Line of Defence - Spring 2019

Line of Defence Issue 13 • Spring 2019

New Zealand’s Defence and National Security Magazine

An interview with Commander Joint Forces New Zealand Terror Resilience: Human factors and psychological strategies

Cover image courtesy NZDF Army News

Logistics: From equipping the unit to equipping the force Boundless Continent: Managing Antarctic border flows

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CONTENTS Editor’s Note

In this Winter issue of Line of Defence, Dr Peter Greener (Senior Fellow at Victoria University Wellington’s Centre for Strategic Studies) asks COMJFNZ RADM James Gilmour about overseas deployments, women in uniform, frigates, helicopters and more.

In an era where ‘value for money’ is key, states RADM Gilmour, “quantity can have a quality of its own” – it’s not ideal having the highest tech platforms if we can only afford them in small numbers.

As far as frigate replacement is concerned, former Defence Minister Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO argues that “two is too few”.

New Zealand, he writes, can afford two modern frigates such as the Type 26 frigate that have been ordered by the Australian and Canadian Navies, but a better choice might be a lighter frigate such as British Type 31. New Zealand could readily afford three of these.

Opposition Defence Spokesperson and former Defence Minister Hon Mark Mitchell comments that he is increasingly concerned at delays in defence procurement processes under the Coalition Government. “Continual review of National’s plans for the defence sector whilst in government is nothing but a costly timewasting exercise,” he writes, including the further review of the Defence Estate announced earlier this year.

Defence Minister Hon Ron Mark points instead to the historic levels of investment the Coalition Government has already made in defence. He writes that his focus is on building the case for some of the highest priority investments contained in the Defence Capability Plan – the Hercules replacement, Protected Mobility vehicles, and a “low-end domestic and regional air surveillance capability to complement the P-8A Poseidon fleet.”

On the issue of public value in procurement, the NZDIA notes the new definition of ‘public value’ in the new 4th edition of the Government Procurement Rules, commenting that the principle of public value “does not mean selecting the lowest price but rather the best possible outcome for the total cost of ownership.”

In International Security, Israeli Ambassador to New Zealand HE Dr Itzhak Gerberg explores the counter-terror role of ‘operative security’, Hagar NZ’s Don Lord highlights the ongoing challenge of human trafficking in the region, and Massey University’s Dr Germana Nicklin looks at the vexed issue of border management in Antarctica.

In Homeland Security, Otago Polytechnic’s Barnaby Pace considers how New Zealand can increase its terror resilience via psychological strategies, chief editor Nicholas Dynon explores the ‘wicked problem’ of securing ‘crowded places’ from attack, and Massey University’s Dr John Battersby makes the case for the new scholarly publication National Security Journal.

Lastly, a very big welcome to new Line of Defence partner Tactical Solutions. The local equipment, procurement and support solutions specialist to defence and law enforcement is now 20 years old and is on the cusp of major expansion.

We feature their latest news. I’d also like to acknowledge our continuing partnerships with GA-ASI, Embraer and Leonardo, without whom Line of Defence would simply not be possible.

Nicholas Dynon Auckland

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CONTACT DETAILS Chief Editor: Nicholas Dynon M: +64 (0)22 366 3691 E: nick@defsec.net.nz

Publisher: Craig Flint T: +64 (07) 868 2703 E: craig@defsec.net.nz

Postal and delivery address 27 West Cresent Te Puru 3575, Thames RD5, New Zealand

www.linkedin.com/company/ defsec-media-limited www.facebook.com/defsecmedia/ www.twitter.com/DefsecNZ

CONTRIBUTORS & INTERVIEWEES

Dr Peter Greener RADM James Gilmour Hon Mark Mitchell Evan Butler-Jones Hon Ron Mark Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO Jennie Vickers Nicholas Dynon John Campbell MNZM Don Lord HE Dr Itzhak Gerberg Dr Germana Nicklin Dr John Battersby Barnaby Pace LTCOL (Ret) Simon Ewing-Jarvie

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Dr Peter Greener Dr Bridgette-Sullivan Taylor Dr John Battersby Debbie Howarth Jennie Vickers Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO Ruth Currie DSD

Prof Rouben Azizian Dr Reuben Steff Paul Howard John Deal Douglas Pauling John Campbell MNZM Pat Cullen

UPCOMING ISSUE Summer – December 2019 Features: non-traditional capabilities, border, wrap-up from Pacific 2019.

Copy Deadline: 03 December 2019

ASSOCIATION

Line of Defence

ISSN 2463-5774 (Print) • ISSN 2463-6258 (Online)

DEFENCE

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

6

Towards the Networked Force: An interview with Commander Joint Forces New Zealand

30

Tackling Human Trafficking

9

National security, international stability and the importance of a resilient Defence Force

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‘Operative’ diplomacy as a force for countering terrorism

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Tactical Solutions hits 20-year mark

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World military expenditure grows to $1.8 trillion in 2018

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GA-ASI extends RPA leadership

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Future-proofing A&D manufacturing for Industry 4.0

Boundless Continent: Managing Antarctic border flows

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18

More frontline troops to respond to crises in region

FM talks up commitment to region’s Public Service Commissioners

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How to defend New Zealand

22

On a mission with the ATR 72MP

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NZDIA Government Procurement Rules guidance

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Protesters beat hollow victory drum

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Logistics: From equipping the unit to equipping the force

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DCP poses big questions over ‘non-traditional’ capabilities

REVIEWS % EVENTS 46

A story of heroism in three parts

47 Events

HOMELAND SECURITY

40

Why do we need a National Security Journal?

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Facilities and Public Spaces conference offers answers to ‘wicked’ problems

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Terror Resilience: Human factors and psychological strategies

Defsec Media Limited publishes Line of Defence, FireNZ Magazine and New Zealand Security Magazine premier publications covering industry sectors that help keep Kiwis safe. Find us online www.defsec.net.nz Copyright: No article or part thereof may be reproduced without prior consent of the publisher.

Disclaimer: The information contained in this publication is given in good faith and has been derived from sources believed to be reliable and accurate.

However, neither the publishers nor any person involved in the preparation of this publication accept any form of liability whatsoever for its contents including advertisements, editorials, opinions, advice or information or for any consequences from its use.

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Towards the Networked Force: An interview with Commander Joint Forces New Zealand Dr Peter Greener, Senior Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies (VUW) asks COMJ RADM James Gilmour about large-scale training exercises, overseas deployments, women in uniform, frigates, helicopters and more.

PG: From your perspective as Commander Joint Forces (COMJ), what are the main implications of the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018, and The Climate Crisis: Defence Readiness and Responsibilities 2018 report?

RADM Gilmour: Overall it’s pleasing to have refreshed direction from Government. The Strategic Defence Policy Statement (SDPS) makes clear the value that the NZDF offers to the Community, Nation and World. It reflects the Wellbeing Budget and the importance attached to ensuring the wellbeing of New Zealanders. The SDPS establishes the value NZDF brings.

Dr Peter Greener is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University Wellington. He is also an Honorary Professor and was previously Academic Dean at the Command and Staff College of the New Zealand Defence Force 6

In looking at the Living Standards Framework (LSF) and the Wellbeing Budget, the Capitals (Social, Human, Natural, and Financial and Physical) which form the foundation of the LSF necessarily rely on a sovereign, secure New Zealand. National security is therefore a critical element in achieving Government’s wellbeing outcomes.

The SDPS sets out clearly the roles and capabilities required of the Defence Force and how we should be prepared to respond. We are required to be combat capable; flexible and agile; highly trained and competetent; properly resourced; embody New Zealand’s values, and be seen as trusted partners.

The Climate Crisis: Defence Readiness and Responsibilities 2018 report had no surprises in it. The report establishes the security-related threats of climate change and by implication the tasks the NZDF will need to be prepared for. The ongoing impact of climate change and extreme weather events, for example in Kiribati and Tuvalu, are illustrations of what we need to be ready to respond to.

PG: Over a fourteen-year period from 1999 until 2013, particularly with Timor Leste and Afghanistan, the New Zealand Defence Force experienced a very high tempo of operations with almost ten thousand personnel deployed to these operations.

With current large deployments, Iraq and Antarctica for example, being alternately training focused or providing logistical support, how

important are major exercises such as Sari Bair, Southern Katipo, Talisman Sabre and RIMPAC to ensuring combat interoperability with our partners and allies?

RADM Gilmour: We need to ensure that we maintain our ability to perform in medium to high intensity operations.

Exercises such as these allow us to operate and integrate with partner militaries and improve interoperability.

Our function at Joint Forces is to take capabilities prepared by the single Services and integrate them. We then use our experience to prepare capabilities rather than people.

PG: Whilst exercises such as Southern Katipo are central to the development of ensuring interoperability with our partners and allies, how important an exercise is it for the development of joint operations for the NZDF and for working with other government and partner agencies?

RADM Gilmour: Southern Katipo (SK) is the largest exercise run by the NZDF alongside other government agencies and NGOs. The focus since 2011 has been to realise the Joint Task Force – usually an amphibious Joint Task Force recognising our maritime environment. It provides the NZDF with an opportunity to ‘get everything out of the shed’ and achieve the Government’s Directed Level of Capability (DLOC) with mounting, projecting and sustaining a Joint Task Force.

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because New Zealand values the rulesbased order and here our actions match our rhetoric. Governments from both sides of the fence have reiterated our commitment in these areas. In return we gain important relationships and partners.

PG: In return, what benefits are NZDF personnel seen to bring to such missions?

RADM Gilmour: Without exception our people are well regarded. Often we are given responsibilities well above our rank level. We provide a capability which is respected, along with a cultural sensitivity which is valued.

This isn’t an accidental capability – we are a bicultural, multi-cultural society which is part of a wider, diverse set of Pacific cultures. We are also a small first world nation and we know what it’s like to be condescended to; we identify other small nations and enter our relationships with them as partnerships.

Over the years we’ve achieved increasing complementarity - though conception, design, projection, sustainment and recovery will always need work. However, over the next five years the focus will be on the development of a truly networked combat force by 2025.

Networked means more than networked communications and command and control systems, it also means networked relationships. We are being very clear that Network to us is both a noun and a verb. So, it is not just about the equipment, it is what we do with it – it’s about attitude and imagination.

A truly networked force should be networked throughout the system rather than just in the battle space. How quickly can we communicate with the systems supporting us? How quickly can we clarify Rules of Engagement or Line of Defence

get an airworthiness system decision to enable operations?

We are now working on SK20 and we need to question just how mature we are at being ‘networked’. Developing connections between Services and between agencies will be a major investment theme here.

PG: Although operational numbers in the Middle East have drawn down over the last six years, the NZDF still retains a significant presence in the area. Some deployments, such as those to the Multinational Force and Observers and to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) have lasted for decades. What benefit do such deployments offer for New Zealand?

RADM Gilmour: The Government continues to commit to these missions

PG: In considering NZDF personnel, despite significant efforts, the number of women in uniform in the NZDF has not significantly increased over the past decade. However academic research, both locally and internationally, demonstrates the value of deploying women in the field. As COMJ do you have any observations here?

RADM Gilmour: Women and men in the NZDF are highly capable and as a Commander I never draw distinctions in ability based on gender. There are though times when it is more appropriate from a cultural perspective for the NZDF to be represented by woman in uniform than men – when on operations engaging for instance with Moslem women.

Women commanders are every bit as effective as their male counterparts.

I am frustrated by the slowness of growth in numbers of women in the ranks; it deprives us of talent. We need to work on perceived barriers to entry, and to exit.

We should encourage millennials to consider a career that will take them in and out of the NZDF. How can we create an employment system which recognises the skills people gain when 7

DEFENCE

they are in civilian employment, yet wish to return to their Service?

People ought to be able to gain promotion from recognition of the new skills they bring back to us. We need an environment that encourages this and I think we are making good progress in this area.

PG: Turning now to platform capability; each of the ANZAC frigates, Te Kaha and Te Mana, have been deployed several times on anti-terrorism and anti-piracy missions, for instance in the Arabian Gulf and off the Horn of Africa. You yourself were Commander, Combined Task Force 151, between July and October 2011 where you were responsible for counter piracy operations in the South Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin. How important is it for New Zealand to have survivable ships to contribute to international peace and security operations?

RADM Gilmour: Survivability is key to operational effectiveness and the ability to persist. The ability to fight, win and survive will depend on threat, machinery, doctrine and training relative to the threat – whether the mission is in the Middle East or the Southern Ocean – nature itself is a threat to our people there. This extends to all equipment that the NZDF operates, not just the ships. A capability’s strengths and weaknesses will determine where it 8

can be deployed and the outputs it can reasonably be expected to achieve.

PG: The Royal New Zealand Navy is in a process of fleet renewal and following the release of the Defence Capability Plan 2019, there will ultimately be nine ships capable of embarking helicopters, with the anticipated two sealift ships capable of carrying additional utility helicopters. At the same time there is to be an increase of more than 25% in Army service personnel. Whilst a commitment has been made in principal to replacing the maritime helicopters by 2028, should consideration be given not only to their replacement, but also to increasing the total number of operational helicopters?

RADM Gilmour: What is our Output Agreement with the Government and how many capabilities are required to achieve that? We have an economy roughly the size of Sydney’s and there’s a lot of competition for the public dollar. The Capital Plan spends some time looking at models of affordability and our current Capability Plan provides the best value for money.

These considerations balance capability qualities and quantities. As an operational commander I am aware that quantity can have a quality of its own – it is not ideal to have the latest highest tech that is not available due to the small numbers of them that can be

afforded.

PG: Returning to personnel, in the July issue of Navy Today the Chief of Navy indicated that whilst Navy will have a world-class fleet by 2030 “there will be a challenge in the personnel area.”

An increase in the size of Army is to be welcomed, but given the additional capability the ships’ platforms may potentially bring, do you believe that there may need to be an increase overall in Navy personnel?

RADM Gilmour: Modelling would show that Navy needs more suitably qualified personnel; the Integrated Force Structure model will show that.

Rather than absolute numbers we need to talk about effectiveness, and here Navy would argue that you need more personnel to achieve a suitable ship-to shore ratio.

PG: What do you see as the major challenges for ‘jointness’ in the NZDF for the future?

RADM Gilmour: The greatest challenge is moving from the ‘joint effect’ to the ‘networked effect’. Each of the single Services have their own training priorities but there’s rarely anything any Service does without support from another. To provide the joint effect requires us to be an integrated, networked force.

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National security, international stability and the importance of a resilient Defence Force Hon Mark Mitchell praises NZDF Christchurch response, lauds continued UNCMAC deployment and P3 and C-130 fleet replacements, stresses importance of mental health, and raises continued concern over Defence Estate Regeneration delays.

At the time of writing, last Sunday marked the six-month anniversary of the Christchurch Mosque Terror Attacks. In light of this, I would like to acknowledge the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) for the significant role it played in the terror attack relief effort. Approximately 550

Hon Mark Mitchell is the Opposition Spokesperson for Defence, the previous Minister of Defence, and a former Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee.

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NZDF personnel were deployed or on standby to offer support or assistance.

I am very proud of our Defence Force personnel for the way they responded to the March 15 attacks.

Whether it be at home or abroad, our Defence Force plays an instrumental part in keeping New Zealanders safe.

In today’s changing world, many emerging threats have global application. That is why we must continue to support international efforts to maintain peace and stability through the deployment of NZDF personnel overseas.

I support the Government’s recent decision to continue deployment of six NZDF personnel to South Korea.

New Zealand has deployed military personnel to the United Nations Command & Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) since 1998. I renewed this commitment whilst I was Minister of Defence and am happy to see this renewed deployment mandate will continue until August 2021.

In order to contribute towards global stability, we must have a worldclass Defence Force. I am becoming increasingly concerned at the delays in NZDF policy and procurement processes under the current Government. Although I acknowledge the Minister for his work to replace the ageing P-3 Orions and C-130H Hercules, as started under National,

his continual review of National’s plans for the defence sector whilst in government is nothing but a costly timewasting exercise.

Earlier this year, the Minister announced a further review of the Defence Estate, despite inheriting a $1.5 billion Defence Estate Regeneration Plan from National.

Defence Estate regeneration may not be as high profile or interesting to the public as the purchase of P8 Poseidons, but it is no less important to our NZDF personnel.

From September 23 to 29, it is Mental Health Awareness Week (MHAW) nationwide. As mental health continues to be a growing issue in New Zealand, this is an important week for all Kiwis and Defence Force personnel are no exception.

When serving in the NZDF, personnel are often exposed to high levels of stress and pressure. It is important to be aware of this and take steps to look after your mental health.

Historically, the Defence Force hasn’t been the best place to talk about your feelings – I am glad to see attitudes are changing and there are services available to help personnel who need support.

During this MHAW, I encourage all members of the Force to check on your friends and colleagues and seek help if you need someone to talk to.

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Tactical Solutions hits 20-year mark Leading local equipment, procurement and support solutions specialist to law enforcement, correctional facilities and defence, achieves two-decade milestone.

Offering a formidable range from their Auckland showroom, Tactical Solutions has been supplying worldclass tactical gear and detection systems to the New Zealand and Australian government and military sectors for the last 20 years.

With certified and trained technical engineers possessing wide-reaching hands-on expertise across security, detection and tactical arenas, the Tactical Solutions team provides unparalleled through-life support services that are unrivalled in New Zealand.

Over two decades, the Kiwi company has evolved to offer single source solutions meeting the unique requirements and challenges of the front-line organisations that keep New Zealand safe, including the New Zealand Defence Force, New Zealand Police, the Ministry of Justice and Department of Corrections, among others.

Most recently, for example, as the New Zealand agents of clothing specialist Cooneen Protection, Tactical Solutions was selected to role out the new and improved body armour for New Zealand Police over the next three years.

“We are extremely proud to have been part of equipping and securing the front-line of New Zealand over the last 20 years,” Rob Hodge, managing director of Tactical Solutions, told Line of Defence. “We are expanding our presence by opening offices and warehouses in Wellington, Christchurch and Melbourne and look forward to actively bringing our expertise to the doorsteps of those we serve.”

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Defence enablers With some of the world’s leading innovators in its armoury, such as ESS Eyewear, Surefire, 5.11 and Camelbak – which it currently supplies to the NZDF – Tactical Solutions provides our soldiers with advanced combat wear that gives them the technological edge.

Long term affiliations and purchasing agreements with hundreds of brands worldwide mean that Tactical Solutions offers equipment, clothing and systems that are field-proven in conflict and disaster zones. They offer a wide variety of equipment, personal protective equipment (PPE), EOD, operational equipment and training to units throughout Australasia.

Law enforcement partners Deployment at the sharp end of law enforcement has provided Tactical Solutions with a genuine affinity for the requirements of the officer on the ground.

Over two decades, the Tactical Solutions team has nurtured extensive contacts with manufacturers who have developed equipment to meet the expectations of law enforcement bodies in some of the world’s most demanding markets, including the US. The company has quietly developed a reputation as the go-to provider of world-leading brands, such as 5.11, Surefire, Oakley and Safariland, and is uniquely placed to deliver insightful advice to procurement officers at the department level.

Detection specialists A trusted supplier of equipment and expertise to New Zealand Corrections for over a decade, the

Tactical Solutions team brings wide industry knowledge and an in-depth understanding of the prison and justice environment to the procurement process.

As a result, they have accrued valuable insights that inform their advisory role. This commitment to ensuring fit-for-purpose equipment specification and supply helps maintain Corrections’ position as a responsible employer with a high regard for the safety of employees and inmates.

From body armour for frontline staff and equipment for response teams, through to the latest innovations in checkpoint security, body scanners and perimeter surveillance, Tactical Solutions is a proven knowledge and supply partner with the scope and credentials to deliver.

Local government suppliers The team also meets the equipment and uniform requirements of several local councils, bringing a worldwide sourcing capability to their varied deployment criteria. From uniforms, boots, auxiliary pouches, protective equipment to body-worn camera systems, the Tactical Solutions team delivers superior products that local government employees are proud to use.

Truly effective partnerships take time, and after two decades Tactical Solutions has become the most trusted local supplier of the world’s most trusted gear to New Zealand’s government and military sectors.

Understandably, they are proud of what they’ve achieved, and privileged to equip the organisations responsible for safeguarding the security of all New Zealanders.

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Thank you to all our supporters for

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DEFENCE GA-ASI extends RPA leadership MQ-9B edges closer to RAF delivery, Predator A turns 25, and GA-ASI demonstrates Multi-Mission Control and Metis RPA capabilities that offer operator savings for the USAF. UK Test and Evaluation Contract signed General Atomics Aeronautical Systems (GA-ASI) has signed a Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) contract with the UK Ministry of Defence to complete the test and evaluation activities required to certify the Protector RG Mk1 Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) system to fly in civil airspace.

The DCS contract also funds additional Protector programme elements, including X-band SATCOM system verification, training material development and logistics planning.

“This completes another important milestone as we work towards the delivery of Protector to the Royal Air Force (RAF),” said Linden Blue, GAASI’s CEO. “We have completed more than 100 qualification test flights using our two company-owned SkyGuardian RPA.” MQ-9B SkyGuardian is the baseline RPA that will become the Protector RG Mk1 once delivered to the RAF. Delivery is expected in the early 2020s and RAF operators will continue to support evaluation activity for Protector using the two SkyGuardian test aircraft and the Protector cockpit.

“The testing and evaluation phase of the Protector programme is an important element that ensures the safe delivery of this next generation capability,” said RAF Group Captain Lyndon Jones, Protector RG Mk1 Programme Director. “The Royal Air Force will continue its strong relationship with GA-ASI to ensure leading edge and innovative technology, such as Detect and Avoid (DAA), is integrated into Protector.”

The GA-ASI-developed DAA system consists of a Due Regard air-toair Radar and processor, integrated with Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance 12

System (TCAS II), and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B). Protector RG Mk1 is also being built for all-weather performance with lightning protection, damage tolerance, and a de-icing system.

Predator A turns 25 GA-ASI marked the 25th anniversary of its Predator A unmanned aircraft in July. Predator A completed its first flight in July 1994 and made its operational debut in 1995.

More than 320 Predator As have been delivered to customers in support of global security throughout the world, and the product line remained in production until 2011. Predator As have flown close to 141,000 missions and over two million total flight hours. More than 90 percent of those hours were flown supporting combat missions.

“With innovation in mind, we have always looked for ways to challenge the industry standard,” said Linden Blue.

“Our Predator-series has evolved over the past 25 years into MQ-9 and Gray Eagle (MQ-1C), which are the most combat-proven RPA in the world.”

GA-ASI won its first major program

award for the Predator A in 1994 from the U.S. Joint Program Office, which was later transferred to the U.S. Air Force. In addition to the U.S., the Predator A was purchased by the Italian Ministry of Defence for the Italian Air Force, and later in a modernised version known as the Predator XP for the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Predator A established GA-ASI’s legacy of delivering long-endurance, multi-mission RPA with integrated sensors and data link systems for persistent situational awareness and rapid strike capabilities. The Predator series continues to excel in combat environments and in performing civilian surveillance missions.

“We’re proud of our long and distinguished history of supporting the warfighter,” said David R. Alexander, president, GA-ASI. “From Predator A, to Predator B, Gray Eagle, Avenger®, and their various mission configurations, our aircraft and payload systems continue to address changing mission requirements for U.S. and Allied militaries and civilian users.”

Over its 25 year history, the Predator series fleets have flown close to six million flight hours.

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MMC and Metis capabilities demonstrated On 28 August, GA-ASI demonstrated its Multi-Mission Control (MMC) and Metis capabilities during a live flight using company-owned MQ-9 Block 1 and MQ-9 Block 5 Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA).

MMC enables a single pilot to control multiple MQ-9s for transit operations and routine Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions using a streamlined graphical user interface and lightweight hand controller. Metis integrates joint force ISR tasking requirements with the MMC to dynamically task MQ-9 assets, as well as report task status and share ISR information using a social medialike interface.

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“These capabilities have the potential to dramatically increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the U.S. Air Force’s MQ-9 enterprise by relieving aircrew manning requirements during certain flight profiles,” said David R. Alexander, president of GAASI. “MMC and Metis, when combined with SATCOM Launch and Recovery and our Advanced Cockpit, will reduce aircrew manning by 50 percent.”

As with GA-ASI’s Advanced Cockpit, these capabilities employ an open architecture design that integrates Artificial Intelligence-based functions such as automatic ISR data processing and natural language processing for automated communications. This open approach enables rapid integration that can be applied to other capabilities like

those using the Open Mission System (OMS) standard, and other aircraft like the MQ-1C Gray Eagle.

MMC marks an evolution in the way operators control RPA. Using a single pilot to operate multiple aircraft enables more efficient use of operators when conducting current MQ-9 operations by increasing loiter time for highly tasked MQ-9 crew force or expanding missions provided in support of the Combatant Commander.

Metis enhances communications between supported units, aircrew, and intelligence cells, making the ISR lifecycle faster and more efficient.

The MMC and Metis flights demonstrated a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 7 capability. In a case when one MMC aircraft is dynamically tasked to perform a strike mission or a more dynamic ISR mission, the system allows seamless handoff of the aircraft to a dedicated Ground Control Station where the mission execution crew can prosecute the new tasking. Both MMC and Metis can be used across military forces and for non-defence applications.

The demonstration flights were performed with the cooperation of the U.S. FAA, and under the Certificate of Waiver or Authorization granted to GA-ASI’s Flight Test & Training Center (FTTC) in North Dakota, USA. 13

DEFENCE Future-proofing A&D manufacturing for Industry 4.0 Evan Butler-Jones, Director, Defence Product Line, Aerospace & Defence Business Unit at IFS, provides a checklist for aerospace and defence manufacturers to ensure they take advantage of the benefits of Industry 4.0.

The benefits of Industry 4.0 for A&D manufacturers are enormous but involve critical decisions on digital investments and an increasingly cyberaware ecosystem. A&D manufacturers can ensure they extract value from Industry 4.0 to stay competitive into the next decade and keep their business processes connected, configurable, intelligent and secure, but that means getting the building blocks in place with a forward-looking software platform for such futureproofing initiatives.

In a recent report Deloitte defines ‘Aerospace & Defence 4.0’ as the application of Industry 4.0 technologies for developing new cost-effective products and services, making existing products smarter using sensors and connectivity, and leveraging advanced manufacturing processes.

A&D manufacturer BAE Systems has been using these principles in its New Product and Process Development Centre since 2017, where 3D printing and virtual reality technology are used to reduce costs and speed up manufacturing processes for combat aircraft. Still, this may seem like a daunting task for many A&D manufacturers, particularly those tier two and three companies that play a vital supporting role in the manufacturing ecosystem but lack large manpower and monetary resources.

This really doesn’t need to be the case. In fact, IFS customer TESTFUCHS is already seeing the real benefits of a dedicated digital twin 14

approach for the ground support assets and test equipment it manufacturers, implemented as part of a companywide push for digital transformation.

Here I pinpoint four key areas, as well as some helpful feedback we hear across our A&D manufacturing client base, all of which highlight where the right software can help A&D manufacturers deliver on an Aerospace & Defence 4.0 strategy and futureproof their business.

1. Connectivity – “Connecting outside our four factory walls is as important as any new feature we get in software”.

The significance of the digital thread as a communication network is huge in scale and consequently in importance.

It enables a connected flow of data and an integrated view of an asset across its lifetime through various isolated functional perspectives, through multiple factory walls. According to LNS Research, the digital thread can increase supply chain efficiency by 16% and reduce the time required to take a product to market.

Alongside these digital initiatives, more manufacturers have realised revenue gains by extending asset management into the field to supply and service customer assets. This brings in service-based contracts with Service Level Agreements (SLAs) which must be met, and the best way to manage these contracts is by providing a suitable mobile platform for field workers and data feedback from the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT).

This means A&D manufacturers need

Evan Butler-Jones, Director, Defence Product Line, Aerospace & Defence Business Unit at IFS to rely heavily on their supporting enterprise software in order to provide this level of connectivity.

Open frameworks, instant collaboration The right software tools can help them connect to this increasingly digital supply chain ecosystem by offering seamless interoperability with other solutions, either through an open integration framework or through pre-built solutions which meet specific government or industry integration standards.

With servitisation-based business models becoming commonplace among A&D manufacturers, Line of Defence

new direct customer connectivity requirements are opened up—right down to IoT, customer systems, in-house Customer Relationship Management and connectivity with third party contractors who may be carrying out repairs on assets in the field. This means supporting enterprise software must be geared to connect these field-based requirements, with specific asset and service management

functionalities bringing these various data streams together.

2. Configurability – “Every contract has new requirements. We’re running a dozen different models and we need our IT to support that”.

High-level manufacturing research from Deloitte shows more than 50 percent of customers indicate interest in purchasing custom

products or services. In the A&D sector this is even more prevalent, with manufactured parts and assets performing highly specific roles in often unique military and aerospace projects. We see A&D customers becoming more demanding in terms of delivery schedules and customisation.

In response to this, it is becoming a key differentiator for A&D manufacturers to have a wide range of project capabilities, who now have to operate on multiple projects for every customer, each with their own complexities. Reacting to these customer requirements means being as agile as possible. If inflexible incumbent software cannot adapt to these new demands this can result in long delays.

Agile capabilities across the business start from the inside Accepting a customer order and then finding out you don’t have the functionality available to implement and manage the contract can lead to lengthy delays and loss of business.

The key to remaining agile to react to specific customer requests is having a broad functional capability from within the enterprise software you deploy. This should

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DEFENCE include fundamental manufacturing capabilities and flexible financial controls—particularly around the complexities of the assets in A&D, such as project-driven work and managing quality.

Then configure, don’t customise But once A&D manufacturers know they have a complete set of functionalities they can rely on, they need to make sure they can deploy them in a modular approach when required, and configure them to adapt to both unique customer requirements and internally-driven lean initiatives— this is the difference between customisation and configuration.

This could mean configuring separate screens and interfaces for executives at the top level of the business looking at overall performance, and the engineers logging granular information into the software daily.

But here companies can also take advantage of new technologies to introduce new Industry 4.0 manufacturing processes into the factory—such as additive manufacturing machines with their specialised

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requirements for material control and process monitoring. The pace of technology is rapid and predicting what may be required next year isn’t possible.

In such cases, the relevant screens required to manage the new processes and statistics may not exist yet, but the tools within the software to quickly and easily create them should be there!

additive manufacturing, artificial intelligence and virtual/augmented reality mature and begin to deliver solid ROI. Witness IFS partner PTC and BAE Systems creating interactive mixed reality (MR) work instructions for Microsoft HoloLens. MR enabled BAE to train its first-line workers 3040 percent more efficiently.

3. Intelligence – “We made a big leap forward when we went live.

Now we need to keep evolving”.

A&D products produce vast amounts of information—for example the Pratt & Whitney PW1000G engine generates four million data points on every flight. Less complex systems generate less data, but at all levels the value of telemetry is well proven.

A&D companies should leverage this information not only for designing, manufacturing and operating their products but also for developing new, smarter, business models.

Standing still means losing out against more forward-looking competitors, particularly as connected machines become the standard, and Industry 4.0 technologies such as

Adopting technology is a constant endeavour Enterprise IT lifecycles are long-term investments that can be expected to last for decades— ‘forever ago’ in manufacturing terms! As more intelligent technology enters A&D manufacturing facilities, supporting software has to keep pace. Locking into an inflexible system for a set amount of time can mean manufacturers are caught flat-footed and unable to capitalise on new tech initiatives.

In today’s market conditions, manufacturers should consider evergreen software built for compatibility through open integration standards. The goal should be to change IT operations from manual to automated processes, driven by

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intelligent software. The result is an approach where increasing technology investment is matched by software support comprised of components that are always up to date.

4. Security – “We used to be insulated from the DOD’s cyber requirements—not anymore”.

One element highlighted in the Deloitte Aerospace & Defence 4.0 report was the need for A&D manufacturers to adapt to the new cybersecurity paradigm. In commercial aviation, according to PwC’s 2015 Global Airline CEO Survey, 85 percent of airline CEOs in the study viewed cybersecurity as a significant risk, likely reflecting the highly sensitive nature of flight systems and passenger data.

On the defence side there are increasing security expectations from military organisations such as the U.S. Department of Defense (U.S. DOD). In fact, the U.S. DOD has just revealed plans for a set of contractor cybersecurity standards that are scheduled to be implemented by January 2020, called the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification.

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Currently, companies supplying products and services to the U.S. DOD must meet 110 security requirements specified in NIST SP 800-171 or risk losing contract awards and new regulations are unlikely to be more lenient. Other countries have followed suit, including the UK with the Defence Information Strategy (DIS) and Australia with the Information Security Manual (ISM).

The cybersecurity challenge becomes even more sensitive when combined with the proliferation of cloud-based solutions and the security implementations of access control and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

Compliance and cybersecurity flow downstream Regulatory-compliant software can be a key differentiator when bidding for A&D manufacturing contracts.

Your enterprise software should be a strategic enabler for information and cybersecurity. It should be designed from the ground up with security in mind, and address risks and threats

throughout all phases of the software development lifecycle.

Recent cloud infrastructure has already produced workarounds for the cloud security challenge, most notably Microsoft, which has made its Azure cloud platform ISO compliant.

A fully compliant software partner and applications that demonstrate the security of the organisation means A&D manufacturers can trust they are well positioned to compete in an increasingly complex digital arena.

Foundations for Aerospace & Defence 4.0 In an Industry 4.0 world, A&D manufacturers face some critical decisions which are directly linked to business success—and they can look like an insurmountable challenge. The benefits include increased efficiency, profits and security, not to mention a highly satisfied customer base.

However, these benefits can’t be realised without the support of a software facilitator, which helps put the building blocks in place for A&D manufacturers to build and execute on an Aerospace & Defence 4.0 strategy.

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More frontline troops to respond to crises in region The people of the NZDF are highly trained and effective, and above all they’re culturally aware and empathetic. They add value wherever they go. But for too long, writes Minister of Defence Ron Mark, they’ve been stretched too thinly.

I recently travelled to Timor-Leste for the 20th anniversary of INTERFET. 20 years ago the people of Timor-Leste were under attack from militia forces following the vote for independence.

The intervention by a multi-national force of peacekeepers managed to stabilise the situation and put TimorLeste on a path to peace and prosperity.

There have been a few speed bumps on the way, but I’m happy to report that from what I saw Timor-Leste is a nation going from strength to strength.

Back in the days of INTERFET New Zealand deployed an entire

battalion, which we rotated six times.

The Air Force deployed helicopters, as well as transport aircraft and our Navy sent the frigates Te Kaha and Canterbury and the tanker Endeavour.

We were a vital and valued component in the peacekeeping effort.

However, since those days our Defence Force, and in particular our reserves, have been run down to a point committing a force of that strength for that length of time would be a difficult task. There are many reasons why we’ve got to this point.

But, what’s important is we have a

plan to fix it. One of the key parts of the recently released Defence Capability Plan 2019 is a goal to increase the number of personnel in the Army to 6,000 by 2035. This will be mainly at the frontline level. We also plan to steadily increase the numbers we have in the Navy to meet the demands of the new ships we plan to bring online in the next 10 years.

Our people are our strength and for too long the frontlines of our Defence Force have been neglected in favour of back office functions. The civilianisation project led by the National Government

Personnel from No. 3 Squadron and 162 Reconnaissance Squadron painting Holbelis village school. Photo: Supplied / NZDF

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NZDF receives warm reception in Timor-Leste. Photo: Supplied / NZDF

cut many of our experienced NCOs and officers and replaced them with consultants and contractors. It lowered morale, increased attrition and took years to recover from.

We’ve never really caught up, but I think if we stay on the course we are now then we’ll get on top of the problem in the coming years.

Meanwhile, we know from our Strategic Defence Policy Statement that the need to make another Timor-Leste style intervention is increasingly likely, due the complex array of challenges facing the Pacific region. And our climate crisis assessment released last year highlighted the pressure that will be placed on the natural environment and scarce resources of Pacific states as a result of climate change.

We must be prepared to intervene and restore peace in our region – which is why under the Coalition Government’s Pacific Reset we now consider it as high a priority as operating at home or the Southern Ocean. We must also be able to contribute to operations globally, in support of an international rules based order that we rely on for our security and prosperity, and is coming under increasing pressure. We must be better prepared to respond when natural Line of Defence

disasters strike, including at home.

The Defence Capability Plan 2019 is more than purchasing long overdue new kit for the Defence Force. It about creating a Defence Force fit for the modern world, across our Army, Navy and Air Force, and which can step in to help when our friends in the Pacific need us the most.

One of the things I heard in Timor-Leste was how valued we are for the way we went about our work during INTERFET. This value is echoed whenever I speak to my Pacific counterparts at bilateral meetings and international events.

The people in New Zealand’s Defence Force are our greatest asset.

They’re highly trained and effective, but above all they’re culturally aware and empathetic. They create value wherever they go, but for too long they’ve been doing this while stretched thinly.

After years of deferred decisions, this is why the historic levels of investment the Coalition Government has made in defence this term is so important, with more than $2.5 billion allocated already. And the Defence Capability Plan 2019 provides the roadmap for what is to come.

Right now, I am focussed on building the case for some of the

highest priority investments contained in the Plan – the replacement of our aging Hercules, modern Protected Mobility vehicles for our Army, and a low-end domestic and regional air surveillance capability to complement the P-8A Poseidon fleet.

We have a fantastic opportunity to create the Defence Force we need to tackle the challenges our nation and the Pacific will face in the coming decades, and I am committed to seeing the task through.

Hon Ron Mark, Minister of Defence

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DEFENCE How to defend New Zealand In a recent Wellington public lecture, Professor Hugh White discussed the historic challenges facing Australia and New Zealand in the way they each approach their security in the face of major-power rivalries in Asia. Dr Wayne Mapp offers his views.

Hugh White, in a recent lecture at the Centre of Strategic Studies at Victoria University, argued that the long-standing commitment of the United States to its Pacific allies was coming to an end.

That in the face of growing Chinese power, not just in Asia but also in the western Pacific, the United States would withdraw, if not into full isolationism, at least to the point of abandoning the alliances it has built in world war two and in the years immediately thereafter.

The deepest alliance guarantees, specifically to Australia, Japan and South Korea would count for nothing.

To be fair, this might be overstating White’s proposition, but he was certainly of the view that the bedrock

Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO was New Zealand’s Minister of Defence and Minister of Science and Innovation from 2008 to 2011 20

of the alliances will slowly crumble to shifting sands.

White’s lecture was derived from his latest book, How to Defend Australia.

In this book White argues that Australia has to adopt a maritime denial strategy.

That means that Australia has currently over-invested in its surface fleet, whereas a better defensive approach would be to invest more heavily in submarines and airpower, especially maritime patrol and strike.

He has made the same point previously in lectures and in private discussion, including with myself.

Australia already intends to build twelve new submarines, so this could only mean that twenty-four would be more appropriate. This would make Australia the fourth in the world in terms of submarine power, behind the United States, Russia and China. Quite an ambition for a middle-ranked power.

The reasoning behind this strategy is that the United States cannot be absolutely relied upon to fulfil its alliance commitments. Therefore, Australia has to be more capable in defending itself. In his lecture at Victoria, White extended the concept to New Zealand on the basis that both countries are effectively one strategic unit.

White has real influence in Australian defence circles. While it is unlikely everything he says will be picked up by the Australian government, it is quite possible that some of it will be. Australia may well buy more F35 aircraft than it currently intends, along with more air tanker support and new basing arrangements. I would not

be surprised if the ultimate F35 buy extends up to 150 aircraft.

Although the decision to buy the F35 binds Australia into the wider western industrial military complex, there really is no practical alternative aircraft. In any event the same could be said of all the twenty or so countries that will ultimately operate the F35. One hundred and fifty F35 aircraft would not be out of line for a country of 35 million people, which will be the likely Australian population in 2035.

Despite White’s influence and reputation, does his overall strategic view have any real merit, in a way that should influence New Zealand policy makers?

The essence of White’s thesis is that China will become the predominant power in Asia. From there he argues that the United States commitment to Australia will wane because the risk of war with China will be too great.

This does rather conflate Asia with the Pacific. Although it might seem that Australia is a geographical extension of Asia, in truth Australia, along with New Zealand, is actually in the South West Pacific. Even the northern reaches of Australia are thousands of miles from continental Asia.

White is probably right that China will supplant the United States in Asia, although it is hard to see that Japan, for instance, will become a Chinese lackey anytime soon. However, that is quite different to China supplanting the United States in the Pacific, even the western Pacific.

Unlike China, the United States has sovereign territory right across the Line of Defence

Pacific, from Guam and the Northern Marianas to American Samoa, and of course the fiftieth state of Hawaii.

America will defend its sovereign interests in the Pacific to the utmost, in the same way that Britain, in much less auspicious circumstances, was prepared to defend the Falklands. More compellingly, it is hard to imagine the United States forgetting the lesson of Pearl Harbor anytime soon.

Part of White’s thesis is that Australia should have more strategic independence. This is not just a response to an increasingly powerful China, or a potentially weaker United States. It is a benefit in its own right in that it gives Australia more choices and more autonomy. So even if the United States alliance still holds, there is an advantage in being more independent.

In White’s view this requires Australia to have more military power.

This is quite a different calculation to that of New Zealand policy makers. We think we can have more independence because we are more remote. And because we are small. In contrast, Australian decision makers think that New Zealand can make that choice because we automatically gain from a powerful Australia.

So, what does all this thinking actually mean for New Zealand?

Should New Zealand embark upon a serious expansion of our defence forces, especially in the air and maritime domains?

Apart from the fact it would be hard to convince the New Zealand public to substantially increase defence expenditure, say all the way to 2 percent Line of Defence

of GDP, it is not obvious there is a compelling case to do so.

It is not obvious that our strategic position, along with that of Australia, has so weakened that we have little choice in the matter. Notwithstanding that there is broad recognition that the international order is coming under challenge, it has not, and will not change beyond recognition. In particular the United States is not going to cease to be the most powerful nation in the Pacific.

However, White’s defence prescription and, in fact, the decisions by New Zealand’s policy makers, do point in a certain direction. The acquisition of the four P8 Poseidon aircraft is the most significant defence decision of the last two decades. They will provide a serious upgrade in maritime surveillance and given that all Poseidon aircraft come in one configuration, they will have much greater maritime attack capabilities than the existing P3 Orions.

In large measure the acquisition of the P8 fits within White’s prescription.

Maybe New Zealand should have bought six, on the basis of a one-forone replacement of the Orions. This is a theoretical possibility for a few more years, but the possibility will soon pass as the production line for the P8 will shutdown within the next five years.

The replacement of the two ANZAC frigates is the next big strategic decision. It is inconceivable that New Zealand would replace the ANZAC frigates with submarines. The last person to seriously argue the case for submarines was Admiral Saull, Chief of Navy in the early 1980s.

Submarines are far too specialised for New Zealand; their only practical use being in an all-out war. With such a small fleet, New Zealand will always want a general purpose naval combat ship that can be used in a wide variety of roles, from general patrol and protection duties through to actual combat roles. The choice is simply between which type of frigate, and the numbers.

Right at the moment it has been shown that two is too few. Both ANZAC frigates are out of service in the middle of their midlife upgrade.

This situation is likely to last for more than a year. If international conditions were more difficult than the present, that is not a risk that New Zealand would want to take.

The choice of ship to replace the frigates will need to be made within the next five years at the outside. Clearly New Zealand can afford two modern frigates such as the Type 26 frigate that have been ordered by the Australian and Canadian Navies. When defence expenditure is around 1 percent of GDP, if such a decision required an increase to 1.1 or 1.2 percent of GDP then that would be a decision that is well within New Zealand’s financial capability.

A better choice might be lighter frigates such as British Type 31 frigate.

These are a serious ship and are in fact slightly larger than the ANZAC frigates.

They are costing 300 million pounds per ship, although that does not include all the combat equipment. The final price is more likely to be 500 million pounds or $1 billion. New Zealand could readily afford three Type 31 frigates from within the existing defence budget, or for a little more.

In summary, New Zealand does not need to radically alter its defence planning. The strategic situation has not altered to a degree requiring any different. However, prudence would indicate that New Zealand does need to make serious decisions about defending the maritime domain. This can be accomplished with the existing defence framework.

The decision to buy the P8 Poseidon was a major part of this thinking. The same clear thought will be required for the next serious decision about replacing the two ANZAC frigates.

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DEFENCE On a mission with the ATR 72MP Strait of Sicily. The temperature at sea level is high. The ATR 72MP, produced by Leonardo, designated P-72A by the Italian Air Force, belongs to the 41° Stormo – Wing, has taken off a couple of hours earlier from the Sigonella Air Base.

On board, one of the four Mission System Operators (MSO) carefully watches over the sea surface with the Seaspray 7300E active electronically scanned radar also produced by Leonardo.

A suspicious track needs further investigation: with the ISAR (Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar) mode the operator gets a clear profile of what turns out to be a large vessel.

The onboard Tactical Coordinator (TACCO) carefully coordinates the operational activity and immediately orders another operator to follow the unit even more closely through the stabilised turret’s electro-optical sensors: now the ship’s identification number can be clearly read and the investigation can go ahead. If necessary, in case of emergency, the onboard technician (OBT), is ready to drop self-inflating life rafts from the rear door, which can be opened in flight.

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On board the P-72A The mission system operator, thanks to the high multirole capacity provided by the Multifunction Operator Console (MOC) can operate with three main sensors, radar, electrooptical as well as with the ESM (for detecting, analysing and identifying 360° any electro-magnetic emitter).

These can be configured for any tactical/operational mission as well as to exchange high-speed data and information with the command and

control centres via advanced Tactical Data Link and satellite communication systems. Therefore, the system stands out for its netcentric and C4ISR (Command, Control, Comunication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) capabilities made possible also by the communication systems that make it suitable for NATO operations.

The MOCs are integrated within Leonardo’s ATOS (Airborne Tactical Observation System) mission system, the aircraft’s real operational heart.

The P-72A has an enormous capability to acquire information and to provide it to the crew with a human-machine interface that provides the option of having all the elements required to maintain a mission situational awareness concentrated on just one display. The performance of the mission system and of the sensors considerably reduce the time needed to achieve the objectives to be pursued.

This allows to adjust, wherever possible, the time spent in the operations area, thus optimising the aircraft’s range.

The P-72A is like a smartphone, partly a telephone, partly a navigator, partly a computer...everything is perfectly integrated and networked.

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Leonardo’s ATR 72MP The P-72A is equipped with one of the most modern “glass cockpits” available on the market. It originates from the one of the commercial ATR -600 versions with differences that are absolutely minimal. Therefore, a pilot coming from the ATR Training Centre in Toulouse (France) can start the operational training straight away.

It is a military version of a civil aircraft. This feature provides an optimisation for the flight management, the mission systems, the continuous monitoring of the flight parameters so that high safety levels are assured in all conditions. The two engines respond promptly especially at low altitudes. Thus, the engine power

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settings for the various operational altitudes and speeds can be regulated precisely, this allows for a good range management.

With over 1,500 aircraft delivered, over 200 operators in more than 100 countries, over 30 million flight hours, ATR assures reliability, operational availability and extremely efficient logistic support on a worldwide scale.

Not only, but many ATR operators fly every day from a number of islands and sea environments, thus the most suitable anti-corrosion strategies are already built into the aircraft. This provides an ideal platform for an aircraft such as the P-72 that carries out most of its missions at low altitudes over the sea.

Surveillance Master The P-72A is a modern aircraft with a state-of-the-art technology capable of giving its best with a suite of sensors that are perfectly integrated within the ATOS mission system. This aircraft was planned to be a maritime patrol aircraft but it offers a potential the goes well beyond patrolling with a wide range of assignable missions. The aircraft’s operational flexibility is remarkable, making it easy to be redeployed almost anywhere. This increases its persistence in the operations’ area.

The system is equipped with a Ground Support Station that allows crews to plan the mission and then send, in-flight, images and tactical data collected in near real time via the satellite channel. Data, disseminated to the Command Centres, can be used both for conducting operations, and for any re-planning needs in times consistent with the operational scenario’s evolution.

The P-72As very first operational use was in 2017 as a support for the security implemented for the G7 summit in Taormina, Italy. The 41° Stormo’s P-72As are manned by mixed crews, formed by personnel belonging both to the Air Force as well as to the Navy. They assure that a platform that perfectly meets the ever more urging maritime patrol, surveillance, search and rescue needs in the Mediterranean Sea will be constantly present.

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DEFENCE NZDIA Government Procurement Rules guidance In its recently released Guide to the new procurement environment covering Defence and other Agencies in New Zealand, the NZDIA breaks down the Government Procurement Rules 4th edition.

According to Chapter 9 of the New Zealand Government Defence Capability Plan 2019 (DCP), “International prime companies submitting proposals to provide their capabilities outlined in this capability plan will be required to provide activity reports setting out the steps they have taken to identify and use New Zealand industry to supply goods and services as part of their proposal.”

This new approach reflects the agency-wide rules changes introduced on 1 October 2019 to procurement processes across the New Zealand Government. The new rules are captured in the Government Procurement Rules 4th Edition 2019 (PR4).

Even in a small country like New Zealand, public sector procurement exceeds NZ$41 billion per annum, and the government is committed to increasing engagement and opportunities for New Zealand business to be involved in government procurement. This commitment is recognised as having the potential to “increase exports and support NZ economic growth”.

The new requirements present both challenges and opportunities to industry from outside and within New Zealand. NZDIA believes that these changes will bring substantial benefits to industry and government, and we are here to support both.

The NZDIA introductory guide is designed to assist Primes and other businesses interested in pitching for work with New Zealand government agencies – and in particular with MOD and NZDF – to understand the new PR4 Rules. NZDIA is ready to assist 24

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• the procurement’s contribution to the results you are trying to achieve, including any Broader Outcomes (see below) you are trying to achieve; and • the total costs and benefits of a procurement (total cost of ownership).

Industry so they have the best chance of success for their business and for the New Zealand economy.

As always, a very good first step is to join NZDIA by visiting www.nzdia. co.nz and clicking on the ‘Become a Member’ link. If already a member, we encourage you to engage even more.

NZDIA is the preeminent association in New Zealand connecting Defence and industry and we are working hard to deliver value to our members and support New Zealand Defence deliver to the Community, Nation and World.

Key changes PR4 rule changes took effect on 1 October 2019. The amendments to the Rules are described as “essential in reforming government procurement to support broader social, economic, cultural and environmental outcomes…” Agencies are working through how to implement the changes.

“Through these Rules, government contracts will now be more explicitly leveraged to support broader outcomes,” states PR4. “By seeking continual innovation and requiring high standards in the procurement process, we are ensuring that those who win contracts in New Zealand can compete in the international market.”

Among the changes there is a new Supplier Code of Conduct with a Statement of Government Expectations of Suppliers.

There is also a new Government Procurement Charter (GPR) setting out Government’s expectations of Line of Defence

how each agency should conduct their procurement activity to achieve public value in areas such as the appropriate management of risk.

These expectations flow down into relationships between Primes and their own supply chains.

All government agency staff engaged in procurement (i.e. not just procurement people) must now be trained in the Five Procurement Principles and the Charter, and the agency’s practices must reflect these.

Businesses should also train their staff to ensure they play their part under the new rules.

Each agency must also be able to show how it has used sound research to plan an appropriate and proportionate approach-to-market strategy.

Accordingly, expect more detail in Procurement Plans. They must contain all known or anticipated contract opportunities that the Rules apply to (not just those driven by the Procurement team), and they are required to be published six-monthly (March/October) in relation to, for example, goods and services (100k plus), and recurrent contracts due for renewal.

New definitions Important new definitions in PR4 include: Public value (Rules 3, 12 and 46): which means the best available result for New Zealand for the money spent.

It includes using resources effectively, economically and responsibly, and taking into account:

The principle of public value when procuring goods, services or works does not mean selecting the lowest price but rather the best possible outcome for the total cost of ownership (over the whole-of-life of the goods, services or works).

Selecting the most appropriate procurement process that is proportionate to the value, risk and complexity of the procurement will help achieve public value.

New Zealand Business (Rule 17): is a business that originated in New Zealand (not being a New Zealand subsidiary of an offshore business), is majority owned or controlled by New Zealanders, and has its principal place of business in New Zealand (references in the DCP to New Zealand industry includes all companies located in and employing people in New Zealand).

Broader Outcomes (Rule 16): are the secondary benefits which are generated due to the way goods, services or works are produced or delivered. They include economic, environmental, social and cultural outcomes.

Designated Contracts: include ICT services/computer software, construction, security services, and light vehicles (these are contract categories identified by Cabinet in which priority outcomes must be included and published online).

Panels All of Government (AOG) and Agency own panels will continue to be used by all agencies. Industry should watch out for opportunities to join Panels and watch out for guidance as to how goods and services work put out to Panels honours the new principles like ‘Public Value’ and delivering ‘Broader Outcomes’.

For more information on the NZDIA and on the Association’s PR4 guidance, visit www.nzdia.co.nz.

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Opinion: Protesters beat hollow victory drum As news that there would be no NZDIA Annual Forum in 2019 became public, protest groups were quick to record it as a win. The tempo of Defence procurement and rate of NZDIA membership growth, writes Nicholas Dynon, suggest otherwise.

On 01 October, Radio New Zealand October reported that “protest groups have said they are “thrilled” to learn the forum is not going ahead”.

A Facebook post just a day earlier

by Auckland Peace Action commented that “undoubtedly, the event is not being held because protests and public opposition has been so strong and so effective, that they no longer think a large scale gathering like this is tenable.”

The NZDIA, however, was quick to rebuke the protest group’s claims.

Responding to media enquiries, NZDIA Chair Andrew Ford pointed out that the NZDIA had clearly indicated it was considering options to change its event schedule and format for this year during media interviews at the 2018 Forum.

“Our executive and board regularly review event schedules and format to create better value for our members and the sector they support,” stated NZDIA Chair Andrew Ford. “In this review, we consider a wide range of risk, issues and benefits”.

These include delegate and community safety in the face of protest action; scheduling a single major event; growing costs of hosting large corporate events; competing export opportunities and events offered regionally; and the need to remain focussed on creating relationshipbased engagement opportunities for NZ national security agencies.

Furthermore, stated Ford, 2019 has coincided with both the Avalon air show in Melbourne and the Pacific 2019 expo in Sydney. “As an association with limited funding, it was felt that our focus was better spent creating a presence at these events for our members, which NZDF, NZ MoD 26

and international clients and partners would also be attending,” he stated.

“We are successfully engaged in a series of smaller more targeted forums that address specific areas of need and requirements for clients and members.” These, Ford pointed out, are more accessible to the Association’s SME members, creating superior “relationship building opportunities.”

The show goes on “Our members, NZDF and the Ministry of Defence are doing no less business this year than previous,” said Ford. “We believe that includes returning economic benefit from public procurement through NZ companies, to their employees and communities.”

Indeed, the association’s membership has continued to grow throughout 2019, with more private sector suppliers to New Zealand’s defence and national security-focused government agencies seeing benefit in the engagement and networking opportunities offered by NZDIA membership.

That the business of equipping our Defence Force, national security and law enforcement agencies remains unabated is a reality not lost on protest groups. `“Now I will be the first to admit that this is not the end of the military industrial complex,” Auckland Peace Action Spokesperson Valerie Morse told RNZ. “We have not defeated the war machine and the New Zealand Line of Defence

government is spending more money than ever before, on the military and on buying new weapons.”

No winner In his Line of Defence anaylsis of protest action at the 2018 forum, Massey University Centre for Defence and Security Studies lecturer Dr Wil Hoverd had bemoaned what he described as “an appalling state of affairs.”

“Ultimately, I found that the standoff was incoherent, occurring between two sides who really had no idea what the other was doing or represented,” he wrote in Line of Defence’s Spring 2018 issue. “Indeed, what worries me is that both sides didn’t actually seem to care about the substance of the other, rather they were concerned about what the other represented for their own purposes.

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The recent media around the 2019 event calendar suggests that incoherence between the two sides of the debate remains unchanged, with both sides claiming a moral victory.

What is clear, however, is that the protest group actions – and their outcomes – do not appear to have ridden high on a wave of community support. What media they attracted was limited and short-lived. The news reports of 01 October elicited little reaction, and Auckland Peace Action’s Facebook post attracted just 17 comments from among its followers.

Ultimately, it appears that the media outlets covering the issue were likely more interested in its news value as a theatrical scrap between protesters, police and the so-called weapons industry rather than an issue deserving sober national debate

around the value to New Zealand of an adequately provisioned defence force.

The NZDIA annual forum was always an easy target for protest groups.

Easy to label as a ‘weapons expo’ and easy to disrupt by physically denying entry to delegates. The clearly more difficult challenge for these groups is the broader narrative one around denying the value to New Zealand of retaining a capable defence force.

An independent public opinion poll conducted on the NZDF and published in 2014 showed that “New Zealanders continue to be favourable towards the NZDF,” and there has been nothing to suggest this has changed.

Debates around the defence budget will always – and should always – occur, and debates around what exactly defence money should be spent on will always – and should always – be a natural consequence of our parliamentary democracy. How government allocates public funds should always be a topic of careful scrutiny – in terms of both its fiscal and moral dimensions.

Ultimately, the relationship between the state and the public in New Zealand is one characterised by strong public support for an adequately provisioned defence force. What’s deemed ‘adequate’, however, is a frequent matter of contention.

While many might question the need for New Zealand soldiers to be involved operationally in conflict zones such as the Middle East and Afghanistan, for example, few would question the necessity of a force capable of defending New Zealand against the broad range of strategic and natural threats it faces.

The alternative is a Defence Force without the equipment it needs to carry out the broad range of activities it does, from fighting fires and providing specialist services such as bomb disposal and search and rescue at home to providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, combatting piracy and illegal fishing, and conducting peace keeping and operational deployments abroad.

It’s just as well we have a defence industry capable of enabling the men and women in uniform who serve to protect New Zealand.

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Logistics: From equipping the unit to equipping the force Acheiving a supply chain that gets the right equipment at the right time and in the right condition to the right person on the front line is harder than it looks, writes John Campbell MNZM, CEO of Auckland-based Ra Moana Consulting.

To say that I have learnt a lot over the last twelve months is an understatement. The most astounding thing is that I have learnt more about logistics out of uniform than I ever did while wearing one!

I was an avid believer in Admiral E.J. King’s quote “I don’t know what the hell this ‘logistics’ is that Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of it.” And as an operator why not - I had all those professional logisticians to worry about supply lines and making sure my ship got off the wharf.

John Campbell MNZM is CEO of Auckland-based Ra Moana Consulting.

He was previously Group Manager Business Improvement and Innovation, New Zealand Customs Service following a 27 year career in the Royal New Zealand Navy.

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So, as an ex operator, I apologise to the logisticians and engineers for my naivety (yes Engineers – you are actually logisticians!)

As an operator I glibly passed off all those other logistic functions to others, especially around throughlife support, maintenance, repair and overhaul (and engineering) (MRO&E), configuration control, supply chain assurity and inventory management.

We risk concentrating on the very big projects (I know they have a lot of risk and political focus) and not placing the same emphasis into the support that is required to manage the non-platform equipment across the Defence Force. Without this we put at risk that initial investment.

As we shift to equipment becoming more complex and more costly, we also need to shift our thinking on what we purchase, why and quantities. We can no longer afford to have large pools of equipment sitting on the shelf, in a garage or in a warehouse waiting because of an inefficient or unreliable supply chain.

The NZDF is taking steps to move to an ‘Equip the Force’ model. This will save capital spend on assets but will only work when they get the logistics organisation set up to succeed and to maximise the benefit from increased availability through good reliability driven by a mature and trusted MRO&E organisation behind the force.

This will then give assurance to commanders that their equipment is fit for purpose and has the reliability to operate in the environment being demanded of it.

It will also give the organisation greater fidelity in failure rates, reliability and availability of equipment, allowing for greater decision making around replacement capabilities into the future. This means the right data needs to be available and then used to maximum advantage to drive decision making.

The NZDF operates with good strategic MRO partners at the depot level but has too much placed on this support without looking at what is required at the front line, be it uniformed personnel, equipment, and knowledge to be a truly deployable force.

The NZDF is working hard to move from the 1980s ‘Equip the Unit’ mentality to a modern ‘Equip the Force’ resource with a trusted supply chain delivering the right equipment at the right time to the right person and in the right condition for the mission they are on.

It sounds easy – it is not. It is a multitude of systems that all intersect – the sum of which will deliver far greater benefits than the individual parts.

For those operators that have not seen the light then I suggest you spend time in your logistics organisation and understand what really does go on to get that ship off the wharf, that aircraft in the air or that company or battalion out the door – and to keep them there!

You cannot make bold statements without quoting Sun Tzu - “The line between disorder and order lies in logistics”. Without order we cannot deliver the effect we are there to deliver.

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DCP poses big questions over ‘non-traditional’ capabilities Eminent New Zealand academics provide their comments in relation to the 2019 Defence Capability Plan, raising ethical and operational questions around the proposed ‘non-traditional’ capability spend.

In the latest instalment from its Notes from the Field series (edited by Dr Nina Harding), Massey University’s Security Politics Development Network features diverse perspectives from a range of commentators in response to the 2019 DCP. Among the contributors, Professor Rouben Azizian of Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Dr Joe Burton of the University of Waikato, and Dr Jeremy Moses of the University of Canterbury, zero in on the DCP’s coverage of ‘non-traditional’ capabilities, including information security, cyber defence, autonomous technologies and space.

Dr Moses expresses interest in references in the DCP to ‘semiautonomous’, ‘remotely operated’, and ‘space-centred’ technologies, “as the prospective move into these areas in the future will likely be plagued by a range of technological, economic and ethical challenges, as they already are for those states that are currently active in these areas.”

He notes that the most probable deployment of these technologies

Dr Jeremy Moses of the University of Canterbury

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is HADR, surveillance, and other noncombat roles, but that deployment in combat situations is a possibility “once concrete decisions on acquiring them come into focus in future.”

“Are we fully prepared for dealing with the ethical ambiguities of semiautonomous weapons? Is there a possibility that becoming more enmeshed in networked military systems increases the vulnerability of defence personnel and citizens? The proposed spend in these areas, he writes, will eventually lead us down the path of having to find answers to these questions.

Professor Azizian notes the elevation of the information domain to the level of the three mainstream domains - air, sea and land, and the role of information and communication technology as a critical component of new capabilities.

The DCP, he comments, “identifies this non-traditional capability as a key element of the positioning of the NZDF for the future.”

Delivering information capabilities will not only require Defence to work with other Government agencies, but these capabilities are also critical to the NZDF’s interoperability and New Zealand’s defence partnerships.

“Information security has the potential to optimise and rationalise the role of the NZDF and could potentially lead to continued incremental redesign of the traditional roles and structure of the Force.”

Dr Joe Burton comments that the DCP’s sections on cyber and space “reflect an ongoing evolution in the international defence and security sphere towards ‘informationised’ conflict. This is where both adversaries

and allies seek pre-eminence in the information domain, including through satellite-based Global Positioning Systems (GPS).”

He suggests that the DCP reflects an NZDF commitment to adopting a range of new technologies with the aim of “protecting, exchanging and exploiting information.”

“The ‘exploiting’ language is particularly provocative and alludes to the use of the information domain for strategic effects, including, potentially, disinformation, information denial and degradation operations. This is part of a more offensive approach on the part of the New Zealand government, mirrored in the 2018 New Zealand Strategic Defence Policy Statement”.

These capabilities, he argues, are being developed with too much secrecy around them, which he sees as contributing to “uncertainty in the international environment which drives competition and mistrust between states.”

For Dr Burton, this raises a number of questions: “What sort of cyber tools are being developed? Are New Zealand personnel going to be hacking into adversary computer networks?

Will these offensive operations be conducted within or outside of armed conflicts? What work is being done on rules of engagement for cyber and information capabilities? Will offensive cyber operations be conducted by allies to support our own military operations, or will we see a fully independent information and cyber operations force? Will the development of offensive cyber and information warfare capabilities potentially make us more of a target for malicious actors?”

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY Tackling Human Trafficking

Don Lord, Executive Director Hagar NZ, spoke on the issue of human trafficking at the Asia Pacific Security and Innovation Summit in Rotorua earlier this year. It’s a crime from which New Zealand is far from immune.

I work with Hagar, a frontline organisation that is working to see communities free and healed from the trauma of trafficking, slavery and abuse.

Over the last 25 years I have seen the growing threat and devastating impacts of human trafficking; a crime which has now become a global issue that takes up headline space in newspapers and news reports around the world.

It shocks many that modern-day slavery still exists in today’s world and in such numbers that would make William Wilberforce turn in his grave, having spent most of his life seeking to abolish the practice of slavery in England. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime, trafficking is now the second largest criminal trade in the world, second only to drugs, having replaced the illegal arms trade for second spot.

The most active area for human trafficking and modern-day slavery in the world, with about 63 percent of the numbers, is the South East Asia and Pacific region, which is literally on New Zealand’s doorstep.

Don Lord, Executive Director Hagar NZ. 30

In a recent example from Vanuatu, one hundred men paid between US$14,000 and US$25,000 to get to Vanuatu from Bangladesh, often scrounging and mortgaging their homes in order to raise the funds.

Once in Vanuatu, however, they were crowded into small properties, forced to work long hours and locked up at night under guard. They suffered torture, scant food and squalid conditions.

Trafficking occurs all over the world, including in New Zealand. In New Zealand several people have already been charged with human trafficking and other offences, and several have been jailed as a result. It is considered one of the most serious crimes in New Zealand and, like murder, can attract a 20-year prison sentence and fines of up to $500,000.

The numbers are staggering: • Trafficking earns about $150 billion per year with almost $100b sourced through sexual exploitation. Sex traffickers can earn US$36k per victim.

• 40.3 million people are estimated to have been trafficked or in slavery today.

• Females – women and girls – make up 71 percent of the total of those trafficked and enslaved.

• Children account for 25 percent of those trafficked.

• The price of a slave today is just US$90.

• The Asia Pacific region is the world’s most lucrative for forced labour and where about 63 percent of trafficking victims are found.

• 24.9m victims are in forced labour – one individual can earn about US$8k for the trafficker.

• 15.4m victims are in forced marriages.

There is no doubt that human trafficking has serious impacts on victims and survivors, some of whom are innocent children and even babies.

Child trafficking is being fueled by the alarming increase in online child pornography, which includes live streaming of sexual abuse of children.

Human Traffickers use devious, cynical methods and destroy trust. In 2016, for example, traffickers set up a rugby training session in Northern India to ensnare and deceive the families of 25 teenage boys to pay about NZ$6,000 to send their boys to France on a ‘rugby tour.’ Interpol is still trying to find out where 22 of the boys are, and there are fears they have been sold and shipped out of France.

Human trafficking is one of the most tragic human rights issues of our time.

It splinters families, distorts global markets, undermines the rule of law, and spurs other transnational criminal activity. It threatens public safety and national security. But worst of all, the crime robs human beings of their freedom and their dignity. That’s why we must pursue an end to the scourge of human trafficking.

- Former US Secretary of State Tillerson.

Why is trafficking escalating?

We only have to think about the law of supply and demand. Sex trafficking delivers huge profits with minimal risk. Net profit margins can be over 70 percent, making sex trafficking one of the most profitable activities in the world. It is becoming increasingly easy and inexpensive to procure, move and exploit vulnerable girls.

The demand for cheap labour in order to accrue high profits keeps this economic machine running. Paired with little risk of criminal prosecution, human trafficking is a lucrative business to enter.

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to further exploitation and experiences challenges to repatriation due to: • Lack of professional and practical skills.

• Psychological problems, including depression and emotional trauma.

• Health repercussions, including sexually transmitted infections or physical injuries.

• Social stigmatisation leading to preventing safe reintegration and employment.

• Ongoing debt, either remaining from prior experience or paying for return flights.

In addition to the demand and supply issue, poverty, globalisation, increased migration, child pornography, internal conflict and war have been major contributors. It affects millions and exists in almost every country of the world.

It is a symptom of a greater problem: the breakdown of community. Broken and abusive homes, fragmented communities, and dysfunctional systems all help create the conditions for exploitation to thrive. If we want to comprehensively address slavery, then we need to acknowledge the compounding issues of poverty, racism, homelessness, abuse, inequality, addiction, gangs, and war, to name a few.

- Katie Bergman, 07 February 2019.

The United Nations defines human trafficking as the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, or receipt of persons by improper means (such as force, abduction, fraud, or coercion) for an improper purpose including forced labour or sexual exploitation.

Counter trafficking – the good news Much is being done to counter this lucrative and criminal trade: • Strengthened and more effective government legislation.

• Regional initiatives – e.g. Great Mekong Region – consisting of Cambodia, China, Laos PDR, Line of Defence

Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam.

• Improved sharing of information between governments.

• Harnessing of improved technology, such as blockchain.

• More accurate data – US Department of State, UN, ILO, Global Slavery Index and University research.

• More effective partnerships between NGOs. • Introduction of modern day slavery legislation in the UK and Australia and parts of the U.S. • Focus on improving global supply chains.

• Innovative businesses supporting the ending of modern day slavery, such as 27 Seconds Wine https://27seconds.co.nz/.

• Ethical shopping guides.

• Younger people advocating for change.

Focusing on the survivors of trafficking In general, there are limited holistic support services available to trafficking survivors, leaving them vulnerable to re-trafficking and further exploitation. Current efforts focus on the prosecution of perpetrators, however justice for survivors requires holistic recovery, not just successful prosecutions.

Without appropriate recovery services, a survivor remains vulnerable

Additionally, holistic recovery has broader benefits to societies, including: • Avoidance of ongoing healthcare costs and increased national welfare.

• Increased productive labour force and decreased costs of illegal immigration.

• Increased contribution of education and skills enhancement.

• Avoidance of additional law enforcement costs imposed by trafficking.

It is clear from Hagar’s experience in case management work that breaking the cycle of exploitation and trafficking through recovery programs has delivered multiple benefits to the individual, family and wider community.

Our consumer driven societies’ demand for goods results in millions being trapped in modern day slavery and exploitative forced labour. “There is slavery present in what we wear, what we eat and the vast array of electronic equipment we unthinkingly use every day,” stated Andrew Wallis, Director of Unseen UK. If we own a smart phone, eat chocolate and wear clothes, it is likely that we have used around 23 slaves to do so.

Modern day slavery and trafficking is a burgeoning criminal trade in the misery and exploitation of vulnerable individuals. It is present in almost every country and some countries are failing to protect the most vulnerable through lax legislation, corruption and apathy.

In order to prevail in this fight there needs to be collaborative action from all actors, including governments, NGOs, civil society, business and others. It is a war we must win – anything else is unthinkable.

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‘Operative’ diplomacy as a force for countering terrorism Diplomacy isn’t all about behind-the-scenes lever-pulling and exchanges across a negotiating table; it can also tackle terrorism head-on, writes HE Dr Itzhak Gerberg, Ambassador of Israel to New Zealand, Cook Islands, Samoa and Tonga.

Terrorism is an old and historic phenomenon, and throughout history it has come in many different types, including single cause terrorism, religious terrorism, sectarian terrorism, ethnic terrorism, nationalistic terrorism, xenophobic terrorism, anarchist terrorism and global terrorism, to name just a few.

Furthermore, there has been the traditional difficulty of distinguishing between crime, hate crime and terrorism. The threshold at which terror is actually considered terror has tended to be in the eye of beholder, resulting in divergent views regarding the nature of terror, as well as political double standards with regards to the motives behind global terror.

Simultaneously, the role and the use of diplomacy in the combatting of international terrorism has often been mistakenly assumed to be one of appeasement, an unwillingness to stand up for one’s belief, or a reluctance to use hard power against global terrorism.

HE Dr Itzhak Gerberg, Israel’s Ambassador to New Zealand.

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The tragic events of 9/11 brought about a new dimension to the paradigm of global security and perceptions of global terrorism, starting with the recognition that the use of violent means against mainly defenceless civilians is immoral regardless of circumstances or motivations.

In the post-9/11 context, the global counter-terrorism effort has found itself facing the necessity of dealing with accelerated globalisation, open international borders, a growing number of non-state actors, high cost of use of military force, growing complexities in global politics, the rising status of civil society, as well as the increasing use of advanced technology, including cyber.

Expedient global security paradigm In its traditional meaning, ‘security’ is often associated with the protection of national interests and the primacy of ‘national security’. In contrast, a broad, contemporised definition of global security should draw from an expanded perspective and not be limited to its national security and/or military dimensions.

As such, global security can be defined as the systemic and prioritised pursuit of essential interests through expedient power influenced by core values within a circumstantial context.

The changing complex reality of the global setting implies that global security is only one of a number of interconnected levels of a security domain that includes universal security, global security, regional security, national security, border security, homeland and civil security,

sub-state security, organisational security, group security and, last but not least, individual security.

Defining global terrorism There has been inherent difficulty in defining terrorism with precision and cohesion due to divergent views in relation to its causes, nature, goals and motives. At the same time, efforts to combat terrorism are often frustrated by political, ideological, nationalist, ethnic, sectarian, cultural and religious – as well as time – factors.

Furthermore, terrorism has tended to be portrayed as a threat to basic values and referred to as a single phenomenon by way of an abstract noun, which blurs the differences between different types of terror.

Following 9/11, the Council of Europe included within its definition of terrorist offences the unlawful seizure of aircraft, unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation, attacks against life, physical integrity or liberty of internationally-protected persons, kidnapping, taking of a hostage or serious unlawful detention, use of bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic firearm or letter or parcel bomb, and the attempt to commit any of the above offences.

By contrast, I suggest a multidimensional approach to define terrorism as: the use of, or threat to use, illegal and irregular forms of violence against civilians or civilian institutions based on identityorientated bigotry (identitism) with the intent to create horror and traumatic events amplified by various forms of communication in a media saturated society.

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Four types of global terrorism Effectively combatting global terrorism first requires distinguishing between four types of global terrorism: A. Traditional radical ‘tactical’ terror: originates from fanaticism and stresses point-blank violence. Often referred to as ‘lone wolf’ terror, it is characterised by a single act mainly aimed at individuals and using basic means/methods in order to gain attention, intimidate or create fear, and divert agenda setting (amplified by mass media).

B. Utopia-oriented ‘operational’ terror: led and motivated by a desire to avenge, stressing large scale violence aimed at a community and/or a particular group while using new technology and digital mass media in order to create anxiety, frustration and demoralisation.

C. Spectacular ‘strategic’ super-terror: motivated by despair, strives to disrupt order and stresses massscale violence mainly against states and institutions, while using modern technology and social networks in order to arouse fear, dismay and uncertainty.

D. Chaos-oriented ‘high-strategic’ ultra-terror: led and motivated by hatred and stresses mega-scale violence in terms of catastrophic and/or non-conventional critical impact aimed mainly against states and civil societies; while Line of Defence

using advanced and sophisticated technology, such as artificial intelligence and cyber-attacks, to target critical infrastructure in order to create panic, vulnerability and loss of control.

Operative diplomacy Operative diplomacy has become an effective force in the complex and Sisyphean task of combatting global terrorism. It is a complimentary, expedient and effective force for countering global terrorism, and can be defined as: disposition, application and target-oriented implementation of foreign policy while taking into consideration human agency values and context.

In the combatting of global terrorism, operative diplomacy can be considered in terms of three basic types of action: a) Diplomatic prevention and preparation b) Diplomatic contention and management c) Diplomatic mitigation and damage control Operative diplomacy is no longer assumed to be a tool of appeasement in the countering of global terrorism.

Its value has been made more obvious given the relative cost of using military force in terms of cost-benefit analysis and in terms of human life.

Diplomatic Prevention and Preparation The practical means to achieve ‘diplomatic prevention and preparation’ are varied, and include global and interstate cooperation, consular collaboration, datagathering and information exchange, bilateral agreements, memoranda of understanding, multilateral agreements, international conventions, endorsement of international resolutions, international conferences, special envoys and/or diplomatic representatives, statements and declarations, working groups, joint workshops, international and academic forums, think tanks, public debates, avoidance of access to tools of terror in general (and dual use materials in particular), bestowing moral and political values in the mass and social media, combating incitement via education, legal prevention of hate speech, discouragement of terror group recruitment, supporting of international non-governmental organisations that encourage pluralism.

Special attention should also be given to the field of information in the era of ‘big data’ and artificial intelligence (AI), which can be used to strengthen the rules governing the streaming of information, the prohibition of incitement in the media, and economic sanctions.

A crucial factor in diplomatic prevention and preparation is the 33

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deployment of economic measures such as economic sanctions, including the freezing of economic assets, funds and bank accounts. However, such economic measures are often constrained by legal and technical factors.

A good example of diplomatic prevention and preparation is demonstrated in the preambles of UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 (both adopted in 2001 following 9/11) that refer to the need to prevent and suppress through all lawful means the financing, recruitment and preparation of acts of terror.

In addition, UNSCR 1624 calls for the prohibition and prevention of incitements to terrorism.

Diplomatic contention and management ‘Diplomatic contention and management’ is based on crisis management diplomacy, legal diplomacy (including ad hoc international law enforcement, legal collaboration and implementation of anti-terror procedures), real time border control and media diplomacy as well as global traditional diplomacy, 34

including consular cooperation, and political and social encouragement that aims to build moral consensus and social norms against terrorism as well as discrediting terrorism, its narrative and legacy.

In practical terms, we can refer to support by ad-hoc packages (the ‘fire brigade’ approach), such as emergency medical care, control of consular services, discouragement of operational foot-dragging and avoidance of double standards, and prevention of legitimacy and/or sanctuary as a support base.

Information diplomacy can contribute to the monitoring of mass media, cyber and social networks, and artificial intelligence can be utilised for preventing the live streaming of such information while safeguarding civil liberties and freedom of speech.

An example of diplomatic contention and management is the UN’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). Established in 2001 as a subsidiary body of the UN Security Council following NSCR 1535, it carries out policy decisions, conducts assessments and facilitates counterterrorism technical assistance.

Diplomatic mitigation and damage control ‘Diplomatic mitigation and damage control’ encompasses means such as judicial diplomacy, mass media diplomacy, cyber diplomacy, digital diplomacy, and aid diplomacy.

The pragmatic means deployed in diplomatic mitigation and damage control concentrate on the restart of ‘diplomatic contention and management’ with an emphasis on law enforcement, resumption of consular services, and implementation of procedures and regulations to combat terror.

Ultimately, global terrorism cannot be combatted through the hard power of military and law enforcement forces alone. Hard power must be complemented by other effective forces in order to become an ‘expedient’ power. One of the most effective tools for achieving this target is operative diplomacy – a purposeful and resilient force in the combatting of global terrorism.

This article is based on a presentation delivered at the 2019 Asia Pacific Security Innovation Summit held in Rotorua. The views expressed in this paper are the author’s own.

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World military expenditure grows to $1.8 trillion in 2018 Total world military expenditure rose to $1,822 billion in 2018, representing an increase of 2.6 percent from 2017, according to new data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

The five biggest spenders in 2018 were the United States, China, Saudi Arabia, India and France, which together accounted for 60 per cent of global military spending. Military spending by the USA increased for the first time since 2010, while spending by China grew for the 24th consecutive year.

Total global military spending rose for the second consecutive year in 2018, to the highest level since 1988, representing 2.1 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) or $239 per person.

“In 2018 the USA and China accounted for half of the world’s military spending,” said Dr Nan Tian, a researcher with the SIPRI Arms and Military Expenditure (AMEX) programme. “The higher level of world military expenditure in 2018 is mainly the result of significant increases in spending by these two countries.”

USA and China lead increase US military spending grew—for the first time since 2010—by 4.6 per cent, to reach $649 billion in 2018. The USA remained by far the largest spender in the world, and spent almost as much on its military in 2018 as the next eight largest-spending countries combined.

“The increase in US spending was driven by the implementation from 2017 of new arms procurement programmes under the Trump administration,” said Dr Aude Fleurant, the director of the SIPRI AMEX programme.

China, the second-largest spender in the world, increased its military expenditure by five percent to $250 billion in 2018. This was the 24th consecutive year of increase in Chinese military expenditure, and accounted Line of Defence

for 14 percent of world military spending. “China has allocated 1.9 per cent of its GDP to the military every year since 2013,” said Tian.

Three decades of growth: Asia and Oceania Military expenditure in Asia and Oceania has risen every year since 1988. At $507 billion, military spending in the region accounted for 28 percent of the global total in 2018, compared with just nine per cent in 1988.

In 2018 India increased its military spending by 3.1 percent to $66.5 billion. Military expenditure by Pakistan grew by 11 percent (the same level of growth as in 2017), to reach $11.4 billion in 2018. South Korean military expenditure was $43.1 billion in 2018—an increase of 5.1 percent compared with 2017 and the highest annual increase since 2005.

‘The tensions between countries in Asia as well as between China and the USA are major drivers for the continuing growth of military spending in the region,’ says Siemon Wezeman, a senior researcher with the SIPRI AMEX programme.

Increases in Central and East European countries Several countries in Central and Eastern Europe made large increases in their military expenditure in 2018.

Spending by Poland rose by 8.9 percent in 2018 to $11.6 billion, while Ukraine’s spending was up by 21 per cent to $4.8 billion.

“The increases in Central and Eastern Europe are largely due to growing perceptions of a threat from Russia,” said Pieter Wezeman, a senior researcher with the SIPRI AMEX programme. “This is despite the fact that Russian military spending has fallen for the past two years.” At $61.4 billion, Russian military spending was the sixth highest in the world in 2018.

Six of the 10 countries with the highest military burden (military spending as a proportion of GDP) in the world in 2018 are in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia (8.8 per cent of GDP), Oman (8.2 per cent), Kuwait (5.1 per cent), Lebanon (5.0 per cent), Jordan (4.7 per cent) and Israel (4.3 per cent).

The comprehensive annual update of the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database is accessible at www.sipri.org.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY Boundless Continent: Managing Antarctic border flows Dr Germana Nicklin of Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies considers the vexed issue of border management in Antarctica as interest in and tourism to the polar continent trend upward.

Antarctica is not the most obvious place about which to consider border management. Getting there is difficult and expensive, there are almost no permanent residents, and there is no commercial trade (recognised by the World Trade Organisation with a zero tariff ).

Crime, including smuggling, is almost non-existent although there is illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the maritime zones of Antarctica.

Dr Germana Nicklin, is Senior Lecturer and Deputy Director at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies (CDSS), Massey University, New Zealand.

Germana has over 30 years operational and policy experience in the Australian and New Zealand public services, including over 17 years with the New Zealand Customs Service, where she held senior policy and strategic advisory positions.

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Flows to and from Antarctica involve two categories of people - the transporting of long stayers researchers and support people who will be living on the continent for several months, and the supplies to sustain them – and tourists, who visit for short periods of time.

This article argues that Antarctica and border management is worthy of study for several reasons. First, there are no Antarctic ‘borders’ in the usual meaning of the word. Antarctica is governed collectively, but the Antarctic Treaty that established the collective also allows pre-existing territorial claims to stand, while at the same time giving them no status within the Treaty.

Seven of the signatory countries – the United Kingdom, Chile, Argentina (whose claims overlap), Norway, Australia, France and New Zealand claim portions of the Antarctic continent as their state territory, though these claims are generally not recognised by other Treaty signatories.

This creates a tricky situation in which reference to Antarctic territory and borders cannot be comfortably accommodated because of the association between borders and state territory.

As a result, the word ‘border’ is not to be found anywhere in the Antarctic collective governance system. What is the impact of a lack of ‘border’ on the collective governance? Secondly, the collective governance body, the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), has developed a system for managing the flows to and from

Antarctica that is almost completely separate from regular state border management systems. What are the benefits and risks of this arrangement?

Thirdly, the Antarctic Treaty System, which consists of the Antarctic Treaty and several protocols and conventions, is coming under pressure from dynamics such as increasing human activity on the continent, geopolitical jostling, and the impending effects of climate change.

Can state border management policies and practices inform the Antarctic Treaty System’s response to these pressures?

The rest of this article discusses these three interrelated questions in more detail.

Access, not border, management The Antarctic Treaty has objectives of peace and science for any human activity on the continent, and protecting the environment was added explicitly in the 1991 Environmental Protocol. Managing flows to and from Antarctica with these objectives is quite different from state objectives for managing border flows, which are commonly about protecting the state from criminal and other harms and growing the economy through trade and tourism.

Thus, rather than ‘border management’, a more acceptable term for managing Antarctic flows could be ‘access management’.

Access management issues are dealt with in two forums – the ATCM, which establishes policies relating to access to Antarctica, and the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Line of Defence

Programmes, which states as its purpose to “develop and promote best practice in managing the support of scientific research in Antarctica”. This includes logistics, although most of the guidelines of this group relate to operations on, rather than getting to and from, the continent.

This custom-made Antarctic access system appears to have worked well for 60 years. It is highly controlled, with a stringent application process for all persons wishing to spend time in Antarctica, and strict timeframes within which those applications can be made. In the same way, goods and equipment taken to Antarctica are strictly controlled.

Compared with state border management, Antarctic access management is very slow. This is due to the relatively small number of Line of Defence

people allowed to access the continent at any given time, the need to make sure those people are properly briefed on the rules and equipped for both safety and protection of the continent.

Each of the five gateway states deals with different access dynamics.

Ushuaia in Argentina and Puentas Arenas in Chile provide access to the northern-most tip of Antarctica known as the Antarctic Peninsular.

Ushuaia is primarily a tourist gateway; Puentas Arenas primarily transports scientists, their equipment and support to the continent, although some tourist vessels also depart from there.

Cape Town in South Africa, Hobart in Australia and Christchurch in New Zealand are also primarily science and logistics gateways. However, small numbers of tourist vessels depart from these states also.

A thin thread connects Antarctic access management with state border management. Foreigners entering and exiting the relevant gateway country on their way to and from the Antarctica gateway port are processed at that country’s border. Travel from the gateway port to Antarctica is treated as domestic.

Research on New Zealand’s practices has revealed that border agencies attribute a high level of trust to the approval processes for accessing Antarctica. The relative absence of security incidents suggests this trust is not misplaced.

One area receiving growing attention in the ATCM is the increase in tourism – from 6,704 for the first tours in 1992-3 to 51,707 in 2017-18, and still growing. In recent years, the number of tourist landings has been 37

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steadily increasing, while cruise ship tours without landings are decreasing.

Most tourism occurs on or near the Antarctic Peninsular, leaving from Ushuaia in Argentina, but there are also growing numbers of tourist vessels sailing from New Zealand and Australia. The ATCM sets the rules for tourist operators, supplemented by guidelines established by the International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO), but not all tourist operators are members of this Association.

Border management approaches?

Unlike state border management systems, the Antarctic access management system does not involve assessing the risks of flows of vessels, goods and people to and from the continent beyond those applying to the National Antarctic Programmes. Two groups that fall outside this process are tourists and yachts.

Individual tourists are not screened for risk and yachts are not part of the IAATO system. Growing tourism, and a growing number of yachts present risks to Antarctica not just to the environment but also because of the potential for incidents requiring responses from nearby sovereign states.

For example, the number of individual yachts travelling to the

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Antarctic Peninsular increased from 33 to 45, or 36 percent, between 201617 and 2017-18. Nine of them, or 20 percent, were unauthorised. In other words, they had not gained approval from Antarctic governance processes to sail in Antarctic waters or land on the continent.

Unauthorised arrivals in state border management systems are not uncommonly associated with smuggling and other criminal activity.

While this may not be the case for Antarctic unauthorised arrivals at the moment, the salient point is that the ATCM states have limited information and systems with which to get early advice of these arrivals and to assess the risks they might pose before they arrive.

Without a deep examination of different participating states’ specific practices, the full impact of a lack of border narratives in the Antarctic Treaty System can only be inferred.

However, in New Zealand, which is one of the five access points to Antarctica, state border agencies are not involved in policy discussions relating to access management for Antarctica.

Assuming this applies across all five Antarctic gateways, it means that border management competencies, such as goods classification,

identification and inspection, and risk management networks are not being utilised in the Antarctic Treaty System.

This absence is relevant in the context of the pressures on that System. The current access management system is designed for summer access to Antarctica, with very few vessels and flights travelling there in the winter months. As mentioned earlier, this system depends on having time to process applications and prepare for the logistics of travel.

What it is not well-designed for is unexpected events other than search and rescue, which is accommodated.

The assumption with the access management system appears to omit the possibility of criminal activity (excepting illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing), which is reflected in the absence of systematic data and trend analysis.

As access speeds up, Antarctic governance would do well to consider the methods used for state border management, and the potential benefits of working more closely with state border agencies. What will be needed for this to happen, though, is some way for the Antarctic actors to accommodate border narratives into the Antarctic Treaty System in a way that doesn’t upset the delicate topic of territory and its usual association with claimant states.

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FM talks up commitment to region’s Public Service Commissioners Foreign Minister Rt Hon Winston Peters lays out Cabinet’s five principles guiding Pacific engagement and reinforces reset to meeting of assembled Public Service Commissioners from across the Pacific The following is a selection of excerpts from a speech delivered in the Grand Hall, Parliament, 26 September 2019: New Zealand is blessed with one of the best Public Services in the world, and it has been a key contributor to New Zealand being one of only nine countries to have sustained continuous parliamentary democracy since 1854.

However, we live in a rapidly changing world and here in the Pacific we are by no means immune to global and regional change.

Some change is bad. Climate change is one of the great challenges of our age. While everyone is feeling its impacts, it poses a particular threat for low-lying small island states. The Kainaki II Declaration for Urgent Climate Change Action Now, agreed by the Pacific Island Forum last month, recognises the climate change crisis and demands greater international action. Even more recently, our thoughts have been with the people of the Bahamas in the wake of Hurricane Dorian.

Some change can be good. The communications revolution, for example, continues to open up new opportunities for the open and transparent sharing of information.

Anyone with an internet connection or a smartphone can read the Kainaki II Declaration themselves. While social media can feel a bit like the wild west, Line of Defence

we have unprecedented ability for the Government and the public sector to share information with our people and invite them to hold us to account.

And change is often uncertain. The Pacific has become an increasingly contested strategic space. This brings opportunities and risks and New Zealand knows that we cannot take our Pacific partnerships for granted.

The New Zealand government’s Pacific Reset recognises that we must, we need and we should be doing more to make a difference in the region.

The New Zealand Cabinet has adopted a set of five principles to guide our Pacific engagement. These five principles speak clearly to the way New Zealand would like to partner with you on public sector strengthening.

First, to demonstrate a depth of understanding. Opportunities to meet together, like this conference, help us to understand each other’s needs and how we can work together to make a difference.

Second, to exhibit friendship. Our relationship is not just a transaction, we are old friends confronting new challenges together.

Third, to strive for solutions of mutual benefit. Our shared Pacific destiny means that strong Pacific Island nations make for a stronger New Zealand. We are not just charitable donors, we are your partners in development.

Fourth, to achieve collective ambition. By taking action on agreed priorities. Talking together is important, but it only makes a difference if it leads to action.

And finally, to seek sustainability.

Not just for now, but for our grandchildren, and their grandchildren and all those who follow after.

These principles are backed up by putting money where our mouth is.

More visits. The last year has seen an unprecedented number of Ministerial delegations to the Pacific.

Meeting face-to-face on your land to strengthen our partnership together.

More ODA. Which was increased by nearly 30 percent, 714 million dollars, in Budget 2018 to support our contribution to global development, including in the Pacific.

More focus on climate change.

Here at home the Zero Carbon Amendment Bill seeks to ensure that New Zealand is playing its part in reducing emissions and is currently in select committee. And at least half of New Zealand’s 300 million dollar global climate finance commitment has been ring-fenced to support our Pacific neighbours’ resilience and response to climate change.

More support for strengthening governance including transparency, human rights, inclusivity of disadvantaged groups, and public sector excellence.

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HOMELAND SECURITY

Why do we need a National Security Journal?

On 2nd October, Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies launched its new National Security Journal, a six-monthly publication featuring contributions from researchers and practitioners. CDSS’ Dr John Battersby explains why the time is right.

National Security has always been a domain in which the state has exerted dominance, primarily because a fundamental purpose of the state is to defend itself and its component parts, from emerging threats which are bigger than all of us, and which individually we are unable to confront.

This has not meant that the state owns national security exclusively, in fact, quite the opposite. Pre-European New Zealanders did not separate military or civilian spheres, or security from non-security endeavour and Maori people contributed equally to production and protection as needs dictated.

New Zealand settler society relied on the British Army for broaderbased international security, but it also relied heavily on settler populations for closer security, reflected in the Volunteer and Militia Acts, Volunteer fire brigades and civilian based police forces that emerged in the nineteenth century.

Dr John Battersby of Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies.

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In the latter part of the New Zealand Wars, settler and Maori contingents were both contributing to various colonial forces units. New Zealand’s part-time ‘territorial army’ was developed at the beginning of the twentieth century anticipating ‘whole of society’ involvement in security was likely to remain and increase.

In the first half of the twentieth century massive security crises were presented by World Wars I and II, and saw the harnessing of entire populations into war efforts not just militarily by conscription, but economically and socially as well.

‘Total war’ required ‘total effort’ from across society and everything was aligned to the war efforts.

In the immediate aftermath of WWII, New Zealand was still drawing out of its population for J-Force in Japan, and K-Force in Korea, as well as running a national compulsory military training programme – selecting men by ballot - preparing an augmented infantry division in case of war with the Soviet Union.

As the Cold War developed, New Zealand governments opted for smaller professional contributions to limited wars used as vents for the greater East/West ideological struggle.

Governments around the world monopolised information collection and supply, and refined secret services to obtain intelligence above and beyond what ordinary people could see.

Intelligence operations - ‘covert ops’ – the longstanding quiet tool of foreign policy – became a wellused lynchpin of many states seeking to avoid public scrutiny of national security activity.

Ordinary people were locked out, and components of the private sector were invited in only if needs absolutely dictated. The Cold War defined most of our security sector, military and intelligence infrastructure for a generation.

In 1989 the Berlin Wall came down, and the Cold War thawed into a hot peace. States held together by coercion fell apart in Eastern Europe, capitalist wealth – despite frequent recessions - outgrew the GDP of many smaller states. Mass media and then social media revolutionised information supply and governments progressively lost the monopoly on intelligence.

Even outer space is a sandpit for corporates to play in.

Globalisation and the cyber world present challenges to the feasibility of aspects of the nation state beyond anything ever encountered before.

Finally the relevance of the general population, and of academic, NGO and private sectors to national security, has returned to what it was before the Cold War took it away from us.

In 2019 national security risks are as great if not greater than the crises of the earlier twentieth century.

Global warming, rising sea levels and world population growth pose interrelated risks to us all, which we can all see – the issues, and the potential solutions to them, cannot be hidden behind walls of classified information.

Moreover, governments do not have solutions to these problems and will not find them without a broader participation of expert and interested sections of our society.

Geo-political pressures continue to develop, Chinese influence in the South Pacific, the future of Hong Line of Defence

Kong and Taiwan, and a divided Korea frustrate any simple approach to general Asia Pacific issues. Globalised terrorism has replaced the politically relevant VIP based ‘high value target’ - now we are all targets of ‘terrorisms’ that bear little relevance to us.

Informed critical debate is genuinely needed to explore the avenues available to confront these challenges, bureaucratic perspectives are vital – but if they are, or become, echo chambers, their vitality will rapidly deplete.

New Zealanders currently live in a First World country at a time when humans have more than they have ever possessed. But the more we have, the more protecting it costs, and governments can no longer afford to maintain police-to-population ratios required to provide general security at public events, or in a range of publicprivate spaces. They can often not afford security oriented technologies that multi-national corporations have.

Public security has now become by necessity, a private sector activity.

Finally, rapid technological advances continue to bring unprecedented advantages, along with potentially horrific consequences. Genetic engineering, cyber-space, and Artificial Intelligence (AI), all offer stunning potential, but also herald potential risks.

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If we had been given the opportunity to broadly discuss the world-wide-web and the internet of things before they were thrust upon us, perhaps there could have been some mitigation of the tremendous vulnerability the internet has brought - hackers, internet viruses, cyberattacks, fraud, confidence trickery, organised crime and terrorism. As we now approach new frontiers of AI, driverless vehicles, pilotless airliners – we need informed discussions about where all this may take us.

What risks lie lurking unseen within the dazzle of new ideas? If technology replaces the roles people perform, what will people do? Are we willingly sowing the seeds for our own irrelevance by letting technology advance unfettered to the point where it does not need us anymore?

National Security Journal (NSJ), launched in Wellington on 2nd October is an initiative which aims to encourage debate, discussion, interaction, problem-sharing and problem-solving - on issues small, large, diverse and dangerous - between the government sector security agencies, universities, NGOs and private sector organisations. That dialogue is hoped to be broad-based, concerning threats to New Zealanders

safety and security emerging from across the range of potential sources discussed above.

It recognises that security dialogue needs to be accessible to New Zealanders, because risks are broad and affect us all now, and we are all increasingly required to be part of proposed solutions.

NSJ will consider high quality contributions from researchers and practitioners on national security related topics in order to stimulate dialogue between them. Perspectives from the community will also be considered. Academic contributions will be peer reviewed.

The first issue of NSJ contains articles on the National Security System, terrorism and terrorism research, industry counterfeiting and the contribution to national security of the private sector.

NSJ welcomes those from throughout and beyond New Zealand into dialogue on these issues; we welcome research-based, evidence-based and experiencedbased contributions from established and new perspectives; we welcome debate and challenge. We welcome critical analysis. We welcome traditional approaches and we welcome different.

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HOMELAND SECURITY

Facilities and Public Spaces conference offers answers to ‘wicked’ problems Conferenz’s Safe and Secure Facilities and Public Spaces conference in August was the first in a string of events this year exploring the ‘wicked problem’ of securing ‘crowded places’ from attack, writes chief editor Nicholas Dynon When I was asked by Conferenz to chair their two-day conference in Wellington, I jumped at the opportunity to attend an event featuring two dozen of the brightest local and international minds in security. Such opportunities on New Zealand soil are rare.

The physical security sector event calendar for the second half of 2019 looks a little different to that of previous years. In addition to the Conferenz event, there is the arrival of other first-timers, including September’s Crowded Places NZ event (Marcus Evans) and November’s Venue Safety and Community Security conference (Aventedge) in Auckland.

The common theme shared by these events is ‘public spaces’ or ‘crowded places’, which the AustraliaNew Zealand Counter Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC) defines as “locations which are easily accessible by large numbers of people on a predictable basis.”

The trigger for the appearance of these new conferences is, no doubt, the 15 March Christchurch mosque attacks and, consequentially, the questions the attacks raise in relation to protecting people in the places they tend to frequent.

The mosque attacks have provided security managers around the country with a new problem, or set of problems. Their employers and customers are now asking them: “How do we make our sitting-duck venue, which is easily accessible by large numbers of people on a predictable basis, secure against the extremely 42

unlikely possibility of a terrorist attack? And how do we do it cheaply?”

It’s a problem that conference speaker Dr Bridgette Sullivan-Taylor of the University of Auckland describes intriguingly as a “wicked problem”.

A wicked problem is a problem that is ‘complex’ rather than just ‘complicated’. It is essentially novel and unique to the extent that every solution to a wicked problem is a ‘one shot operation’. Wicked problems are often intractable, with no clear relationship between cause and effect. Solutions are neither right nor wrong.

Social, economic and political problems, such as poverty, economic failure, political instability, climate change, are regarded as wicked problems, although the latter has been described more precisely as a ‘super wicked problem’ because those seeking to solve the problem are also causing it.

Ultimately, wicked problems are problems for which there is the great practical reality of there being no hope of a solution. But, importantly, they are problems for which there is a great moral expectation that a damn good attempt at a solution is made. The New Zealand public, for example, justifiably expects that ‘something be done’ to minimise our collective vulnerability to another mass casualty weapons attack.

In her presentation, Dr SullivanTaylor also mentioned Black Swan Theory, or the Theory of Black Swan Events. This theory was named for the black swan, which was thought for centuries to be a fiction until actual black swans were discovered in Western Australia.

Dr Bridgette Sullivan-Taylor is Senior Lecturer in business at the University of Auckland. During 20 years in the UK, she worked in the NHS and with the UK Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat

A Black Swan, wrote proponent Nassim Nicholas Taleb, is an event with the following three attributes.

Firstly, it is an outlier, as it lies outside the realm of regular expectations, because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility.

Secondly, it carries an extreme ‘impact’. Thirdly, in spite of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its occurrence after the fact, “making it explainable and predictable.”

According to Taleb, a small number of Black Swans explains almost everything, from the success of ideas and religions, to the dynamics of historical events, to elements of our personal lives. They are events that are the product of “unknown unknowns” – a term made famous by Former US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld.

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Post-15 March, there has been the inevitable attempt by many to concoct explanations for the attacks after the fact, and these explanations are generally inadequate and simplistic.

The event represented an intelligence failure, or a border security failure, for example, or it was a consequence of South Island racism, importedfrom-Australia terrorism, or online extremism. Singularly – or even combined – none of these explanations are particularly useful.

A Black Swan Event can be said to represent a “failure of recollection”, and 15 March can be seen as such because the attacks are widely regarded as ‘unprecedented’ and because they are seen in terms of a national loss of innocence.

But this, of course, assumes that terrorism wasn’t a thing in New Zealand prior to that event. This assumption, as conference speaker Dr John Battersby of Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies (CDSS) points out, is wrong.

In his upcoming article in the inaugural issue of the CDSSpublished National Security Journal, Dr Battersby notes the spate of terror events that rocked New Zealand during the Vietnam War. In 1969, Line of Defence

for example, four men succeeded in detonating a gelignite bomb at the Waitangi Flagstaff. “Their actions were motivated by the perception that peaceful protest against Vietnam was getting them nowhere so they “had to bring the war home.”

Following this, over a dozen bombings occurred in 1970 alone targeting mainly military bases and government buildings.

The first act of international terrorism in New Zealand, notes Dr Battersby, occurred in October 1975 when three adherents of the Ananda Marga religious sect broke into a quarry in order to steal gelignite to bomb the Indian High Commission in Wellington.

In 1976 two “fringe members” of the Hare Krishna movement were killed in Auckland when the bomb they were making exploded prematurely. They had planned to bomb a local meat works.

During the 1981 ‘Springboks’ tour of New Zealand resulted in the exploding of five bombs, the locating of four undetonated improvised explosive devices, and the making of multiple bomb-threats were made against various locations. Since then, multiple well-document incidents have

occurred in Whanganui, Wellington, Christchurch and Ashburton, among others, including the infamous bombing of the Rainbow Warrior.

If New Zealand’s collective ill-preparedness for the 15 March Christchurch mosque attacks reflected a ‘failure of recollection’, it was also, according to conference speaker and Auckland Live security head Dean Kidd, a “failure of imagination”.

Gaining currency in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the US, “failure of imagination” describes an inability to imagine the possibility of a lowprobability outlier event occuring.

The 9/11 Commission found that this failure to “connect the dots” and imagine what was being planned was an important contributing factor to the September 11 attacks, stating “the most important failure [concerning the 9/11 attacks] was one of imagination.”

The question in relation to Christchurch – as it was for 9/11 – is: could the dots have been joined?

It’s a question that the current Royal Commission of Inquiry is looking into.

But perhaps the more relevant question, particularly for New Zealand, is: even if we’d joined the dots, would anyone have been listening?

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HOMELAND SECURITY

Terror Resilience: Human factors and psychological strategies How can New Zealand improve its resilience against terror attacks? Barnaby Pace, Head of Department - Postgraduate and Research at Otago Polytechnic considers psychological approaches to counter terrorism and consequence management.

The events of the Christchurch Mosque attack have dramatically changed the New Zealand security landscape and the country’s sense of safety against terrorism. This presents us as a nation with an opportunity to reconsider defence strategies against such terrorist acts.

In this article I provide a brief summary of potential human factors and psychological strategies that could be implemented in an attempt to reduce the likelihood of future terrorist activities. What is provided here is a summary based on a presentation I delivered at the Asia Pacific Security Innovation Summit in Rotorua, which draws from the 2004-published Psychological Strategies for the Defence Against Terrorism by Koltko-Rivera and Hancock.

I present the defence strategies in terms of two potential approaches: ‘counter-terrorism’ and ‘consequence management’.

Barnaby Pace is a human factors psychologist and cognitive scientist specialising in risk management and behavioural analysis 44

Counter-Terrorism Increased terrorism awareness This first approach – education – may seem logical, however it requires background work to ensure in particular that an appropriate definition of terrorism awareness is developed. The definition is important because it will provide a conceptual frame of reference for the development of any training.

To this end, psychometric measures need to be developed to ensure strengths and weaknesses within assessment tools and training packages are clearly identified so to maximise their effectiveness. This can be

achieved through the development of programme evaluations.

Improve detection performance of counter-terrorism personnel This second approach focuses on improving the detection performance of counter-terrorism personnel and can be divided in into four categories: (i) enhance detection abilities; (ii) supply sophisticated tools; (iii) enhance team function; and (iv) advanced training: ‘Enhance detection abilities’ can be achieved through the application of cognitive psychology and human factors research and methodologies to improve individual attention and decisionLine of Defence

making skills, particularly in highpressure situations. This can be achieved through the use of situational awareness and situated cognition training, as well as cognitive modelling [situated cognition is a theoretical approach to human learning that supports the idea that learning takes place when an individual is doing something].

‘Sophisticated tools’ that utilise fuzzy signal detection theory and artificial intelligence can also improve the performance of counter-terrorism personnel in the detection of terrorist activity, however, training will again be critical.

The third category is ‘enhance team function’. From a psychological perceptive, the field of industrialorganisational psychology has a lot to offer through team performance improvement research [industrialorganisational psycholog y is the branch of psycholog y that applies psychological theories and principles to organisations].

Finally, ‘advanced training techniques’ can be implemented through the use of simulations, virtual reality training and micro world scenarios. These can provide the environment to enhance individual and team performance.

Several parallel approaches are recommended as consequence management interventions; including: (i) enhancing the capabilities of the first responders; (ii) improving escape and evacuation procedures; (iii) promoting greater resilience within the population; and (iv) the effective treatment of victims:

Obstruct terrorist activities The third counter-terrorism approach suggested by Koltko-Rivera and Hancock is the obstruction of terrorist activities. Achieving this requires a focus on qualitative research and cognitive task analysis to ensure that professionals have an effective understanding of terrorist activities in order to obstruct them [cognitive task analysis (CTA) is aimed at understanding tasks that require significant cognitive activity from the user, such as decision-making, problem-solving, memory, attention and judgement].

One method to understanding terrorist behaviour is to reverseengineer the actions of terrorist actors in order to determine motivation behaviours.

Enhance capabilities of first responders Training is a recurring theme across all the approaches discussed. The development of situational awareness and situated cognition for first responders is the same as for counterterrorism personnel discussed earlier.

Effective decision-making in higher pressure situations and cohesive team functioning is also critical for first responders. These skills could be enhanced through the use of simulations and micro world techniques along the same lines as that recommended for counterterrorism personal [a micro world is a learning environment inside which a student can explore alternatives, test hypotheses, and discover facts that are true about that world].

Consequence Management If an event such as the Christchurch attacks was to occur again it is imperative that New Zealand has strong consequence management systems in place to minimise the impact on a local and national scale.

Improve escape and evacuation procedures Drawing on human factors research, improvements to emergency egress, including the usage of signage and alarm systems, could be identified and implemented.

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Promote resilience in the population Promotion of resilience through the utilisation of positive psychology research can serve to ‘strengthen’ and ‘toughen’ communities. Stress exposure training is also suggested

by Koltko-Rivera and Hancock, although this would be difficult to implement within a community setting.

It is suggested that stress exposure training be undertaken within target groups, such as first responders [stress exposure training is the practicing of skills in a stressful and distracting environment to develop the ability to perform them reliably in spite of the circumstances].

Treat victims effectively It is critical that post-traumatic treatment and crisis psychological intervention be implemented effectively and efficiently. Treatment is also essential for military personnel and first responders, and for clinicians working with victims.

Conclusion The majority of the strategies summarised here focus heavily on the implementation of effective training packages for those individuals working within counter-terrorism, first responder and medical roles or those who are likely to encounter terrorism. Such training packages need to be established and successfully implemented ahead of time, allowing skills to be tested and developed before they are required within real world situations. Preparation is key.

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REVIEWS A story of heroism in three parts LTCOL (Ret) Simon Ewing-Jarvie reviews MAJ (Ret) Craig Wilson’s ‘call it as you see it’ soldier’s account of the Battle of Baghak, New Zealand’s largest combat engagement since the Vietnam War. Bravo Kiwi: New Zealand Soldiers, Afghanistan and the Battle of Baghak

By Major (Ret) Craig Wilson NZGD. (Auckland, David Bateman Ltd, 2018), 239 pp. ISBN 978-1-86953-856-9.

RRP $39.99. A percentage of the proceeds goes to the Fallen Heroes Trust.

“The Chinese are all business, and right or wrong is not high on their agenda. It probably takes a country that still has development and corruption problems of its own to understand a sustainable way to operate in Afghanistan.”

Referring to an agreement between the Chinese and Afghan Governments to relocate a village allowing the construction of a large power station, this remarkably forthright statement

by Wilson is typical of the ‘call it as you see it’ style he employs throughout this account of his military career from 2009 to 2012.

‘Bravo Kiwi’ begins with his posting to 2nd/1st Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment in Burnham Camp as Officer Commanding B (Bravo) Company. It traverses the period of a normal unit and subunit training cycle through to pre-deployment training for Afghanistan.

This book is really three stories in one. Part one focuses on Wilson’s transition from life as a Special Forces officer in the NZ Special Air Service back to his parent corps of infantry.

There is clearly regret at moving out of the SF but he focuses on lessons learned and how he can use that experience to get the best out of his new command.

Part two begins with the direction to prepare his company and others for deployment to Afghanistan as the next Provincial Reconstruction Team in Bamyan Province for the 20th rotation of Operation CRIB (CRIB20 / Kiwi Company). It ends with his near-fatal wounding by insurgent gunfire and subsequent evacuation in the early stages of the Battle of Baghak on 4 August 2012 – New Zealand’s largest combat engagement since the Vietnam War. 46

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The third and final part is an assortment of stories that also cover the deaths of a further three of his soldiers in an IED attack on their vehicle while he was recovering in a hospital in Germany and his repatriation to New Zealand.

At the beginning of the book, the author acknowledges he is informed by mixed facts (from others after his wounding) and speculation on his part (such as the enemy perspective of the battle). This, he says, enables him to tell his story and he accepts that an official history may record things differently. Wilson also points out that he wrote the book while recovering from his wounds and under heavy medication.

‘Bravo Kiwi’ is a gritty, soldier’s eye view and account of life in training and on operations. It has some great belly laughs, such as the 2/1 Bn swimming sports and his soldiers’ entry into a synchronised swimming event (p.24). Wilson is upfront about his temper but also exposes his softer side when talking about his wife, children and the families of his soldiers.

He doesn’t shy away from telling his troops how terrifying combat is based on his prior operational experience. You come away with the feeling that there is a lot more to him than just his self-definition as a combat leader (p.14). However, there are several comments that will raise eyebrows, particularly in his reference to individuals or groups acting bravely or performing as well as his ‘Purebreds’ even though they weren’t infantry.

Wilson doesn’t hold back from naming people, with only a few exceptions. He describes people how he saw them, warts and all, including some of his Afghan allies.

The inclusion of five maps provide useful context with two showing the layout of Bamyan Province and the location of the Kiwi Company bases. The three others provide a time-staged situation map of the Battle of Baghak with operational information overlaid on satellite photography.

Numerous photos in both grey scale and colour help to bring the scenes to life. All but two of these photos are copyright NZ Defence Force which seems at odds with claims elsewhere that the NZDF had blocked the publication of this book since its completion in April 2013.

There has been very little in the public arena about the Battle of Baghak apart from a few media stories, the NZDF’s heavily redacted findings from its Court of Inquiry and the Stuff Circuit series ‘The Valley’.

Whether you agree with the story Wilson presents or not, ‘Bravo Kiwi’ is an important addition to the literature available on a significant moment in New Zealand’s military history. It presents the Clausewitzian concepts of ‘fog’ and ‘friction’ in war starkly.

Wilson dedicates his book to the memory of the five Kiwi Company soldiers who died on CRIB20 – Corporal Luke Tamatea, Lance Corporal Jacinda Baker, Lance Corporal Pralli Durrer, Lance Corporal Rory Malone and Private Richard Harris. A part of the revenue from the book is being donated to the Fallen Heroes Trust.

Works like this are a cathartic experience for the writer and you do get the sense that this has been the case for Craig Wilson. It’s hoped that many more will tell their stories of service in the future. Recommended reading.

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EVENTS

Safety & Security Asia When: 1-3 October 2019 Where: Marina Bay Sands, Singapore www.safetysecurityasia.com.sg

2019 NZ Cyber Security Summit When: 16 October 2019 Where: Te Papa Tongarewa, Wellington www.conferenz.co.nz/events/2019-nz-cyber-security-summit 2019 NZ Digital Identity Summit When: 16 October 2019 Where: Te Papa Tongarewa, Wellington www.digitalidentity.nz/events/ Purplecon When: 16 October 2019 Where: Pipitea marae, Wellington www.purplecon.nz Kawaiicon 2019!

When: 17-18 October 2019 Where: Wellington www.kawaiicon.org ISC2 Auckland Chapter Meeting When: 24th October 2019 Where: Auckland Topic: Phishing and user awareness – Ray Cabrera www.isc2chapter-auckland.org.nz/events/ NZ Division 34th Annual Symposium and Awards Royal Aeronautical Society When: 1 November 2019 Where: Wellington www.raes.org.nz/ Maritime Safety & Security Conference When: 5-7 November 2019 Where: Canada www.maritimearcticsecurity.ca Procurement Roadshow Series When: 12 November 2019 Where: Christchurch Details: NZDIA 3rd Fraud Film Festival When: 13-14 November 2019 Where: ASB Theatre, Auckland www.fraudfilmfestival.co.nz Logistics and Supply Chain Defence Update Day When: 26 November 2019 Details: NZDIA Procurement Roadshow Series When: 21 November 2019 Where: Wellington Details: NZDIA World Border Security Congress When: 31 March – 02 April 2020 Where: Athens, Greece www.world-border-congress.com

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JOURNEY OF WONDER

KC-390

READY FOR THE MISSION

Embraer celebrates the first of 28 deliveries of the KC-390 to the Brazilian Air Force. At the same time, the Portuguese Government signed a contract for the acquisition of five airlifters to be operated by the Portuguese Air Force. This is a significant moment in the KC-390 program, marking, not only its Entry Into Service, but also the confirmation of the aircraft’s export potential and operational effectiveness within NATO. This follows an exceptionally thorough campaign in which the aircraft accumulated more than 2,200 hours of flight testing in the most demanding environments, reinforced by thousands of engineering simulation hours. In the coming months the Brazilian Air Force will continue to incorporate additional KC-390 into service. Embraer also looks forward to seeing the aircraft recognized and accepted by other Armed Forces around the world as the natural choice in its field. The combination of 21st century, state-of-the-art advanced systems and proven engines, in conjunction with a worldwide sustainment alliance of reputable suppliers, makes the KC-390 the most reliable, easy to operate and efficient aircraft in its class.

EMBRAER DELIVERS THE FIRST KC-390 TO THE BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE

kc-390.com