Line of Defence Magazine - Spring 2021

Line of Defence

Issue 21 • Spring 2021

New Zealand’s Defence and National Security Magazine

Photo courtesy of New Zealand Defence Force

Interview: Defence Building New Secretary Andrew Zealand’s Future Navy Bridgman SECDEF talks Defence Assessment, Defence Capability Plan review, international engagement, and the Ministry’s key priorities in 2021/22.

Peter Greener: The need to replace half of the RNZN’s fleet by the mid 2030s presents rare opportunity to move away from like-for-like replacements.

Counterterror Mental health blind spot Nicholas Dynon: Punitive approaches by government to individuals exhibiting lone actor terrorist behaviours are not making us safer.

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CONTENTS

Editor’s Note Kia Ora and welcome to the Spring 2021 – and 21st – issue of Line of Defence. It’s been a big few months in the Defence and National Security space.

As I write this Editor’s Note I’m particularly conscious of the announcement just a couple of days ago of the new AUKUS trilateral security partnership between the US, UK and Australia. It’s a big announcement, and one that the Morrison Government is making much positive noise about, not least because it stands to take eventual delivery of 12 nuclear powered attack submarines.

The announcement caught the world unaware, including an apoplectic French Government, which recalled its Ambassadors to the US and Australia in protest over the killing of its $90bn Australian submarine deal. The European Union too couldn’t have been overly impressed; unaware of the potential clash, it had launched its Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific on the same day as the Biden-Johnson-Morrison announcement.

Beijing has predictably sounded its disappointment at what it sees as the latest expression of containment of China by the US-led Anglosphere. Commentators seem polarised on the question of whether the new partnership will promote stability within the Indo Pacific region or erode it.

Polarisation appears also to be the case among New Zealand commentators. Should New Zealand have been invited to join the partnership? How will the development alter New Zealand’s strategic outlook? What about the Five Eyes going forward? Are there interoperability implications? Will New Zealand need to step up as a result, or have we just dodged a bullet in terms of needlessly upsetting our largest trading partner?

While there is much dust yet to settle on this, the key takeaway at this point is that AUKUS provides strong indication that a post-Afghanistan US and a post-Brexit UK are doubling down on their focus on the Indo Pacific, a strategic intention highlighted by Dr Wayne Mapp in his AUKUS focused article in this issue of Line of Defence.

We’re also joined in this issue by Editor-at-large Dr Peter Greener, who writes that the need to replace half of the RNZN’s fleet by the mid 2030s presents a rare opportunity to move away from simply considering like for like replacements. The jury’s still out on whether or not the aforementioned AUKUS arrangement might change the decision calculus over such things as frigate replacement, but in the meantime there’s some serious analysis that needs to be had in relation to our future maritime needs.

We are particularly honoured to be joined in this issue by Defence Secretary Andrew Bridgman, who sat down with me to discuss the upcoming Defence Assessment, Defence Capability Plan review, international engagement, the Ministry’s key priorities in 2021/22.

And that’s just the tip of the iceberg. This is a particularly ‘packed’ edition of Line of Defence with opinion and analysis from a range of exceptional authors. I hope you enjoy the read!

Nicholas Dynon Auckland

ASSOCIATION

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CONTACT DETAILS Chief Editor: Nicholas Dynon M: +64 (0)22 366 3691 E: nick@defsec.net.nz

Publisher: Craig Flint T: +64 (07) 868 2703 E: craig@defsec.net.nz

Postal and delivery address 27 West Cresent Te Puru 3575, Thames RD5, New Zealand www.linkedin.com/company/ defsec-media-limited www.facebook.com/defsecmedia/ www.twitter.com/DefsecNZ

CONTRIBUTORS & INTERVIEWEES

Andrew Bridgman Sir Ken McKenzie KH RADM (Ret’d) Clint Thomas AM CSC Clinton Williams Dr Peter Greener Lewis Holden Assoc Prof Jeremy Moses Dr Geoffrey Ford Dr Sian Troath Chris Penk MP Nicholas Borroz Ian Harman Jennie Vickers Dr John Battersby Dr Rhys Ball Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO Nicholas Dynon

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Dr Peter Greener Dr Bridgette-Sullivan Taylor Dr John Battersby Debbie Howarth Jennie Vickers Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO Ruth Currie DSD

Prof Rouben Azizian Dr Reuben Steff Paul Howard John Deal Douglas Pauling John Campbell MNZM Pat Cullen

SPONSORS & PARTNERS Rheinmetall General Atomics Aeronautical Serco Defence Tabella New Zealand Defence Industry Association RiskNZ: Diversified Communications Australia

UPCOMING ISSUE

Summer – December Main themes: Spotlight on the UK, Indo Pacific, Autonomous Systems Copy Deadline: 20 November 2021 Publication: 05 December 2021

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ISSN 2463-5774 (Print) • ISSN 2463-6258 (Online)

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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The Interview: Andrew Bridgman, Secretary of Defence

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Were recent events in Afghanistan really an ‘intelligence failure’?

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Serco Defence brings Design, Build, Operate and Maintain expertise to region

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Policy challenges highlighted in National Security Journal Indo-Pacific special issue

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Building New Zealand’s Future Navy

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MQ-9B Remotely Piloted Aircraft Support For Resource Protection

AUKUS announcement signals rise of the Indo Pacific

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Remote Working: Protecting sensitive data

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New Zealand could take a global lead in controlling the development of ‘killer robots’ — so why isn’t it?

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Afghanistan – Lessons to be learnt

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Common Space Start-up Communications Errors

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Q&A: Ian Harman, CEO, New Zealand Defence Industry Association

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Littoral Manoeuvre Craft contract goes to Tasmanian company

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Report Card: Broader Outcomes two years on

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HOMELAND SECURITY

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IFSEC Global Influencers in Security and Fire 2021 Announced

NZDF exercises with international counterparts in South East Asia

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Private Sector Crowded Places Security Advisory Group gets the nod

Australia identifies Space as cyber warfare high-ground

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One Eye Open: Mental health blind spot in counterterror efforts

Defsec Media Limited publishes Line of Defence, FireNZ Magazine and New Zealand Security Magazine premier publications covering industry sectors that help keep Kiwis safe. Find us online www.defsec.net.nz Copyright: No article or part thereof may be reproduced without prior consent of the publisher.

Disclaimer: The information contained in this publication is given in good faith and has been derived from sources believed to be reliable and accurate.

However, neither the publishers nor any person involved in the preparation of this publication accept any form of liability whatsoever for its contents including advertisements, editorials, opinions, advice or information or for any consequences from its use.

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The Interview: Andrew Bridgman, Secretary of Defence In this exclusive interview with chief editor Nicholas Dynon, Secretary of Defence Andrew Bridgman talks Defence Assessment, Defence Capability Plan review, international engagement, and the Ministry’s key priorities in 2021/22.

ND: A new Defence Assessment has been in progress for a while now. Will there be an unclassified version of that available and when might we expect to see it?

Andrew Bridgman is Secretary of Defence and Chief Executive of the Ministry of Defence. A public servant since 1991, he was previously Chief Executive and Secretary for Justice (2011-19).

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AB: The Defence Assessment is being worked on. We’re at the final stages of preparing it and we hope to be putting it up to Ministers for consideration over the next quarter.

What I can say is that we really continue the themes of the last Defence Assessment, which is around climate change and geostrategic competition.

It endorses the work that went into the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018. In that sense it is thematically the same, but it will have different emphases.

There are two key things about the document. One is that it’s the view about the challenges for New Zealand from a Defence lens. That’s important because government has a number of instruments of statecraft that they can use at any one time, whether it be diplomacy, trade, or aid, and defence is one of them; so we’re very conscious that this is our view of the world.

The second is that the Defence Assessment for us is important in that it feeds ultimately into capability decisions. It’s about, “Here are the challenges that we think New Zealand faces through a Defence lens, and here’s the role that Defence could play, and here are the capabilities it needs to undertake the tasks that Government asks of it.”

ND: The Minister indicated that the Defence Capability Plan (DCP) was being reviewed, but that “We are not cutting back on the DCP.” When are we likely to hear the outcome of the review?

AB: There are two aspects to this. The first is that the Ministers are looking at the Defence Capability Plan in light of the fiscal constraints that have occurred due to the global pandemic since that plan was launched in 2019. Defence Capability Plans are always very long term; they are always 10-15 year plans and things change over that time.

Governments always look at them at any point in time in light of what the situation is fiscally, and that’s what they’re doing at the moment. I couldn’t give you a timeframe on that but the plan and the projects within it will be looked at in light of what other priorities Government needs to consider.

Ultimately, regardless of the fiscal situation, what people need to understand is that each purchase is presented to Cabinet on its own merits.

You need to demonstrate the overall value of capabilities like the P-8As, Bushmasters and the Hercules to Government. In one sense the Defence Capability Plan acts as a guidance mechanism.

The second thing – and this has probably gotten a bit lost – is that at the moment we have capabilities worth $5.6 billion under acquisition, with the critical ones being the

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that our industry is positioned to take advantage of opportunities in Australia and New Zealand.

Secretary of Defence greeted by a New Zealand Army officer in Iraq.

Image: Ministry of Defence.

P-8As, C-130Js, and the Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicles, as well as the recently announced Consolidated Logistics Programme, which includes the building of a new engineering workshop at Linton Military Camp valued at around $47 million.

So while the future of the plan is really important, our current focus is equally – if not more – about ensuring that our spending of the $5.6 billion is executed well.

ND: In 2018 and again last year, the importance of Closer Defence Relations between Australia and New Zealand was emphasised. In a post-Covid 19 economic environment how important is it that we continue to work together to deliver capability in the most costeffective way?

AB: The short answer is that it’s extremely important. Australia is our only formal ally. By geography we logically have similar objectives, and by the numbers we are critical to each other. Even if you look at our respective defence forces, we are relatively small but we are material.

Interoperability and capability with Australia is really critical, because we have to operate together. We have operated together historically and we operate together now if you look, for instance, at the recent evacuation mission to Afghanistan. If you look at our focus on the Pacific and the broader Indo-Pacific, our operations won’t

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always be joint but there will inevitably be a joint or at least strongly coordinated component to many of them.

The P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft is an example of a joint capability, in this sense. We’ve also both got the Hercules, and we’re acquiring the new Bushmaster fleet from an Australian company – and the Australian Defence Force also use them.

These capabilities make it really easy to operate together – and if I look at those three capabilities they make it easier to operate together in places like the Pacific.

This interoperability also creates opportunities for businesses on both sides of the Tasman. We’re using an Australian defence apparel company that has set up a distribution centre in Palmerston North to provide uniforms for the New Zealand Defence Force, and that will create around 16 jobs in the region. A Wellington company has secured a contract to supply small unmanned aerial vehicles to the Royal Australian Air Force. We should be constantly looking at how we can provide our industry with opportunities in Australia, and vice versa.

Despite this, we’ve also got to be aware of the reality that theirs’ is a $44 billion industry and ours’ is roughly a $3 billion industry, so we’re on a different scale, and inevitably they will be focusing on capabilities that we won’t be focusing on. But it’s a case of looking out for opportunities, being agile, and making sure where we can

ND: Alongside capability development and policy advice, the Ministry undertakes international defence engagement activities that support broader defence, security and foreign policy objectives. Can you tell us how the Ministry’s International Defence Engagement Strategy has had to change since the onset of Covid 19?

AB:It has had to change. The reason for that is that there is no question that the ideal is face-to-face, but what we’ve learnt through Covid is that there is actually a lot that you can achieve with telephone calls and through Zoom or MS Teams meetings.

And what we’re more inclined to do now – which I think is very good for relationship building – is to pick up the phone or organise a zoom call and have a conversation that previously we may well have left for a more formal dialogue. I’ve had a lot of contact with my Pacific partners via phone or Zoom that I probably otherwise would have left for those formal, twice a year dialogues. That’s been very beneficial.

The Ministry has managed to continue with a lot of big formal dialogues via Zoom, including the ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus meeting, and various other meetings, where you’ve got a large number of countries ‘around the table’. These have continued along with more informal dialogues, but ultimately it will be beneficial to get back to face-to-face meetings when it is safe to do so.

Everything we do is built on relationships, and like any relationship if you’re meeting twice a year it’s probably not going to be as beneficial.

But if in the meantime you’re adding Zooms or phone calls you’re still building relationships, so it’s shown us a new way and one that’s very complementary to the old way.

ND: The Maritime Security Strategy published by the Ministry of Transport in December 2020 states that “Cabinet has agreed to bring forward the investment in complementary air surveillance capability [Enhanced Maritime Awareness Capability] to

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DEFENCE ensure that delivery coincides with the arrival of the P-8As in 2023.” Are you able to provide insight into the current status of this project?

AB: It’s still very early days in the Enhanced Maritime Awareness Capability Project. The project is focused on information gathering and it would be fair to say that we’re still looking at the options such as remotely piloted aircraft, satellite services, and small to medium size crewed aircraft.

ND: When you were last interviewed for Line of Defence Magazine (Autumn 2020), in terms of the Capability Management System you mentioned that been a huge investment in getting things right.. From your perspective, how is the system performing?

AB: The new system was a big change, and I think it’s going really well. The current Chief of Defence Force Kevin Short and my predecessor Helene Quilter were instrumental in the establishment of this system.

Defence capability acquisition is incredibly complex and challenging, and it’s probably something that most

people aren’t really fully aware of but it’s around the fact that Defence capability is unique – It’s a high-cost industry to enter – which is why there are in some cases a limited number of vendors for specific capabilities. Projects are often large and extend over long periods of time, where costs can change and there’s just huge complexity.

The Capability Management Framework provides a framework and formal process and governance system for the acquisition of major military equipment, and was designed to mitigate the possibilities of things going wrong, as much as possible. Sir Brian Roche in his independent 2018 review of the system acknowledged that the very nature of defence capability acquisition makes it a risky business, and that you’ll never eradicate the risk completely but you can minimise it.

There are three things I would say in relation to the system: The first is that we’ve invested a lot of resources into it. In particular, people. There’s absolutely no question that if you’ve got a big undertaking you need to adequately resource it.

The second is that we have our Integrated Project Teams, which are

critical to the successful definition of a capability, acquiring it, and introducing it to service. These are teams where we have Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force people working together on the delivery of a particular capability, combining the necessary military and civilian expertise. I think that gives you a robustness as you’re going through the process.

The third is governance at various layers (i) in relation to the actual project itself, (ii) broader governance over the whole system at a management level, and then (iii) Capability Governance Group, which is chaired by Chief of Defence Force and myself.

In our case, there has been turnover in a number of senior roles since its introduction in 2017, and yet this system remains as vigilant and robust as it’s always been. I think the key thing there is the culture of the two organisations and their people. We firmly believe in the system’s value, so when Helene left and I came in, things didn’t change.

Ultimately, it’s about consistency of purpose, and discipline. The system and its governance are utterly critical in ensuring that we manage the $5.6

Secretary of Defence collecting funds for the RSA on Poppy Day. Image: Ministry of Defence.

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Secretary of Defence visiting HMNZS Aotearoa with Chief of Defence Force. Image: Ministry of Defence.

billion we’ve got under management at the moment.

ND: You’ve been at the Ministry of Defence for two years now, and this year you are also marking 30 years working in the public service, what are your observations about the Defence sector and Ministry of Defence?

AB: Defence is a fascinating area. It really is intrinsically interesting. From a public policy perspective – which is my background – it’s fascinating because there are so many unknowns. It doesn’t have the same clear boundaries that other areas of public policy have. It is an area which is full of unknowns and full of complexity.

When you do a Defence Assessment and when you read articles in defence journals trying to anticipate what geostrategic competition will look like and what the intentions of various countries are, it would appear that we’re all trying to anticipate the future, which is challenging in and of itself That’s one area that I find quite fascinating and quite different, for instance, to Justice where I had worked previously.

Then, in terms of capability, everything that you purchase in Defence tends to costs hundreds of millions or billions of dollars, so there

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are consequences of getting it wrong or significant benefits in getting it right.

The final thing I’ll add is that Defence is an area – understandably – that the public hasn’t historically had a lot of familiarity with, and I think there’s a real role for the Ministry to play in overcoming that.

I think it’s up to us in the Defence sector to be able to explain to the New Zealand public why we need a specific capability, why it serves the interests of the public, and why it often comes at a significant cost.

Bringing New Zealanders back from Afghanistan is a good example of where the public can see the benefit of our Defence Force, as was the Christchurch earthquakes, and the more recent South Island floods, and of course the MIQ facilities. These help to explain the value of a Defence resource and, importantly, a contingent resource that needs to be there on standby. If it’s not contingent then you don’t have anybody to be able to do anything when you need it in an emergency.

ND: What are some of the key priority areas for the Ministry in 2021/2022?

AB: At an output level, the thing we talk about often is that we have about $5.6 billion under active management,

and I cannot stress enough that we are very conscious of the obligation that we have to the government and the public to successfully manage that $5.6 billion and to deliver on what the government’s intent is for it.

The second priority is finalising the Defence Assessment. It is clear that there is more global challenges than there used to be. Being able to provide to government an updated version of where we think the world is at from a Defence perspective is going to be very important.

The third priority is maintaining engagement in the Covid world, and despite what I said before, it is intensive.

You’ve got to maintain the momentum, you’ve got to maintain our efforts to engage with our partners and right now it’s more important than ever because we can’t do face-to-face.

The fourth priority is about supporting our people at the Ministry of Defence. The current situation is not easy for anyone. As a Ministry, first and foremost we need to support our people through this time. It’s an anxious time no matter what positive light you put on it. It’s challenging within an environment of significant uncertainty; we’ve all got family and friends and commitments beyond work.

We therefore need to be spending a lot of time on supporting our people.

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DEFENCE Serco Defence brings Design, Build, Operate and Maintain expertise to region According to Serco Defence’s Clint Thomas and Clinton Williams, international naval shipbuilding experience provides the defence prime with an understanding of future naval support operations, scale and capability that few can match.

RADM (Ret’d) Clint Thomas AM CSC joined Serco Asia Pacific as Managing Director, Defence in July 2017 following a 40-year career in Defence and the Royal Australian Navy, most recently as Commander of Joint Logistics.

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Clinton Williams joined Serco Asia Pacific as Defence Relationship Manager (NZ) in June 2020 following a 19-year career in the Royal New Zealand Navy. His most recent RNZN posting was as Commander Officer Training School.

For more than 50 years, Serco Defence has been trusted by governments around the world to deliver complex maritime project management, including design experience in all ship types, spanning new vessel design and refit modifications, Icebreaker and Southern Ocean support vessel design and operation, mariner training and simulations support services, and waterfront maintenance of over 900 ships worldwide.

Serco has been involved in every major US Navy ship programme over the past 40 years and has provided assured support to the Royal Australian Navy for the past 20 years.

Globally, one third of Serco’s revenue results from serving our defence customers, and the majority of our military support tasks are naval. Serco’s ships and designs, our people and experience play key roles in supporting the Royal Navy (RN), the United States Navy (USN), the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN).

This makes Serco one of the larger maritime service companies in the world, able to call upon a wide range of maritime expertise across the ‘Five Eyes’ nations.

It’s perhaps Serco’s best-kept secret, but Serco is a well-established ship builder. To its customers, “shipbuilding” means successfully bringing together a team of programme

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managers, naval architects, ship builders, sub-contractors, crews and logisticians, and providing an end-toend programme to deliver a customertailored marine solution. Serco supports USN warship programmes, the RN Offshore Support Vessels (OSVs) and Tug Boats, and has designed and built the Australian Antarctic Division’s (AAD) next generation Icebreaker.

“Our ongoing work in Australia is perhaps the best example of Serco’s shipbuilding capabilities and also probably its least advertised example,” said Clint Thomas, Serco Defence Managing Director.

“For many years in North America the Serco team has worked hand-inglove with the USN, with the recent acquisition and rebranding of Serco’s ‘Marine Engineering Technology and Sustainment’ business unit. This has brought a formidable naval design house into the Serco fold; a welcome addition to our extensive USN support and maintenance capabilities,” he said.

“Likewise, Serco Canada Marine (SCM) is the Canadian arm of Serco’s ‘Global Maritime Community’ (GMC), offering comprehensive ship design and programme management services, as well as acting as Serco’s incubator for cutting-edge software and waterfront technology development.

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“In Australia, we’ve delivered 17 assorted naval auxiliaries for the RAN over the last decade, alongside several dozen other smaller vessels and Ship’s Boats. The largest and latest of these is the AAD’s new icebreaker, the RSV Nuyina, the third largest ship Australia has ever owned and operated as a nation.”

To successfully deliver the Nuyina, Serco used the Dutch designer/builder Damen to build the ship in Romania and the Netherlands (due to shipyard limitations in Australia), with Serco now operating the ship using our own crew of specialist mariners. Serco’s Hobart operations team has developed a wide-ranging local Tasmanian supply chain to support the ship from its new home port, establishing a diverse industry team to deliver everything from engine spares to food at sea.

“The Nuyina programme demonstrates the efficiencies that can be made with an agile and vibrant supply chain, highlighting that shipbuilding today is primarily about effective international programme management, indicating a move from the more traditional approach of managers focusing on welding on the waterfront and forgetting the wider programme deliverables required for a truly successful outcome,” said Thomas.

To illustrate our global approach, Serco has recently responded to the New Zealand Government’s Request for Information covering the RNZN’s proposed Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel (SOPV). Within the response, Serco highlighted the advantages and potential efficiencies that the New Zealand Government could harness, should Serco’s extensive design portfolio be teamed with a shipyard in Singapore, South America or Vietnam.

As a proven shipbuilder, Serco is in a unique position globally to offer what is known as a “DBOM” approach: a holistic Design, Build, Operate and Maintain project service for our naval and commercial customers.

The Nuyina is a classic example of DBOM methodology, with Serco as the Prime contractor responsible for the delivery of a 30 year, ‘cradle to grave’ solution for the AAD. Using this model, Serco can offer the RNZN a similar DBOM package, allowing the MOD to benefit from our specialist design skills and pre-existing stable of ‘ice rated’ designs, and allow Serco’s programme management team and specialist mariner crews to facilitate a ‘one stop shop’ for the SOPV. Serco’s ability to identify and harness extensive local supply chains for logistic and maintenance support means

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RSV Nuyina. Image: Serco Asia Pacific.

that New Zealand’s local industries can contribute meaningfully to the SOPV programme, offering participation and economic benefits to New Zealand.

In drawing on our global experience, Serco understands that customers may not have the capacity for administrative oversight required to generate and support numerous onerous separate contracts with shipyards, designers, subcontractors et al: customers want a single accountable contract with a reliable prime which has the proven capacity to bring all the varied elements of a ship build programme together, within a single, warranted project package.

By deploying our unique DBOM methodology, Serco can combine efficiencies of an in-house tailored design solution and a carefully selected shipyard partner, identify sustainable shipboard systems and supply chain partners, to deliver a reliable SOPV capability throughout the life of the platform.

Additionally, Serco has extensive experience in operating ships in demanding operational environments.

Serco’s UK-based operations provide an insight into many challenges marine service delivery companies face. On any given day, Serco provides waterfront and naval operations support services for the RN, as well as operating the Northern Isles Ferry Service. And while our role is obviously and prudently not that of a frontline combat capability

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for the UK Government, we add value to our RN customer by delivering commercial vessels and crews for support and auxiliary functions in order to release uniformed personnel for their primary missions.

Our support work for the RAN demonstrates that Serco is not scared by the size of a task: whether you need a rubber boat with an outboard engine or a company to build and operate the world’s most impressive Icebreaker, Serco can deliver.

This multi-levelled approach mirrors what we do in Canada, where Serco Canada Marine is currently partnered with Davie Shipyards to design and build the next generation of Canadian icebreakers, while offering bespoke Frigate and Offshore Support Vessel designs for a diverse foreign customer base. As part of this global customer community, Serco is investigating supporting the UK’s Fleet Solid Support ship programme, deploying the best of Serco’s global workforce to help generate the Royal Navy of the future.

Serco’s reputation for expertise and excellence in ship building is recognised around the world. As a prime, Serco has the technical ability and commercial influence to deliver the right design, the right shipyard, the right team, and the right operational model combination to deliver adaptable and efficient marine outcomes. As a trusted and proven industry partner,

Serco has a keen understanding of the unrelenting pressures that challenge all governments. Serco approaches each and every programme with a commitment for quality delivery.

“Our interest in working with the RNZN on the SOPV programme stems from our belief that we can improve on the current contracting and operational delivery arrangements in New Zealand,” Clinton Williams, Serco Defence New Zealand Relationship Manager said.

“We’re not trying to sell a single product for a specific instance in time.

Instead, we’re delivering exactly the operational and economic outcomes the New Zealand Government customer seeks, i.e., the best operational outcome for Aotearoa. Because we’re already working with multiple governments and can draw upon different operational models, Serco can be commercially agile and flexible to meet the unique needs of each naval or Government requirement,” he continued.

“Our intention is to bring Serco’s proven offshore expertise to New Zealand. We intend to build the sustainable local industry base critical to supporting the MoD and RNZN into the future.

“Our strong partnerships with governments in North America, Europe and Australia will allow us to support the New Zealand Government on the SOPV programme in a manner different from the competition. Serco’s understanding of future naval support operations, combined with our ongoing naval maintenance contracts, offers advantages in scale and capability that few companies can match. Likewise, the New Zealand Government is in a favourable position to capitalise on operational efficiencies for the SOPV programme by drawing upon Serco’s continuing activities to support the Australian Government’s ‘Pacific Step Up’ and the US Government’s “Pacific Pivot”.

The SOPV stands as a unique opportunity for the New Zealand Government to adopt new operational and contracting models, guaranteeing the RNZN’s ability, via the SOPV capability, to safeguard New Zealand’s maritime and Antarctic interests well into the 21st century. Serco stands ready to help.

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Defence solutions

Serco Defence is a leading integrated marine services provider in the Asia Pacific region

Deep expertise in complex maritime project management from design, build, and modifications through to vessel operation and maintenance

Serco’s reputation for excellence in ship building is recognised around the world. We deliver customer tailored marine solutions to each contract.

Photo: Rob Atherton/Shutterstock.com

Award winning marine services provider

Design and delivery of academic, operational and resilience training

A trusted global partner in the naval environment

Naval Business of the Year, 2020

Simulator based maritime warfare training for the Royal Australian and New Zealand Navies

Technical management of vessels across the full asset lifecycle with worldwide support

Expert technical staff and software engineers who maintain and develop training systems to enhance capability

40 years supporting US Navy

Best Recruiting Campaign, 2020 Excellence Awards for Best Leadership Development Programme and HR Team of the Year, 2020

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY AWARDS

WINNER

To find out more, visit www.serco.com/aspac

NAVAL BUSINESS OF THE YEAR

2020

A design and engineering partner for the Royal Canadian Navy

2020 AUSTRALIAN HR AWARDS

2020

2020

AUSTRALIAN HR AWARDS

AUSTRALIAN HR AWARDS

ELLENCE AWARD EXC

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DEFENCE

Building New Zealand’s Future Navy The need to replace half of the RNZN’s fleet by the mid 2030s presents a rare opportunity to move away from simply considering like for like replacements, writes Editor-at-large Peter Greener, and to consider newer and fewer classes.

Dr Peter Greener is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University Wellington, and an Honorary Professor – and previously Academic Dean – at the Command and Staff College of the New Zealand Defence Force.

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At a time when the economy continues to face the costs imposed by the Covid – 19 pandemic it may seem premature to be exploring opportunities for building the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) of the future, but now is the very time to be doing so.

Over the next ten to fifteen years, the government will need to consider replacements for the Protector class Offshore Patrol Vessels, the Anzac frigates and the dive and hydrographic support ship HMNZS Manawanui.

The Defence Capability Plan 2019 (DCP19) envisaged a decision being made by 2028 for the replacement of the Offshore Patrol Vessels, with the Anzac frigates being replaced in the 2030s “with modern surface combatants relevant to New Zealand’s prevailing strategic environment”. The dive and hydrographic capability was to see HMNZS Manawanui “replaced with a similar vessel in the mid-2030s”.

DCP19 highlighted that there would need to be “investment in all the core capabilities that have provided the foundation for New Zealand’s Defence Force for the last two decades. These high-end capabilities offer significant value to New Zealand’s security and our defence relationships.” Whilst we await a new Defence Assessment and a revised DCP, it appears that the baseline settings outlined in the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018, the document that generated DCP19, still hold today.

However, one theme identified in these documents appears even more pressing in the light of the impacts of COVID-19. Minister of Defence Peeni Henare recently noted that: “for many Pacific Islands that [economic recovery

after the pandemic] means protecting the fisheries. Assisting with fisheries patrols is an important way the Royal New Zealand Navy…can help.” Maintaining a significant patrol vessel capability has thus become even more salient.

It was therefore reassuring to have Minister Henare tell the Foreign Affairs and Trade Select Committee in August this year that, “We are not cutting back on the DCP.” Secretary of Defence Andrew Bridgman added that a revised Defence Capability Plan would not mean scrapping planned projects but would rather necessitate moving them “out a bit”.

Following the AUKUS announcement, former Defence Minister Dr Wayne Mapp was noted in The Dominion Post of 18 September as commenting that defence assessments in the past decade made clear the frigates were one of the three ‘critical’ pieces of military hardware that needed upgrading. ‘‘We all knew that the top one of those three would in fact be the frigates. We always knew the frigate question would be the tough question.’’

Over the past quarter century, one of the fundamental difficulties for a small Navy such as New Zealand’s has been the training and maintenance burden imposed by the requirements of each class of ships in service varying significantly. Currently with nine ships in service there are six different classes of vessel. This has been compounded by the bespoke nature of the vessels – the refitted Anzacs are now very different ships from their Australian counterparts. Some recent research has sought to identify how best to respond

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to the challenge of being a small Navy with a large area of responsibility.

For example, in the inaugural edition of the Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy of December 2020, Andrew Watts published a convincing article entitled “Designing the Next Fleet.” He argued for a rationalised future Navy fleet, making a case for designing a force structure and not merely replacing like for like.

He acknowledged that there are specialist roles that require a single class of ship – HMNZS Aotearoa, HMNZS Canterbury, and the future Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel are cited as examples.

Nevertheless, at the core of his thesis is the importance of reducing the number of ship classes, promoting the concept of one fundamental ship design capable of generating several possible capabilities.

Central to this model is the notion of modularity: “Modular installations that provide a basic ship structure and services that allow various mission packages to be installed and interchanged as needed.” Here the ship and its fundamental core systems remain unchanged - “to which a removable payload system tailored to a particular mission and level of capability is added.”

Watts notes that this would allow the possibility of fitting a vessel out as an offshore patrol vessel; with Expeditionary Reconnaissance and Mine Counter Measures equipment (though he acknowledges the possible need for additional hydraulic systems) to undertake many littoral warfare tasks; or fully fitted out as a capable combat frigate.

Whilst acknowledging that frigates require a high maximum speed at times,

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he notes that patrol vessels also need speed for interdiction and emergency response. In addition, they both need range, endurance, and good sea-keeping qualities. “The potential for combining combat and patrol functions in a single platform able to accept modular systems for combat and/or patrol missions should thus be investigated.”

Importantly, given the amount of capital that investing in such technology requires, such platforms have been in existence for three decades now, initially with the introduction of the Danish STANFLEX system. The most recent iteration of this can be found in the Royal Navy Type 31 frigates that are currently under construction. The Babcock Arrowhead 140s are based on the modular concept of the Iver Huitfeldt class Royal Danish Navy frigates.

Built to a very tight budget limit of GBP 250 million, five of these ships are planned at a total cost of GBP 1.25 billion. Many of the required systems will be fitted later, some of them being re-purposed from the current Type 23s.

A successor to the Type 31, the Type 32, is likely to provide even more flexibility for configuration, to be designed from the outset to support autonomous technology and facilitate the deployment of mine counter measures.

What was clear in Watts’ recommendations was that no particular ship was being advocated for, but two significant points were highlighted. In choosing a ship fitted with modular systems, upgrades can be undertaken without a ship having to be taken fully out of service. The other feature is that ship availability could be higher; greater

flexibility could allow for the ships to be rapidly reconfigured from combat to patrol, thus helping to manage wear on engines and other equipment.

It is noteworthy here just how long both RNZN frigates have been unavailable over their lifetime because of their refits. Greater standardisation across a greater number of ships could also allow for “price leverage on suppliers.”

It may be that a future tender results in promising offers from the United Kingdom, Denmark, Spain, Italy, or South Korea for suitable contenders.

However, the building of four or five ships to replace three current classes of ship also provides for other significant opportunities in both a post-Covid environment and a more challenging strategic context.

In May 2021, Finance Minister Grant Robertson, whilst visiting the revitalised Hillside railway workshops in Dunedin, stated thar he wanted to see workers involved in advanced manufacturing. “It is good for our communities, and it is good for our economy,” he said. “I want to see communities around New Zealand with manufacturing, like Hillside.”

Defence Minister Henare earlier this year indicated that the Prime Minister was due to “go to Australia soon and we should explore complementary defence industry opportunities.” That visit may be on hold, but new possibilities for the defence industries of Australia and New Zealand remain when thinking about new ships for the RNZN. Whilst there was much controversy in New Zealand over the decision in 1989 to purchase the Anzac frigates built by Australia and New Zealand, what was clear ultimately was the high level of New Zealand industry participation in the project. With the frigates in the end costing close to NZ$2 billion, the total value of work awarded to firms across New Zealand was in excess of NZ$800 million.

The renewal of half of the RNZN’s fleet presents a rare opportunity to move away from simply considering like for like replacements. Consideration of a new type of Anzac ship for New Zealand’s future Navy, based on an already proven design, may just be what would work best to meet New Zealand’s needs.

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DEFENCE MQ-9B Remotely Piloted Aircraft Support For Resource Protection

New Zealand is a maritime nation with the third-largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and one of the largest search and rescue areas in the world. Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) systems provide an opportunity to deliver a more effective maritime surveillance capability at much lower cost, and with significantly less environmental impact, than existing manned platforms. The General Atomics MQ9B SeaGuardian, the maritime variant of the SkyGuardian, is a capability that can undertake multiple nonmilitary tasks relevant to New Zealand and its region of interest, including resource protection, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. It is also very capable across a wide range of military roles.

A study recently commissioned by Hawk Eye Ltd and conducted by the NZ Institute of Economic Research (NZIER) Inc., utilising public and

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commercially available information, addressed employment of the MQ-9B in a fisheries protection role, by scoping the economic returns from enhanced surveillance of Antarctic Toothfish fisheries in the Ross Sea. While narrow in its focus, the results are believed to have applicability across broader resource protection roles and other non-military applications. The study found that MQ9B SeaGuardian employment would: • Provide value for money – MQ-9Bs were significantly more cost effective than existing platforms, such as P-3 Orions or other fixed-wing alternatives; • Provide enhanced capability – The ability to stay on station for long periods without being easily detected provides a degree of deterrence beyond existing platforms; and • Pay its way – The economic returns from enhanced surveillance and

reduced need to operate more expensive platforms would both cover the operating costs and meet the overhead and capital costs of the SeaGuardian.

Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing has been estimated to account for 10% to 30% more fish being harvested than is being accounted for by legal fishing around the world.

Such illegal activity compromises the sustainability of fish harvesting operations, including in New Zealand’s EEZ or across its region of strategic interest.

Fishery management over extended sea areas depends on effective monitoring of activity and enforcement of regulations. Aerial surveillance complements other monitoring capability including satellite surveillance, by being able to cover large areas of sea, and identifying vessels,

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particularly those acting suspiciously.

Aerial surveillance can be conducted covertly or overtly.

New Zealand monitors fisheries in the Ross Sea sector of the Southern Ocean under the auspices of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). A principal target of that management is prevention of illegal fishing for Antarctic Toothfish which are found within and solely managed under the CCAMLR. The basic premise for the examination conducted by the NZIER is that surveillance monitoring of the Ross Sea Antarctic Toothfish fishery can be more effectively achieved with RPA than under the current arrangement of infrequent flights by manned P-3K2 Orion aircraft and occasional surveillance by a naval vessel.

The study analysed the government leasing of two Company-Owned, Company-Operated (COCO) MQ9B SeaGuardian RPA and related systems for a range of flight hours each year. MQ-9B RPA are capable of conducting missions of up to 35 hours with a maritime sensor configuration, including a multi-mode radar, an electro-optics/infrared system, and an automatic identification system (AIS).

In terms of the cost of the aircraft being on-station, the longer sortie durations, and lack of on-board crew for the MQ-9B mean that drone

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Table 1 Cost effectiveness of options for aerial surveillance of the Ross Sea

COCO#1 COCO#2 P-3K2 P-3K2 MQ9B MQ9B Low cost High cost

Outward transit hrs

11

11

5.0

5.0

Time on Station hrs

13

13

1.0

1.0

Return transit hrs

11

11

5.0

5.0

Sortie hours (Light)

35

35

11

11

$ 25,847

$ 60,926

$ 137,500

$ 220,000

Cost/hour on station Source: NZIER

options are more cost-effective in delivering hours of surveillance than crewed aircraft. An extract from the NZIER report highlighting a range of MQ-9B and P-3K2 operating options and costs per on-station hour is contained in Table 1.

The NZIER report concluded that drone operations also have a qualitative advantage, in that more effective surveillance can be provided by a 13-hour sortie over the ocean when compared to much shorter sorties by crewed aircraft. The collection of ‘pattern of life’ is one example. Further, with two RPA available, it is possible to deploy these RPA consecutively to provide up to 18 hours continuous surveillance, further increasing the advantages over crewed aircraft.

The MQ-9B RPA, which is available today, could both replace some current surveillance operations and also extend

surveillance capability. The principal benefit realised would be an increase in the detection of non-compliant activity in the Ross Sea fishery, leading to the positive identification of suspect vessels; and the deterrent effect of more regular patrols that should reduce the number of infringements and level the playing field for compliant vessels. Either of those outcomes has potential to increase the probability of New Zealand vessels increasing catch sizes and adding to national economic benefit.

The study also concluded that similar increases in cost-effectiveness for other mission types including, but not limited to, firefighting; combatting trafficking of drugs, arms and people; search and rescue; biosecurity response; disaster response; law enforcement; and infrastructure monitoring were potentially feasible.

The study also noted that MQ-9B RPA operation would make a positive contribution to New Zealand by reducing its emission of greenhouse gases. The MQ-9B carries a maximum of 2720 kg of AVTUR for a maximum sortie endurance of 35 hours: around 1/9th of the maximum fuel load of a P-3K2 and around 1/12th of the P-8A Poseidon.

SeaGuardian presents a gamechanging, cost-effective, and ecological ISR solution for New Zealand’s civil security, while also having proven potential to support a wide range of Defence needs. Meaningful New Zealand industry opportunities would exist through the lease or acquisition of the SeaGuardian RPAS – from a family of RPAS with over 7 million flight hours and the world’s most experienced RPAS manufacturer – General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc.

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DEFENCE

Remote Working: Protecting sensitive data Online collaboration has its challenges, particularly when working with sensitive data.

But, writes Tabella Managing Director Lewis Holden, there are a range of tools that deliver security without getting in the way of teamwork.

The recent lockdowns have again seen a surge in the use of Microsoft Teams and other collaboration tools as more people work from home. Securing remote workers remains a challenge though, and even without the lockdown protecting your sensitive data is becoming ever more important.

As archTIS’ New Zealand partner, Tabella brings to market leading security solutions in the sensitive data space, including securing Microsoft Teams with NC Protect.

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Converting a channel from standard to private NC Protect takes a different approach to creating Private channels in Teams that allows users to make changes later.

Leveraging the same logic engine and UI augmentation from the previous scenarios Team Owners can restrict access to a channel to a subset of Team Members. Importantly, the NC Protect functionality can be altered or completely removed to make the channel open to Team Members.

Facilitates fully featured private channels NC Protect provided Private channels maintain all the capabilities of a standard channel. Thanks to the way that NC Protect enables Private Channel access there is no need to create the underlying disconnect between the main Team and the Private channel that the out of the box feature requires therefore scheduling meetings in our Private channels and adding the Planner app is possible.

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Advanced chat blocking and information barriers NC Protect can block chat messages in real-time that contain sensitive information, personal information (PII, PHI), payment data, inappropriate content or language, and apply information barriers in Teams to enforce policies for information security and regulatory compliance in chats.

Additionally, if new rules are added to block chat data, any existing conversations with data matching the new rule will retroactively remove the data to ensure the entire chat history is appropriately secured. Other solutions, including OOTB tools, only lock existing chat messages as read-only and block any subsequent messages.

Provide single channel access Adding the specified Guest or Member user attributes to the conditional logic to only allow access to a specific channel. This eliminates the need to create a new Team for the sole purpose of sharing an existing channels content with a guest or other member.

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IT friendly private channels IT Friendly Private Channels provide the ability to simplify the creation and management of private channels that restrict access to specific individuals within a Team. NC Protect restricts private channel access based on user attributes without increasing the number of site collections in SPO to support those channels. It reduces admin overhead over time associated with managing large numbers of site collections and simplifies backup and life cycle task ‘Archiving’ channels and removing tabs and apps NC Protect can augment the Teams app UI to remove various components.

We achieve this using conditional logic to support the use case. For example, in the pseudo “Archiving” of a channel we create a rule that only allows Team Owners or designated Team Members to have that channel available to them in the Teams app. The same principles can be used to automatically remove apps and tabs such as the Wiki for some or all the Team.

Third party sharing NC Protect eliminates the need to create separate Teams for guests to control access to specific types of content.

Instead, NC Protect automatically controls what content guests can see in a Team based on their user attributes, making guest access simpler to manage and more secure. For example, content that is marked “internal use only” can be hidden from guest users in the Team so they only see files they are permitted access to within the Team.

Learn more Contact Tabella today to learn more about NC Protect for Microsoft Teams, Sharepoint, Office 365, file shares and even DropBox! Tabella is a New Zealand technology company focused on bringing worldleading cybersecurity solutions to the New Zealand market. It is the New Zealand partner for archTIS, the market leader in attribute-based access control (ABAC) cybersecurity solutions.

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New Zealand could take a global lead in controlling the development of ‘killer robots’ — so why isn’t it?

According to the University of Canterbury’s Jeremy Moses, Geoffrey Ford and Sian Troath, the New Zealand Government appears hot and cold on the issue of autonomous weapons systems, but it could take a leadership role.

“New Zealand versus the killer robots” might sound like a science fiction B-movie, but that was essentially the focus of an event at parliament earlier this month.

Hosted by Minister of Disarmament and Arms Control Phil Twyford, the “Dialogue on Autonomous Weapons Systems and Human Control” looked at how New Zealand might take more of an international lead in regulating these highly contentious new technologies.

Twyford warned of the danger of warfare “delegated to machines”. He referred to a recent survey showing widespread public opposition to the deployment of autonomous weapons in war and strong support for government action to ban or limit their development and use.

The prospect of New Zealand’s leadership has been warmly received by activists and campaigners involved in the “killer robots” debate.

Human Rights Watch’s Mary Wareham has argued New Zealand leadership could act as “a total catalyst for action”, while the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots listed Twyford’s commitment as one of the “key actions and achievements” of its campaign to date.

Yet New Zealand has not joined the 30 states that have formally called for a ban on autonomous weapons, and

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Twyford’s statements have tended to waver between bullish and reserved.

During the event at parliament he acknowledged the clear ethical problems with autonomous weapons, but also the complexity of making policy.

Sensitivity to military allies If the mood of the people and government of New Zealand is strongly behind regulation, what makes the issue so difficult?

The short answer is politics and economics. A major obstacle for Twyford is allowing the New Zealand Defence Force to work with allies and partners.

Both the US and Australia are heavily invested in pursuing cuttingedge military technologies, including robotics, artificial intelligence and autonomy. A key pillar of their strategy is building systems that allow more coordination on the battlefield.

Leading a movement to have these systems regulated or banned could see New Zealand’s military shut out of joint exercises where such technologies are being trialled or used.

Given the political pressure to take a stronger stand against China, it seems unlikely New Zealand’s Foreign Affairs and Trade or Defence ministries will want to risk further discord with key defence partners.

Protecting high-tech industry The second hurdle lies in the economic promise of technologies developed in New Zealand that could potentially be used in autonomous weapons programmes elsewhere.

Many leading engineers and technologists have advocated for the regulation or banning of autonomous weapons, but others are attracted by the potential rewards of militaryrelated projects.

These tensions have already surfaced in the debate about US military payloads being launched from New Zealand by US-owned aerospace company Rocket Lab. Autonomous weapons could well see similar questions raised about other technologies developed by New Zealand companies or researchers — most obviously in the fields of computer vision, robotics and swarm intelligence — that could be used in military systems.

Regulating autonomous weapons without also inhibiting potentially lucrative AI and robotics research and development remains a challenge.

Public opinion not enough The hope that regulation of autonomous weapons could represent another “antinuclear moment” in New Zealand’s disarmament and foreign policy history therefore seems premature.

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While it’s clear there is support for some form of regulation, there’s little evidence at this stage to suggest public opinion will sway the government’s current conservative and watchful position.

So, what should be done?

In the absence of international agreement, New Zealand could press ahead with its own domestic legislation to regulate these technologies, as proposed in a petition from local Campaign to Stop Killer Robots coordinator Edwina Hughes.

This has the potential to expose a lack of serious commitment to principle in the government’s position, but it would still come up against the political and economic interests opposed to action on autonomous weapons.

Acknowledging those political and economic obstacles is a critical first step for meaningful public debate.

Engagement and transparency the key In the near term, a stocktaking exercise should be undertaken to understand what research and development is being carried out in New Zealand universities and companies.

Efforts should also be made to understand which autonomous technologies are likely to be developed and possibly deployed in the coming years by New Zealand’s major defence partners, particularly Australia and the US. Serious, sustained dialogue with commercial interests and defence partners is a necessary precondition for the advancement of Twyford’s agenda. While there is some evidence this work is underway, it needs greater transparency to ensure public understanding of what’s at stake.

Without that, New Zealand will probably struggle to take an international leadership role on this critical issue.

This article was originally published on 19 August 2021 in The Conversation.

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DEFENCE Afghanistan – Lessons to be learnt According to Opposition spokesperson for Defence and Veterans Chris Penk MP, New Zealand must learn lessons from Afghanistan if we are to respond properly to the moral and military challenges of the future.

Chris Penk MP is the Opposition Spokesperson for Defence and Veterans. He has served as an officer in both the Royal New Zealand Navy and Royal Australian Navy.

Let’s talk about Afghanistan. The security situation in that country has undergone such a dramatic transformation in the past several weeks that it’s probably unwise of me to record my thoughts on it now. After all, the next several weeks could yet register a further shift – as the situation is clearly not settled, as I write – that other lessons to be learnt may well overtake any that I offer now.

On the other hand, some points feel so compelling that they simply must be made at the earliest opportunity. More importantly, though, a number of lives hang in the balance now.

First, I want to emphasise my gratitude (and I hope the gratitude of every Member of Parliament) to the brave men and women of our New Zealand Defence Force who served in Afghanistan. I’m referring to all those who deployed these past two decades, including those most recently as part

of the evacuation mission, Operation Kōkako. On a similar, sombre note, I want to express my deep heartfelt sympathy to the families of the brave US soldiers and Afghan civilians who were killed during an attempted evacuation from Kabul Airport.

I also want to pay tribute to those Afghanis who worked closely alongside the NZDF and the troops of our friends and allies, helping to make their country a safer and better place.

The events of the past month have not decreased the significance of such service. Sadly, though, these events will inevitably have increased the prospect that the Taliban will seek to enact reprisals against these people.

New Zealand owes a moral obligation to every such man, woman and child. This has been met in part – but by no means yet in full – by Operation Kōkako. The government, on our behalf, simply cannot turn its

Kabul at dawn.

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back on them now. In late August, the re-settlement door was slammed shut as the government abruptly advised that no further applications would be considered.

It’s certain that not all of the Afghan civilians who worked alongside us have been evacuated. The only uncertainty now is the number left behind. I was disappointed to see the Defence Minister, in a statement to Parliament, unwilling or unable even to estimate and answer the simple question posed by Judith Collins: how many New Zealand nationals and Afghanis who worked alongside us have been left behind?

It is true enough that the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated faster than almost anyone expected. Too many countries were caught off guard by the sudden takeover by the Taliban. Across the world, we have been shocked, as well as saddened, by some of the harrowing scenes playing daily on our TV screens.

It seems extraordinary to me that our government did not appear to have

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considered the possibility that the Taliban regime would quickly re-assert itself in the absence of coalition boots on the ground. The Defence Minister and his Cabinet colleagues need not have thought it certain – but merely possible – that such a situation might eventuate, in order to have conducted some contingency planning.

Not only were we caught off-guard in that respect but our subsequent reaction was slow. Quite simply, the Ardern Administration took far too long in the circumstances to meet to discuss deploying to evacuate people from Afghanistan.

Cabinet didn’t trouble itself to meet prior to its regular, scheduled meeting on the Monday afternoon. We lost several days’ worth of time that could have been used to prepare NZDF assets and personnel for deployment, given that it was actually the preceding week that the Taliban rampage was already taking place in earnest. The UK convened its Parliament early, for example, and other nations also acted with some urgency.

In short, we got caught short.

So what other lessons might we learn? Our failure to evacuate all civilians who worked alongside New Zealand in Afghanistan may well prove harmful in other ways. In a hypothetical equivalent deployment elsewhere in the future, we might not see the same level of support from locals if they fear that their fate might be the same. Based on the events of 2021, such fear would be well founded, painful as such an admission may be.

At this stage, all these home truths are lessons that we can learn.

More than that, they are lessons that we should learn. Whether or not we do learn them is, of course, an open question.

Let us hope that we can indeed learn these lessons so that New Zealand is able to respond properly to the moral and military challenges of the next two decades. In the coming weeks, as the Taliban hunt down our friends in Afghanistan amid desperate pleas to Wellington, we will have an answer, at least for now.

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DEFENCE

Common Space Start-up Communications Errors Based on interviews with communications specialists within the space industry, founder of Rotoiti Consulting Nicholas Borroz identifies the common communications errors made by space start-ups.

Nicholas Borroz is founder of New Zealand-based Rotoiti Consulting.

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Failure to strategically target audiences Failure to target communications can jeopardise space start-ups’ success. Defining success depends on start-ups’ objectives.

Whatever the objectives are, though, it usually makes sense to focus on communicating to certain audiences instead of others. Some communications strategies are effective for certain audiences but are ineffective or even damaging for other audiences. Objectives should thus inform which audiences firms target with communications.

Many space start-ups feel driven to develop a public fanbase. More so than in other industries, space firms – particularly those in launch services and downstream analytics – often spend significant effort explaining how their business aligns with larger societal missions. Firms will claim they are driven to ‘democratise’ space, for instance, which they say will benefit all of society. Firms that focus on such messaging can develop followings of fans who praise them in public forums – notably on social media – and thus increase the firms’ reputational profile.

Developing a fanbase can sometimes open firms up to criticism, particularly if they are perceived as behaving in ways that are inconsistent with professed societal missions. Military contracts and exacerbating inequality are two matters that provoke criticism.

Many start-ups compulsively publish investor-targeted updates on business and technology development. Given how common it is for space start-ups to seek external financing (often via venture capital), their founders feel pressure to convince investors that they are making advances that are worthy of

investment. This leads to a proliferation of updates on business developments like memoranda of understanding or signed contracts. Start-ups often profusely publish about minor technology-related developments that are of questionable importance.

Sometimes, investor- and publicfocused communications are interrelated; start-ups with higher public profiles may more easily attract investment. The space industry is a particularly complex and opaque industry and it can be difficult to understand trends. With the exception of high-visibility issues like launches or numbers of satellites in orbit, it is challenging to access quantitative data about the industry.

Investors’ decisions are therefore often significantly influenced by public interest or media coverage. Start-ups that are covered in news stories or which are the subject of social media chatter may thus more easily attract investors’ attention.

In terms of developing relationships with customers, communications strategies designed for the public and investors can be counterproductive. Ultimately, start-ups succeed if they secure customers. Customers, especially those in government, usually care about products’ or services’ technical details and performance.

If a start-up uses significant resources to propound a ‘cool’ story about its societal mission and if it overshares updates to spur investment, this may cause customers to question the startup’s viability. Such start-ups may be seen as ‘flashes in the pan’ – firms that are interested in generating buzz but which do not have long-term strategies to develop and sell reliable products. Savvy

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customers may be wary of engaging such start-ups.

For some investors, if public relations campaigns are perceived as coming at the expense of technology development, this will damage start-ups’ chances of attracting investment. For investors with substantial due diligence processes in place, a startup’s public image will be an important factor in their decision-making, but it will not be the only factor. They will also seriously consider the underlying technology being developed and if the start-up seems likely to ultimately be able to sell that technology to customers.

Like customers, these more diligent investors will mostly be interested in start-ups’ ability to someday deliver a technically robust product or service that meets demand. They may be sceptical about investing in start-ups that constantly seek public attention and which appear to be primarily driven by idealism.

Another important audience to consider is government authorities. For many firms in space, it is important to secure buy-in from government authorities. This is especially the case if a firm works in an area where regulations have not ‘caught up’ with the firm’s intended business area; a positive relationship with regulators can help ensure new regulations facilitate rather than stymy business.

To gain buy-in, it is important to have a social license to operate and not run afoul of public opinion. Engaging the authorities is also important because government entities will offer more contracts if they understand what technologies can help them achieve.

Other common errors space startups should avoid Whatever the target audience, messaging should be consistent, succinct, and via channels that reach that audience. It is not incumbent on the audience to decipher what a start-up is doing; the audience’s attention is divided, and it is up to startups to make the audience understand what they do and how they offer value.

A start-up should strive to be an “earworm” in its niche; audiences should naturally think of it as providing products or services they desire.

This requires repeated exposure to a consistent and succinct messaging.

Communications must also use

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appropriate channels; different audiences use different media platforms, for instance.

Start-ups often face difficulties explaining what a product is and why it matters; it is usually important to use non-technical language and visuals to do this. If a start-up must communicate to a non-technical audience, engineers and scientists staff may find it difficult to explain technical issues given how entrenched they are in their own expertise. It is important to use nontechnical language and to sometimes use visuals to explain what the start-up is doing. Such communications usually benefit from involving professionals with non-technical perspectives.

A common mistake start-ups make is overpromising on timelines. This issue is not unique to start-ups; some of the largest firms in the industry regularly overpromise on timelines to inflate projected capabilities and revenues.

Start-ups feel compelled to show they are advancing. To that end they often publish aggressive deadlines that they fail to meet. Over time, missing deadlines damages relationships with investors and customers. Firms should caveat language in ways that are not overly-hedging but which allow them to defend their records if timelines slip.

In the space industry, meeting timelines is largely outside of any single firm’s control. If a start-up needs to carry out an orbital test of a subsystem it is developing, for instance, then it must depend on a launch services provider. If the start-up has committed to an orbital test date, and if for some reason the launch services provider fails to launch on time, then the start-up will have failed to meet its own self-defined deadline.

Sometimes, it is better to be selfrestrained when communicating with the outside world. Overcommunicating, besides giving the appearance of a ‘flash in the pan’ and wasting resources, poses other drawbacks or lost opportunities.

One issue is that start-ups that overshare can draw more competition into the niche they are trying to fill, undermining their incumbency advantage and sometimes helping competitors reverse engineer intellectual property. Another issue is that various regulatory requirements limit how much information space firms can share, and by compulsively oversharing,

start-ups may unknowingly violate such regulatory restrictions.

Another issue is it is arguably better to let customers speak for themselves, rather than advertise how satisfied customers are; besides being less genuine, advertising customers’ experiences may also raise concerns about discretion among customers.

Start-ups should be careful to harmonise external communications with what is actually happening within the company; otherwise, communications can negatively affect staff morale and business success. An important stakeholder group is staff. If a start-up conveys a narrative to the outside world that doesn’t reflect what is happening inside the firm, this can sow distrust and dissatisfaction amongst current and future staff.

For current staff, inaccurate communications can raise questions about the firm’s future. For future staff, if their decisions to join the start-up are based on external communications, they may be disappointed if, after joining, they see the firm’s operations do not match their expectations. Keeping staff satisfied, and correspondingly keeping turnover rates low, is an important factor for business success.

Start-ups with mostly technical staff should consider bringing in professionals with communications or other types of nontechnical expertise. Technically-minded staff, despite their capabilities to develop technologies, are not necessarily skilled at communications.

Start-ups’ staff, particularly their founders, should recognise any skills shortcomings that they have. Rather than forcing technically-minded staff to try to tackle communications strategies, it may make more sense for a start-up to bring in communications staff and to let the technically-minded employees return their efforts to what they do best: developing technologies.

In general, having more professional diversity and communicating that diversity to external stakeholders may significantly improve start-ups’ business prospects. If venture capitalists seek to make a return by investing in space startups, for instance, then they will likely feel more confident about the prospects of start-ups whose leadership teams include accountants and operations managers, not just engineers and scientists.

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Q&A: Ian Harman, CEO, New Zealand Defence Industry Association Now with his feet firmly under the desk, Line of Defence speaks with New Zealand Defence Industry Association CEO Ian Harman about Defence-Industry engagement, Covid challenges, and his vision for the NZDIA.

LoD: You’re professional experience spans several sectors and job roles. What are the key strands that connect these and that have led you to your current role as NZDIA CEO?

Ian Harman, CEO, New Zealand Defence Industry Association

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IH: I was trained as an aircraft engineer with Marshall Aerospace and Defence Group in England a long time ago. I loved aircraft and aviation, and working with the military came at an early age when I started my apprenticeship at the age of 16. I was on a team that carried out modifications for the fleet that went down to Stanley for the Falklands War, and in the process garnered a very good view into how the military works and how things change during a conflict situation. It was a very interesting time.

Because I was on that team I got my first really good exposure to managing people and stakeholders because we did six months’ work in six weeks.

I was seconded for a while to RAF Lyneham and then became an engineer on the road for many years, before moving into aviation recruitment.

These were the glory days of recruitment in England when we were supplying teams all over Europe for the winter programmes.

That provided very good experience in learning how to manage people and projects and dealing with the stakeholder expectations aspect of projects. Our guys came in for six months of the year to Germany and did all the heavy maintenance on

the aircraft, and I had a knack of relationship building and stakeholder management and really enjoyed managing people and leading the teams.

Hopefully these were the strands that the [NZDIA] Board saw when they asked me to take the role.. plus I’m very calm, and I think that’s an asset when you’re dealing with Defence and military. The limelight side of it was never of interest to me!

I always preferred being the one in the background that quietly made everything work.

LoD: What is your vision for the NZDIA, and which direction(s) do you see the Association heading over the next couple of years?

IH: The first direction is ‘backwards’, a retro-step back to being a more face-toface, hand-shaking, eye-to-eye contact operation. I understand the need for virtual events, but it wasn’t really how I – or members generally – envisaged the NZDIA being. The second direction is to expand the scope of what the NZDIA does.

The first is relatively easy. It was really about picking up the phone and talking to the members and main stakeholders, and asking “What is it that you actually want? What do you like? What don’t you like? What haven’t you liked? What do you see different?”

And it was almost unanimous that they wanted to go back to being in the same

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room as the people they wanted to talk to, and having the opportunities to network afterwards.

The second direction is around broadening our scope. We shouldn’t just be limited to Defence, or New Zealand. What opportunities can we provide for New Zealand industry, whether it’s the ADF, other suppliers to Defence in Australia (which is where I intend to start) or into Asia Pacific and Europe (which is the plan)?

We’ve already started liaising with Corrections, Intelligence, Fire and Emergency, Police, etc, and bringing these other government agencies into the fold. They won’t necessarily be members, but they’ll be a part of the team with a view to two things: (i) the Defence and MoD people in the room will have access to these other agencies, the agencies will have access to the senior Defence staff present, and – more importantly for the membership –they’ll have access to these other government agencies.

It’s a slow process, but there’s been ongoing conversations between the NZDIA Board and the senior stakeholders, and it’s a direction that everyone wants to go in. We have to be seen to be offering the members value. We can’t stay still, we have to move forward, and part of that is encompassing other agencies, which offers members greater access to opportunities. We can only do that if we’re all in the same room talking to

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each other. The more opportunities we can offer the membership the better.

We’ve also been building up a great relationship with NZTE. Although the upcoming DSEI event is in Europe, all NZ industry can attend the event virtually, which is a great opportunity for them. In addition, and in conjunction with NZTE, we’ll also have a representative there in person who can connect with exhibitors at the event on behalf of any member organisation. This is a first big step in providing New Zealand industry with wider opportunities.

LoD: How would you describe the current state of Defence - Industry engagement?

IH: It’s not necessarily as simple and straight forward as it should be. There is a sense, it seems, that the NZDF and MoD have been inherently suspicious of industry’s agenda and objectives, and quite often industry feels that they don’t get enough information and communication back on opportunities.

But it’s actually moving in a very positive record.

There’s been some announcements recently on procurement that we’ve been asked by Defence to put out to our membership via the newsletter. Although such things do go out via GETS, etc, it’s wonderful that Defence is actually asking us to do this on their behalf because it shows the strengthening relationship.

Communication is key, and I’ve been

working hard to get communication working both ways.

LoD: Having been in the role now for a number of months, what do you see as the key challenges currently facing the NZDIA? IH: At the moment it’s Covid of course. We’ve had to postpone the CEO lunch, which is a real shame, as well as the events we’ve got on 6th and 7th October.

Cyber security is another ongoing issue. We’ll need to ensure that we’re ahead of it and that the information we have on our website and database, etc. is safe and secure.

The main challenge for the NZDIA for me as the CEO is making sure that the members see that they’re getting value, which will benefit from our expanding scope and bringing in a wider range of opportunities.

LoD: What re the continuing challenges posed by Covid for the Association?

IH: One of the first things the Board asked me to do was an updated emergency plan and risk matrix in place for the organisation, and obviously that had to encompass the Covid chaos at that time. We have a plan, and if we have to we’ll revert to virtual meetings as a last resort, bearing in mind that one of the prime comments from the members when I joined was that they really didn’t see value in the big virtual events.

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We’re going step by step to see what the government does, and we’re adjusting our plans accordingly. In the first instance, we’re going to delay and postpone events with a view that we can hopefully return to meetings around mid- to end-October-November. If it becomes a much bigger disruption then we’ll simply have to rely on virtual events.

In the meantime , we’re liaising via teams and we’ve been busy. We’re proceeding in the best virtual way we can.

IH: The original plan was to start bringing the other agencies into our meetings during the first quarter in 2022, but I expect that it may even happen a little bit before then. We invited Amotai to come along to the last meeting, and we’ve had people such as Ron Mark and Des Ashton come along to recent meetings, which provides opportunities for members to talk to people who are incredibly knowledgeable and well connected.

LoD: Over the years there has been talk of broadening the scope of the NZDIA beyond its traditional defence focus to one encompassing the broader National Security sector. Where does this currently stand?

LoD: Broader Outcomes and the 5% Maori procurement target are topical for suppliers of government and defence. How seriously do you see these being taken on board by stakeholders, particularly Primes?

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IH: We’re very supportive of the Government Procurement Rules and particularly the rules around Broader Outcomes. As mentioned, we’ve already been liaising with Amotai, and we are very supportive of developments in that space.

We don’t have a stand on Broader Outcomes. It’s not our job to have a stand on it; our job is to support it and to then see where the opportunities are for New Zealand industry, and if that includes a percentage of Maori owned businesses then that’s great. It’s then about how can we assist in getting them involved.

I thought what Paul Howard said at the last Member Meeting around 5% Maori procurement was excellent: “This is what the government has asked us to do, it’s not going to happen overnight but it’s going to happen.”

Where the NZDIA can really add value is in having the conversations and being able to say “This is the number of companies that identify as Maori, and this is the number of companies that have this capability.” We can join the dots and bring them together. We’re using the MBIE requirements to gather this information from new members so that we can report on it.

Part of what we can do going forward is to provide as much information on capability in New Zealand across the board, including the Broader Outcomes requirement, that the government needs.

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Littoral Manoeuvre Craft contract goes to Tasmanian company Hobart-based PFG has been awarded the contract to deliver the Royal New Zealand Navy’s Littoral Manoeuvre Craft in what is being lauded as a major boost for Tasmania’s defence industry.

Boat builder PFG has announced it has secured a contract with the New Zealand Defence Force to design and construct three 12.6 metre, high-speed Littoral Manoeuvre Craft (LMC) to the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN).

The project is valued at approximately $6 million.

The watercraft, based on PFG’s ‘Sentinel’ design, will be fully constructed from next-generation boat building material, High Density Polyethylene (HDPE). It is the company’s first major foray into the defence arena.

Jeremy Rockliff, Tasmania’s Minister for Advanced Manufacturing and Defence Industries has described the win as a “triumph for our worldclass advanced manufacturing industry,” stating “Tasmania’s Sentinel further boosts [the state’s] defence industry capability.”

‘The Sentinel’ is described as the latest generation of fast, sophisticated, and impressively durable sea boats, heralding a step change in tactical watercraft capability.

The initial three Sentinels on order are set to increase the RNZN’s capabilities in expeditionary reconnaissance, mine counter measures, ship to shore and inter-island transport, as well as logistic material transfer operations.

“Following in the ANZAC tradition, it is fantastic to have one of our most innovative Tasmanian companies working so closely with our cross-Tasman neighbours in defencerelated activity,” stated Minister Rockliff.

Developed over 25 years, there are more than 100 custom-built Sentinel vessels already in operation with law

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Image courtesy of PFG.

enforcement and emergency response organisations, including Tasmania Police, Queensland Police and the Western Australian Department of Fire and Emergency Services.

The Advanced Manufacturing and Defence Industries Minister took the opportunity to highlight the state government’s support for the growth of the sector.

“Our Tasmanian Defence Industry Strategy was designed to increase opportunities for Tasmanian businesses in the defence sector, and contracts like this one between PFG and the New Zealand Government clearly shows our combined efforts are working,” he stated in a media release.

“That’s why we are providing an additional $10 million over four years to support advanced manufacturing and defence industries to collaborate, innovate, commercialise and scale up to create jobs and further opportunities for Tasmanian businesses.”

PFG is a family owned Australian owned company with over forty years

history as a multi-platform technology focussed manufacturing business in the maritime industry. With manufacturing facilities in Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania, PFG distributes Australian designed and manufactured products globally.

Designed by naval architects One2three, there are over 100 Sentinel vessels in current operations and they are available up to 15 metres in length in various configurations including inboard or outboard propulsion, hard and soft collars, plate vessels, cabins or consoles, with payload capacity up to 6,000kg.

The Sentinel vessels are manufactured from High Density Polyethylene (HDPE), a cost effective, environmentally friendly semicrystalline engineered polymer that demonstrates several properties which rate is as a superior boat building material. They are highly stable, provide superior reliability and availability and transfer low impact to the crew as the HDPE hull absorbs vibration.

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DEFENCE Report Card: Broader Outcomes two years on CEO of Zeopard Consulting Jennie Vickers delivers her scorecard on government agency implementation of the Government Procurement Rules’ ‘Broader Outcomes’ two years after it was first announced.

The concept of Broader Outcomes was announced back in June 2019 and the requirement to comply took effect in October 2019.

Two years on, it’s a good time to ask the question whether New Zealand business as a whole (which was supposed to benefit from the Broader Outcomes concept) has actually seen the mooted benefits? Have we seen change in procurement mindsets and behaviours sufficient to deliver this uplift?

In September 2020, ProcurementNZ and Waka Kotahi (New Zealand Transport Agency) published the Framework for Delivering Broader Outcomes. This 28-page detailed document provides ample detail for Agencies to get on with incorporating Broader Outcomes and for industry to know what is expected and how to address it.

In April 2021, Waka Kotahi’s Broader Outcomes working group reached out to Agencies to get involved, and noted that it is “important that this delivers results as opposed to being about discussions.”

In December 2020, Minister Nash released the first MBIE Progress Report on The Implementation of Broader Outcomes and New Government Procurement Employment Rule. The results indicate some progress, but of concern included (among other lacklustre results, that only 14 percent of survey respondents have effective contract management and reporting practices relating to Broader Outcomes.

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Jennie Vickers , CEO of Zeopard Consulting.

The covering Cabinet paper acknowledges that procurement needs to do more to create employment and keep New Zealanders in work. This concern led to the recommendation for a new rule, which is the Rule 18A referred to above.

Back in 2019, as CEO of the New Zealand Defence Industry Association (NZDIA), I wrote a guide for industry (local and overseas businesses) on working with the new Government Procurement Rules (PR2019), and in particular the Broader Outcomes requirements.

That Guide reflected an optimistic belief that finally New Zealand would

see procurement teams stepping up and giving all New Zealand entities the access denied previously to a range of contract opportunities. There are, of course, pockets of improvement like Waka Kotahi, but to an observer, not enough improvement and not enough change.

It would seem that my 2019 optimism was too Pollyanna and not enough cynic. Change is still needed and fast, and this needs more Cabinet focus on the laggards.

A telling statistic (if available) would be the number of agencies that have introduced the Supplier Code of Conduct versus those that have active programmes to ensure they comply with the Government Procurement Charter (which includes the words: “The New Zealand government directs agencies to: Seek opportunities to include New Zealand businesses”).

Overseas businesses have nothing to fear from these changes but plenty of incentives to collaborate with NZ SMEs to deliver consortium and other JV responses to Agencies. The NZDIA Guide has more info on the what and how.

Finally, it will be interesting to see the results of MBIE’s Broader Outcomes reporting framework and progressive procurement data collection, the initial reporting period for which is 01 July to 30 September 2021.

Until then, “C – Must try harder” seems a reasonable conclusion.

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NZDF exercises with international counterparts in South East Asia New Zealand Defence Force set to participate in Bersama Gold 21 and interact with the UK Carrier Strike Group (CSG) in South East Asia on 50th anniversary of the Five Power Defence Arrangements.

According to a 09 September NZDF media release, Royal New Zealand Navy frigate HMNZS Te Kaha and replenishment tanker HMNZS Aotearoa, with a Seasprite helicopter on board, have departed for the next two to three months at sea.

Aircrew on a Royal New Zealand Air Force P-3K2 Orion will join the naval Task Group for Bersama Gold 21, a major exercise on the international calendar marking the 50th anniversary of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). The Orion will also interact with the UK CSG. Commander Joint Forces New Zealand Rear Admiral Jim Gilmour said exercising with international militaries enhanced inter-operability and strengthened relationships, critical to NZDF’s contribution to the rulesbased international order.

“Deploying naval and air assets solidifies our long-standing relationships with our FPDA partners [Australia, United Kingdom, Singapore, and Malaysia] and our ongoing commitment to the region,” Rear Admiral Gilmour said.

FPDA exercises are designed to offer significant value by enhancing cooperation on conventional military operations, building trust and confidence, developing greater people-to-people links and fostering interoperability between the armed forces of the member nations.

The aim of Bersama Gold 21, to be held off the coast of Singapore and the Malaysian Peninsula, is to exercise FPDA defence forces in the conduct of

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Rear Admiral Jim Gilmour RNZN. Image: NZDF.

Combined and Joint Operations in a multi-threat environment. The exercise will commence with Force Integration Training and conclude with a War-atSea exercise.

Rear Admiral Gilmour has also confirmed the NZDF’s intention to accept the invitation of the Royal Navy to interact with the UK CSG. The exact nature of the interaction with the UK CSG is to be finalised but will involve transit in company in East and South East Asia.

“With HMNZS Aotearoa and HMNZS Te Kaha in the area for Bersama Gold 21, every opportunity is taken to operate with partners,’’ said

Maritime Component Commander Commodore Mat Williams.

The New Zealand Task Group was likely to operate with French Forces in the Pacific en route to Bersama Gold 21 and the Royal Australian Navy on the ships’ return to New Zealand, in addition to interactions with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, he said.

“The introduction of new capabilities, with Te Kaha’s Frigate Systems Upgrade and with this being HMNZS Aotearoa’s first operational deployment to the South East Asia region, also makes this an ideal time to engage with partners and put capabilities to the test.’’

The NZDF has operated in the South East Asia region for decades as part of bilateral and regional defence engagement, and demonstrates its commitment to regional security through its presence in the region.

NZDF deployments exercise freedom of navigation and overflight.

Approximately 270 Navy and Air Force personnel are deploying on the two ships. A medical doctor for the Task Group, in addition to medics, has been deployed as part of measures to ensure the health and safety of personnel. RNZAF personnel also follow strict Covid-19 prevention procedures when deploying with the Orion aircraft.

The exercise arrangements for Bersama Gold 21 mitigate the risk of Covid-19 transmission due to the exercise being conducted “contactless” at sea and under strict protocols for the air elements.

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Australia identifies Space as cyber warfare high-ground The Australian Defence Force explores options for Space Electronic Warfare following the announcement that a new Space Division will take up floorspace within the Department of Defence from 2022.

On 29 July the Australian Government announced the establishment of Defence Project 9358 to “explore options for the acquisition of a ground-based Space Electronic Warfare capability,” according to a media release from Defence Minister Peter Dutton.

According to the Department of Defence 2020 Defence Strategic Update, assured access to the space domain is critical to the ADF’s warfighting effectiveness, situational awareness and the delivery of real-time communications and information.

The Update stated that the government would significantly increase investment in Defence’s space capabilities, agreeing to invest around AUD 7 billion in space capabilities over the next decade. These include plans for a network of satellites to provide an independent and sovereign communications network, and sensors and tracking systems for space situational awareness.

“A Space Electronic Warfare capability, as part of the Australian Defence Force’s approach to space control, seeks to detect and deter attempts to interfere with, or attack, our use of the space domain,” stated Mr Dutton.

The Department of Defence 2020 Force Structure Plan called for the development of options to enhance ADF space control through capabilities to counter emerging space threats to Australia’s free use of the space domain. “Defence supports efforts to promote international norms,

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transparency and cooperation in upholding responsible behaviour in space,” he continued.

The announcement came just over two months after an announcement

by Australia’s Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal Mel Hupfeld AO, DSC, that a Space Division headquarters would be established in the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in early 2022. It was announced that personnel from all areas within Defence would be posted to the new headquarters.

“We use Space daily for understanding the weather, navigating, access to geospatial information and sharing information across Australia or across the world,” Air Marshal Hupfeld said.

“Defence is delivering capabilities including Space domain awareness, sovereign controlled satellite communications and Space-based Earth observation, and navigation.”

As the Defence Space Domain lead, Air Marshal Hupfeld is conducting a Space Domain Review to improve how Australia manages, acquires and operates its Space capabilities. “Defence will need capabilities that directly contribute to outcomes in Space as a contested domain, however this does not mean that Defence encourages the militarisation of Space,” he said.

Air Marshal Hupfeld also announced the selection of Air ViceMarshal Catherine Roberts AM, CSC as inaugural Head of Defence Space Division.

AVM Roberts is currently inaugural Head of Air Force Capability,

Air Vice Marshal Cath Roberts, AM, CSC. Image: Australian Department of Defence.

responsible for designing and shaping the needs and future requirements of air and space power for the joint force, and she is also the Defence representative in the Australian Space Agency Advisory Group. She will take up the Head of Space Division role next year.

According to her official profile, AVM Roberts is a “self-professed science fiction buff,” who “has always been fascinated by advanced technology and space, and has committed her career to advancing air and space power for Australia’s defence.”

“To reach for the stars and actually get there is a phenomenal feeling,” she said. “As an aero-space engineer I have always been fascinated by space – the ultimate high-ground.”

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY Were recent events in Afghanistan really an ‘intelligence failure’?

The Taliban’s rapid retaking of Afghanistan highlighted failures, but it was no intelligence failure, writes Dr John Battersby and Dr Rhys Ball of Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies.

Dr John Battersby is a Teaching Fellow at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies (CDSS), Massey University, specialising in terrorism and counter terrorism.

He is also Managing Editor of the CDSS-published National Security Journal.

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Dr Rhys Ball is a Lecturer in Security Studies at the School of People, Environment and Planning, Massey University. A former intelligence officer, his research interests include intelligence studies and intelligence and military history.

‘Intelligence failure’ has no agreed definition. Intelligence practitioners and academics who have attempted a definition have found it far more elusive than it looks at first glance. The term ‘intelligence failure’ is too freely used by people with little experience of intelligence. It is often used by those looking for scapegoats for a poor decision or an unexpected outcome, or by the media for its utility as a headline, and by politicians as a timely and convenient way to reduce further criticism of some act or omission to act.

Here we present a discussion that explores what intelligence failure is and what it is not for future clarification.

The recent events in Afghanistan will be discussed with a view to examining if what has occurred there should be labelled, as former Prime Minister Helen Clark has so described, a ‘massive intelligence failure’ in terms of New Zealand’s understanding of, and response to, the situation.

“We don’t have any independent intelligence, so we only go on what we can gather and analyse, and it was not good ...” (Helen Clark, August 2021).1 Here Clark criticises New Zealand’s lack of an intelligence capacity, and therefore we have accepted the assessments of others, including the deficiencies of those. But is this really ‘a massive intelligence failure’ on New Zealand’s part, or a much broader New Zealand failure to maintain an independent intelligence capability.

Intelligence failure is when intelligence officers who are responsible

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for collecting information, negligently miss what was reasonably within their grasp to obtain, or when they, in analysing all available information from all relevant sources, fail to conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that a given eventuality could happen. That is genuine intelligence failure.

All intelligence assessments are mental exercises using imperfect and incomplete raw data to either create an impressionistic picture of what an adversary is likely to be doing, or outline a spectrum of possible future outcomes which provide decision makers with an estimate of what could happen – and therefore a range of options of how to act. Intelligence failure does not occur just because

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intelligence analysts are unable to predict that an outcome is a certainty - because until it happens it is not.

Politicians and the media alike are prone to, at time ‘breakneck speed’, say exactly this.

Intelligence failure is not being unable to see the future – that’s clairvoyance, and it is a confidence trick, not a disciplined evidence-based analytical practice. Intelligence failure should not be made the fall-guy for poor decision-making, nor should it seemingly go hand-in-hand with policy failure, or for when things simply do not turn out how we would have liked them to.

Intelligence failure is not the inability to see an occurrence that

emerges completely unheralded. If there is no evidence that something is likely to occur, then intelligence analysts cannot be expected to see it. It is, however, a reasonably rare occurrence that intelligence analysts give a categorical assurance that something will not happen. Intelligence analysis – if done correctly – is the critical, objective thinking process that produces intelligence assessments for decisionmakers. It seeks to reduce complexity, and offer clarity, in advance of events.

Intelligence failure is not the prediction that something is likely to occur, and then it doesn’t. The extent of the intelligence discipline is simply to identify that it could have. Intelligence failure does not occur when decision-

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY makers fail to utilise intelligence.

In 1979, the US Intelligence Community was castigated for not predicting the fall of the Shah of Iran and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in that country. The inability to accurately assess the influence and popularity of the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini and the intense disdain for the Pahlavi regime was attributed to the CIA not asking the right people the right questions. It was an intelligence collection failure, and for many within the community, a catalyst for changing the way in which intelligence needed to work better.

Intelligence failure is not the routine refusal of human beings to critically and dispassionately analyse the past and learn lessons from it. Historians, Rudyard Kipling’s poetry and prose, informed commentators and former Soviet military and intelligence officers all provided warnings about intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 – what major power has intervened there in the last few thousand years, and ever come out of it successfully? There is no shortage of available information on the ills that befell the British in the nineteenth century, and the Soviets in the twentieth in their attempts to do so.

Was ‘success’ ever actually defined by President George W Bush, or by Helen Clark, when they sent their respective countries’ forces there in 2001?

In times of crisis, do decisionmakers actually want to hear the spectrum of possible future outcomes, or are they looking for the comfort of whatever evidence suits the decision they want to make? The 2003 decision to invade Iraq to find WMDs is regarded too readily as an anomaly – it is not. More importantly we need to question if 2003 was actually an intelligence failure (there certainly were intelligence failings) - or was it a situation set up to fail by decisionmakers creating a culture in which they only wanted to hear one option? Did our decision makers in 2001 ask for the implications of our deployment in Afghanistan 20 years hence or indicate a preparedness to deal with the aftereffects of a sustained presence there?

There has been much press recently about the rapid resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, of the ‘intelligence failure’ that it was not

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predicted, and that no one warned that such an eventuality could occur so unexpectedly quickly. But was it really unexpected? Was it really that quick?

Or were we wrapped-up in ourselves – as New Zealanders often are – and simply content to take no notice of what was, in fact, a reasonably likely outcome of foreign forces indicating that their mission now was to withdraw from Afghanistan.

The British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab told his critics at the beginning of September that his government’s decisions had relied on the combined assessments of the British Joint Intelligence Committee, the same bureaucratic organisation that took responsibility for the Iraqi WMD failure in 2003. Raab was said to have blamed “optimism bias” for the intelligence assessments that he was seeing and basing government action on. This could be a case of genuine intelligence mis-assessment, and a failure. Or it could be the effect of the same politicised cultural conditions prevailing as had been the case in 2003.

We need to be wary of the ease with which blame for poor or unexpected policy outcomes can be apportioned to intelligence organisations that cannot publicly speak up for themselves nor present their analysis to a wider public for scrutiny. Judgement of any decisionmaking and the intelligence it was based on should be reserved until those intelligence assessments can be seen.

That there were potentially hundreds of people in Afghanistan who had assisted New Zealand troops in Bamyan has been no secret. No doubt there were plenty of people in Kabul assisting with New Zealand activities there also.

That the Taliban had not been subdued, and could, and probably would, re-emerge if the US forces left, hardly required specialist intelligence skills to be understood as a distinct possibility. The declaration by US President Joe Biden in April 2021 that US troops would be pulling out of Afghanistan should have sent a clear message to New Zealanders – whose troops had already left by then, that if New Zealanders, or those who we were concerned about, remained in Afghanistan, preparations would likely need to be taken in order to get

them out. Remember, the current New Zealand government formally announced that it would end all military commitments to Afghanistan in mid-February 2021.

Other coalition forces, like France, had begun evacuations much earlier than this. There was every opportunity that New Zealand could have started this process much earlier. The most likely reason why this does not appear to have been done is that New Zealand had no intention of doing it. This is a failure, but it is not an intelligence failure.

In 2012, New Zealand somewhat reluctantly agreed to resettle 23 former Afghani interpreters and their families. These people claimed their lives were at risk for the assistance they provided to New Zealand troops who had been deployed in Bamyan Province. Even then, there were claims that a considerable number of those who assisted New Zealand’s Provincial Reconstruction Team had not been included in the resettlement. These people had reported they were in hiding due to the risk the Taliban posed.

There have been a number of subsequent claims by Afghani’s who assisted New Zealand, even verified by military officers, whose appeals to be accepted into New Zealand have been declined by successive National and Labour led governments. If these people were fearing for their lives while the massive US-led multi-national force was still in the country, any prospect that it would leave should have prompted our decision makers to start asking not just for intelligence assessments of likely future outcomes, but for planning to commence if responsibility was going to be taken to evacuate those who needed to be. If there is a failure here – it is why this did not happen. This is not an intelligence failure.

Thomas Manch (2021), ‘‘Utterly surreal and devastating’: Former PM Helen Clark shellshocked to be ‘back where we were’ in Afghanistan as Taliban take over’, Stuff, 16 August 2021. Available at: https://www.stuff. co.nz/national/politics/126081418/ utterly-surreal-and-devastating-formerpm-helen-clark-shellshocked-to-beback-where-we-were-in-afghanistan-astaliban-take-over 1

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Policy challenges highlighted in National Security Journal IndoPacific special issue According to guest editors Nicholas Khoo and Alex Tan, a December 2019 US Department of State-sponsored tour of Hawaii for New Zealand-based academics was the catalyst for the recent National Security Journal special issue.

Khoo and Tan’s brief to contributing authors was simple: reflect a topic of their research expertise and to include a section on the implications of the results of the 2020 Presidential elections for New Zealand in respect to that topic. The result was a collection of five articles showcasing New Zealand perspectives on key regional security issues: • “The Trump Administration and the United States’ China Engagement Policy,” by Nicholas Khoo.

• “The Biden Administration and New Zealand’s Strategic Options: Asymmetric Hedging, Tight Five Eyes Alignment, and Armed Neutrality,” by Reuben Steff.

• “Securing the Maritime Domain: U.S. and New Zealand in a Bordered Pacific,” by Germana Nicklin.

• “The Philippines’ Institutionalised Alliance with the US: Surviving Duterte’s China Appeasement Policy,”

by Andrea Chloe Wong and Alexander C. Tan. • “Rethinking Threat in China’s South Pacific Presence,” by Stephen Noakes.

“While no attempt was made at the editorial level to synchronise views,” stated the guest editors in a foreword, “two major themes and a variety of significant questions have struck us as having emerged in an organic fashion from the articles in this special issue.”

The first was the theme of great power rivalry in a globalised era. “Whether is it New Zealand’s

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maritime security; Wellington’s menu of foreign policy options in respect to Beijing and Washington; China’s South Pacific policy; the US-Philippines alliance; or the breakdown of the post-1972 version of US engagement policy with China,” they stated, “the theme of intensifying Sino-US rivalry is increasingly central.”

“What exactly should New Zealand’s policy posture be toward China and the US? What is the acceptable level of tension that we are able and willing to sustain between our liberal democratic-values infused diplomatic language on foreign policy issues, and the fact that Wellington has to live in a world where might is often right?”

“Even if we accept that this tension is nothing new,” continue Khoo and Tan, “it is clear that the intensity of tension has increased.” From this, they write, few questions emerge.

“Is it realistic to believe that we can continue to reap the gains of expanding economic ties with China at little or no cost to our relationship with Australia and the US? Are we prepared for an era where there will be increased great power incentives and pressure to adjust our foreign policy? Should New Zealand alter its alignment policy in an emerging bipolar international environment where the two states differ deeply on their basic ideology? If so, what are the principles that should guide such a significant change?”

The second theme identified was that of “New Zealand’s place in the world and the related question of how foreign policy should be calibrated to respond to the not inconsiderable range of challenges facing us in the post-2020 era.”

For policymakers, associated challenges include “dealing with climate change; buttressing our medical infrastructure and skills capacity in a post-covid19 world; ensuring that our economy is ‘fit for purpose’ in an increasingly competitive international environment; managing relations with an Australia that is increasingly feeling the sharp edge of China’s rise”, among others.

View and download these articles from the National Security Journal website: https:// nationalsecurityjournal.nz

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AUKUS announcement signals rise of the Indo Pacific

The Afghanistan withdrawal and AUKUS announcement signal a sharpened US focus on the Indo Pacific. This has implications for New Zealand, writes Dr Wayne Mapp, not least in terms of future maritime capability decisions.

Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO was New Zealand’s Minister of Defence and Minister of Science and Innovation from 2008 to 2011.

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The end game in Afghanistan proved to be as traumatic as was ever feared.

The sight of thousands of panicked Afghans at Kabul airport, with the ultimate denouement of ISIS-K terror bombings seemed a stark illustration of the impotence of the west. It was an ignominious end to the 20 years year’s intervention by the US led coalition, which at its peak involved more than 50 nations.

Naturally there were many commentators, both left and right, who saw this as the end of American leadership of the west. That hereafter the nations of the west would be aimlessly absorbed in their own internal morass while more capable and confident nations would assume the mantle of the true dispensers of power. These nations, China and Russia, would be able to impose their authoritarian approach across the world, most particularly in Asia.

Does the final failure in Afghanistan presage this outcome? That the west is in inevitable decline and the world has become a more dangerous and uncertain world for all who believe in a more liberal world order.

It is worth restating that the fundamental facts of great power relativities remain. The United States is the most powerful economic and military actor in the world. It is a continent spanning nation with nearly 400 million people.

Political discourse and government competence will be a variable factor changing from administration to administration, perhaps more evident in recent years. Nevertheless, it is not immediately obvious that the United States is suffering such a fundamental loss of confidence that marks the

current era apart from previous times of political disturbance as existed two generations ago in the 1960s and 1970s.

Most pertinent for New Zealand is the fact the United States has sovereign territory right across the Pacific. In this regard, World War Two, and in particular, the Pacific War casts a long shadow.

Even if the United States reduces its global footprint, the last place this would occur is in the Pacific. In fact, it is likely that the United States presence in the Pacific will increase as resources are shifted into this region. There is a deep consensus in the United States, right across the entire body politic, that the United States must be the preeminent power within the Pacific.

The recent announcement of the Australia, United Kingdom and United States alliance (AUKUS) reaffirmed United States’ commitment to lead within the Pacific. For Australia this is the most significant defence arrangement since the formation of ANZUS. It’s not just the nature of the membership, but also what is being proposed. Australia would be moving into the top rank of middle powers, with the acquisition of at least eight nuclear powered submarines. These new submarines will be based on either the British Astute class or the American Virginia class.

The arrangement is also the first major foreign policy outcome of Brexit. No longer will Britain view its international relations through the lens of the EU. Britain will make its own assessment of a changing world.

As it happens, Britain is rebuilding its traditional relationships, with the added benefit that this is taking place in the most dynamic part of the world, the

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HMNZS Aotearoa. Image: NZDF.

Indo Pacific. When contrasted to the prior concept of the Asia Pacific, the Indo Pacific has a distinctly more maritime flavor. The Asian continent is dominated

by China; the Indo Pacific is not.

The idea of the Indo Pacific rests on securing the maritime routes of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The four nations of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) India, Australia, Japan and the United States, have an extensive maritime heritage. It now seems certain that Britain will also join the Quad as a core member. The Quad nations have also developed broader connections with the Quad Plus group, which includes New Zealand.

The Quad nations have been active in organising naval exercises as their preeminent defence activity. AUKUS will be a substantial boost to the naval combat power of the Quad. It will mean three of the four nations of the Quad will have nuclear submarines, with the Harpoon cruise missile providing long range attack capability.

Although there is speculation that the combination of the Quad and AUKUS will be the nucleus of an emerging NATO type organisation, this is unlikely.

The Quad nations will not act in concert in the manner of NATO. Their interests are too diverse for that. There are many potential flash points in the Indo Pacific that would only engage the interests of two or three of the Quad nations.

The complicating point for China is that it will not be able to definitively determine on any particular issue how many Quad nations would choose to be engaged. Depending on the location of the conflict and the specific issues in play, it is also quite possible that other nations may join the Quad nations.

Some of these, notably Singapore,

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South Korea and Vietnam, as well as other ASEAN nations, have sufficient naval capability to be able to make a real difference.

The announcement of AUKUS has significant implications for New Zealand. One of the AUKUS members, Australia, is New Zealand’s only formal defence ally. As a result, the strategic pressure upon New Zealand has just increased.

New Zealand will have to quickly decide the extent to which it wants to be engaged with both AUKUS and the Quad. The dominant nation within these two groupings, the United States, remains an extremely important partner for New Zealand. It is inevitable there will be an expectation that New Zealand has a proper level of engagement and the ablity to contribute meaningful military capability.

Looking to the future means assessing the nature of the military capabilities that will be useful in the maritime domain. The P8 Poseidon aircraft, the ANZAC frigates, and the new sustainment ship, HMNZS Aotearoa stand out. As the NZDF notes, the Aotearoa is a “technologically enhanced asset that can add real value to combat operations.”

As readers will have noted with the UK Carrier Strike Group, led by HMS Queen Elizabeth, two of the nine ships in the group were RFA tankers, Tidespring and Fort Victoria.

The Aotearoa would have comfortably fitted within such a carrier group. More pertinently the Aotearoa is one third of the tanker capability of the Australian and New Zealand navies.

The critical issue now facing New Zealand is the replacement of the ANZAC frigates, which are

more than midway through their life, notwithstanding the recent major upgrade of their combat systems. While both ships are likely to remain in service to the mid 2030s, that means planning for the replacement needs to start now.

I have been arguing in this publication that it would be credible for New Zealand to move to an all patrol fleet. However, I now believe that AUKUS makes that a moot argument.

New Zealand will be expected to make a more meaningful contribution than patrol vessels.

New Zealand will need to replace the ANZAC frigates with ships with at least a similar level of combat capability.

Being in a military alliance, as we are with Australia, has obligations as well as advantages. In this instance the obligation is to provide maritime naval capability with real combat power.

It is noteworthy that Australia, Britain and Canada already have a joint programme to replace their aging frigates with the British designed Type 26 frigate. These ships cost around $4 billion each, which would almost certainly be regarded as too expensive by any likely New Zealand government.

However, Britain is also building the Type 31 frigate, which is similar in size to the ANZAC ships. They have been designed as having either high or low end combat capability, and cost between $1 and $2 billion, depending on their level of capability. In real terms this is comparable to the cost of the ANZAC ships that came into service a quarter of a century ago. There is an opportunity to replace both the two ANZAC frigates and the two OPVs with a high low mix of ships based on a common platform, as is possible with the Type 31 frigate.

The Labour New Zealand First coalition had the foresight to replace both the P3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft and the C130 Hercules. The announcement of AUKUS makes it imperative that the current Labour majority government get on with replacing the ANZAC frigates. With the changed strategic environment, this is not a decision that can be put off beyond the next election. New Zealand’s principal strategic partner, Australia, can reasonably expect that we will carry our fair share of alliance obligations.

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HOMELAND SECURITY IFSEC Global Influencers in Security and Fire 2021 Announced

The IFSEC Global Influencers in Security and Fire for 2021 have been revealed, and the good news is that a record six New Zealanders feature among the winners – proof that Aotearoa’s security-focused industry sectors are influencing well above their weight.

The IFSEC Global Influencers in Security and Fire, awarded annually, is one of the most prestigious in the annual industry awards calendar, yet perhaps least understood. IFSEC Global Influencers recognises ‘influencers’ in security roles from around the world.

According to IFSEC’s definition, an influencer as a person who: • has played a key role in driving technological innovation.

• has been a driving force in changing regulation, standards/guidance or best practice.

• holds insights/opinions that are widely respected and that are influential in shaping debate around industry issues.

• has been instrumental in the success of the organisation or business they lead or are employed by.

• has helped to raise the industry’s profile or been an influential voice in the national media.

Nominations were judged by an international panel of two dozen highly respected judges, including Line of Defence Magazine chief editor Nicholas Dynon, who sought to identify the world’s biggest ‘influencers’. This year, security professionals were recognised across six security categories, including: • Security executives (the senior most official in an enterprise, whose primary duties encompass leading and managing security for the enterprise) • Security end users (e.g. heads of security, directors of security) • Security manufacturers/vendors/

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installers/integrators (those displaying exemplary work in the field of installation or specific projects, as well as technological innovation) • Security thought leadership (e.g. thought leaders, association figures, academics) • Security ‘One to watch’ (championing the sector’s rising stars, nominees should have worked in the industry for no longer than five years) • Cyber security professionals and thought leaders New Zealand winners emerged in the categories of ‘Association Figures, Academics, Thought Leaders’, ‘End Users’ and ‘One to Watch’. In a record showing for Aotearoa, our winners for 2021 are: Jennie Vickers (1st – Association figures, academics, thought leaders)

Jennie Vickers has been focused on the Defence sector in Australasia for the last eight years, stepping down as CEO of the New Zealand Defence Industry Association (NZDIA) in April 2021 after four years in the role. During her tenure, she brought the Association into the 21st century and widened its remit to include members from throughout New Zealand’s security sector.

As NZDIA CEO, Jennie championed courageous and open conversations between Government and industry in the defence and security sectors to support better procurement outcomes and more SMEs in supply chains.

Apart from significantly increasing the Association’s membership and its links across other industry sectors and internationally, Jennie pioneered the use of made-for-purpose virtual event platforms. This enabled the NZDIA to quickly pivot during COVID to virtual events, which was critical in ensuring that engagement among the NZ national security supply chain continued without missing a beat. It also ensured the successful launch of New Zealand Defence’s Information Domain.

Jennie’s leadership and considerable online and cross-sector engagement has been instrumental in raising the profile of the private sector’s contribution to the defence and national security sectors in New Zealand.

Now a consultant at Fortinet, Jenny describes her expertise as connecting people, building relationships,

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influencing, problem solving and supporting better business outcomes.

Along with qualifications to practice law (commercial/IT) in NZ, Australia and UK, Jennie is a WorldCC Fellow, Expert in SRM and CCMP qualified in CCM. As a category 1st place winner, Jennie remains in contention for the Global Influencer of the Year award!

The winner of this award will be chosen between the winners of the five IFSEC Global Influencers security categories (not including the ‘One to Watch’ award).

A final round of judging will be undertaken by an independent group of judges, after which the Global Influencer of the Year award will be announced live at the Security & Fire Excellence Awards, due to take place in London in November.

Gary Morrison (13th – Association figures, academics, thought leaders)

over 70% and the association has led significant improvements in industry training and standards and developed a Good Practice Guideline that clearly articulates industry best practice.

During Gary’s tenure, the NZSA has also developed and introduced a Skills for Industry programme with the New Zealand Ministry of Social Development that supports and encourages those on benefit payments into fulltime employment with NZSA members. This programme has seen in excess of 400 beneficiaries take up fulltime employment with NZSA members over the last three years.

In the past 12-18 months, Gary has led several transformative initiatives, including the development and introduction of a virtual reality training platform for security guard licensing training; and he has stewarded the industry through the COVID pandemic, which included lobbying government for better recognition of the essential nature of security services, ensuring PPE supply certainty for security providers, and the establishment of a security guard awards programme to reward guarding excellence in the context of the COVID new normal.

In addition to his work with the NZSA, Gary is a long-term ASIS member and in his private capacity sits on the board for a Community Health Trust.

Ngaire Kelaher (16th – Association figures, academics, thought leaders)

Gary Morrison has spent 40 years in the security industry, including running New Zealand’s largest security provider, establishing his own security company and more recently as the CEO for the New Zealand Security Association (NZSA), the industry association for New Zealand’s physical security industry.

Since joining the NZSA in early 2016, Gary has been instrumental in resurrecting the association as the voice for the security industry and the catalyst for many positive industry developments. In the last five years, the NZSA’s membership has grown by

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Ngaire Kelaher CPP PSP is the Security Risk and Training Consultant for RISQ New Zealand and Bespoke Security Group. She started her career as a security officer in 1995 and continued

to develop into the training sector of the security industry designing, facilitating and assessing various security programmes over the years.

Ngaire has been an ASIS International member for just over 15 years, and is the first female in New Zealand to hold two ASIS international Certifications – Certified Protection Professional (CPP),and the Physical Security Professional (PSP). Ngaire is also the first female Chairperson of ASIS New Zealand and has held a variety of roles on the executive committee previously, including Secretary and Deputy Chair.

As Chair, Ngaire has over the past 12 months instituted a number of key initiatives, including a Chapter Young Professionals’ Network, an annual Formal Certification Dinner to recognise and celebrate the achievements of new ASIS Board Certification certificants, and a calendar of frequent webinar and networking events significantly more active than previous years’. Ngaire’s enthusiasm is infectious, and she elicits wide respect due to her own professional example.

Ngaire is also a member of the New Zealand Security Association (NZSA), the New Zealand Institute for Professional Investigators (NZIPI), the Security Institute (UK) and the International Foundation for Protection Officers (IFPO).

John Battersby (18th – Association figures, academics, thought leaders)

Dr John Battersby is a Teaching Fellow at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University, Wellington, lecturing in Intelligence and Counter Terrorism. John spent a decade as a

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HOMELAND SECURITY research historian specialising in military and policing aspects of nineteenth century New Zealand history.

In 2005 he took up a law enforcement role, with various duties including time as a police prosecutor and then Practice Leader at the Leadership, Management and Command school at Royal New Zealand Police College. In 2016, John returned to academia as Research Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University, Wellington where he commenced research into the impact of terrorism on New Zealand.

Dr Battersby has been a major voice within New Zealand’s security sector in the wake of the 2019 Christchurch mosque attacks and subsequent roll-out of gun control laws and the publication of the report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the mosque attacks. In 2020, he was invited to speak on the opening panel of the hui on Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Christchurch.

Importantly, in 2019, Dr Battersby also founded the National Security Journal, a peer reviewed scholarly publication. The journal has in the subsequent 18 months become widely recognised in New Zealand and internationally, providing a vehicle for the showcasing of security related research and the highlighting of important sector trends and issues. This is an achievement of major national significance.

John has also published on New Zealand Wars, New Zealand security and the United Nations, and terrorism in Australian and Zealand contexts, and he is a regular contributor to NZSM and Line of Defence Magazine.

Andrew Thorburn (2nd – End users)

Andrew D. Thorburn is Enterprise Security & Risk Manager at Atlas Gentech NZ Limited. A highly experienced and commercially astute protective security and organisational development consultant with a career that spans both the private and public sectors, he brings over 25 years of security technology and staff services strategy and implementation experience to colleagues and end user clients.

Andrew is widely respected within New Zealand’s security industry and has worked hard to promote the participation and successes of women in security and to bridge traditional silos between physical security and information security professionals.

He is also pursuing initiatives for the development of culturally aligned sector training for indigenous people.

In 2020, Andrew founded the Women in Security Awards Aotearoa, a breakthrough event which recognised leading women in New Zealand’s security industry and government across several categories.

The awards generated considerable interest and brought professionals together from across the physical security, cyber security and resilience domains.

Andrew regularly contributes to the profession through voluntary sector leadership, development and delivery of subject matter to special interest groups, such as New Zealand Security Association, ISC2 and ASIS International, and contributes thought leadership pieces for industry publications, including NZSM. He is also a steering committee member of the New Zealand Security Sector Network (NZSSN), an organisation promoting cross-sector collaboration between the private sector, academia and government.

Andrew is the immediate past ASIS International Chapter 148 Chairperson and the 2018 New Zealand Security Consultant of the Year.

Ankita Dhakar (One to Watch) In the short time since founding cyber security consultancy Security Lit as its Managing Director in February 2020, Ankita has built a strong team and acquired noteworthy key clients.

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Her vision is to take Security Lit global and to keep educating businesses and individuals about cyber security threats and how to protect themselves.

Ankita has taken opportunities over the past 12 months to advocate strongly for increased security awareness and an understanding of the human factors driving cyber security outcomes.

With Bachelor degrees in commerce and business administration, Ankita learnt about digital security from her previous work experiences. Now at the age of 28, Ankita is helping start-ups and SMEs in NZ and across the globe with security audits and penetration testing services, having teams in Hungary, India and New Zealand. She is also actively promoting cybersecurity awareness in the community and is also trying to get more women in IT security through multiple speaking and writing opportunities at/in sector events/ publications.

Her focus for the next growth phase is to reshape the way people think about cyber security in NZ, to keep educating businesses and individuals about cyber security threats and how to protect themselves, and to provide practical ways for implementing a new status quo.

Congratulations to our six New Zealand Global Influencers in security!

With six awardees out of a total international awardee cohort of 90 across all categories, we can be proud that Aotearoa New Zealand punches well above its weight in international sector influence.

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Private Sector Crowded Places Security Advisory Group gets the nod Formation of the Crowded Places Security Advisory Group (CPSAG) viewed as a positive step in recognising the contribution of the private security sector to counter-terror efforts.

Several months after the release last September of New Zealand Police’s Protecting our Crowded Places from Attack: New Zealand’s Strategy, and following meetings with Police, a Crowded Places Security Special Interest Group (CPSSIG) was established under the New Zealand Security Association (NZSA) in February.

Three advisory groups had earlier been established as part of the Crowded Places Strategy,: (i) a government Crowded Places Advisory Group New Zealand (CPAGNZ); (ii) a private sector Business Advisory Group New Zealand (BAGNZ); and (ii) a Community Advisory Group New Zealand (CAGNZ).

Established to contribute insights and ideas relating to crowded places security and resilience gathered from the particular sector they represent, and to share appropriate information back to their sectors, the private security sector had not been extended an invitation to any of these groups.

A 23rd February meeting hosted by the NZSA and attended by Police and a small group of security industry representatives discussed the potential for industry involvement in the crowded places strategy. While that meeting effectively gave birth to the CPSSIG, Police expressed a view at that point that the security industry not be represented in the BAGNZ due to potential conflict of interest.

Fast forward a few months and Police has since greenlighted the

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Sir Ken McKenzie, CPSAG Chair and Head of Security, Health & Safety at Auckland Museum.

idea of a new advisory group. Now the CPSSIG has become the CPSAG (Crowded Places Security Advisory Group).

Described as a body of experienced security industry specialists, the CPSAG will provide specialist advice and direction in the protection of Crowded Places in line with the Strategy and the Government’s Protective Security Requirements (PSR).

According to the group’s chair, Sir Ken McKenzie, “CPSAG is a skilled, experienced and diverse group of industry specialists from across NZ and well known to and respected within the private and public security sphere.”

“The formation of CPSAG is a positive step forward in bringing greater recognition to the significant

contribution the private security sector provides in supporting the public sector agencies in NZ,” he told Line of Defence Magazine.

“We are committed to delivering robust policy and transparent assurances that the private security sector is equipped and recognised a credible security delivery partner in these rapidly changing times.”

Still in its very early days, the CPSAG will likely focus on areas such as intelligence, and threat, vulnerability and risk assessments, potentially expanding to include protective security, counter terrorism, crowd control, physical security, security training, security policy, and research and development.

The Group’s mission is to build stronger private and public partnerships, share information and provide guidance, implement effective protective security and improve response while increasing resilience. It will partner the BAGNZ and CAGNZ and - via NZ Police – the Counter Threat Assessment Group (CTAG).

“We are currently focused on establishing strong relationships within the private and public security sector,” said Sir Ken, “developing specialist competency frameworks to further support and enhance what is already on offer through NZQA with clear paths of learning and development opportunities for those seeking to grow a career in security consulting and a licensing structure that clearly aligns to the competency matrix.”

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HOMELAND SECURITY

One Eye Open: Mental health blind spot in counterterror efforts Chief editor Nicholas Dynon writes that established punitive approaches by government to individuals exhibiting lone actor terrorist behaviours are not necessarily making us safer.

Nicholas Dynon is chief editor of Line of Defence Magazine, and a widely published commentator on New Zealand’s defence, national security and private security sectors.

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Ahamed Aathill Mohamed Samsudeen, the 32-year-old ISIS sympathiser who stabbed six people before being shot dead in an Auckland supermarket on 3rd September is New Zealand’s latest ‘terrorist’. While the terrorist label may fit, history tells us that it’s not particularly helpful.

There are, according to various studies, over 200 definitions of terrorism. They are academically contested, often legally convoluted, frequently politically appropriated, sometimes emotively deployed, and inevitably prone to obsolescence. As a rule of thumb, they tend not to be particularly helpful.

And New Zealand is no exception to this rule. The Counter-Terrorism Legislation Bill currently before Parliament is seeking to address inadequacies in the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 (TSA), including amending the legal definition of ‘terrorist act’.

According to the Ministry of Justice, terrorism has evolved since the TSA was drafted in the early 2000s.

The TSA, it states, “predominantly responds to the threat posed by organised terrorist entities and groups rather than a fuller range of terrorist activities, such as attacks that involve lone actors and low-sophistication.”

The ‘fuller range of terrorist activities’, however, is potentially a very long list. Similarly, the ‘terrorist’ label itself encompasses a range of actors that has broadened over time, from terrorist organisations, militant groups and rebel fighters, to violent extremists,

lone actors, radicalised offenders, disgruntled petitioners and fixated persons.

In Samsudeen’s case, it would appear that beyond the general categorisation of ‘terrorist’, there is some consensus among commentators that he was a ‘lone wolf ’ or, less pejoratively, a ‘lone actor’. Although we again face the difficulty of multiple contested definitions, lone wolf terrorism may be described as involving a single perpetrator acting without direct support in the planning, preparation and execution of an attack, and whose decision to act is not directed by any group or other individuals.

Understanding the LynnMall terrorist as a lone actor is important because research has identified characteristics in relation to this particular category of terrorist that distinguishes it from others, including – importantly – in terms of the role played by mental health.

The mental health connection On 15 December 2014, Man Horan Monis held 18 people at gunpoint inside the Lindt café in Sydney, a siege that resulted in the deaths of two captives and Monis himself. It ultimately transpired that Monis was acting independently – a lone actor – and that he had serious mental health problems.

A 2015 Study by Corner and Gill of 119 lone actors in Europe and the US found that 32 percent had been diagnosed with a mental illness, whereas organised terrorist groups had a relatively low prevalence of mental

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illness, with only 3.4 percent of those studied having psychiatric diagnoses.

They found that the odds of a lone actor having a mental illness is 13.49 times higher than the odds of a group actor having a mental illness.

A 2020 study by Morris and Meloy of 23 lone actors referred to authorities as posing a national security risk from a county in Scotland found that 39 percent had previous psychiatric contact.

In his 2019 study of security sector practitioner perceptions of the terror threat environment before the Christchurch attacks, Massey University’s Dr John Battersby noted that mental health conditions and ‘fixations’ featured prominently as a major source of concern of practitioners in relation to ‘at-risk individuals’.

Published in the National Security Journal just days prior to the LynnMall attack, an article by Massey University Alumna Josinta Tillett, provides the

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most comprehensive picture yet of the characteristics of lone actors in New Zealand. Her paper, “Understanding Lone-Actor Terrorists: The Global Context and How it can be Applied to New Zealand”, also notes the prevalence of mental illness within this cohort.

Summarising eight significant international studies that analyse a range of lone-actor terrorist characteristics or indicators from Europe, the US, or both, Tillett notes that actors are overwhelmingly male, usually aged in their 30s, always hold a radical ideology, probably suffer a personal grievance, are dependent on the internet, are socially isolated, usually have intimacy issues, often have mental health problems, have average to high education levels, often suffer employment problems, and often have a prior criminal history.

Tillett’s analysis of the characteristics of seven New Zealand lone actors found that there were both

similarities and differences between the international and New Zealand results, including higher mental health rates within the New Zealand cohort.

Five out of the seven lone actors were identified as having mental health issues, with one ‘possible’ and one ‘unknown’.

Using anonymised Police data of suspected potential lone-actor cases alongside anonymised data relating to general offenders who had been charged with serious violence offences in the five years to December 2018, Tillet found that there were relatively higher mental health/suicide figures in relation to the possible lone actors (29 versus 19 percent).

The mental health gap Corner and Gill note that their abovementioned findings “suggest a need for revisiting the issue of mental illness as a part of the process for some people becoming involved in

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HOMELAND SECURITY

Love, truth, and mutual respect - the late Dr Rob Roche.

terrorism.” Furthermore, they note that mental illness mechanisms “remain systematically unexamined, and there may be grounds to pursue a more concrete understanding of how mental illness and psychological processes influence an individual’s participation in and trajectory through terrorist behaviors.”

Evidently, the LynnMall attacker had a significant mental health history.

Auckland barrister Aarif Rasheed recently told Stuff.co.nz’s Jehan Casinader, “For years, the authorities had treated this man as a terrorist – labelling him a terrorist, and convincing him that he is a terrorist.” Samsudeen had reached out to the defence lawyer in late 2017 while being held in custody after sharing violent content on Facebook.

Having talked with Samsudeen, Rasheed had sought advice from Dr Clarke Jones, a counter-terrorism expert at the Australian National University’s Research School of Psychology specialising in youth interventions, radicalisation, correctional reform, terrorist offenders and prison gangs.

“As it was, law enforcement treated him exclusively as a violent extremist, with no apparent efforts to address his mental health issues,” Jones wrote in the wake of the attack in The Guardian.

“His experience with New Zealand police and the criminal justice system could have triggered his recurring experience of the original trauma,

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alleging mistreatment or excessive use of force during his time in the NZ criminal justice system.”

“The tragedy of 3 September shows that traditional law enforcement strategies to address extremism are not the only solution,” he continued.

“We must urgently consider and try alternative approaches that seek to address causal factors.”

In 2015, I had the pleasure of interviewing the late Dr Rob Roche for an article on countering violent extremism in the New Zealand Security Magazine. A member of the New Zealand Peace Foundation, Roche was a retired Auckland-based medical practitioner who had previously led ground-breaking work with patients suffering from alcoholism and serious drug addiction.

It was just months after Parliament’s December 2014 passing of the Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill, which had given the NZSIS greater surveillance powers and the Minister of Internal Affairs greater powers to suspend and cancel passports.

Although acknowledging the role of security and law enforcement, it was Roche’s opinion that the then National Government was approaching the issue of violent extremism with one eye open.

“To be effective, any program for the rehabilitation of extremists must be based on love, truth, trust and mutual respect”, he insisted. “It will

have a better chance of success if it is non-judgmental and where there are no elements of confrontation or fear of physical punishment or condemnation.”

These were brave words. Love, truth, trust and mutual respect were not ideas with which one might have expected the New Zealand Government to have approached people exhibiting extremist tendencies.

National’s approach was firmly around deportation, passport cancellation, incarceration and, failing these, surveillance… and this hasn’t changed under Labour.

From the many that existed overseas, Roche singled out a program in Germany that had been in operation since 2011 and had at that point dealt with almost 500 cases. The Hayat (Arabic for ‘life’) program was supervised by Daniel Kohler, director of the German Institute of Radicalisation and De-radicalisation and a leading figure in counter-extremism.

“Kohler stresses the importance of treating a radicalised individual as a patient,” explained Roche, “so that appropriate psychological counselling and other specialised services can be provided when needed.” The identification of the at-risk person as someone ‘in need’ rather than a mere target of state surveillance or law enforcement is a key ingredient for Roche. “The object”, he stressed, “is to generate a sense of wellbeing and self-worth so that the patient is well equipped to find a rewarding place in society.”

Roche passed away in his 91st year last January. One of my enduring memories of the doctor was accompanying him during Ramadan to an iftar (breaking of the fast) at the then Auckland University of Technology Mosque. He had wanted to meet with Muslims to learn more about their lives and beliefs. He sat awestruck during the maghrib prayer, and afterwards ate together with the Imam and the hands of several others from the same plate.

Six years later, authorities still appear wedded to the type of securitised, punitive approach to atrisk individuals favoured several years ago. That approach didn’t work for lone actor Samsudeen, nor his victims, and ultimately it’s unlikely to work in future.

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MQ-9B SeaGuardian

THE MOST VERSATILE

MULTI-DOMAIN SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY Cost-effective, multi-role ISR • Multi-agency ISR for resource protection, disaster response, critical infrastructure monitoring and security across land and maritime environments • Capable of securing New Zealand’s vast area of interest – from the mainland to off-shore territories • Long endurance capable of supporting missions in the South Pacific or Southern Oceans

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