

1974

1976

1970

1972

1968

1966

1962

1964

1960

350

Note: Excluding French overseas departments up to and including 1997. Breaks in series: 1991, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2017, and 2019.

a 2.5 percentage point increase since 2019, mostly due to the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. The southern countries of the eurozone had already been experiencing high youth unemployment when the pandemic hit. In 2019, it was 27.7% in Italy, 31.2% in Spain, and 34.5% in Greece, but these numbers are expected to rise even further this year. In the same period, youth unemployment in France stood at 19.9%, and, in Portugal, at 17.7%, so these two countries ranked better than the other three, but they have also been hit hard by the economic crisis surrounding the struggle to contain the coronavirus, which is likely to have a bearing on their unemployment figures.10 The number of women of childbearing age 11 has also been decreasing, making it more difficult to maintain healthy population structures, as even a high fertility rate among fewer women results in lower numbers of children born. Southern member states all saw a decrease in this cohort in the past decade, with the biggest drop observed in Greece. Between 2003 and 2019, the proportion of these women in the total population of these countries decreased by 20.4%. In Spain, a sharp decline can be observed after 2011, reaching a 10.5% decrease by 2019. Portugal showed a similar pattern with a negative

change of 13.5% between 2001 and 2019. Italy also had a 13.3% decline in this cohort between 1993 and 2019. France had the least concerning numbers with a 4.3% decrease between 1996 and 2019.12 Another indicator connected to low fertility rates is the rise in the mean age of first-time mothers within the EU. Over the past decades, women have gradually been giving birth to their first child at an increasingly later age, which increased from 28.8 in 2013 to 29.4 in 2019. Spain and Italy have the highest numbers in this category, as well, with 31.1 and 31.3, respectively, while this indicator is 30.6 in Greece and 29.9 in Portugal. At 28.8, France is well below the the European average. 13 This tendency also affects the number of children a woman has during her life, as fertility decreases with age. As indicated by the foregoing data, France stands out among the southern member states, with its fertility being the highest within the EU. According to data from 2020, 740,000 babies were born in the county that year, which translates into a fertility rate of 1.84.14 The country’s success has been attributed to its generous welfare system, put in place after World War II and focussing on four main areas: the sick, the elderly, the unemployed, and families. The main objectives of the SOCIETY

167

French family policy are to improve families and children’s well-being by providing financial support and extensive childcare services. Family-allowance funds (caisses d’allocations familiales) include general living, childcare, and special allowances. Eligibility does not require the parents to be employed, only to live in France on a long-term basis, to legally have at least one dependent child with them and a residence permit or a valid long-term visa. Maternity leave is granted up to sixteen weeks, which is raised to twenty-six weeks after the third child. Children are considered dependent until their twenty-first birthday if certain requirements are met.15 Tax incentives are also an important tool in the French system, where the amount of taxable income reduces as family size grows. However, birth numbers have been declining at a faster rate since 2015, partly due to budget cuts, decreasing the availability of these allowances16 French childcare services are also quite versatile, intended to accommodate the different care needs of parents and children through municipality-operated centres, family day cares, company crèches, and drop-in centres for temporary care. This comprehensive

family welfare system is connected to the widely shared belief in France that the state is responsible for the children’s well-being, also by providing care. 17 AGEING In parallel with dwindling birth rates, people in Europe live a longer life, which results in an increasingly ageing society. During the past two decades, life expectancy at birth has been steadily rising almost every year, a trend mostly attributed to improving healthcare and working conditions, environmental factors, and changing lifestyle trends. In 2019, an infant born in the EU was expected to live 81.3 years, a 3.4-year increase since 2002. For women, it stood at 84 years and, in the case of men, at 78.5 years.18 However, in recent years, this increase seemed to slow down and even stagnate in many European countries.19 In Southern European states, the life expectancy of the population has also been steadily increasing, surpassing even the European average. According to data published by Eurostat, longevity in 2019 was 84 years in Spain, 83.6 in Italy, 83 in France, 81.7 in Greece, and 81.9 in Portugal.20 As a

Chart 2: Population change by component (annual crude rates) in the EU between 1960 and 2020 (per 1,000 persons) 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 –2

Total change

Net migration and statistical adjusment*

2020

2015

2010

2005

2000

1995

1990

1985

1980

1975

1970

1965

1960

–4

Natural change*

* 1960: not available. Note: Excluding French overseas departments up to and including 1997. Breaks in series: 1991, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2017, and 2019.

168

SOCIETY

Chart 3: Births and deaths in the EU between 1961 and 2020 (million) 7.00 6.50 6.00 3.00 5.50 5.00 4.50 4.00 3.50

Live births

2016

2011

2006

2001

1996

1991

1986

1981

1976

1971

1966

1961

3.00

Deaths

Note: 1960: not available. Excluding French overseas departments up to and including 1997.

result of this rise and decreasing birth rates, the proportion of the population aged 65 and older has been growing. In 2020, 20.6% of the EU population was aged 65 or older. This number is 3 percentage points higher than it was a decade ago. Italy (23.2%), Greece (22.3%), and Portugal (22.1%) are all above the European average in this aspect, with an even more pronounced shift since 2010, ranging between 2.6 and 4.1 percentage points. Although France (20.4%) and Spain (19.6%) have a lower number of people aged over 65 years, they have both seen a significant rise in this indicator during the past ten years: 3.9 percentage points in the case of France and 3 percentage points in the case of Spain. 21 It is no surprise that, in light of this data, Southern European member states are frequently mentioned together with Japan as one of the “oldest” regions in the world. Significant changes in a population’s age structure, most notably in the increasing proportion of older generations, create challenges for the economy in terms of workforce availability, pension funding, and healthcare capacity. As a result, Greece, Italy, and Portugal, along with seven other member states, have decided to adjust retirement age to rising life expectancy, thus limiting the average number of dependent years. France is also planning a comprehensive pension reform, which has so far been met by strong public resistance.22

MIGRATION Finally, international migration is another indicator influencing population size and structure. In 2019, an estimated 4.2 million people immigrated to the European Union from a third country, and about 2.7 million left the EU the same year, resulting in positive net migration. Southern member states are among the largest recipients of these masses, with Spain, France, and Italy receiving the second-, third-, and fourth-highest number of migrants within the EU27 (750.5, 385.6, and 332.8 thousand, respectively). Many of these countries are not just points of entry for migrants but also their final destinations.23 Migration from non-EU countries has frequently been mentioned in relation to current demographic trends as a potential “solution” to counteract the effects of an ageing European population. According to Eurostat, people arriving in Europe from outside the EU are aged between 25 and 64 years, with a median age of 36 years.24 Working-age people entering a country with the intention to settle have the positive effect of raising the proportion of the younger population, but they also need to raise the fertility rate to exert a lasting positive impact because they themselves will eventually age and belong to the group of people aged over 65 years. For example, in the case of France, where the fertility rate is close to reproduction SOCIETY

169

Total fertility rate in Europe in 2018 (EU-28 = 1.56)

<1.40 1.40–1.50 1.50–1.70 >1.70 Data not available

levels, experts have proved that, even though a large number of migrants enter the country every year, it is not them who ensure the country’s favourable tallies. In 2017, only 19% of the 730,242 children born that year had immigrant mothers. The reason for the low incidence is that immigrant women represent only 12% of the female population of childbearing age and, even though their fertility rate is 2.6, they are not be able to significantly increase the number of births on a national level.25 THE EFFECTS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC The year 2020 brought an unprecedented demographic challenge to Europe and the world. The spread of COVID-19 forced countries to take extreme measures in order to halt the pandemic, while their economies all took a significant hit. 170

SOCIETY

In terms of demographics, the most visible effect of the pandemic has been a spike in the number of deaths across the continent. An important indicator for this is excess mortality, defined by Eurostat as “an unusual mortality increase during a specific period, in a given population.” 26 Data is compared to a so-called “baseline” consisting of the average number of deaths for a particular month over the years from 2016 to 2019. Comparing only COVID-19 mortality numbers per country proved to be complicated due to different measurement techniques concerning cause of death classifications in each member state, but excess mortality data does give a general idea of the impact of the pandemic, as it includes all deaths regardless of their causes. According to data, the worst month based on the EU27 average was November 2020, when

excess mortality stood at 40.7%. 27 Southern European states were hit especially hard by the pandemic, in part due to the larger proportion of people over 65 within their population, who have a higher mortality rate in the case of COVID-19. Italy peaked at the excess mortality of 51.6% in November 2020, while Spain and France had their worst numbers in April 2020 at 79.4% and 36.4%, respectively. Portugal and Greece, by comparison, suffered a smaller rise in deaths, with excess mortality reaching 26% and 31.8% in November 2020.28 COVID-19 has also had a negative effect on European couples’ desire to have children. The

number of births in Europe saw a decrease in the past year, a natural consequence of economic crisis, also seen after the previous one starting in 2008. Many couples facing financial insecurity, combined with possible health risks, have re-evaluated their plans on starting a family. Although, at the time of writing, mostly estimates and preliminary data are available, it can be stated that, in general, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to an unprecedented drop in Europe’s birth numbers, especially in its southern member states. France, a country on top of birth-rate statistics, experienced a 7.3% decrease in

Life expectancy at birth by NUTS 2 region in 2019 (years, EU = 81.3) <74 74–77 77–80 80–82 >82

SOCIETY

171

Chart 4: The share of immigrants in the EU-27 member states in 2019 (per 1,000 inhabitants)

43.01

60 50

172

SOCIETY

5.57

5.44

Italy

Bulgaria

1.29

5.73 France

Slovakia

5.93

5.68

5.97 Poland

Latvia

7.07 Portugal

Finland

9.28

9.07

Croatia

Hungary

10.45

9.92

10.56 Denmark

Czechia

10.67 Germany

the number of children born in December 2020 from 62,977 in the same month of the previous year. According to a survey conducted in fifteen cities in Italy by the Italian National Institute of Statistics, the country experienced a sharp drop of 21.6% in the number of births in December 2020, compared to the same month of the previous year. 29 Similarly, Spain met 23,226 births in December 2020, the lowest number since 1941, and a 20.4% drop, compared to December 2019. 30 Both countries were severely affected by the pandemic, with soaring death rates and governments forced to implement strict lockdowns. Portugal registered 6,252 births at the end of 2020, amounting to 10% fewer babies than in December 2019. 31 In Greece, a 6.5% decline could be observed in the number of births when comparing November and December 2020 to the same period of the previous year, according to the Greek ministry of interior.32 Finally, the coronavirus pandemic has also affected migration tendencies, as European countries have restricted international, transborder, and internal movements. Compared with the figures of the previous month, the number of detections of illegal border crossings on Europe’s main migratory routes fell by 85% to around 900 arrivals in April, the lowest number since Frontex began collecting border data in 2009.33

Romania

12.07

11.27

Greece

12.29 Austria

Sweden

13.06

12.44

Belgium

13.76 Estonia

Netherlands

15.00

14.34

Slovenia

Lithuania

15.92 Spain

Cyprus

Malta

Luxembourg

EU–27

5.43

17.35

Ireland

29.67

CONCLUSION Demography in Southern Europe shows very similar patterns to the ones visible on the rest of the continent—but at a faster and more worrying rate. The most difficult situation can be seen in two of the largest countries, Italy and Spain. Ageing will continue to put a strain on economies, increasing the number of dependent people while also decreasing the proportion of working-age citizens within the population. The COVID-19 pandemic, still wreaking havoc across Europe, has only accelerated the negative tendencies in southern member states, pushing them into a serious economic recession, which, in turn, will have a powerful effect on the entire European Union.

ENDNOTES 1 Population and population change statistics. Eurostat. Last updated in July 2020. <https://bit.ly/3utQmYN > 2 Population structure and ageing. Eurostat. Last updated in August 2020. <https://bit.ly/3fuI8v3 > 3 Population and population change statistics. 4 The number of live births per 1,000 persons. 5 Fertility statistics. Eurostat. Last updated in March 2021. <https://bit.ly/2XhLyLg > 6 The mean number of children who would be born to a woman during her lifetime if she were to spend her childbearing years conforming to the age-specific fertility rates that have been measured in a given year.

7 Births and fertility. Over 5 million babies born in the EU in

28 Excess mortality indicator. Eurostat. <https://bit.

2015. Women first became mothers at almost 29 on average.

ly/3g7UF75 > Accessed: 25 March 2021.

Eurostat. 8 March 2017. <https://bit.ly/3oAWLzW >

29 Gian Carlo Blangiardo: Primi riscontri e riflessioni sul

8 Total fertility rate, 1960–2019 (live births per woman).

bilancio demografico del 2020. Istituto Nazionale di Statistica.

Eurostat. <https://bit.ly/2RTM7Z5 > Accessed: 10 February

1 February 2021. <https://bit.ly/3fSwKIr >

2021.

30 Experimental Statistics – Monthly Estimate of Births (MEB).

9 Women between the ages of 15 and 49.

Instituto Nacional de Estadística. 10 March 2021. <https://

10 October 2020 Euro area unemployment at 8.4% EU

bit.ly/2SD2WaZ >

at 7.6%. Eurostat. 2 December 2020. <https://bit.

31 Saldo natural negativo agrava-se. Em 2020 o número de

ly/3vxlRCn >

óbitos aumentou 10,2 % e o número de nados-vivos

11 Also known as women of reproductive age.

decresceu 2,6 %. Instituto Nacional de Estatística. 16 March

12 Women of reproductive age (15–49 years) population

2021. <https://bit.ly/3xQO4Fj >

(thousands). World Health Organization. <https://bit.

32 Anna Wichmann: Birth Rate Declines in Greece Despite

ly/3uycoJM > Accessed: 8 April 2021.

Lockdown. Greek Reporter. 27 March 2021. <https://bit.

13 Mean age of women at childbirth and at birth of first child.

ly/3vv4Clq >

Eurostat. <https://bit.ly/3ftFW7a > Accessed: 11 March

33 Situation at EU external borders in April – Detections

2021.

lowest since 2009. Frontex, European Border and Coast

14 Sylvain Papon–Catherine Beaumel: Demography Report

Guard Agency. 12 May 2020. <https://bit.ly/3i4fmDg >

2020. Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques. 19 January 2021. <https://bit.ly/3d5sIMt > 15 These requirements include, e.g., school attendance and later salary limits. 16 France – family allowances. European Commission. <https://bit.ly/3j61B7K > Accessed: 22 March 2021. 17 Policy responses to low fertility: How effective are they? UNFPA Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 1. May 2019. <https://bit.ly/35NkhB6 > 18 Mortality and life expectancy statistics. Eurostat. <https:// bit.ly/3vvQE2p > Accessed: 22 March 2021. 19 France – family allowances. 20 Life expectancy by age and sex. Eurostat. <https://bit. ly/3wH037w > Accessed: 10 March 2021. 21 Proportion of population aged 65 and over. Eurostat. <https://bit.ly/2RKtMxR > Accessed: 12 March 2021. 22 Hugh Schofield: French reforms: Why France is resisting Macron’s push on pensions. BBC. 17 February 2020. <https://bbc.in/3zggyIC > 23 Migration and migrant population statistics. Eurostat. Last update in March 2021. <https://bit.ly/3fuLPRt > 24 Ibid. 25 Sabrina Volant–Gilles Pison–François Héran: French fertility is the highest in Europe. Because of its immigrants? Population & Societies, 568. July–August 2019. 1–4. <https:// bit.ly/3hZYYUl > 26 Glossary:Excess mortality. Eurostat. <https://bit. ly/3zayXXu > Accessed:15 September 2021. 27 Volant–Pison–Héran.

SOCIETY

173

HUNGARIAN−ITALIAN CULTURAL RELATIONS— INTERVIEW WITH GÁBOR KUDAR, DIRECTOR OF THE ACCADEMIA D’UNGHERIA IN ROMA Zsombor Szabolcs Pál, 6 May 2021 The interview was conducted in Hungarian and translated by AJKC.

Can you provide a short overview of the history of Hungarian−Italian cultural and academic relations? The (cultural) diplomatic relations between Hungary and Italy go back to more than a thousand years. By asking Pope Sylvester II for the Holy Crown, King Saint Stephen made a decision that determined our political, religious, and also cultural development. Venetian-born Bishop Saint Gerard was followed by countless ecclesiastics, scientists, and artists in our country through the centuries. Rome exerted a similar attraction for Hungarians: our founder of state established a pilgrim house in Rome at the location occupied today by the sacristy of St Peter’s Basilica. From the 15th–16 th 174

SOCIETY

centuries, the famous universities in Padua, Bologna, Venice, and Ferrara were preferred destinations for Hungarian students, such as Janus Pannonius or János Zsámboky. The court of King Matthias was the first beyond the Alps to welcome humanist scientists, and his palaces in Visegrád and Buda showed Renaissance characteristics. There were numerous Hungarian soldiers in Garibaldi’s army, fighting for the liberty and unity of the Southern European country. Hungarian presence in the Italian capital became significant in the last quarter of the 19th century, when Pope Leo XIII opened the Vatican Secret Archives. Hungary was among the first to send researchers to study the documents pertaining to the history of our country. An exceptional figure of the time was Bishop Vilmos Fraknói, an academic who founded the Hungarian Historical Institute in Rome to accommodate the scholars arriving to do research in the city. It was also on his initiative that the Accademia di Belle Arti (Academy of Fine Arts) of Hungarian artists would be established in the Italian capital. In 1927, on the initiative of Count Kuno Klebelsberg, a politician who served as minister of the interior and minister of culture of the Kingdom of Hungary between the two world wars, the Hungarian state bought the Falconieri Palace in the heart of the Eternal City and established the Hungarian Academy in Rome to host the representatives of Hungarian science, culture, and art. In the following decades, the greatest Hungarian scientists, writers, painters, and sculptors of the time— among others, Zoltán Kodály, Károly Kerényi,

György Lukács, Antal Szerb, János Pilinszky, Sándor Weöres, and the members of the socalled Roman School, an artistic movement akin to Italian Novecento, Vilmos Aba-Novák, Pál C. Molnár, István Szőnyi, Pál Pátzay— stayed there. The Hungarian Academy also served as a publishing house, issuing a number of specialist publications. The most significant of these was the periodical Annuario, which included articles and studies about Italian− Hungarian relations and the description of the cultural and artistic work done by scholarship holders. The academy was incorporated into the Embassy of Hungary in 1948 and lost its status as an independent institute for science and art. During the Cold War, it served as a propaganda tool and returned to the competence of the Ministry of Education and Culture only in 1981. After a number of changes, the academy became part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 2016 and, since last September, it has been operating under the name Collegium Hungaricum of Rome, keeping its traditional name in Italian, Accademia d’Ungheria in Roma. Are there any examples of cultural, scientific, or research cooperation between the two countries? How can you describe the relations among universities and in the field of education? Count Kuno von Klebelsberg said at the conference Intellectual Cooperation between Italy and Hungary held in Rome in 1926 that “Great [Italian] architects, sculptors, painters, composers, virtuosos, and actors have been travelling around the world for centuries, fertilising the thought and imagination of peoples, eliciting fascination for the Italian creative spirit, the Italian genius, and thus bringing honour to Italy. Meanwhile, thousands of scholars (especially archaeologists and art historians), writers and poets, artists and musicians as well as scientists from other cultured nations flock to see the artistic and natural beauties of Italy. The French established an art school in Rome in 1666, and following their lead, other peoples, among them us, Hungarians, also founded institutes of art, archaeology, and history in

Rome and other cultural centres in Italy. This coopération intellectuelle between Italy and the civilised world is not a postulate but a reality that has been here for centuries.”* These words served (and continue to serve to this day as well) as an excellent foundation for cultural, academic, and research relations between Hungary and Italy. However, not until 1935 did the governments of the two countries strengthen this millennium-old cooperation in culture and education with a bilateral treaty. After World War II, cooperation between the governments of Hungary and Italy came to a standstill but took a new turn in 1965, when the second treaty (mostly similar in content to the first) was signed. The last work plan, based on the above-mentioned bilateral cultural cooperation, was ratified in 1999. In the document entitled The XIVth Execution Plan for the 2000–2003 Cultural Treaty in Education and Culture, the two parties defined the joint programmes to be implemented in the 2000−2003 period. Part of this was regular Hungarian participation in various Italian festivals, e.g., in different film festivals, the RomaEuropa festival, and the Mittelfest festival. Over the last nearly twenty years, there were two spectacular events in the cultural cooperation between the two countries: the Hungarian−Italian cultural seasons of 2002 and 2013. These included several larger-scale events in Italy, which I will describe later, when we discuss exhibitions.

THE (CULTURAL) DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN HUNGARY AND ITALY GO BACK TO MORE THAN A THOUSAND YEARS. SOCIETY

175

Since Hungary joined the European Union in 2004, European cooperation systems (such as the Erasmus+ scholarship system) and partnership agreements made between the institutes of specific fields (universities, research facilities, theatres, and cultural associations) have become more decisive. Developing bilateral work plans with Italy is not “automatic” any more, as the already signed plans are still in force and there are also a lot of opportunities to develop bilateral relations and promote student and teacher mobility. Projectbased partnerships and European scholarships for students and researchers offer numerous opportunities for cooperation, where, in many cases, well-established and working customary practices complement the treaties in force. In 2010, the Hungarian and Italian foreign ministers signed a Declaration on Strategic Partnership. In this manifesto, several fields were noted (politics, economy, the sociocultural and cultural spheres) where there is room for cooperation between the two countries. In 2015, a cooperation agreement was signed between the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and its Italian counterpart, the Romebased Accademia dei Lincei, with the mediation of the Collegium Hungaricum in Rome. The opportunities and the joint programmes offered by the European higher education framework also operate in the Italian−Hungarian relations, and our institute strives to mediate actively in forming new relationships, as it happened in 2018 between the University of Pécs and the Sapienza Università di Roma, or, in 2019, between the Károly Eszterházy University of Eger and the above-mentioned Italian institute. The EU4ART project launched in 2019 by four European higher education institutions of fine arts is also exceptional. The threeyear programme is led by the Hungarian University of Fine Arts, and its other members are the Accademia di Belle Arti di Roma, the Hochschule für Bildende Künste of Dresden, and the Latvijas Mākslas akadēmija of Riga. The main goal of this international cooperation is to create a joint and flexible training structure for 176

SOCIETY

IN 2010, THE HUNGARIAN AND ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS SIGNED A DECLARATION ON STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP. painting, graphic arts, and sculpture. In addition to this, it seeks to strengthen a European sense of identity, to promote European culture, especially its heritage of fine arts and its diversity, and to familiarise people with it. Among the other goals of the cooperation are promoting competitiveness, mobility, and community, fostering an awareness of common goals, and reducing educational and cultural differences between geographical areas via an interdisciplinary and international approach, which aims to integrate innovative pedagogical methods as well. Although it is not strictly related to this question, I would also like to mention that, except for the last year, our institute has been hosting Hungarian researchers and artists on scholarships, as well as scientists and students, who come to the Italian capital to find inspiration and to create or to study and to do research in libraries or universities in Rome. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has a one- or two-month research grant called Kuno von Klebelsberg Scholarship, which is of special importance for us: this was created for studying and researching the foreign (Italian) written records and material remains of the Hungarian language, literature, history, and culture. Besides, the National Cultural Fund of Hungary also offers the Fine Arts Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy in Rome, which aims at allowing Hungarian artists to familiarise themselves with professional opportunities,

galleries, collections, and museums in the Italian capital and to develop professional relationships so that Rome and the inspiration derived from Italian culture may further enrich the art of scholarship holders. The primary propagator of Hungarian culture in Italy is, of course, the Collegium Hungaricum in Rome, but a number of state-run, churchrun, and private organisations also work to popularise our culture in the Southern European country. The Embassy of Hungary in Rome, the Embassy of Hungary to the Holy See, and the Pontifical Hungarian Ecclesiastical Institute all have important roles in diplomatic events of major significance and events celebrating state or church holidays. Our institute is also often involved in organising such events. Besides, the eleven honorary consuls dispersed across the country help promote our culture as much as they can. Moreover, Hungarian−Italian cultural associations, as well as online and offline interest groups are also present in several regions (such as Tuscany, Emilia-Romagna, Liguria, South Tyrol, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, or Sicily) and larger cities. These initiatives primarily foster national unity and keep “Hungarian identity” alive in Hungarians living abroad. How much are Italians interested in Hungarian culture today? Which aspects of Hungarian culture are interesting for them? How much is the Italian public aware of Hungarian cultural achievements or works of art? In my experience, Italians are very receptive to Hungarian culture. It is a complex topic, and one cannot give an all-encompassing answer, but we can definitely say that the Italian public is particularly open to Hungarian cultural products, be that music, literature, fine art, film, or classical and contemporary artists. Without claiming to be exhaustive, one could list the best known and most liked composers and performing artists: Franz Liszt, Béla Bartók, Zoltán Kodály, Ferenc Lehár, Ernő Dohnányi, Leó Weiner, György Cziffra, Ferenc Farkas, Annie Fischer, György Ligeti, and György Kurtág. Music lovers, however,

also know Zoltán Kocsis, Iván Fischer, András Schiff, Miklós Perényi, Éva Marton, Sylvia Sass, or Andrea Rost. Concerning literature, we must mention that there are some publishers in Italy that “specialise” in issuing works by Hungarian authors. Such a publisher is Adelphi, which has put out nearly the complete works of Sándor Márai. Edizioni Anfora, which publishes the most important works of Magda Szabó, also contributes to familiarising the Italian public with Hungarian literature. Other well-liked writers are Imre Kertész, Péter Esterházy, György Konrád, but excellent translations have also been published from the works of Dezső Kosztolányi, Antal Szerb, István Örkény, and Géza Csáth. As for contemporaries, I would like to mention here Edith Bruck (who actually lives in Italy), Péter Nádas, László Darvasi, László Krasznahorkai, Imre Oravecz, and György Dragomán. Finally, another interesting information: Ferenc Molnár’s The Paul Street Boys is very popular with Italian children. Hungarian films are also very well known to the Italian public. This is partly due to our famous directors (such as István Szabó, Lajos Koltai, Béla Tarr, Márta Mészáros, Miklós Jancsó, István Gaál, or Sándor Sára) and partly to the work of contemporary directors who have won a number of important awards in recent years (just think of, for example, László Nemes Jeles’s Son of Saul, Ildikó Enyedi’s On Body and Soul, Kristóf Deák’s Sing, Kornél Mundruczó’s Pieces of a Woman, or Ferenc Török’s 1945). Animated films are particularly successful, primarily because of the international prestige that the Moholy-Nagy University of Art and Design in Budapest enjoys. In the last few years, a good number of Hungarian films and directors have been presented in Italian film festivals. There are four very different but interesting examples of this: the selection of the 2020 Venice International Film festival included Mundruczó’s Pieces of a Woman, which won, among others, the award for best actress. This year, the Bergamo Film Meeting is honouring director Márta Mészáros, who turned 90 in September 2021, SOCIETY

177

by screening five of her movies. At the La Guarimba International Film Festival, which is held in Amantea and has a very good press, there are several Hungarian animated films in the selection every year—in 2021, there are three of them. It is also planned that cinematographer Gergely Pohárnok will be on the international jury of the 2021 Rome Independent Film Festival and will also give a masterclass there. The Collegium Hungaricum in Rome has several film-related plans for this year and the next few years, but we will keep them as surprise, since these are still being organised. All this contributes to our aim that the Italian public can get to know Hungarian cinema better. As far as our institute’s programmes popularising Hungarian culture are concerned, there are more and more exhibitions held in the gallery opened in the Falconieri Palace in 1992, in its decorative staircase, and the hallways and rooms of its first floor. The halls serve to host Hungarian and international exhibitions, too, where young talents and famous contemporary

I THINK CULTURAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE ALREADY ENTWINED IN MANY ASPECTS, BUT OBVIOUSLY THEY CAN STILL BE EXPANDED FOR NEW SECTORS AND DEEPENED IN THE FUTURE. 178

SOCIETY

Hungarian artists are likewise exhibited. The work of the institute’s fine arts scholarship holders are also exhibited there every year. In the halls and rooms of the palace, we mostly hold classical concerts of the work of the abovementioned famous and well-liked Hungarian composers with performers who are talented but still unknown and also musicians who are well known in Hungary or internationally. We have even held popular music concerts, too (for example, Ákos, Žagar, and Kaláka also played here). Besides, we also show old Hungarian movies and contemporary films in the great hall, which also functions as a cinema room, and we hold academic conferences, roundtable discussions, book launches, readings, and workshops here, as well as in the other rooms. There have been large-scale, successful Hungarian-related exhibitions at other locations, too, supported by, among others, our institute, primarily during the 2013 Hungarian− Italian Cultural Season. Such examples include the Museum of Applied Arts’ Tiffany and Gallé exhibition in the Musei Capitolini in Rome, the exhibition called The Time of Modernity: Hungarian Painting, 1905–1925 in the Galleria Nazionale d’Arte Moderna e Contemporanea in Rome, the King Matthias and Florence in the San Marco Museum of Florence, and the Selfportraits of Hungarian Painters in the Collection of the Uffizi Gallery in Florence held in La Galleria degli Uffizi. The Museo di Roma also put on a show of photographs entitled Robert Capa in Italy, 1934–1944. Between 2011 and 2017, the Museo Casa di Dante in Florence had three exhibitions showing the work of István Madarassy, inspired by Dante’s Divine Comedy (Inferno, Purgatorio, and Paradiso). The Hungarian Museum of Fine Arts’ Toulouse-Lautrec exhibition in the Ara Pacis in Rome between 2015 and 2016 must also be mentioned, and, from 2019, the Museo di Roma in Trastevere had a Korniss exhibition, while the Palazzo delle Esposizioni in Rome put on The Techniques of Survival, within the Hungarian series called 30 Years of Freedom. The latest grand exhibition was held

in the Italian capital’s Galleria d’Arte Moderna in 2019–2020: it was called The Revolution in Seeing: Towards Bauhaus, Moholy-Nagy and his Hungarian Contemporaries. Hungarian contemporary dance, choreography, and contemporary ballet are worth being listed here, too, since these are also known in Italy, primarily because of dancer and choreographer Antal Fodor and ballet artist and choreographer Susanna Egri (the co-founder of Egri for Dance Foundation), the Hungarian Dance Academy, the Szeged Contemporary Dance Company, and the Ballet Company of Győr. Finally, mention must be made of a special segment of Hungarian culture, gastro-culture as well. Italians are famous for appreciating good food and drink, especially quality food and wine. When Hungarian gastronomy comes up, the Italian public is well aware of “classics” like goulash soup, chimney cake, or good Hungarian red wines, while certain spirits (first of all, Unicum and sometimes even pálinka) have started to acquire fame, too. The Collegium Hungaricum in Rome recognises the appeal of this sector and works together with the Association of Towns and Villages to present two Hungarian towns in the Falconieri Palace every year at events that include folk dances and folk music, gastronomy, and folklore so that they can shape Hungary’s image in Italy and popularise the less famous or even unknown regions of the country. Do you think we could improve our cultural relations? If so, what would be worth promoting and how? Yes, of course. I think cultural relations between the two countries are already entwined in many aspects, but obviously they can still be expanded for new sectors and deepened in the future. Both parties are shaped, made richer and stronger if we have more points of connection. Culture is a living thing, and, beyond the classic, permanent elements, it is continually evolving and changing. For this to happen, it needs constant reinforcements, but I believe Hungarian and Italian people have great

creativity and a rich historical past to draw on. The emergence of the novel coronavirus in Italy in 2020 and the subsequent destruction paralysed and transformed not merely everyday life but also the world of culture. This has been going on for more than a year now and no one knows when (if, indeed, ever) we can return to our “good old ways of life.” Cultural relations are now established and developed online, and it is nearly a requirement now to promote Hungarian culture this way in Italy while the demand for it is also great. Even though, in my opinion, there is no substitute for a live, in-person cultural event, it is certainly positive that a lot of people can be reached through the internet. The Collegium Hungaricum in Rome pays special attention to showcasing and promoting Hungarian cultural achievements and works for the Italian public through as many of its own channels online as possible (via, for example, our new homepage: culture.hu/hu/roma, on Facebook: https:// www.facebook.com/Accadung/, and YouTube: www.youtube.com/Accadung). This online content is quite popular, those interested can watch Hungarian feature films, nature documentaries, animated films or listen to concerts and literary works. We also provide our own virtual exhibition guides, access to exhibitions of Hungarian museums, and online theatre and opera performances to our followers. We try to highlight anniversaries of Hungarian−Italian cultural relevance and the works of Hungarian artists who were forced to flee our country so that we can bring the Italian public closer to Hungary. We do all this with the express ambition that, after the end of the pandemic, more Italian tourists would choose Hungary as a destination.

Gróf Klebelsberg Kuno beszédei, cikkei és törvényjavas-

latai, 1916–1926. Athenaeum Kiadó, Budapest, 1927. 233. SOCIETY

179

ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE

Since its inception in 2010, the Antall József Knowledge Centre (AJKC) in Hungary has introduced a variety of events targeting Hungarian students enrolled in higher education, as well as domestic and international professional audiences. The Knowledge Centre is named after József Antall (1932–1993), a Hungarian teacher, educator, librarian, historian, and statesman, who served as the first democratically elected prime minister of Hungary after the fall of communism (from 23 May 1990 to his death on 12 December 1993). The Knowledge Centre’s main objectives, in line with Antall’s philosophy, include managing talent and providing students and young professionals with wide-ranging practical knowledge through various events. The Knowledge Centre is a foreign policy think tank researching topics such as the Visegrad Cooperation, the future global role of the EU, the US, China, issues of the Middle East and Far East, security policy, as well as technological and social innovation. The whole of AJKC works towards strengthening institutional relations both at a national and international level, developing scholarship and internship programmes, and boosting professional cooperation via international conferences,

workshops, and event series. Our institution’s main office is located in Budapest, operating with two international departments, focussing on European and global relations, respectively, a research department, and a thematic department, covering areas such talent management and innovation. In addition, AJKC has a regional office in Győr and an office in Brussels, which was established in 2015 to represent the Antall philosophy in the heart of the European Union and to promote the values that he stood for at an international level. The publishing activities of AJKC involve releasing professional publications, scholarly works on political and social sciences (with special regard to security policy and international relations), as well as university textbooks. In our autobiographical series, prominent personalities of the Cold War period, including Ronald Reagan, George Bush, Margaret Thatcher, and Helmut Kohl, recount crucial years and decisions still affecting our lives. Reacting to events of political, social, and economic significance in the 21st century, the professional publications series of the Knowledge Centre features works incorporating the latest results of international relations and geopolitics, the history of politics, economics, and psychology.

THE MISSION OF AJKC IS TO FORMULATE AND PROVIDE FOREIGN POLICY INSIGHT AND ANALYSIS, SUPPORTING A SECURE AND THRIVING HUNGARY IN A CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPEAN, EUROPEAN UNION, AND TRANSATLANTIC FRAMEWORK.

The AJKC’s most ambitious professional event is called think.BDPST. The conference, organised in cooperation with Hungary’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and supported by the International Visegrad Fund, focusses on regional development and the new perspectives of research, innovation, and future technologies. The business world’s most notable, creative, and innovative thinkers are all invited to think.BDPST, along with actors from NGOs and the political sector, to share and inspire one another to develop forward-thinking strategies that will facilitate the development of the whole Visegrad region. The event also aims to position Budapest as an ideal destination for enterprises with a pioneering spirit seeking new horizons, new markets to enter, or a new territory and knowledge base to include in their plans for the future. In 2021, topics covered at the 6th think. BDPST conference included the effects of and the opportunities offered by digitalisation, with special regard to issues such as the renewing of the economy after the pandemic and the implementation possibilities of digital governance. The Antall József Summer School is an educational programme for MA and PhD students, as well as young professionals, which examines the Central European region, in

particular, the Visegrad Cooperation, and its wider neighbourhood from various aspects through frontal and more interactive forms of education. In 2021, the Antall József Summer School focussed on the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the Visegrad Cooperation and its relations with the Western Balkan region. The event was organised in partnership with the Konrad-AdenauerStiftung in Hungary. Each year, the Knowledge Centre organises its Foreign and Security Policy Conference, which focusses on the key diplomatic priorities of Hungary, the Central European region, and the transatlantic alliance as a whole, such as the future of NATO, stability in the Western Balkans, and EU defence cooperation. The 2021 event will examine a path forward for NATO, based on the Agenda 2030 strategic document, with a particular emphasis on the role CE countries play in achieving a more cohesive, secure, and effective transatlantic alliance. In addition, it will also discuss ambitious defence sector reforms in CE countries, while also analysing their importance to NATO and considering the roles allies can play in these development projects. The conference series is organised in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and supported by the NATO Public Diplomacy Division.

S GUE OR

AUTHORS

S GUE OR

AUTH ST

Bendarzsevszkij, Anton Leader of the geopolitical research group at Danube Institute, Budapest, and former director

Russian Influence in Southern Europe

of Pallas Athene Innovation and Geopolitical Foundation and its research institute

Borriello, Arthur FNRS postdoctoral researcher at the Centre for the Study of Politics,

A Populist Decade in the European South

Université Libre de Bruxelles

Martino, Roberto Postdoctoral researcher at the University of Florence and researcher of the Chief Economist Unit of the Directorate General of Research and

Productivity, the Twin Transitions, and the European Divide(s)

Innovation of the European Commission

Massaro, Guisy Research fellow at the Institute for Competitiveness (I-Com), Italy

Masulli, Michele Director of the Energy Area at the Institute for Competitiveness (I-Com), Italy

182

AUTHORS

Start-ups and Competitiveness in Mediterranean Europe

Company Size in Italy, Export Performance, and Challenges to Digital Transformation

S GUE OR

AUTH ST

Morgado, Nuno Research fellow at the Social Futuring Center and assistant professor at the GEO Department, Corvinus University of Budapest, as well as an external associate researcher at the

Geopolitics in the Mediterranean: Geographical and Identity Realities in and beyond the Mare Nostrum

Department for Government and Public Policy, Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Szilágyi, István Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and professor emeritus at the Faculty of Natural

When Southern Europe Became a Distinctive Part of the EU

Sciences, University of Pécs

Vaské, Cameron Founder, executive director, and editor-in-chief of the international remote think tank

Spain is Back—Again

The International Scholar

AUTHORS

183

C AUT JK

RS OF A HO

RS OF A HE

Bodolay, Dalma International relations manager at the European Relations Department

Alto Adige/Südtirol—The German Minority in Italy

Spain, Europe, and the World—Interview with He Anunciada Fernández de Córdova, the Ambassador of Spain to Hungary D’Onofrio, Alessandro Senior research fellow

The Future ahead of Us: The Education, Innovation, and Economic Recovery of Italy and Southern Europe—Interview with Marco Del Panta Ridolfi, the Secretary General of the European University Institute Italy and the Hard Post-Coronavirus Pandemic Recovery

Gulyás, Zsófia International relations manager

China and Southern Europe

at the Global Relations Department

Jánoska, Dóra International relations manager

Demographic Trends in Southern Europe

at the European Relations Department

Korpics, Fanni International relations manager at the European Relations Department

184

AUTHORS

Whose Mare Nostrum?—Italian and French Rivalry in the Mediterranean France and the EU: What’s after Brexit?

C AUT JK

RS OF A HO

RS OF A HE

Krajcsír, Lukács International relations expert at the Global Relations Department

Whose Mare Nostrum?—Italian and French Rivalry in the Mediterranean

Miklós, Norbert International relations manager

China and Southern Europe

at the Global Relations Department

Interview with He Anunciada Fernández de Córdova, the Ambassador of Spain to Hungary Pál, Zsombor Szabolcs Senior research fellow

Restás, Bianka International relations manager at the European Relations Department

At the Edge of Two Worlds—The Future of Portugal’s Atlanticism Hungarian−Italian Cultural Relations—Interview with Gábor Kudar, Director of the Accademia d’Ungheria in Roma

On the Front Line—The Role of Spain, Greece, and Italy in International Migration Management

Szőke, Noémi International relations manager

China and Southern Europe

at the Global Relations Department

Vass, Ágnes Head of the European Relations Department

“Friends of Cohesion” and Regional Disparities between the South and the East of the EU

AUTHORS

185

REFERENCES OF 8

PICTURES AND USED DATA Cover Miraculous Aqueduct (Acueducto de los Milagros), Mérida,

3 POLITICS

Spain. Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

Geopolitics in the Mediterranean: Geographical and Inside front and back cover Traditional

portuguese

tiles,

Identity Realities in and beyond the Mare Nostrum azulejos.

Source:

Darya

Superman/Shutterstock.com (image ID: 1195796191).

Member states of the EuroMed 7 Group. Source: https:// commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:EU-Med_Group.png, author: This user, CC BY-SA 4.0. The map is based on the

Photos between chapters

work of Júlio Reis, Ssolbergj & others: https://hu.wikipedia.

2) Mdina city gate, Malta. Source: Calin Stan/Shutterstock.

org/wiki/F%C3%A1jl:Blank_political_map_Europe_in_

com (image ID: 460823059).

2008_(with_Kosovo).svg, licenced under CC BY-SA 3.0.

3) Temple of Saturn in Forum Romanum, Rome, Italy.

Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

Source: katjen/Shutterstock.com (image ID: 570844282). 4) Canaletto: The Mouth of the Grand Canal looking West

The division of Cyprus and the British air bases in its territory.

towards the Carità. Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/

Source:

wikipedia/commons/3/36/Canaletto_%28Venice_1697-

districts_named.png, author: Golbez, licence: CC BY-SA

Venice_1768%29_-_The_Mouth_of_the_Grand_Canal_

2.5. The map is based on the work of nale/Shutterstock.com

looking_West_towards_the_Carit%C3%A0_-_RCIN_

(image ID: 281818631). Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cyprus_

400519_-_Royal_Collection.jpg, licence: public domain. 5) Raphael: School of Athens. Source: serato/Shutterstock.

Greece’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Source: Greece

com (image ID: 753294010).

MRGID 5679. Marineregions. <https://www.marineregions. org/eezdetails.php?mrgid=5679 > Licenced under CC BY

4.0.

INTRODUCTION

The map is based on the work of Tyk: https://en.wikipedia.

Mediterranean Europe

org/wiki/Azores#/media/File:Locator_map_of_Azores_

Map and graphics. Source of data: Eurostat, World Bank,

in_EU.svg, licenced under CC BY-SA 3.0. Author: Péter

Worldometer, The World Factbook, World Heritage List

Magyar ‘Medoks.’

Statistics, and European Patent Office. The map is based on the work of Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock.com (image

The north–south divide in Italy represented by regional per

ID: 496799155). Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

capita GDP in 2015. Source: https://commons.wikimedia. org/wiki/File:Map_of_Italian_regions_by_GDP_per_capita_

Spain, Europe, and the World—Interview with HE

in_euros_(2015)_alternative_colours.jpg, author. Conte di

Anunciada Fernández De Córdova, the ambassador of

Cavour, licence: CC BY-SA 4.0. The map is based on the

Spain to Hungary

work of boreala/Shutterstock.com (image ID: 223697200).

The photo published in this interview was provided by HE

Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

Anunciada Fernández De Córdova’s office. France’s navigable waterways. Source: https://commons. The Future ahead of Us: The Education, Innovation,

wikimedia.org/wiki/File:French_canals_index_map.jpg,

and Economic Recovery of Italy and Southern

author: David-waterways, licence: CC BY-SA 4.0. The

Europe—Interview with Marco Del Panta Ridolfi, the

map is based on the work of Eric Gaba: https://commons.

Secretary General of the European University Institute

wikimedia.org/wiki/File:France_blank.svg, licenced under

The photo published in this interview was provided by Marco

CC BY-SA 2.5. Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

Del Panta Ridolfi’s office. Portugal’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Source: https:// commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Portugal_EEZ.PNG,

author: Luis wiki, licence: CC BY-SA 3.0. The map is based on

Commercial Corridor: Rome and Ankara‘s Geopolitical

the work of Tyk: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Azores#/media/

Symbiosis Is Creating a New Mediterranean Strategic

File:Locator_map_of_Azores_in_EU.svg, licenced under CC

Paradigm. Austria Institut für Europa- und Sicherheitspolitik,

BY-SA 3.0. Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

Fokus,

10/2020.

https://www.aies.at/download/2020/

AIES-Fokus-2020-10.pdf

The map is based on the work

A Populist Decade in the European South

The Rise Of Populism In Europe. Source of data: Niall

496799155). Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

Peter

Hermes

Furian/Shutterstock.com

(image

ID:

McCarthy: The Relentless Rise Of Populism In Europe. Statista. 2 May 2019. <https://www.statista.com/chart/17860/results-

Table 1: Terrorist incidents in France after 2011. Source of

of-far-right-parties-in-the-most-recent-legislave-elections/ >

data: List of terrorist incidents in France. Wikipedia. <https://

Licenced under CC BY-ND 4.0. The map is based on the work

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_terrorist_incidents_in_France >

of Júlio Reis, Ssolbergj & others: https://hu.wikipedia.org/

Licenced under CC BY-SA 3.0. Accessed: 20 May 2020.

wiki/F%C3%A1jl:Blank_political_map_Europe_in_2008_(with_

Design: Péter Somos.

Kosovo).svg, licenced under CC BY-SA 3.0. Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

The countries participating in the 2019 Summit of the Two Shores. Source of data: Summit of the Two Shores – Jean-

When Southern Europe Became a Distinctive Part of the EU

Baptiste Lemoyne’s participation in the Montpellier Forum (2–3

Members of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). Source:

May 2019). Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_for_the_Mediterranean#/

<https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/

media/File:Union_for_the_Mediterranean_-_updatable.svg,

civil-society/news/article/summit-of-the-two-shores-jean-

author: Treehill, licence: CC BY-SA 4.0. The map is based on

baptiste-lemoyne-s-participation-in-the > Accessed: 20 May

the work of Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock.com (image ID:

2021. The map is based on the work of Peter Hermes Furian/

496799155). Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

Shutterstock.com (image ID: 496799155). Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

The institutional structure of UfM. Source: Erzsébet N. Rózsa: From Barcelona to the Union for the Mediterranean. HIIA Papers

French

T-2010/9. 12 April 2010. 7. Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Op%C3%A9rations_

military

interventions

after

2001.

Source:

ext%C3%A9rieures_depuis_2001.png, author: Blaue Max, Migration routes to Spain and the fight against migration. Source

licence: CC BY-SA 4.0. The map is based on the work of Peter

of data: Antonio Alonso–Rodrigo Silva: La frontera sur de Melilla

Hermes Furian/Shutterstock.com (image ID: 496799155).

con Marruecos. El País. 27 May 2016. https://elpais.com/

Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

elpais/2016/04/20/media/1461174790_388026.html . The map is based on the work of Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock.com

Gas pipelines across the Mediterranean and the Sahara.

(image ID: 496799155). Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

Source:

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Gas_

pipelines_across_Mediterranee_and_Sahara_map-en.svg, The largest immigrant communities in Portugal in 2019.

author: Sémhur, licence: CC BY-SA 3.0. The map is based on

Source of data: Relatório de Imigração, Fronteiras e Asilo

the work of Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock.com (image ID:

2019, edited by Joaquim Estrela. Serviço de Estrangeiros e

496799155). Redesign: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

Fronteiras, Barcarena, 2020. 17. The map is based on the work of Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock.com (image ID:

Chart 1: The French–Maghreb trade between 2010 and 2018.

496799155). Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

Source of data: World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solution. <https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/

Whose Mare Nostrum?—Italian and French Rivalry in

FRA/ > Design: Péter Somos.

the Mediterranean The Turkey–Italy–Tunisia commercial corridor. Source of

Chart 2: The Italian–Maghreb trade between 2010 and 2018.

data: Michaël Tanchum: Italy and Turkey‘s Europe-to-Africa

Source of data: World Bank, World Integrated Trade Solution.

<https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/

Macron wants good relations with other international actors,

ITA/ >. Design: Péter Somos.

too.

Source:

http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news

/54617/photos/48552, licence: CC BY 4.0. The countries of the “Mediterraneo allargato.” Source: Prof. Michael Tanchum (@michaeltanchum) at Twitter <https://twitter.

France is still present in many parts of the world. Source:

com/michaeltanchum/status/1301624907663581186 >

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Outre-mer_en.png,

The map is based on the work of Peter Hermes Furian/

author: Hoshie, licence: CC BY-SA 3.0. The map is based on

Shutterstock.com (image ID: 496799155). Author: Péter

the work of Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock.com (image ID:

Magyar ‘Medoks.’

496799155). Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

Table 2: Italian peace-keeping deployments by region. Source

Italy and the Hard Post-Coronavirus Pandemic Recovery

of data: Gabriele Abbondanza: Italian Peacekeeping Missions:

The budget alliances in Europe during 2020: the so-called

Vast, Praised and Underused. IAI Papers 20|20. August

Frugal Four and the Friends of Cohesion with Italy among

2020. 5. <https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaip2020.pdf >;

them. Source of data: European Budget Alliances. Geopolitical

Operazioni Internazionali in corso. Ministero della Difesa.

Futures. <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/wp-content/uploads

<https://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op_intern_corso/

Pagine/Operazioni_int.aspx > Accessed: 20 May 2021.

The map is based on the work of Júlio Reis, Ssolbergj & others:

Design: Péter Somos.

https://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/F%C3%A1jl:Blank_political_ map_Europe_in_2008_(with_Kosovo).svg, licenced under CC

Countries

NATO’s

Mediterranean

Dialogue.

Source:

BY-SA 3.0. Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NATO_Partners. png, author: Aris Katsaris, licence: CC BY-SA 3.0. The map

How much NGEU money does the Italian government want

is based on the work of Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock.

to allocate to the six key areas of its recovery plan? Source

com (image ID: 496799155). Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

of data: Piano Nazonale di Ripresa e Resilienza. Governo Italiano, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. 12 January

Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). Source of data:

2021. 22. https://www.governo.it/sites/new.governo.it/files/

Members. East Mediterranean Gas Forum. <https://emgf.org/

PNRR_2021.pdf. Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

about-us/members/ > Accessed: 20 May 2021. The map is based on the work of Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock.com (image ID: 496799155). Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

Table 1: The pay-out rates of the EU regional development and funds between 2014 and 2020. Source of data: Zsolt Darvas: Will European Union countries be able to absorb and spend

France and the EU: What’s after Brexit?

well the bloc’s recovery funding? Bruegel. 24 September

France’s nuclear arsenal in context. Source of data: SIPRI

2020. <https://www.bruegel.org/2020/09/will-european-union-

Yearbook 2020 – 10. World nuclear forces. Stockholm

countries-be-able-to-absorb-and-spend-well-the-blocs-

International Peace Research Institute. https://www.sipri.org/

recovery-funding/ > and Regional Policy 2014–2020 EU Payment

yearbook/2020/10 The map is based on the work of Peter

Details by EU Countries (daily update). European Commission.

Hermes Furian/Shutterstock.com (image ID: 496799155).

<https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/2014-2020-Finances/

Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

Regional-Policy-2014-2020-EU-Payment-Details-by-EU/vs2bdct3/data > Accessed: 20 May 2021. Design: Péter Somos.

Chart 1: French spending on defence in an European comparison (2019, % of GDP). Source of data: Eurostat,

Would you like to leave the eurozone and the EU? Source of

General government expenditure by function (COFOG), online

data: Guglielmo Sano: Sondaggi elettorali Tp: per gli italiani

data code: gov_10a_exp. Design: Péter Somos.

imprese a rischio debiti dopo la crisi. Termometro Politico. 11 April 2020. https://www.termometropolitico.it/1523599_

The renewed European tandem? Source: Frederic Legrand –

sondaggi-elettorali-tp-italiani-coronavirus-economia.html

COMEO/Shutterstock.com (image ID: 683014165).

Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

Italian multinational oil and gas company Eni’s stakes in

Lisboa,_Port_of_Sines,_Faro,_on_the_Portuguese_coast.

Eastern Mediterranean gas as of spring 2020. Source of data:

png, author: Geo Swan, licence: public domain. The map

John V. Bowlus: Eastern Mediterranean gas: Testing the field.

is based on the work of Volina/Shutterstock.com (image ID:

European Council on Foreign Relations. May 2020. https://

42723118). Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

ecfr.eu/special/eastern_med/gas_fields. The map is based on the work of Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock.com (image ID: 496799155). Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

The Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP). Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CPLP_-_ Mapa.png, author: Cristiano Tomás, licence: CC BY-SA

The Trans-Adriatic Gas Pipeline (TAP). Source: https://

4.0. The map is based on the work of Peter Hermes Furian/

commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Southern_Gas_Corridor.

Shutterstock.com (image ID: 496799155). Author: Péter

png, author: CuriousGolden, licence: CC BY-SA 4.0. The map

Magyar ‘Medoks.’

is based on the work of Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock.com (image ID: 496799155). Redesign: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

Spain is Back—Again Arancha González Laya, the foreign minister of Spain. Source:

President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte

https://www.flickr.com/photos/greecemfa/50163020047/,

before signing a memorandum of understanding in 2019.

author: Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών, licence: CC BY-SA 2.0.

Source: Alessia Pierdomenico/Shutterstock.com (image ID: 1725604720).

Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez during the European Parliament debate on the future of Europe in 2019.

At the Edge of Two Worlds—The Future of Portugal’s

Source:

Atlanticism

commons.m.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:MEPs_debated_the_

European

Union

2019—EP

via

https://

The US air base on Lajes, Azores, during World War

future_of_Europe_with_the_President_of_the_Government_

https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/

of_Spain_Pedro_S%C3%A1nchez_%C2%A9_CC-BY-

Ficheiro:P_20150401_204842_HDR.jpg, author: Tuga1143,

4.0_%C2%A9European_Union_2019_-_Source-EP.jpg,

licence:

author: Pietro Naj-Oleari, licence: CC BY 4.0.

and

today. public

Source: domain;

https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Ficheiro:Lajes_Air_Base,_2009.jpg, author: Guido Melo/ U.S. Air Force, licence: public domain.

The

Fractured

Senate.

Spanish

Source:

Congress

Deputies

and

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/

Prime Minister Mário Soares, Deputy Prime Minister Rui

File:Congreso_de_los_Diputados_de_la_XIV_legislatura_

Machete, and Minister for Foreign Affairs Jaime Gama

de_Espa%C3%B1a.svg, author: Phalbertt, licence: CC BY-

signing the accession treaty of Portugal in 1985. Source:

SA 4.0; https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Senado_

European Commission, Audiovisual Service, photo ID:

de_Espa%C3%B1a_-_XIV_legislatura.svg, author: Palbertt,

P-002612/04-31A, author: Christian Lambiotte, licence:

licence: CC BY-SA 4.0; Wikipedia. <https://en.wikipedia.

org/wiki/Senate_of_Spain > Licenced under CC BY-SA 3.0.

Communities, 1985.

Accessed: 20 May 2021. Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

NATO missions Portugal has been involved in. Source:

Chart 1: Spain’s GDP between 2000 and 2020 (billion

Wikipedia. <https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miss%C3%B5es_

USD). Spain’s GDP during the last two decades in current

no_estrangeiro_das_For%C3%A7as_Armadas_

USD—the pandemic’s impact was massive. Source of

Portuguesas > Licenced under CC BY-SA 3.0. Accessed:

data:

20 May 2021. The map is based on the work of Peter

CD?locations=ES, licence: CC BY-4.0 and open data.

Hermes Furian/Shutterstock.com (image ID: 496799155).

Design: Péter Somos.

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.

Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’ Pablo Iglesias, second deputy prime minister of Spain The Port of Sines in Portugal has an excellent location.

between January 2020 and March 2021. Source: KikoStock/

Source:

Shutterstock.com (image ID: 442279603).

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Porto,_

Russian Influence in Southern Europe

Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi and Chinese premier Li

Map of the Orthodox Church in Europe. Source of data: The

Kequian in 2014. Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/

World Factbook. The map is based on the work of Peter

palazzochigi/15350929819/, author: Palazzo Chigi, licence:

Hermes Furian/Shutterstock.com (image ID: 496799155).

CC BY-NC-SA 2.0.

Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’ Chart 1: Chinese investment in Spain between 2005 and March Chart 1: The 10 importesr of Russian gas in Europe in 2020

2020 (gross investment flows, EUR thousands). Source of data:

(billion m3). Source of data: Статистика поставок. Динамика

DAtaInvex. Estadísticas de inversión extranjera en España.

реализации газа в Европу. Газпром экспорт. <http://www.

Gobierno de España, Ministerio de Industria, Comercio y Turismo.

gazpromexport.ru/statistics/ > Accessed: 20 May 2021.

<http://datainvex.comercio.es/CabeceraPersonalizada.

Design: Péter Somos.

aspx?action=drilldown&eje=Columnas&valor=Todos%20 los%20a%C3%B1os&unvalor=%5BPeriodo%5D.%5

Chart 2: The Balkan states’ favourable opinion about third

BTodos%20los%20a%C3%B1os%5D&nivel=0&otroValor=

states in 2020. Source of data: Western Balkans regional poll.

total &otroNivel=0&id=1 > Accessed: 20 May 2021. Design:

February 2, 2020–March 6, 2020. 9 June 2020. International

Péter Somos.

Republican Institute. <https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/ final_wb_poll_for_publishing_6.9.2020.pdf > Design: Péter

Spanish prime minister Felipe González and Deng Xiaoping

Somos.

in 1985. Source: https://static.wikia.nocookie.net/althistory/ images/0/01/FelipeGonzalezchino.jpg/revision/latest?cb=

NATO enlargement after 2004. Source: https://commons.

20200704114309&path-prefix=es, author: not known, licence:

wikimedia.org/wiki/File:History_of_NATO_enlargement.

CC-BY-SA.

svg, author: Patrickneil–glentamara, licence: CC BY-SA 3.0. The map is based on the work of Peter Hermes Furian/

COSCO Shipping’s container terminal in Piraeus. Source:

Shutterstock.com (image ID: 496799155). Author: Péter

Aerial-motion/Shutterstock.com (image ID: 1724167972).

Magyar ‘Medoks.’ Talks between prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and China and Southern Europe

president Xi Jinping in 2019. Source: https://www.flickr.

The location of Macau within China. Source: https://

com/photos/greecemfa/49049738852,

commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Macau_locator_map.svg,

Εξωτερικών/ΑΠΕ-ΜΠΕ, licence: CC BY-SA 2.0.

author:

Υπουργείο

author: Sémhur, licence: CC-BY-SA-3.0. The map is based on the work Li Chao: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/

Members of the 17+1 cooperation in 2020. Source:

commons/archive/9/92/20080506110557%21China_blank_

Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern

map.svg, licenced under CC BY-SA 4.0 and on the work

European

ASDFGHJ

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/

Accessed: 20 May 2021. The map is based on the work

File:Macau_Location.svg, licence: public domain. Author:

of Júlio Reis, Ssolbergj & others: https://hu.wikipedia.org/

Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

wiki/F%C3%A1jl:Blank_political_map_Europe_in_2008_(with_

(talk):

Countries.

<http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/ >

Kosovo).svg, licenced under CC BY-SA 3.0. Author: Péter The container port in Sines. Source: Ungureanu Catalina

Magyar ‘Medoks.’

Oana/Shutterstock.com (image ID: 1066146701). Trade connection between the Roman and the Han

On the Front Line—The Role of Spain, Greece, and Italy

empire.

in International Migration Management

Source:

https://flickr.com/photos/136041510@

N05/29078797066/, author: Patrick Gray, licence: CC BY-NC

Table 1: The Mediterranean migration in numbers. Source of data:

2.0. The map is based on the work of Peter Hermes Furian/

Mediterranean Situation. UNHCR. The UN Refugee Agency.

Shutterstock.com (image ID: 496799155). Author: Péter

<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean >

Magyar ‘Medoks.’

Accessed: 26 April 2021. Design: Péter Somos.

The Moria camp in 2018. Source: Nicolas Economou/

data code: rd_e_gerdreg. The map is based on the work

Shutterstock.com (image ID: 1133715041)

Randam:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nomenclature_

of_Territorial_Units_for_Statistics#/media/File:NUTS_2_ The Aquarius rescue ship a few days after it was welcomed

regions.svg, licenced under CC BY-SA 4.0. Author: Péter

in Spain in 2018. Source: GERARD BOTTINO/Shutterstock.

Magyar ‘Medoks.’

com (image ID: 1126980335) “Friends of Cohesion” and Regional Disparities

between the South and the East of the EU Gross domestic product (GDP) per inhabitant by NUTS2

ECONOMY

regions in 2008 (in percentage of EU-27 = 100). Source of

Productivity, the Twin Transitions, and the European

data: Eurostat figures compiled by the author. The map is

Divide(s)

based on the work of Randam: https://en.wikipedia.org/

Figure 1: Labour productivity trend in Southern Europe

wiki/Nomenclature_of_Territorial_Units_for_Statistics#/

between 1995 and 2019 (gross value added per hour

media/File:NUTS_2_regions.svg, licenced under CC BY-SA

worked, 2015 = 100). Source of data: OECD database,

4.0. Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

compiled by the author. Design: Péter Somos. Chart 1: Percentage of cohesion policy funding in public Figure 2: Labour productivity in the European Union in 2018

investment per EU-28 member state between 2015 and

(gross value added per worker). Source of data: ARDECO

2017. Source of data: % of cohesion policy funding in public

database, compiled by the author. The map is based on the

investment per Member State. Based on Share of Cohesion

work of Júlio Reis, Ssolbergj & others: https://hu.wikipedia.

Policy per Member State to public investment 2015–2017.

o r g / w i k i / F % C 3 % A 1 j l : B l a n k _ p o l i t i c a l _ m a p _ E u ro p e _

European Commission. <https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/

in_2008_(with_Kosovo).svg, licenced under CC BY-SA 3.0.

Other/-of-cohesion-policy-funding-in-public-investment-p/

Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

7bw6-2dw3 > Accessed: 20 May 2020. Design: Péter Somos.

Figure 3: R&D intensity in European countries in 2018.

Company Size in Italy, Export Performance, and

Source of data: Eurostat data compiled by the author. The

Challenges to Digital Transformation

map is based on the work of Júlio Reis, Ssolbergj & others:

Chart 1: Labour productivity by level of dynamism and size

https://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/F%C3%A1jl:Blank_political_

class in Italy according to the 2019 census (enterprises with

map_Europe_in_2008_(with_Kosovo).svg, licenced under

ten or more employees, value added per p.e. in KEUR).

CC BY-SA 3.0. Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

Source:

Roberto

Monducci:

Nuove

misurazioni

della

struttura, comportamenti e strategie delle imprese italiane. Figure 4: Average labour productivity growth in European

Presentation at the event “Imprese che guardano al futuro.

regions between 1999 and 2018. Source of data: ARDECO

I primi risultati del Censimento permanente del 2019,”

database, compiled by the author. The map is based

organised by Istituto Nazionale di Statistica in Milan on 7

on the work of Randam: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Februrary 2020. Design: Péter Somos.

Nomenclature_of_Territorial_Units_for_Statistics#/media/ File:NUTS_2_regions.svg, licenced under CC BY-SA 4.0.

Chart 2: Value of goods exports by size class for exporting

Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

enterprises (%, 2018). Source of data: Eurostat figures compiled by the author. Design: Péter Somos.

Figure 5: R&D intensity (left) and R&D intensity growth (right) in 2018 and between 2010 and 2018, respectively.

Chart 3: The taxonomy of firm export orientation. Picture

Source of data: Lukas Bounsky [et al.]: The Geography of

based on Stefano Costa [et al.]: Tech on the ROC: Export

R&I and Productivity: Regional Disparities and Dynamics.

Threshold and Technology Adoption Interacted. LEM

Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg,

Working Paper Series 2019/38. 2019/December. 14.

2020. 15. <doi.org/10.2777/10591 >; Eurostat, online

<https://bit.ly/35J9YOw >

Start-ups and Competitiveness in Mediterranean Europe

ALTO ADIGE/SUDTIROL | BOLZANO/BOZEN. YouTrend.

Chart 1: Starting a business score in Mediterranean Europe

< h t t p s : / / w w w. y o u t re n d . i t / m / m a p p a - e l e t t o r a l e / i n d e x .

countries according to the World Bank in 2020. Source of

html#/c/1953-06-07/4-21/trentino-alto-adige-sudtirol/

data: World Bank figures compiled by the author. Design:

bolzano-bozen > Accessed: 20 May 2021.

Péter Somos. The map of the constituencies in South Tyrol where Chart 2: Newborn enterprises in select Mediterranean countries

SVP won in 1953. Source of data: ITALIA | TRENTINO-

between 2012 and 2018. Source of data: Eurostat figures

ALTO ADIGE/SUDTIROL | BOLZANO/BOZEN. YouTrend.

compiled by the author of the article. Design: Péter Somos.

< h t t p s : / / w w w. y o u t re n d . i t / m / m a p p a - e l e t t o r a l e / i n d e x . html#/c/1953-06-07/4-21/trentino-alto-adige-sudtirol/

Chart 3: Innovative start-ups that have both female majority

bolzano-bozen > Accessed: 20 May 2021. The map is based

and youth majority in March 2021. Source of data: InfoCamere

on the work of NordNordWest: https://de.wikipedia.org/

(available at https://startup.registroimprese.it/), processed by

wiki/S%C3%BCdtirol#/media/Datei:Italy_Bolzano-Bozen_

I-Com. Design: Péter Somos.

location_map.svg, licenced under CC BY-SA 3.0. Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

Chart 4: The contribution of Italian innovative start-ups to revenue creation by geographical area in March 2021 (EUR).

The language distribution in South Tyrol in 2011. Source:

Source of data: I-Com estimates based on InfoCamere figures

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Language_distribution_in_

(available at https://startup.registroimprese.it/) Design: Péter

South_Tyrol,_2011.svg, author: Spesh531, licence: CC BY-SA

Somos.

4.0. Redesign: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’

Chart 5: The VC market in Mediterranean European countries

“South Tyrol is not Italian,” says a table at the Italian–Austrian

in 2010 and in 2016. Source of data: The Evaluation of the

border—this regional tension is still not fully resolved. Source:

Italian “Start-Up Act.” OECD Science, Technology and

https://de.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datei:Suedtirol_ist_nicht_

Industry Policy Papers, No. 54. September 2018. https://bit.

Italien_-_Brennero.JPG, author: Llorenzi, licence: CC BY-SA

ly/3jtWyhC Design: Péter Somos.

2.5.

Demographic Trends in Southern Europe Chart 1: Population in the EU states between 1960 and 2021

SOCIETY

(at 1 January, million persons). Source of data: Population

Alto Adige/Südtirol—The German Minority in Italy

and population change statistics. Eurostat. Last updated

The dissolution of Austria-Hungary in 1919 with the parts

on 5 July 2021. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-

given to Italy. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_

explained/index.php?title=Population_and_population_

of_Saint-Germain-en-Laye_(1919)#/media/File:Dissolution_

change_statistics#Population_change_at+a_national_level >;

of_Austria-Hungary.png. The map is based on the work

Eurostat, online data code: demo_gind. Design: Péter Somos.

of Júlio Reis, Ssolbergj & others: https://hu.wikipedia.org/ wiki/F%C3%A1jl:Blank_political_map_Europe_in_2008_(with_

Chart 2: Population change by component (annual crude

Kosovo).svg, licenced under CC BY-SA 3.0. Author: Péter

rates) in the EU between 1960 and 2020 (per 1,000 persons).

Magyar ‘Medoks.’

Source of data: Population and population change statistics. Eurostat. Last updated on 5 July 2021. <https://ec.europa.

The Victory Gate in Bolzano. Source: https://commons.

eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Population_

wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bolzano,_monumento_alla_vittoria_

and_population_change_statistics#Population_change_at+a_

(13995)_01.jpg, author: Sailko, licence: CC BY 3.0

national_level >; Eurostat, online data code: demo_gind.

Chart 1: The electoral results of SVP in South Tyrol between

Chart 3: Births and deaths in the EU between 1961 and

1953 and 2018. Source of data: ITALIA | TRENTINO-

2020 (million). Source of data: Population and population

change statistics. Eurostat. Last updated on 5 July 2021. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/

index.php?title=Population_and_population_change_

ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE

statistics#Population_change_at+a_national_level >;

All pictures published in this chapter are possessions of the

Eurostat, online data code: demo_gind. Design: Péter

Antall József Knowledge Centre.

Somos. Total fertility rate in Europe in 2018 (EU-28 = 1.56). Source

of data: Births and fertility. Over 5 million babies born in the

AUTHORS

EU in 2015. Women first became mothers at almost 29 on

The portraits of our contributing authors were provided by

average. Eurostat. 8 March 2017. https://ec.europa.eu/

themselves.

eurostat/documents/2995521/7898237/3-08032017-AP-

The portraits of authors of the Antall József Knowledge

EN.pdf/b17c1516-faad-4e65-b291-187826a7ac88.

Centre are possessions of the Antall József Knowledge

The

map is based on the work of Júlio Reis, Ssolbergj & others: https://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/F%C3%A1jl:Blank_political_ map_Europe_in_2008_(with_Kosovo).svg, licenced under CC BY-SA 3.0. Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’ Life expectancy at birth by NUTS 2 region in 2019 (years, EU = 81.3). Source of data: Mortality and life expectancy statistics. Eurostat. Last updated in May 2021. <https:// ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index. php?title=Mortality_and_life_expectancy_statistics#Life_ expectancy_increased_in_EU-27_in_2018

Eurostat,

online data code: demo_r_mlifexp. The map is based on the work of Randam: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Nomenclature_of_Territorial_Units_for_Statistics#/media/ File:NUTS_2_regions.svg, licenced under CC BY-SA 4.0. Author: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks.’ Chart 4: The share of immigrants in the EU-27 member states in 2019 (per 1,000 inhabitants). Source of data: Migration and migrant population statistics. Eurostat. Last updated in March 2021. <https://ec.europa.eu/ eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migration_ and_migrant_population_statistics >; Eurostat, online data codes: migr_imm1ctz and migr_pop1ctz. Design: Péter Somos. Hungarian−Italian Cultural Relations—Interview with Gábor Kudar, Director of the Accademia d’Ungheria in Roma The photo published in this interview was provided by Gábor Kudar’s office.

Centre.

IMPRINT

IN FOCUS

Publisher: Antall József Knowledge Centre Publishing Director: Péter Antall, Chairman of the Foundation Board Editor-in-Chief: Zsombor Szabolcs Pál Editors: Alessandro D’Onofrio, Bianka Restás Language Editor: Mónika Vajda Proofreader: Mónika Horváth Contributors: Csilla Lichtenstein, Zita Mihály Graphic Design: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks’, Péter Somos Cover: Péter Magyar ‘Medoks’ Pre-press Preparation: Péter Somos

2019. 4th Issue Free of Charge

The Gulf—Complex and Divided

Interviews

Society

Culture

Economy

F ÓKUSZBA N Izrael szerepe az átalakuló világrendben 2017. 1. szám ingyenes kiadvány

Interjúk

Társadalom

Kultúra

Gazdaság

Printed and Bound: Prime Rate Kft. Managing Director: Dr Péter Tomcsányi

Nemzetközi kapcsolatok KÖSZÖNTŐK

CONTACT INFORMATION

IN FOCUS Digitalisation

Interviews

Society

2018. 1st Issue Free of Charge

The Effects on the Society

Economy

Transport

Culture

WELCOMING WORDS

IN FOCUS

Antall József Knowledge Centre 1027 Budapest, Királyfürdő utca 4. +36 20 310 8776 www.ajtk.hu www.ajtkkonyvmuhely.hu

Previous issues of In Focus are available on the AJKC Digital webpage: digitalistudastar.ajtk.hu/en/in-focus

2019. 4th Issue Free of Charge

The Gulf—Complex and Divided

ISSN 2677-111X HU ISSN 2677-111X

Interviews

Society

Culture

IN FOCUS

Economy

2018. 2nd Issue Free of Charge

China at the Dawn of the New Era

Previous issues of In Focus are available for free on the Knowledge Centre's webpage www.ajtk.hu. Interviews

Society

Culture

Economy

The magazine was published with the support of the Prime Minister’s Office of Hungary and the Bethlen Gábor Foundation.

In Focus - Mediterranean Europe

Articles inside

China and Southern Europe On the Front Line—The Role of Spain, Greece, and Italy in International

Russian Influence in Southern Europe

a Distinctive Part of the EU

Welcoming Words

Geopolitics in the Mediterranean: Geographical and Identity Realities in and beyond the Mare Nostrum

Innovation, and Economic Recovery of Italy and Southern Europe—Interview with Marco Del Panta Ridolfi, the Secretary General of the European University Institute

Spain, Europe, and the World—Interview with He Anunciada Fernández de Córdova, the Ambassador of Spain to Hungary The Future ahead of Us: The Education,