DEFENCE
Hard budget choices ahead if New Zealand to be a force for stability Uncertain times require defence spending to be maintained at the NATO two percent standard, writes Dr Wayne Mapp. What would be the priorities, and could they be afforded within a two percent of GDP defence budget?
Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO was New Zealand’s Minister of Defence and Minister of Science and Innovation from 2008 to 2011.
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Just six months ago, I was arguing that it would be sufficient for New Zealand to maintain defence spending at 1.5 percent of GDP, which was essentially the level of defence spending for the last 20 years. The accounting change in 2018, which shifted the calculation of New Zealand’s defence spending onto the NATO measure, did not actually increase defence spending, it was simply an accounting exercise. Nevertheless, it was an important change because it provided a proper comparison to New Zealand’s partners, rather than shortchanging New Zealand’s true defence expenditure. Since then, the Ukraine war has occurred and with it, the unparalleled unity of the West. Finland and Sweden have abandoned their neutral stance that has prevailed since the end of World War Two, and in Sweden’s case, for much longer. Both nations see the importance of being within the umbrella of collective defence. The war has also provided the impetus for increased defence spending among western nations. The utility test of having enough for the general security environment of the last twenty years, and beyond that, being little more than a tripwire
is not sufficient. Defence spending must provide real resilience. Help might be many months away. In our own region, China is aggressively pursuing a deeper relationship with ten Pacific nations. China’s aspirations go beyond economic issues. In the case of The Solomons, China is seeking a security relationship as well. Two of the ten nations, the Cook Islands and Niue, are actually part of the realm of New Zealand, with New Zealand being responsible for security and defence. New Zealand, along with Australia, will have to act deftly. Increasing New Zealand’s defensive capability in maritime security and working more fulsomely with the Pacific States, especially through the Pacific Forum, has assumed a new importance. Even during the period of the so called “benign strategic environment” it was clear that the multiple deployments of East Timor, The Solomons and Afghanistan severely stretched the New Zealand Defence Force. At the peak, when all three deployments were occurring simultaneously, it was not actually sustainable, certainly not for the Battalion Group in East Timor. We should draw a lesson from the last twenty years, then add on the Line of Defence
