AUSTRALIA IN SPACE
The 2020 Defence Strategic Update and Force Structure Plan highlighted the importance of Australia pursuing both enhanced space domain awareness, as well as moving towards developing effective space control capabilities that could ensure space access for the ADF but also counter threats to allies in orbit. degree than it has in the past. There are real opportunities for space in Australia’s defence diplomacy. The signing of the AUKUS agreement on 16th September 2021 opens up new opportunities for collaboration on critical and emerging technologies, and cooperation in space technology is a natural fit for activities to be undertaken under AUKUS. Building closer cooperation with other partners in the Indo-Pacific region, through both the ‘five eyes’ and also via the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (‘the Quad’) also creates new opportunities for Defence to work with partners to manage emerging space security risks and challenges, especially those posed by Chinese and Russian counterspace systems. The growing threat of counterspace technologies mean that Australia has to take space control seriously. The 2020 Defence Strategic Update and Force Structure Plan highlighted the importance of Australia pursuing both enhanced space domain awareness, as well as moving towards developing effective space control capabilities that could ensure space access for the ADF but also counter threats to allies in orbit. Russia’s test of a ‘kinetic kill ASAT’ on 15th November 2021, and the continued development of a suite of ‘hard kill’ and ‘soft kill’ counterspace technologies by both China and Russia have reinforced the reality that the days of assured space access for Australia are over. Instead, the ADF operating alongside its allies, will need to gain and maintain space control, which can’t be done if Australia is dependent on others in space. The threat posed by counterspace systems is only going to worsen in coming years. Direct-ascent kinetic-kill ASATs, such as demonstrated by China, Russia and India, and which are operationally deployed by China, will be complemented co-orbital ASATs. It’s co-orbital ASATs that are perhaps more threatening because their use is likely to feature ‘soft kill’ technologies based around jamming, directed-energy weapons, or direct physical interference of a satellite. These can generate scalable effect (in the case of jamming) and can disable or deny rather than destroy. As such, they don’t generate a large debris field associated with kinetic kill ASATs, and therefore, are far more likely to be employed in a crisis, including to exploit grey zone effects. Ground-based interference, including cyber-attack on satellites and their associated ground-segment adds to the complexity facing the ADF in space. Space is an ‘operational domain’ but it seems almost certain that prior
34 | Australia in Space Magazine
to, or at the outset of any war, it will become a ‘warfighting domain’ and the ADF alongside its key allies in the region need to be ready both to try to deter attacks in space, but also to defend against threats if they appear. The ‘space control’ task for the ADF, as highlighted in the 2020 Force Structure Plan, alongside expanding ADF Space Domain Awareness (SDA) under project JP-9360 is going to be important in coming years. SDA is Defence’s Operation Dyurra which integrates space capabilities, services and effects into wider operations, and provides critical data to the US-led Operation Olympic Defender Space Surveillance network. Building this capability for space control must be a key priority for Defence Space Command in coming years and would complement Australia’s involvement in international diplomacy to define what constitutes responsible behavior in space. Australia is fully engaged in dialogue via a UN Open Ended Working Group, which was established late last year following the tabling of UN General Assembly Resolution 75-36 by the United Kingdom. Ultimately, the space control task will require Defence to consider the importance of rapid augmentation and reconstitution of space capabilities in a crisis. Through enhanced SDA that will emerge under JP-9360, Australia and its allies can deny an adversary anonymity if they act in an irresponsible or threatening manner and can have better tactical warning of an emerging threat to take defensive measures. Yet, having the ability to launch Australian satellites on Australian launch vehicles from Australian launch sites in a manner that is responsive to rapidly changing tactical and operational requirements, should be a key goal for both Defence and the Australian Space Agency. It would mark the coming of age for Australia in space and mark a decisive break from past decades of dependency on others. It is this goal that should drive Defence Space Command in the coming decade as they consider how Australia’s defence force plays a role on the high frontier.
