Th e Eve of the “Italian War”

Turkey was very important for the Germans and when the ill-fated Dardanelles campaign began in February 1915, they urged Haus to help the Turks. Th e Dardanelles project was the brainchild of Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty. Frustrated by the stalemate on the Western Front, he advocated an attack on the “soft underbelly” of the enemy. After considering Schleswig or the Adriatic fi nally the Dardanelles were chosen. Th e unsuccessful attempt to storm the Turkish straits led only to the fall of Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty and the reactivated Sir John Fisher as First Sea Lord. Th rough mid-March, before the failure of the British became obvious, the Germans put a great pressure on Haus to do something. Among other demands the Germans suggested an attack on the French forces at the mouth of the Adriatic. Even after the Turkish position stabilized some politicians of the Dual Monarchy and the Germans continued urging Haus to attack the French. Count István Burián, common Foreign Minister argued that a naval victory over the French would deter Italy from entering the war. Desperate to secure the Italian neutrality, Burián did not realize the unreality of such a demand and the high chances that an action against the French fl eet would rather push Italy towards the Entente.447 Th e German embassy in Vienna also tried to put pressure on Haus, employing even Baron Max von Beck, former prime minister of Austria as an emissary.

On 31 March, Haus wrote a lengthy letter called as the Haus Memorandum to Baron Beck in which he explained and defended his policy.448 Haus repeated his earlier argument about the limited achievements of the French in the Adriatic. He pointed out that the French were content with blocking the entrance of the Adriatic, and since neither the French nor the Austro-Hungarian fl eet had a goal important enough to risk their destruction in a battle, that strategy of patient waiting is the sole rational one. Haus wrote: “To attack a superior fl eet under these circumstances, when one does not know where to fi nd it and how large their superiority is an unreasonable demand”. He complained: “It is diffi cult to make clear to many men that in many cases not to do anything is the only correct thing.” He pointed out that actions like Coronel, Falkland Islands and Heligoland had resulted in the defeat of the materially weaker squadron. Haus concluded that if one can draw lessons from this, it is certainly not that the Austro-Hungarian fl eet, which was much weaker, should increase the activity of its battleships. Th e old Emperor and Archduke Friedrich, titular head of the AOK agreed with Haus’s arguments.449

On the night of 26-27 April, the Austro-Hungarian Navy achieved its greatest success against the French. During the diplomatic negotiations between the Triple Entente and Italy, Lapeyrère extended to farther north the course of the French cruiser patrols. Th is decision proved to be disastrous. Th e Austro-Hungarian submarine U 5 commanded by the future submarine ace Linienschiff sleutnant Georg Ritter von Trapp torpedoed and sank the French armored cruiser Léon Gambetta off Cape Santa Maria di Leuca on the Ionian Sea. Th e cruiser went down in only nine minutes with 574 hands. Th e sinking of the Léon Gambetta marked the end of the “French War” as Lapeyrère withdrew all his heavier units south to Cephalonia. Due to this decision and other circumstances the French blockade of the mouth of the Adriatic practically ended in May 1915. In the remainder of the war the French sent against the Austro-Hungarian Navy only submarines and destroyers.

A couple of hours before the U 5 sank the Léon Gambetta on 26 April the Treaty of London between the Triple Entente and Italy was signed. Signing the treaty Italy committed itself to declare war on Austria-Hungary and Germany within one month. On 23 May a new phase of the Adriatic naval war has begun: the so called “Italian War”.

Th e Eve of the “Italian War”

Th e Triple Alliance was never popular among the population of Italy. Th e country’s archenemy was the Dual Monarchy, the mysterious and menacing “Regno del Nord” of Dino Buzzati.450 Most of the disputed territories claimed by the Italians, fueled by Italia irredenta, were part of the Habsburg Empire, so not surprisingly the Central Powers could off er little during the diplomatic bargaining that took place after the outbreak of the war. Over the winter of 1914-1915, Italian Foreign Minister Sydney Sonnino negotiated with both sides in an eff ort to secure the best deal for Italy in exchange for its entering in the war. Germany pressured the Monarchy to appease the Italians, but this was a very

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57 Italian dreadnoughts

hard if not impossible task. Italy asked a price too high even for its neutrality: Trentino and Trieste. In March 1915, Austro-Hungarian common Foreign Minister Burián off ered the Italian speaking part of Tyrol, but it was too little, too late. To Italians, the intervention of Italy to the First World War is sometimes referred to as Quarta guerra d’indipendenza italiana – Th e Fourth Italian War of Independence, refl ecting the view that this war was the fi nal act in the unifi cation of the nation.

Th e Entente was in the position to off er a much more attractive deal to Italy, not to mention that they did not have to sacrifi ce their own territories. Only the question of Dalmatia complicated matters, because Russia strongly supported Serbia’s claim for a substantial part of Dalmatia. In the Treaty of London signed on 26 April 1915, the Triple Entente promised to Italy territories which had beside the Italians also an ethnic German and Slav population. A part of Tyrol, Trieste and the entire Istrian Peninsula, a part of Northern Dalmatia including Zara and Sebenico and many of the islands along the Dalmatian coast would go to Italy in a postwar settlement. Th e Entente confi rmed also the possession of Valona and a sphere of infl uence in Albania. Th e fulfi llment of all the promises would have rendered the Adriatic de facto an Italian Mare Nostrum.

Th e third article of the Treaty of London provided for the naval cooperation. “Th e French and British fl eets shall render active and permanent assistance to Italy until such time as the Austro-Hungarian fl eet shall have been destroyed or until peace shall have been concluded. A naval convention shall be immediately be concluded to this eff ect between France, Great Britain and Italy.” Th e naval discussions were started on 2 May in Paris and after some hard bargaining on 10 May a formal naval convention was concluded. Th e convention called for the establishment of the so called First Allied Fleet and the Second Allied Fleet. After Italy’s entry into the war, bearing the burden of operating against the Austro-Hungarian fl eet was primarily the task of the First Allied Fleet. Th is fl eet, based at Brindisi and at Taranto, was composed of the most modern Italian units, a contingent of a dozen French destroyers and six submarines and a British detachment of four old standard battleships and four small cruisers. Th e Second Allied Fleet was de facto Lapeyrère’s force. While the

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