Explosion and Fire at Polythene No. 2 Plant, Wilton Works, Teesside

"The nozzle should be so contrived that in the event of a vehicle moving while the nozzle re:Uains in the fil.ling pipe, the flow of liquid will stop and the nozzle will be released from the delivery assembly before damage to the control valve, coupling, delivery hose or pump can occur". The facts of the matter are that the Home Office the Greater London Council and most Local Autho;ities have given th~ OPW latched nozzle their full approval in resl?ect ?f this and all of the required safety measures. Major 011 companies specify the OPW latched nozzle and seyeral thousand are in use, and very satisfactorily so, in this country. With incr~asing experience in using OPW latched nozzles, the circumstances which give rise to the necessity fo~ this Pi:trticular safety requirement are understood and ~e~ng av~1ded, but in the reducing number of cases where it is reqmred to come into force, OPW have a first-class safety record. Link-Hampson Ltd. G. K. M. SYMONS

STORAGE OF PETROLEUM SPIRIT AND DIESEL OIL IN A DOUBLE-COMPARTMENT TANK

A pr.oblem has arisen 01! .the adv!sabili~y _of allowing the sto1 age of petroleum spmt and diesel 011 m adjoining compartments of a multi-compartment underground storage tank. O~e possibility for consideration is that at some time in the life of the tank a leak will develop between the compartments. which would not be easy to detect from stock records with normal "wastage". This possibility is enhanced by the fact that a full pressure test on one side of the flat division plate may bend the plate and so weaken the weld at some future time. Should such a leak occur and petroleum spirit build up in the diesel oil, then this ~ould lead to a dangero.us build-up of petroleum vapour m the fuel tank of a vehicle or some other container. This vapour would be more dangerous as ib would be unsuspected, and m_ay cause a fire or explosion in the container or at the vehicle filler-pipe or in the engine. A similar position could arise with a delivery into the wrong compartment. A further c<;>nsideration is that with a double-compartment tank a licensee would be the more likely to switch pumps, and so ~ank compartments, from petrol to diesel or vice versa without notifying the Licensing Authority. Paragraph 2. l.l 5 of the Model Code refers specifically to "domestic burning oils" and l am wondering whether the same considerations should apply to diesel because of the above-mentioned unsuspected risk should a compartment leak occur.

Dudley C.B.C.

G. H. HARVEY

Explosion and Fire

at Polythene No. 2 Plant Wilton Works, Teesside

Prepared by H. Johnson, Chief Fire Officer, Teesside

A call was received at Brigade Control on Tuesday, 21st January, 1969, at 1952 hours indicating an explosion had occurred in the No. 2 Polythene Plant, I.C.I., Wilton. The initial attendance of three pumps, emergency tender and foam tender was sent on, followed by the Assistant Divisional Officer and Station Officer. The Chief Fire Officer and Deputy Chief Officer were informed and responded. Upon arrival at the incident the Assistant Divisional Officer in charge was faced with a building which had been severely damaged by explosion, numerous leaks of ethylene which was escaping from fractured pipe flanges and had been ignited and a report of persons trapped. The l.C.I. works fire brigade was in attendance and had a jet to work, other members in conjunction with uninjured plant personnel were assisting the injured and searching for casualties. The Assistant Divisional Officer reported 'a serious explosion, persons trapl?ed' ~n~ as part of Brigade standard procedure for serious mc1dents made pumps ten. Liaison was established with Plant management and works fire officer. The Assistant Divisional Officer was informed that isolation was being carried out and at this time two jets were got to work and teams organised to search the first floor in the compressor house and at ground level. The Divisional Officer arrived at 1959 hours and took command. As appliances arrived furtl!er jets we~e brought into use and crews directed in searchmg operat10ns. At 2012 hours the Chief Officer and Deputy Chief Officer arrived, the Chief Officer taking command and setting up control at the emergency tender. Jets w.ere then mad~ up to a total of nine and three ground momtors ~rought mto use for cooling and fire fighting purposes, part1culi:tr attention being given to local ethylene tanks, fractured hues and structural steel members. Searchincr continued and at approximately 2055 hours two bodies0 were recovered, the third being found at 2200 hours; all were found at first floor level. Fire damage was confined to local tured pipe lines and collectively was areas around fracminimal compared with the damage caused by the explosion. The whole of the structure, l 90ft. by 120ft. and approximately 50ft. high, including walls, floor and roof, was severely damaged by blast, varying in degrees from partial to complete collapse. The team effort shown by the Fire Brigade, works fire brigade, plant personnel and ambulance personnel was of the highest standard under what one can only describe as difficult and hazardous conditions. Once again the value of liaison and close co-operation with management proved to be of great assistance in the control of this incident. 53