InFocus Environmental Migration 2018/3. by Antall József Tudásközpont

IN FOCUS Environmental Migration

2018. 3rd Issue Free of Charge

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A Case of Reverse Environmental Migration— Populating the Israeli Negev Desert Welcoming Words Guest Authors

Yemen—A Multifaceted Crisis on the

Arabian Peninsula

Tomorrow’s Atlantis

The USA of the 21st Century—The Era of “Megadroughts,” “Megafires” and “100Year Storms” Trends Global Migration Data Sheet 2005–2010

Climatic Migration in Latin America and the 6

Caribbean—A Potential Adaptation Strategy?

Whose (Environmental) Debt?—Interview with Csaba Kőrösi

Global Any Way. Is it Environmental Migration, Anyway?

Antall József Knowledge Centre

From Where to Where

Introduction

Climate Scenarios. In Scope: Water Cycle

Future Events

A Scientific Approach to Climate Change—

5 Years of SUSCO Budapest

New Releases

Natural Resources and Migration—

Authors

Environmental Diplomacy to Mitigate

Endnotes

Interview with Zsolt Hetesi

Resource Conflicts

References of Pictures and Used Data

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The Prospects of Water Wars and Global Involuntary Migration

Next Issue In Focus: India Regional Environmental Disasters, Migrations, and Large-Scale Land Purchases—How Unruled Capitalism Forces Movements of People?

Migration Trends in Africa—The Link between Migration and Environmental Change

The Consequences of the Worsening Climate in Southern Africa—The 2016 El Niño and its Aftermaths

Great Green Wall Initiative for the Sahara and the Sahel—A Development Project to Discourage Future African Migration

A Prolonged Development Crisis and the Complex Issue of the Migratory Flows— Interview with Sába Tesfay

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WELCOMING WORDS

Dear Readers,

Editor’s introduction

The present issue of In Focus is about the highly debated topic of linking environmental degradation to mass movements of people. “Environmental migration” has become a buzzword which lacks scholarly consensus. It has often been suggested that environmental degradation and global warming affect and alter migration dynamics, and may have become the instigator of violent conflicts. There is, however, scarce evidence to support direct links. Hence the complexity of the present topic—academically malleable, yet too important to neglect. This present edition starts out with the definitional problems of “environmental migration,” and then, through a series of case studies, we further examine these phenomena in real life: from the Horn of Africa to the Pacific Islands, then from Peru to Italy, we try to weigh evidence in this matter. Who is the ultimate victim of climate change? Is “environmental migration” a useful or applicable term, anyway? What ails the present asylum regime and what is the ultimate reason for migration? Please join us in getting a further insight into one of the most ancient human phenomena and assess if there is a fundamental change under way regarding its nature.

Migration has always been one of the ways how people adjust to shifting environments. Human population growth and all of its consequences, such as increasing energy and land use or pollution, are undoubtedly the driving forces of changing weather conditions. The number of extreme weather events over the last decades has significantly increased, and news about hurricanes, tsunamis, and tornadoes regularly hit the headlines, but the gradual changes of our environment are likely to have a much bigger impact in the long term. Of course, socio-economic changes and trends exist without any extreme weather events or climatic effects, and their impact is difficult to distinguish from other economic and demographic phenomena. There are a lot of unknowns and variables in the equation. The success of future mitigation experiments and the adapting ability of humanity move on an unprecedented scale. The present issue of In Focus aims to provide an overview of the complex relationship between climate change and human mobility, considering the underlying socio-economic and political processes of the given region. Please accompany us on this thoughtprovoking global journey.

Tamás Péter Baranyi—Editor in-Chief

Cecília Varsányi—Editor

Head of Research

Head of Office

Antall József Knowledge Centre

Antall József Knowledge Centre WELCOMING WORDS

GUEST AUTHORS

2 TRENDS

Gábor Baranyai Graduated with a Masters in Environmental Law (LL.M.) in environmental law at the University College London in 1998. Following three years of legal practice at White & Case LLP, Budapest, he served as Hungary’s environmental attaché to the European Union in Brussels between 1999 and 2003. Later, he was in charge of organising the 2013 Budapest Water Summit. Since 2014, he has been the Government Plenipotentiary for the settlement of the Gabcíkovo–Nagymaros transboundary water dispute with Slovakia. He has been heading the Centre for Sustainable Development Studies since 2016. He is the author of several articles on environmental and water law. He became Knight of the French National Order of Merit for facilitating the Hungarian–French cooperation within the EU. THE PROSPECTS OF WATER WARS AND GLOBAL INVOLUNTARY MIGRATION page 30

Sándor Madar Middle East and Asia-Pacific specialist in International Relations and International Security, graduated from Sciences Po, Paris. He is working with the Environment and Security Unit of UN Environment in Nairobi, and he is the Sustainability Director of V4SDG and also Founder of (With You) Initiative. NATURAL RESOURCES AND MIGRATION— ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY TO MITIGATE RESOURCE CONFLICTS page 27

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ANY WAY. IS IT ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION, ANYWAY? Tamás Péter Baranyi

The very title of this issue of In Focus magazine is rightly questionable from the outset. Environmental migration is, of course, a buzzword, an intellectual shorthand for some particular movement of people, but very little hard evidence is at hand to blame it on nature itself or on climate change. Many experts do not agree on the use of the term and point to the fact that a large share of publications are not academic but fall into the “grey zone” of policy papers, recommendations, etc.1 In fact, such movements are seldom short of, at least partly, an environmental character. Partly is an important word, as they do involve a set of other issues, which are, in many cases, more important than the natural ones: societal, political, demographic, and so forth. It is not a point to stop reasoning, however, because if we agree that most migration motivation complexes involve at least some degree of environmental causes, then why would we suddenly introduce this compound term instead of using just “migration.” In the coming pages, I try to put the concept of “environmental migration” against a list of some of the most striking common sense counterarguments so as to judge whether it is justifiable to approach this topic in such a way. CENTURIES-OLD MIGRATION PATTERNS AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS The so-called “environmental migration” as a phenomenon is often presented as something essentially “new,” but in fact, the notion is as old as reasoning about migration. At the same time, the institutionalisation of the asylum paradigm, as well as the general direction of sciences in the 20 th century up until the 1980s caused a downturn in both interest in and focus on environmental factors. The “comeback” of the notion of environmental migrants was given a new currency after climate change had firmly settled in public interest.2 In order to find out what is new 10

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or old in “environmental migration,” we should first take a glance at migration patterns of the past. When we say human migration is as old as humanity, we mean it. Homo sapiens took shape in the African savannah around 200,000 years ago. Its early migrations were among those that can less justifiably be called “environmental,” as humanity first settled in regions similar to their previous habitat. Before doing so, however, humans made two revolutionary breakthroughs: first came the overall expansion of their population and the diversification of their communities. The second was the emergence of organised, grammatical languages. Both of those changes resulted in the so-called cross-community migration, meaning that people did not “just move away,” but established communities, then migrated back and forth, then a little further, with the basic knowledge of the further parts already at hand. With organised language, the categorisation, knowledge, information, and technology was easier to transmit. Environmental factors, though their positive and negative effects are omnipresent even in the expansion of the populace, do not seem to have played a crucial part in the story. What is striking, instead, is the great human skill of accommodation. The turbulent years between 25,000 and 5,000 BC saw the most severe climatic changes, first global cooling, later warming, ever experienced by humanity. Still, mankind did not lose much territory, and they even started to invent different modes of production.3 Following through the thread of history, we see human migration more as a result of complex social and behavioural factors than a phenomenon determined by climate. For quite some time in the past, sedentary communities were much less prone to migrate than nomads. And even nomads preferred to migrate in a narrow swath of land. The main determinants of the movements

The barbaric invasions, or Völkerwanderung

of pastoral nomads have always been the availability of natural resources, the number of livestock, and the number of their population. All three have environmental bases, but none of them are truly environmental causes in the modern sense, since, for example, the number of livestock may drop without extreme weather conditions or climate change. It may be caused by a human population boom emerging against the background of a flat and advantageous climate. Yet again, political factors, like the loose structure of nomadic societies, their dependence on sedentary communities, and their militarised nature contributed more to their movements than their vulnerability to nature.4 Among those nomadic conquests were the “barbarian invasions,” whose cumulative effect was the downfall of the Roman Empire. “Barbaric invasions” is an English term, but the German Völkerwanderung, as well as the Hungarian népvándorlás, shows more of the case, as they clearly indicate the transformative nature of migration by emphasising the role it played in moulding the future nations of Europe. In fact, migration has always had a transformative role in world history and the trajectory of states. Not only Völkerwanderung but also the Great Expansion of the Europeans into the world or the Bantu expansion in Africa had a profound effect on what the world looks like today. Thus, it is natural that already existing states are concerned about migration prospects. In such a context, largescale migration always had a transformative,

disruptive, and even negating nature on states. Nomadic conquests, however, largely disappeared from world history from the high Middle Ages on: the emergence of the Russian Empire as an artificial barrier against migration is perhaps a factor that helps explain this fact. MOVING BEYOND THE NATURAL According to the definition of the International Organization for Migration, environmental migrants are “persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment as a result of climate change that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.” However, even such cautiously worded definitions are widely criticised for suggesting monocausality, downplaying human agency, and blurring distinction between voluntary and forced migration. 5 Others point out the fact that, driven by humanitarian fervour and an alarmist approach, people tend to broaden definitions because “bigger categories” invite “bigger numbers” in forecasts, which are, in turn, more useful to draw in support from the public or politicians.6 On the other hand, not even those involved in climate research agree on the level at which climate change can be associated with migration. There are generally three types of environmental hazards that are taken into account: sudden onset events GLOBAL

(typhoons, floods) and progressive tendencies, where desertification and sea level rise produce two distinct types. Most scholars agree that this last type, i.e. sea level rise, is clearly attributable to climate change and will eventually lead to outmigration, but it will be slow and easier to handle. The first category of natural catastrophes always involves migration, but usually short-term and in-country. After some time, most refugees fleeing from natural disasters return home to participate in rebuilding. The second category is the hardest to analyse: its environmental factors are obvious but not exclusive. According to one of the most renowned scholars, all we can say is that there is a connection, but it is always “highly contextual.” Moreover, those three categories are often blurred, and so are the consequences: for instance, a group of people who left because of a flood might return, but the idea of longer-term migration might be born out of their earlier experience.7 As has been suggested, historical examples as well as recent academic achievements both suggest that climate has been playing an obviously important role in most migratory movements in history, but not an exclusive one. Moreover, in most cases, the role it played was often secondary and mediated. The question is what has changed since the historical examples and how we should characterise recent developments. It is quite true that global migration is a highly differentiated phenomenon. Skeldon points out the fact that the overwhelming majority of migrants are coming from “labour frontiers,” i.e. not the poorest and environmentally most exposed parts of the globe but from areas that are relatively well-connected to the global value chain and are geographically closer to the developed world.8 Mexico, Pakistan, and North Africa serve as good examples. In most cases, the environment may thus play a secondary role, but not a primary one. There are, of course, people who migrate from poverty or war. It has often been suggested that such misery is also a consequence of climatic facts. However, other security experts point out the very political nature of the Syrian conflict and try to prove that the connection between environmental issues, climate change, and the Syrian war does not hold water. Moreover, misidentifying 12

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environmental issues as the origins of events may as well contribute to misjudgement of the situation and the downplaying of real factors.9 For quite some time, it was convenient to point out the fact that the 19th century saw migrations of much larger scale than in our present time. The direction of the great expansion of that century was, however, from Europe to the rest of the world, and not vice versa. In this vein, the view of multitudes of migrants could have been interpreted as an optical illusion, as the numbers were far lower than in the previous century.10 The migration crisis in Europe in 2015 has changed this nuanced approach. No one understood how the huge numbers of migrants could readily stand on the threshold of Europe. There was a general conclusion that something had changed in how people migrate. There are a couple of minor observable causes for this phenomenon. One of them is the fact that many of those people were already migrants before, but their route to Europe was not free: they were largely held back by the governments of Middle Eastern and North African countries. In turn, the disintegration of such states (Syria, Libya) or political crises in others (Greece) contributed to “opening the roads” to Europe. Disintegration, societal violence, terrorism, and war have all contributed seriously to the situation. But there is an underlying cause to all such movements: the population boom of the developing countries on the periphery of the European continent. Population growth and urbanisation explain more of the situation than environmental degradation. Marcel Leroy, senior researcher at the University of Peace’s Africa Program, says it is very difficult to discern causes of migration, but experts should be more cautious. The problem of the Horn of Africa region is primarily overpopulation, not drought. In fact, that part of the world experienced increased precipitation from 1979, but at the same time, it went through a series of droughts. As the population doubled in 20 years while livestock quadrupled, the region would be running out of resources even if environmental factors were better than before.11 Land degradation is a major factor in such migratory movements. But it is not simply an environmental issue nor a purely economic one. When we think of nomadic herders, we can also

think of the reasons why they decide to move. Still, those motivations cannot be cited in a global migration framework: an African herdsman might move away to a nearby territory to continue herding; but it must change its livelihood if it moves to a larger city. Not that migrating in an African environment would be a purely individual matter: as many scholars point out, heavy individual fates notwithstanding, migration in Africa is a community decision.12 Those complex social, economic, political, and environmental cnnmnnmnmauses all point to a much less debated part of the problem: global urbanisation. The relatively low-income agriculture and herding could produce, combined with population growth and land degradation, leads many people not only to move away but also to give up their way of life. Such harrowing decisions, as well as the pull factor of diaspora relations, contribute a lot to present-day migration.13 PROBLEMATISING ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION In Focus: Environmental Migration does not want to judge or take stands in the ongoing debate whether there is environmental migration as such. Rather, it expresses concern over the possibility of the problem getting worse, and brings up case studies of situations that may worsen to a point where the term becomes painfully relevant. For now, there are certain debated points and problematic issues that are important to highlight. First, migration is a highly politicised issue in academia. Even the words we use are often loaded

with political meaning—intended or unintended. The same goes for “axioms” referred to. For instance, the word “refugee” has a meaning that draws more empathy, while “migrant” was meant to be neutral. Those concerned with the security of states even tend to use the word “migrant” in a negative sense. On the other hand, those concerned with humanitarian issues may use the word “refugee” so as to convey their empathy and use “migration” when they refer to the “naturalness” of the phenomenon. This leads to the second problematic issue: the relation to the state. As we have seen, there is something inherently anti-state in mass migration. Still, if protecting the vulnerable is a priority, one cannot rely on anything else than the law-enforcing capabilities of the state. Those who do not believe in the primacy of the security of states, but in human security to be granted by “humanity” and supranational organisations, face a dilemma, as human security has so far always been granted by states. Whether migration can be environmental depends on many different factors. As we have seen, most instances of migration have included at least a portion of environmental dimensions, but they were also rife with many other issues. The question becomes: from what extent can anything be called “environmental.” Of course, it is largely a question out consensus and discourse. There are experts who tend to think of present-day migration as an all-out environmental question, while others are keen to point out the lack of solid evidence. There are even a large number of scholars who GLOBAL

Geographic Coordinates

Biomass status index

Geographic Coordinates

Soil resources status index

Geographic Coordinates

Soil resources process index

started out in one camp and later changed their minds.14 And while we discuss the impact climate had on populations close to the borders of the developed world, more remote segments of the Earth are experiencing phenomena that are less questionably called “environmental migration.” Alongside the climatic hardships of Aleut and Inuit people in the Artic countries, who are perhaps one of the most vulnerable peoples,15 the first environmental refugees might be Pacific islanders who have already left their homes due to rising sea levels.16

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There is yet another dimension to add. Environmental issues have always played a role in human migration—but usually a limited one. Depending on the future of the climate of the Earth, including anthropogenic climate change, the share of climate in migratory motivations may emerge sharply. Thus, environmental migration, much as it is debated today, could become an undoubted and staggering reality the day after tomorrow. For this reason, the topic of the present issue is not merely an intellectual play, but it represents an urgency for solid methodological basis, definitional clarity, and responsible policy implications.

FROM WHERE TO WHERE Mihály Kálóczy

“Climate change is a threat multiplier,” Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel said at the Conference of Defence Ministers of the Americas in Arequipa, Peru, in 2014. One also needs to add to this claim that, as history proves, climate change is capable of causing migration. Climate change is a phenomenon, which means in the vernacular that in the long term, weather patterns transform. But what is long-term? And what is supposed to be a pattern? These questions can only be answered concerning a certain, chosen area and period. Also, we have to clarify the exact goal of the questions. Since most estimations and goals concern 2100 at the latest,17 and future forecasts predict from 25 million to 1 billion environmental migrants by 2050,18 it seems that the efforts humanity makes in the next few decades are decisive. Therefore, it is very important to choose spatial and time limits, because all the answers change accordingly. According to the IPCC’s official definition,19 long-term typically concerns decades or even longer periods, so taking this and the above-mentioned estimations into consideration, this article will focus on the most distant time period and the global climate patterns, while the following ones will focus on current and predicted situations full of tension in specific areas of Earth. BEFORE INVENTING THE FRIDGE To understand what is happening to the climate around us or globally, imagine that Earth was a fridge out of order, and its door was open at the beginning. According to the current state of science, the fridge (the Earth in its form back then) was very hot due to the reductive atmosphere consisting of water (H2O), methane gas (CH4), and ammonia gas (NH3). Probably, the first microbes being able to produce oxygen by photosynthesis were the

cyanobacteria. The oxygen produced thanks to their life activity was enough to saturate dissolved iron or organic matter, which has been accumulating in the atmosphere ever since. That event is called the Great Oxygenation Event and it started 2.45 billion years ago, resulting in the creation of the atmosphere’s current composition.20 Considering that free oxygen is toxic to obligate anaerobic organisms that were the inhabitants of the fridge then, it caused the first mass extinction on the Planet. On the other hand, this way, the fridge could become a suitable place for human evolution. The more oxygen there was in the fridge, the smaller the portion of methane gas became, as methane reacted with oxygen and its concentration decreased in the atmosphere. Since CH4 and H2O (or water vapour) are potent greenhouse gases, the greenhouse gas effect was diminishing over time. It was followed by the cooling of atmosphere, and the first glacial period—colloquially, the first ice age began. The fridge door was closed for the first time. Cooling enabled the evolution, development, and survival of humankind for a long time. That large amount of carbon, which formerly constituted the methane gas, became a part of the biomass (bacteria, plants, etc.) over time. Probably, this biomass was the first to transform into oil and natural gas. EARTH HAS BEEN OPENING AND CLOSING THE FRIDGE DOOR—FOR HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF YEARS The last ice age ended 15,000 years ago, and the next one was due in 50,000 years’ time (ice age means “a period of long-term reduction in the temperature of Earth’s surface and atmosphere, resulting in the presence or expansion of continental and polar ice sheets and alpine glaciers”).21 Earth’s rotation axis is not perpendicular to the plane on which it orbits the Sun, which is why the above-explained change GLOBAL

Global mean temperature (C)

12 10 8 6 4 500,000

400,000 300,000 200,000 Years before present

100,000

Figure 1 - Global mean temperature shows the glacial periods in the past 500,000 years. The last five such periods are marked with snowflakes.

happened. Therefore, the angle in which the sunrays hit the planet’s surface wobbles, and so does the incoming heat capacity. Currently, we are in the middle of the Holocene, an interglacial epoch, which seems to last for a long time. Since the climate of the planet stabilised, it has had a well-defined periodic change until very recently, so literally, the global climate is permanently and periodically changing. There have been more than 50 ice ages in the history of Earth.22 The historical ice ages and the current one differ along two main parameters, the first being the change in global temperature and the second one being the pace of the current change. The Earth’s climate has been relatively stable for the past 12,000 years, and this stability provided the opportunity for our civilisation to develop and create our current way of life. Primarily, stability means a change of only a few Celsius at maximum in the global mean temperature. Although a relative 2 or 3 °C change does not threaten humanity with extinction, it is definitely able to crunch economies, causing crisis by hindering water or food supply, which finally forces people to leave their homeland. THE FRIDGE HAS BEEN LEFT OPEN AND NOW IT’S WARMING INSIDE According to the scientists of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research,23 the Earth will skip a whole glacial cycle. The next ice age may have been delayed by over 50,000 years, due to human intervention in the atmosphere’s condition. To describe the level of change, two statements, and the underlying data, should be considered. CO2 is not the only but the most decisive greenhouse 16

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gas. The last time its concentration reached the current level was around 3.6 million years ago, in the middle of the Pliocene Epoch, when it ranged from about 380 to 450 parts per million.24 Concerning that epoch, just to make the current and past climate conditions easier to compare, two more interesting data: the sea level was 10-40 meters above the current one,25 and what is more, the global surface temperature was substantially warmer, estimated to be about 2 °C to 3 °C above pre-industrial temperature. 26 It was before the stabilisation of the Earth’s climate. However, it is not only the concentration that matters, but also the pace at which temperature changes: a mathematical equation, created to describe the impact of human activity on Earth, finds that human activity causes the climate to change 170 times faster than natural forces.27 NATURE VS HUMANITY Prior to the Industrial Revolution, any change in climate could have been explained by natural causes, 28 such as changes in solar energy, volcanic eruptions, natural changes in greenhouse gas concentrations, and changes in the reflectivity of land surface and atmosphere. Fortunately, technology, research, and samples (e.g. ice core samples) from the last and the current geologic ages help us differentiate between natural and anthropogenic drivers of climate change. The three charts at Figure 2 show the change in the concentration of the most important greenhouse gases in the last 10,000 years, highlighting a sudden but significant increase since 1970.29 Simplifying the results of more than 60 years’ research, the contribution of the mentioned gases to global warming through the greenhouse effect have been modelled and compared to the observed temperature changes on land and ocean surface. Based on them, in its 5th Assessment Report, IPCC claimed: “It is extremely likely that more than half of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by the anthropogenic increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and other anthropogenic forcings together. The best

Nitrous Oxide (ppb)

Radiative Forcing (W m -2)

Methane (ppb)

Radiative Forcing (W m-2)

Carbon Dioxide (ppm)

Radiative Forcing W m-2)

Figure 2 - Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide over the last 10,000 years (large panels) and since 1750 (inset panels). Measurements are shown from ice cores (symbols with different colours for different studies) and atmospheric samples (red lines). The corresponding radiative forcings are shown on the right hand axes of the large panels.

Time (before 2005)

estimate of the human-induced contribution to warming is similar to the observed warming over this period.” 30 HOW DOES IT AFFECT OUR EVERYDAY LIVES? Global change does not necessarily affect the local or regional climate conditions. But in most cases, it results in some kind of environmental

change, affecting the quality or quantity of one or more environmental elements. Biotic (living things like animals, plants, etc.) and abiotic elements can be affected directly or indirectly, and have a complex interaction network between them. These changes can have different effects on different species. Flowers blooming too early, green winters, frogspawn in wintertime, birds nesting at the wrong time, species disappearing and migrating as they follow the moving climate zones are just a few phenomena that serve as evidence. IPCC’s scientists know with very high confidence, or even greater certainty, that “human-induced warming influences physical and biological systems throughout the world, sea levels are rising, glaciers and permafrost are shrinking, oceans are becoming more acidic, ranges of plants and animals are shifting.”31 For example, climate change affects agriculture through not just changes in average or local temperatures but rainfall, heat waves, atmosphericcarbon dioxide and groundlevelozone concentrations, changes in pests and diseases, even in the nutritional quality of some foods, as well as changes in sea level. As a response, even one degree of change in temperature makes plants migrate, but as a study states, “The rate of future climate change is likely to exceed the migration rates of most plant species. The replacement of dominant species by locally rare species may require decades, and extinctions may occur when plant species cannot migrate fast enough to escape the consequences of climate change.”32 Amongst the mentioned factors, perhaps the most direct ones that can be observed are the increasing frequency and severity of extreme environmental events, such as droughts, rising sea levels, floods, and hurricanes. The most important—and also the most vulnerable—environmental element is water. Water needs to be readily available to constantly supply societies with enough food through irrigation, and the appropriate amount of drinking water on Earth is crucial not just for direct consumption. Due to its conjunctive role, it is the most influential element not only for our lives but also for the whole planet. GLOBAL

A FRIDGE STILL OPEN—WATER-ICE CUBES ARE MELTING Only 3% of the world’s water is fresh water, and two-thirds of it is tucked away in frozen glaciers or otherwise unavailable for human consumption. Moreover, the amount of ice worldwide as a possible source, such as polar caps or glaciers in high mountains, is also on the wane due to the global warming trend. The thermohaline circulation, also known as the global conveyor belt, connects the three main states of water on a global scale, which means it balances the temperature differences, reducing the risk

of extreme events. So, the melted ice has not disappeared, but become less spectacular. Naturally, the amount of groundwater is a possible stock for freshwater, but it is more of a local challenge to have it in the appropriate quality and quantity. The level of greenhouse gas emission definitely reached a point where the correlation between human activity, the related pollution, and the increasingly frequent weather extremes could firmly be stated, and now the consequences have to be borne jointly by poor and rich countries.

Figure 3–4 - As for food insecurity, comparing the current and estimated data of the 2050s (presuming middle-level greenhouse gas emission and low-level adaptation), Africa and the Middle-East seem to be the most vulnerable areas on our planet. 18

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CLIMATE SCENARIOS. IN THE SCOPE: WATER CYCLE Cecília Varsányi

CLIMATE, CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING As seen in the previous article, our climate is influenced by a whole series of natural cycles (for example, carbon cycle, nitrogen cycle, etc.) The long-term state of the environment is a result of environmental balances: let us just think of temperature, a result of cooling and heating factors, or salt concentration in the oceans determining the ocean currents, which is a result of the freezing and melting of the polar ice caps. Some of these cycles take place within a day, and some are incredibly long, lasting a “few” thousands of years. Climate change serves as an umbrella term for several phenomena, which actually are changes in these constantly running cycles. Therefore, it is worth raising the question what climate, climate change, and global warming actually mean—knowing that these terms are often used interchangeably but have distinct meanings. Climate characterises the regular weather conditions dominating in a given area. These average patterns of temperature, sunshine, cloudiness, air pressure, humidity, precipitation, and winds, averaged over a series of years, determine the average climate of a specified region. Climate change is often identified with global warming, however, climate change includes warming, as well as the “by-products” of increased temperature such as melting glaciers, heavier rainstorms, or more frequent drought. Climate change—as the broadest concept of these phenomena—in general means a significant change in the mean values of meteorological elements that have an environmental, economic, and social impact, and of course, this change in mean values also refers to a longer period. Climate and climate change can be interpreted globally and locally, i.e. in a smaller area. The fact that Earth’s average temperature increases does not necessarily mean that there are no areas on

the planet where the average temperature would not remain unchanged or even become lower, so global climate change may occur locally in completely different ways. So, global warming is just one symptom of the much broader problem of climate change. Global warming is the term used to describe a gradual, long-term (century-scale) increase in the average temperature of the Earth’s atmosphere. Independently of the different definitions, there is no scientific debate about the obvious proofs like an increase in average world temperature or a decrease in ice cover and sea level rise; although there is a discussion about the impacts which are going to be seen as a long-term result. THE MOST OBVIOUS PROOFS OF A VERY ABRUPT TRANSITION According to an ongoing temperature analysis conducted by NASA’s scientists at Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS), the average global temperature on Earth has increased by more than 0.8 °C since the end of the 19th century. Sixteen of the seventeen warmest years on record occurred since 2001. Not only was 2016 the warmest year since modern record-keeping began, but eight of its twelve months were the warmest on record for the respective months. The sea surface is warmed mainly by solar irradiation; seawater evaporates but also soaks the atmosphere’s heat. The question is: How long will it be able to absorb the Earth’s excess heat? This increased heat is/has been mainly absorbed within the top 700 meters of the ocean. 33 Nevertheless, recent results of scientific research find that the oceans have been warming up faster and deeper than it had been previously expected.34 Additionally, there are signs that the oceans might be starting to release some of their stifled thermal energy.

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Temperature Anomaly (C)

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Figure 1 - Change in global surface temperature relative to 1951–1980 average temperatures

According to scientists, today’s sea level rise is about one-third the result of the warming of existing ocean water, and the rest is due to melting land ice.35 As a consequence, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), by the mid-2090s, global sea level rise is expected to achieve 0.22 to 0.44 m above 1990 levels, as seen in Figure 2.36 However, observations show that sea level is not rising evenly around the world.37 In some regions, rates are several times higher than the global mean rise, while in other regions sea level is falling. One might think these adversities are restricted to just some parts of the globe, but actually, the whole world stands to lose ground. The most affected regions and seashores include Japan, Vietnam; Pacific Islands such as Tuvalu and Kiribati, while European shores like the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Ireland have to deal with serious coastal problems as well. WHAT DO ALL THESE SYMPTOMS ACTUALLY MEAN IN OUR DAILY LIVES? The already mentioned 0.8 °C average increase38 may not sound much, but for the world we live in, 1 °C difference might lead to the weakening of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation and cause the extinction of approx. 10% of land species. To mention some more region-specific examples, 20

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small glaciers in the Andes would disappear completely and would threaten water supplies of 50 million people. These are only some of the symptoms of an additional 1 °C global temperature increase, relative to pre-industrial levels. The latest science suggests that the Earth’s average temperature will even rise by more than 8 °C if global emissions continue on their current path and various forms of positive feedback (e.g. the release of carbon dioxide from soils or methane from permafrost) amplify the warming effect of greenhouse gases.39 Such effects could be catastrophic but are currently “very hard to capture with current models as temperatures would be so far outside human experience,” as the IPCC suggests. Despite the ambitious goals and the international efforts that work towards reducing emissions worldwide, we already have to talk about a possible 8 °C temperature increase scenario. One of the many possible reasons—besides anthropogenic impacts—is the greenhouse warming feedback mechanism involving water vapour. ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT POINTS IN THIS WHOLE STORY: THE WATER CYCLE Just think about it: whenever we try to explore another planet with our satellites, the first thing

Figure 2

we look for is water. No water: not interested. Way simple. Our ecosystems on the planet have developed over millions of years based on the water cycle; water is involved in all components of the climate system: in the atmosphere, hydrosphere, cryosphere (frozen surface), lithosphere (land), and biosphere. Climate change is dramatically modifying the water cycle, which is absolutely frightening. This era (set up by natural and anthropogenic impacts) is leading us to a profound environmental crisis including very serious consequences for our hydrological system and for the water systems we build. But what is the hydrological cycle exactly about? It is evaporation, rainfall, and runoff. General warming intensifies this cycle because as air temperatures increase, more water evaporates into the air; additionally, warmer air can hold more water vapour. Here, it is worth mentioning that for every 1 °C by which the temperature of the planet goes up, the atmosphere absorbs 7% more precipitation from the ground40 as the heat forces more condensation into the clouds, it becomes a more concentrated precipitation. Scientific evidence indicates that warming caused by manrelated emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases increases the amount of water vapour in the air by boosting the rate of evaporation. WATER RESOURCE VARIABILITY Understanding the mechanisms by which climate change affects water resource variability is of critical

importance. It is not only about island nations and coastal areas (of course, these are the areas which can actually be swamped by rising sea levels in the near future) 41 but increased vulnerabilities of ecosystems and of human society. Some of the results of the mentioned greenhouse warming feedback mechanism are dramatic spring floods, prolonged summer droughts, and category 3–5 hurricanes we used to think might happen once in every thousand years: now this is becoming the new normal. As mentioned, recent observations project decreases of renewable water resources42 in some regions and increases in others. Water resources are projected to decrease predominantly in many mid-latitude and dry subtropical regions: frequency and intensity of droughts have especially increased in the Mediterranean and West Africa. A late NASA study finds that the drought that began in 1998 in the eastern Mediterranean Levant region is likely to be the worst drought of the past nine centuries.43 The most regular trend of increasing water resources is seen in North America and in the Asia-Pacific region with more intense and frequent extreme precipitation events. According to predictions, the number of tropical cyclones may fall globally, although their maximum wind speed and precipitation is expected to grow, due to the warmer and thus more energetic atmosphere. Among the latest examples are Hurricane Katrina in 2005, which swept along the Gulf coast from central GLOBAL

HOW DOES THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT OF WATER

direct relation to the temperature: if an additional factor (for

VAPOUR WORK?

example CO2) causes an increase in temperature, more

Although the extent of its contribution to global warming

greenhouse gas) causes the temperature to go up even

has been debated, water vapour is known to be Earthâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s

water evaporates. This additional water vapour (being a further. Shortly: humans release CO2, causing warming;

most abundant greenhouse gas. What is sure is that

this warming boosts evaporation, which in turn, augments

Florida to Texas, or Irma in 2017, one of the most powerful hurricanes in the US in more than a century. The increase in temperature and thereby in sea levels also contributes to contaminating our drinking water, causing shortages in drinking water supply (see, for example, the Gulf of Mexico, especially Florida and Louisiana), not even mentioning how it affects irrigation and farming.44 Climate change has an impact on freshwater variability all around the globe; some of the effects impacting Europe can be seen on Figure 3.

Some environmental effects, such as drought, make it more difficult to subsist in a given area day by day. Some, for example, a hurricane or a flood, force people to leave their homeland instantly, some others, like sea level rise, push back living areas slowly. What might these events cause on a short- or long-term? Higher taxes? Restrictions imposed on the use and export of natural resources? War on resources? Migration? Some of these events continually push people to think about leaving their homeland. If this decision is made by millions of people, they will not be the only ones to think about a solution.

the amount of water vapour in the atmosphere exists in

warming even further.

Figure 3 - A closer example: impacts of changing climate on water variability and agriculture in Europe 22

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A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH TO CLIMATE CHANGE Interview with physicist Dr Zsolt Hetesi, leader of the Research Group for Sustainable Development and Resources

You have been doing researches related to environment, energetics, and sustainability since 2005. A decade ago, it was predicted that global warming would reach 1-2 °C by the end of the 21st century, and now it is expected to happen within one or two decades. It is quite clear that climate is changing quicker than it was expected, but one cannot help feeling that, as for the expected values, information is disclosed in small bits—or that it is withheld. Are the changes really so unpredictable? At the moment, the relatively harmonious, long-term but dynamic balance is decomposing. What I mean by dynamic balance is that in a multi-parameter space, the average temperature of Earth, the location of climate zones, and the number of extremities are roughly in a state of equilibrium and do not significantly deviate from this. If I consider climate as a continuously changing system, this system is still characterised by different parameters: average temperature, the greenhouse gases being present in the system, the position of the climate zones, the prevailing winds, or the big oceanic and terrestrial water cycles. Comparing these to the last ten thousand years, it is highly probable that a new state of equilibrium is taking shape. As a matter of fact, we should not speak of warming but the

changing of extremities and an increase in average temperature. There is more and more energy in the system, since the atmosphere cannot cool down the way it could five centuries ago. That is why the system will find a new equilibrium sooner or later. How can it be illustrated via an everyday example? For instance, let us take a room with a thermometer showing the temperature of this room. So the mercury in the thermometer shows the actual temperature of the room. If I continuously heat it with a lighter, I will move it out of its state of equilibrium. The very same thing is happening to the atmosphere. We are emitting more and more substances—greenhouse gases— which greatly affect the balance of the atmosphere. Now, this very finely tuned system may give substantial responses to even the smallest interferences. At first linearly, but later the change of any parameters will take place at an exponential speed. In other words, the process will accelerate. For us dealing with complex systems, there is nothing surprising in the acceleration of the process. When described by numbersand formulae, it is clearly understandable —however, of course, not everybody lives in the realm we scientists live in. One must fathom mathematics to have an objective opinion on many phenomena of our world.

Dr Zsolt Hetesi gained his degree in Physics in 2003 and his PhD in Particle Physics and Astronomy in 2008. In his current position as senior research fellow at the National University of Public Service, Faculty of Water Sciences, Institute for Sustainable Development Studies, his field of research includes applied statistics in the field of modelling renewable sources, energy system modelling, and adaptive agricultural technologies for climate change. Mr Hetesi gained his latest degree in Theology in 2018.

The interview was conducted by Cecília Varsányi on 18 July 2018. GLOBAL

If one does not understand the mathematical contexts, it is advisable to avoid expressing firm opinions on these topics. Meanwhile, it is very often argued that mankind is not responsible for this extreme weather. What is your opinion about it? I cannot speak about my opinion but only the scientific facts: the Planck function, the physics of absorption spectra, the radiation balance and its calculation method, the numerical integrals used for their calculations in the atmosphere, or what effects concentration change causes and where. It is not a process one makes up sitting at home in an armchair: it is rooted in thermodynamics, statistical physics, and quantum theory. One must understand the physical background of the phenomena. Based on all these, it is very likely that mankind is to blame for it. As for the climate of Hungary, what can we expect? Will there be any consequences of global warming, more serious than what the general public anticipates? In the case of Hungary, temperatures no longer rise linearly. Based on the data that have been measured for the last one hundred and fifty years, it increases quicker than what can be considered linear. The number of extremities will also increase. In the atmosphere of Earth, there are some big prevailing wind systems. Around the Arctic Circle, the air is cold. In the high atmosphere, there is a wind blowing from west to east, which is caused by the differences in atmospheric pressure and the Coriolis force: it is called polar easterly. If the temperature is not high enough, nor is the pressure difference, and the effect of the Coriolis force is stronger, since the wind blows because of the pressure difference (the temperature and the pressure being proportional to each other). If the difference in temperature decreases between two currents, so does the pressure difference, and so, disturbances emerge in the system. It is at such times that warm air can reach high circles of latitude. Recently, temperatures over 30Â Â°C have been measured in the Scandinavian countries, while this summer is surprisingly cool in Hungary. 24

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THESE CHANGES HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE BY DIFFERENT CIVILISATIONS MANY TIMES, SO IT WOULD BE ENOUGH TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS FORM THEIR ECOLOGICAL, HUMAN ECOLOGICAL, AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES. On the edges of these currents, there is usually a weather front to be found. This front causes heavy rains and thunderstorms. A hundred years ago, such air masses with considerably different temperatures could not mix. Let us take the heat-sinking vessels as an example: the bigger the difference in temperature between them, the quicker the heat exchanging process will be, since the process is propelled by the differences in their temperatures. Therefore, if bigger differences in the temperature are present, the weather phenomena will be more boisterous; whereas with smaller differences, these phenomena tend to be normal. As air masses with considerably different temperatures meet more and more often, the number of weather extremities in the Carpathian Basin has been increasing as well. Precipitation becomes increasingly heavy: it either falls all at once in a huge quantity or does not fall for a long time, and missing the vegetation period, it holds off until early spring or late autumn.

What we call “Medárd” in Hungarian is practically a European monsoon phenomenon in such years when all conditions are good. It can emerge when the beginning of the summer is cool enough because then the Atlantic air masses can flow from Iceland in the least over Europe; if the summer is warm, however, such motion of air cannot occur. If “Medárd” comes, there will be crops to be harvested, if it does not, it will be a droughty year. But if “Medárd” is too strong, too much rain makes the harvest difficult. It may occur that in winter a current of plus 20 °C appears, or there comes a cooling of minus 5 °C in May. Such and similar phenomena can be expected in Hungary in the future. We should not prepare for becoming an olive-growing area, but the agricultural sector must get prepared for growing very resistant crops being capable of surviving among droughty and very wet conditions. The time of old agricultural practices based on more or less predictable conditions has gone forever. One cannot predict when winter will come and what weather it will bring. What relations can you perceive between climate change and the migration crisis hitting Europe? All of us learnt about the fall of the Roman Empire, but most probably only few of us have heard about about what the Greek and the Roman had done to the Mediterranean Basin. I am hinting at deforestation. Hellas, Rome, and later all the medieval civilisations were based on the natural resources of forests: they used wood for buildings, heating, ship building, etc. To enlarge the available agricultural land, they also cut trees, so the precipitation washed the fertile soil off the hillsides. Let us take the city of Ephesus as an example: in its golden age, during the 1st century BC, it was one of the most important cities of Asia Minor—and nowadays, it is a barren land. The shrubland that is called maquis in France and macchia in Italy is not autochthonous. This is the vegetative cover that invaded the place of the original forests. Those forests were subtropical, or almost such, in the sense that they were very vulnerable to weather conditions: when there was low rainfall, their regeneration process was very

problematic. Whereas in the temperate zone, if an open area is abandoned, there will be a forest growing in one hundred years’ time, in the Mediterranean, only shrubland could take roots. If somebody wants to see what the autochthonous forests looked like, they must visit the Plitvice Lakes National Park. But why is it so important? In the Sahel, there has been a huge population explosion recently, while climate change has had a very unfavourable effect on precipitation in the Middle East, in Morocco, or in Libya. The burden brought about by overpopulation, economic backwardness, and climatic extremities—while in certain areas precipitation is actually increasing, not in the Sahel, which also relates to the lack of forests— concerns hundreds of millions of people. It is not the only factor present, but nonetheless, it does appear among other factors. There are more and more countries on relatively normal terms with each other for a long time that now start disputing about a river, claiming that one does not provide enough water for the other. For example, there is the debate among Turkey, Syria, and Iraq about the Tigris and the Euphrates. What lies behind this dispute is the percentage of water to be handed over. We do not have to travel too far, though: just think of Bős–Nagymaros. As climate change does not affect us so severely, for the time being, we do not find this issue very urgent to solve. In many parts of the world, conditions are deteriorating to such an extent that not even safe water or food supply can be guaranteed. At any rate, as I told you, climate change is only one of the many reasons. Some put it forward as a counter-argument that although there has been more precipitation than there used to be for example on the Horn of Africa, there is still a migration wave flowing out of that region. What is the real problem: the deterioration of the environment or the population explosion? We have transformed our planet into a backyard where we grow food and keep animals. Kipling’s wild jungles in India or in Congo disappeared long ago. We have preserved local wildlife in reserves. GLOBAL

Each nature film is shot in these enclosed areas because elsewhere it would be very difficult to capture unspoilt environment. These reserves still cover areas as big as half or the whole of Hungary, but they are relatively small compared to what we have taken away from our planet. In certain parts of Earth, the carrying capacity of the land is rapidly decreasing, or it can even completely cease because of climatic changes (desertification, erosion, etc.). From this perspective, which are the most affected regions? When the soil is taken into consideration, heavily overpopulated countries, such as China and India, or regions where agriculture is overmechanised, such as Western Europe and North America, are the most affected ones. In the USA, soil is in a dangerous condition everywhere. Its humus content has been radically decreased during the last fifty or sixty years. Peripheral ecosystems, which already have very delicate ecological balances, are greatly affected by climate change, too. The remains of the savannahs and the subtropical rainforests are such regions, where even the smallest climatic change may cause the collapse of the whole ecosystem. There are plenty of such areas on Earth. From the Iranian Zagros Mountains to the Atlas Mountains in Morocco—which is practically the birthplace of the universal civilisation—the autochthonous vegetative cover has almost completely disappeared: partly because of natural climatic changes, but more significantly, because of human activities. As a result, climate is different to what it used to be: there is less moisture, less precipitation, but there are more extremities. According to Jared Diamond (an American evolutionary biologist, biogeographer, and professor of physiology— ed.), it is superfluous to scientifically examine what is happening at a given place where forests or the autochthonous vegetative cover have been radically changed. These changes have already been made by different civilisations many times, so it would be enough to draw conclusions form their ecological, human ecological, and socio26

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economic consequences. However, since we have to feed 7.5 billion people today, protecting nature is becoming more and more difficult. Long-term climatic changes may significantly strengthen people’s inclination for migration. When speaking of slower environmental degradation, and not of a sudden catastrophe, what environment protection-related measures can be taken to help the affected countries keep their populations? As for this topic, there are two main considerations: agriculture and housing. Regenerative agriculture has a number of simultaneous beneficial effects. It increases the adaptability of the fields and improves the structure of the soil increasing its humus content and its water retention capacity as well. This way, the field will be more resistant to droughts and extreme precipitation. Sometimes, the beneficial effects of the shelter belts and those of the arable lands and meadows are combined within agroforestry systems or mosaic-like landscape structures. If it is possible to integrate such elements into these systems that are capable of keeping any sudden and heavy precipitation, they will be suitable to handle some of the most important symptoms of climatic changes. If regenerative agriculture were capable of increasing the humus content by 0.5% a year—which is normally attainable for ten years—at the end of this period, the humus content of the given soil would be 5-6% higher. This is only true for the temperate zone, where the normal humus content of the steppes is 7-10% and that of the forests is 5-7%. But because of intensive agriculture, at the moment, it is no more than 1-2%. If organic matter content could be increased by 0.5% per hectare per annum, one hectare of this agricultural land would extract 25-30 tons of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere in a year. At the moment, there is no better solution, only in laboratories or in someone’s mind, at best.

NATURAL RESOURCES AND MIGRATION— ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY TO MITIGATE RESOURCE CONFLICTS Sándor Madar, Sustainability Director of V4SDG

PEOPLE ON THE MOVE Migration has become one of the most politicised and divisive issues of the decade. However, we often forget that humankind has always been on the move for diverse reasons. In today’s globalised and interconnected world, people have achieved an unprecedented level of mobility, and as a result, 250 million of them live and work outside of their own countries, along with another 750 million who migrate internally.45 These numbers are likely to rise as Earth’s population is expected to hit 9 billion by the middle of the century. However, for many, migration will become a necessity to survive rather than a result of free deliberation. Nowadays, an outdated understanding of migration prevails, observing its root causes from two aspects. One is that of forced displacement due to political reasons, as a result of discrimination, persecution, limitations on freedom, conflict, insecurity, or coercion. The other is the voluntary and deliberate decision to migrate, due to economic motives, such as employment opportunities, income, and well-being. The influx of migration waves into Europe since 2015 have proved that the drivers of migration are more complex. This was a wake-up call to start tackling migration related to demographic, social, and environmental factors. Despite this recognition, the environmental causes of migration are still not being addressed sufficiently. WHAT IS THE MATTER WITH NATURAL RESOURCES? Environmental factors, such as extreme weather conditions, geophysical disasters, environmental degradation, loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services, depletion of natural resources, exposure to natural hazards, are forces triggering

displacement. Additionally, climate change is a multiplier factor aggravating these phenomena, as well as the volume and pace of migration. Natural resources, such as water, land, forests, biodiversity, and extractives, are playing a crucial role in migration. The depletion and scarcity of resources, their unsustainable exploitation, and the difficulties to satisfy the growing demand for resources are threats to human security. If basic human security is not granted, people are forced into internal or external displacement. Furthermore, the lack of coordination or the mismanagement of natural resources can create disputes and conflicts at local, national, or regional levels, which further drive migration. These conflicts can also result in the use of violence. Intrastate or transboundary conflicts over resources often emerge along tribal, ethnic, or sectarian lines, and are equally associated with the worsening of political, economic, and social conditions. The use of violence and the emergence of conflicts related to natural resources are further increasing the chances for displacement and the likelihood that people become refugees under international law. In 2016, more than 65 million46 people were registered as refugees, and approximately 128 million47 people were in need of humanitarian assistance. Between 2008 and 2015, a yearly 26.4 million people became environmental refugees, and these figures are expected to get worse.48 Due to a growing global population, more people will live in environmentally vulnerable areas, and as a consequence, an estimated 200 million people will be displaced because of environmental reasons including emerging conflicts over natural resources.49 GLOBAL

MAPPING MIGRATION-RELATED TO NATURAL RESOURCE CONFLICTS Historical and recent trends suggest that Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia are highly affected by migration fuelled by natural resource-related conflicts. The African continent is home to 30% of Earth’s remaining natural resources and some of the most rapidly developing countries. Paradoxically, the continent suffers under the pressure of intrastate and transboundary conflicts as well as the fragility of states. Most of the conflicts have a natural resource-related dimension where resources are either the causes of conflicts or tools that fuel and finance violence through illegal exploitation, trafficking, and trade. Conflicts are generally sparked over ownership of, allocation of access to, and distribution of natural resources and related revenues. They often cause the degradation of the local political and socio-economic situation, contribute to the creation of inequalities and insecurity, and result in forced displacement. Almost all countries on the continent are affected by some form of natural 28

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resource conflict. Land and water resources are the most predominant causes of conflicts that resulted in 15 million displaced people on the continent in 2015. 50 The current crisis of Somalia illustrates the complexity of natural resource-related conflicts and how they end up driving migration. Somali people’s livelihood is highly dependent on charcoal. However, the decades-long unsustainable use of forest reserves led to the mismanagement of water resources, causing droughts, floods, and water scarcity. The illegal exploitation and trade of charcoal and the ownership of water resources created disputes among different tribes. They turned into conflicts that became violent over the years. Violent clashes weakened the stability and security of the state and contributed to the degradation of the local people’s socio-economic situation, leading to the internal and external displacement of masses. The most affected area is Jubaland, where local tribes fight over resources, and this makes them prone to use violence, follow extremist ideologies, and pledge allegiance to terrorist groups present in the region, such as Al-Shabaab, in hope of better life conditions.

ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY The overwhelming majority of natural resourcerelated conflicts and thus the underlying mass displacement could be prevented or resolved through diplomatic tools such as mediation. Multilateral organisations are putting a greater emphasis on the identification of emerging conflicts via early warning systems and concentrate efforts on prevention with the help of local and national authorities, civil society, and private sector actors, in addition to the active inclusion of regional organisations. Evidence suggests that even in the most complex conflicts, natural resources can be a major driving factor toward achieving peace and building resilience among the locally affected population. Where women and young people are also involved in the negotiation process, parties find more sustainable and more inclusive solutions. Natural resource conflicts are technically complex and politically sensible issues requiring appropriate diplomatic solutions. Mediation successes have brought solution and peace

through the joint management of natural resources between opposed parties in a number of cases. One example is the accord of Israel, Palestine, and Jordan on transboundary water resource management in the Jordan Valley. Another example is the Indus River Treaty that survived three different wars between India and Pakistan. In Afghanistan, a successful accord was created between local authorities and the Talibans on the joint exploitation of natural resources. The most recent example is from the Horn of Africa, where the shifting international politics of Ethiopia is bringing more cooperation on joint resource management with Eritrea and Somalia. These agreements achieved by natural resource mediation help to build stability and resilience among vulnerable communities exposed to such conflicts and prevent them from forced displacement. Despite the visibility of the issue and the achieved successes to mitigate these conflicts, the international community is not doing enough to address environmental and natural resource-related conflicts by which a significant percentage of migration could be prevented.

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THE PROSPECTS OF WATER WARS AND GLOBAL INVOLUNTARY MIGRATION Gábor Baranyai, Executive Director, Institute of Sustainable Development Studies, Faculty of Water Science, National University of Public Service

THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS AND THE PROBLEM OF TRANSBOUNDARY RIVER BASINS While the amount of accessible freshwater in the world is limited and remains constant, it has to satisfy the ever-growing demands of an ever-growing number of users, be it human beings, the economy, or the natural environment. Moreover, the various humaninduced pressures of our era—population growth, urbanisation, climate change, just to name a few—are leading to a massive degradation of the quality and quantity of useable freshwater resources worldwide. As a result, according to the United Nations World Water Development Report 2015, the world is projected to face a 40% water deficit by 2030, if current trends remain unchanged. Consequently, water security in the broadest sense of the term will be one of the critical questions of development, peace, and stability in the 21st century. Not surprisingly, in the past few years, the World Economic Forum has repeatedly identified water as one of the top global sources of risk. The US National Intelligence Council also concluded in a 2012 report that “water may become a more significant source of contention than energy or minerals out to 2030 at both the intrastate and interstate levels.” Changing hydrological conditions are further complicated by the geography of water: around 47% of Earth’s surface waters lie in basins shared by at least two countries. These basins are home to some 40% of the world’s population and account for about 60% of the global river flow. Thus, the bulk of the world’s unfolding water crisis will have to be solved in an international context. 30

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THE CONSEQUENCES OF DECLINING H Y D R O L O G I CA L CO N D I T I O N S IN INTERNATIONAL RIVER BASINS An Individual Strategy: Migration The causal link between changing hydrological conditions in international river basins and migration is particularly relevant. The deteriorating carrying capacity of the countryside, the chronic mismanagement of the soil and water resources, coupled with the inability of weak states to contain major population movements are major drivers of domestic and international migration. When a country or a region heavily depends on water resources originating outside its own territory, a decline in the access to such exogenous waters can become a direct precursor to domestic or international migration. This has been far too well demonstrated by the disintegration of Syria and Iraq, and the uncompromising water abstraction and storage practice of upstream Turkey in the Tigris–Euphrates region. Here, low downstream flow volumes unilaterally imposed by Turkey, and the consequential overabstraction of already depleted groundwater resources had a cascading effect on migration, civil war, state failure, etc. Yet, exposure to transboundary water resources does not automatically lead to declining living conditions, instability, and migration. Irrespective of the international cooperation challenge (see next section), states can do a lot to mitigate their dependence on external water resources through purely domestic measures. The example of Israel is a case in point. When the country was established in 1948, its water system was largely based on the Jordan river, whose headwaters were largely controlled by Lebanon and Syria. As it is described in more detail in another article of this issue, since the early 1950s, it has

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established a complex and integrated national water infrastructure and governance regime, capable to support not only a world class irrigated agriculture but also the tenfold multiplication of its population without major water scarcities. A National Strategy: Wars for Water? Water is such a fundamental natural asset that human, economic, social, and ecological needs inevitably lead to competition for the same resource. Consequently, when water becomes scarce, states may choose to respond to this pressure by seeking a solution outside their boundaries. Water scarcity and poor distribution therefore magnifies the potential for conflict in transboundary basins. This potential grows significantly when the availability of water drops below a critical level. This potential for conflict has been eloquently formulated in 1954 by senior British colonial officer Lord Birdwood as follows: “of the elements that make for political controversy in human affairs, the control of water is one of the most persistent … the last community to get the water is always suspicious of the intentions of those upstream.”

it relates to conflict. Empirical research by Aaron Wolf and his team at the Oregon State University have unambiguously demonstrated that water wars are neither prevalent nor inevitable. Water war theorists wrongly based their arguments on a number of water conflicts confined to the Middle East, which displays a rare and particularly flammable combination of water scarcity and political instability. In reality, cooperative engagements among riparian states grossly outnumber water-related incidents worldwide. Armed conflicts triggered directly by water are even less common, with the last recorded hostility having ended in the 1970s. In fact, launching military action for water would only make sense by a downstream regional hegemon against a weaker upstream riparian state. There are only a few river basins in the world where such a scenario may become plausible at all (Nile, Mekong, La Plata). Even in such cases, however, the political, economic, and human costs of an armed intervention would be disproportionately high for a natural resource that, in many cases, is relatively cheap to obtain through other methods, e.g. seawater desalination.

ARE WE HEADING FOR A FALL?—THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WATER WARS THESIS In the 1980s and early 1990s, the conflict potential of transboundary waters triggered the emergence of a widely held conviction that wars for water were both inevitable and imminent. Various statements made by Boutros Boutros Gali, former UN Secretary General, or Ismail Serageldin, vice-president of the World Bank (both of Egyptian origin by the way), projecting that the wars of the 21st century will be fought for water, gave rise to the impression in mainstream political discourse and academia that water wars were imminent and inevitable. Despite its popular appeal, however, the water war thesis has turned out to be largely unfounded. While the potential for conflict undeniably exists, the prophets of water wars have been rightly criticised as alarmists whose conclusions have been based more on speculation than examination of water and how

SO, ARE WE OK THEN? Reality has largely proven the water war alarmists wrong. Despite undeniable tensions around transboundary waters, it seemed that diverse mutual interdependencies among basin states and the limited chances for success by violence create powerful incentives for states to cooperate even over the most difficult water-related issues. For this, however, states need to agree on the establishment of robust and well-functioning institutional frameworks (treaties, basin commissions, or other mechanisms) that provide a platform to turn collective action problems into cooperation. So, everything fine then? Not quite so. The so-called institutionalists have been hugely successful in disproving the water wars theory and in identifying the drivers of transboundary water cooperation. Yet, there are several large river basins in the world that experience a “no war, no cooperation” phenomenon. These are where significant cooperation gaps exist, yet the situation does not evolve into a serious conflict either.

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This paradoxical situation shows that conflict and cooperation are not necessarily contradictory but can occur simultaneously. All in all, while full-fledged water conflicts remain unlikely in the medium term, transboundary waters will continue to pose a major threat in interstate relations.

Water—cooperation or conflict?

Take the well-known example of the still unresolved Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros affair between Hungary and Slovakia. In 1992, (then) Czechoslovakia unilaterally dammed the Danube and diverted the border river into its own territory over a 30-km-long stretch. In 1995, Slovakia and Hungary agreed on a temporary water-sharing regime that was supposed to be replaced by a final allocation arrangement by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The 1997 judgement of the ICJ, however, not only failed to clearly define the parties’ rights and obligations, but the contradictory language of its verdict also helped ossify the pre-litigious position of the two states. So, the dispute and the 1995 temporary regime still live on. Yet, during the past 25 years, Slovak–Hungarian cooperation over the rest of the shared water bodies has successfully expanded.

DRIVERS OF CONFLICT AND COOPERATION The most important conclusion of the study on international politics of water is that the stability of co-riparian relations, in other words: hydropolitical resilience, is not determined by one single hydrological or political factor such as scarcity in the basin or the ambitions of a downstream hegemon. Rather, it is defined by the legal and institutional arrangements riparian states have put in place to manage the shared resource. If a given legal and institutional arrangement is sufficiently robust and flexible, it may absorb even very significant changes in the basin without negatively affecting the efficiency of cooperation among riparian states. The chance of serious conflict emerges when the magnitude and/or the speed of change (be it physical or political or both) in the basin exceeds the absorption capacity of a given governance regime. The absorption capacity of a governance scheme is thus not a stationary condition: riparian states can always adapt it to changing hydrological or political circumstances. Naturally, every basin differs in terms of hydrology, politics, etc. Thus, the workability of the above general model can be positively or negatively influenced by a number of variables. These include: Geography and the availability of water: the starting point is that the physical geography of river systems hardly coincides with political boundaries. This discrepancy, however, shows significant variations. While in a pure “through-border” configuration upstreamdownstream asymmetry applies in its fullest, in “border-creating” situations riparian states are exposed to the consequences of each other’s actions in equal measure. The other geographical/hydrological factor most likely to determine the quality and nature of co-riparian GLOBAL

relations is the availability of water. Indeed, water scarcity lies at the core of the water war theory, suggesting that a high degree of scarcity is directly linked to the high likelihood of conflict and a low likelihood of institutional cooperation. Yet, empirical research shows that while the lack of water can become an important irritant in co-riparian relations, it can also act as a driver of cooperation (e.g. in the US–Mexico relation). Sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security: countries often feel that cooperation over transboundary watercourses affects their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security. In regions characterised by high political tensions or a history of unilateralism, entering into legally regulated or institutionalised cooperation over shared rivers may give rise to a suspicion of external intrusion or a concern to surrender decision-making power to a supranational entity. Geopolitical setting and non-water-related political integration: the aggregate political and economic power of the countries concerned may play a crucial role in transboundary water relations. Significant imbalances in regional power relationships may impede or foster cooperation, depending on the position of the hegemonic actor in the basin. The presence or the lack of major power asymmetries in the watershed and the behaviour of the regional hegemon are likely to determine the nature and structure of the relevant hydropolitical regime. Thus, where no major power asymmetries exist, states are likely to create egalitarian basinwide cooperation regimes. Such arrangements normally emerge in wider political settings such as the European Union. However, in regions dominated by a regional hegemon, such parity may not be in the interest of the hegemonic party if it implies relinquishing existing control or influence over water resources. Especially, where the regional hegemon lays upstream (e.g. China, India, Turkey), the likelihood that it will unilaterally exploit its position becomes high. Where the regional power lays downstream, it may find it more beneficial to become the engine of cooperation (e.g. South 34

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Africa in the framework of the Southern African Development Community). However, the mere location of a hegemon in the basin is not a precursor to either conflict or cooperation. There are positive examples where the upstream regional power is a real driver of cooperation (e.g. in the US–Mexico context). Equally, experience shows that downstream hegemons can have significant interests in blocking, rather than fostering, broader transboundary cooperative arrangements so as to exploit upstream political division to their own benefit (e.g. Egypt in the Nile basin). In any case, the lack of major power imbalances in the basin tends to be conducive of creating resilient cooperation mechanisms even among a large number of riparian countries (Danube, Lower Mekong). The level of economic development and the economic importance of the river: different levels and/or dynamics of national development in the same basin can also become important drivers of tension or cooperation. The increasing water demand of a fast developing riparian country inevitably leads to stronger competition for the same resource. On the other hand, more developed regions with limited or controllable urbanisation/developmental/ population pressures have better political and technological capabilities to manage a shared river basin. The actual economic importance of shared water resources also influences the dynamics of co-riparian relations. Arid downstream countries whose supplies depend on the headwaters of large transboundary rivers (Nile/Egypt, Tigris–Euphrates/Iraq) are particularly sensitive to any upstream change in river flow or water quality. Domestic issues: internal issues, such as domestic politics, identity, or national values, may also hamper efforts of transboundary cooperation. The strong political and emotional mobilising power of water renders intrabasin cooperation an easy subject for national(istic) political rhetoric. Therefore, transboundary water disputes often arise or remain unresolved due to domestic political determinations. Thus, the notorious Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros

dispute seems to have been unresolved for decades due to competing political narratives surrounding the construction of the Gabčíkovo hydropower complex in Slovakia and Hungary, leaving no room for a domestically acceptable common ground for the two countries. Capacity shortages: managing co-riparian relations demands significant administrative and technical capacities. Some countries, especially developing ones, however, often lack the resources to fully participate. This does not only pose an evident technical barrier but may also give rise to a fear that they may not be able to negotiate an optimal deal or fully benefit from a new or existing governance framework. This is particularly problematic if there are large discrepancies among riparian states in terms of aggregate power and economic strength. Examples include the cumbersome and wary negotiations in the Nile and the Zambezi basins, where certain countries deliberately impede or frustrate negotiations even though they are likely to benefit from the eventual cooperation regime. Cultural factors: transboundary water issues often revolve around core values and cultural constructions that date back to generations. These cultural or psychological factors (the “national water ethos”) may determine how a nation “feels” about its water resources. Such factors may include the “mythology” of water in national history, the religious dimensions of water, the importance of water in national security discourse, etc. Likewise, cultural differences (stereotypes of neighbouring nations, enemy images) can become major hindrances to cooperation. This applies particularly among riparian states with different religious backgrounds and/or where the river concerned is embroiled in identity concerns (e.g. the perception of the Ganges by Hindu India and Islamic Bangladesh). On the other hand, cultural similarities can be a major facilitator of cross-border water cooperation. The highly sophisticated system of transboundary water cooperation in Europe is attributed to a long history of cooperation, high degree of cultural homogeneity among the countries, and widely shared ecological consciousness.

THE ROLE OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATER CONFLICTS IN GLOBAL MIGRATION: A SNAPSHOT The above institutional, political and geographical variables render hydropolitical resilience and vulnerability susceptible to objective measurement. Thus, in the past decade or so, a series of assessments by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the World Bank, and various academic publications have been conducted to evaluate the conflict potential of the various international river basins of the world. While the direct focus of these studies was not the impact of transboundary water relations on migration, their findings reveal important linkages in that dimension too. One of the best illustrations of global hydropolitics can be found in a 2014 study by Adelphi, an independent consultancy, prepared for the German Federal Foreign Office. This conflict map shows that the instability of co-riparian relations is already acute in the Tigris–Euphrates basin, in the Nile catchment area, in Central Asia (Aral Sea basin), the entire Indian subcontinent, and the Mekong basin. Not surprisingly, these are regions that are also characterised by gross internal and international migration. Here, the correlation between the inability of states to manage worsening hydrological conditions in a transboundary context and involuntary migration appears in a very clear way. Yet, the map also leads to other, far less evident conclusions. First, hydropolitical tensions can soon be on the rise in Europe as well, especially in the Danube basin. While most of Europe is unlikely to witness water scarcities on the scale of the Middle East, the role of water in European politics will surely intensify. Second, some of the really arid regions of the world seem to do very well (e.g. the US–Mexico relation) or relatively well (e.g. the Southern African hydropolitical complex) in terms of cooperation. This shows that cooperative spirit and robust institutional mechanisms can prevent major water-related conflicts and mitigate the drivers of climate-induced migration. Finally, the growing domestic water problems of large federal or unitary countries such as Russia and China can also gain international relevance even if the river systems affected remain confined to national territory. GLOBAL

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ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS, MIGRATIONS, AND LARGE-SCALE LAND PURCHASES—HOW UNRULED CAPITALISM FORCES MOVEMENTS OF PEOPLE? Alessandro D’Onofrio

The impressive migratory flow that has been affecting the European continent since 2014 is proving to be a big challenge to the stability of the whole European Union. Rising numbers of people arrived in the European Union, travelling across the Mediterranean Sea or overland through Southeast and Central Europe, and we have witnessed the European solidarity project suffering a hard hit. The struggle to cope with this crisis is a very divisive issue between member states and the EU institutions. In the light of the inadequate management of the unexpected flow of migrants, some member state governments re-introduced border controls within the Schengen Area instead of cooperating in order to achieve a common solution of the immigration problem. Furthermore, rifts have emerged between countries willing to allow the entry of asylum seekers and other countries trying to stop the flows by adopting solutions not always suiting the requirements of Communitarian or International Humanitarian Law. As a result of the migratory crisis, Europeans experience the rise of extremist and xenophobic movements rallying to defend the borders of their countries and stirring up intolerance and hate towards foreigners. SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS: WHERE ARE THE SYRIANS FLEEING? Europeans still have the images of Syrian refugees in their minds fleeing from their lands and crossing Europe, trying to find help. Since the greatest number of refugees fleeing to Europe come from Syria,51 where the gravest humanitarian crisis is taking place since World War II, the flow had a huge impact on media and contributed to shaping the political discourse. But contrary to what is continually foisted on people, only a small part of 38

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these refugees were heading towards the EU. In fact, approximately 13 million Syrians have fled their homes since the outbreak of the civil war in March 2011. Among them, the majority have sought refuge in neighbouring countries or within Syria itself. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 5.6 million have fled to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq, and 6.6 million are internally displaced within Syria.52 Meanwhile, about one million have requested asylum in Europe. A recent study in the journal Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences suggested that one of the major factors that forced Syrians to move was the intense drought that lasted from 2007–2010.53 The drought led to the collapse of the agricultural sector54 and pushed almost 2 million farmers into urban areas, contributing to economic difficulties, political instability, revolts, and ultimately, armed conflict. The failure of Bashar al-Assad’s regime to respond to the challenge effectively exacerbated other tensions, such as unemployment and inequality, which resulted in the eruption of the ongoing civil war,55 causing a massive migration of Syrian refugees to neighbouring countries, where the arrival of displaced individuals put a major stress on the scarce water resources and led to new tensions. In 2014, Lebanon’s Environment Minister Mohammed Machnouk expressed his concern about the environmental impact of this huge flow of refugees at a conference, “We are living in a state of environmental emergency … because of the Syrian refugees who have exceeded 1.5 million over the past years ... We are really living in an environmental catastrophe.” 56 Francesco Femia of the Center for Climate and Security said, “We can’t say climate change caused the civil war. But we can say that there were some very harsh climatic

Aerial view of the Zaatari Refugee Camp in Jordan

conditions that led to instability.” 57 However, in the face of scientific evidence, it is incorrect to minimise the role of the climate change factor in spreading conflicts in the region and around the world. THEY ARE NOT ONLY ESCAPING FROM THE WAR: HOW THE WORD “REFUGEE” GETS MISUSED When we talk about refugees, clarity is required. In fact, law marks a line between refugees and displaced persons, although the two terms have often—and wrongly—been used as synonyms. By definition, refugees are individuals forced to flee towards other countries because of wars or persecutions, looking for protection, which, according to international law, should be granted in other countries. On the other hand, displaced persons are those who forcibly move within or outside their countries for some reasons that, today more than ever, are linked to economic and environmental factors including the inaccessibility of natural resources or the deterioration of the environment. However, they are not entitled, according to international law, to ask for the refugee status. Obviously, this kind of interpretation does nothing to help solve the sensitive issue that many countries have to face with regard to when and

whom they should grant the refugee status to. Moreover, this explanation passes over the fact that it is hardly possible to isolate a single reason why people migrate. In fact, today’s interconnections between environmental disasters and wars are so inextricable that the outbreak of many armed conflicts is linked to the dispute for gaining access to scarce resources, such as water, commodities, and farmlands. It should be taken into account that after World War II, 111 conflicts in the world were triggered by environment-related causes,58 79 of which are still ongoing and 19 out of these are considered very intense. Given the dimension of this phenomenon, the international community is facing an increasing need to discuss if it is feasible to grant some sort of legal protection to those who are today called “environmental migrants.” According to the International Organization for Migration, “Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.” 59 According to the latest global statistics,60 since REGIONAL

2008, an average of 24.2 million people have been forced to flee from their homes because of climateor weather-related events such as adverse climatic conditions, pollution, and difficulties in accessing natural resources, while “only” 6.9 million come from countries affected by a conflict. Moreover, a recent UN report indicated that 90% of the disasters recorded in the last 20 years have been caused by climate-related phenomena (floods, cyclones, heat waves, droughts, etc.), and that in most cases, responsibility for these disasters lies with human activities.61 The fact that these disasters mostly occur in areas that contribute less to climate change and pollution than others, weighs heavily on the balance of this problem. From this point of view, Europe has been hit by the wave of mass migration only marginally and only in recent years. In fact, the bulk of these movements of people takes place within the countries affected by environmental disasters or within neighbouring countries. This is exactly what is happening in Syria or in many other areas that have already experienced forced migration due to climate change, such as Bangladesh, Turkey, Senegal, Egypt, India, Mexico, Alaska’s indigenous tribes, and Panama. According to the latest estimates of the International Organization for Migration, the number of people displaced because of climaterelated problems might even range between 25 million and 1 billion by 2050,62 and most of them will come from Sub-Saharan Africa, heading to the Mediterranean Sea. It is not enough to receive this kind of migrants: to deal with an issue of this magnitude, it is necessary, as a first step, that the countries owning more resources than others to solve or at least contain this problem should start acting at its roots. Despite the uncertain management of the issue at the international level, the EU has proved itself once more a pioneer in human rights-related issues. The 28 member states have already started dealing with environmental migration as an issue that demands some attention, and some of the member states have recognised that a comprehensive migration policy is needed to consider this problem. Lamberto Zannier, former OSCE secretary, stated that governments must make people aware of the fact that the impact of 40

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the richest countries’ industrial policies seems to have contributed to today’s environmental changes,63 and that “there is an underestimation of the environmental phenomenon impact on migrations and on refugees flows” and “for this reason it would be appropriate to recognise the existence of this problem and to grant protection to climate refugees too.” The simple cooperation on climate-related themes might be too slow or could be—as in the case of the US—disputed by some first-order actors. Thus, up till now, only Finland and Sweden have decided to include “environmental migrants” as “persons otherwise in need of protection” in their official state immigration and asylum policies.64 Both countries grant protection to “environmental migrants,” since these people are “unable to return to the country of origin because of an environmental disaster.” In this sense, the case in Italy is also indicative and forward-looking, where a local tribunal, following humanitarian law, granted the right to stay in the country to a Bengali citizen who had fled his land because a huge flood destroyed his farmland, his family’s only source of income.65 In order to cope with this issue, the richest countries should be ready to agree to sign binding pacts, the primary goals of which must be the reduction of pollution and the exploitation of natural resources, the imposition of new free trade agreements that taking into account not only the interests of industrialised countries but also the implementation of sustainable development models for emerging countries, and the fight against the expropriation of fertile lands by multinational companies. THE IMPACT OF LAND GRABBING ON MIGRATIONS: IS IT RIGHT TO FLEE IF SOMEBODY STEALS YOUR LAND? Exactly this last phenomenon, known as “landgrabbing,” albeit ignored by western media and political debates, is one of the factors contributing to the rise of environment-related migration in recent years. These large-scale land acquisitions—the official name of landgrabbing put in place by enormous agricultural companies, investment funds, and nation-states in developing countries, where arable lands are

cheap and abundant—are seen by many people as the latest form of colonialism. Although land grabbing is not exclusively limited to Africa, its causes, extensions, and consequences appear more evident there. The phenomenon experienced its extension in 2007–2008, following an increase in agricultural product prices in developed countries and a consequent rise in farmland prices.66 For this reason, many global actors started to look at developing countries in order to obtain vast portions of cheaper farmland. Moreover, large-scale purchases were also needed to cope with the growing demand on the market for biofuels considered by many an effective substitute to carbon-related fuels. Multinational companies have usually been able to obtain long-term contracts—even up to 99 years— from local governments, giving them the right to cultivate single crops (wheat, rice, sorghum, corn, palm oil, sugar cane, zircon) and extract various minerals on lands where property rights belonged to small landowners. Land expropriation without compensation became

a tragic slogan in many African countries, and even though progresses have been made, multinational companies teamed up with corrupt governments are still determined to go along with that practice. Today, there are about 400,000 multinational companies operating in developing countries and negotiating with African, Asian, South-American, and European governments, acquiring millions of hectares of fertile agricultural land, predominantly in Africa.67 As a commitment towards these governments,68 which indiscriminately use their power to expropriate land owners, multinational corporations usually promise the creation of workplaces, the development of infrastructure, and the establishment of new business activities. Yet, these obligations towards the indigenous population are nearly always disrespected, and the consequence is a huge wave of displacement caused by “development”—although using this word is nonsense, since development is expected to benefit societies through the reduction of poverty and the promotion of well-being. The business-at-every-cost attitude of multinational

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corporations, combined with the greed of local governments, has forced millions of people in the past years to flee from their homelands. In fact, since most of these lands are used for single and industrial crops, food shortage has appeared where formerly there was poverty but not hunger. Under these circumstances, people find it very hard to survive, and even though some are able to find employment on these new plantations, life conditions are extremely miserable. So, migration represents their only hope for survival. While not all large-scale land acquisitions can be defined as land-grabbing, research by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) shows they also carry risks for local communities and their environment, especially in countries where governance is weak and land rights are unclear. Beside its destructive and irreversible impacts on rural societies, land-grabbing also has a terrible effect on local stability. Since migration to cities is one major option, urban agglomerations have become overpopulated with disastrous consequences for the environment, water affordability being one of the major issues among several degrading natural resources. Furthermore, the uncontrollable movement of thousands of people removed from their lands also brought about conflicts within the hosting countries. In fact, countries that host excessively large numbers of refugees might face destabilisation, the exacerbation of existing economic problems, and a possible rise in political and ethnic tensions, offering a fertile ground for radical nationalist ideologies and movements. The biggest impacts on host environments are usually exerted by deforestation, desertification, depletion of water resources, and land degradation. Since resources are scarce, competition for their control leads to clashes between groups that often culminate in armed conflicts. The destabilising effects of migration in the Middle East and in Africa are there for all to see, and this could lead to the spread of wider regional conflicts. If we take the example of Nigeria, we can see that a protracted armed conflict for the control of oil fields and agricultural lands has devastated the country and forced millions of 42

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people to migrate, first within their country or towards neighbouring countries, with the result of fuelling tribal and religious hate in the area, and eventually to the Western hemisphere through northern Africa, with migrants trying to reach the Mediterranean Sea. Although the concept of migration related to land-purchasing is still challenged by multinational companies, since it jeopardises a consolidated economic model, in September 2016, a decision of the International Criminal Court (ICC) based in The Hague included land-grabbing within the most serious environmental crimes. According to this interpretation, land-grabbing is a practice that causes forcible movement, as well as deportation, of thousands of farmers and whole communities from their lands. Moreover, land-grabbing brings hunger and tensions in all the areas affected by the phenomenon. It was in this context that the Court decided to intervene, trying to ensure that the consequences of this practice would not cause any harm to the inviolable human rights, as enshrined by the International Community. This achievement was made possible thanks to Fatou Bensouda, Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, who examined a major case of landgrabbing in Cambodia, where businessmen and government representatives were involved. But the main limitation of ICC concerns is their capacity to proceed only against the 139 countries that signed the Rome Statue and against crimes that took place following its entry into force in 2002. Actually, countries such as China and India, whose multinational companies are also among those accused of perpetuating land-grabbing, never signed the Statute and cannot be persecuted for crimes related to that kind of practice. After having exposed this phenomenon, we should keep in mind that land-grabbing is not intrinsically negative, since, when regulated, it can bring new opportunities and consistent investments within interested countries. And it is only through the acknowledgment of the necessity of regulating this widespread practise that the governments of developed countries may specifically intervene in order to cope with the problem before these people are forced to leave.

WHAT COULD INTERNATIONAL ACTORS DO? Given that migration is a human phenomenon, history shows that it cannot be stopped by walls or frontiers.69 From this perspective, it might be more valuable to try to understand the reasons behind the decision of an individual to leave his or her country. That is why the generic term “migration” seems to hide the fact that firms and governments from richer countries may have contributed to driving farmers and shepherds whose lands have been removed to leave their homes. These new migrations represent a key marker of our time, and what is really needed, considering that the international community is still far from reaching agreement/consensus on the status of environmental migrants, is serious attempts from multinational companies and the governments of richer countries to respect and implement international regulations upon land-purchasing agreements. In order to have a positive effect on local development, multinational companies should make investments that involve local farmers as equal business partners, leaving them in control of their land. In Zambia,70 for example, a partnership between a co-operative of farmers producing

sugar cane and a processing company gives farmers shares in the company and representation in its board. Inclusive investments combine the strengths of the investor with those of local farmers. The investor brings capital, technology, and expertise in management and marketing, while farmers provide labour, land, traditional know-how, and knowledge of local conditions. In addition, developing countries’ governments should be helped to address this issue, to improve the investment climate, and to give priority to inclusive national land policies with special reference to the rights of land users and small farmers. In November 2013, Coca-Cola—the world’s largest purchaser of sugar—announced major commitments to respect and protect the land rights of rural and indigenous communities. PepsiCo declared similar commitments in March 2014. Then, in August 2014, Nestlé followed suit with a bold commitment to “zero tolerance” for land-grabbings in its supply chains.71 Civil society groups and international organisations may also have an active role in advocating effective land use policies and carry on their fight to reduce environment-related crimes that now require immediate attention more than ever.

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MIGRATION TRENDS IN AFRICA—THE LINK BETWEEN MIGRATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE Zsuzsa Molnár

Migration in Africa has a long-standing history, just like in Europe. On the Dark Continent, the number of intracontinental migrants is three times (or according to other estimates, six times) higher than the number of international migrants. It means that people—especially from Sub-Saharan Africa—rarely cross the borders of the African continent. African people respect family bonds and their roots, so it is not their primary option to leave everything behind. The most vulnerable people are the poorest, since they have the fewest opportunities to migrate: their resources are limited, and they do not possess the necessary money to go elsewhere and start a new life. Most of the time, these people are trapped and left with no options.

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In 2015, 14% of all international migrants worldwide were Africans, which means 33 million people. It is important to emphasise at the beginning that much of the international migration occurs legally: in fact, 90% of all African migrants reach their destinations through legal channels—even though the public opinion might suggest something different. Data also indicate that those who decided to leave their own countries would go back to their home, so, in a sense, a kind of circularity characterises this type of movement. In addition, there is a huge difference between North African and Sub-Saharan African migration. Most of the people from North Africa leave the continent and try to find their fortune in Europe. Most commonly,

Where do the people of Africa migrate to?

Algerians go to France, Moroccans go to Spain, and Tunisians go to Italy. However, the Gulf States also absorb a significant number or Arabic-speakers from this region. Meanwhile, as mentioned before, people from Sub-Saharan Africa stay in the region, crossing only their national borders and mainly migrating to neighbouring countries. However, when it comes to rural migration, data are not easy to collect in Africa. That is the reason why sometimes the numbers co ncerning internal migratio n might differ from reality. International and nongovernmental organisations are trying to provide the most accurate numbers possible,

but notably, information management is the most challenging task for them. Most of the movement from rural communities to urban areas happens unrecorded. If we look at the numbers more closely, we can see that around 16 million Africans stay in their neighbouring region, while 16 million go to other, farther regions. For 9 million people this â&#x20AC;&#x153;other regionâ&#x20AC;? means Europe (5 out of the 9 million come from North Africa), for 4 million, Asia, and for 2 million, Northern America. In Africa, Egypt is the country which gives the most migrants to the world, and South Africa accepts the most people, which means more than 3 million international migrantsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;and this is just an estimate, as the REGIONAL

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real number can be more than double. While in Europe, the proportion of migrants in the total population is 10%, this percentage is 16% in Gabon, 13% in Djibouti, and 12% in Libya. UNDERSTANDING THE DEMOGRAPHIC B O O M â&#x20AC;&#x201D; U R B A N I S AT I O N WITHOUT INDUSTRIALISATION Africa is one of the most populous regions on Earth, and its population is growing rapidly; neither China nor India have experienced similar intensity of population growth. Consequently, the chance that a higher number of people might face the lack of security or opportunity increases there. This means that around 2% of the whole population decides to leave their homes, and this number has been relatively stable throughout history. Sub-Saharan Africa is still a rural area, where the demographic boom also occurs in rural circumstances. Since urbanisation happened without industrialisation, the underdeveloped industry cannot absorb the huge amount of local labour force. Hence, the case of Africa is completely different from that of the past European experience; on the latter continent, urbanisation, along with industrialisation, was the source of development and new job opportunities over the past two centuries. Consequently, African states have to figure out how to give jobs to the huge amount of new labour force and how to satisfy their needs. On the other hand, due to the traditions of the local rural communities, people tend to seek jobs in agriculture, just like their parents. Yet the problem is that the increased number of people needs more alimentation, which requires more water for irrigation and better agricultural techniques. However, African states are not famous for their highly developed water management systems or agricultural practices. Therefore, the development of agriculture is very important in the continent in order to provide the necessary amount of food for the people. THE ROLE OF NATURAL DISASTERS Although Africa has the smallest ecological footprint, African people are the most affected by the effects of climate change, as the continent is especially vulnerable to natural disasters,

whose strength and frequency is predicted to increase due to the changes in climate. While the lack of water has always represented a security threat to the entire continent, and droughts are historically common in the region, the problem has recently been exacerbated, as climate change induces higher temperature and less precipitation in some affected areas. Droughts can be a possible reason for crop failure, which itself can render the local population more vulnerable, since people highly rely on water in their agricultural production. Small wonder that there is also a strong correlation between disaster and poverty: less developed regions and people living in poverty are more exposed to changing nature. Thus, the compound of the growing number of people, the increasingly intense and unpredictable disasters, and the growing concentration of the population results in more intense human movement. FINAL REMARKS Migration from Africa is a problem which will be with us in the long run. I used the word â&#x20AC;&#x153;problemâ&#x20AC;? on purpose, because until we find a solution, it will represent a problem both for the sending and the receiving countries. Some of the most acknowledged Africa researchers say that it is nearly impossible to stop those who have decided to leave their homes and are already on the move. Consequently, the solution is to provide the remaining people with the necessary conditions that can ensure their livelihoods and mitigate the drive that compels them to leave. There is no quick solution. With enough international cooperation and investment, results might be visible in some generations. People should elaborate innovative strategies for agriculture and rural development. It is necessary to understand the link between climate change and migration, the shifting climatic patterns and decreasing rainfall in order to be able to predict future hazards on the African continent. It means that by knowing the tendencies, future weather shocks can be forecasted more successfully, which can give a solid base for preparation and action. Still, as migration is a type of adaptation strategy that has been part of history, it is likely to last and be a part of the future of African societies. REGIONAL

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE WORSENING CLIMATE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA—THE 2016 EL NIÑO AND ITS AFTERMATHS Zsuzsa Molnár

INTRODUCTION The central issue of this article is the 2015– 2016 El Niño-induced drought that severely affected more than 60 million people around the world. This climatic event has caused the worst drought in 35 years in Southern Africa. After taking a look at the humanitarian situation in the region with regards to the available human movement data, present piece makes an attempt to draw conclusions by assessing different factors that might contribute to the above human movement. As the case of the

A map of Southern Africa 48

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El Niño-induced drought and the ensuing challenges are very complex and can be examined from a wide range of aspects, present article does not attempt to analyse all its features; it rather focuses on explaining some of the most important environmental, societal, and economic elements involved. Accordingly, the case study will start with considering the special features of climate and the hazards it poses in the region, paying special attention to the climatic phenomenon El Niño. After that, the interaction of the regional

Southern Africa is globally among the areas most exposed to desertification and land degradation

demographic boom, society, and agriculture will be investigated. Following this, based on the data presented, the focus will be shifted to the present and possible future migration patterns. A REGION WITH MANY DIFFICULTIES The southernmost part of the African continent, or Southern Africa, consists of eleven countries, namely Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Madagascar. Although theoretically the latter is also part of the region, it falls outside the scope of the present analysis, because it has distinct geographical features deriving from its island nature. Hydrologically, Southern Africa is surrounded by the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans, its largest rivers being the Zambezi, the Limpopo, and the Orange, which all rank among the largest rivers of the continent. Its climate ranges from warm and mild in the south to tropical in the north, while the landscape includes deserts, rainforests, vast plains, and high mountains. Vegetation found in the area can be divided into four main categories: savannah woodlands in the north, a series of dry woodlands to the south of these, arid and semiarid grassland, scrubland,

and bushland in the Namib and Kalahari deserts and their environs, and Mediterranean vegetation along the southern coast. Today, these countries are independent, multiracial, but weak democracies characterised by political instability. Their societies show high levels of income inequalities, which are among the worst in the world. Poverty is multi-dimensional, which does not only mean low income, but also the fact that individuals lack clean water or electricity, have poor health, quality of work and education, and suffer from malnutrition. A high level of poverty is worsened by a dynamic demographic boom that characterises the entire region; especially, the rural and agrarian areas are the ones overburdened by their increasing population. Moreover, households in the countryside do not have a diverse source of income, since most of the families make a living from crop production. Local communities and their livelihood depend on rain-fed agriculture; more precisely, 96% of the land used for agriculture in the region of Sub-Saharan Africa relies on rain. What is more, traditionally, maize is the most common agricultural product in the region. The fact that it is a particularly drought-sensitive crop and monocropping is the REGIONAL

most common agricultural practice only increases local communities’ water dependence. The local rural society usually does not use modern farming techniques due to lack of investment and capital. In addition, their access to information is limited, which makes the much-needed innovation even more difficult to obtain. Monoculture farming has its pros and cons, but it is conventional wisdom that planting the same crop in the same area every year drains the necessary nutrients out of the soil. As a result, lands become weak, which is unfavourable for healthy plant growth, reduces the possibility of a good harvest, and carries the risk that even the basic needs of the increasing population cannot be satisfied. Moreover, in rural areas, 15-25% of the adult population has never attended school. As a result of the low level of education and the attachment to family traditions, people keep on trying to find employment in agriculture as they are rarely qualified for other jobs. This means that, due to he mentioned demographic boom, there is a massive rise in the number of people struggling to secure their living from farming. EXTREME WEATHER CONDITIONS AND INSECURITY Today, the whole region is heavily affected by unpredictable changes caused by natural hazards. Crises linked to water scarcity follow each other more frequently, demonstrating a worsening trend in the region. Oxfam, a confederation of independent organisations that focuses on alleviating poverty globally, published a research in 2008 that showed the number of disasters worldwide was four times as high as it had been two decades before. Their findings showed that while the number of geological hazards (for example earthquakes or volcano eruptions) had stayed relatively constant, the number of climatic events (droughts, floods, cyclones, etc.) had increased considerably. Other studies have also confirmed that global warming will cause more intense and more often-recurring droughts. Due to the aforesaid dependence on rain-fed agriculture, this fact needs to be taken seriously in Southern Africa. 2016 was the warmest year ever recorded on the planet: the average temperature was 1.3 °C higher 50

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than before the Millennium. This partly resulted from the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO). As a consequence of the ENSO, it is usually the central and eastern tropical Pacific that warms up; this phenomenon occurs every three to seven years on average and can last up to 18 months. However, new trends suggest that its frequency is increasing due to the effects of climate change. El Niño affects weather systems all around the globe, which means that some places receive more rain, while others receive none at all—often in a reversal of their usual weather pattern. This can bring about record global temperatures alongside droughts, floods, and forest fires. Nevertheless, we have to note something very important: El Niño phenomena are not caused by climate change, but their strength is exacerbated by it. Another important fact is that it is associated with widespread dry conditions during the Austral summer in Southern Africa. As mentioned, in 2016, El Niño was one of the root causes behind Southern Africa’s poorest rainfall season in decades, resulting in a longterm drought. As a consequence of the local communities dependency on rain-fed agriculture, there are calculations about the damages El Niño caused. According to the United Nation’s estimations, 40 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance in the region. The drought, added to existing vulnerabilities, caused water and food insecurity, and damaged all the sectors and

No/minimal scarcity Physical water scarcity Imminent physical water scarcity Economic water sarcity No data

Source: The 4th edition of the UN World Water Development Report (2012)

Water scarcity in Southern Africa and in other parts of the world

segments of life in many ways. Weather conditions were not favourable for agricultural production: the April 2016 harvest resulted in a deficit of 9.3 million tons of maize. As a consequence, cereal deficit hit Southern Africa and caused an increase in food prices: since maize is the most commonly used crop there, its price grew by about 50% above the five-year average, which further exacerbated regional food insecurity. The following year, 2017, was the second warmest year ever recorded on the planet. This is remarkable for one thing: that year the warming influence of the El Niño event was not present anymore. Since climate change causes modifications in the frequency and intensity of weather events and their patterns, it has become challenging to forecast future meteorological and El Niño-related occurrences—thus, it is especially hard to predict the phenomena which will be born from their interaction. Therefore, if the past few years were not easy for the people living there, their future is expected to be even more volatile. LIVING AT THE TIME OF DROUGHT Apart from its impact on maize production, the drought also directly affected people and livestock. It caused the death of 643,000 cattle in 2016, and people were forced to drink from unprotected water resources. As a matter of fact, due to the lack of infrastructure, only 61% of the region’s population has access to safe drinking water and 39% has access to adequate sanitation facilities. Therefore, the state of general public health deteriorated and the risk of spreading communicable diseases

increased. Schools and hospitals struggled to operate without water. Farmers are forced to leave their lands because they do not secure their subsistence anymore, and men leave the cultivation of crops to women and children. Unavailability of food caused by low crop yields is the main reason why school drop-out rates are increasing, with families concentrating their efforts on finding food and water. Women and girls are among the most vulnerable groups—usually, girls are responsible for water collection, which may increase their exposure to sexual violence and early pregnancy, as they spend more time away from their home. This phenomenon increases the likelihood of spreading sexually transmitted diseases, such as HIV and AIDS. The number of sexual acts in exchange for food and the number of early child marriages have risen, because parents cannot satisfy the basic needs of their children. Gender-based violence and unwanted pregnancies make people’s everyday life even more difficult, decreasing the survival chances of babies, mothers, and children alike, since the nutrition of young children, pregnant and lactating women, and elderly people is far from adequate. In one sentence, hostile weather events combined with population growth in areas where people rely on rain-fed agricultural production risk the survival of many and generate migration. THE PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE PATTERNS OF MIGRATION The effects of environmental change on migration are complex. Human movement is considered REGIONAL

an adaptation strategy of society, and it does offer some kind of resilience to disaster-hit communities. As those who decide to migrate are more likely to stay in their home region in Southern Africa, droughts there increase rural to urban and regional cross-border migration. However, the capacity of urban areas to absorb new inhabitants is limited, so migrants will likely end up in peri-urban informal settlements—the number of shantytown dwellers is continuously growing in the region. The situation in this kind of settlements is far from satisfying. Most of the time, they lack infrastructure or adequate sanitary conditions, increasing the chance of a disease outbreak. In some cases, people are forced to leave their home countries with the aim of searching protection and safer livelihood, which increases cross-border migratory movements. Southern Africa is an appealing destination for most of the Africans, and it also attracts some migrants from overseas. Cross-border movements raise the concern of increasing tensions within the society and the spread of communicable diseases. It puts extra pressure on governments, already struggling to provide their citizens with basic services. In the region, youngsters are more willing to leave rural agricultural areas in the hope of finding better opportunities and education. Usually, women who leave their home are younger and they do not travel long distances. They tend to stay closer to their family house, and their migration is rather a temporary choice; they return to their home at the end of their temporary job. Educated people are more likely to migrate for a longer period. Migrants, e.g. in Malawi, tend to have a higher level of education than non-migrants. In South Africa, for example, 17% of the country’s population have migrated internally. This country also absorbs the most international migrants in the African continent. This can also be the consequence of the attractive nature of the country, since it has one of the most dynamic and most prosperous economies in Africa—it is a state where urbanisation has actually happened and that has the potential to absorb some of the rural labour force. While South Africa is the most attractive destination, 52

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countries such as Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia are also increasingly being viewed as possible destinations. In Zambia, a kind of commuter movement is visible following the direction of the mining industry. Urbanisation is developed around mining towns, where mostly male workers spend their time, leaving their children and women behind in rural areas. However, most of the workers go back to the rural areas after retirement. The number of people who leave the continent and go somewhere else in the world is a bit higher than that of regional internal migrants. Africa produces the biggest proportion of young (between 15-24 years) international migrants. However, in some cases, natural disasters can also force vulnerable people to stay on their land because they have no financial resources left to move away. For instance, during the years of drought, and especially right after the natural disasters that hit Southern Africa, no out-migration could be observed from the region. Impoverished people face a double set of risks: they are unable to move away from environmental threats, and their lack of capital makes them especially vulnerable to environmental changes. Relocation means an exception, and people usually go back to their homes when the emergency is over. According to predictions, three different migration patterns will be visible in Africa. The first scenario says that South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe will have to face more incoming migrants. The second scenario indicates that there will be an intense movement towards the coastal areas, which might be reversed in case of a future sea level rise. The last scenario predicts that “cooler” areas (like the Great Lakes, Ethiopia, and Southern Africa) will become more attractive. It is interesting to see that all these scenarios point to Southern Africa as an attractive destination despite all the negative factors previously mentioned in this article. This might also increase the demographic pressure the region needs to bear. Consequently, the most important question regarding the future is how Southern Africa is going to manage the huge demographic boom, the deteriorating weather conditions, and the increasing number of internal and external migrants.

GREAT GREEN WALL INITIATIVE FOR THE SAHARA AND THE SAHEL—A DEVELOPMENT PROJECT TO DISCOURAGE FUTURE AFRICAN MIGRATION Bianka Restás

There is a consensus of opinion that climate change has an impact on population movements; however, the linkages between migration and climate change are heterogeneous with causal attribution being difficult to demonstrate. As it was previously mentioned by other authors of the magazine, no migration can be attributed to a single factor because it is a highly complex process, in which social, political, economic, environmental, and demographic factors interact. As a result, existing migration dynamics are modified or aggravated by different climatic events rather than being solely caused by them. This phenomenon can be observed in the Sahel region as well. The Great Green Wall (GGW) Initiative for the Sahara and the Sahel aims to tackle the region’s greatest current and future challenges—such as drought, desertification, land degradation, loss of biodiversity, and food and water insecurity— and as a consequence, reduce malnutrition, hunger, and poverty, while mitigating migration and contributing to the safety of the region. THE SAHEL REGION The Sahel extends through the southern edge of the Sahara desert, including countries or parts of countries as diverse as Senegal, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, central Chad, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, and the northern edge of Ethiopia (see the map on this page). The region presents a multiplicity and complexity of links between climate change and migration due to a high geographical vulnerability to unfortunate, harmful events and wide-ranging problems.

The blue highlighted area shows the location of the Sahel region, one of the most fragile conflict zones in Africa

DESERTIFICATION—A GLOBAL CHALLENGE Desertification (the degradation of the land in arid, semi-arid, and dry sub-humid areas resulting from various factors, including climatic variations and human activities) is a worldwide phenomenon, which represents one of the most serious challenges for the local communities in the Sahel. It is accompanied by a reduction in the natural potential of the land and a decrease in surface and ground water resources. It does not concern natural deserts and can only occur on a land which is vulnerable to the desertification process. The vulnerability of land to desertification is mainly due to the climate, the topography, the state of the soil, the natural vegetation, and the ways in which these resources are used. Since the REGIONAL

Drought and desertification have worsened the livelihoods of the local communities in Africaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s drylands

1970s, Africa has heavily been affected by recurrent periods of drought. These droughts have threatened the livelihoods and future of entire populations across the region. The lack of rain has led to the disappearance of livestock and the destruction of cereal crops. FROM A LINE OF TREES ACROSS THE SAHEL TO A MOSAIC OF INTERVENTIONS The Great Green Wall Initiative was launched in June 2005 in Ouagadougou, during the 7th summit of the leaders and Heads of State of CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan States), 72 by former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo, strongly supported by the Senegalese president. From then on, the GGW Initiative began to take shape, and 54

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it was formally adopted at the Conference of Heads of State and Government with the objective of tackling the serious social, economic, and environmental consequences of land degradation and desertification in the region. Recognised as a programme with encouraging future impacts, the international organisations have mobilised resources and are coordinating development projects in support of the GGW. From the initial idea of a line of trees (creating a multi-species belt of vegetation) from East to West through the African desert (covering a 15-km-wide and 7,775-km-long area from Dakar to Djibouti), the vision for a Great Green Wall has evolved into a mosaic of interventions, tackling the challenges that the people face in the region.

SUSTAINABLE L AND MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES—THE VALLERANI SYSTEM AND THE ZAI TECHNIQUE The GGW Initiative aims to support the efforts of local communities in the sustainable management and use of forests, rangelands, and other natural resources in drylands. It also seeks to contribute to climate change mitigation, boost food security, and improve the livelihoods of people in the Sahel and the Sahara. The Initiative is also a platform for knowledge management, sharing of experiences, and the distribution of the most appropriate sustainable land management practices across the region. The overall goal of the Great Green Wall plan is to strengthen the resilience of the region’s communities and natural system through ecosystem management, land restoration, and the protection of rural heritage, to reduce their vulnerability to climate change, and to improve the living conditions of the local population. A number of native species, such as the desert date tree (Balanites aegyptiaca L. Delile) and other species like Acacia (Acacia

senegal, Acacia seyal) or Jujube (Ziziphus mauritiana), have been selected to be planted in the area of the Great Green Wall as they are suited to the semi-arid climate. These species provide a vegetation-based cover and a sustainable source of food and income for local populations. There are different examples of good practices and technologies of sustainable land management that promote the success of the rural development scheme. From these initiatives, Vallerani and Zai can be considered as examples of the most commonly applied techniques adopted in the region (about the two systems, see the respective text boxes). The Vallerani System is a mechanised, complex technology that was inspired by traditional practices with the aim to combat desertification and restore degraded soil. Zai is another labour-intensive but effective system against desertification. This new sustainable land and water management intervention method was introduced in Ghana by Mr Asher Nkegbe, the Regional Director of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

THE VALLERANI SYSTEM

ploughs have been used in 13 countries worldwide:

The “Vallerani System” (VS) is a new approach to the

Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Syria, Sudan, Tunisia, and

technical and socio-economic integrated management

of human and natural resources. It includes a method of working arid and semi-arid land to bring life back

and restore degraded soil. Developed in close collaboration with local populations and inspired by

traditional practices, it allows optimising the storage

and use of rain water, reforesting entire desert areas, and improving pastures and agricultural production. The technology uses the Delfino plough invented and patented by Dr Venanzio Vallerani and manufactured

by Nardi.73 The plough creates a system of microbasins and underground bags which collect rainwater,

overflow, and other resources available such as fine soil, organic matter, seeds, etc. The VS allows for direct

seeding of native plants (possibly supplemented by transplantation of nursery species) whose germination

and growth is possible thanks to the water collected into the micro-basins. As of today, Vallerani System

Burkina Faso, Chad, China, Egypt, Jordan, Kenya,

Madagascar. Over 200,000 hectares of arid and degraded land have been ploughed so far. Applying the Vallerani System for the treatment of arid land

has given important and quick results, significantly improving the quality of life of the locals. The system

increased the speed of production to 4-8 km/hour, which corresponds to a working surface of 1.5-3

hectares per hour (a variable depending on the type of soil, processing, rainfall, etc.), and created 2 to 4

times more water available for crops, pastures, and plants. The system lowers costs to approximately

80 to 130 euros/hectare, depending on the size of the intervention, the characteristics of the soil, the

distance between the working lines, the cost of labour, the days of work, and other supplementary

components. The technique helped to restore more than 50,000 hectares of agroforestry systems in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Senegal.

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THE ZAI TECHNIQUE

water, retains moisture in situ, and holds water long

Zai is a technique of digging small holes in the soil

protects seeds and organic matter against being

to retain runoff while adding manure to increase soil fertility. The Zai pits have a diameter of 15

to 30 cm and a depth of 10 to 15 cm to collect rainfall and runoff. Farmers use the pits to put a

handful of organic matter in each of them, ranging from about 300 gram per pit. The concept promotes

the efficient use of limited quantities of organic

matter and ensures the concentration of water

and soil fertility at the beginning of the rainy season. The use of the method increases the amount of

water stored in the soil profile by trapping rain

CONCRETE RESULTS Even though the initial idea of the Great Green Wall has evolved into a mosaic of interventions and productive landscapes, the programme— inspiring the local communities to use sustainable land management techniques—has contributed to concrete and visible achievements. In Ethiopia, 15 million hectares of degraded land (which equals the size of one and a half territory

enough to allow it to infiltrate. At the same time, Zai washed away, in addition to conserving nutrients. Even though Zai is a labourintensive method, experts

say it increases yields by up to 500 percent if properly executed. The technology also reactivates biological

activities in the soil and eventually leads to an improvement in soil structure and less desertification.

Since the Regional Director introduced the Zai Concept,

the crops of the farmers involved have been doing

better than before. Eight Sahel countries are now successfully replicating this technique.

of Hungary) were restored during the period of 2007–2016; furthermore, water catchment and land tenure security improved as well. During the same period, a green belt was created over more than 2,500 hectares of degraded and drylands in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, involving about 120 communities. In Nigeria, 5 million hectares of land were restored, while 415 km of shelterbelts and 319 km of windbreaks

As a consequence of land degradation, food and water insecurity can be considered an important push factor for migration 56

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The Great Green Wall has contributed to concrete and visible achievements

were set up. The initiative created 20,000 jobs in the country: over 5,000 farmers were trained on natural regeneration and farm forestry, more than 500 young unemployed people were hired as rangers, and five skill acquisition centres were constructed for training unemployed youths and women on various livelihood activities. Positive results can also be mentioned in Senegal, where 11.4 million trees were planted, and 24,600 hectares of degraded land were restored. During the period of 2007–2016, 2,000 hectares of land were restored in Sudan as well. EVALUATION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS Similarly to other initiatives, the idea of the Great Green Wall has been criticised by many, while others evaluate it with scepticism. While donors hope that the project will encourage would-be migrants to enjoy better conditions at home, some migration experts believe such development policies might have the opposite impact. The logic behind this opinion is that with a little more money in people’s pockets, migration becomes more attainable for those who intend to leave. Other experts think that the GGW Initiative, which has become a metaphor (and not a real, 7,775-km-long physical barrier of trees on the edge of the desert) to describe a mosaic of sustainable land management interventions and uses, could play a decisive role in the future of the African continent. Even these achievements

pale in comparison to what is needed, but the techniques have shown that degraded land can be restored, and the projects have given ambition and hope to local communities (especially women) to believe in a better future. It is unarguable that the local population is growing rapidly, and to survive, people already face difficult choices every day. The region’s population is expected to double yet again by 2050 (reaching 2.2 billion people) and then by 2100 (4 billion), driving the world’s population dynamics and approaching the size of Asia. If climate change and land degradation continue at the current rate, vulnerable communities could be forced to make serious and risky decisions. According to the estimation of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), by 2020, 60 million people from Sub-Saharan Africa are expected to migrate because of desertification. Delivering all (or just parts) of the Great Green Wall promises requires significant investment and continued political commitment in all countries, as well as resource mobilisation, capacity building, and support to local communities provided by international organisations. It is also necessary to accelerate and reinterpret the implementation of the initiative in the area of the Great Green Wall and to monitor and coordinate all current and future actions in terms of sustainable land management, adaptation to climate change, and sustainable and resilient agriculture. REGIONAL

A PROLONGED DEVELOPMENT CRISIS AND THE COMPLEX ISSUE OF THE MIGRATORY FLOWS Interview with Sába Tesfay, assistant lecturer at Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE)

There are many links between conflicts, disasters, and human mobility. In addition to changes in the climate, there has been a high population growth in Africa in the last decades. How do you see the recent situation of the continent considering migration flow towards Europe? T he reasons for migration from Africa towards Europe are extremely complex. It is known that during the period of European industrialisation, on Europe’s initiative, increasingly intense economic relations were established with the African continent, which brought about extremely significant economic and social changes through all the years of the European colonisation. The African situation could not be understood independently of its historical and geopolitical setting, even in that period. My point is that the effects of global factors are to be found in the background of the present unequal situation. Nowadays, there has been a huge demographic restructuring process in Africa, in the background of which, among other things, population growth is a major reason. The unpredictable weather, the lack and exhaustion of water sources and cultivable lands result in forced migration, while, due to the macro level lack of resources, large 58

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numbers of educated intellectuals also try to find opportunities in Western countries. M igrati o n is a cult ural, economic, legal, and political issue. Consequently, it would be rather complicated to resolve it exclusively by legal and political sanctions. However, migration, together with climate change, reveals the delicate truth that Europe cannot exist as an isolated entity and cannot turn a blind eye to what is happening in the other part of the globe. Europe’s economic and political decisions have influence on the safety of the Southern hemisphere—therefore, Europe should adopt a somehow more global perspective. Do you have any experience about how a society or a social group perceives water scarcity first? What services might be affected first, and in what order? Which are the first restrictions, how can governments react, what policy instruments are available? Responses given to water scarcity differ depending on the society and location. The roaming of the African nomadic herder or former hunting societies was and continues to be determined— but not always primarily—by the seasonal depletion and refilling of water deposits. In those parts of Africa where there are characteristically dry and rainy

Sába Tesfay studied cultural anthropology for her MA and was a PhD student at the European Ethnology Program, Department of Ethnography, ELTE. Currently, she teaches economic anthropology, social anthropology, anthropology of Africa and introductory courses at the Department of Cultural Anthropology, ELTE. Her main research focus is Eritrea and Africa, and her main interest lies in land tenure, kinship, and migration. She has been involved in several research topics: she researches Eritrean villages, Gábor Gypsies in Transilvania, and migration in Hungary.

The interview was conducted by Cecília Varsányi.

seasons, livestock herders are often forced to roam periodically in search of water. In these societies, water scarcity first leads to the decimation of livestock, the very base of their existence, and then results in conflicts with neighbours. The narrower their living space has become, the more likely a conflict will escalate among the neighbouring tribes. In cases like these, the most common response from states may be to initiate well-drillings. On the other hand, it is always a potential weapon that can be used by the government to enforce its interests. Via expropriation or opening of water deposits, the population can be forced to settle down or move away. Nationwide water scarcity often makes the rural population find alternative working opportunities, while the state has to import food, which also adds to the burden falling on the population’s resources. Is it possible to distinguish between socioeconomic, political, and climate -related reasons for migration in the case of Africa/ East Africa? If the answer is yes, how can we distinguish between them? If the answer is no, why is that? I think, it is not. The reasons for migration cannot normally be traced back to a single reason. For example, if precipitation gets growingly unpredictable in a certain area, the land will not ensure the livelihood of a family any longer, so the family moves to the city, where the children find it difficult to make their ways in the world because of their rural roots. Therefore, they further increase the population of the urban slums. Many of them decide to try their luck in another country or continent. Climate change, economic reasons, and political factors all make their contributions to the migration of the young. It is not worth looking at migration as a phenomenon where the reasons are as crystal clear to the migrants as we want them to be. Furthermore, in Africa, the majority of those who are forced to leave their homes never make it through all the way to Europe. A large number of them end up in refugee camps

ECONOMIC REASONS AND POLITICAL FACTORS ALL MAKE THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MIGRATION OF THE YOUNG. IT IS NOT WORTH LOOKING AT MIGRATION AS A PHENOMENON WHERE THE REASONS ARE AS CRYSTAL CLEAR TO THE MIGRANTS AS WE WANT THEM TO BE. in their own country or in the neighbouring states. Migration aiming for Europe means a considerable capital outflow for the families and the country of origin, so the poorest usually do not reach Europe. Let’s talk about Eritrea if you don’t mind, since I know that you are half-Eritrean. Is it possible to observe any kind of environmental deterioration in Eritrea? If the answer is yes, what is its nature, and what are its consequences? Eritrea lies on the very edge of the Sahel. The county is seriously stricken with extreme desertification. In recent years, there have been quite a few large-scale droughts in REGIONAL

Eritrea, which obviously have resulted in low yields, forcing more and more people to spend their meagre incomes on food. This has been accompanied by mass migration into cities to earn a living there. More and more members of the urban families—who are less bound by the norms of the rural areas—have decided to try their luck abroad. This way, the drought has made its contribution to migration. Eritrea has been faring well in objective indicators of prosperity, like the Human Development Index. On the other hand, military service is mandatory in the country, and this, along with the repression and militarisation of the society, is an often-cited reason why Eritrea is among the leading releasing countries. Eritrea is also a country on the Horn of Africa—an often-debated part of the “environmental migration complex.” At the end of the day, what is the most important factor in Eritrea’s emigration? Within a country, the political, economic, and environmental factors act together on the inclination to migration. It would be difficult to point out which one is the strongest factor. Eritrea, in terms of its historical background and geographical position, is an isolated country, and its climatic conditions have very unfavourable effects on its economy. It has only been independent for 27 years. Considering the previous wartime period and the conflicts with its neighbours that have since taken place, it can be seen that this 27-year period was too short for the country to get prepared for the economic and migratory challenges. Recently, the political leadership has put special emphasis on guarding its autonomy and political influence as well as on preventing the country from foreign economic and political influence. While doing so, other measures have often been overshadowed. Accordingly, the defence objectives and the compulsory military service (or “national service”) are all on the agenda. It should also be kept in mind that the county’s political elite, which fought for its independence for decades, still mainly 60

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consists of the military leaders of that period. Now, the country lives in an era of full speed nation-building and laying the foundations of national traditions. The young are provided with very few options in this process, and that is (also) the reason why the migration rate is the highest in their age group. Hopefully, the peace treaty with Ethiopia, which has recently been made public, will offer solution to the slowing economic growth and give new impetus to the regional trade creating new opportunities in the country. In this part of the world, interstate coop e ration to ove rcome re source scarcity would be crucial. Do you think it is possible? Climate change and migration are both global concerns. Although coping mechanisms in Africa are generally considered to be weak… Interstate cooperation—mainly in the case of Eritrea—is really crucial in this conflictstricken region due to the unstable domestic political environment of the neighbouring countries or the dissension based on ethnic and political interests. Consequently, interstate cooperations tend to be ephemeral. The colonial past of the continent, during which the establishment of regional trade was not an issue of high importance, does not encourage international relations either, since local states were dominantly bound to the economic interest of their colonising powers.. Nonetheless, some slow improvements can be perceived. For example, Ethiopia has started such developments—the execution of which can be judged as problematic for many reasons—which can also help the electricity supply of the neighbouring countries. On the other hand, local production mainly stimulates overseas trade, which in most cases means the withdrawal of resources from the given country. The production infrastructure being characteristically weak in Africa as a whole does not provide a base strong enough to counter the challenges of climate changes. The migration spanning over state boundaries is one of the consequences of this very situation.

A CASE OF REVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION— POPULATING THE ISRAELI NEGEV DESERT Zsolt Csepregi

The overarching hypothesis of the In Focus: Environmental Migration publication is that deteriorating environmental conditions all around the globe can and do force communities to uproot themselves and move to different locations. Focusing on preventing and solving this degradation is a worthy cause, but what if we could even go a step beyond? This case study presents a governmental-national effort to “turn the deserts blooming” and move people to regions previously thought uninhabitable. The Israeli experience with “positive” environmental migration shows that the answer to this grave issue is not only technological: it also requires a huge amount of political will to create not only sustainable solutions but an altogether sustainable country. After the State of Israel was founded in 1948, the growing number of Jewish immigrants put great stress on the small country to find sufficient inhabitable land for a population which quadrupled in a mere twentyfive years, from 800,000 to 2.4 million. Soon, the

number of inhabitants will surpass 9 million on an overall territory which is less than one fourth of Hungary’s landmass, 20,000 km2. However, the millions of “exiles” returning to Israel found very little of their land of milk and honey. Most of the territory allocated to establish the Jewish state in 1947 by the United Nations General Assembly and later conquered during the Israeli War of Independence in 1948–1949 is the Negev Desert. This means that more than half, or 13,000 km2, of Israel’s territory is a mostly arid land with some semi-arid sub-regions in the Northern Negev, characterised by lower rainfall and higher evaporation levels, unlike Northern Israel, where the annual average rainfall is not much less than in Hungary. Israeli decision makers rapidly understood that this territory had to be utilised to the maximum if they wished to sustain the rapidly growing population. The gravest problem with the Negev was of course the lack of water sources. Since ancient times, only (semi-)nomadic, pastoral tribes like

The Negev Desert REGIONAL

the ancient Hebrews/Israelites and contemporary Bedouin Arabs were well accustomed to endure the harsh conditions and conduct trade between Africa and Asia, connected by the Negev as the only land bridge, together with the similarly arid Sinai Peninsula. After Israel’s independence had been achieved, Israeli leaders understood that, in order to have a sustainable country, they needed to gradually populate the Negev region. So-called developmental towns were set up in the northern, semi-arid sector of the Negev, with the city of Beersheba becoming the regional centre. However, this was only the beginning of the efforts to turn the vast desert into habitable and productive land, limited by the technological means of the Cold War era. Throughout the following decades, Israel built on five factors to create a sturdy centre of power in the Negev: large-scale water transportation, desalinisation, water reclamation, advanced city planning, and sustainable agricultural technologies. As in most countries struggling with environmental challenges, water resources are located highly unequally in Israel as well. In the North, close to the Golan Heights, which was only later conquered by Israel from Syria, there is sufficient water to support the population and agricultural activity, with large surpluses which could be transferred to the South. One, if not the largest, infrastructural investment in Israel was the construction of the National Water Carrier, a network of pipelines moving the excess water in the North to the South. The project, which had its origins during the British Mandate era, had two important components to be solved, apart from the hardships of building the hundreds of kilometres of pipelines through the country, which should not be underestimated either. These two were financing the megaproject and conducting international negotiations on water allocation. After its inception, Israel, a prime example of an underdeveloped country, needed outside financing and loans to finance the massive public works of the National Water Carrier, a project that costed, on a per capita basis, six times as much as the Panama Canal had costed to the American taxpayer. Financing came from 62

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three major sources. One-third was covered by the young country issuing bonds and thereby taking on debt in the international financial market. Most of the financing, on the other hand, came from the American Jewry, who were eager to donate for a lasting and meaningful investment into the country’s future, and from the American government, which was interested in supporting a Western ally in the Middle East and, on a cynical note, using Israel as a testing ground for the much-needed technology. The message is clear: a developing country cannot undertake transformative projects by its own, but suitable forms of financing depend upon the unique circumstances of the particular country and nation. The Israeli example of negotiating water allocation with its neighbours on the Jordan River’s supply is a great example showing that even countries legally at war can achieve mutually beneficial deals on water if the technocrats of the involved nations can come together. This victory could not have been made without the mediation of the United States. In the end, the National Water Carrier system achieved its goals by pushing the habitable territory in Israel further to the South and giving lifeline to developmental cities for the new immigrants. Getting the water to the South was only the first step, as using these resources in an effective and sustainable manner was a new thing in the middle of the 20 st century. Technological limitations of the era, for example not yet having advanced materials such as nanofilters available, meant that these efforts focused on having the least amount of water wasted when using it for agricultural purposes. One aspect was the remarkably little amount of water lost during the transfer from the Northern regions to the Negev, which showed how meticulous the planning and engineering work on the National Water Carrier was. The second aspect was the so-called dripping irrigation system, which— although revolutionised agriculture during the Cold War—is still scarcely adopted outside Israel. The idea is simple but brilliant: each type of crop has an optimal amount of water it can consume within a given time, so giving it more only goes to waste and evaporates under

the scorching sunlight in the Negev. By drilling small holes into the tubes and positioning them as close as possible to the roots of the crops, irrigation water can be used more optimally. This method would not help much were it not to be coupled with expert knowledge of the needs of the crops and how much water they can useâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; or from another perspective, with knowledge of what is the least amount of water on which they can produce sufficient yields. These efforts required not only engineering knowledge but also great expertise in biology, a discipline which saw rapid development in the young state. Not surprisingly, understanding existing crops led to the development of more resilient types of plants in academic and research centres located in the Negev, such as the BenGurion University in Beersheba and Sde Boker in the heart of the desert. The next step after using the freshwater efficiently was using reclaimed water. Although water used by households is very hard and expensive to turn into potable water, in the Negev, these resources are equivalent to gold. Israel has by far the highest rate of water reclamation; depending on varying definitions, over 80-90% of waste water is reused, mostly for agricultural purposes, while the global average is the inverse: 80% of waste water is leaked

into the environment. Even though nowadays high-tech solutions are applied to develop and manufacture the filters used to reclaim sewage water, for less developed countries, the Israeli example from the early Cold War era shows that even the desert offers many opportunities to purify waste water. Sand serves as a natural filter, and building aquafers in the desert, making of course sure that the water will not evaporate or leak through the cracks, can serve as a low-cost alternative for treating water already used. Desalinisation is considered the rich manâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s solution to water scarcity, and rightfully so. At the inception of modern Israel, even the technology was only a dream, and industrial-scale application might have seemed ludicrous. Nevertheless, the Founding Fathers of Israel, chiefly its first prime minister, Ben-Gurion, understood that the state must eventually become self-reliant in terms of its water resources. A large amount of funds went into research to find at first an applicable and later an economical solution to turn seawater into freshwater or at least sufficiently desalinate it for irrigation. Israeli scientist and government-supported research projects were funded and failed to find a method to alleviate Israelâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s growing water scarcity. The United States contributed significantly to these efforts, for similar reasons as with the National Water Carrier project. American money coupled

Agriculture in the Negev Desert REGIONAL

with Israeli resourcefulness and determination stemming from geopolitical constraints proved to be successful. What the Israeli example shows is that, in such large-scale undertakings as turning seawater into potable water, a country has to accept that even for decades, its investments may not bear fruit. Only in the 1990s did Israeli scientists reach the conclusion that reverse osmosis, employing highly refined membranes to clear the seawater, is the way to go. The origin of the research was not even in seawater purification but the reclamation of agricultural brackish waste water, showing that all these efforts are highly interlinked. The first industrial-scale desalinisation plant was built in 2005 in the quasi-developmental coastal city of Ashkelon, on the north-western edge of the Negev. After five such megaprojects had been built, Israel achieved its dream and even more, as it became self-sufficient in freshwater. Desalinated sources cover 80% of potable water consumption, and the country has started to supply even the northern regions with desalinated seawater (Figure 1). Furthermore, it now has a net surplus, which can be used to replenish the Sea of Galilee and the Dead Sea and exported to Jordan stabilising the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s international environment. The southern city of Eilat and Arava near the coast of the Red Sea are entirely supplied through smaller scale desalinisation plants, showing that the desert can indeed be claimed for human life if the will, funds, and technology are available.

Figure 1 - Desalination

Israel found a solution for its need for water, which is of course the basic ingredient for any life on Earth. Still, the Israeli pioneering spirit became somewhat limp after achieving peace with Egypt 64

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and Jordan, regional military superiority, and probably even more importantly, relatively high living standards, as in terms of nominal GDP per capita, it has surpassed even Japan this year. The unemployment rate is below 4%, while GDP growth has not dipped under 3% for many years, so the population is not eager to move to the Negev just for the spectacular scene. The last major Jewish immigration managed directly by the Israeli government was completed in the 1990s, settling the tens of thousands of members of the Ethiopian Jewish community; the authorities moved a large percentage of them into developmental towns in the Negev. The current immigrants are mainly American, French, Russian, and Ukrainian Jews who prefer Central and Northern coastal Israel while another mass exodus to Israel is not expected in the coming years. These factors have not stopped Israeli companies to invest in R&D connected to sustainable solutions for arid environments, as it has grown into a multibillion dollar business, exporting technology, know-how, and equipment, and fine-tuning the existing infrastructure at home. For these reasons, the Israeli government, which has not given up on motivating more people to move to the Negev, had to employ â&#x20AC;&#x153;carrotsâ&#x20AC;? in its strategy. New highspeed railways connect the coastal cities and Beersheba with Central Israel and beyond, to the industrial centres in the North, anchoring in Haifa. The dreaded municipal tax, the so-called arnona is set by the popularity of the location, so those moving to the South can enjoy a larger slice of their gross salary. As unemployment is so low in Israel, people are not forced to find a job in the South, so they can only be tempted with a better career. Beersheba has become the next high-tech centre of Israel, as the coastal strip between Tel-Aviv and Haifa, previously favoured by companies such as Intel and Microsoft, is overcrowded and expensive. The development was also motivated by the army relocating from prized Central Israeli lands into the Negev and bringing a large number of service and mechanical jobs but also partnering with local universities in the field of advanced technologies such as cybersecurity. As young people know that not only their basic needs but also their highest expectations for career and living standards will be

Beersheba

met in the middle of the desert in regional centres such as Beersheba with its 200,000 inhabitants, they have become much more willing to move. Beersheba is one of the fastest-growing cities in the country (Figure 2), where young people enjoy lower university tuition fees, low tax rates and tempting career opportunities mainly in the fields of computer technology, renewable energy, and water management. These top-tier positions also bring with them many more jobs in the service sector, and urban planners envision a city of half a million in the coming decade. Thus, there would be overall one million new inhabitants in the Negev, including other developmental suburbs, cities, and the unique Israeli cohabitation and industrial/agricultural communities, such as the moshavs. While Israel

Figure 2 - Population of Beersheba

was forced to allocate the immigrants through governmental direct action, today it is all about tempting the population into reverse environmental migration and changing old mindsets. The clock is ticking, as Israel is projected to grow quite rapidly in the coming decades, reaching up to 12-16 million citizens, according to the best known Israeli demographer, Sergio Della Pergola, professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Israel is a good example of a country where environmental migration is gradually happening in a reverse direction, and population moved into regions which were previously thought to be unfit for modern life. The country was motivated by its security situation and its nationalist-religious commandment to inhabit the desert and the whole of the land they see as their Promised Land. This way Israel, utilising its unique position, was â&#x20AC;&#x153;forcedâ&#x20AC;? to become a leader in the required technologies, mainly in water management, to create the conditions for large-scale immigration into the arid regions of the country. As the high level of related tech export from Israel has already shown, the world can learn from the success and the trial and error nature of the quest for populating the Negev Desert, prevent forced migration stemming from environmental degradation, and even reclaim lands previously thought uninhabitable. REGIONAL

YEMEN—A MULTIFACETED CR ISIS ON THE AR ABIAN PENINSULA Tamás Kozma

State sovereignty issues, ethnic and religious tensions, extremism, the lack of sufficient political and economic reforms, rapid population growth as well as high unemployment rates among the youth are long-standing and often-quoted characteristics of the Middle Eastern countries. Growing climate and environmental concerns add up to this picture: water scarcity, soil degradation, food security, and desertification are well-known issues. Yemen is no exception, as it thoroughly exemplifies all the above complexities: it is a peripheral country carrying the burdens of its adverse history and its ongoing crisis. Moreover, it is a country where the great degree of insecurity is topped by unfavourable environment- and climate-related developments. Despite the complexity and severity of the conflict, it can be said that Yemen has not been in the spotlight to the same extent as Syria, for instance. The case of Syria is more to be viewed as a conflict with its local, regional, and global layers, while the Yemeni conflict shows predominantly local and regional characteristics. This, of course, determines how extensive media coverage can be in the Western world about Yemen, given that the conflict stays primarily within the borders of the Middle East. Yemen mostly appears in the centre of attention due to the regional security implications of its ongoing conflict. However, worsening environmental factors should also receive greater attention, as they negatively affect the overall conditions in the war-torn country, including its economic situation, living conditions, public health, and migration patterns, among other things. To highlight the complex security situation of the country, it is worthwhile to take a glimpse first of the political dimension of the ongoing turmoil. Given the unfortunate history of the 66

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country, clashes of interest groups have long contributed to insecurity in Yemen. The Houthi movement based in northwestern Yemen was gradually organised in the 1990s, and the direct war between them and the government forces broke out in 2004. This momentum became a key point of departure for the long-lasting conflict, the intensity of which varied throughout the years. Like in many countries in the Middle East, the events of the Arab Spring can be identified as important milestones for the further developments. This set of events led to longruling President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s resignation in November 2011. Presidential elections took place in early 2012, where Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, Saleh’s former vice president, won. This step could however not become the guarantee for a peaceful future for the country. The Houthis, alongside with the supporters of ex-president Saleh, have been fighting against the government. The Houthis captured the capital city of Sanaa in September 2014 and gained control over a significant part of the country’s Western territories. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia and its allies intervened in the conflict on the side of the Yemeni government, while the Houthis received support from Iran. The conflict has thus inevitably gained an international character and became to some extent part of the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, it would be oversimplifying matters to portray the ongoing Yemeni conflict one-sidedly in the light of the tensions between Riyadh and Tehran. It is much more to be seen in the context of an escalated conflict between the government forces and rebel groups of Yemen, which has led to neighbouring Saudi Arabia’s intervention based on the threats the conflict might pose to the security of its borders, and which has also

The map of Yemen

triggered Iranâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s support to Houthis. It is also necessary to add that in the meantime, the turmoil provided fertile ground for the terrorist group Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to gain positions, thus further contesting the sovereignty of the legitimate government over Yemeni land. According to data collected by WHO, from March 2015 until April 2018, the total death toll of the Yemeni conflict reached 9,559, while 55,616 were injured.74 Prone to unresolved political and economic crises on the southwestern edge of the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen has long been considered the poorest country in the Middle East. In 2016, per capita GNI equalled only 1,040 USD.75 While in 1990 the population of the country was around only 12 million, by today, it has surpassed the 27.5 million level.76 Food security usually becomes a priority in case of such dynamic demographic growth, and both the armed conflict and the environmental realities lay an extra burden on the impoverished country, which has been turned into the state of humanitarian catastrophe. According to the available figures published by the United Nations

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), in Yemen, 2 million people are internally displaced, 17 million can be considered as food insecure, and 14.4 million are lacking access to safe drinking water and sanitation.77 Today, the declining conditions for agriculture, due to both the security situation and water scarcity, forces Yemen to import food from abroad, thereby making the country even more vulnerable to and dependent on foreign import and aid. However, the Saudi Arabia-initiated air, land, and sea blockade on Yemen has become another factor that worsens the situation in Yemen. The accessibility of food, medicine, and foreign aid is heavily hindered, thus it further fuels the humanitarian catastrophe and poses the threat of one of the 21st centuryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s worst famines. Accordingly, malnourishment is another critical issue: based on the available World Food Programme (WFP) data, 67% of children under the age of 5 are chronically malnourished, while in some governorates, the acute malnourishment of children under the age of 5 reaches 25%.78 REGIONAL

As suggested in the preface, unfavourable environmental and climate-related developments should be better highlighted when it comes to giving an account of the current state of Yemen. Rising temperatures are worrisome: since the 1960s, average temperature has risen by 1.8 °C,79 and long-term expectations are even more drastic. Yemen has a semi-arid to arid climate; therefore, water—or more precisely, the lack of sufficient water supplies—constitutes a pivotal question, too. According to World Bank data, up to the recent years, irrigation level in Yemen has increased by 15 times since the 1970s, while natural precipitationfed agriculture has shrunk by 30%. In rural Yemen, at least half of the agricultural investments are going to ruin within five years due to water scarcity, and there are a number of areas in the country where the daily available water capacity equals only to 30 litres, which is an alarming outlook beyond doubt.80

Water scarcity is a worsening issue in Yemen 68

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Only 15% of the GDP originates from agriculture, despite the fact that 55% of the active population is employed in this sector.81 Agricultural lands are prone to deterioration: desertification and the increase in soil salinity are a major threat to sufficient agriculture and food security. It is worth noting that qat production is one of the most water-consuming agricultural activities in Yemen. This mild narcotic is the source of more than one-third of the Yemeni agricultural GDP, while it requires approximately 40% of the total water resource use.82 World Bank highlights that qat production required 3.9 bcm water use in 2010, while the amount of total renewable water source was only 2.5 bcm.83 This massive overuse of water rendered the underground water reserves excessively depleted. Sources suggest that the water table declines 6-7 metres annually.84 Though

Troubled waters: The port of Djibouti in the Gulf of Aden

Yemen is not the most water scarce location in the Middle East, the overall circumstances in the war-torn country exacerbate the negative effects of water scarcity. Another problem is that Yemenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s economy is on the verge of bankruptcy, and this situation, along with the lack of security, does not allow the wide-scale deployment of seawater desalination plants, which has proven to be a feasible solution throughout the Gulf countries. Due to the lack of proper access to drinking water and sanitation, Yemen has become a hotspot for cholera outbreaks in recent years. Only between April 2017 and April 2018, nearly 1.1 million suspected cholera cases were identified, while the associated death toll reached 2,275 during this one-year period.85 At the same time, extreme climate events cause unprecedented catastrophes. Tropical cyclones, such as the ones in 1996, 2008, or 2015, caused torrential rainfalls and devastating flash floods in the country, thus leaving tens of thousands of residents without housing or jobs and compelling them to leave their homes and lives and become internally displaced at least for a certain period of time. In case of Yemen, internal migration is very frequent. Considering that agricultural lands are vulnerable to climate phenomena and prone to

water scarcity, rural to urban migration patterns are very typical in the country. This process results in a growing pressure on food and water supplies in urban spaces, where the population growth rate is more than twice of that in rural areas.86 Besides the voluntary choice of moving for better living, one can see that in Yemen both the harsh environmental circumstances and the armed conflict compel people to consider escaping their deteriorating living conditions. As a result of the 2008 flood in Hadramout and Al Mahra provinces, more than 10,000 citizens were forced to leave their homes, as 2,000 houses were ruined.87 The tropical cyclone called Chapala in 2015 was even more devastating: 36,000 citizens were displaced and 700 houses were destroyed or damaged. At certain locations, the quantity of rain that fell in 48 hours equalled the quantity that usually falls in 7 years.88 As pointed out in UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) reports, approximately 2 million citizens became internally displaced until July 2017 as a consequence of the complex challenges such as the ongoing fights and the deepening humanitarian crisis, and 84% of them had to stay away from their homes for more than one year.89 REGIONAL

What makes Yemen’s situation even more complicated is its involvement in the bordercrossing migration flows in a trifold way: conflictaffected Yemen is a country of origin, a transit country, and a destination country at the same time. Despite the disastrous conditions, the country serves uninterruptedly either as a destination or transit state for refugees and migrants from Africa, given its proximity to the Horn of Africa. It is necessary to underline that in terms of bordercrossing migration, Yemen is strongly interlinked with the countries in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf states. The latter countries are typical migration destinations for both Yemenis and Africans who transit via Yemen to seek better economic opportunities in the Gulf states or to escape extreme droughts and famine. Migration flows from Yemen to Gulf countries show a mixed picture. Based on the figures published by the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, 51,000 had left Yemen for neighbouring Oman by the end of 2016; however, only 5,000 of them were Yemeni.90 For migrants leaving Yemen, the second Gulf destination was Saudi Arabia. Out of the total 39,880 persons, 30,000 were Yemeni citizens,91 thus making Saudi Arabia the top Gulf destination for migrants with Yemeni citizenship. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia is a key country in terms of Yemeni migrant workers’ remittances to their homeland. Besides the migration flows from Yemen towards the Gulf states, it is necessary to shed light on the other direction as well, namely on the Horn of Africa. According to UNHCR statistics, between March 2015 and April 2017, 95,807 Yemeni, Djiboutian, Ethiopian, Somali, and Sudanese refugees and migrants arrived in total from Yemen to the Horn of Africa.92 It is worth noting that Somalis returning from Yemen to Somalia equalled 31,129,93 a considerably higher figure than the number of Yemeni citizens fleeing to any of the countries in the Horn of Africa. Based on the report at hand, for Yemeni citizens, the most relevant destination country was Djibouti. The number of Yemeni citizens leaving for this country reached 19,636 over the same period.94 It remains to be seen, however, whether the outflowing migration from Yemen to the Horn of Africa is much less 70

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significant than the other way around. Between March 2015 and March 2017, UNHCR registered slightly more than 95,000 arrivals from Yemen to the Horn of Africa, while in the opposite direction, arrival numbers reached 207,000.95 The ongoing conflict in Yemen has obviously been a major driving force behind migration flows from or within the country. Given the unfavourable climate situation in the country, it is necessary to highlight some specifics of environment- or climate-induced migration as well. A specific study on MENA countries concluded that the impact of weather shocks on migration flows has remained limited until now, but at the same time, it also noted that this impact will presumably grow in the future.96 In addition, today it seems that weather shocks rather tend to induce non-border crossing migration and trigger migration mostly from rural to urban spaces. Based on a specific survey conducted on five countries including Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Syria, and Yemen, the most relevant reasons for migration in these countries were associated with the hope of better employment conditions or with the current lack of employment of the respondents.97 Climate-related events such as droughts and floods as migration-inducing factors remained far beyond the above-mentioned primary factors. The above study also underlined that weather shocks do influence the migration patterns of Yemeni people, but socio-economic factors seem to provide the primary motivation for people to abandon their homes in the hope of finding better living conditions. At the same time, it should be noted that the current crisis in Yemen consists of a number of dimensions, including political, security, humanitarian, economic, environmental, etc. Given their interlinked nature, it is hardly possible to assess one area without referring to the others. Accordingly, the motivation behind a person’s decision to leave one place for another—whether it be internal or border-crossing migration—can probably be best analysed when all the above dimensions are taken into account. There is already a growing number of academic works dedicated to the analysis of Yemen’s highly complex case, and given the increasing concern about the environmental implications of the crisis, the need for analysing the mobilising effects of environmental factors should be better addressed.

TOMORROW’S ATLANTIS Diana Wiszt

Even though the story of Atlantis is only a myth, it might become reality in the Pacific island region. According to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),98 small island states, including Oceania, are the most directly affected by climate change due to their geographic situation—nowhere else in the world do countries face the complete disappearance of their territory: even the 1.5 °C goal of the Paris Climate Agreement would allow their land to be submerged by the end of the century. Despite the best efforts of the Alliance of Small Island States to make their voice heard and raise global awareness, not enough attention has been paid to these countries, as those threatened by climate change will likely stay in the region, even in the event of crossborder displacement. Nonetheless, mitigation and adaptation to sea level rise should not only be a regional but a global concern as coastal cities, notably New York, Miami, and Amsterdam, are bound to experience serious land loss in the near future. Therefore, mitigating the hazards and finding feasible solutions for the atoll nations can serve as a valuable lesson for the future to the international community as well. The main questions are the following: Is it already too late to save these states and their population? Are the current legal frameworks adequate to protect the forcibly displaced? What lessons can be drawn for the future? 23 culturally diverse countries and their territories are located in the Pacific island region, which is made up of 20,000-30,000 remote and dispersed islands covering one-third of the globe’s surface. Despite their low global emission of greenhouse gases (0.03%)99 and a relatively small population of 10.5 million, they are in the front line of global warming exacerbating the situation of the already vulnerable, poor, and resource-constrained countries. The population

of these island nations has very few or no background knowledge on global warming; yet, they are well aware of its consequences as on the majority of the islands, issues concerning land loss, degradation of environment, food security, water shortage, and human health arise.

WHY OCEANS ARE IMPORTANT As seen from the earlier article of our issue, oceans not only cover three-fourth of the Earth, but their role is also essential in regulating the climate system. They provide food and shelter to marine ecosystems and people living on their resources, and they generate half of the world’s oxygen, not to mention that they altogether absorb 93% of Earth’s extra heat. Due to their important role, climate change, REGIONAL

the challenge of our time, cannot go unnoticed in these huge masses of water either, and its consequences are serious: a rise in sea level and higher ocean temperatures. This not only changes rainfall patterns significantly but also results in acidification and coral bleaching: increasing ocean temperatures coming into chemical reaction with CO2 induce acidification, so in the long run, warmer and more acid water results in the death of corals, which not only harms the existing fish stock but also threatens the livelihood of the coastal population. Tourism and economy are at severe risk among other aspects.

The very first climate refugees recognised by the UN were the population of Tegua (Vanuatu) in 2005, then, two years later, the government of Papua New Guinea started the evacuation of the Carteret Islands.100 In both places, after years of fight against man-made climate change and building sea walls, the population was gradually provided refuge internally. In case of forced displacement, volcanic islands with high altitude, such as Papua New Guinea, have the possibility to internally displace their people; however, the low-lying island states probably have no other option in the long term but to seek refuge cross-borders.

CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON PACIFIC SMALL ISLAND STATES Although each island faces different adversities, sea level rise and more intense storms may have the severest implications on the low-lying ones. Saltwater intrusion contaminates not only agricultural land but underground freshwater too, which threatens with the emergence of conflicts in the already vulnerable and oftentimes politically unstable nations. More than 50% of the island population lives on the littoral that raises security issues. Except for the main island of Papua New Guinea, the entire Pacific region is at high risk, as the majority of these nations lie only a few meters above sea level: therefore, even a small rise in sea level or an intense storm causing floods can render their land uninhabitable. Researchers expect a 1-meter rise by 2100, which means the submersion of several island nations. Hence, the lowest-lying islands (Kiribati, Tuvalu, Marshall Islands) need to take urgent action in order to adapt to the situation caused by climate change. According to worst-case scenarios, entire populations will be forced to relocate, which means hundreds of thousands of people, and millions in the long run. Their future is uncertain due to possible land loss and the consequent displacement. This also means millions of people whose legal status is yet to be determined. Hitherto, several islands have already been engulfed completely in the area (e.g. the Marshall Islands), although the complete disappearance of a country due to sea level rise is unprecedented.

MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION The population of these island nations does not want to migrate; island life has been their identity for 3,000 years, and losing their land would mean losing their culture. They not only face global warming threats but also existential challenges, as nature, which has so far supported them, now claims their land. Considering that uninhabitability precedes the extinction of the island, the manner of displacement and the displaced populationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s legal status become the most urgent questions.

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Forced Migration Under the Montevideo Convention of the Rights and Duties of States of 1933, Article 4, four criteria have to be satisfied for a state to be recognised as such: permanent population, defined territory, government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Changes in constituent criteria (i.e. change in population) do not automatically result in a country losing its statehood; as international legal order presupposes the existence of the state, its termination is only exceptionally recognised. Whereas natural disaster-induced internal migration has legal coverage under the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement of 1998, cross-border displacement should be updated to fit current circumstances. In order to be recognised as refugees, the displaced should meet the criteria of the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Protocol relating to the Status of

Refugees of 1967, which are political in nature, meaning that they do not fit the prevailing definition of refugees. While international law provides them with the right to seek asylum, granting it is a state-based sovereign act, and countries do not accept climate change as a reason for doing so, claiming global warming does not discriminate. The lack of legal definition of environmental refugees does not mean they have no protection. Everyone is entitled to human rights; therefore, under the principle of non-refoulment (Article 33 of the Refugee Convention), sending people back to an island threatened to be destroyed by sea level rise is inhuman, as they face risk of death, and so, it violates their right to life. Considering that serious problems emerge due to food safety, water scarcity, and human health risks, if there is no other way to save their lands, security issues would inevitably render their migration a forced one. Still, New Zealand courts do not agree with this logic, rejecting environmental asylum seekers regardless of health standards, unemployment, and risk of conflicts. On humanitarian grounds and especially due to strong family ties to New Zealand, the family of Sigeo Alesana from Tuvalu was granted refuge in 2007—however, most of the appellants face deportation. In order to avoid last minute mass migration, a 2016 World Bank research argues for open migration from climate change-threatened Pacific Islands, creating a new visa, and thus offering the possibility of permanent settlement and work in Australia and New Zealand.101 International migration due to global warming is not a new occurrence; yet, as this issue is still unresolved and current legal frameworks are inadequate to protect the forcibly displaced, an update of the international refugee and human rights law is imperative and urgent.

but still above sea level—or fully submerged island, two possibilities can be taken into consideration: contractual transfer of land or the creation of artificial islands. The government of Tuvalu and Kiribati have already purchased land from Fiji in order to prepare for the relocation of their population. Besides land lease, area growth by building artificial islands could very well be the solution for islands losing their lands—even though their realisation is costly, especially for nations that depend heavily upon international aid. The idea is not new, as among many, the Maldives has already built two artificial islands, but the most recent and ambitious project to make the headlines was that of Kiribati. Under the presidency of Anote Tong, Japanese engineering company Shimizu came up with the futuristic and unfeasibly expensive project of a “floating island,”102 costing USD 450 billion, which is able to accommodate 30-50,000 people. The idea was, however, washed away with the change of government in 2016; the new government prefers investing in the economic development of the remaining islands instead of working on emergency plans relating to population displacement and adaptation. Expensive as they are, artificial islands could be the solution for island nations if they could preserve statehood for good, but under UN Convention Law of the Sea of 1982, they are currently not considered real islands. Until the complete submersion of the original state territory, the notion is feasible, but as soon as all is shrunk, artificial islands lose their rights, too. It is only over the maritime zones that states have sovereignty, which can be completely lost with sea level rise; moreover, if they cannot sustain human lives, they are not allowed to be called continental shelf either. The complete disappearance of defined territory thus evokes the problem of statelessness as well.

Can Their Land and Statehood be Saved?— Defined Territory Under prevailing legal frameworks, international recognition of a state is maintained until other countries do not decide otherwise; nonetheless, the complete loss of state territory poses new legal challenges. In case of an uninhabitable—

Further Adaptation Strategies First and foremost, it is crucial to increase governments’ efficiency in raising global warming awareness, spread environmental education among their population, and promote adaptive solutions. Initiatives like the creation of protected marine areas can preserve fisheries, REGIONAL

and according to researches, experimental coral farms might even recover the bleaching coral reefs slowly but steadily. However, strategies including building sea walls with sandbags or rocks and planting mangrove forests to serve as natural barriers against floods are only temporary solutions; they can only delay the unavoidable. Several successful development and adaptation projects have already been implemented in the region, among which Pacific Adaptation to Climate Change (PACC) with the cooperation of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) is one of the first and most significant. Vulnerability of the 14 atoll nations participating in the project differs, but they share three key areas. Therefore, the programme focuses mainly on coastal zone management, food security and production, and water security. Besides PACC, the Green Climate Fund encourages climate-resilient actions including transition to renewable energy, which can foster the energy

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independence of small island states and the reduction of carbon emissions. CONCLUSION Move or stay?â&#x20AC;&#x201D;considering that the islands in question are among the poorest nations, international assistance is absolutely needed, while taking action to find a solution is a global responsibility. Given that their access to climate change funding is neither smooth nor equal, Fijiâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s presidency of COP23, held in Bonn in 2017, was a significant achievement in this regard, while it also provided a chance for small island nations to raise their voice and disseminate climate awareness. It is expected that several atoll nations are already becoming modern-day Atlantis as sea level rise jeopardises their livelihoods; and yet, in case a stronger contribution between the governments and the global community can be established, several islands may still be saved. However, international migration is likely unavoidable. Global warming is real; ignorance will only exacerbate the global humanitarian crisis to a scale that is so far unforeseeable.

THE USA OF THE 21ST CENTURY—THE ERA OF “MEGADROUGHTS,” “MEGAFIRES,” AND “100-YEAR STORMS” Diana Wiszt

Doomsday movies attract millions of viewers worldwide, but can you really imagine a world where major, vital cities that everyone knows are wiped off the map? The population of major cities, such as Miami, New York, Atlantic City, Los Angeles, etc., are facing huge threats caused by global warming. Extreme heat, intense periods of drought, wildfires, and hurricanes are forcing millions to leave their homes. As Mother Nature interferes, coastal cities gradually become uninhabitable, and forest homes are destroyed by unprecedentedly devastating fires. Therefore, it is logical and easy to expect people to move to safer regions. Due to the geographical position, international

migration is not necessary—but is internal relocation as simple as it seems? Has massive environmental migration already started in the United States? If yes, what are the means? If no, what hinders it? Where to relocate and who is to pay for it? FOREST FIRES As heat waves and hot conditions gradually become the norm, never before have so many and so severe fires been seen. Wildfires are also changing. With the weather getting warmer and drier in the whole western part of North America, fire seasons last 2.5 months longer than 40 years ago. Therefore, forest fires can

Thomas fire, California in December 2017 REGIONAL

occur all year round.103 As fire burns through the soil, it allows the trees to dry out faster, hindering the recovery of the native species. Besides the heatwaves, there is another impor tant, reinforcing phenomenon to forest fires: the pine bark beetle. With rising temperatures, they reproduce twice a season, threatening bigger and bigger regions in America. According to entomologist Diana Six,104 over the past decade, pine beetles have killed more trees than fires altogether in North America. Scientists predict the loss of 20 million acres each year by 2050, which will make nearly half of the American forests

Aerial view of buildings along Miami Beach 76

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disappear in the upcoming few decades. Warmer and drier water, forest fires, and growing bark beetle infestation end up in a vicious circle, which only accelerates global warming, as with the trees dying, the carbon they have so far absorbed will now end up in the atmosphere. According to statistics, since the turn of the century, fourteen of the twenty most destructive fires took place in California. Thomas fire, the severest wildfire ever recorded in the region, burned more than 270,000 acres and made hundreds of thousands of people lose their home in December 2017.

SEA LEVEL RISE, FLOODS Coastal cities like Miami are already experiencing rising sea levels and more and more furious storms. A projected 6.6-meter sea level rise by 2100 would make the city completely submerged.105 Adaptation projects, such as raising the main roads and building pumps around the city, can serve as solutions for a few decades. However, as these are just temporary solutions, Dan Gerber, mayor of Miami Beach, slowed down the costly project for their construction. Nonetheless, it is impossible to keep the water out, since Miami and Florida are built on porous limestone that used to be the habitat for shrimps.106 Through this “Swiss cheese” foundation, in the event of a high tide, floods looking like left over rain occur miles away from the beach, even in mainland Florida, raising, above all, public health concerns. Despite the clear risks, developments indifferent to the future are growing along the shoreline, exacerbating the problem. Before, people did not build on the strips, but now, a whole industry of billions of dollars is created on it, resulting in an unsustainable future.107 Companies, individuals, and governments are underestimating what they are facing, but problem will strike in when insurance companies assess the risks too high and stop covering for the losses. MOVING OR REBUILDING? Increasing megastorms, megafires, and rising sea levels should ring a wake-up call: a call for the people to move out of risk-prone areas and a call for the government to implement stricter regulations in regard to developments. Yet, all actors think that the short-term advantages outweigh the risks, which is partially due to the American insurance system. Matthew Hauer, a demographer of the University of Georgia, finds that 56% of the US counties will be affected in some way by environmental migration.108 The greatest risk awaits Florida, possibly about to lose nearly 3 million of its population, whereas other parts of the region, for example Texas, will see the influx of migrants. Although people are aware of the risks, rebuilding their houses on fire- and flood-

prone areas is further incentivised by local governments and insurance companies. While 50 years ago an average of 100 houses were destroyed by a wildfire, now the number has risen to 5,000—nonetheless, between 1970 and 1999, 94% of the houses were rebuilt.109 “Repetitive loss properties” are a serious problem, and buyouts by the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program are incredibly slow, whereas the federal government-created National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) of 1968110 makes people trapped. NFIP, originally devised to help those in need by paying insurance companies’ policies, offers discounted insurance which was supposed to make people move to safer regions—but now, it encourages them to stay in risk-prone areas. The system, which is already resulting in a nearly USD 25 billion debt to the US Treasury,111 has several flaws. Floods maps, which the system is based on, are outdated and inaccurate. Moreover, the bigger the disaster, the more profit insurance companies make, as covering the losses is not their responsibility but that of the government and the taxpayers—so, the wealthy and the insurance companies are on the winning side, as many of the repetitive loss properties are vacation homes, and their owners get money and rebuild them after each natural disaster, which costs a fortune to the taxpayers. Despite the risks, most people still decide to stay in flood-prone areas for several reasons; however, at the same time, their properties lose value and selling them becomes more and more difficult. So, those who cannot afford moving lose everything, as they rely heavily on NFIP. The program is due for a significant reform and reauthorisation at the end of July 2018 in order to really help those that it was aimed to help in the first place. No doubt, insurance programmes should be imperatively and urgently updated in order to efficiently help people start a new life in a safe region, and money should be spent on the preparation of host cities so that they can accommodate people if they eventually feel forced to move from the risk-prone areas. We will see whether new legislation, growing risks, and higher sea levels can set off a new kind of inner migration in the United States. REGIONAL

CLIMATIC MIGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN—A POTENTIAL ADAPTATION STRATEGY? Zsombor Szabolcs Pál The present piece’s focus is the so-called Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region, which stretches from the northern border of Mexico to the Tierra del Fuego archipelago in Argentina and makes up almost 50% of the whole American continent. For the moment, there are no clear-cut signs of purely climate-motivated migration or displacement of people, but according to a number of scenarios, odds are that this situation might shift—at least slightly—if changes in climate continue to loom on the region. To have an approximate idea of the possible changes in such a huge and diverse landmass, this study will proceed along the following steps: First, it makes an attempt to characterise the region’s main climate hazards. Second, it sets forth the most cogent future trends in climatic changes and their effects. Third, it gives a short introduction to the present regional demographic traits. Finally, taking into account the spatial distribution of climatic changes, the projectable demographic trends, and the migratory and adaptation patterns, it seeks to outline some of the most conjecturable demographic movements. PRESENT AND FUTURE CLIMATIC CHANGES TO COPE WITH As a greatly extended area, the LAC is home to both anthropogenic and non-anthropogenic catastrophes. Yet, this paper is dealing almost exclusively with the first category, as calamities that fall into this group are more tightly related to climatic changes, and—due to the centuries-long local adaptation strategies—disasters of the latter set are less likely to cause massive and permanent demographic movements. According to the Annual Disaster Statistical Review 2016,112 compiled by the Catholic University of Leuven, currently, the main 78

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Figures 1a-b show the most typical meteorological, while Figure 1c the most typical hydrological hazards (for Figure 1c see the next page)

anthropogenic disasters afflicting the region have climatological, hydrological, or meteorological roots. Based on their spatial distribution, as of now, we can separate three main, sometimes overlapping, zones: climatological disasters, principally droughts, chiefly concentrate on the tropics, meteorological disasters are most common in the northern part of the LAC and in Central America, while disasters of a hydrological nature are more frequent in South America—although the northern part and the isthmus connecting the two continents are not completely devoid of them either (Figure 1a-c). Experts expect that in the future, as a result of human-related activity, climatic extremes can intensify in the region. Although changes will possibly affect the whole planet, the

Figure 1c

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change foresees in its Fourth Assessment Report that their impact will be more severe in the developing countries of the tropics, the rise of mean temperature and temperature anomalies will become more intense there (about the most likely regional scenarios, see Figure 2).113 It is a telling fact that, according to estimates, between 2001 and 2011, catastrophes affected five times more people in the LAC than between 1960 and 1970.114 As the region’s topography is highly versatile, precipitation is quite concentrated in South America: it has extremely dry territories like the Atacama Desert, which is one of the driest deserts in the world, and it has soaking wet places, too, like some spots in Columbia that rank among the wettest areas on the planet. According to different climate models, as a consequence of this trait and the higher temperatures, drought may become particularly severe in the Brazilian Northeast, in the Caribbean region, and Central America, as well as in the northern part of Mexico—in the latter three, it will be also exacerbated by the El Niño and the La Niña phenomena. At these places, the arid or semi-arid territories can suffer salinisation and degradation of soil, and thus, desertification. Moderately or more aggressively, this soil erosion may affect one third of mainland areas. This may lead to a decrease in biodiversity—the eastern part

Figure 2 - Summary of climate change patterns projected for 2100 in Latin America and the Caribbean REGIONAL

Figure 3 - Relative change in percent of the flows in South American rivers for the period 2041–2060 related to the average in the period from 1900–1998

of the Amazonas and Central and Northern Mexico are at particular risk: 60% of the arid or semi-arid lands of the latter, for example, are likely to suffer from erosion.115 As a secondary effect of the above phenomena, drier temperature will affect water security, and for example, by marring crop yields, food security as well. As many people still make a living from agriculture, and especially from rain-fed agriculture, this process can deal a serious blow to them and result in the collapse of their livelihood. Besides, another corollary of higher temperatures is the acceleration of the melting of glaciers. As shown in Figure 2, this phenomenon follows the lines of the Andes, where glaciers have a paramount importance in fresh water supply and in energy and agricultural production. Consequently, their disappearance may badly afflict many local communities in Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Columbia. Since 1970, Andean glaciers have lost almost one-half of their area, and the process is accelerating.116 The change in temperature, vegetation, and the volume of glaciers may feed back into the present cycles of seasons and weather, especially in the Amazonas Basin and Central America. Dry seasons may last longer, rainy seasons may come later and arrive with unusual intensity, which can also impact— albeit not necessarily in a negative way—existing agricultural production and beyond this, the 80

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livelihood of many people. A good example is the Brazilian South, Southeast, and Central East, which nowadays fill up their water reserves by the “flying rivers,” i.e. air masses rich in vapour, coming from the forests of the Amazon basin. Therefore, a change in the biodiversity of the latter and its deforestation may have repercussions for the water supply of the economically more advanced southern part of the country.117 Parts of the continent south of the tropics, on the other hand, are likely to face problems of a diametrically opposite nature, as seen in Figure 3. The increase in the flow of rivers may result in more floods in the southeastern part of South America, especially in Uruguay, southern Brazil, and the Argentinean pampas as well as in Peru, Ecuador, and Chile. In the Littoral of Argentina, annual rainfalls have shown a steady increase in intensity and frequency over the last 50 years. And, according to mid- and long-term scenarios, mean rainfall will increase by 10% in this area.118 Besides freshwater, blue water is going to spell disasters too. Even though the continent is not particularly threatened by sea level rise, since in absolute numbers, it has less land area and fewer inhabitants in the low elevation coastal zone than, for example, Asia, North America, or Europe, some islands in the Caribbean are likely to disappear, while on other parts of the continent,

higher sea levels can put freshwater availability, tourism, and fish stocks at danger. Whereas only 8% of urban zones are threatened by flooding, and most at-risk areas are agricultural or marshy lands, population-wise, 77% of people living in endangered zones live in big cities, where the population is growing.119 Lastly, speaking still about the oceans, if their surface temperature rises, tropical storms will afflict more frequently and fiercely the Caribbean and Mexico. INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND POTENTIAL CLIMATIC HAZARDS Although each of these climate changes has the potential to incite population movements, the mere occurrence of such a change eo ipso does not necessarily mean massive demographic shifts. Evidently, one thing that can bear on the outset of such a movement is the geographical distribution of people; even if radical climate changes occurred, as long as they did not to affect too many people, their consequences in terms of migration would remain negligible. Therefore, putting the above pieces of information in a demographical context might enhance a more comprehensive

understanding of to what degree they can make people leave their wonted premises. Looking at Figure 4, one can observe the population distribution that characterises the region; putting together this map and the above-listed changes and hazards can help sketching up future trends in population movements. Comparing Figure 2 and Figure 4 shows that places affected by a rise in mean temperature and longer dry spells overlap with high population density at two places: one is the northeastern and the other is the southeastern part of Brazil. Another potentially risky place is the northern part of Mexico, a country whose area is already 70% arid.120 Economy in the northeastern part of Brazil is principally based on agricultural products like sugar, cocoa, cotton, as well as cattle breeding. As irrigation in this densely populated part of the country, home to around 30% of the whole Brazilian population, is rather sparse, peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;especially those having a small farm and dispose of limited resourcesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;are more exposed to the prospective desertification of this region. The Southeast Region is highly probable to face the parallel effects of higher temperatures and a decrease in precipitation. As it is the most

Figure 4 - City and population density in the LAC region REGIONAL

populated, most urbanised part of the country, with the highest industrial and agricultural output, these changes are likely to threaten the livelihood of millions of people. Finally, population density in northern Mexico is lower, but almost 75% of the country’s grazing land is located there,121 so the complementary result of higher temperatures and a decrease in precipitation can seriously affect local private ranchers. It has already been pointed out that another change of high confidence level, the receding of glaciers, takes place along the lines of the Andes. Figure 4 shows that main urban centres and densely populated areas are situated around the mountain range; so, locals’ water supply is expected to shrink, especially during droughts that are also projected to occur in a higher number over the next decades. The disappearance of glaciers can affect big cities (e.g. glaciers contribute to 15% of La Paz’s water resources at an annual scale,122 and it is also important for energy generation),123 but because of the shrinking of surface run-off used in irrigation, private farmers with low adaptation capacity are in particular peril. Figure 4 also shows that in Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, but also in inland Brazil (or else in the so-called La Plata basin), population density increases around the Uruguay, Paraguay, and Paraná rivers. Thus, a positive change in the flow of these rivers as a result of the massive amount of water pouring down on the deforested basin around the rainy season and the resulting floods as well as the ensuing decrease in food production and energy generation are going to do harm to these densely populated areas. The neighbourhood of Buenos Aires, where the Paraná and the Uruguay meet, is at an especially critical position. Figure 4 reveals yet another distinctive feature of the region: the vast majority of South Americans lives on the rims, near to the Atlantic or the Pacific Ocean. Thus, sea level rise can affect the lives of a substantial number of people—especially, because this phenomenon has the highest potential to induce definitive displacement. Although the vast majority of territories is above the projected sea levels, there are a few islands in the Caribbean that might be threatened with extinction. However, a 82

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Figure 5 - Sea level rise and exposure levels for population projected to 2090 according to different scenarios

brief look at Figure 5 evinces that these are not the zones where sea level rise can possibly have the greatest population impact; in this respect, again, chiefly the big coastal megapolises and megalopolises (i.e. chains of metropolitan areas) of South America—and especially those of the Atlantic, such as Greater Buenos Aires or the Expanded Metropolitan Complex of São Paulo— are in the most serious situation. Finally, merging Figure 4 with Figure 1a-b or Figure 2 makes it clear that in the coming decades, the littoral of Central America and the Caribbean is expected to stay the most hurricane-hit area of the region. MIGRATORY PATTERNS: DETERMINANTS AND/OR SUBJECTS TO CHANGE Having examined the above two factors—climate changes and demography—that may have the most important impact on future large-scale climate migration, there is yet another aspect to consider. Namely, the human factor, i.e. what kind of migration patterns exist in the region and to what degree locals can—or are inclined to—adapt to the deterioration of their living conditions. This is

especially important as most experts agree that in the region, actually, climate change only intensifies present trends and contributes to other factors, but it is never a primus motor in itself, except for unmitigated natural disasters. A general feature of regional migratory trends is that they have a more local than interstate/ intercountry character, and that people move from the countryside towards huge urban centres— this also shows that income and employment unbalances bear upon migration patterns in several cases. This movement can happen either in a permanent or in a temporary manner: The former is more typical when people seek better living conditions elsewhere—one of the most emblematic examples is the Brazilian North-East, a region with a high concentration of poor families and weak economic structure, where there is a long tradition of cyclical outflow of people. Between 1960 and 1980, some 3.4 million people flowed out of the region, mainly to the economically more robust southern parts of the country.124 The latter is more usual when local farmers strive to diversify their incomes, and therefore commute to cities

Figure 6 - International emigration in the Americas (territory size shows the number of international emigrants originating there) REGIONAL

for work—or in the aftermath of disasters such as hurricanes, when people want to get home as fast as they can once the tragedy is over. In the first case, harsh climatic conditions can intensify and increase the outflow, whereas in the second, they can turn temporary choices permanent. However, it is also worth mentioning that in all the above cases, migration traditionally belongs to the locals’ adaptation strategies, while there are more isolated communities where people have no inclination to leave their neighbourhood—partly because they have no existing patterns to follow and partly being bound by tradition or their livelihood—so, they need to get through difficulties where they are. It is still open to doubt whether and to what degree climate change can induce migration in places like this. As mentioned above, the scale of international migration is lower in the region, and Figure 6 demonstrates quite convincingly that it is also asymmetrical, being more relevant to the north of the region, especially Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, certainly by reason of their proximity to the United States border. Nevertheless, migration is just one of several other adaptation strategies, and it fits into a complex matrix of political, social, and economic components. For example, one of the most severe problems in the region is unequal land tenure. This is an issue that ensues from the age of early colonisation, when local people were forced to smaller and less fertile lands, and the archetypes of today’s latifundia emerged.125 If the state does not contribute to mitigating these problems, local farmers’ adaptation capacity may break under unfavourable circumstances, and they might choose to move on. Likewise, if less effective states are not instrumental in helping disaster-hit places and persons or putting a bridle on crime and rampant unemployment, which are not uncommon for many regional countries, people might easier turn to migration as a solution. If we look at state actors outside the region, Figure 6 also makes it relatively evident that the future (pro- or anti-migratory, or neutral) attitude of the United States carries some weight in shaping climate migration patterns, too. 84

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While local migration homes in on megapolises, many poor people seeking a better life there cannot find a proper place to live; more than 30% of present-day urban population lives in shanty towns or slums,126 and a significant part of new urban expansion occurs in areas highly exposed to environmental hazards. Consequently, even today, slum-dwellers have to face an elevated risk of floods, landslides, water scarcity, and other climate-related plagues; in the future, however, these hardships might grow even more intense and are likely to be supplemented by the consequences of sea level rise because as we have seen, big urban centres are usually located on the seashore. As a consequence, some experts predict present trends can undergo a slight change and climate-ridden people from the countryside and from large metropolises might start to flow towards smaller and medium-sized settlements. FINAL THOUGHTS In the foregoing paragraphs, we have tried to rough out some of the foremost factors that can help grasp how climate can impact future population movements in the region. We also ventured to demonstrate that effects and consequences are not necessarily as evident as one may assume it first, for climate is only one component of a complex and multi-layered mechanism that might eventually impel people to leave their communities—which is almost invariably a very tough choice, especially, if there are no patterns that can be followed or might show its viability. Thus, more doubts stay moot than get settled: Future climate—or rather climate-related—migration and its extent will not only depend on changes in the environment but also on questions like “How much stress can the usually poor locals absorb?” “To whom is migration available as a solution?” “Is there any state intention to counter the mal-effects of change, and can weak local governments succeed in it?” and above all, but not independently from the earlier, “Is it necessary that these changes make people move?”

WHOSE (ENVIRONMENTAL) DEBT? Interview with Csaba Kőrösi, Head of the Directorate for Environmental Sustainability at the Office of the President of the Republic of Hungary

2015 was the year of important decisions in terms of how the world would deal with the issue of climate change. You were a member of UN’s Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) and achieved considerable success in the relevant diplomatic processes. When setting these Sustainable Development Goals, how and in what ways was the problem of climate change taken into consideration? It was a tough matter. It was obvious to all of us that climate change is one of the most serious problems influencing our future, but it was still very difficult to achieve that determined actions against climate change should become an integral part of the SDG Programme. First of all, it is worth explaining the logic of the framework of the SDGs. When speaking of the SDGs, these shall be interpreted as a global vision outlining where and how we would like to see our world and ourselves in 2030. If this vision is compared to the present situation, it seems to be rather obvious that a decisive change must be achieved. The SDGs were set to introduce the steps of this decisive change detailed in the 17 global fields thus determining the goals to reach. Anyhow, why was it so difficult to incorporate the issue of making determined actions against climate change into this framework? Partly, because there were parallel

negotiations: while the world was discussing how to set up the SDGs, preparations were being made for the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP) in Paris at another forum on climate protection. There was a (quite understandable) logical concern of not to pre-empt the COP’s results in advance. The second reason why having the SDG on climate acknowledged ended up being so difficult was the fact that getting ready for and preventing the effects of man-made climate change hurt a lot of economic interests; furthermore, these measures would put certain countries, communities, and companies into a difficult situation, therefore they were not likely to easily give up their present positions. The third reason is that climate negotiations have had and continue having an ambiguous political heritage: for a very long period of time, parties have clearly been thinking in terms of a northern-southern dichotomy during the consultations. In such a context, the most difficult question is always to determine who is responsible for the actual situation and to what extent; who can obtain any release from certain acts in the past or from acts likely to be done in the future and to what extent. Who should pay, how much and to whom? Issues like these can easily embitter negotiations; if they are thoroughly examined, it does seem as if we opened Pandora’s box. No

Ambassador Csaba Kőrösi is head of the Directorate for Environmental Sustainability at the Office of the President of Hungary. In his previous capacity, as Permanent Representative of Hungary to the United Nations (New York), he co-chaired the international negotiations on Sustainable Development Goals. The SDGs mark the key objectives of paradigm change in global development for the next 15 years, agreed upon at the 2015 September Summit. For his work, he has been decorated by the 2014 Elizabeth Haub Award for Environmental Diplomacy.

The interview was conducted by Cecília Varsányi. REGIONAL

wonder that Goal 13 of the SDG system (“take urgent action to combat climate change”) was only accepted at the fourth try. It is extremely rare that the leaders of a negotiation make a fourth try despite having been rejected by the participants three times. As a rule, these initiatives are normally abandoned upon the second refusal. However, we considered it useless talking about any visions without integrating one of the most serious risk factors into the system at least as a framework. It meant to provide a shell for the goal, and the actual content was to be determined by the Climate Change Conference. You mentioned how difficult it was to set up these frameworks, which is quite understandable since climate change affects each country to a different extent. How do you think climate change becomes everyone’s problem? Our planet has only one atmosphere. It cannot be divided between continents or along the boundaries. It can be asserted that nobody questioned this during the negotiations: the atmosphere and its changes, that is to say, the climate, belong among the global common goods. It is much more global in its nature than any other natural resource. Any local impacts on climate immediately become part of the global space: this can only be denied if one deliberately wants to turn away form the facts, because he/she is guided by other interests. There is no country unaffected by this change, which is accelerating. It is important, however, that the more vulnerable societies are affected to a much greater extent than the wealthier, better prepared countries. On the other hand, significant changes taking place in the more vulnerable societies make their influence felt at long geographical distances—partly through the global value chain, partly through, heaven forbid, mass migration: it spills over not only into neighbouring countries but other continents as well. During a long series of negotiations, this is pretty difficult to make understood, especially when different countries are driven by differing interests. So some emotional points were needed to shake-up the negotiating parties. 86

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How could a sustainable development trajectory be interpreted either for the above-mentioned more vulnerable, less developed countries or the more developed and more prepared countries? What possibilities could they have to manage environmental impacts? First, let’s see what exactly a sustainable development trajectory means since it is not typically the problem of vulnerable countries and normally does not belong to their exclusive tasks. Sustainable development means that decisions made in the present do not deprive communities, countries or future generations of the possibility of maintaining an adequate quality of life. When planning and managing such development, short- and long-term decisions must be made by incorporating all the social, economic, and environmental considerations. In other words, this is a path of development where we try and keep the development of human, social, environmental, built—and where applicable, of course, financial—capital in balance. So, none of these four capitals can be neglected; meanwhile, each can temporarily be converted into any other. If any of them is persistently neglected, catastrophic consequences could occur. But the content of sustainable development— or else the things that actually must be done in a certain society—is always a country- and society-specific issue. The SDGs only outline the vision, but the means of how to get there differ by countries and communities. It cannot be denied, though, that for the richer societies with stronger resilience, there are more options to choose from. It is because they possess bigger reserves and possibly wider knowledge so they have the capability of “escaping forward.” For example, they can count on convertible financial capital and proper technologies. Still, I must add here that high incomes do not necessarily guarantee longterm and sustainable development in a country. It is enough to look at one-sector-heavy economies specialised in exploiting one particular kind of resource. The examples are countless in history: if the circumstances change or the given basic resource of the one-crop economy depletes, these societies typically collapse.

Environmental migration is a trendy notion— still it is widely argued whether there is such a migratory phenomenon where the root cause is environment itself. On the other hand, environmental factors are almost always present in the different kinds of migration. How useful do you think it is to talk about “environmental migration” as a theoretical frame? It is known and understood that environmental effects are making their influence felt in every society—what is more, they are gaining an everincreasing influence on the behaviour of societies. We should understand that these effects do not act independently in an ‟absolute” way, but magnify the risk factors already existing in a society. They can magnify these risk factors to the very extent where given community is no longer capable of managing its own problems, and the economic, political, and conflict-managing institutional systems all become overburdened. And if this institutional system collapses, the conviction that it is impossible to get on within the current circumstances with the given population and territory can very quickly surface and spread within a society. You mentioned environmental migration. Those who are often called environmental migrants do not consider themselves as such—neither the ones arriving through the Mediterranean Sea, nor those who come through the Balkan route. Not even if in many cases it is the serious environmental degradation that escalated a conflict from which these migrants are fleeing. These cases can be interpreted best as a chain of events in the history of the affected societies: for example, the recession of agricultural production in a basically agrarian society is a key issue. The death of livestock, the spreading of diseases, the outbreak of conflicts or the fading of hope for better living conditions all show towards migration. The environmental considerations also contribute to it by accelerating the process, but by no means exclusively. As for the environmental factors, for most cases there can be solutions. They are not all-encompassing nor perfect for sure, but if the natural resources were exploited with different technologies and infrastructures, and at the same time, the institutional and legal framework could be improved as well, it is quite likely that the carrying

capacity of given communities would show a rather different picture. It is all the more important because we perceive and know that different societies give different responses to more or less similar environmental impacts and risk factors. Let me give you a specific example: in Syria, a threeyears drought decisively contributed to the collapse of the society. The same climatic conditions in neighbouring Jordan did not lead to social collapse; on the contrary, Jordan accepted 1 million refugees without breaking down. It is staggering, and it is hardly able to manage the situation, but it can be seen that it reacts to the same challenge in a different way. One may claim that one of the basic conditions of proper living standards is the availability of cheap energy and industrialisation. How could more developed countries help the less developed in realising these? Is it correct to say that these investments can have any population-retaining effect up to a certain level? Obviously, it is a very complex question… Shortly speaking, yes, they can. However, it is a much more complex question indeed. Let me recall the earlier point of how the more developed countries can help the least developed ones, or what responsibility they may assume themselves. Your question is based on the— well-understandable—dichotomy on which the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were established. It is also understandable that this is such a division that can easily lead to the formation of political groups; yet, the core of maintaining sustainable development is not the northern– southern division. In other words, the core of a sustainable development transformation is not how developed countries will solve the problems of the less or the least developed countries. Not least, because the “North,” or else, the developed world has at least as many problems to be solved as the “South” does. Quite a lot of developed countries will have to face more challenges in terms of accumulating environmental debt. So, the claim that we should act quickly and effectively is true for both parties. Returning to the relationship between migration and external help, I suggest that we take a closer REGIONAL

look at the push and pull factors. Now, I would prefer to elaborate on the push factors: what factors are capable of pushing a bigger crowd out of a country? We should examine whether rapid population growth can be brought in line with the growth of the sustaining capacity of a given society. If these two factors are not synchronous, with population growth being considerably bigger than that of the supporting capacity, it will obviously lead to ever-growing tensions in the society. We also must take it into consideration whether managing the natural resources can be brought in line with the needs and development of the society. Speaking of migration, it is extremely important whether the prospects for growth can be sustained in the long run. In any society there must be a vision feeding the hope of “living better next year than last year” or “my children live better than I did.” The lack of such a vision would normally further increase the push factors. It is also very important what conflict management abilities of a given society are, both in an institutional and in a cultural sense. If these are not strong enough or it is impossible to make them stronger, it is highly likely that the given society will sooner or later emit a huge migration wave. These problems are very difficult to solve from outside. The given community should always take a coordinating role in managing external supports. Actually, this logic of every country taking responsibility for its own development has been included in the Agenda 2030 and in the Paris Agreement, too. Meanwhile, it is still present in our way of thinking that my development is going to be solved by someone else. Globally, the so-called official development aid (ODA), which basically flows from north to south, amounts to USD 140 billion a year. This is approximately 1% of the total north–south capital flows. Besides this USD 140 billion, there are some other items worth mentioning: at the moment, an additional USD 70 billion a year is activated in the form of various philanthropic activities. This already runs to half of the ODA and increases faster than ODA. The foreign investments are still dominantly “from north to south” and imply cash flow of USD 330-350 billion per annum. The remittances, which also flow mainly from north to south, mean a further USD 400 billion a year. On the other hand, illegal cash flow and illegal trade take more than 88

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USD 400 billion, or sometimes even USD 500 billion each year from south to north. So, if we wanted to speak about the effects of the aid, we should probably keep the whole cash flow under control, which is far from being the case at the moment. Speaking of aid-based cooperation, preventive programmes can only be effective if they can focus on the major risk factors; what is more, always in a systemic manner. In regions where migration risks can clearly be seen, investments, resource management, job creation, the strengthening of the institutional structure and increasing the incomegeneration capacity are particularly important. To what extent are local governments interested in managing these problems? Do they act as partners? Can they act as partners at all? And what are their interests anyway? The type of cooperation that can be established with a given country—a cooperation more or less effective in driving the country onto the path of sustainable development—is always country- and region-specific. So, there is no lapis philosophorum to solve everyone’s problems in the same way. Let me tell you an example of a tendency from the field of water management. If we do not manage water sustainably, we will have to face really serious problems. According to the surveys of World Bank Group, there will be a sharp decrease in the GDP of the Sahel, Near East, Central Asia, and the Far East till 2050 due to inadequate water management: the World Bank reports a fallback between 7 and 14 percent in GDP if the efficiency of water management is not improved in these regions. Let me change the topic a bit. What is your opinion: isn’t the technocratic language of the international sustainability regime and lobby groups alienating people form the actual protection of the environment? It is a very relevant question. The consumer behaviour in general, or else, my behaviour as a consumer and a citizen, has more than 50% of influence on chances of a society to achieve successful transition towards sustainability. Therefore, if one can only hear some technocratic jargon, it will not have any influence. But today I can sense that an international campaign of

unprecedented dimensions has been unfolding partly on the interpretation of sustainability and partly on how to introduce SDGs, and partly on the contents of the transformation the world and each and every country aspire to achieve. It is just like life itself. Our existence has an impact on nature, and vice versa. Each society understands and feels it in its own way. The question is how a society can integrate it into its economic operations. Objectively speaking, in case of the poorer countries, the “sustainable development transition” means the promise of rise. Conversely, in case of the more developed countries, it often appears as an element of “long term comfort.” You mentioned that basically no one considers themselves as environmental migrants; still, this concept has been gaining more and more ground in international legislation. What possible advantages and disadvantages do you think there are if this phenomenon is interpreted as a separate legal category in the future? We should be very prudent before introducing this concept. First of all, its content has not been defined and it is very easy to arrive at oversimplified definitions. We have talked about the fact that mass migration is a result of a multifaceted process. Environmental factors amplify the risk factors and increase the inclination to migration in a vulnerable community. Yet, the decision to migrate—whether personal or communal—is always a complex one. It can be ascribed to multiple reasons, rather than to one or two environmental factors. I think we should avoid giving excuse from due diligence to anyone by introducing the concept of “environmental migrant.”. Prevention and supporting sustainable development is not an option but an obligation for all of us. It is also against the introduction of this concept that very similar environmental effects can lead to very different consequences in different societies. There are places where these cause serious crises, while elsewhere a given society chooses to “escape forward” by accelerating its technological development. Where it is reasonable to associate the notion of “migrant” with environmental factors is a natural disaster with well definable spatial and temporal dimensions,

such as a volcanic eruption, a tsunami or a flood. These, however, do not typically result in persisting migration waves. Apart from a very few exceptions, these communities normally settle back when the root cause ceases to exist. So, it is easy but not reasonable to extend the notion of “refugee” based on the deteriorating environmental conditions, thus making the otherwise very complex social issues over-simplified. Let us suppose that in 2030 mankind declares that it has achieved all goals of sustainable development. In this case, what migration processes will Europe have to face? The gap to achieving SDGs related to natural resources is actually growing. We are getting closer and closer to the danger zone, which definitely strengthens the push factors of migration. However, it is never advisable to separate judgement on migration from social and economic acts. On the other hand, the role of climate change as a risk factor cannot be denied. It can clearly be seen that there are and will be tipping points. Therefore, it is very important not to think linearly. These tipping points—be it an escalating climatic change or a water crisis— can accelerate the social conflicts up to such a “speed” that the systems simply cannot deal with. Let me recall some challenges that are most likely to happen because of climate change. For example, some small island states will surely disappear. Momentarily, we have neither legal nor ethical solutions as to how we will and can handle their rights for sovereignty in the future. If an island state disappears, what would happen to its debts and outstandings, its fishing rights on its territorial waters, mining rights, its other quotas, and in general, its material assets? What would happen to its voting rights in the international organisations? How would we handle the universal responsibility of everybody being involved in the changes that have occurred? Who should bear the responsibility for these damages suffered, and in what ways? These are very critical issues, even if we are speaking of countries with relatively small territory and population. At the moment, the international law is helpless in answering these questions. REGIONAL

ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE

The Antall József Knowledge Centre (AJKC), during its nine years of existence, has organised a variety of events targeting Hungarian students enrolled in higher education, as well as domestic and international professional audiences. The Knowledge Centre is named after József Antall (1932–1993), Hungarian teacher, educator, librarian, historian, and statesman, who served as the first democratically elected Prime Minister of Hungary after the fall of communism (from 23 May 1990 to his death on 12 December 1993). The main objectives of the Knowledge Centre, in line with the Antall philosophy, are talent management and providing students and young professionals with wide-ranging practical knowledge through various events. The Knowledge Centre is a Budapest-based think tank researching topics of national, regional, and international relevance such as the Visegrad Cooperation, the future global role of the US, China, and the Middle East, security policy, sustainable development as well as technological and social innovation. Our institute is structured into three international offices—dealing with the EU and the V4, the USA, and Asia and Africa—three thematic offices—

focusing on security policy, sustainable development, and talent management—two regional offices in Pécs and Győr as well as the Brussels Office, all of which are working toward strengthening institutional relations both at the national and international level, developing scholarship and internship programmes, and boosting professional cooperation via international conferences, workshops, and event series. The publishing activities of AJKC involve releasing professional publications, scientific works on political and social sciences (with special regard to security policy and international relations), as well as university textbooks. In our series of autobiographies, prominent personalities of the Cold War period, including Ronald Reagan, George Bush, Margaret Thatcher, and Helmut Kohl recount crucial years and decisions still affecting our lives. Reflecting on events of political, social, and economic significance in the 21st century, the professional publications series of the Knowledge Centre is composed of works that observe the latest developments of international relations and geopolitics, main the history of politics, economics, and psychology.

The think.BDPST conference is the most ambitious prfessional event of AJKC. The main aim of the project focusing on innovation, new technologies, and regional development is to put Hungary on the map of large-scale regional conferences, such as GLOBSEC, the Krynica Economic Forum, and the Prague European Summit, by organising the most significant innovation forum in the region, thereby facilitating a dialogue between the representatives of the economic, governmental, and scientific spheres. The event enjoys the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary and the International Visegrad Fund. In addition to innovation, the Knowledge Centre puts special emphasis on sustainable development. During the four instalments of the SUSCO Budapest conference series, many topics were examined, including sustainable development in general and the sustainable development goals (SDGs) developed by the United Nations, such as sustainable cities and communities, clean water and sanitation, or affordable and clean energy. This year’s instalment focuses on the long-disputed phenomenon of

environmental migration, reflecting upon the Sustainable Development Goal 13. In 2018, the Knowledge Centre organised the sixth Antall József Summer School. Every year, 30-35 students from more than 20 countries enrolled in different MA and PhD programmes participate in a two-week event, the aim of which is to strengthen and render the Visegrad Cooperation more visible in the field of education. The Antall József Summer School provides those interested in Central European studies with the opportunity to deepen their knowledge of the V4 region and Hungary. The objectives of the Knowledge Centre include talent management and the establishment of a higher education network. For these purposes, AJKC organises the annual Danube Regatta. The number of participating universities has grown year after year since its inception: in 2018, on the occasion of the Hungarian Presidency of the Visegrad Group, we welcomed teams from the Visegrad Countries again, who this time not only competed in rowing and dragon boat races but in other sports events as well. Other aims of the Regatta include encouraging a diverse use of the Danube and improving the image of Hungary.

FUTURE EVENTS

Foreign and Security Policy Conference Budapest 2018—Geopolitics Matter:

The Future of the Transatlantic Alliance

think.BDPST—Connect to the Future Spring 2019

Budapest, 4 December 2018

The multilayered relationship between global and great

Organised by the AJKC, think.BDPST is a strategic

over the past one hundred years. The “changing world

regional development. Its past speakers include Lord

powers has been changing at an unprecedented pace order” has become a widely discussed theme within

the prevailing political discourse, and thus needs to

be addressed at the highest academic levels. Our conference will explore the role of the United States and

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the global scene, by fostering a sharing of ideas between distinguished American scholars of transatlantic affairs and geopolitics. The second panel will discuss the

state of world economy, the future of multilateral trade agreements, and more broadly, the role of geoeconomics,

representing the issue’s pivotal role in the transatlantic

alliance. On our third panel, building on the former’s conclusions on the current state of the world order and

the transatlantic alliance in it, the speakers will outline the

conference focusing on perspectives of innovation and David Willetts, Board Member of the UK Research and Innovation; George Pataki, Former Governor of NYS; George Friedman, geopolitical forecaster; Dr Edmund Stoiber, Former Prime Minister of the State of Bavaria;

Sheik Dr Mohammad Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah, Former Deputy Prime Minister of Kuwait; Rabbi Professor Daniel

Hershkowitz, Former Minister of Science and Technology of Israel; HE Chang Whan Ma, Deputy Minister for

Planning and Coordination at the Ministry of Science and

ICT of the Republic of Korea; Robert-Jan Smits, Director

General for Research and Innovation at the EC; Dr Jacob

Cohen, Chief Scientist at NASA Ames, and HE Péter Szijjártó, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary. The conference has two side events, the Young

role of geopolitics in the 21st century. While technology is

Leaders’ Forum and the Start-up Expo. The Young

that geopolitics will not be less relevant but even more

soon to become important actors in the field of innovation

also advancing at an unprecedented rate, we propose

complex and more deeply interactive with other societal factors. We undertake the academic inquiry of the issue

at hand with the firm belief that understanding the global geopolitical dynamics of the past, present, and future is key to developing the most appropriate national strategies for the countries of Central Europe and the NATO as a whole.

ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE

Leaders’ Forum features outstanding young professionals and R&D. YLF is the only forum in Central Europe that

gathers young professionals from this field. Start-up

Expo is an exhibition where innovative enterprises and innovators have the opportunity to meet and share ideas, while promoting their products in front of an international audience.

NEW RELEASES

Robert M Gates: A Passion for Leadership

Lee Kuan Yew: From Third World to First

Real leadership is a rare commodity, states Robert M Gates, and we are prone to believe him, as he makes this statement after spending 50 years in public service. As Secretary of Defence, Director of the CIA, President of a university in Texas, and board member of various corporations, he himself was an architect of institutional systems in the public and private sectors. In this book, he shares his experience on leadership, primarily, he hopes, with young people interested in public service who aim to better the lives of their fellow citizens. The book by Gates is neither a manual on management-counselling, nor an avenue for leaking US governmental secrets—it rather provides a key to how to operate an institute successfully: beyond the personal capabilities of a leader, what conditions apply to continuously renew a bureaucratic organisation reflecting on inner and outer demands and pressure; what kind of visions, tactics, and strategies are needed to improve the quality of service. May our “client” be the US president, a university student, or a pensioner waiting for a health insurance card.

Born in the former British colony, Lee Kuan Yew (1923–2015) is the founder of Singapore. When the Japanese occupied the country during World War II, he abandoned his studies at the National University of Singapore, and continued in England after the war, ultimately attending Cambridge University. Upon returning home, he first practised law, then became a politician. In 1959, he was elected prime minister of the country, a position which he held until 1990. After that, he attained a honorary position in government up until his death It is due to Lee Kuan Yew’s efforts that Singapore is today a global centre for trade and finance. After its separation from Malaysia, the Asian city-state went through an incredible development: GDP per capita multiplied, it became a city of order and security, it is among the least corrupt countries, and there is rule of law and separation of power. The young state has for decades been considered one of the most competitive countries of the world. The question is, however, whether it can preserve its place on the world stage after the death of its founding father.

ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE

NEW RELEASES

Péter Stepper (ed.): Central Europe and the Visegrad Cooperation

Daniel Yergin: The Quest

The first edition of the textbook on Central Europe and the Visegrad Cooperation presents a brief history of the regional partnership, the road to the EU accession of 2004, the Group’s role in contemporary European politics, as well as the internal dynamics and foreign relations of the V4 Group. We hope that students and experts who use this book will receive the necessary scientific background to recognise the importance of EastCentral European countries and their voice within the Euro-Atlantic community. In the last three decades, a number of international and regional alliances have been established, involving the countries of the region. Several formats were adapted, such as the pre-integration projects of CEFTA, CEI and the V4, reductionist cooperation formats such as the Weimar Triangle and Slavkov, issue-based initiatives focusing on transport networks such as TSI and 16+1, as well as partnerships focusing on defence such as the B9 and the CEDC. Among these, the V4 is the most well-known, a platform which, as we believe, is able to facilitate further cooperation, serves as the very core of Central European politics and contributes to the emerging relevance of this pivotal region in Europe.

Climate change, environmental concerns, receding resources, and the world’s ever-growing hunger for energy—how will all of these affect our future? This book by Pulitzer-prize winning author Daniel Yergin seeks an answer to this question. The Quest recounts the history of energy and all the factors that can fundamentally change energy’s place in the world, including political turmoil, military conflicts, a signifi cant change in global economy, the change in pricing and regulation, or technological breakthroughs. Although renewable and alternative resources are becoming more and more defining, it is still disconcerting that securing the world’s energy needs without crises and clashes is a seemingly impossible mission. Release Date: January/February 2019

ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE

OUR

TING

NTR

THO

Tamás Péter Baranyi, PhD Historian Head of Research Antall József Knowledge Centre

Any Way. Is it Environmental Migration, Anyway?

Mihály Kálóczy Environmental Manager, MA Project Manager

From Where to Where

Antall József Knowledge Centre

Cecília Varsányi Economist, MA Head of Office, Sustainable Development Office

Climate Scenarios. In the Scope: Water Cycle

Antall József Knowledge Centre

Alessandro D’Onofrio International Relations Expert, MA International Relations Manager Antall József Knowledge Centre

Zsuzsa Molnár International Relations Expert, MA International Relations Manager Antall József Knowledge Centre

Environmental Disasters, Migrations, and LargeScale Land Purchases—How Unruled Capitalism Forces Movements of People

Migration Trends in Africa—The Link between Migration and Environmental Change The Consequences of the Worsening Climate in Southern Africa—The 2016 El Niño and Its Aftermaths

OUR

THO

International Relations Manager Antall József Knowledge Centre

Bianka Restás International Relations Expert, MA

TING

NTR

Great Green Wall Initiative for the Sahara and the Sahel—A Development Project to Discourage Future African Migration

Zsolt Csepregi International Relations Expert, MA International Relations Coordinator, Head of Office, Security Policy Office

A Case of Reverse Environmental Migration— Populating the Israeli Negev Desert

Antall József Knowledge Centre

Tamás Kozma International Relations Expert, MA PhD Student Head of Office, Asian and African Relations Office

Yemen—A Multifaceted Crisis on the Arabian Peninsula

Antall József Knowledge Centre

Diana Wiszt American Studies, MA International Relations Coordinator Antall József Knowledge Centre

Tomorrow’s Atlantis The USA of the 21st Century—The Era of “Megadroughts,” “Megafires,” and “100-Year Storms”

Zsombor Szabolcs Pál Historian, PhD Candidate Researcher Antall József Knowledge Centre

Climatic Migration in Latin America and the Caribbean—A Potential Adaptation Strategy?

ENDNOTES

15 Elizabeth Ferris: A Complex Constellation: Displacement, Climate Change and Arctic Peoples. Brookings-LSE, Project on Internal Displacement. 30 January 2013. <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/ uploads/2016/06/30-arctic-ferris-paper.pdf > Accessed: 19 June 2018. 16 Kenneth R. Weiss: The Making of a Climate Refugee. Foreign Policy. 28 January 2015. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/28/the-making-of-a-

Any Way. Is it Environmental Migration, Anyway?

climate-refugee-kiribati-tarawa-teitiota/ > Accessed: 19 June 2018.

1 Eugene Piguet—Antoine Pécoud—Paul de Guchteneire: Migration and Climate Change: An Overview. Refugee Survey Quarterly. 2011/3. 1–2. 2 Idem, 3–7.

From Where to Where

3 Patrick Manning: Migration in Human History. In: The Cambridge World

17 Richard B. Alley [et al.]: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change

History. Vol.1: Introducing World History, to 10,000 BCE, edited by David

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Christian, 277–310. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015.

the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

282–289.

Change, edited by Susan Solomon [et al.], 1–18. Cambridge University

4 Anatoly M. Khazanov: Pastoral nomadic migrations and conquests. In:

Press, Cambridge, 2007. 12–17.

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18 Migration, Climate Change and the Environment. A Complex Nexus.

Conflict, 500 CE–1500 CE, edited by Benjamin Kedar—Merry Wiesner-

International Organization for Migration. <https://www.iom.int/complex-

Hanks, 359–382. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 359–363.

nexus > Accessed: 9 August 2018.

5 Piguet—Pécoud—Guchteneire, 16–18.

19 Alfons P.M. Baede: Annex II. In: Climate Change 2007. Synthesis Report,

6 Olivia Dun—François Gemenne: Defining ‘environmental migration’.

edited by Rajendra K. Pachauri [et al.], 76–103. IPCC, Geneva, 2007. 78.

Forced Migration Review. 2008/October. 10–11.

20 Great Oxidation Event: More oxygen through multicellularity.

7 Piguet—Pécoud—Guchteneire, 6–14.

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21 Gary Smith: How Does Earth Work?: Physical Geology and the Process

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22 Michael Schirber: Ice Ages Blamed on Tilted Earth. LiveScience.

10 Roland Dannreuther: Nemzetközi biztonság. Antall József Tudásközpont,

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Budapest, 2016. 221–222.

tilted-earth.html > Accessed: 10 August 2018.

11 Moses Jackson: Why Do People Move? Research on

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Environmental Migration Coming of Age. Wilson Center, New Security

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<https://www.pik-potsdam.de/news/press-releases/human-made-climate-

people-move-research-environmental-migration-coming-age/ >

change-suppresses-the-next-ice-age > Accessed: 10 August 2018.

Accessed: 8 June 2018.

24 Stephanie Paige Ogburn: Ice-Free Arctic in Pliocene, Last Time CO2

12 Gábor Búr—István Taróssy: Az afrikai vándorlás hátteréről és jellemzőiről.

Levels above 400 PPM. Scientific American. 10 May 2013.

In: Új népvándorlás. Migráció a 21. században Afrika és Európa között,

<https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ice-free-arctic-in-pliocene-

edited by István Taróssy—Viktor Glied—Dávid Keserű, 99–114. Publikon

last-time-co2-levels-above-400ppm/ > Accessed: 10 August 2018.

Kiadó, Pécs, 2011. 102.

25 Maureen E. Raymo [et al.]: Departures from eustasy in Pliocene sea-level

13 Reinhilde Sotiria König—Marina de Regt: Family dynamics in

records. Nature Geoscience. 2011/4. 328–332.

transnational African migration to Europe: an introduction. African and Black

26 A.P. Ballantyne: Significantly warmer Arctic surface temperatures during

Diaspora: An International Journal. 2010/January. 1–15.

the Pliocene indicated by multiple independent proxies. Geology.

14 Stijn Neuteleers: Environmental Refugees. A Misleading Notion for a

2010/June. 603–606.

Genuine Problem. Ethical Perspectives. 2011/June. 229–248. or Ellen

27 Humans causing climate to change 170 times faster than natural

Bechtel: How We Talk About “Climate Refugees” and Why It’s Complicated.

forces. The Guardian. 12 February 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/

HuffPost. 13 May 13 2014. <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ellen-bechtel/

environment/2017/feb/12/humans-causing-climate-to-change-170-times-

how-we-talk-about-climate_b_4958311.html?guccounter=1 > Accessed:

faster-than-natural-forces > Accessed: 10 August 2018.

9 August 2018.

28 Thomas F. Stocker [et al.], eds.: Climate Change 2013. The Physical

41 Risk levels are not necessarily comparable, especially across regions.

Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment

42 Groundwater bodies (deep aquifers) can be considered as non-

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renewable water resources as they have a negligible rate of recharge on

University Press, Cambridge, 2013.

the human time-scale.

29 Richard B. Alley: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2007.

43 Ellen Gray: Drought in eastern Mediterranean worst of past 900 years.

The Physical Science Basis. Working Paper Group I Contribution to the

NASA Global Climate Change, Vital Signs of the Planet. 29 February 2016.

Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

<https://climate.nasa.gov/news/2408/drought-in-eastern-mediterranean-

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worst-of-past-900-years/ > Accessed: 9 August 2018.

Press, Cambridge, 2007. 2–5.

44 Nathaniel L Bindoff [et al.]: Observations: Oceanic Climate Change

30 Climate Change 2014. Synthesis Report. Summary for Policymakers.

and Sea Level. In: Climate Change 2007. The Physical Science Basis.

International Panel on Climate Change.<https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/

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The Consequences of the Worsening Climate in Southern

Figure 1 (Desalination): AJTK, source: Central Bureau of Statistics,

Africa—The 2016 El Niño and its Aftermaths

State of Israel; Agriculture in Israel: The Industry Account Price

A map of Southern Africa: Shutterstock

Indices of Output and Input 2015–2016. 30 November 2017. http://

Southern Africa is globally among the areas most exposed to

www.cbs.gov.il/www/publications17/haklaut16_1695/pdf/t12.pdf

desertification and land degradation:

Beersheba: Shutterstock

https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail/national/nedc/training/

Figure 2 (Population of Beersheba): AJTK, sources: (1) Hillel

soil/?cid=nrcs142p2_054003, Soil map and soil climate map, USDA-

Fendel: Be’er Sheva to Jump from 7th to 3rd-Largest Israeli City.

NRCS, Soil Science Division, World Soil Resources, Washington D.C.

Arutz Sheva. 10 July 2015. https://www.israelnationalnews.com/

Change in potential cereal output, 2080: https://www.flickr.com/

News/News.aspx/201505. (2) Berman Mildred: The Evolution

photos/nordpil/7073250535, author: Hugo Ahlenius, licence:

of Beer Sheva as an Urban Center. Annals of the American

CC BY 2.0

Geographers. 1965/June. 308–326. (3) Nufar Avni—Nurit Alfasi—

Water scarcity in Southern Africa and in other parts of the world:

Lisa Bornstein: City profile: Beersheba. Cities. 2016/April. 18–29.

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_Water_scarcity. PNG, author: Axelsaffran, licence: CC BY-SA 3.0

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Yemen—A Multifaceted Crisis on the Arabian Peninsula

Figure 6 (International emigaration in the Americas (territory

The map of Yemen: Shutterstock

size shows the number of international emigrants originating

Water scarcity is a worsening issue in Yemen: Shutterstock

there): http://archive.worldmapper.org/posters/worldmapper_

Troubled waters: The port of Djibouti in the Gulf of Aden: Shutterstock

map16_ver5.pdf © SASI Group (University of Sheffield) and Mark Newman (University of Michigan) subject to http://archive. worldmapper.org/copyright.html

Tomorrow’s Atlantis Photo 1: Shutterstock Photo 2: https://www.flickr.com/photos/350org/26302075039/in/

Whose (Environmental) Debt?—Interview with Csaba Kőrösi

album-72157689761669006/, author: 350.org, licence:

Office of the President of the Republic of Hungary, Press Department

CC BY-NC-SA 2.0

The USA of the 21st Century—The Era of “Megadroughts,” “Megafires” and “100-Year Storms” Thomas fire, California in December 2017: Shutterstock Aerial view of buildings along Miami Beach: Shutterstock

Climatic Migration in Latin America and the Caribbean— A Potential Adaptation Strategy? Figure 1 (Figures a-b show the most typical meteorological, while Figure c the most typical hydrological hazards): Figure 1a: https:// commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Retired_ Atlantic_hurricane_ tracks.png, source: NASA/National Hurricane Center; Figure 1b: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pacific_hurricane_ tracks_1980-2005.jpg, source: NASA/National Hurricane Center; Figure 1c: http://archive.worldmapper.org/posters/worldmapper_ map250_ver5.pdf, © SASI Group (University of Sheffield) and Mark Newman (University of Michigan) subject to http://archive. worldmapper.org/copyright.html Figure 2 (Summary of climate change patterns projected for 2100 in Latin America and the Caribbean): http://www.grida.no/resources/6145, author: Nieves López Izquierdo (Associate Consultant UNEP/GRID-Arendal) Figure 3 (Relative change in percent of the flows in South American rivers for the period 2041–2060 related to the average in the period from 1900 –1998): http://www.scielo.br/pdf/ea/v22n63/ en_v22n63a06.pdf, p. 88, subject to http://www.scielo.br/scielo. php?script=sci_serial&pid=0103-4014&lng=pt&nrm=iso Figure 4 (City and population density in the LAC region): http:// population.city/images/la.jpg, subject to http://population.city/terms Figure 5 (Sea level rise and exposure levels for population projected to 2090): https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ PMC4503776/pdf/pone.0133409.pdf, page 7. Authors: Borja G. Reguero—Iñigo J. Losada—Pedro Díaz-Simal—Fernando J. Méndez—Michael W. Beck, licence: CC BY 4.0

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NEXT ISSUE IN FOCUS: INDIA Based on the 2017 figures of the World Bank, India has been announced to be the world’s 5th economy, overtaking France. This country of extreme differences yet remarkable unity was chosen as the topic of the upcoming In Focus issue. India is a subject in Hungarian political discourse that is seriously underrepresented. This country weighs a lot on its own in international politics with a massive economic presence, a population of more than 1.3 billion, and a territory that is ranked 7th among all countries. Despite such indicators of absolute and relative importance, regional sway, and global soft power, India is still not known enough in our region. A reason for this perhaps is the diversity of the country which allows for no easy readings and interpretations, but geographical and cultural distance might also play a role. The AJKC has always been in the forefront of bringing the latest academic results to a broader audience in our region and always put an emphasis on topics that are important, yet not obvious. Now, casting light on the whole microcosm of ethnicities, heritages, races, and religions in a single federal state, as well as a broader, ancient culture and its economic and strategic considerations is the aim of In Focus: India. Don’t wait until India’s becoming the fourth largest economy.

FÓ KUSZ BAN India – Szemérmes nagyhatalom? 2018. 4. szám ingyenes kiadvány

Additional issues of In Focus are available on the webpage of the Knowledge Centre, www.ajtk.hu. Please kindly note that In Focus can be downloaded free of charge after registration.

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Antall József Knowledge Centre Address: 2 Czuczor Street, H-1093 Budapest Web: www.ajtk.hu Telephone: +36 20 310 8776 E-mail: ajtk@ajtk.hu

Publisher: Péter Antall, Director, AJKC Editor-in-Chief: Tamás Péter Baranyi Editor: Cecília Varsányi Co-editor: Zsombor Szabolcs Pál Translators: Csaba Antóni, Mónika Horváth Language Editor: Viktor Kaposi Proof-reader: Anna Ledó Layout: Gergely Kiss Graphic Design and Pre-press Preparation: Ivett Perlaky Printed and Bound: Prime Rate Kft. Managing Director: Dr Péter Tomcsányi

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