Youth Ministerial Meetings 2015 Policy Recommendations Executive Summary The following policy recommendations were written by the delegates during the Youth Ministerial Meetings 2015. At the Youth Ministerial Meetings 2015, the delegates were divided into five different groups chaired by various experts active in the respective field. The five groups were: “Crisis Management,” “New Strategic Concept,” “NATO-Russia Relations,” “Syria and ISIS,” and “Readiness Action Plan.” The delegates worked on the policy workshops from May 12 to May 14 and received guidance and feedback from the workshop chairs. At the end of the Youth Ministerial Meetings, the delegates presented the final policy recommendations to the audience in attendance at the Youth Ministerial Meetings.
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Crisis Management Chaired by Ms. Burcu Sansonumut, Head of Civil-Military Planning and Support Section, NATO Head Delegate: Martin Michelot Delegates: Jurate Cizauskaite, Safak Bas, Kristina Dzhadzharova, Patrik Maldre, Sinem Sinangil, Paul Sturm, Mihai Turcanu, Banu Özek
Background With the focus of the Alliance currently being put on missions of collective defense and territorial security, the issue of crisis management seems to have been left aside in the discussions regarding the future of the Alliance. The areas of unrest in the Alliance's southern neighborhood, the instability of the region due partly to the lack of follow-up to Operation Unified Protector in Libya, and the spillover effects and threats this creates for NATO (related to illegal immigration or increased terrorist activity on Allied territory, etc.), however, are indicators that NATO's crisis management missions are still very likely to comprise a key part of its missions in the near future. Statement of the Issue NATO’s resources are frequently overstretched in order to maintain a viable response capability to emerging crises. For NATO’s active crisis management missions such as KFOR and Ocean Shield, these operations run into key problems such as high turnover rates of personnel and lack of cooperation with partners and neighboring countries. How can NATO and its member states adequately prepare, coordinate and sustain a crisis response capability with limited resources and varying degrees of political will? Recommendations In order to improve the awareness of NATO decision-makers and to improve the Alliance's preparedness for crisis management operations, the working group of the Youth Ministerial Meetings has agreed on a set of six recommendations. Recommendation 1: Early Warning Mechanisms a) The early warning mechanisms, which allow NATO to define the priority areas for crisis management planning, should be improved, and the prioritization and utilization of information must be rethought in order to bring the most relevant information, early indications and warnings to the attention of the NAC for specific action. In order to help move this process forward, one of the existing relevant committees would be led by a senior NATO official, such as the Assistant Secretary General (ASG) for Operations, in order to distil relevant information and make recommendations to the NAC while simultaneously informing the Military Committee. Such a committee would have a real political and analytical value added to the existing Situation Center.
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b) In parallel, in order to enhance the quality of the information that NATO receives, the Alliance should also foster a more deliberate engagement of think tanks that work on prospective issues and strategic plans. This effort would be led by the ASG for Emerging Security Challenges, who would be represented by a point person, responsible for full-time coordination of the engagement with various institutions. Recommendation 2: NATO-UN Engagement NATO should strive to share best practices and doctrines with the UN, especially in regards to certification, for the training of UN troops who would benefit from operating at a level on par with NATO’s forces. NATO should also be proactive about sharing lessons learned from operations. This level of cooperation represents a true program of capacity-building for UN troop contributors, much like NATO has done in the past for countries such as Georgia and Azerbaijan, when they participated in missions under NATO command. In order to foster this process, we recommend that a joint workshop bringing together the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (UNDPKO) and Field Support operations from the UN, and the International Staff Operations Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) from NATO. This workshop would report its outcomes to the next annual staff to staff meeting that will be held in 2016, and will continue to meet as necessary. Recommendation 3: NAC-PSC Cooperation a) NATO should increase the level of cooperation with the European Union by having a rational, casespecific division of labor regarding crisis management. The general idea is to focus, in principle, on one's own area of expertise. NATO, for example, focuses on defense and military cooperation, and the EU focuses on issues related to capacity-building on respect for the rule of law, reinforcement of national justice system, and policing and military training missions. In order to strengthen this necessary cooperation between institutions, we recommended that a series of North Atlantic Council (NAC)/Political and Security Committee (PSC) – NAC/PSC – meetings take place as a crisis arises and before any action is taken in order to avoid duplication, and allow for each situation to be dealt with ad hoc. In addition, when politically possible, the two institutions should find ways to conduct an EU-NATO joint tabletop exercise to test chains of command and respective decisionmaking processes. b) Relations with the EDA should be streamlined in order to avoid duplication, and preserve and develop capabilities for crisis management. These proposals should be put on the agenda of a forthcoming EDA-Defense policy and planning meeting. Recommendation 4: Improving Coordination and Cooperation It will also be crucial for NATO to improve coordination and cooperation, and to deliver new joint formats of discussion with key regional partners. Following this principle, it is likely that most crisis management missions will take place in Europe's Southern neighborhood. It follows that technical capacity-building missions for peacekeeping with the African Union, the League of Arab States, or the Economic Community of Western African States would enhance international readiness for crisis management missions. In parallel, a higher level political coordination aspect could be achieved from cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council. In order to achieve these objectives, joint visits by the High Representative for Foreign Policy of the EU and the NATO Secretary General for high-profile negotiations and discussions with these institutions should be organized. 3
Recommendation 5: Integrating Strategic Communications into Planning Process Strategic communications should be integrated into crisis management planning processes. It is paramount to display what is being done in an operation to a wider audience in order to generate support for stakeholders so that efforts cannot be undermined by counter-narratives. It is therefore crucial to improve public diplomacy and strategic communication efforts of operations management. To foster this process, nations should train and employ a critical mass of public affairs officers, either by carrying out joint trainings with ACT within a specific Center of Excellence, or a NATO school. Crisis management modules should also be integrated into NATO training programs in order to raise awareness within NATO international staff. Finally, in order to complement these trainings, a fellowship opportunity in NATO's Public Diplomacy Division should be created in order to give extra tools to select military public affairs officers. Recommendation 6: Cyber Security Finally, cyber security should be at the heart of any (re)thinking of crisis management. This means working on capacity-building with partner countries to prevent, mitigate, and recover from cyber incidents. The goal should be to improve overall cyber stability by fostering resilience, sharing best practices, standards, and norms in order to build awareness to prevent crises stemming from cyber threats; much like NATO already does with Allies and the EU with its member states. Additionally, NATO can assist in developing a cyber strategy and legislative arsenal, and can also suggest exercises and trainings. In the context of ongoing discussions with partner nations, if one of them have not selected cyber as a priority in its Partnership program with NATO, a relevant senior official can engage in bilateral discussions with his counterparts, or via the Permanent Representation, in order to assess the level of interest of that country in pursuing a reinforced cyber strategy. If the two parties decide to move forward, a crisis management module with a cyber core will be agreed upon. The Cyber Defense Center of Excellence would coordinate who carries out the trainings for partner countries, drawing from a pool of experts from the Civil Emergency Planning Committee, experts from Allies, or other experts as necessary. Equally important as the recommendations, the group also highlights several other key components to crisis management that did not give way to specific recommendations, including:
Crisis management cannot be performed without operational capabilities, and it is therefore paramount that Allies deliver on the pledges made at the Wales Summit.
The current illegal migration crisis is a catalyst for inter-institutional cooperation, and both NATO and the EU have a role to play in addressing this crisis. This does, however, require a very strong political commitment before any crisis management tools can be applied to it.
Leaving from the principle that crisis are more likely to arise in the South, political leaders will need to address the issue as to whether tools such as the VJTF can also be applied to crisis management situations occurring in the Southern neighborhood of Europe, and whether the measures of RAP should be reinforced to address these issues, or whether a new set of measures should be defined altogether.
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Readiness Action Plan Chaired by Mr. Bruno Lete, German Marshall Fund Head Delegate: Huseyn Panahov Delegates: Daniel Bennett, Hanife Cetin, Milovan Milosevic, Kerim Rached, Robert Shushich, Gabriella Wilow
Background Despite common strategic interests, an international alliance of 28 countries at times creates delays in responses to crisis situations across the Euro-Atlantic region, especially at a time of rapidly changing security environment. The Readiness Action Plan agreed upon during the Wales Summit in 2014 was a positive initiative to address this issue. However, its deployability, flexibility and operational capacity to address threats both East and South are still being determined. Statement of the Issue The most important questions regarding the NRF are the flexibility and the responsiveness of this force. While the RAP is oriented towards the Eastern flank, there has recently been an increase in the threats stemming from the southeast border. How quickly can the NRF be deployed in this direction and how well is it equipped to combat those new threats? Recommendations Recommendation 1: Emergency Council In order to expedite the decision making process of NAC, a smaller Emergency Council will be created that will streamline some decisions that normally require NAC to come together. Our aim is not to replace the NAC, which is an essential decision-maker. As crises can develop very quickly, however, a parallel rapid response mechanism is required. The Emergency Council will have the authority granted by NAC to implement crisis-response decisions in non-military and military fields. Such rapid response mechanism could have the potential to force the aggressor to back down. Recommendation 2: A Proactive Role in the Defense Budget Planning NATO will play a more active role in defense policy and budget planning processes of individual member states. Today, NATO only receives national defense planning and budgets of member states; it does not offer any feedback in return. It is time for NATO to be more involved in the budgetary planning process of member states in order to avoid duplication and redundancy. Such feedback would help to address capability gaps in the Readiness Action Plan. Giving feedback on national defense plans would also encourage broader 5
involvement of member states in the RAP. Similarly to the EU and its member states, NATO should develop a similar mechanism where it provides non-binding budgetary recommendations for its member states. Recommendation 3: Train and Educate Our recommendation is that the newly established command and control centers are actively engaged in education, training and briefings with the local law enforcement agencies in the host country. In order to increase interoperability NATO has to engage at a local level and train and educate local security agencies. The RAP also needs a civilian dimension, where the newly established Command and Control center will streamline security procedures to deal with a potential crises on the ground. Officers from the RAP Spearhead Force will make tours across their designated regions and offer training and educational programs for local citizens and authorities regarding security issues. Recommendation 4: Enhance Public Diplomacy Around the RAP A concrete public diplomacy initiative to enhance support for the RAP. Broader public support is important because it would result in broader government support. Hence, we recommend NATO PDD to create a new project that will call for applications from young professionals and give some selected candidates the opportunity to participate in a future NATO military exercise. The idea behind this is to enable people to become more involved in the security of their countries.
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NATO-Russia Relations Chaired by Mr. Robert Pszczel, Head of NATO’s Information Office in Moscow Head Delegate: Mateusz Krupczynski Delegates: Marianne Copier, Nikolaos Farantouris, Daria Petrashenko, Sanel Prelic, Milan Suplata, Selim Han Yeniacun Background Since the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s involvement in the armed conflict in Ukraine, the NATORussia relationship quickly deteriorated, resulting in the decision by NATO to suspend practical collaboration with Russia in April 2014. A year has passed already, Russian actions in the region dealt a great blow to the level of trust between NATO and Russia that cannot be easily restored. First steps were taken by signing the Minsk agreements, but these are not complied with by Russia. NATO must now find a new equilibrium in the relations with Russia in order to further cooperation on areas of mutual interest. Statement of the Issue Since the crisis in Ukraine, NATO - Russia relations are in a deadlock. So far, there are no signs of improvement of the situation. The crisis creates new security realities for the twenty first century and demands a significant response from NATO. What can NATO and its members do to prevent further Russian aggression? Recommendations We propose that once the following three basic conditions are met by Russia, cooperation can be reestablished. These conditions are as follows: a) Russia must actively contribute to minimizing the tension in Eastern Ukraine by refraining from providing military support to separatist groups b) Russia must provide military transparency on a mutual basis c) Russia must cease its disinformation campaign against NATO member countries Recommendation 1: Engage Relevant International Organizations to Stimulate Free Press NATO should strengthen the cooperation with the OSCE and other relevant international organizations in order to create environment for freedom of media in Russia. Particular focus should be directed at NGO’s operating within Russia, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia whose primary functions are to stimulate free press. Viable partners could include: Reporters Without Borders or Freedom House.
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Recommendation 2: Engage Russian Diaspora in NATO Member Countries NATO Public Diplomacy Division should strengthen its efforts to reach out to Russian communities living in the member states in order to disseminate democratic values and correct understanding of NATO to communities (academics, NGOs, etc.) within the Russian Federation. The main focus should be on organizing events such as NATO policy workshops and seminars which tackle misconceptions about NATO and Western intentions towards Russia. In addition to reaching out to the Russian community, NATO should make an effort to increase public awareness within member states about its policies. Recommendation 3: Coordinate Policies with Existing Partner Countries NATO should work closely with its partner countries, particularly those in the Mediterranean Dialogue, to coordinate a common approach towards Russia. Closer engagement and coordination with existing partners in the Mediterranean could help offset Russia’s energy leverage over the European market. Moreover, close coordination with members of NATO’s Partners Across the Globe could offset Russia’s strategy of engagement with Asia when relations with the West are troubled.
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New Strategic Concept Chaired by Dr. Gerlinde Niehus, Head of the Engagements Section at the Public Diplomacy Division, NATO & Ms. Barbora Maronkova, Public Diplomacy Officer, Public Diplomacy Division, NATO Head Delegate: Felix Seidler Delegates: Robert Baines, Daniel Fazlic, Vera Khajalia, Lea Kristensen, Merve Seren Background The global security environment has gone through rapid developments and changes since the adoption of the 2010 Strategic Concept. The Ukrainian Crisis has shifted some areas of conflict much closer to NATO Allies and a conventional response became a realistic possibility. In the wake of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, cooperation has expanded in critical areas. The new Strategic Concept should emphasize the new changing environment in the Euro–Atlantic area and strengthen cooperation with member and partner states to stabilize the security environment. The Southern Flank of NATO has also become a security issue due to developments that have caused large migrations through the region and across the Mediterranean, increasingly destabilizing the security environment in the countries in North Africa and the Middle East. The situation in the Middle East has changed to a level where traditional non-state actors have evolved from isolated groups into the organized, state-like actor, ISIS. Conventional approaches to ISIS have largely been inadequate. This has destabilized the region from Syria to Iraq, as well as in other countries in the Mesopotamian region. Hybrid warfare is becoming an operational reality in several countries, which is a challenge NATO needs to address. The response to the current threats has been insufficient and time consuming, thus a new strategic approach to these emerging threats is necessary. The destabilized security and economic environment in Africa and the Middle East has shifted population centers and produced a large number of displaced persons and refugees. Many of these refugees are moving towards the Mediterranean, which puts a large strain on defense and security structures in the Mediterranean countries. A common approach based on alliance solidarity and cooperation is necessary to alleviate the burden on countries affected by these migrations. NATO is also facing significant internal challenges, which stresses the need for a new Strategic Concept. The financial contribution of many member states, especially in Europe, have not achieved any significant progress in reaching the 2% GDP goal. Additionally, the much needed 20% for Research and Development is not met by many countries, and should be the primary goal in reaching a stable and operational defense
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system. Consequentially, NATO needs a new Strategic Concept that outlines new responses to the financial challenges and Research and Development requirements. The emerging arc of concern, which includes NATO’s Eastern, South Eastern and Southern flanks, requires new policies and responses. A new Strategic Concept is an excellent opportunity to resolve this. Statement of the Issue Taking into account the recent events in Ukraine, the partnership with Russia is seriously jeopardized. Moreover, the intervention in Libya, withdrawal of the military mission from Afghanistan, the rising threat of ISIS, the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine and cyberattacks all pose new security challenges for the Alliance. How can NATO adjust itself to address these threats and future emerging challenges? Recommendations Recommendation 1: How NATO Should Develop a New Strategic Concept In accordance with previous successful practices, the Secretary General should be appointed to develop a new Strategic Concept. The NATO Warsaw Summit 2016 should be the key point in providing a mandate to the Secretary General to develop a new Strategic Concept, to be presented by the next summit. Public inclusiveness and transparency in making a new Strategic Concept is necessary. In order to provide public support and understanding of the alliance’s security goals, the process should be as open as possible. The timeline should include and facilitate a large public debate, and should be divided into three key tasks: a) Public Debate The first level of the process needs to include public debates in member countries with panels and round tables to help engage a wide audience. This should include different NGOs and the civil society to better grasp the changing security perceptions on the national level, and understanding in non-direct stakeholders. The debates should include different stakeholders who have not traditionally been involved in security and defence debates. This should also encompass those sectors that provide invaluable practices such as opinions in solving non-conventional threats and conducting peace-building operations. b) Profession Inclusion The second level would include professionals, NGOs and the civil society that are engaged with security issues. This will provide concrete recommendations for the issues that have surfaced in the public debates. These recommendations should then go to the political level within the member states and to other interested parties. c) Political Framework The third level is a Political Framework Group to develop the next Strategic Concept. This multilateral, state-level Group would consist of outstanding individuals who will help to facilitate a political debate among all member states in providing the best possible Strategic Concept. Whereas the first two levels achieve a better public awareness and public image, it is also important to get as much information as possible from people working in the field. This systematic approach, including the civil society, is necessary to produce the best possible new Strategic Concept for NATO. The 10
political linkage to the European Union regarding parallel affairs, with special concern to a new European Security Strategy, should also be one of the core tasks of this process. Recommendation 2: What the New Strategic Concept Should Include a) Collective Defence With respect to Article 5, collective defence will remain on top of the core purposes of NATO. This includes the re-assurance of member states and deterrence of potentially hostile third parties. The alliance will do whatever is necessary to defend and reassure its members. Potentially hostile third parties should be aware that NATO is ready and capable to respond to any threat posed to one of its members. For strategic stability in international affairs, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. To reassure member states, air-policing missions, naval deployments and joint exercises in regions of concern should be intensified and involve a higher number of member states. Member states are expected to spend 2% of their GDP on defence in order to respond to all challenges facing the alliance; member states can propose special investments to be taken into account when calculating their contribution. Moreover, to be ready for any future challenges, at least 20% of national defence budgets should be spent on Research and Development. b) Crisis Management NATO should remain capable of conducting the full range of crisis management missions, from large-scale operations to training missions. Crisis management should follow the principle that projecting stability is more effective in solving regional issues and security challenges than reacting to events after they have happened. A structured approach, coordinated with all stakeholders, should assist partners in security-related areas of activity such as reforming military education for officers, or building capacity to meet emerging security challenges. c) Cooperative Security NATO will continue to pursue its Open Door Policy. The alliance is looking forward to welcoming new members from the Euro-Atlantic area. Relationships with the present aspirant countries should be strengthened further. Cooperative partnerships should have more emphasis in solving possible security threats before they reach NATO members. NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept identifies “cooperative security” as one of NATO’s three essential core tasks. It states that the promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organisations around the globe. These partnerships make a concrete and valued contribution to the success of NATO’s fundamental tasks. The new Strategic Concept should put more emphasis on the necessity for such programs in solving security issues by complimenting the present regional partnership programs with a theme-based approach. The new Strategic Concept should address new challenges in security threats that transcend the present, region-based security cooperation, and find partners across the globe that have common interests. 11
The new Strategic Concept and its cooperative security section should emphasize maritime security because of ocean’s role in connecting nations through an interdependent network of economic, financial, social and political relationships. The statistics are compelling: 70% of the Earth is covered in water; 80% of the world’s population lives within 100 miles of the coast; 90% of the world’s commerce is seaborne, and 75% of that trade passes through a few, select choke points. Furthermore, the world’s oceans and seas are an increasingly accessible environment for transnational criminal and terrorist activities, including the transport and deployment of weapons of mass destruction and associated materials. Criminal activity in the maritime environment includes the growing range of pirate attacks, which raise concerns about the safety of vessel crews and citizens. Illegal human trafficking has become a huge public and political debate in the EuroAtlantic area, especially with the growing crisis of migrant trafficking — exemplified by the recent tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea. Recommendation 4: NATO-China Council To respond to global power shifts, a NATO-China Council should be conceived as a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building and cooperation in which the individual NATO member states and China would work as equal partners on a wide spectrum of security issues of common interest. Maritime security could be a key area for NATO-China cooperation. China is increasingly becoming an invaluable economic and political partner to many Euro-Atlantic countries and both NATO and China should approach their security concerns together in order to achieve the best possible framework for solving them. This new Strategic Concept will allow NATO to meet future challenges effectively to provide peace, security and stability for its member states and the Euro-Atlantic area.
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Syria and ISIS Chaired by Dr. Ozgur Ozdamar, Professor of International Relations, Bilkent University Head Delegate: Ahmet Gencehan Babis Delegates: Katrina Allikas, Francisco Costa, Ilja Djugumanov, Mustafa Veysel Guldogan, Denys Pashchenko, Emiliano Stornelli Background More than 200,000 Syrians have lost their lives in over four years of armed conflict, which began with antigovernment protests before escalating into a full-scale civil war. More than 11 million others have been displaced as forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad and those opposed to his rule battle each other. Adding to this complex situation, jihadist militants from ISIS, which formed in 2013 by growing out of AlQaeda, have gained significant ground in Syria. No one knows the exact size of ISIS, but it is estimated to be at least 30 000 fighters, with some estimating that ISIS could mobilize around 200,000 fighters. Since Syria’s internal conflicts create negative spillover effects that affect the wider region, it is clear that addressing these problems should be a priority for the international community. The United States-led coalition, comprising partner countries including NATO members such as Canada, Belgium and the UK, have been conducting airstrikes in an effort to combat ISIS. Although a frontline NATO member facing ISIS, Turkey remains adamant and objects to contributing further to the fight. NATO must reassess its policy in order to be most efficient in combating ISIS. Statement of the Issue War is destabilizing the region and the flow of foreign fighters travelling to join ISIS is increasing. Stronger support to Turkey and more vigorous cooperation between NATO and its partner countries is required to combat the threat posed by ISIS. What can NATO do to better address the growing flow of foreign fighters, humanitarian crisis and regional instability? Recommendations Recommendation 1: Strengthening Security of NATO Member States The North Atlantic Council should reinforce aerial and other military assets already deployed under Article 4 in Turkey. At the same time, NATO should strengthen the security of embassies and critical infrastructures relevant to NATO member states in the border region that faces ISIS and other terrorist organizations.
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Recommendation 2: Strengthening NATO Partnerships in the Mediterranean and Middle East NATO should build up the defense and security capacities of relevant partners in the region such as Jordan and Iraq to face the ISIS threat and prevent a spillover effect of the Syrian crisis. In particular, special attention should be placed on border security in the form of technical support and increased training of border security guards. Recommendation 3: Intelligence NATO should increase capability in the intelligence community within NATO and partner countries in order to prevent foreign fighters from joining ISIS/other terrorist organizations and their return to home states for illegal activities. In particular, NATO should enhance information sharing and coordination between security agencies. Recommendation 4: Cyber Security Noting that the terrorist propaganda in cyber space is one of the most efficient ways to recruit militants and considering the high importance of “hybrid war� in NATO’s agenda, NATO should concentrate its efforts on building an effective social media counter-campaign against the propaganda of ISIS in social media. Bearing in mind that cyber measures are one of the most effective ways to decrease the recruitment and financing for terrorist groups; a cyber-security strategy should be adopted with this intent. Recommendation 5: Humanitarian Issues Both member states and NATO should their increase financial contribution to the humanitarian crisis by providing assets that can be used for refugee assistance. Specifically, NATO and various member states should consider aiding the humanitarian crisis management organizations in the neighboring states such as Turkey and Jordan.
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