ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Volume 5 - Issue 7 July 2015
Information Warfare Information warfare is not a new concept as the recourse to propaganda and misinformation is a frequent tool to reinforce one’s camp and counteract the potential impact of the opponent. Propaganda is used to bring individuals together around a common cause, to reinforce the role of a leader, a political movement or a cause, and/or to vilify an enemy who presents an opposite model and tries to impose it. These methods were widely used during the Cold War when the East and the West were trying to contain one another while expanding their models to the rest of the world. Today, those methods are still common practice as state-owned media, censorship, counter-propaganda and the dissemination of false information are still widely used, such as in the case of the Ukraine crisis. Social media and new technologies are also playing a crucial role in spreading the word about ISIS’s fight, propaganda that the West is finding difficult to counteract. This issue focuses on these two cases in an effort to discuss the implications of information warfare for the security of the Euro-Atlantic region and the world at large.
Media as means to conduct information warfare (Photo: Globalresearch.ca)
Contents: Confronting Insurgent Propaganda Mr. Quint Hoekstra analyzes the use of propaganda by insurgents to support their efforts to change the society they live in. Building on examples from the past, the article applies the concepts of propaganda and information warfare to the case of the Islamic State and its insurgency propaganda.
Battles In The Information Space: Exploring Russia’s Hybrid Strategy During The Ukraine Conflict Ms. Jenny Yang, through the analysis of the definition of information warfare and key policies in Russia, sheds light on the Russian conception of information warfare, exploring how Russia’s focus on information has evolved and intensi-
- Flora Pidoux Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 7
fied over time, as illustrated in the Ukraine crisis. 1
Confronting Insurgent Propaganda By Quint Hoekstra
T
is
changes in the environment is the more likely one to win.
omnipresent. In the newspapers, images
Today’s wars, such as those currently fought in Ukraine
are printed of the recorded beheadings of
and Iraq, are all about information and propaganda. Of
Western aid workers in Syria. On television,
course, guns still fire and bombs still explode, but these
documentaries are abound about young people moving
wars are less of a kinetic affair than those of the past. The
to the Caliphate. And on the internet, videos of the
rising importance of the media has meant that conflicts are
destruction of Iraqi historic sites have gone viral. The
now just as much decided on the battlefield as they are in
Islamic State, despite being several time zones away
the information sphere. In this new environment, success
from Western media consumers, has managed to
depends in large part on the effectiveness of the
deeply penetrate Western media outlets with their
protagonist’s propaganda strategy.
he
Islamic
State’s
propaganda
message. It is a message of death and destruction, but it
Propaganda can be understood as acts of
is also one that sells. Over the past year, thousands of
communication by a government or political organisation
Western citizens have travelled to the Caliphate with
that has the specific intent to change the target audience’s
the aim to join the Islamic State’s army.
political behaviour. Propaganda distribution may take any
The difference between the Islamic State’s media
form; oral (e.g. radio), written (e.g. leaflets), visual (e.g.
strategy and that of the United States-led mission to
television), or cyber (e.g. Facebook). An often forgotten
counter the Islamic fundamentalists, Operation
form is propaganda of the deed. Here, the belligerent
Inherent Resolve, is worrying. Since September 2014,
commits an act, such as a bombing, to convey a specific
this coalition of over 60 states and organisations has
political message to a wider audience. A case in point is
fought against the Islamic State insurgents. Yet to this
the murder of Lee Rigby in 2013 on the streets of London,
day, its media visibility remains low. Bombing sorties
an act carried out to demonstrate the two perpetrators’
are flown out of the public eye, with little information
objection to the British military’s activities in the Middle
reaching mainstream media. NATO member states are
East.
therefore currently losing their propaganda war against
While propaganda as a concept gained notoriety in the
the Islamic State. This article investigates how
1940s in the hands of Nazi-Germany and the Soviet
insurgents have adapted to changes in the media
Union, its practice, however, is legitimate both during
environment and asks why NATO members have so far
war- and peacetime, and has been common before and
been unable to adopt an equally effective propaganda
after the Second World War. Propaganda messages can be
strategy. It concludes with several recommendations
directed for a limited goal, such as joining a street protest
on how to proceed.
or a labour strike, or it can be part of a larger strategy to
Defining Propaganda
achieve broader political outcomes. In the latter situation,
War, Clausewitz said, is an ever-changing phenomenon, and the protagonist who best adapts to
propaganda serves as a means to establish a coherent and compelling narrative about a nation or a cause. The Scottish Nationalist Party’s strategy during the Scottish
Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 7
2
independence referendum of 2014 is a good example. Here,
(PLO) realised that new technologies could be used to
political messages were extensively used to foster the idea of
create novel forms of propaganda. The organisation
a free and prosperous Scotland.
started with hijacking airlines in order to raise money and free fellow insurgents from prison. Realising the
Evolution of Insurgency Propaganda
powerful effect of television, they then switched to an
Insurgents are no stranger to propaganda. Their practice
even more dramatic type of tactic by holding eleven
of it can be traced at least as far back as 1892, when an
Israeli athletes hostage during the 1972 Munich
American citizen called Alexander Berkman used a
Olympics. Operationally, the mission was a big failure;
propaganda of the deed approach in an attempt to instigate an
all hostages and three of the terrorists were killed.
anarchist revolution. By assassinating the chairman of the
However, the PLO’s propaganda of the deed tactic was
Carnegie Steel Company, Henry Frick, Berkman hoped to
successful in raising global awareness for the Palestinian
free the population from the ‘parasites in carriages riding on
cause.
our backs, and sucking the blood of the workers’. Frick, however, survived the attack while Berkman was convicted to 21 years in prison.
Creative forms of insurgent propaganda therefore proved to be highly effective. This led the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) to try their own bold
During the 20th century, insurgents would have much
strategy in 1981. Complaining about prison conditions,
greater success with propaganda tactics. It started with Mao
inmates of this Northern Irish nationalist insurgency
Tse-Tung, who used it to help bring
decided to go on hunger strike.
about a communist revolution in
The most famous of them was
China. His model differed from
Bobby Sands, who got elected
Berkman’s in that he waged a
as
prolonged,
short,
during his strike but succumbed
campaign. A common Maoist tactic
to his hunger soon after. Just
was to send one or two insurgents to
like the PLO’s act, this tactic
a remote village with the sole aim of
generated great international
rather
than
slowly winning over the local population.
In
the
1960s,
Propaganda poster calling for the Communist Revolution in China (Image: Revolution1314)
Communist revolutionaries tried to replicate Mao’s success
Member
of
Parliament
attention, especially in the United States, where the PIRA
enjoyed large support amongst expatriates.
in Latin America. Here revolutionaries such as Fidel Castro and Ernesto Guevara believed that there was a shortcut to
Modern Tactics
winning popular support. They adopted a strategy that
In the 21st century, insurgent propaganda has again
became known as focoism, in which populations would be
taken on a new form. The most infamous of these
won over simply by initiating attacks against the government.
groups is Al-Qaeda, who spread its message in the 1990s
These attacks provoked the government into overly
around the Muslim world via sermons delivered on
repressive acts, which then drove the people into the
cassette tapes and later CDs to any ear willing to listen.
insurgent’s arms. While this tactic proved successful in
But in order to increase international attention and
Cuba, it failed elsewhere.
followers, the Islamic extremist group soon resorted to
A decade later the Palestinian Liberation Organisation Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 7
spreading terror. First attacking American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, they then bombed the USS 3
Cole in 2000 and then carried out the 9/11 attacks. While these suicide attacks may appear irrational, they are not. As Robert Pape of the University of Chicago points out, suicide attacks are effective in gaining publicity, signalling credibility, and raising the
winning the battle on the ground and a separate propaganda campaign aimed at winning the battle in cyberspace. It is precisely this combination of the virtual and the physical that has been the recipe for its recent success.
costs of resistance for the adversary. Moreover, the
The above shows that over the past century and a half,
9/11 attacks successfully provoked the United States
insurgent propaganda has evolved continuously. Starting
and their allies into an expensive, deadly and prolonged
with simple acts of propaganda of the deed, insurgents
ground war in Afghanistan and contributed to its ill-
then developed more sophisticated forms of propaganda
fated decision to invade Iraq in 2003.
before adopting new technologies, such as television and
Since then, the rise of the Islamic State has been a real game changer in insurgent propaganda. The Islamic States follows an innovative model, which relies on
later the internet, to develop powerful ways to spread their message. NATO’s Efforts
social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook to
NATO member states, by contrast, have made no
communicate with key sympathisers elsewhere. These
such progress. While the government use of propaganda
actors, known as re-disseminators, then redistribute
developed quickly at the start of the 20th century, the
information to others. This way, insurgents make clever
horrors of Nazi propaganda have effectively frozen this
use of new information technology to influence world
evolution. The Second World War left Western citizens
opinion, mobilise supporters, and eventually destabilise
highly sceptical about the government use of propaganda.
governments. Not only do they use the internet as a tool
Deeming it too Orwellian, the United States government
for communication, they also use it to bypass state
was even long forbidden to distribute government-made
censors, thus allowing insurgents to reach their wider
news to its own citizens. Yet such anti-propaganda laws
target audience directly.
have also obstructed governmental efforts to develop the
The Islamic State’s recorded beheadings, for
powerful narratives that are necessary to defeat an
example, now instantly reaches people’s smartphones
insurgency. These stories come in two forms:
around the globe. To this end, the insurgents have even
counternarratives and alternative narratives.
created a specific media department called Al-Hayat.
Counternarratives are stories aimed to discredit the
This department produces the glossy internet magazine
information
Dabiq and leads the insurgents’ social media campaign
extremists, for example, have claimed that the West aims
by uploading videos about life in the so-called Caliphate.
to subjugate Muslims and convert them to Christianity.
As Neville Bolt of King’s College London says, by
This narrative can be countered by spreading information
creating powerful media events, insurgents are currently
that disproves this, such as evidence that Western forces
better able to deliver their narrative than their (state)
stationed in the Middle East have increased the capacity
adversaries. Yet while virtual efforts are a crucial
for local governments to govern themselves, and have
element in contemporary warfare, these insurgents do
helped fund new mosques.
acknowledge that the physical battle remains important. This is also reflected in the Islamic State’s two separate lines of effort; it runs a military campaign aimed at Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 7
the
adversary
is
spreading.
Islamic
Discrediting the Islamic extremist narrative is, however, fraught with difficulties. David Betz of King’s 4
College London is right when he says that the West does not
This can quickly and easily lead to a scandal that
have the necessary credibility to mingle in discussions about
undermines a government’s official narrative. Just one
the various interpretations of Islamic theology. What
example is the leaked ‘trophy photos’ of Lynndie England
Western governments could do, however, is build an
and Charles Graner that recorded the torture practices in
alternative narrative. In this scenario, the protagonist
the Abu Ghraib prison and deeply undermined NATO’s
presents a different scenario to rival that of the insurgency.
war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
NATO member states are well positioned to engage with
Most Western militaries have not yet adapted to the
this option; they have an excellent track record when it
new media environment. Instead of viewing the use of
comes to using capitalism to generate widespread
propaganda and information warfare in general as a core
prosperity, using liberalism and democracy to create
component of contemporary war, they continue to
harmonious societies and using the rule of law to keep
perceive it as a secondary and supportive aspect of their
governments honest.
campaign. And instead of increasing the release of
Yet to this day, NATO member states still struggle to
positive information about their operations, they have
get their message across. In a study on the contribution of
become even more tight-lipped. Embracing the Cold
NATO member states to the International Security
War-era mantra that every bit of information can be
Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF), Beatrice de Gaaf
turned into a weapon, they believe that the less
(Utrecht University), George Dimitriu (Dutch Defence
information is released to the public, the smoother an
Academy) and Jens Ringsmose (Syddansk University), find
operation is likely to perform. Most states participating in
that Western governments struggle to convince even their
the bombing campaign against the Islamic State therefore
own domestic audiences about the wars they fight, let alone
give little detailed information about the number of
develop narratives targeting the civilian population of a
sorties flown and the number and type of targets hit.
country they are currently operating in.
How NATO Members Should Respond
Over the last two decades, this problem has been
To defeat current-day insurgents like the Islamic
further exacerbated by the profound changes that have taken
State, Western militaries need to overhaul their attitude
place in the global media landscape. Traditional news
toward information warfare and propaganda. The
outlets, such as CNN and the New York Times, have lost
opening of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre
their once all-powerful position. New actors, such as social,
in Latvia in 2014 is a good start. Yet so far it has only
digital and citizen media, have become increasingly popular.
publically released two documents. More is therefore
These organisations are unique in that they distribute news
needed. Its focus is also set too narrowly on Russia. The
recorded by citizens on their mobile telephones. Former
current operations against the Islamic State may not be an
BBC World presenter Nik Gowing argues this transition has
official NATO mission, but NATO members are strongly
been particularly difficult for those organisations who use
involved. The Latvian centre of excellence should
traditional, hierarchical organisational structures. With the
therefore also focus on events in the Middle East.
democratisation of hand-held digital technology, Gowing argues that information power has shifted from large organisations, such as governments, to individuals. Now, anybody who witnesses a major newsworthy event can record it with their telephone and reach a global audience. Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 7
But most importantly, NATO member states must acknowledge the effects of the new media environment in which they operate. The application of kinetic power alone will be an insufficient tool to win today’s wars. 5
Governments must therefore embrace, not fear,
About the author
information sharing. It is often better to respond quickly with an imperfect answer than it is to respond
Quint Hoekstra is currently studying for a Master
late with a perfect reply.
degree in Conflict, Security and Development at the
Western strategists must also learn from the field of marketing on how they can better persuade adversary audiences without the recourse to violent means. For inspiration they could turn to a small Syrian activist group called Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently. These activists go to great lengths and personal risk to post short videos on the internet about what life is really like in the Caliphate. By exposing the atrocities committed by the Islamic State they offer a powerful counternarrative. NATO members can also do much more to exploit their own intuitively appealing narrative. What the alliance offers is a safe, secure, and prosperous society that protects human rights. The Jihadist story, by contrast, is intuitively much less appealing. It centres on death, murder, strict living rules and human rights violations. So far, the Islamic extremists have been able to sell their message to thousands of people by virtue of their superior packaging. NATO should respond by developing their own digital material that makes better use of the advantages of the West’s narrative. This information, which should clearly be branded as a NATO product, should then be disseminated online through intermediaries. The above is not meant to suggest that today’s wars can be fought with words alone. Soft power will not suffice; weapons will still be necessary. But the relentless bombing of the claimed Caliphate’s territory will be of no avail if global audiences are not captivated by the coalition’s superior narrative. Increasing its story -telling capabilities is a crucial step for NATO members to win today’s conflicts.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 7
Department of War Studies at King’s College London. He holds a bachelor degree (with distinction) in Political Science with a specialisation in International Relations and Organisations from Leiden University. In 2013 he completed a research internship at the Royal Netherlands Navy.
Bibliography Berkman, Alexander. 1912. Prison Memoirs of an Anarchist. New York: Mother Earth Publishing Association. Betz, David. 2008. “The Virtual Dimension of contemporary insurgency and counterinsurgency.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19(4): 510-540. Bolt, Neville. 2012. The Violent Image: Insurgent Propaganda and the New Revolutionaries. London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd. Carter, Joseph A., Shiraz Maher and Peter R. Neumann. 2014. #Greenbirds: Measuring Importance in Syrian Foreign Fighter Networks. London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. De Graaf, Beatrice, George Dimitriu and Jens Ringsmose. 2015. Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War: Winning domestic support for the Afghan War. London: Routledge. Gowing Nick. 2009. ‘Skyful of Lies’ and Black Swans: The New Tyranny of Shifting Information Power in Crises. Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Hoffman, Bruce. 2006. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press. Hudon, John. 2013. Foreign Policy. http:// foreignpolicy.com/ 2013/07/14/u-s-repeals-propagandaban-spreads-government-made-news-to-americans/ (June 9, 2015). July 13. Mackinlay, John. 2009. The Insurgent Archipelago: From Mao to Bin Laden. New York: Columbia University Press. Pape, Robert A. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” American Political Science Review 97(3): 1-19. Shy, John and Thomas W. Collier. 1986. “Revolutionary War.” In Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 815-862. Sly, Liz. 2015. The Washington Post. “Inside an Undercover Network Trying to Expose Islamic State’s Atrocities.” http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/ islamic-state-learned-to-exploit-the-internet-activists-areturning-the-tables/2015/06/09/8d3e490a-0964-11e5-951e -8e15090d64ae_story.html (June 13). June 9. Von Clausewitz, Carl. [1832] 1984. On War, ed. transl. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 6
Battles In The Information Space: Exploring Russia’s Hybrid Strategy During The Ukraine Conflict By Jenny Yang
L
uciano Floridi, a leading theorist in the
words. Before the Euro-Atlantic Alliance can address
philosophy of information, asserts that
how to counter this type of modern warfare in which
information has always played a central
information plays a central role, we must first
role in conflicts. Telecommunications technologies
understand what information warfare is, how it works,
such as the radar, computer, satellite, GPS, and the
and how it can be employed on the battlefield.
Internet were developed initially for the military
To begin, we will examine different definitions of
domain. However, in today’s wired world,
information warfare, aiming to shed light on the Russian
information can be considered a weapon precisely
conception of information warfare. Then, through
because the targets themselves are increasingly
examining policy frameworks such as Russia’s National
informational in nature. Information is the optimal
Security Concept and Russia’s Military Doctrine, we
weapon because it is discreet,
will investigate how Russia’s
inexpensive, easy to produce,
focus on information warfare
and is able to move across state
has evolved and intensified
borders freely. According to
over time. Using Ukraine as a
Russian
case study, we will explore
General
Makhmut
Gareev, technological advances
how
mean that information warfare
information was applied and
has become more sophisticated
how the use of mass media
over time, with computers and communications
systems
facilitating the swift collection
NATO Allies signing MoUs for the establishment of the NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence in Riga (Photo: NATO Stratcom CoE)
this
approach
to
played a role in sowing confusion and destabilizing a target country. And finally,
and dissemination of information. As early as 1995,
we will consider various strategies NATO can employ
General Gareev noted that information warfare was
to counter offensives in the information realm.
a decisive element in future conflicts, suggesting that in place of direct armed attacks, conflicts may change into latent, undeclared wars. Twenty years later, the crisis in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea is a perfect illustration of how strategic control over information could mean the difference between an armed intervention or “an intervention without a single shot being fired” — as stated in President Putin’s own
What Is Information Warfare?
NATO’s Science and Technology Committee defines information warfare as “defensive and offensive operations, conducted by individuals or structured organisations with specific political and strategic goals, for the exploitation, disruption, or destruction of data contained in computers or transmitted over the internet and other networked information systems.” In
Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 7
7
comparison, Russia’s definition of information warfare is
one’s defined goals. Therefore, many Russian officials
far more broad and comprehensive, extending beyond the
and defence experts agree that information warfare can
realm of information systems and technology. According
be defined as the pursuit of certain objectives through
to the 2011 Yekaterinburg Convention on International
measures spanning multiple domains such as the political,
Information Security, Russia defines information warfare
economic, diplomatic, and psychological spheres.
as a “conflict between two or more States in information space with the goal of inflicting damage to information systems, processes, and resources, as well as to critically important structures and other structures; undermining political, economic, and social systems; carrying out mass psychological campaigns against the population of a State in order to destabilize society and the government; as well as forcing a State to make decisions in the interests of their opponents.” Hence, we can see that in addition to the technical component, the Russian definition encompasses elements such as the use of influence over a country’s political, economic, and social systems as well as psychological campaigns in order to destabilize a target country.
The Growing Importance of Information in Russia’s Defence Policy
In fact, as far back as 2000, the importance of information was already being addressed in Russia’s Military Doctrine, noting that modern war included “active information rivalry, and the confusion of public opinion in the individual countries and in all global public opinion.” Likewise, Russia’s 2000 National Security Concept warns that Russia faces a growing threat posed by countries striving for dominance in the information sphere. A decade later, Russia’s 2010 military doctrine claims that an intensification of the role of information warfare is a key feature of contemporary military conflict. In other words, information warfare can be
In the same vein, many Russian defence experts
applied in order to achieve political objectives without
support this comprehensive conception of information
recourse to military force.
warfare described in the 2011 Yekaterinburg Convention.
2014 Military Doctrine, the information space has
Andrey Kokoshin, the former Deputy Minister of Defense
undergone progressive ideologizing. For example, the
and former Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, states
document warns that Russia and especially Russian youth
that
assert
are susceptible to information warfare and subversive
informational, psychological, and physical influence on
attempts to undermine the “historical, spiritual and
government personnel as well as on economic and military
patriotic traditions in defence of the Fatherland.” The
entities. Furthermore, Andrei Illarionov, former advisor
2014 doctrine also stresses the insidious nature of soft
to President Putin, highlights that information warfare
power wielded by civil society organizations and foreign
plays a central role in this new mode of hybrid warfare in
organizations. In May 2015, Russia banned foreign
which a full-spectrum of non-military means, whether
organizations deemed undesirable ahead of the 2016
political, informational, or economic in nature, are
elections.
information
operations
are
able
to
employed to exploit a country’s vulnerabilities. Political scientist and former KGB officer Igor conceives of information warfare as “a kind of warfare between parties in which special (political, economic, diplomatic, military and other) methods and measures” are used to achieve Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 7
Interestingly, in Russia’s
The Winter Internet Uprising of 2011-2012
Overall, this intensification of focus on the information space can be traced to the Russian Winter Internet Uprising of 2011-2012, in which netizens 8
protested against then-Prime Minister Putin’s run for
and in December 2006, local parties in Crimea
a third term as the President of Russia. The impact of
organized a referendum on NATO accession in which
social media was evident after several protests were
98% of respondents voted against NATO accession.
organized online, eventually leading to mass arrests
In 2010, the Ukrainian Parliament voted to suspend
on May 6, 2012. In response, Russia’s state-
seeking NATO membership altogether.
controlled NTV channel created a film claiming that the U.S. State Department was behind organizing the protests against Putin. A website also claimed that the protests in Russia were triggered by a secret U.S. military base in Alaska “beaming high-frequency signals into the brains of Russians.” After the 2012 presidential
election,
controls
such
as
the
criminalization of libel, heightened restrictions on Internet and social organizations were swiftly adopted. Domestically, we can see a trend towards
Case Study: The Ukraine Crisis
During the beginning of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, television and radio studios as well as broadcasting and transmission towers were the first to be taken over in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, showing the strategic value of communications infrastructure. ProKyiv media was banned and was replaced with Russian
channels,
to
that
the
central
government was unable to broadcast information to regions under attack. A few days after the annexation
more repressive measures in an attempt
meaning
of Crimea, President Putin
control
awarded medals of the
communication networks and
Order of Service to the
social media.
Fatherland to four hundred
Russia’s Media Influence in
journalists,
editors,
and
Ukraine
television
hosts
—
underlining the important
Nowhere else is Russia’s strong media influence more apparent than in Ukraine, in
Anti-Putin protests in Moscow (Photo: Ivan Sekretarev / AP)
role the mass media had played in the information
which 60% of the books purchased were in Russian
campaign in Ukraine. State-controlled Russian media
and ten Russian-language websites exist for every
outlets used manipulated images and videos from
seven Ukrainian-language websites. According to
Syria, Kosovo, and Chechnya, presenting them as
researcher Andrzej Szeptycki, the dominant position
reality in Eastern Ukraine.
of Russian media in Ukraine is a key factor in
Due to media sources challenging the legitimacy of
Ukrainian opposition to NATO accession. In
the interim government in Kyiv, police officers in
December 2005, at least 7,000 people rallied in Kiev
Ukraine were unsure which side was legitimate and
in an anti-NATO demonstration. In May 2006, public
whose orders to follow. In fact, many police
protests in Crimea prevented American troops from
commanders disappeared or changed sides in Eastern
participating in the joint U.S.-Ukrainian Sea Breeze
Ukraine. After the annexation of Crimea, more than
manoeuvres. In June 2006, the Crimean Supreme
5,000 Ukrainian soldiers and navy personnel
Council declared the zone a “NATO-free territory”
continued to serve in the Russian forces, partly due to
Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 7
9
the mass media’s successful attempt to weaken morale and foment dissent and distrust against the central government. The strategy used in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine corresponds to the strategy articulated by Russian General Makhmut Gareev. General Gareev argues that the systematic broadcasting of biased or incendiary materials containing a mixture of partially true and partially false information can undermine public trust in the government and security forces, destabilizing countries targeted by information warfare. Primarily, one reason why this category of information warfare is particularly difficult to address is because the preliminary phase resembles conventional tools of
Europe. Countering Misinformation Effectively
To effectively counter misinformation, Russian media specialist Peter Pomerantsev believes that Brussels and Washington
should
and media prove popular. There is currently a 3.5-milion Russian-speaking
diaspora
and
legitimately
fall
threats
the
in
today’s
environment
security
cannot
be
neutralized through weaponry or armed occupation. In effect, they can only be fully eliminated through a “battle for hearts and
supporting under
alone,
expert Leigh Armistead, new
outlets,
government-friendly NGOs all
Germany
Lithuania, or Latvia. According to information warfare
funding cultural and educational projects,
in
outnumbering the respective populations of Estonia,
contacts,
media
and
Baltic countries where Russian state-funded news stations
gathering information, liaising establishing
developing
to the Russian-speaking diaspora — especially in the
during peacetime. For instance, influential
in
strengthening media channels, which will directly appeal
diplomacy used by Moscow
with
invest
minds.” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg with Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk (Photo: NATO images)
On a more concrete level,
domain of diplomacy and outreach. Moreover, the
civilian
communication
infrastructures
in
regions
approach favoured by Russia is able to channel the
susceptible to hybrid attacks should be reinforced and
West’s own openness as a weapon. For instance, EU
strengthened. Even if radio towers, broadcasting stations,
legislation currently prohibits member states from
and Internet cables were to be damaged, precautions
banning the dissemination of false information if the
should be taken such that the government would be able
broadcaster is registered in another country. The EU’s
to communicate effectively with its citizens across the
audiovisual media market and TV without frontiers
country. Resources should be devoted to promoting
directive mean that certain Russian broadcasters licensed
media literacy and critical thinking skills so that the
in EU countries are able to violate hate speech laws
general populace would be better able to identify
because procedures make it too cumbersome to take the
unreliable sources of information.
channels off the air. The Baltic countries and Finland
According to researcher András Rácz, disinformation
have composed a joint letter to the European
campaigns are a ‘distract and delay’ tactic given that they
Commission proposing the establishment of a Russian-
gradually weaken over time as falsehoods are eventually
language TV channel in order to offer an alternative
dispelled. Rácz believes that the best way to bolster
source of information to Russian-speaking diasporas in
resilience in a society is through good governance,
Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 7
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promoting media freedom, the rule of law, freedom of association, and democratic legitimacy. To quote NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, "Our best weapon against disinformation is information based on our values of democracy, freedom of speech and open societies.” However, the reality may not be as cut-and-dry. As the Ukraine crisis has illustrated, we should not assume that freedom of information necessarily leads to a more open or democratic society. Moving forward, it is important to consider that information can be harnessed and manipulated by authoritarian regimes in order to generate confusion and undermine trust in government, often with unpredictable and destabilizing effects on society.
About the author Jenny Yang is a Junior Research Fellow for the NATO Association of Canada, pursuing her Master’s in International Relations at the University of Cambridge. Previously, she has worked at INTERPOL headquarters in Lyon, France. She was invited by the Atlantic Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina to attend the 2014 NATO Summer School in the Balkans. She has also worked as an Advisor for the Embassy of Canada to the Netherlands, in which she provided support to the Canadian Permanent Representation for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
Bibliography BBC News (2015) ‘Ukraine, NATO discussing project to counter Russian propaganda’, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, June 21 2015. Chong, A. (2014) ‘Information Warfare? The Case for an Asian Perspective on Information Operations’, Armed Forces & Society, 40(4), pp. 599-624. Darczewska, J. (2014) ‘The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, A Case Study’, Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), May no. 42, pp. 5-33. Darczewska, J. (2015) ‘The Devil is in the Details: Information Warfare in the Light of Russia’s Military Doctrine’, Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), May no. 50, pp. 538. Ehlers, V. (1999) ‘Information Warfare and Information Atlantic Voices, Volume 5, Issue 7
Security’, NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Science and Technology Committee, Oct 06 1999. Floridi, L. (2014) “The Latent Nature of Global Information Warfare.” Philos. Technol., 1(24), pp. 317-319. Gretskiy, I. (2013) “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Under Yushchenko.” The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs. 22 (4), pp. 7-27. Husarov, V. (2014) ‘The Second Front – Information’, Narodna Armiya Newspaper, Aug 12 2014, Reprinted by BBC News in ‘Ukrainian-Russian information warfare viewed’ BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, Aug 14 2014. Kuzio, T. (2010) ‘Ukraine blocks the Road to NATO Membership’, Ukrainian Weekly, July 11 2010, 78(28), pp. 3 -15. Kropaite, Z. (2014) ‘Lithuania bans Russian TV Station’, EU Observer, April 9, 2014. Available at: https:// euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/128267 NATO (2015) ‘NATO-Ukraine agreement paves the way for further technical cooperation’, NATO News, April 24 2015. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ news_118967.htm NATO. ‘NATO’s Practical Support to Ukraine Fact Sheet’, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Feb 2015. Available at: http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/ pdf_2015_02/20150203_1502Factsheet_PracticalSupportUkraine_en.pdf NATO Stratcom Centre of Excellence (2014), ‘Report: Analysis of Russia’s Information Campaign Against Ukraine’, Oct 2014. Oliker, O. (2015) ‘Russia’s New Military Doctrine: Same as the Old Doctrine, Mostly’ RAND Corp. Jan 15 2015. Retrieved at: http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/01/russias -new-military-doctrine-same-as-the-old-doctrine.html Pomerantsev, P. (2014) ‘Yes, Russia matters: Putin's guerrilla strategy’, World Affairs 177(3), pp.16. Pomerantsev, P. (2015) ‘The big chill: the battle for Central Europe’, World Affairs. 177(5), pp. 37. Rácz, A. (2015) ‘Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy’s Ability to Resist’, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1(43), pp. 11-104. Siddique, H & Yuhas, A. (2014) ‘Putin signs treaty to annex Crimea as Ukraine authorises use of force’, The Guardian, March 18, 2014. Szeptycki, A. (2011) ‘Ukraine as a Postcolonial State?’ The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 1(1), pp. 5-29. Thomas, T. (2014) “Russia’s Information Warfare Strategy: Can the Nation Cope in Future Conflicts?” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 27(1), pp. 101-130. Zhang, X. (2015) ‘The Re-Politicization of Russian Politics’, in Aris, S., Neumann, M., Orttung, R., Perovic, J., Pleines, H., Schroder, H., Snetkov, A. (eds) Russian Analytical Digest 1(168), pp. 2-5.
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