Measuring Damages for Injury or Death of Livestock
By Amie K. Wilcox
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Amie K. Wilcox is an attorney at Friday, Eldredge & Clark LLP in Little Rock. She is pictured with her dog Hamilton.
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The Arkansas Lawyer
www.arkbar.com
umans’ relationship with animals—particularly in light of millennials’ bonds with pets—has evolved in recent decades. This article focuses on historical trends for evaluating damages for injury or death of animals—which, until recently, has been limited to livestock. Traditionally, the measure of damages for animals has been based on that animal’s objective economic value, measured by comparing the market value of the animal prior to the loss or destruction to its current value (if any). This general rule in Arkansas dates back to 1888, where a Supreme Court of Arkansas judgment included an assessment of interest between the time of the injury and the time of trial, against a railroad company for the death of the Plantiff ’s leased mule.1 “[I]n the cold, unsympathetic eye of the law, sentimental value is not recognized as a basis for damages.”2 For nonfatal injuries, Arkansas courts have allowed two measures of damages: (1) the difference between the value of the animal preceding and following illness, plus cost of care or (2) the difference between the value of the animal preceding illness and following recovery, plus a sum for the loss of time, care, attention, and other necessary expenses or losses caused by the sickness, including value of usage lost for working animals. While these two general rules should reach the same result, the latter was intended for cases where it may be difficult for the jury to assess the actual value of the sick livestock. These rules originated from a case wherein cattle became sick after eating cotton seed hulls and meal made from rotten cotton seed.3 Other states have allowed damages based on inferior breeding to valuable stock. A Nebraska court awarded damages for the impregnation of a purebred Hereford cow by a trespassing purebred Angus bull on the value difference of the cow as a purebred registered Hereford for breeding purposes before and after breeding. In this case, the Court did not necessarily consider the purebred Angus bull to be “inferior stock,” but based its damages award on evidence that the calf produced would have no value in the purebred market.4 Interestingly, despite the defendant’s claim that plaintiff was contributorily negligent or assumed the risk based on known malfunctions of his “hot wire” fence, the Court rejected these claims and found that the plaintiff had the right to use his pasture without erecting a fence strong enough to keep out trespassing bulls. In a case that did involve valuable 13-month-old heifers bred by a “scrub” bull, a Kansas court held that the jury could take into consideration the loss in production of thoroughbred calves sustained by the premature breeding considering evidence that the heifers should not have been bred until two years old.5 The Kansas court framed this loss of production as a separate and distinct injury apart from the depreciation of value.
