Line of Defence Magazine - Winter (June) 2022

Line of Defence Issue 24 • Winter 2022

New Zealand’s Defence and National Security Magazine

Peter Greener:

Andrew Watts:

Rebecca McAtamney:

Scott La Franchie:

No White Paper, so where’s Defence policy and capability heading?

The Navy – what do our partners really think of us, hypothetically?

Overseas investments and protecting New Zealand’s strategic interests.

High inflation fuels ram raids and creates a market for stolen goods.

www.defsec.net.nz

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CONTENTS

Kia ora and welcome to the Winter 2022 issue of Line of Defence Magazine! With so much happening internationally, regionally, and domestically, this edition covers a wide range of topics, from questions around future Defence capability to geopolitics in the Pacific, nuclear competition, overseas investment, and the state of the economy and its impact on crime.

With no new Defence White Paper in sight, and in an international security environment marked by Russian aggression in Europe and Chinese influence in the Pacific, editor-at-large Dr Peter Greener asks what is the direction for New Zealand defence policy and capability?

The theme of uncertain times is echoed by Dr Wayne Mapp, who writes that current conditions require defence spending to be maintained at the NATO two percent standard. What should be the priorities, he asks, and could they be afforded within a two percent of GDP defence budget?

In an intriguing hypothetical, Andrew Watts puts himself in the shoes of one of New Zealand’s international Defence partners, penning a brief by the Chief of Navy of a fictional regional power on the state of New Zealand’s maritime capability. It’s not quite real… but it’s not too fictional either.

In his regular contribution to Line of Defence, National Party spokesperson for Defence and Veterans Tim van de Molen writes that the time is right for identifying what investments are needed to defend our values, play a leadership role in the Pacific, and contribute internationally. On the topic of investments, Professor Alexander Gillespie writes that New Zealand and Australia may well need to put their money where their mouths are in order to shore up their influence in the Pacific.

In this issue of Line of Defence, we’re joined by Rebecca McAtamney, LINZ’s Head of Regulatory Practice and Delivery, who describes the role of the National Security and Public Order regime in overseas investments in Strategically Important Businesses are in New Zealand’s interests. An important topic for the many Defence industry readers of the magazine.

Amid historically high inflation rates, Scott La Franchie writes that academic research points to a positive correlation between inflation and the incidence of property crime: as inflation increases, so too does theft; while crime also features in my piece on the challenges facing tourism security as Aotearoa opens its post-Covid doors to international visitors.

As always, a special thanks to our excellent sponsors who have made this 24th issue of LoD possible: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Serco Defence, Nova Systems, and Rheinmetall.

Nicholas Dynon, Auckland.

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CONTRIBUTORS & INTERVIEWEES Dr Peter Greener Tim van de Molen MP Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO Dr Lora Saalman Rebecca McAtamney Nicholas Dynon

Jude Rushmere Andrew Watts Prof Rouben Azizian Prof Alexander Gillespie Scott La Franchie

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD Dr Peter Greener Dr Bridgette-Sullivan Taylor Dr John Battersby Debbie Howarth Jennie Vickers Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO Ruth Currie DSD

Prof Rouben Azizian Dr Reuben Steff Paul Howard John Deal Douglas Pauling John Campbell MNZM Pat Cullen

SPONSORS & PARTNERS General Atomics Aeronautical Nova Systems Serco Defence Rheinmetall Massey University Security Exhibition & Conference

UPCOMING ISSUE

Spring – September Main themes: Land Domain; Regional Security, Land Forces 2022.

Copy Deadline: 20 August 2022 Publication: 01 September 2022

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CONTACT DETAILS

DEFSEC Chief Editor: Nicholas Dynon M: +64 (0)22 366 3691 E: nick@defsec.net.nz

Publisher: Craig Flint T: +64 (0) 274 597 621 E: craig@defsec.net.nz

Postal and delivery address: 27 West Cresent, Te Puru 3575, Thames RD5, New Zealand Social Media:

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ISSN 2463-5774 (Print) • ISSN 2463-6258 (Online)

DEFENCE

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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What direction now for New Zealand Defence Policy and Capability?

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National Security Journal analyses regional nuclear challenges in South Asia

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HMNZS Aotearoa on route to first RIMPAC exercise

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SIPRI: Global nuclear arsenals are expected to grow

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Nova Systems looks for greater depth in New Zealand’s maritime sector

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Global displacement hits another record, capping decade-long rising trend

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Tim van de Molen: Focus on Information, Maritime, and People needed

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Kacific launches transportable disaster relief WiFi communications solution

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MQ-9B Is the Solution for New Zealand’s Maritime Awareness Requirements

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To meet the Chinese challenge in the Pacific, NZ needs to put its money where its mouth is

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Rheinmetall NIOA Munitions opens historymaking defence manufacturing facility

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Canadian leg of Frigate Systems Upgrade winds up

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The Navy: What do our partners really think of us, hypothetically?

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Hard budget choices ahead if New Zealand to be a force for stability

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Defence Minister addresses climate security at defence summit

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Veterans and Reservists deliver leadership in turbulent times

COVER HMNZS Aotearoa Antarctica Resupply.

Image courtsey New Zealand Defence Force

HOMELAND SECURITY

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Cyber Fears: Australian Security Confidence Index 2022

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Overseas investments and New Zealand’s strategic interests

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New Zealanders among 2022 IFSEC Global Security Influencers

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Ram-raids highlight the peculiar relationship between inflation and theft

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Tourism Security: Protecting visitors, protecting ‘Brand New Zealand’

Defsec Media Limited publishes Line of Defence, FireNZ Magazine and New Zealand Security Magazine premier publications covering industry sectors that help keep Kiwis safe. Find us online www.defsec.net.nz Copyright: No article or part thereof may be reproduced without prior consent of the publisher.

Disclaimer: The information contained in this publication is given in good faith and has been derived from sources believed to be reliable and accurate.

However, neither the publishers nor any person involved in the preparation of this publication accept any form of liability whatsoever for its contents including advertisements, editorials, opinions, advice or information or for any consequences from its use.

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What direction now for New Zealand Defence Policy and Capability?

With no new defence white paper in sight, in a world marked by Russian aggression in Europe and Chinese influence in the Pacific, Dr Peter Greener asks what is the direction for New Zealand defence policy and capability?

Dr Greener is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University Wellington, and an Honorary Professor – and previously Academic Dean – at the Command and Staff College of the New Zealand Defence Force.

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In March 2022, the Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee on the 2020/21 Annual Review of the Ministry of Defence and the NZDF, noted in the section headed ‘Strategic competition and co-operation in the Pacific’ that, “We heard that there will not be a white paper in 2022. However, Defence will be recommending to Ministers terms of reference that look at the development of defence policy settings in a more proactive approach, and the force structure that would support those settings.”

Last month I asked the following question in an earlier version of this article published on Incline: “Does this mean that there might be a new white paper in 2023, will we see another government defence policy statement, or will there be a revised defence capability plan?”

Shortly after going to press, the Minister of Defence Peeni Henare answered the question unequivocally in an article published on Friday 27 May on Stuff, where Thomas Manch noted that, “Henare said there would be no new Labour Government defence capability plan.”

This article then asks the question: What will the future direction be for New Zealand defence policy and capability?

The Ministry of Defence website notes that Defence policy settings in New Zealand are reviewed on

a regular basis, and that, “The results of these reviews, Defence White Papers and Strategic Defence Policy Statements, are the highestlevel expression of Government’s Defence policy settings.” It notes that, “these policy documents will present an assessment of New Zealand’s strategic environment and set out at a high level the range of activities the New Zealand Defence Force must be prepared to undertake” before adding that, “The most recent formal expression of New Zealand’s Defence policy is the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018,” which was released by the Labour-led Coalition Government.

Unlike a white paper, the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018 (SDPS), although describing capability needs in general terms, did not set out in any detail the necessary mix of capabilities that the Defence Force would require.

It did, however, make the point that, “Cabinet will decide on replacing the Defence Force’s P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft capability.” In the same month that the SDPS was released, July 2018, the Government took the opportunity to approve the acquisition of four Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft to replace the Orions.

The total estimated cost for the project was $2.346 billion.

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The following year the Defence Capability Plan 2019 (DCP) was released. As I argued at the time, the Capability Plan provided perhaps the most comprehensive and clearly articulated argument for investment in the Defence portfolio in modern times. Not only was there a commitment to maintain the $20 billion in capital investment out to 2030 that had been indicated in the 2016 white paper, but beyond that the Plan also provided indicative investments out to 2035.

This was “to allow for considered, long term planning for the Defence Force’s future needs. These capabilities will be reassessed ahead of the 2022 Defence White Paper.” [my emphasis.]

Amongst the near-term investment decisions that were planned, the first to be mentioned was Future Tactical Air Mobility, the replacement of the current C-130H Hercules. A year later, on 5 June 2020, the Government announced that a fleet of five C-130J-30 would replace the ageing fleet of C-130H Hercules at an estimated project cost of NZ$1.521 billion.

The need to provide Protected Mobility for Army, replacing the armoured Pinsgauer, was another near-term decision that was signalled in the DCP. The decision to purchase a new fleet of 43 Australian-designed and built Bushmaster NZ5.5 was announced on 8 July 2020.

At the time Defence Minister Ron Mark noted, “The age and lack of protection offered by the old fleet make this another investment in New Zealand Defence Force capability that must be made in order to protect our service people.”

Funding of $102.9 million was to be committed to the project at this time, though the indicative capital cost for the whole project was between $300 and $600 million.

By this point then, the Government had already committed $4 billion to new capability acquisitions, yet more investment Line of Defence

decisions were planned for the near future. Of note in the Capability Plan these included the Enhanced Maritime Awareness Capability project and the Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel (SOPV).

The Enhanced Maritime Awareness Capability project was intended to “support the Government’s civil maritime security strategy, providing air surveillance capabilities that enhance all-ofGovernment maritime domain awareness in New Zealand and the Southern Ocean.” A number of capabilities were to be considered, including smaller manned aircraft, remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) or satellites, at a cost estimated again to be between $300 and $600 million.

The Maritime Security Strategy 2020, officially launched on 17 June 2021, highlighted that “Cabinet has agreed to bring forward the investment in complementary air surveillance capability to ensure that delivery coincides with the arrival of the P-8As in 2023.”

The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic though had by this stage already made itself evident.

The following month, July 2021, Defence Minister Peeni Henare told the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee that whilst projects had not been cut from Defence Capability Plan 2019, it would be redrafted to align with Government priorities because of fiscal constraints due to the cost of the Covid-19 pandemic.

“We are not cutting back on the DCP. We’ve made it very clear that we want to be able to have a look at the DCP, review it but also looking to align it with Government priorities,” Thomas Manch reported the Minister saying.

It was clear though that major projects were being affected. There are now no details of the Enhanced Maritime Awareness Capability project available on the Ministry of Defence website.

An Official Information Act request to the Ministry elicited the following response on 4 March 2022: “The EMAC project is at an early stage and some of the information you have requested does not exist”, then adding “it is necessary to withhold existing information in full, as release would … prejudge Cabinet’s future decisions on the project”.

The Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel project has also been affected. The need for the SOVP was first raised in Defence White Paper 2016, whilst the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018 noted that the project to acquire an ice-strengthened ship was already underway. The Defence Capability Plan 2019 affirmed that the “Acquisition of a Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel will occur in the mid-2020s.”

However, on 22 March 2022, Reuters reported that Michael Swain, Deputy Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, had confirmed that further work on purchasing a Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel had been suspended.

“Due to the impact Covid-19 has had on the fiscal environment and emerging personnel pressures from other projects, this work has been deferred” he said. The Ministry’s website notes that, “The Southern Ocean Patrol Vessel project will continue to be considered in coming months.”

A further major development that was signalled in the DCP was the intent to grow the size of the Defence Force, with the wish to grow uniformed personnel by 1,500 – with 1,000 of these new troops increasing the size of the Army to 6,000 by 2035. Perhaps not surprisingly movement has been modest here, and much has been made of the impact of Defence personnel having to serve in Managed Isolation and Quarantine (MIQ) facilities.

Nonetheless, whilst in June 2019 the Regular Force had 9,328 in uniform, by April 2022 that had grown by 150 to 9,478. Over the 7

DEFENCE same period though Army had only grown by four to 4,659.

In an interview with the author on 17 May 2022, the Opposition Spokesperson for Defence, Tim van de Molen, indicated that he wished to see Defence numbers grow in the future much more substantially than the 1,500 outlined in the DCP. He went on to say, “I want to see a new Defence White Paper. With the acceleration of the impacts of climate change in our region and challenges to the global order, we need to re-assess what capabilities the Defence Force requires. We are in a very different strategic environment than we were even two years ago.” This was clearly the message of the Defence Assessment 2021, released last December.

Highlighting that increased strategic competition could lead to increasing confrontation, the Assessment drew attention to the growing need for enhanced capabilities in our immediate region.

The Defence Minister told Thomas Manch on 27 May, “If we look towards growing our asset base now and our platforms, we actually don’t have the necessary skills and people to be able to man those assets.”

The Minister’s concerns to attend to pay and living conditions as set out in his 2021 Principles and Priorities are clearly necessary and may be addressed to an extent by this year’s Budget funding boost for Defence, though a nominal increase of 4 percent overall over several years will severely limit what can be achieved.

But what of other capabilities?

Given that the Government is dealing with the ramifications of a Covid-affected economy, it is perhaps not surprising that no commitments are being made at the moment on capital-intensive capability projects.

However, in the Defence Capability Plan 2019 there was a commitment to maintain the $20 billion in capital investment out to 2030.

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When speaking to the recent Budget announcement for funding of $662.5 million to maintain existing defence capabilities, the Minister of Defence highlighted that the Government had committed $4.5 billion to twelve major defence capability projects. Whilst this is indeed the largest capability investment Defence has ever had, it is somewhat short of the $20 billion pledged in the DCP. Subsequently, when confirming that there would be no revised defence capability plan, and that the new funding would “keep the lights on”, the Minister said that “We’ve just had to look at it [the existing plan] with a different lens.”

So what will the balance of capability and resourcing actually look like? When it comes to the 2023 election, without a white paper or a revised capability plan, what will Labour’s Defence platform be?

Defence spending fell to its lowest level in recent times, at 1.11 percent of GDP, under the Nationalled government in 2011. However, in April this year National Party leader Christopher Luxon told the New Zealand Herald that National supported the idea of New Zealand lifting its level of defence spending, possibly to two percent of GDP (as it was three decades previously).

When asked by the Herald whether National could afford to increase spending levels, Luxon said that was “the conversation” that caucus was having.

In a world where Russia has changed the face of Europe and China seeks ever-greater influence in the Pacific, the question therefore remains, what will the future direction be for New Zealand defence policy and capability?

This is a revised and updated version of an article first published last month on Incline.

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HMNZS Aotearoa on route to first RIMPAC exercise HMNZS Aotearoa will be taking part in RIMPAC 22, the world’s largest international maritime exercise, as part of a five-and-a-half month deployment to the Asia Pacific region.

Twenty-six nations are taking part in RIMPAC 22, hosted by Commander US Pacific Fleet. The exercise will include 38 surface vessels, four submarines, more than 170 aircraft and approximately 25,000 personnel.

The exercise will be conducted primarily in the vicinity of Hawaii and Southern California over the period 29 June to 4 August, and it will be the sixth time the New Zealand Defence Force has participated in the exercise since 2012.

The theme of RIMPAC 22 is ‘Capable, Adaptive, Partners’, and participating nations will exercise a range of capabilities ranging from disaster relief and maritime security operations to complex warfighting.

Maritime Component Commander Commodore Garin Golding said the NZDF’s primary purpose was to conduct military operations in support of New Zealand’s national security interests Participating in a multinational training activity of the scale of RIMPAC 22 provided the NZDF with an unparalleled opportunity to hone skills the NZDF could be called on to use, and would enhance interoperability with military partners, he said.

“This will be a real test of warfighting capabilities and exciting to be part of for all those involved.

Each day will challenge our people as they exercise real life scenarios in a multi-national environment.”

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In addition to HMNZS Aotearoa, HMNZS Matataua Navy dive and hydrography teams will be based in San Diego where they will undertake activities including mine counter measures, NZ Army is providing a Joint Fires Team including Joint Terminal Attack Controllers, and Royal New Zealand Air Force, Army and Navy personnel will fill roles in both the Combined Air Operations and Warfighting Centres.

For the first time, New Zealand will fill the Carrier Strike Group Sea Combat Commander role, whose staff will be embarked on USS Mobile Bay for the duration of the Exercise.

It will also be the first time HMNZS Aotearoa has participated in RIMPAC, and the ship’s Commanding Officer, Commander Dave Barr, said the ship’s crew was looking forward to the exercise.

HMNZS Aotearoa will be one of

only a few replenishment tankers involved.

“Operating in company, in a large task group of ships, will test everyone on board – from our Communications Warfare Specialists who will work around the clock providing real time tactical communications, to the Combat Systems Specialists with their ability to track, classify and build a situational awareness picture, our marine and electronics technicians who keep the ship running from the temperate waters of New Zealand to the tropical waters of Hawaii, and more.”

The ship’s involvement in RIMPAC 22 will be part of an almost six month deployment to the Indo-Pacific region, which will include attendance at the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force International Fleet Review in November prior to returning to New Zealand in time for Christmas.

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DEFENCE

Nova Systems looks for greater depth in New Zealand’s maritime sector Nova Systems is looking to further build on the depths of its maritime experience in New Zealand with plans to double in size within the next 18 months as the business supports the nation’s defence into the future, according to new General Manager Jude Rushmere.

Mr Rushmere revealed the longterm growth plan for the leading engineering services and technology solutions company after taking over the New Zealand helm earlier this year following a global restructure of the company.

“We have been successfully working on Operational Test and Evaluation and development of safety cases for New Zealand’s Naval fleet and that will continue to be part of our pipeline as we support delivery of vital capability,” Mr Rushmere said.

He said the company was vying for several significant new maritime contracts backed by a strong pedigree of supporting the sector globally and growing into the New Zealand maritime domain during the past eight years.

“Among our aspirations is for our highly experienced team to support the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) as it works towards Operational Release of its frigates following their recent upgrades.

We also have specialist skills, such as ship surveying, and the flexibility to provide support to larger organisations as part of the Maritime Engineering Support Team construct,” Mr Rushmere said.

“Test and Evaluation is embedded in Nova Systems’ DNA, and we’ve particularly focused on delivering this expertise as an integral part of the RNZN for many years including 10

Jude Rushmere , General Manager Nova Systems

the RNZN’s newest vessels HMNZS MANAWANUI and HMNZS AOTEAROA.” HMNZS MANAWANUI was acquired as the RNZN’s specialist dive and hydrographic vessel to close the capability gap for navy after the decommissioning of the survey ship HMNZS RESOLUTION in 2012 and HMNZS MANAWANUI in early 2018.

The vessel was purchased by the Ministry of Defence and entered service with the RNZN in 2019, Nova Systems having been tasked with supporting her Test and Evaluation.

“Our Nova Systems team is supporting major Maritime projects including with Test and Evaluation, Integrated Logistics and Engineering

Assurance support services for the RNZN Dive Hydro and Maritime Sustainment vessels,” Mr Rushmere said. “We also provided expert advice on the Future Maritime Support Construct that would see the RNZN move to an ISO 55000 framework when they are ready.”

HMNZS AOTEAROA supports combat operations, humanitarian relief functions and operational and training support. Its primary mission is to provide global sustainment to New Zealand and coalition maritime, land and air units, and United Nations security operations through resupply of ship and aviation fuel, dry goods, water, spare parts, and ammunition.

“Our involvement has included supporting the introduction of the vessel into service including the successful Trials and Development planning including the Antarctic Replenishment Operations when HMNZS Aotearoa completed her first re-supply mission to the ice,” Mr Rushmere said.

“Our Safety Assurance services have expanded after successful completion of an Independent Safety Case Assurance Review for AOTEAROA generated confidence in our capabilities. This supported Nova Systems being awarded a contract to develop a retrospective Safety Case for the Offshore Patrol Vessels.”

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HMNZS Aotearoa on a resupply mission to Antarctica. Image courtesy NZDF.

Mr Rushmere said the New Zealand growth plan followed Nova Systems’ move earlier this year to capitalise on decades of defence industry experience and rapid global growth by drawing its four businesses under one banner.

“We are creating new scope for our company in vying for new nation-building projects along with those we are currently undertaking to support the New Zealand Government in national maritime projects,” Rushmere said.

The local company was established in 2014 when Nova Systems made a significant expansion into Maritime services.

Now with bases in Wellington and Auckland, the NZ company has grown and expanded its client base and Mr Rushmere said it would look to recruit new specialist staff to support its continued development.

“We are supporting defence projects across Maritime, Land, Air and Information domains. In particular, our Design Control, Design Assurance and Change Management expertise, which is currently being utilised to optimise Line of Defence

the Land Engineering Regulatory Environment, has significant potential to deliver broader enhancements across Defence,” Mr Rushmere said.

Nova Systems is also keen to support HMNZS Canterbury – a humanitarian relief and disaster aid vessel capable of ferrying vehicles, food and other essential to support the Pacific Region.

“Nova Systems New Zealand has proven capability in developing safety cases for new and existing vessels and reach back into the great depths of capability from the team in Australia and globally to support New Zealand in the Maritime domain,” Mr Rushmere said “We want to support our defence client better through organic growth, using New Zealand people to help and support the New Zealand Defence Force.”

As part of Nova Systems’ global restructure, Mr Rushmere was appointed to the role as General Manager in NZ, while Geoff Comber, who has been GM since the Nova Systems NZ business was fully established in 2017, is focusing

on growth as the NZ Delivery and Business Manager.

“This is the next step in the company’s evolution with scope to employ more New Zealanders, to win new contracts across sectors and to support investment and build in this country,” Mr Rushmere said.

“Globally, almost 50 per cent of our employees are veterans, the skills offered by ex-defence personnel are highly valued by Nova Systems as they enable us to effectively support government projects.”

“One of our company’s great strengths is its ability to utilise decades of knowledge gained working on highly complex projects and to evolve. Nova Systems continues to broaden its scope from aerospace to maritime, land, cyber and space across defence and nondefence customers.”

Nova Systems also has significant reach through its global network with a workforce approaching 800 staff.

The company has some 300 supply chain relationships and now operates from strategically located offices based in Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Singapore and Norway.

Mr Rushmere said Nova Systems has a strong track record working on some of the most complex national defence projects and in knowledgesharing with Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Norway.

In New Zealand, Nova Systems continues to work on a diverse range of projects across multiple domains.

“The company is privileged to have been appointed as a supplier to the New Zealand Ministry of Defence’s Technical and Support Service Panel and to various Defence Force and Government panels,” Mr Rushmere said.

“And our NZ business has been recognised with several nominations for Minister of Defence Awards of Excellence.”

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Tim van de Molen: Focus on Information, Maritime, and People needed National Party spokesperson for Defence and Veterans Tim van de Molen writes that the time is right for identifying what investments are needed to defend our values, play a leadership role in the Pacific, and contribute internationally.

Tim van de Molen is National Party spokesperson for Defence and Veterans and a former member of the New Zealand Army Reserve Forces.

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The three months since the last Line of Defence publication have flown by, and during that time we have seen significant geo-political pressure in the Pacific alongside the continued Russian invasion of Ukraine. As this global security situation evolves, we must reassess our foreign policy, our Defence priorities, and the subsequent investment, to determine if they are still fit for purpose.

At a time when many of our international partners are committing to spending two percent of their GDP on Defence, our government released the annual Budget in May which showed Defence spending dropping to less than one percent of GDP by 2025/26.

Part of this was their recent cancellation of the planned $300$600M investment in a new patrol vessel for the Navy. We have seen plenty of unnecessary spending by this government and we need to see that reined in, however in my view, Defence funding shouldn’t be cut – especially given the current heightened global tension, which is unlikely to disappear in the coming years.

We are sending all the wrong signals. Now is the time for us to stand clearly by the values we hold dear as a country, and to stand strongly alongside our international partners in joint condemnation of breaches of these values.

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From a Defence perspective, this means our Minister of Defence must show strong and decisive leadership, clearly articulating our response, and investing appropriately to ensure we can defend the freedoms and values of New Zealand and contribute to international efforts to uphold these same beliefs. Disappointingly, our Minister has not even contacted his counterparts in Ukraine, any of our Five Eyes partners, or the Solomon Islands.

The extension of the NZDF deployment in the Solomon Islands demonstrates the long-standing partnership between our two nations, it is important that we are resourced to contribute to these sorts of leadership roles in the Pacific especially given the evolving security risk in the region. But meanwhile our government is walking back on long term defence investment.

I firmly believe that we must sharpen our focus on Defence.

Instead of cutting the Defence budget, we should be looking at what investments are needed to ensure that we can defend our values and rights, play a leadership role in the Pacific, and contribute to broader international efforts. This immediate investment focus should centre around the Information Domain, the Maritime Domain and People.

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We must continually modernise our NZDF to improve our effectiveness and ensure our interoperability with other nations.

Investing in the Information Domain should be a key focus to deliver this effectiveness. Cyber capability, satellites, and drones are all options that should be considered. Not only would this allow us to make a potentially meaningful contribution to international efforts from afar, but it would also create additional jobs and grow the local economy.

Satellites could better monitor our EEZ, but also have commercial applications in the farming sector with some exciting agri-tech innovations around soil fertility or pasture measurements from space.

Investing in technology that has a dual military/commercial capability and can be delivered more quickly than a new patrol vessel, for example, and enhances our local defence industry too, is very appealing.

Because of the long lead time for naval vessels, I believe we should be committing now to putting additional capability on the water.

If we’re to truly play an effective leadership role in the Pacific whilst enforcing the protection of our EEZ we need to bolster our fleet.

The final immediate investment focus needs to be on our people.

Sadly, we are currently seeing very low morale and very high attrition rates. There are a number of factors behind this – two of the key ones are the impact of Op Protect (MIQ responsibilities) and the extremely tight labour market.

I commend the government for trying to address this through the Budget by allocating $90M for improving the incomes of lowpaid personnel. I hope all of this investment is directed to front line personnel and not to be used in recruiting bureaucrats, as the Government has a habit of doing this.

In my view, our personnel numbers need to increase so that New Zealand can ensure that we are, at all times, able to rapidly deploy our sweep of capabilities and assist our allies when needed. For example, I don’t have confidence that we could effectively deploy our naval fleet if required.

Alongside this recruitment focus, we need to invest in equipping personnel with modern tactical options to enhance their effectiveness and enable a more streamlined integration with any coalition forces that we may work with.

On a side note, I recently had the opportunity to visit NZDF Base Ohakea. It was really valuable to have the opportunity to see the current construction project underway that will house the four new maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft, the P-8A Poseidon.

I’d like to thank base commander, Group Captain Rob Shearer, and his team for their extensive knowledge and capabilities of the aircraft.

I was highly impressed by their professionalism, and I thank them for their time. Also having Chief of Air Force, Air Vice Marshall Andrew Clark, and Secretary of Defence Andrew Bridgman, made for a highly valuable day discussing both high level priorities and seeing first hand some of the great work our Air Force personnel do.

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MQ-9B Is the Solution for New Zealand’s Maritime Awareness Requirements When Japan’s Coast Guard needed a long-endurance, highly versatile new maritime patrol aircraft for critical missions around its home islands, it selected the MQ-9B SeaGuardian. This decision offers many lessons for other Western Pacific nations and may prove instructive to New Zealand in addressing its requirement for All of Government Maritime Domain Awareness.

The SeaGuardian is the latest generation in a long-proven family of remotely piloted aircraft systems built by San Diego-based General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. Larger and more capable than its sibling MQ-9A Reaper, the aircraft is tailor-made for users such as the Japan Coast Guard and others around the region.

For the Japan Coast Guard’s missions, SeaGuardian will be used to conduct wide-area maritime surveillance including search and

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rescue, disaster response, and maritime law enforcement. The Japanese government’s choice follows a series of successful Coast Guard flight trials that used SeaGuardian to validate the same missions in accordance with Japan’s “Policy on Strengthening the Maritime Security Systems.” Tokyo was so pleased with the trials that it decided to operate the MQ-9B full time.

The SeaGuardian features a multimode maritime surface-search radar with an Inverse Synthetic Aperture

Radar imaging mode, an Automatic Identification System receiver, and a high-definition full motion video sensor equipped with optical and infrared cameras. This sensor suite enables real-time detection and identification of surface vessels over thousands of square nautical miles and provides automatic tracking of maritime targets and correlation of AIS transmitters with radar tracks.

SeaGuardian has a full-spectrum radio frequency wave detection and direction system that can

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identify radar, communications, and emergency signals. The aircraft also can carry a huge variety of payloads, including additional search radars, networking support equipment and more.

The JCG SeaGuardian is an all-weather RPA and built for full compliance with international government certification standards.

These features, along with an operationally proven collisionavoidance radar, will enable flexible operations in civil airspace.

The aircraft doesn’t need special accommodations from air traffic controllers and other aircraft in the way older models of RPA once Line of Defence

did. Its detect-and-avoid and other capabilities mean it can fly in mixed airspace no different from any other aircraft.

Integrated Intel Accompanying Japan’s new SeaGuardian and its Certifiable Ground Control Station is an innovative GA-ASI mission execution product called the System for Tasking And Real-time Exploitation, or STARE. It provides a common operating picture by integrating and displaying the wide range of surveillance information gathered

by GA-ASI platforms. STARE also brings together data from a variety of

external multi-domain data feeds, as well as tactical data from intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms. STARE lets operators seamlessly analyze and disseminate information about what’s happening to key decision makers as well as disparate stakeholders.

Another new feature of STARE is Optix, which lets users visualize real-time and historical data from numerous sources on a moving map display. Optix was developed by General Atomics’ Commonwealth Computer Research, Inc. (CCRi) and enables big data processing and analytics that turn multitudes of information into usable knowledge.

Optix combines, correlates, and streamlines multiple sources of intelligence data so users can observe both strategic and tactical data sources and target track information.

For example, the system generates anomalous behavior alerts using artificial intelligence based on activities or behaviors of interest.

Optix notes nefarious maritime activities such as vessel-to-vessel transfers, a vessel not broadcasting on AIS, and violations of an exclusive economic zone. These and other actions are detected automatically, and alerts generated for users’ map.

That means that human intelligence officers or other personnel don’t need to stay glued to RPA sensor feeds or other intelligence inputs. The system watches for them. The goal is to decrease the number of people required to monitor and decipher all of the various feeds.

SeaGuardian aircraft and the supporting mission systems such as STARE would provide an extremely capable and cost-effective solution for New Zealand. They also offer considerable potential for New Zealand industry participation in the operation and ongoing support of the system, including the combination of STARE with New Zealandindigenous mission intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems.

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Rheinmetall NIOA Munitions opens history-making defence manufacturing facility Four years in the pipeline and two years after construction began, Australia’s Defence minister opens large new industrial plant in Maryborough, Queensland.

Then Minister for Defence Peter Dutton joined Federal Member for Wide Bay Llew O’Brien, Rheinmetall NIOA Munitions (RNM) directors and staff in May at the new $60m artillery shell forging factory.

The state-of-the-art factory includes a 1,200-tonne forging press and computerised machinery that will produce the world’s most technically advanced 155mm projectiles for the Australian Defence Force, with 50 percent of the output committed to overseas orders from allied nations.

When fully operational later this year, the plant will have the capacity to produce 30,000 shell cases per year with a workforce of up to 100 from line supervisors, skilled operators, maintenance staff, labourers and apprentices.

Australian company BADGE Constructions led the building phase for the project which has had multi-level government backing with a $28.5m injection from the Federal Government’s Regional Growth Fund on top of $7.5m from the Queensland Government’s Regional Jobs and Investment Fund.

NIOA CEO and Rheinmetall NIOA Munitions Deputy Chairman Robert Nioa said the factory opening was a watershed moment for the region.

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Peter Dutton

“This is more than a new factory – it is a new industry for the region,” Mr Nioa said. ‘‘When we first conceived this almost four years ago with our long-term partners Rheinmetall Waffe Munitions, it highlighted our ambition to invest back into regional Queensland.

‘We wouldn’t be standing here today without the support from all levels of government. We thank them all for their investment because this is a true example of what can be achieved with that support and a spirit of collaboration.

‘Rheinmetall NIOA Munitions embraces the government’s priority

to strengthen sovereign industrial capability because it delivers economic benefit to communities such as Maryborough, it develops new skills and it creates new export markets.”

Southeast Queensland were the big winners with 55 contracts accounting for 98 percent of the project spend.

Rheinmetall Waffe Munitions CEO and Rheinmetall NIOA Munitions Chairman Roman Koehne said the projectile plant put Maryborough firmly on the map as a centre of excellence for defence manufacturing.

“We are proud to partner with NIOA in welcoming a new chapter in Maryborough’s manufacturing history,’’ Mr Koehne said. “This plant is one of the most advanced, high-tech facilities of its kind in the world.

It will harness Rheinmetall’s global expertise combined with a highly-qualified local workforce to create the jobs of the future, right here in regional Queensland.’’

Rheinmetall NIOA Munitions is a joint venture between Rheinmetall Waffe Munition GmbH (51 percent) and NIOA (49 percent).

Australian-owned NIOA is the leading supplier of weapons and munitions to the Australian Defence Force.

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Canadian leg of Frigate Systems Upgrade winds up As the FSU programme winds up, HMNZS Te Mana sets its sights on home after a threeyear stay in Canada marked by delays and legal controversy.

According to a 31 May Ministry of Defence media release, the Royal New Zealand Navy frigate HMNZS Te Mana and its 165-strong crew are setting sail for home following completion of a major systems upgrade in Canada.

“This complex programme of work has upgraded both Anzac-class frigates’ combat systems including radars, weapons, hardware, electronic systems, and sonars,” said Mike Yardley Deputy Secretary Capability Delivery at the Ministry of Defence.

“I’d like to thank the Royal Canadian Navy for their support while the frigates have been based in Victoria.”

The Frigate Systems Upgrade is one of a series of projects aimed at extending the Anzac-class frigates’ operational life out to 2035.

“With the upgraded HMNZS Te Kaha already home, the return of HMNZS Te Mana signals the restoration of the Royal New Zealand Navy’s combat capability,” said Chief of Navy, Rear Admiral David Proctor.

“Once their modern systems have been fully introduced, the frigates will provide Aotearoa with high end options over the full range of maritime operations.

Te Kaha and Te Mana will be able to deploy anywhere in the world to advance our national interests, including providing maritime security alongside our partners where needed.”

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image courtesy NZDF

The upgrade by Lockheed Martin Canada has delivered new radars, electronic detection and other above water systems, self-defence missile system, decoys against missiles and torpedoes, and upgrade to the hullmounted sonar, and the combat management system that integrates these.

After stripping out legacy systems, Lockheed Martin Canada began the project’s installation phase in May 2018 with HMNZS Te Kaha. Working commenced on Te Mana in 2019.

“The work for each frigate involved removal of 44 tonnes of old equipment and structure, and the addition of 67 tonnes of new equipment. More than 55 kilometres of new cabling was pulled through the two ships; and over two million lines of code was written, linking the ships’ weapons and sensors to her new combat management system,” Mike Yardley said.

On returning to Aotearoa, Te Mana will undertake a series of trials, tests, and exercises, allowing for the progressive release of the ship’s operational capabilities.

Both ships were due to return to New Zealand in 2020. Te Kaha returned in December 2020, nine months after its planned completion date.

The Frigate Systems Upgrade (FSU) project was identified in the 2010 Defence White Paper as necessary to maintain the frigates’ combat capability until the end of their service life. According to RNZ, the costs to upgrade Te Mana and Te Kaha blew out to between $600 million and $700m, “due in part to project management mistakes.”

According to Canada’s CTV News, subcontractor Seaspan Shipyards filed a lawsuit against Lockheed Martin in British Columbia’s Supreme Court in 2020, “alleging that problems with the company’s designs had cost the shipyard more than $20 million in delays and workarounds on the first ship alone.”

Lockheed responded with a counterclaim, alleging that negligence, understaffing and mismanagement at the Victoria shipyard had caused the delays and “had set the company back tens of millions of dollars.”

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The Navy: What do our partners really think of us, hypothetically?

In this fictional brief, a Chief of Navy of a fictional regional power provides insights to his defence Minister on New Zealand’s maritime capability prior to navy to navy talks. A hypothetical by Andrew Watts.

In an over three-decade career in the RNZN, CAPT Watts RNZNR commanded HMNZ Ships Pukaki, Wellington, Resolution and Te Mana, and served as Director, Capability Development and Programme Director Network Enabled Capability, and Captain, Fleet Personnel & Training. He is a Defence Adviser at KPMG based in Riyadh.

Minister, In preparation for your upcoming talks with the New Zealand Minister of Defence, you asked for an assessment of the contribution made

by New Zealand’s navy (the Royal New Zealand Navy - RNZN) to regional security. This assessment is provided herewith.

The RNZN is divided into a number of functional forces – combat, patrol, sustainment, and littoral warfare. The capabilities these forces bring to regional security are as follows:

Combat The combat force is based on two Anzac class frigates. Although over 20 years old, their combat systems are in some respects near leading edge, particularly in relation to what is known as local area air defence. The Sea Ceptor missile with which they are equipped is very advanced, featuring “active homing” capability.

They can provide meaningful defence against aircraft and missiles to a small sea area containing up to about three “high value” units,

Sealift capability: HMNZS Canterbury. Image courtesy NZDF.

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HMNZS Aotearoa sails from Devonport naval base to participate in RIMPAC 22. Image courtesy NZDF.

such as our amphibious force ships.

They have reasonable Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capability, meaning that they can contribute to what is known as maritime domain awareness – an understanding of the maritime environment and who and what is operating in it.

Anti-submarine warfare capabilities are basic but are supplemented by high quality defensive systems against submarine launched torpedoes. In summary, these ships make a very useful contribution to maritime security in partnership with our own forces.

However, there are only two of them, which makes the likelihood of their availability in the event of a regional crisis somewhat problematic – probably no greater than 50%. Although New Zealand naval people have a well-deserved reputation for commitment and professionalism, the challenges that the RNZN must face in maintaining a naval combat workforce must be serious, given Line of Defence

the typical personnel attrition rates that both their defence forces and our own must accept as permanent features of our capability landscape.

Sustainment In 2020 the RNZN introduced into service a new replenishment ship, HMNZS Aotearoa. This ship is a very valuable addition to regional maritime capability. Replenishment ships are essential components of any maritime force and regionally there are very few of them. Aotearoa is comparable in capability to replenishment ships recently acquired by the Royal Navy and Royal Australian Navy.

Sealift The acquisition of a sealift capability resulted from a major defence re-orientation following the election of a Labour government in 1999. The highly regarded, highly professional air combat capability based on modernised A-4K Skyhawk aircraft was abandoned, together with their planned

replacement by the F-16. New Zealand land forces received a long overdue re-equipment, and funds which had been set aside for a third Anzac class frigate were instead allocated to sealift and patrol capabilities.

The sealift element, HMNZS Canterbury, is based on an adapted roll on/roll off ferry design. This ship has proven itself in a range of maritime exercises and real world disaster relief operations.

Its main limitation is that it lacks a well dock, which means that it can only operate landing craft in almost calm sea states. In an operation which required forces to be landed quickly and in a specific area, this limitation could be serious, even in the Pacific.

Nonetheless, our own naval and land forces have operated extensively with Canterbury, and her capabilities are significant. In common with our own amphibious sealift ships, she requires escort by combatant forces in anything but the most benign threat conditions.

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Patrol The RNZN operates two Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) and two (formerly four) Inshore Patrol Vessels (OPV). These are not combat capabilities. They are equipped with sufficient armament for law enforcement operations and no more. They are also constructed to commercial standards, which means they are much less damage resistant than combat ships like frigates.

Nonetheless, these ships make a substantial contribution to regional security. They conduct patrols in support of Pacific nations’ maritime enforcement and domain awareness in the course of which they have built enduring relationships with Pacific security forces. We ourselves have noted that this type of engagement builds capacity and makes our Pacific partners more resistant to what we might consider malign external influences.

It could also be said that the RNZN patrol ships are “right sized” for the Pacific – our partners view their capabilities as more relevant to 20

their needs than frigate/destroyer type ships. In summary, RNZN patrol capabilities make a significant contribution to collective regional security interests, and thus our own.

Hydrographic and Diving Support The RNZN operates a highly capable, ex-commercial, hydrographic and diving support ship, HMNZS Manawanui. This acquisition is in some respects a case study in adaptability and innovation.

For a much smaller outlay than a new build ship with much less capability would have required, the RNZN has acquired a highly versatile, highly capable ship of a type not found in our own navy or in that of our other regional partners.

If we were required to undertake a major underwater salvage operation, say to recover parts of a crashed aircraft, Manawanui’s capabilities would be invaluable, particularly as our own diving and hydrographic specialists are used to working with their New Zealand counterparts.

Littoral Operations The RNZN maintains a small but highly professional littoral operations capability. The Operational Diving Team is able to conduct expeditionary reconnaissance and mine countermeasures operations, albeit with equipment limitations that are being addressed. Littoral operations teams routinely operate from Manawanui.

Sustainment and Availability As indicated above, RNZN personnel have a reputation for commitment and professionalism.

Nonetheless, the range of capabilities that they operate must create serious sustainment challenges. Each type of ship operates different platform and mission systems, creating multiple supply chains and training pipelines which even a navy as professional as the RNZN must have great difficulty in addressing.

Assessment Our region faces a wide range of serious security threats, including great power competition and what Line of Defence

appears to be the imminent collapse of the rules based order on which our security and prosperity has hitherto been based. New forms of aggression are being encountered at sea in the form of “grey zone” tactics, responses to which require a high level of naval presence.

Our own resources are insufficient for the level of presence required; the support of our security partners not only makes up that deficiency but also signals to aggressors and the world at large that threats to our maritime sovereignty will not go unchallenged.

The contribution made by the RNZN to regional security in the form of patrol, sustainment and sealift capability is substantial as explained above. We would not wish to see any of these capabilities abandoned or reduced. However, the form of maritime support that we most require is naval combat capability.

The upgraded RNZN frigates are capable combatants, and their presence would add to the overall Line of Defence

deterrent and combat value of regional naval forces. However, their availability is problematic, as there are only two of them.

Our partners defence capability investments are a matter for their governments, but our interests would be better served if our New Zealand friends could offer naval combat capability on a more frequent and sustained basis.

If additional frigates are beyond their means, they could perhaps consider more specialised and thus affordable combat capability.

For instance, our region abounds in narrow choke points through which shipping must pass and which are vulnerable to a range of air, surface and sub-surface threats, include asymmetric “swarming” attacks.

Combat capability effective in such zones would free up larger multi-mission combatants such as those which form our own naval combat force for “high end” operations, including theatre antisubmarine warfare and area air defence.

I am not suggesting that you seek to influence your New Zealand counterpart in any particular capability direction.

However, should the concept of defence “complementarity” arise in discussion, the above example may provide a useful reference point.

In summary, the existing New Zealand naval fleet makes a significant contribution to regional maritime security. It is flexible, versatile, and its contribution to Pacific security in particular is noteworthy. Its people have a high reputation for commitment and professionalism.

However, it is assessed that wide system diversity presents major sustainment and availability challenges. Viewed purely through the lens of our own interests, a New Zealand Navy that was able to make a more regular and sustained naval combat presence contribution would be welcome.

Whether this comes about or not is solely a matter for the New Zealand government.

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Hard budget choices ahead if New Zealand to be a force for stability Uncertain times require defence spending to be maintained at the NATO two percent standard, writes Dr Wayne Mapp. What would be the priorities, and could they be afforded within a two percent of GDP defence budget?

Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO was New Zealand’s Minister of Defence and Minister of Science and Innovation from 2008 to 2011.

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Just six months ago, I was arguing that it would be sufficient for New Zealand to maintain defence spending at 1.5 percent of GDP, which was essentially the level of defence spending for the last 20 years.

The accounting change in 2018, which shifted the calculation of New Zealand’s defence spending onto the NATO measure, did not actually increase defence spending, it was simply an accounting exercise.

Nevertheless, it was an important change because it provided a proper comparison to New Zealand’s partners, rather than shortchanging New Zealand’s true defence expenditure.

Since then, the Ukraine war has occurred and with it, the unparalleled unity of the West.

Finland and Sweden have abandoned their neutral stance that has prevailed since the end of World War Two, and in Sweden’s case, for much longer. Both nations see the importance of being within the umbrella of collective defence.

The war has also provided the impetus for increased defence spending among western nations.

The utility test of having enough for the general security environment of the last twenty years, and beyond that, being little more than a tripwire

is not sufficient. Defence spending must provide real resilience. Help might be many months away.

In our own region, China is aggressively pursuing a deeper relationship with ten Pacific nations.

China’s aspirations go beyond economic issues. In the case of The Solomons, China is seeking a security relationship as well.

Two of the ten nations, the Cook Islands and Niue, are actually part of the realm of New Zealand, with New Zealand being responsible for security and defence.

New Zealand, along with Australia, will have to act deftly.

Increasing New Zealand’s defensive capability in maritime security and working more fulsomely with the Pacific States, especially through the Pacific Forum, has assumed a new importance.

Even during the period of the so called “benign strategic environment” it was clear that the multiple deployments of East Timor, The Solomons and Afghanistan severely stretched the New Zealand Defence Force. At the peak, when all three deployments were occurring simultaneously, it was not actually sustainable, certainly not for the Battalion Group in East Timor.

We should draw a lesson from the last twenty years, then add on the Line of Defence

RNZAF Hercules flying in formation with two USAF C-130Js over Auckland. Image courtesy NZDF.

increased uncertainty of recent times.

To my mind, if we keep defence spending at 1.5 percent of GDP, New Zealand will be shortchanging future risk. There would be a real prospect that New Zealand could not meet the commitments expected of us, especially within our own region. There is simply not enough resilience within the Defence Force, or to put it another way, not enough reserve capacity to provide security in uncertain times.

The NATO standard of two percent of GDP, which all NATO countries are now striving to achieve, would increase New Zealand’s defence spending by one third from the existing 1.5 percent of GDP. There is no doubt that this would be a substantial increase. However, it would not be sufficient to introduce new capabilities, such as an air combat force. Instead the increase Line of Defence

should be used to strengthen existing capabilities.

I know from experience the level of risk we currently undertake as a nation. I introduced a policy of a daily report on what aircraft were available. There were simply too many times when only one aircraft, across the entire fleet, was available for tasking. Although this was during the various upgrade programmes, when two or three aircraft were in the production process, I understand that the situation has barely improved.

Similarly, with the naval ships.

With only two frigates, during the recent upgrade there was a twelve month period when New Zealand had no frigates available. The Army would struggle to field a full Battalion Group. Sustaining it for more than twelve months would be almost impossible.

What would be the priorities, and could they be afforded within a defence budget of two percent of GDP? Air Force It is noteworthy that New Zealand has not replaced the P3 Orions on a one-to-one basis. A major part of the reason was cost, although it was considered that the new aircraft would have greater availability.

However, the defence demands within our region, including South East Asia have become more demanding, so more capacity might be desirable. Two extra P8 Poseidon’s, with a full range of spare parts, would cost an additional $800 million. At least one extra crew would also be required.

The C130H Hercules have been replaced on a one to one basis, though the Cabinet was offered 23

DEFENCE the opportunity to purchase one or two more. The same argument applies. The increasingly demanding situation, which also includes climate change and thus a greater requirement for disaster relief, means more resilience is required. A commitment to two percent of GDP would mean the two extra aircraft could have been purchased.

This argument also applies to the helicopter fleet, particularly the NH 90, where there is only eight in the fleet. With Australia going out of the NH90, maybe there is a case to acquire some of them. This approach proved very successful with the acquisition of the Australian Seasprite fleet.

Some years ago, New Zealand missed the opportunity to purchase the last two C17 heavy airlifters. As a consequence, New Zealand is unable to airlift the NH90 helicopters and is reliant on the goodwill of the RAAF to provide their C17s to do so. It would make sense to have a fleet of smaller helicopters that can be airlifted by the C130J. Clearly the Augusta 109 can be airlifted, though because of the amount of equipment in these helicopters, they have a limited payload.

The cost of bolstering the core fleets of the RNZAF would add 25 percent to the annual RNZAF budget, with another $250 million in operating costs and around $1.2 billion in capital.

Army The Capability Plan presented by Ron Mark in 2018 would have added another 1,000 people to the Army, lifting the numbers to 6,000. This number would guarantee that New Zealand could field a Battalion Group on a sustainable basis.

As with the RNZAF, the annual cost would be in the order of $250 million operating costs. Capital expenditure would also be required, particularly in expanding existing bases. It would be prudent to plan 24

for not less than $1 billion, given the relatively poor state of Defence Force infrastructure.

Navy The more challenging expansion would be within the Navy. When it comes to replacing the two ANZAC frigates, logic dictates that three ships be purchased. This will require not less than an additional $1.5 billion capital beyond the $3 billion currently envisaged to acquire two ships. Since the replacement ships are not required for another decade, this expenditure won’t be required till then. This is similarly true of the extra crew that will have to be recruited.

The Navy has an additional problem. The Project Protector fleet will need replacing before this decade is out. The Project Protector vessels were bought on the cheap and their deficiencies have been evident during their service. The Project Protector vessels cost $500 million twenty years ago, effectively $1 billion today.

Substantially more capable ships will cost considerably more. An increase in funds of 100 percent would be realistic, so a total of $2 billion will be needed.

As with the Airforce and the Army, it would be realistic to plan for an increase in annual operating costs in the order of $250 million. The additional capital costs will be more like $2.5 billion, being the additional frigate and the increased cost of replacing the Project protector fleet with more capable vessels.

billion in operating costs and $1.5 billion in capital costs. The capital expenditure appears in both Vote Defence Force and Vote Defence (MOD), but it seems to a single block of expenditure.

Stepping up from the 2022 budget and building resilience into the Defence Force would require an additional annual cost of $750 million in operating costs and an extra $500 million in capital costs.

This amounts to a 25 percent increase in operating costs and a 33 percent increase in capital costs and would result in defence expenditure of 1.9 percent of GDP. Sufficiently close to two percent.

This resilience plan will take most of a decade to implement, particularly in respect of the naval expenditure.

Thus, the immediate annual increases will be more modest.

A real increase to the defence budget of five percent per annum, in addition to inflation, will see the defence budget reach 1.9 percent of GDP well before 2030. Decisions to increase the P8 Poseidon fleet from four to six and the C130J Hercules fleet from five to seven could be quickly taken and would be fully implemented within five years.

This would be a clear signal to our partners, particularly Australia and the United States, that New Zealand is serious about our contribution to the security of our shared Pacific region.

Adding it up Adding all this up means an increase in annual defence operating costs of $750 million. The increase in capital expenditure across the three services will be not less than $5 billion.

However, this expense will be spread over a decade, so the increase in capital is $500 million per year.

The 2022 budget continued defence expenditure at 1.5 percent of GDP, made up of approximately $3 Line of Defence

Defence Minister addresses climate security at defence summit Speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Defence Minister Peeni Henare identifies climate change as one of the greatest security challenges for New Zealand and the Indo-Pacific region.

Minister Henare joined a panel of Defence Ministers to discuss climate security at the 19th Annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on 11 June.

The Minister addressed the 2022 summit at a special session on “Climate Security and Green Defence”. He was joined on the stage by his counterpart from Maldives and representatives from Germany and the United Kingdom.

The annual Shangri-La Dialogue is the Asia-Pacific’s premier defence and security forum with about 45 countries and organisations represented.

“Defence leaders are meeting in the context of an increasing threat to international security - climate change,” said Mr Henare. “The climate crisis is an existential challenge for many Pacific states. Its effects are accelerating and are being felt early and deeply in the Pacific region.

“The COVID-19 pandemic has emphasised that militaries have an important role to play in addressing a broader range of security threats than we may have thought of in the past, and this includes climate change.

“Because the impacts of climate change will require more humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, stability operations and search and rescue missions it will be one of the greatest security challenges for our Defence Force and the Indo-Pacific region for decades to come.

“The Pacific is one of the Government’s top defence priorities announced last year and reflects the emphasis we place on investing in the security of our region.

“Major Government investments will ensure the Defence Force has the capacity and capability to undertake climate related assistance. For example, the new P-8As have been designed and purpose built to patrol maritime environments and monitor vessels on and below the surface.

“We also know that climate change is adversely impacting Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. As one of Line of Defence

Hon Peeni Henare meets with Hon Anthony Veke, Solomon Islands Minister of Police, National Security & Correctional Services at Shangri-La Dialogue 2022. Image: Twitter.

the few militaries that routinely operates in this area, the New Zealand Defence Force must be prepared to adapt its operational and capability requirements accordingly.

“I expect officials to continue the dialogue with their counterparts to support regional efforts to address climate change,” he said.

The New Zealand Defence Force is committed to reducing net zero emissions by the end of 2025 in line with the Carbon Neutral Government Programme. As part of this, the NZDF will progressively replace its commercial vehicle fleet with electric or hybrid vehicles, with a goal to be 50 percent electric or hybrid by 2030.

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Veterans and Reservists deliver leadership in turbulent times According to Serco, businesses with policies designed to identify, attract and retain staff with a defence background stand to benefit within an increasingly uncertain business environment.

You don’t need to scroll too far down your newsfeed before headlines influenced by our current employment market come to your attention. A record low unemployment rate, a drove of skilled workers taking up opportunities offshore, and low migration post-pandemic all contribute to a situation where talented people can be hard to find.

However, for as long as there have been movements in employment trends, there have been people with ties to Defence – veterans and reserves – looking for opportunities in the civilian sector.

Many of these people indicate that the greatest hurdles they face in their job hunt is in communicating their value to a potential employer.

Either they struggle to ‘sell’ what they have, or employers find it hard to relate a candidates’ Defence experience to their business needs.

The reality is that military experience brings a range of skills and qualities to add significant value to any commercial activity, with veterans often equipped with experiences that are keenly attuned to the demands to the business community.

The range of skills and experience that military trained employees can bring to the workplace is wide and varied. Collectively, this workforce reflect community values, a strong work ethic, well developed planning and analysis tools, a healthy attention 26

to detail, the ability to work collaboratively and/or independently, and an expansive aptitude for learning new skills.

These qualities are unsurprising when considering the nature of military organisations: large and complex but with a clear hierarchy, an abundance of processes and procedures, a continuous training and development pipeline to prepare people for new roles and higher duties, and a need to operate effectively under pressure with incomplete information.

The sheer dominance of this quasi-corporate structure and the need to navigate it makes military trained personnel incredibly versatile, provided of course that potential employers can look beyond the specific military tasks a veteran once wielded and make use of the complete range of skills that a candidate brings.

While these transferrable skills are indeed valuable, they largely serve to underpin the effectiveness of a veteran or reservist’s greatest contribution to an organisation, namely “leadership’, or more specifically, “leadership in turbulent and demanding circumstances”.

The modern business environment is becoming increasingly volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous, or ‘VUCA’, with executives and academics alike seeking to understand and convey the impacts of the fourth industrial revolution on their corporate

strategies. Interestingly, the term VUCA was first used by the US Army War College in the late 1990s to describe the post-Cold War era military operating environment.

Unsurprisingly, the emergent paradigms resulted in military organisations re-emphasising the development of ingrained leadership capabilities to navigate and respond to unpredictable and evolving environments over the past two decades. Put a little more bluntly, what is ‘new’ in business is ‘old hat’ in defence circles.

The emerging consensus in the commercial world is that dynamic capabilities that support organisational agility are the key to survivability and success.

Commonly categorised as ‘sensing, shaping, seizing and transforming’ capabilities, the ultimate aim is to position an organisation in a manner that enables it to respond to unpredicted changes in their environment.

Further, driving this response – and ultimately organisational performance – is the domain of leadership. Those individuals who are able to detect and identify trends, establish a clear vision and direction toward the future, guide the collaborative formulation of options, organise and resource the organisation to deliver, and continuously innovate and adjust accordingly, have a high probability of success.

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Serco Defence staff at the Wellington Cenotaph, ANZAC Day 2022.

L-R: Rewi Thompson, LT CDR, RNZN (Retd); Clint Williams, CDR, RNZNR; Clint Thomas, AM, CSC, RADM, RANR; Jamie Steel, LT CDR, RNZN (Retd).

Military organisations have been developing, training, employing and refining these specific skills in their leaders for years.

Pick up any readily available military planning doctrine (the US DoD Joint Planning Doctrine, and the ADF Joint Military Appreciation Process are available online), and you will see that the concepts of understanding the environment, intelligence processes, command intent, course of action development and assessment, and operational design are synonymous with the dynamism and competitive energy of any successful commercial entity.

To any organisation that recognises the value these types of capabilities bring, then it is an easy Line of Defence

pathway to recognising how veterans and reservists can bolster their own commercial fortunes and that it would be beneficial for them to implement employment strategies that enhance their ability to attract these skills.

The first step a commercial leader could take might be to create opportunities for veterans and reservists to engage with the parent Defence organisation.

This may involve attending career transition events run by the military or affiliated agencies, creating a vehicle for veterans and reservists to highlight their military experiences outside of their resume when registering for roles.

Secondly, organisations might commit to preferentially

interviewing veterans or reservists for vacant positions and providing guidance and feedback to the applicants to aid in their continued search for post-service employment.

Military personnel are wellaccustomed to receiving feedback and tend to digest and act on it in a professional manner that their civil counterparts are unaccustomed to.

Further, understanding that veterans and reservists will typically have an affinity to the service and a desire to contribute to the collective success of others needs to be acknowledged. Implementing veteran and reserve-friendly policies that enable ex-military staff to continue engagement with Defence is a means of enhancing the attractiveness of a organisation to potential employees with a military background.

Finally, actively championing veteran and reservist employment can help raise the profile of commercial entities within the veteran and reserve community, which in turn will serve to increase access to those seeking a transition to civilian employment.

The world is becoming increasingly turbulent and chaotic, with the modern information age driving change at a pace and scale that presents many challenges, but that equally offers many new opportunities.

Recruiting and empowering passionate leaders into an organisation, meaning harnessing the skills of those who are adept at dealing with the volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity that a business might encounter, can only serve to develop resilience and position those companies to thrive.

Military veterans and reservists can bring those desired leadership competencies to a potential employer, and those businesses with policies designed to identify, attract and retain staff with a defence background will present favourably to a diverse, talented and experienced community.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY National Security Journal analyses regional nuclear challenges in South Asia

The co-editors of the recently published Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Special Issue of Massey University’s National Security Journal discuss nuclear arms competition in South Asia in this abridged version of their introduction.

Professor Rouben Azizian (pictured) and Dr Lora Saalman are the co-editors of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Special Issue of the National Security Journal.

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This special issue of the National Security Journal assembles a group of prominent political, military, technical and academic experts from Australia, China, India, Pakistan, Russia and the United States to analyse regional nuclear challenges in South Asia. Given the complexity of these issues and polarisation of political and theoretical perspectives on the causes of the regional nuclear dilemma, the essays vary in their assessments.

However, there is also strong agreement among the authors that nuclear challenges are highly destabilising—not just in the regional context in South Asia—but also globally. Their analyses reveal that previous frameworks need to be updated to address the emergence of new factors and actors. The following offers a brief overview of key points from the essays contained in this volume.

South Asia retains an important position in the game of major powers both shaping and being shaped by the international order. In comparison to the Cold War experience between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the India-Pakistan and India-China nuclear dyads have the potential to shift from proxy conflict to that of more direct conflict.

While both the USSR and the United States maintained a naval presence in the Indian Ocean, this marked a secondary theatre of operations. By contrast, now that the Indian Ocean region is part of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, the likelihood of China-United States confrontation in the region is growing with spill over effects on countries like India and Pakistan.

Within these dynamics, there are a range of factors that are impacting nuclear issues in South Asia. Among these, India and Pakistan remain outside the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Further, regional religious conflicts, ethnic tensions, military confrontations and territorial disputes are ongoing.

In the midst of this complex security environment, India and Pakistan are engaged in a conventional and nuclear arms competition with new technologies and systems that have a direct bearing on their respective doctrines and nuclear postures.

In creating a new framework for evaluating nuclear risks in South Asia, longstanding disputes and emerging rivalries must be factored, as well as the role of external powers. This is in large Line of Defence

part due to the complexity of the causes of instability and the risks of conventional and nuclear escalation.

Thus, in spite of the tendency to focus on India and Pakistan, inclusion of a broader set of countries is required to better achieve and implement more wholistic risk reduction measures. This engagement must occur not simply in dyadic, but also in multilateral contexts, due to the cascading effects of postural and technological interactions among them.

Within this shifting strategic construct, external powers are likely to play an enhanced role in future risk reduction measures. ChinaUS bilateral relations, as well as China-India-Pakistan and ChinaIndia-Russia trilateral relations all serve as critical parts of South Asian multilateral relations.

Without these more dynamic and inclusive forms of engagement, confidence-building measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan are likely to continue to falter in their implementation. The essays contained in this volume suggest that the best way to address escalatory tendencies and mistrust is through the creation of a platform of open dialogue and discussion.

To this end, this volume coedited with Dr Petr Topychkanov does not seek to achieve consensus, but rather to provide a representative overview of a plurality of viewpoints.

It is divided into four sections— framework, postures, technologies and future.

Framework In the first section, Dr David Brewster and Dr Jingdong Yuan offer their evaluations of how to best create a new framework for analysing stability and instability in South Asia under the nuclear shadow. Dr Brewster explores India-Pakistan and China-India cross-border clashes to examine how nuclear weapons shape both conventional and subconventional conflicts.

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Dr Yuan furthers this analysis by providing his own assessment of how shifts in postures such as no first use (NFU) and escalate to de-escalate, as well as technological advances may either mitigate or exacerbate nuclear risks. In doing so, he advocates moving beyond dyadic to multilateral constructs to form a new framework for nuclear risk reduction.

Postures In the second section, Lieutenant General (retd) Amit Sharma, Dr Adil Sultan and Professor Wang Dehua analyse challenges to nuclear posture and deterrence from India’s, Pakistan’s and China’s vantage points. Lieutenant General (retd) Sharma examines India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear paths and how these are shaped by nuclear trends in China, Russia, Israel, North Korea and the United States.

Dr Sultan focuses his analysis on India’s and Pakistan’s new technologies and their impact on such postures as NFU, limited war in a nuclearised environment and full spectrum deterrence. Professor Wang concludes the section with his evaluation of the South Asian security architecture and its impact on nuclear stability.

Technologies In the third section, Dr Roshan Khanijo, Dr Alexey Kupriyanov and Dr Chen Kaimin examine how technologies intersect with postures

and weapon systems to affect escalation and strategic stability.

Dr Khanijo provides an overview of the key technological trends in tactical nuclear weapons, unmanned weapons and asymmetric warfare for their negative impact on CBMs. Dr Kupriyanov focuses on an increasingly saturated maritime environment to explore how an underwater Cold War may be emerging with efforts to deploy nuclear-powered submarines armed with nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, as well as nuclear-capable cruise missiles on diesel-electric submarines in the Indian Ocean.

Dr Chen completes the discussion by providing an assessment of various trends and technologies, and their impact on nuclear escalation in South Asia.

Future In the fourth section, Dr Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry and Dr Dmitry Stefanovich provide their recommendations on how to best address nuclear challenges, misperceptions and geopolitics through the lens of evolving nuclear technologies and postures.

Dr Chaudhry analyses the short-, medium- and long-term challenges to strategic stability in South Asia, proposing a three-tiered framework at the bilateral level between India and Pakistan, the trilateral level among China, India and Pakistan and the multilateral level to facilitate future conventional and nuclear CBMs. Dr Stefanovich suggests risk reduction and arms control measures that address threat perceptions and misperceptions among the leadership of South Asian nuclear weapon states, as well as the role of external powers and their longer-term impact on nuclear posture and technology development in the region.

The National Security Journal can be accessed at https:// nationalsecurityjournal.nz 29

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SIPRI: Global nuclear arsenals are expected to grow The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 2022 Yearbook finds that despite a marginal decrease in the number of nuclear warheads in 2021, nuclear arsenals are expected to grow over the coming decade.

The nine nuclear-armed states—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea— continue to modernise their nuclear arsenals, and although the total number of nuclear weapons declined slightly between January 2021 and January 2022, the number will probably increase in the next decade.

Of the total inventory of an estimated 12,705 warheads at the start of 2022, about 9,440 were in military stockpiles for potential use. Of those, an estimated 3,732 warheads were deployed with missiles and aircraft, and around 2,000—nearly all of which belonged to Russia or the US—were kept in a state of high operational alert.

Although Russian and US total warhead inventories continued to decline in 2021, this was due to the dismantling of warheads that had been retired from military service several years ago. The number of warheads in the two countries’ useable military stockpiles remained relatively stable in 2021.

Both countries’ deployed strategic nuclear forces were within the limits set by a bilateral nuclear arms reduction treaty (2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, New START). Note, however, that New START does not limit total non-strategic nuclear warhead inventories.

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“There are clear indications that the reductions that have characterised global nuclear arsenals since the end of the cold war have ended,” said Hans M. Kristensen, Associate Senior Fellow with SIPRI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme and Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS).

“All of the nuclear-armed states are increasing or upgrading their arsenals and most are sharpening nuclear rhetoric and the role nuclear weapons play in their military strategies,” said Wilfred Wan, Director of SIPRI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme. “This is a very worrying trend.”

Russia and the US together possess over 90 percent of all nuclear weapons. The other seven nucleararmed states are either developing or deploying new weapon systems, or have announced their intention to do so.

China is in the middle of a substantial expansion of its nuclear weapon arsenal, which satellite images indicate includes the construction of over 300 new missile silos. Several additional nuclear warheads are thought to have been assigned to operational forces in 2021 following the delivery of new mobile launchers and a submarine.

The UK in 2021 announced its decision to increase the ceiling

on its total warhead stockpile, in a reversal of decades of gradual disarmament policies. While criticising China and Russia for lack of nuclear transparency, the UK also announced that it would no longer publicly disclose figures for the country’s operational nuclear weapon stockpile, deployed warheads or deployed missiles.

In early 2021, France officially launched a programme to develop a third-generation nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).

India and Pakistan appear to be expanding their nuclear arsenals, and both countries introduced and continued to develop new types of nuclear delivery systems in 2021.

Israel, which does not publicly acknowledge possessing nuclear weapons, is also believed to be modernising its nuclear arsenal.

North Korea continues to prioritise its military nuclear programme as a central element of its national security strategy. While North Korea conducted no nuclear test explosions or long-range ballistic missile tests during 2021, SIPRI estimates that the country has now assembled up to 20 warheads, and possesses enough fissile material for a total of 45 to 55 warheads.

“If the nuclear-armed states take no immediate and concrete action on disarmament, then the global inventory of nuclear warheads could soon begin to increase for the Line of Defence

first time since the cold war,” said Matt Korda, Associate Researcher with SIPRI’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme and Senior Research Associate with the FAS Nuclear Information Project.

Mixed signals from nuclear diplomacy There were several landmarks in nuclear diplomacy during the past year. These included the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in January 2021, having received the required 50 state ratifications; the extension for five years of New START, the last remaining bilateral arms control agreement between the world’s two leading nuclear powers; and the start of talks on the US rejoining, and Iran returning to compliance with the Iran nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

During 2021, the nucleararmed permanent members (P5) of the United Nations Security Council—China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA—worked on a joint statement that they issued on 3 January 2022, affirming that Line of Defence

“nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”.

They also reaffirmed their commitment to complying with non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control agreements and pledges as well as their obligations under the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

Despite this, all P5 members continue to expand or modernise their nuclear arsenals and appear to be increasing the salience of nuclear weapons in their military strategies.

Russia has even made open threats about possible nuclear weapon use in the context of the war in Ukraine.

Bilateral Russia–USA strategic stability talks have stalled because of the war, and none of the other nuclear-armed states are pursuing arms control negotiations. Moreover, the P5 members have voiced opposition to the TPNW, and the JCPOA negotiations have not yet reached a resolution.

“Although there were some significant gains in both nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament in the past year, the

risk of nuclear weapons being used seems higher now than at any time since the height of the cold war,” said SIPRI Director Dan Smith.

A mixed outlook for global security and stability The 53rd edition of the SIPRI Yearbook reveals both negative and some hopeful developments in 2021.

“Relations between the world’s great powers have deteriorated further at a time when humanity and the planet face an array of profound and pressing common challenges that can only be addressed by international cooperation,” said Stefan Löfven, Chair of the SIPRI Governing Board.

In addition to its detailed coverage of nuclear arms control and non-proliferation issues, the latest edition of the SIPRI Yearbook includes insight on developments in conventional arms control in 2021; regional overviews of armed conflicts and conflict management; in-depth data and discussion on military expenditure, international arms transfers and arms production; and comprehensive coverage of efforts to counter chemical and biological security threats.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY Global displacement hits another record, capping decade-long rising trend

Despite some signs of progress, the speed and scale of forced displacement is outpacing solutions for refugees, says UN refugee agency.

Globally, the number of people forced to flee their homes has increased every year over the past decade and stands at the highest level since records began. It’s a trend that can be only reversed by a concerted push towards peacemaking, UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, announced on 16 June.

By the end of 2021, those displaced by war, violence, persecution, and human rights abuses stood at 89.3 million, up eight percent on a year earlier and well over double the figure of 10 years ago, according to UNHCR’s annual Global Trends report.

Since then, the Russian invasion of Ukraine – causing the fastest and one of the largest forced displacement crises since World War II – and other emergencies, from Africa to Afghanistan and beyond, pushed the figure over the milestone of 100 million.

“Every year of the last decade, the numbers have climbed,” said the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi. “Either the international community comes together to take action to address this human tragedy, resolve conflicts and find lasting solutions, or this terrible trend will continue.”

Last year was notable for the number of conflicts that escalated 32

and new ones that flared; 23 countries, with a combined population of 850 million, faced medium- or high-intensity conflicts, according to the World Bank.

Meanwhile, food scarcity, inflation and the climate crisis are adding to people’s hardship, stretching the humanitarian response just as the funding outlook in many situations appears bleak.

The number of refugees rose in 2021 to 27.1 million. Arrivals climbed in Uganda, Chad and Sudan among others. Most refugees were, once again, hosted by neighbouring countries with few resources. The number of asylum seekers reached 4.6 million, up 11 percent.

Last year also saw the 15th straight annual rise in people displaced within their own countries by conflict, to 53.2 million. The increase was driven by mounting violence or conflict in some places, for example Myanmar, in Ethiopia’s Tigray and other regions, and in Burkina Faso and Chad.

The speed and volume of displacement is still outpacing the availability of solutions for those displaced, such as return, resettlement or local integration.

Yet the Global Trends report also contained glimmers of hope. The number of refugee and IDP returns

increased in 2021, returning to preCOVID-19 levels, with voluntary repatriation having surged 71 percent, though numbers remained modest.

“While we’re witnessing appalling new refugee situations, and existing ones reigniting or remaining unresolved, there are also examples of countries and communities working together to pursue solutions for the displaced,” Grandi added. “It’s happening in places – for example the regional cooperation to repatriate Ivorians – but these important decisions need to be replicated or scaled up elsewhere.”

And although the estimated number of stateless people grew slightly in 2021, some 81,200 acquired citizenship or had it confirmed – the biggest reduction in statelessness since the start of UNHCR’s IBelong campaign in 2014.

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Kacific launches transportable disaster relief WiFi communications solution Singapore-based broadband satellite operator launches all-in-one instant connectivity solution for civil defence and aid agencies in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

In May, Kacific Broadband Satellites Group launched its emergency connectivity solution, CommsBox, designed to provide broadband service in emergency or disaster zones rapidly.

A transportable, all-in-one satellite communications product, CommsBox can be rapidly deployed in disaster zones when other communication channels fail. The turnkey solution is designed to meet the particular disaster response requirements of territories in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

The solution consists of preconfigured, solar-powered units which, with minimal setup, provide instant internet access to assist relief operations and connect users.

Governments, civil defence, police, military, rescue services, and aid operations can store the CommsBox units in remote locations or transport them directly into disaster zones.

According to Kacific, between 1970 and 2020, natural hazards in

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the Asia Pacific affected 6.9 billion people and killed more than 2 million. Since 1970, the region has accounted for 57 percent of global fatalities from disasters and 87 percent of the total global population affected by natural hazards.

“The Asia Pacific region is prone to natural disasters. With many islands and mountainous regions, its geography adds an extra challenge for coordinating rescue and relief,” said Christian Patouraux, Kacific’s Chief Executive Officer.

“When powerlines are down, transport routes blocked, and fibre or other ground-based communications equipment damaged, Kacific CommsBox can be shipped into the disaster zone to provide internet access within minutes of touchdown.”

Specifically designed for civil defence, police and not-forprofit organisations, each Kacific CommsBox includes: • A small auto-pointing satellite antenna

• Preconfigured and connected modem and satellite electronics • Solar-power energy pack • WiFi access point • A user-tablet • A sealed, shock-resistant, fireresistant, water-resistant, and transportable all-inclusive container • Unlimited high-speed data with first priority speeds of up to 50 Mbps download and 5 Mbps upload The satellite antenna connects to the Kacific1 satellite, which offers widespread coverage across the Asia Pacific, including islands, mountainous regions, and remote areas.

Kacific Broadband Satellites Group is a broadband satellite operator providing access to affordable, high-speed broadband across Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

It uses multi-beam space and ground communications technologies to provide a high-quality service to organisations and communities.

Kacific1, its high-throughput Kaband satellite, connects underserved rural and suburban areas, fostering greater internet usage and improving the delivery of critical services across the region.

Kacific is headquartered in Singapore with main operations out of Vanuatu.

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To meet the Chinese challenge in the Pacific, NZ needs to put its money where its mouth is New Zealand and Australia are the region’s biggest aid donors, but their spending falls well under the GNP-based level of assistance recommended by the UN, writes Professor Alexander Gillespie.

Alexander Gillespie is Professor of International Law at the University of Waikato.

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This week’s White House meeting between Jacinda Ardern and Joe Biden reflected a world undergoing rapid change. But of all the shared challenges discussed, there was one that kept appearing in the leaders’ joint statement – China in the Pacific.

Tucked within the statement, with all its promises of increased cooperation and partnership, was this not-so-subtle declaration: In particular, the United States and New Zealand share a concern that the establishment of a persistent military presence in the Pacific by a state that does not share our values or security interests would fundamentally alter the strategic balance of the region and pose national-security concerns to both our countries.

Unsurprisingly, this upset Chinese officials, with a foreign

ministry spokesperson accusing Ardern and Biden of trying to “deliberately hype up” the issue.

But hopefully the statement will also prompt New Zealand to put its money where its mouth is when it comes to increasing assistance in the Pacific region. Expressing “concern” about China’s influence means little otherwise.

Aid and influence While New Zealand and Australia are responsible for around 55% of all of the aid flowing into the region, that contribution needs to be seen in perspective.

There are two obvious shortcomings. First, more needs to be done to promote democracy in the Pacific, which means supporting anti-corruption initiatives and a free press. Second, both countries simply need to give more.

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New Zealand Army provides instructor support to the Republic of Fiji Military Forces Basic Recruit and Senior Non-Commissioned Officer courses. Image courtesy NZDF.

Neither spends anywhere near the 0.7% of gross national income on development assistance recommended by the United Nations (UN).

The high-tide mark for both was long ago: 0.52% for New Zealand in 1975 and 0.48% for Australia in 1967. Today, New Zealand spends 0.26% and Australia 0.21% of their incomes on overseas aid.

It’s against this backdrop of under-spending that China has come to be seen as an attractive alternative to the traditional regional powers. It has no colonial baggage in the Pacific and is a developing country itself, having made impressive leaps in development and poverty reduction.

Debt and distress Many of the small developing island states in the Pacific share common challenges and vulnerabilities: negative migration patterns, risk from climate change and fragile economies.

Three states in the region (Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu) are in the UN’s “least developed countries” category. Two others (Samoa and Vanuatu) are just above the threshold.

Most are at high risk of debt distress, increasing the risk of poor policy decisions simply to pay bills.

The average debt-to-GDP ratio for Pacific states has risen from Line of Defence

32.9% in 2019 to 42.2% in 2021.

Vanuatu, Palau and Fiji have debt-toGDP ratios greater than 70%.

China currently accounts for only about 6% of all aid in the region, but supplements this with grants and loans, some commercial and some interest-free. These overlap with grand infrastructure plans such as the Belt and Road Initiative aimed at connecting many regions of the world.

While it might not have secured its desired regional multilateral trade and security agreement with Pacific nations, China is clearly in the Pacific for the long haul.

Working with China This presence need not be seen entirely negatively. In the right circumstances, Chinese assistance can have a positive impact on economic and social outcomes in recipient countries, according to the International Monetary Fund. (The same study also found a negative but negligible effect on governance.)

Overall, Chinese influence in the Pacific is not necessarily something that must be “countered”. For the good of the region, countries should seek ways to work together, especially given that aid to the Pacific is often fragmented, volatile, unpredictable and opaque.

Co-ordinated, efficient and effective partnerships between donors, recipients and regional institutions will be vital, and cooperation with China could be part of this.

New Zealand and Australia need to expand their work on the vast infrastructure and development needs of the Pacific. Transparency should be a priority with all projects and spending, and co-operation should be tied to shared benchmarks such as the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals.

For its part, China should give more aid rather than loans (especially to the least developed countries) to avoid the risk of poor countries becoming beholden to lenders or even bankrupted.

Peace and security Above all, peace and security between and within countries should be an agreed fundamental principle.

The good news is that South Pacific nations have already taken steps towards this by agreeing to the Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.

This could be complemented by an agreement banning foreign military bases in the region to maintain its independence. If needed, peacekeeping or outside security assistance should be multilateral through the UN, not bilateral through secret arrangements.

Co-operation for the good of the Pacific should be the goal, but this is only possible if the region is not militarised.

Chinese influence and power in the Pacific is a reality that cannot be wished away or easily undermined.

With the US similarly determined to assert itself, the stakes are rising.

All nations should work together to ensure no small, independent Pacific country becomes a pawn in what could be a very dangerous game.

This article originally was published in The Conversation on 03 June 2022. Republished under Creative Commons licence.

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Cyber Fears: Australian Security Confidence Index 2022 Commissioned by the Australian Security Industry Association, the Australian Security Confidence Index (ASCI) 2022 identifies cyber threats as the number one security fear, followed by sexual assault and terrorism.

Now more than ever before, Australians are increasingly concerned about cyber security, sexual assault and terrorism.

Fear of sexual assault, physical assault, robbery, terrorism and a spike in cyberattacks are the five key security concerns among Australians in 2022, according to the Australian Security Confidence Index (ASCI).

The annual study, commissioned by the Australian Security Industry Association Ltd (ASIAL) surveyed 1,600 Australians nationwide from all walks of life about their security concerns in a range of contexts, from their own homes and workplaces, to their online activities and when at large in public.

It reveals the depth of feeling Australians have for their security in an increasingly uncertain and security-conscious world.

ASIAL says the NielsenIQ researchers found that key security concerns focus on cyber threats, which is now the number one security fear for 44 percent of Australians, up from 38 percent last year.

ASIAL Chief Executive Officer, Bryan de Caires said that this sends a clear message to Australia’s governments and the Security Industry alike. “The key element in the term ‘Cyber Security’ is the word ‘Security’ and the study identifies fear of being victim to a cyberattack is an issue of growing concern to Australians.”

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“As the domains of physical and virtual security converge, it is evident that more needs to be done to build cyber resilience and ensure that IT personnel are appropriately vetted to handle the sensitive data and information they have access to,” he said.

“Ensuring the probity and skill levels of those providing cyber security advice and support is vital.

This has clear policy and regulatory implications for governments and the Security Industry alike,” he said.

Security concerns about sexual assault on women has also increased significantly since last year in the wake of a number of highlypublicised assaults. Fear of robbery and physical assault were also higher.

Researchers were surprised by an increase in terrorism awareness and concerns, especially among younger people, which comes amidst the

rapidly deteriorating situation in the Ukraine. Six percent of Australians feeling unsafe overall (five percent in 2021).

Those who identify as of Indian ethnic background are significantly more likely to feel unsafe. This year they are joined by females aged 4054, those who reside in CBD/cities, those looking for employment or working in hospitality.

Only one in five Australians feel “very safe” in their day-to-day lives, with many being acutely aware of situations and activities that could put them at risk.

The full ASCI 2022 report can be accessed from https://asial.com.au/ASCI. The ASIAL Security 2022 Conference will take place on 17-18 August 2022 and will coincide with the 2022 Security Exhibition & Conference at ICC Sydney from 17 to 19 August.

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HOMELAND SECURITY

Overseas investments and New Zealand’s strategic interests Rebecca McAtamney, LINZ’s Head of Regulatory Practice and Delivery, describes the role of the National Security and Public Order regime in overseas investments in Strategically Important Businesses are in New Zealand’s interests.

Rebecca McAtamney is LINZ’s Head of Regulatory Practice and Delivery

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New Zealand’s ability to maintain effective defence forces and gather intelligence is vitally important to our national security. We also have international obligations to manage the sale and export of military and dual-use goods and technologies. The National Security and Public Order regime is in place to ensure overseas investments in strategically important businesses and infrastructure are in New Zealand’s interest. The Overseas Investment Office (OIO) has a range of helpful information and is available to answer any questions.

New Zealand’s defence forces and intelligence agencies play a pivotal role in ensuring our country’s national security.

As a country we need to maintain a credible defence force to protect our people and the natural resources that underpin our economy and play our part in multi-national operations. We need to be able to carry out search and rescue operations on land and far out to sea, as well as respond when disaster strikes - at home or across the region.

We need intelligence to help us identify threats to the safety and security of New Zealanders, both shorter term threats of violence and longer-term efforts to interfere with our society and democracy.

We also need to protect our critical infrastructure, important

institutions and the intellectual property that will drive our future economic success.

The people who go to work in defence and intelligence help ensure our country’s national security and public order and are committed to making a difference. They can’t and don’t do it alone though. Our agencies rely on businesses across the country that supply them with the equipment, technology and support services they need to perform their role.

These businesses are likely to be an attractive investment proposition to overseas investors. Most investors have good intentions and see a quality investment that aligns with their business. They often also bring benefits to New Zealand such as access to new technology and expertise. Some, however, may have other motivations.

As a country we need to make sure overseas investments are in our national interest, particularly when the investment involves a business that is strategically important.

Protecting New Zealand’s interests and security The Overseas Investment Act is in place to ensure overseas investments are in New Zealand’s interests and sets out rules and approval requirements for investments into sensitive land, businesses, business assets and fishing Line of Defence

quota. The Act sets out different requirements for different types and amounts of investment.

The National Security and Public Order (NSPO) regime is in place to assess overseas investments of less than $100million into Strategically Important Businesses, where particular thresholds are met.

This applies to businesses that are critical direct suppliers to the New Zealand Defence Force or intelligence agencies and to producers of military and dual-use technology. The system also applies to major financial institutions, businesses that hold sensitive information about New Zealanders, as well as important infrastructure such as ports, airports, and the electricity system, and the businesses that operate them.

The regime’s coverage is described in deliberately general terms and captures any overseas investment into a strategically important business or its assets.

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The NSPO regime gives the Minister of Finance power to, where necessary, call in an investment for closer scrutiny and for the Government to take action to mitigate risks if a foreign investment is assessed as presenting a significant national security risk. There is a high bar for taking action, but there are powers to impose conditions, and even unwind transactions and order the disposal of assets where that is needed to mitigate risk.

Strategically important businesses Some suppliers are particularly important to our defence forces and intelligence agencies being able to perform their roles and are listed as Critical Direct Suppliers under the Overseas Investment Act. These businesses have access to information, supply equipment and services, and may have access to bases and facilities.

These Critical Direct Suppliers are Strategically Important Businesses under the Overseas Investment Act. Some suppliers are published on the Overseas Investment Office website, but some are deliberately unpublished due to the confidential nature of their involvement. Businesses that are unpublished Critical Direct Suppliers are aware of their status and are responsible for advising any prospective investor.

Businesses that produce, research, or maintain military or dual-use goods and technologies are also strategically important.

So too are businesses that supply services to government agencies important to New Zealand’s security and international relations. This includes any business that holds information on the staff, operations, or information holdings of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, or an intelligence agency.

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Mandatory notifications It is a legal requirement under the Overseas Investment Act to notify the OIO of any overseas investment in a Critical Direct Supplier to the New Zealand Defence Force, New Zealand Security Intelligence Service or Government Communications Security Bureau.

It is also mandatory to notify the OIO of any overseas investment in a business that produces, researches, develops or maintains military or dual-use goods or technologies.

Notifications are free and must be made before the investment takes place. The OIO will assess the proposed investment, usually within 15 working days, and if there is no significant risk identified will give a ‘Direction Order’ to proceed.

Voluntary Notifications recommended Notifying the OIO of overseas investments in other types of strategically important business, including businesses that hold data sets about the staff and operations of listed government agencies, is voluntary but recommended. It is free to notify, and initial assessments 40

are usually completed within 15 working days. Again, further assessment is only needed if a significant risk is identified.

A notification can be made before an investment takes place or up to six months afterwards. If a notification is made, and the OIO gives a Direction Order to proceed, the investment will receive ‘safe harbour’ and will not be subject to further overseas investment scrutiny. If no notification is made, the investment can be scrutinised at any point in the future.

Large investments Strategically important businesses and overseas investments come in many different shapes and sizes, and some investments may be worth more than $100 million. Overseas investments of more than $100 million are automatically classed as significant business assets and need consent under the Overseas Investment Act. Overseas investments of this size in strategically important businesses or involving a foreign government investor also require a mandatory national interest assessment.

Get in touch This is a complex area of law and we do recommend seeking expert legal advice. More information on the NSPO regime and how to make a notification, as well as other aspects of the Overseas Investment Act is available on the OIO website. Our team is also available to answer questions about whether a proposed investment falls within the NSPO regime.

We recommend contacting us before making a notification so we can help to clarify the information we need and make the process smoother and faster.

You can get in touch via our website: www.linz.govt.nz Toitū Te Whenua Land Information New Zealand’s Overseas Investment Office is responsible for regulating overseas investment into New Zealand.

The OIO manages the process for receiving and assessing applications and notifications from overseas investors, supporting the Ministers who make decisions on applications, and making some decisions under delegated authority.

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New Zealanders among 2022 IFSEC Global Security Influencers Last year’s record showing of six New Zealanders in the IFSEC Global Influencers in Security and Fire has been followed up with three Kiwi influencers in the 2022 edition of the prestigious award programme.

IFSEC Global Influencers seeks to recognise ‘influencers’ in security from around the world; individuals who have played a key role in driving technological innovation, changing regulation, standards or best practice, achieving success for their organisations, shaping important debates, or raising the profile of the security industry.

Nominations were judged by an international panel of two dozen judges across six security categories, including: Security executives; Security end users; Security; Security thought leaders; Security ‘One to watch’; and Cyber security professionals. New Zealanders featuring among the influencers included:

New Zealand Security Association, ISC2 and ASIS International, and contributes thought leadership pieces for industry online and print publications. He is a past ASIS International Chapter 148 Chairperson and the 2018 New Zealand Security Consultant of the Year.

Andrew has demonstrable experience in local and central government critical national infrastructure projects and is currently working on establishing local, but globally supported, industry leadership and governance awards. He is continuing to drive for the development of culturally aligned sector training for indigenous people.

Andrew Thorburn, Enterprise, Security & Risk Manager, Atlas Gentech NZ 7th Place: Association Figures/ Academics/Thought Leaders Andrew is a highly experienced and commercially astute protective security and organisational development consultant with a career that spans both the private and public sectors. He brings over 25 years of security technology and staff services strategy and implementation experience to colleagues and end user clients.

Andrew regularly contributes to the profession through voluntary sector leadership, development and delivery of subject matter to special interest groups, such as

Jennie Vickers, Founder, Zeopard Security 14th Place: Association Figures/ Academics/Thought Leaders Jennie is very proud to have been the Inaugural IFSEC Global Security Influencer of the year 2021-22, with further Awards in 2021/2022 including as co-winner of the 2021 New Zealand Security Sector Network (NZSSN) Women in Security Awards Aotearoa (WiSAA) ‘Thought Leader’ category, and as a finalist in the inaugural 2022 New Zealand OSPAs (Outstanding Female Security Professional Category).

Jennie has been using her position of influence this past year to connect people and Enterprise/

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Government, to secure better security outcomes for others across defence and security. Jennie describes her expertise as connecting people, building relationships, influencing, problem solving and supporting better business outcomes.

For the last 12 months Jennie has been full time consulting to Fortinet in New Zealand, while previously she was CEO of the New Zealand Defence Industry Association.

Antoinette Murray, Cyber Security Advisor, New Zealand Parliamentary Service 17th Place: Cybersecurity Professionals Antoinette has a Masters in Psychology and a background working in New Zealand’s Intelligence Community. She currently works for Parliamentary Service as the Cyber Security Advisor, responsible for building a cyber security education and awareness programme, managing the certification and accreditation process of Parliamentary systems, and increasing the understanding and cyber security maturity of Parliamentary staff.

Outside of her role, she has contributed to the wider security sector by founding and Chairing the Government Cyber Security Messaging group; Co-Chairing the Government Security Information Exchange; and Chairing the NZ Internet Task Force Mentoring Working Group.

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HOMELAND SECURITY

Ram-raids highlight the peculiar relationship between inflation and theft Amid historically high inflation rates, Scott La Franchie writes that academic research points to a positive correlation between inflation and the incidence of property crime: as inflation increases, so too does theft.

Scott La Franchie, General Manager – Marketing and Product at FIRST Security.

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Inflation is often characterised as the ‘invisible thief ’ due to the fact that high inflation rates result in devaluing people’s savings. If a $50 bag of groceries is now costing you $55 at the checkout thanks to inflation, it can feel like someone’s just picked $5 from your pocket.

That feeling of being ‘robbed’ has felt pretty raw among New Zealand’s motorists, who’ve been suffering eye-watering price hikes in recent months at the pump. But while that feeling of being short-changed may be well justified, according to a range of research there exists a far more substantive correlation between inflation and theft.

While we’re talking fuel prices, it’s interesting that the MTA noted a couple of years back that service station fuel thefts were rising in New Zealand along with the price of petrol and diesel. “When fuel prices started rising in late 2017,” stated the MTA, “so too did the number of drive-offs.”

In a news article published recently, the ABC in the US similarly noted that ”as gas prices continue to rise, so have reports about gas theft, either through stolen credit cards, or straight out of the tank.”

But what about inflation beyond the pump?

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Research identifies inflation as crime driver Traditional wisdom indicates that during financial crises, unemployment surges, falling wages and other economic stressors lead to spikes in shoplifting and theft.

A recent Bloomberg report is a case in point, stating that the “last time consumers were under severe strain — in the wake of the 2007 financial crisis, amid rampant job losses and spikes in prices for food and fuel — shoplifting surged.”

But according to Brent Orrell, a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, it’s inflation to blame, not unemployment or falling wages, for increases in thefts and other crimes.

In an piece published last October, Orrell wrote that traditional views on the relationship between economic downturn and crime didn’t hold up during the Global Financial Crisis-induced recession of 2008-10. “Even though unemployment soared, real wages Line of Defence

fell, and consumer sentiment hit record lows, the FBI’s 2009 Uniform Crime Report showed declines in both violent and property crime.”

Orrell cites the work of University of Missouri-St Louis Emeritus Professor Richard Rosenfel, who found that in the case of both the Great Depression of the 1930s and the recession of 2008-10, an increase in unemployment and a drop in crime rates occurred in the context of deflation. In other words, during the 2008-10 recession, there wasn’t any inflation – and no increase in crime despite the tough economic times.

It’s important to note that these two economic downturns are by no means historical outliers as manifestations of the correlation between inflation and theft.

Researchers have also noted a pattern of statistical increases in crime during historical periods of rising inflation, adding further weight to the argument that inflation – as opposed to other economic stressors

– is the key link between the state of the economy and crime.

Other research supports this argument. In a 1981 dissertation titled Inflation and Incidence of Crime in the United States, S.Chungviwatanant studied the correlation of four types of crime and Consumer Price Indexes (CPIs) from 1960 to 1978. The results demonstrated that with trends in inflation moving towards annual increases of 4.5 percent (5.1 percent for food), “trends in the seven specific crimes were also moving toward increases, with an average yearly increase of 3.4 percent for murder, 6.8 percent for aggravated assault, 6 percent for burglary, 5.7 percent for larceny, and 5.9 percent for auto-theft”.

Orrell similarly notes that “in the 1970s, when inflation and unemployment took hold at the same time—the era of “stagflation”—crime rates rose. Inflation, not general economic hardship, appeared to be the culprit behind rising crime.”

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HOMELAND SECURITY Inflation creates a market for stolen goods So, what’s the theoretical explanation for why inflation leads to crime? And why does it matter in the context of present-day New Zealand?

“As prices rise, consumers tend to “trade down,” or substitute cheaper goods and services,” explains Orrell.

“But for individuals who were already buying the cheapest goods (for example, shopping at discount outlets), the market in “hot” goods may be the only place where they can find what they need at prices they can afford.” According to the theory, this demand for cut-price stolen goods incentivises thieves to create supply.

“The theory plays out in a study published in 2007 by the journal Global Crime, which examined the relationship between crime and inflation and unemployment in the United States from 1960 to 2005.

“Crime rates rise as the inflation rate rises,” wrote the authors. “Because of the lag between price and wage adjustments, inflation lowers the real income of low-skilled labour, but rewards property criminals due to the rising demand and subsequent high profits in the illegal market.”

This is further borne out by Professor Richard Rosenfel’s 2019 paper “Crime and Inflation in U.S. Cities”, which found that inflation increases property crime rates, such as theft, in less affluent cities more so than in well-off ones.

Keeping inflation in New Zealand in check In the case of New Zealand, we’ve largely avoided inflation hikes of over five percent since the early 1990s. Along with historically low inflation, New Zealand’s crime rates have generally kept to a downward trend since the mid-1990s. According to the Ministry of Justice’s Youth Justice Indicators Summary Report – December 2021, for example, offending rates among youth have dropped by 63 percent over the past decade.

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But with the recent nationwide spate of ram-raid attacks on retail businesses and New Zealand Police Victimisation Time and Place data indicating increases in crime rates from pre-COVID levels, that all seems to have changed.

This recent increase in the incidence of property crime has coincided with an annual inflation rate that’s just hit a three-decade high of 5.9 percent.

According to the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), transient – or short-term – inflation can be caused by “a rise in the prices of imported commodities, such as oil”, and structural inflation results from “widespread shortages of labour and materials.” Now, it appears, we may be dealing with both, which has given rise to pronouncements in the media that we are experiencing a ‘cost of living crisis’.

If we accept the premise that inflation decreases people’s spending power and increases demand for stolen goods, then we can observe the synchronicity of the ram-raid spike and New Zealand’s historically high inflation rate as no mere coincidence. It’s the logical (and perhaps predictable) result of a calculation by organised criminals that increased demand for their loot means increased reward.

Against this background, it’s worth noting Auror CEO Phil

Thomson’s comment that most of the ram-raids were methodically planned attacks as opposed to opportunistic incidents. “The majority of what we’re seeing is coming from organised and repeat offenders,” he told Radio New Zealand. “They will move from shop to shop stealing and then sell those goods online or in marketplaces.”

Many are blaming the spate of thefts on law enforcement resourcing gaps, the police pursuit policy, the justice system’s approach to juvenile offending, social issues, and a government apparently ‘soft’ on gangs and crime. These may be part of the mix, but they are not the driver.

Ultimately, according to the academic research, inflation truly is an ‘invisible thief ’. By lowering the real incomes of those already struggling to make ends meet, inflation results in an increase in the demand for stolen goods, and in doing to it creates an economic environment that motivates thieves.

Looking ahead, if the RBNZ is again unable to prevent annual CPI from increasing substantially beyond the 1-3 percent stipulated by its current Policy Targets Agreement (PTA), then the research tells us that we can expect to see a rise in the incidence of theft and other property crimes.

Here’s hoping we manage to keep a lid on those prices!

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Tourism Security: Protecting visitors, protecting ‘Brand New Zealand’ New Zealand’s border is opening and the tourism sector is awakening from a two-year hiatus. With the opportunities comes with the challenge of ensuring that tourist security is up to the mark, writes Nicholas Dynon.

Nicholas Dynon is chief editor of Line of Defence, and a widely published commentator on New Zealand’s defence, national security and private security sectors.

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Decisions by Cabinet to allow all fully vaccinated travellers from Australia from 12 April, and visawaiver countries from 1 May without needing to self-isolate – and the scrapping of pre-departure tests from 20 June – have paved the way for the return of international tourism.

Although great news for the New Zealand economy and for the many businesses dependent on that sector, government ministers conceded that we shouldn’t be bracing ourselves for a sudden influx of tourists. A recent study by money.co.uk listed New Zealand’s post-Covid tourism recovery as the world’s 12th slowest.

Transport Minister Michael Wood announced in March that the Government had agreed to an additional $250 million to support flights from 1 April 2022 to 31 March 2023 under the Maintaining International Air Connectivity (MIAC) scheme.

“Even now as we look forward to welcoming overseas visitors back to our shores, the number of passenger flights into New Zealand is only a quarter of pre-COVID levels, and many of those planes still carry few passengers,” he said.

It’s a point echoed by Tourism Minister Stuart Nash in his 25 March speech to the Otago University Tourism Policy School.

With some countries’ borders

remaining closed and travel costs elevated, we “know that the impact of COVID-19 will continue to be felt, and international visitors from some big markets are not likely to return in large numbers straight away,” he stated.

“It’s now more important than ever that we focus on tourism’s ability to inspire and change lives as a key part of our world-leading brand,” he continued. “To attract these visitors, we will need to make a concerted effort to live our brand.”

Post-COVID tourism is shaping up to be more competitive than prior to the pandemic, with travellers thinking harder than ever about where to spend their money.

According to Mr Nash, if we don’t ‘live the brand’, “no amount of crazy scenery and breath-taking experiences will lift us above many other destinations around the world.”

Traditionally safe destination While the New Zealand brand is all about beautiful scenery and all things ‘pure’, it’s also informed by Aotearoa’s ranking as one of the safest countries on the planet.

According to the recently published 2021 Global Peace Index (GPI), New Zealand is the second safest country in the world, and the safest in the Asia-Pacific region.

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HOMELAND SECURITY The GPI uses 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators, and measures the state of peace across three domains: the level of Societal Safety and Security; the extent of Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict; and the degree of Militarisation. By comparison, Australia currently sits in 16th place.

In terms of the index’s Societal Safety and Security domain, which is the domain that covers crime, New Zealand ranks a very respectable 11th – and still above Australia at 17th. But of the GPI’s three domains, it’s our worst performing one.

And the statistics are telling us that property crimes are on the increase. According to a 8th March Stuff article, data released by police “showed within the first 11 months of 2021, dairy and convenience store theft was up 30 per cent on 2020 figures, and burglaries were up nearly 20 per cent.”

In other words, 1,402 more thefts were reported in New Zealand in 2021 than the year before. Auckland was the worst-hit region, with retail offences rising 25.8 percent, with Waikato’s rising by 19.7 percent and Christchurch by 14.2 percent.

Tourists vulnerable to crime According to a report by the European Forum for Urban Security, there is an “unwelcome but close relationship” between tourism and crime. “Although there are very few studies on this topic, research has shown that tourists are particularly at risk of suffering crime.”

A 2019 article in Security & Defence Quarterly titled “The impact of crime on security in tourism” provides some insights into why this might be the case.

“Separated in an unknown environment from various forms of social support and protection which they have at home, and from a network of family and friends who can help them, tourists can easily become crime victims,” state the 46

to have a lower risk perception, as are tourists who are wealthier and more educated. Older tourists are more likely than younger tourists to be concerned about personal security.

article’s authors Hrvoje Mataković and Ivana Cunjak Mataković.

Tourists tend to be ‘lucrative targets’ as they often carry largerthen-usual amounts of money, credit cards, and attractive belongings that can be readily resold. Tourists can also be more careless than usual for the simple fact that they are on vacation, and they can be more inclined to engage in risk-taking behaviour compared to when they’re at home.

Impact of crime on tourism The effects of crime on tourists, observed Hrvoje and Ivana Cunjak Mataković, differ according to (i) the type of crime in question and (ii) individual tourist perceptions of crime, safety and risk: 1. Type of crime: Violent crime, including robbery, assaults, rapes or killings have much more negative effects on tourists than property crime, especially if stolen goods are of smaller value. There is no difference in the likelihood of revisiting the destination where the theft occurred, among those who personally experienced theft as well as those who know someone who experienced theft on a journey.

2. Perceptions of safety and risk: studies have found that tourists with more extensive international travel experience are more likely

Interestingly, the article authors found that although property crime victimisation will not necessarily impact on a tourist’s inclination to return to a destination, the media can sway opinions. Intensive mass media coverage of security incidents contributes to the decline of tourist visits to affected destinations, and thus the media “has the potential to make or break a destination.”

Ultimately, they conclude that there is strong evidence that crime can have a very negative impact on tourism, that security in tourism cannot be “taken for granted”, and that therefore “it is necessary to make significant efforts (both financial and organisational) to ensure a safe environment for tourists.”

These include designing and implementing measures aimed at reducing the opportunities for emergence of crime and tourist victimisation, and enable assistance to victims when crimes are committed.

As New Zealand’s tourism sector emerges battered from the existential struggles of Covid-19, it is faced with several risks: from the slow pace of recovery to the challenge of securing adequate numbers of skilled staff. In this mix are the very real risks posed by the potential of rising criminality due to the increasing costs of living and other post-Covid uncertainties.

Tourists are low hanging fruit for opportunistic criminals. If an increase in crimes against tourists was to materialise to the extent that it drew the attention of the news media, it could present a bruising blow to ‘Brand New Zealand’ and the many tourism operators that rely on its good name.

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