INTERNATIONAL SECURITY From Oslo to Wellington: A role in keeping the great power peace
Former Defence Minister Hon Wayne Mapp surveys the state of China-US rivalry in East Asia, suggesting that New Zealand can play an important role in diffusing tension in the region – if Wellington chooses to invest.
Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO was New Zealand’s Minister of Defence and Minister of Science and Innovation from 2008 to 2011.
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The tempo of the war of words between China and the United States keeps building. It is no longer uncommon to see speculation about a future great power military conflict in East Asia. How much attention should we be paying to this? To what extent is it a real threat? I last wrote about the China challenge in the Summer 2019-20 issue of Line of Defence Magazine, nearly two years ago. The fundamental trajectory of China has not changed since then. China remains on track to reaching economic parity with the United States within a few years, though per capita GDP will only be a quarter of that of the US. However, it is worth recollecting that when the US had similar real GDP per capita, it was building its first nuclear aircraft carrier and was about to embark on the Apollo programme. China has the potential to hugely increase its military capability. Most informed estimates have China’s defence spending at about 2 percent of GDP, about double the official figure. Taken as a percentage of population, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is about a quarter the size of that of the US defence force, though in absolute terms, the PLA has about the same number of people. The percentage of people in uniform is actually similar to that of New Zealand but given the high level of investment in high end technology, China will be spending substantially more than New Zealand as a percentage of GDP.
During my time at the Centre for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) in Washington DC in the summer of 2012, one of the researchers there argued that a combat aircraft would cost China the same in nominal terms as it would in the United States. I said that took no account of the significantly lower costs in China. At that time China was building as many Su 27 aircraft per year as the US was building F15E, F16 and F18E/F aircraft. However, the cost per aircraft was clearly much less than in the United States, particularly given that in 2012 China was spending only 2 percent of GDP on defence and that China’s economy was only half the size of the United States’. The labour cost per aircraft was clearly much less in China than in the US. China’s defence force is still substantially less powerful than that of the United States, both in qualitative and quantitative terms. However, China has focused its investment on naval and air capabilities that will have greatest effect within China’s continental margin, specifically within 1,000 miles of the China’s coast. This includes both the East China Sea and the South China Sea. It is clear that China intends to be the dominant power within this area. China’s reach within this area clearly will not go uncontested. The US has sovereign territory close to China’s continental margin, in Guam and the Northern Marianas. Japan, in particular, will contest China’s influence in the East China Sea, and Line of Defence
