Line of Defence Magazine - Spring 2023

Line of Defence

Issue 29 Spring 2023

New Zealand’s Defence and National Security Magazine

Watts: Future Force Design Principles and the next generation RNZN fleet.

Planning for complex hybrid operations in the South West Pacific.

Mapp: Big defence spending decisions on the horizon for new govt.

www.defsec.net.nz

EDITOR’S NOTE Kia ora and welcome to the Spring 2023 issue of Line of Defence Magazine!

Thank you for your patience with this 29th issue of Line of Defence. We were hoping by now that the dust may have settled on October’s election, but that’s MMP! Nevertheless, editor-at-large Dr Peter Greener and senior contributor Dr Wayne Mapp press on with some excellent analysis of defence policy possibilities in the post-election landscape.

Even at “the most reasonably affordable standard”, highlights Peter, an almost total replacement of naval ships, new maritime helicopters, replacement of strategic air mobility, and a new primary combat vehicle is a big shopping list. And while Wayne indeed agrees with the length of that list, he suggests that the new government has a little time – but not too much – to make clear-eyed purchasing decisions.

We’re honoured to again have Andrew Watts writing for Line of Defence. In this issue, Andy considers the Future Force Design Principles 2023 through the lens of capability modularity. Does a modular approach present the most cost effective means for acquiring capability for the full spectrum of potential NZDF missions?

This issue sees Ben Morgan join our panel of expert contributors. Identifying Melanesia is a potential setting for future hybrid conflict, Ben writes that wargames may be a cost-effective way to simulate integration of civil and military information operations in the region.

In International Security, Dr Awni Etaywe explores the complex geopolitical and ideological dynamics in Gaza, referring to the current Israeli military offensive as an act of ‘geno-urbicide’. We also feature editor Dr Rogier Creemers’ thoughts on the just-published The Emergence of China’s Smart State, a book that seeks to understand China’s ramped-up digital ambitions.

On the theme of books, we also take a look at the recently published State of Threat, edited by the Massey University Centre for Defence and Security Studies’ Dr William Hoverd and Deidre Ann McDonald. In this latest addition to New Zealand security literature, local and international academics and sector experts discuss the issues facing New Zealand across defence, diplomacy, intelligence, policy, trade, biosecurity and border management.

If you haven’t already, consider subscribing to our eNewsletter THE BRIEF. And lastly, don’t forget to nominate a well-deserving colleague for the Women in Security Awards Aotearoa 2023. Details inside!

Nicholas Dynon, Auckland.

CONTRIBUTORS & QUOTED Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO Jude Rushmere General Atomics Dr Awni Etaywe Assoc Prof William Hoverd Prof Alexander Gillespie

CAPT Andrew Watts RNZNR Dr Peter Greener Ben Morgan Asst Prof Rogier Creemers Fortinet Nicholas Dynon

SPONSORS & PARTNERS

General Atomics Aeronautical Centre for Defence and Security Studies ASIS International New Zealand Chapter Massey University Security Exhibition & Conference Fortinet Nova Systems

COVER IMAGE

UPCOMING ISSUE

SUMMER – December 2023 Main themes: Space; Information Domain; Women in Security Related events: INDO PACIFIC 2023

INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS

CONTACT DETAILS

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Chief Editor: Nicholas Dynon M: +64 (0)22 366 3691 E: nick@defsec.net.nz

Publisher: Craig Flint T: +64 (0) 274 597 621 E: craig@defsec.net.nz

Postal and delivery address: 27 West Cresent, Te Puru 3575, Thames RD5, New Zealand Social Media: www.linkedin.com/company/defsec-media-limited www.facebook.com/defsecmedia/ www.twitter.com/DefsecNZ

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CONTENTS

ISSN 2463-6258 (Online)

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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Future Force Design Principles and the Next Generation RNZN Fleet Babcock’s Arrowhead suppliers’ day a success with SMEs in Nova Systems advancing Test & Evaluation (T&E) through Digital Innovation New Zealand Defence Policy and Capability – A Rejoinder Revolutionary Trentham clothing store enhances NZDF operational readiness General Atomics Aeronautical Leverages Additive Manufacturing for Product Line of UAS Sentinel Boats a “game-changer” for Royal New Zealand Navy The National Party’s newly proposed policy intent for Defence Big defence spending decisions on the horizon for new government Civil-Military Wargames: Planning for highcomplexity hybrid operations in the South-West Pacific C-130J-30 simulator build begins, as does plans for Unimog replacement Women in Security Awards Aotearoa return for 2023 As new Air Force Chief begins role, new leaders appointed

AEROSPACE

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New Zealand resumes Sinai peacekeeping force leadership Breaking the Code: Understanding the linguistics of geno-urbicide in Gaza The Emergence of China’s Smart State Who cares in peacebuilding? Universities call for action to improve support for carers

HOMELAND SECURITY

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State of Threat: he challenges to Aotearoa New Zealand’s national security National Security Strategy highlights cybersecurity as a core national security issue Allied Universal releases World Security Report 2023 iSANZ Awards unveils finalists for 2023 Another day, another roadblock: how should NZ law deal with disruptive climate protests?

Defsec Media Limited publishes Line of Defence, FireNZ Magazine and New Zealand Security Magazine premier publications covering industry sectors that help keep Kiwis safe. Find us online www.defsec.net.nz Copyright: No article or part thereof may be reproduced without prior consent of the publisher.

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Government backing Canterbury’s future in aerospace industry Dawn Aerospace delivers hardware to deep space mining customer

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Disclaimer: The information contained in this publication is given in good faith and has been derived from sources believed to be reliable and accurate. However, neither the publishers nor any person involved in the preparation of this publication accept any form of liability whatsoever for its contents including advertisements, editorials, opinions, advice or information or for any consequences from its use.

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Future Force Design Principles and the Next Generation RNZN Fleet Andy Watts considers the Future Force Design Principles 2023 through the lens of capability modularity. Does a modular approach present the most cost effective means for acquiring capability for the full spectrum of potential missions?

In an over three-decade career in the RNZN, Andrew Watts commanded HMNZ Ships Pukaki, Wellington, Resolution and Te Mana, and served as Director, Capability Development and Programme Director Network Enabled Capability, and Captain, Fleet Personnel & Training.

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This is the sixth instalment in a series of articles in which I have discussed options for the regeneration of naval capability in light of the reality that every ship in the current fleet (with the exception of HMNZS Aotearoa) reaches the end of its forecast life in the early to mid-2030s. This article re-examines the thinking embodied in those earlier articles in the light of the updated policy settings outlined in the Defence Policy and Strategic Statement 2023 and the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) Future Force Design Principles 2023.

I hold strongly to the premise that I first developed in a paper published in the Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy in 2020 – that block obsolescence of the current fleet gives us an opportunity to set in place an affordable naval fleet that delivers on enduring government policy objectives, provided we consider and exploit the technological and doctrinal possibilities of modularity, open computing architectures, and autonomous systems. Fleet design along these lines is absolutely consistent with the Future Force Design Principles (FFDP).

To recap, capability modularity involves the adoption of platforms that can be fitted with removable self-contained capability modules

tailored to specific types of operation. The number of platforms acquired can be determined by the number of operations of all types that a given fleet is expected to undertake at any one time, allowing for maintenance and respite. The number and type of capability modules acquired is dependent on the number and type of missions that the fleet is expected to undertake concurrently.

Fixed Principles Systems Approach. The first of the three fixed future force design principles is that force design will be based on a systems approach: Ensuring that all components of capability are considered, that future systems are integrated, and that industry is engaged earlier in planning and design. The NZ Defence components of capability are people; research and development; infrastructure; concepts, doctrine and collective training; information technology infrastructure; and equipment, supplies and services.

Each of these is addressed below: People. Prolonged separation from family and friends is often cited by naval people as a disincentive to remaining in the service. If supported by imaginative human Line of Defence

A BAE Systems Adaptable Strike Frigate. Image: BAE Systems.

resource management practices, modularity could allow personnel tempo to be more effectively managed by only requiring those people needed to operate and maintain the modules required for a particular operation to be deployed.

It would also allow mission module specialists to train using innovative simulation techniques when not deployed, reducing skill fade – a major impediment to combat effectiveness. If not required to deploy when their module is not required, people are more likely to be available for professional and personal development education and training – maintaining throughput for these critical career stages is one of the most difficult challenges for naval HR managers, and lack of opportunities to undertake such training and education is another significant dissatisfier.

However, a means would need to be found to address the personnel tempo demands made on people assigned to platforms as opposed to modules, possibly through the rotational crewing concepts that the Royal Navy has adopted with some success.

Research and Development. If mission and platform systems are

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de-coupled, applying the fruits of R&D programmes to both is much simplified. If a New Zealand start up were to produce an innovative autonomous vehicle, for example, the vehicle and its supporting systems could be integrated and tested as a module before rapid installation in the modular ship. Interestingly, the proposed UK modular capability system, PODS, could include a module specifically designed to allow the in situ development of innovative modular capability.

Infrastructure. If mission systems were based on modules that could be installed or removed using shipboard systems such as the SH Defence Cube, ships could be re-rolled by module replacement wherever a secure alongside berth was available.

Concepts, doctrine, and collective training. In previous articles and papers I have discussed the intersection between modularity and emerging maritime doctrine based on Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO).

To re-cap, the naval forces of the liberal democracies are facing significant numerical overmatch in relation to potential adversaries because the cost of modern multi-

function surface combatants has reached a level where even the United States can no longer afford to acquire a numerically sufficient force of highend destroyers and frigates. DMO therefore spreads the combat power of a naval force over both high-end combatants and less capable but fully networked crewed and autonomous platforms optimised for specific functions – primarily long-range strike and anti-surface warfare.

Specialisation reduces cost, enabling larger numbers to be acquired than would otherwise be affordable. The greater the number of platforms in a given force, the greater the aggressor’s targeting problem, and thus the greater the likelihood that sufficient platforms will survive an aggressor’s pre-emptive strike to impose an unacceptable cost in retaliatory strikes. DMO thus increases the deterrent effect of naval surface forces.

A modular New Zealand combatant equipped with capability modules appropriate to a given contingency would therefore be a credible contribution to operations with our partners in support of the international rule of law. I would argue that a modular contribution would be more credible than a traditional multi-function combatant, because available investment can be channelled 5

DEFENCE into meaningful specialised capability modules as opposed to having to be spread over a number of mediocre permanently fitted systems in the name of nominal multi-function capability.

Information technology infrastructure. Modularity is largely neutral in relation to the technical means whereby data is exchanged.

However, a modular platform could embark IT modules that could greatly enhance command and control for deployed operations by providing Commanders with scalable decision support capability and

enhanced connectivity. A traditional multi-mission combatant has severe limitations in that regard.

Equipment, supplies, and services.

Capability modules can be maintained as discrete entities without affecting the availability of platforms for other missions. This is one of the primary advantages of modularity – obsolescence can be managed without taking whole platforms out of service for lengthy and technically and financially risky half-life refits.

Our experience with the Anzac class Frigate Systems Upgrade program is germane, as is the experience of other navies with similar programs.

Kaitiakitanga. Defence will be guided by Kaitiakitanga (guardianship) in responding, adapting, mitigating, and engaging in response to the climate crisis. It is impossible to foretell the exact ways in which the climate crisis will require Defence to react in future.

However, most forecasts anticipate an increase in natural disasters within our region and in Aotearoa/ New Zealand itself.

A modular fleet able to be rapidly re-rolled for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is much more likely to be able to respond with meaningful capability at short notice than the current fleet, or a future fleet based on specialised non-modular combat and patrol platforms.

In addition, it is possible that scientific monitoring programs measuring the impact of climate change may need to be enhanced.

Maritime scientific equipment lends itself to modularity; a modular fleet is more likely to be available to provide meaningful support than a specialised fleet.

People. People are the Defence Force’s most important capability.

A highly professional, well trained, and skilled workforce is critical to achieve defence policy objectives. As outlined above under components of capability, modularity could allow new, imaginative human resource management models that improve the quality of life and professional and personal development opportunities for our most important capability.

Sliding Principles In addition to the three fixed future force design principles, there are eight sliding principles. To consider the sliding principles: Combat Capability. The extent to which the Defence Force is designed to deliver in different levels of conflict intensity and duration.

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The Defence Force will be able to deploy in a range of situations, from non-combat operations to conflict zones, and be able to regenerate. I respectfully take issue with the “medium” setting for this principle.

The Defence Policy and Strategic Statement unambiguously highlights current and emerging threats to the international rule of law and to the security of Aotearoa/New Zealand.

Our strategic environment is no longer benign, and whether we like it or not, we need meaningful combat capabilities to deal with this reality.

To my mind, a setting of medium is inconsistent with our circumstances.

Deterrence is not mentioned in either the Defence Policy and Strategic Statement or the FFDP. Again respectfully, to me this is an oversight. The main purpose of capable defence forces is not to fight wars, but to deter them.

Our world is made up of a number of interconnecting geopolitical networks based in the main on shared values and common interests. Regrettably, the main nexus of one such network, China, has adopted policies that are in many ways inimical to the interests and values of the network to which Aotearoa/New Zealand belongs.

I do not suggest for an instant that the independent foreign policy valued by so many of our people be abandoned, or that we slavishly hitch our wagon to that of any particular antagonist in the geopolitical conflict with which we are now faced. Nonetheless, a critical component of the collective security efforts of the network to which we belong is the maintenance of forces that affect a potential aggressor’s calculations in such a way that the cost of aggression is self-evidently disproportionate in relation to the likely benefits.

Aotearoa/New Zealand is a direct beneficiary of the deterrent calculus, and until humanity finds a way to order its affairs such that the Line of Defence

risk of armed conflict is permanently eliminated, I would argue that we have a responsibility to contribute to it.

Modularity offers a way to contribute to the deterrent calculus calibrated to the perceived needs of a given situation and Aoteraroa/ New Zealand’s independent foreign policy.

In the event of heightened tension in a region important to us and our friends, a modular combatant could be deployed initially with capabilities that signalled resolve without undue provocation, such as ISR and expeditionary reconnaissance modules. If the situation were to escalate and our government were to determine that a more substantive combat role was appropriate, modules with surface strike capability could be deployed to a forward port for installation in the deployed platform.

More generally, modularity separates platform and mission systems in a way that allows government far more capability choice, both in initial acquisition and in subsequent through life adaptation to changes in strategic circumstances and capability needs.

Modularity therefore allows the setting on the combat capability sliding scale to be altered far more easily than with traditional fleet concepts.

Concurrency. The extent to which the Defence Force can undertake activities in multiple locations simultaneously.

The Defence Force will be called to respond to more events in the future, and will increase its ability to undertake a range of activities at the same time. The sliding scale for concurrency is set towards the high end, reflecting justifiable concern that future contingencies are likely to be multi-facetted, requiring simultaneous combat readiness and humanitarian assistance capability

(for example). The flexibility of a modular force of common platforms is far more suited to dealing with concurrent contingencies than a force consisting of specialised platforms.

Resilience. The extent to which Defence is prepared for shocks. The Defence Force will develop more resilience, including being able to maintain defence capability during times when supply chains are fragile and networks (including digital) are disrupted. By standardising on systems across a fleet of largely common platforms, modularity increases resilience by reducing the number of supply chains that have to be maintained.

Flexibility. The extent to which Defence can respond to a range of circumstances, covering both organisational and capability flexibility. The advantages of modularity in relation to the flexibility principle are much greater than a traditional fleet mix of specialised platforms.

Scalability. The extent to which the Defence Force is able to rapidly expand if required. It will improve its ability to rapidly expand or reduce its capabilities, and structures, allowing it to adapt to future changes in the strategic environment. Scalability is another principle that is much more easily applied to a modular fleet of common platforms than to a fleet of specialised platforms in which mission systems are tightly coupled to platform systems. Should strategic circumstances change, modules suited to new and emergent threats could be acquired.

Partnered. The extent to which the Defence Force is capable of acting independently or in partnership.

Defence will maintain its level of partnership including its ability to lead operations in the region. It will continue to partner with other 7

DEFENCE government and non-governmental agencies, New Zealand’s ally Australia, Pacific partners, other security partners, and industry.

A modular fleet could be dynamically tailored to suit the needs of particular operations being carried out in conjunction with other forces and agencies.

Modularity also offers the prospect of greater partnering with New Zealand industry and research institutions. Innovative capability could be developed and fielded as new modules, promoting indigenous solutions to capability problems.

Technological Approach. The extent to which the Defence Force pursues leading edge technologies to support systems and capabilities. The Defence Force will seek opportunities to adopt technologies earlier in their lifecycle once proven, and in line with what our partners are doing. Defence will not seek to be at the leading edge.

Technology insertion is much easier to accomplish with a modular approach. Technology can be developed and tested within the module without disrupting host platform availability. Partner nations are rapidly developing modular technology, particularly for autonomous systems, making it likely that there will be a wide arc of choice in selecting modules for emergent functions.

System Complexity. The extent to which the Defence Force acquires capabilities that are simple to operate, repair, and maintain.

The force will seek lower system complexity, including acquiring off-the-shelf instead of bespoke military capabilities where possible.

Some systems will be proprietary, but generally simpler systems will be sought. The simplicity inherent in modular architectures is consistent with this principle, noting that simplicity and sophistication are not mutually exclusive concepts.

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The counter argument The advantages conferred by modularity have been formally recognised by a number of our partner navies, most notably the Royal Navy with the recently published Maritime Operating Concept and Maritime Modularity Concept documents. It is becoming increasingly rare for any naval product to be marketed without some reference to the extent to which it is compatible with modularity, even if such benefits are somewhat difficult to identify.

It can be said with confidence that modular concepts are taking hold and will shape the naval fleets of the future. However, there is as yet no platform that fully embodies modularity in detailed design or production. Any approach to the adoption of modularity must be tempered by this reality.

Naval engineers and logisticians rightly maintain that “parent navy” responsibility for a platform unique to our navy is a thing to be avoided if at all possible. This means that any exploration of modular potential should be carried out in partnership with other navies with like requirements. The UK is an obvious choice given the Type 32 program which is likely to be

highly modular, but so is Australia given the emergence of the “Tier 2” combatant requirement outlined in the Australian Defence Strategic Review. Tri-lateral exploration of this possibility seems clearly indicated.

A final word I have consistently advocated for the investigation of a modular approach to next generation fleet design, as I believe that it is the only way in which naval capability effective across the full spectrum of potential missions can be acquired within reasonable cost bounds. However, this position, like any other bearing on defence investment choices, must be tested to destruction. It must be tested alongside non-modular and lessmodular capability options to determine if the benefits outlined above can in fact be realised within acceptable cost and risk bounds.

We have highly capable people within the capability divisions of the Ministry of Defence and the NZDF, but establishing an evidence-based way ahead will require that they have the resources needed to consider these matters in the necessary depth. I hope these resources will be forthcoming.

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Babcock’s Arrowhead suppliers’ day a success with SMEs Following a successful suppliers’ day held in New Zealand for potential future Arrowhead suppliers, Babcock confirms it will formally present its Arrowhead platform as the future solution to the RNZN.

In response to the New Zealand Ministry of Defence’s industry engagement request to replace the current naval fleet, Babcock Australasia held a suppliers’ day for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in New Zealand aspiring to undertake work to support the delivery of company’s Arrowhead solution.

Babcock Australasia confirmed that it will formally present its proven Arrowhead platform as the future solution for the Royal New Zealand Navy.

Attended by more than 65 suppliers, the event was aimed at increasing awareness of Babcock’s design, build and support offering, and engaging local SMEs to understand how they can play a part in delivering this solution to the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN).

Babcock has a strong marine defence presence in Aotearoa New Zealand. The company is currently contracted to operate the country’s largest marine engineering and maintenance support facility in Devonport, Auckland.

“Our local suppliers are critical to supporting the services we proudly provide the Royal New Zealand Navy, and they will be integral to supporting the country’s future naval fleet,” said Babcock Australasia Managing Director Marine Simon Spratt.

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“Babcock’s Arrowhead offering is a capable, adaptable and cost-effective modern ship that is operationally proficient in both blue water and littoral areas and would deliver significant multi-mission capability to the Royal New Zealand Navy, meeting its requirements both now and in the future.

“Now more than ever, what we do matters: creating a safe and secure world, together.”

Babcock’s Arrowhead would provide support for a range of RNZN functions including combat, search and rescue, humanitarian and disaster relief capability.

At Rosyth, Scotland, Babcock is well underway with the design and build programme that will deliver five Type 31 Frigates for the UK Royal Navy, based on its Arrowhead 140 (AH140) platform.

In 2021, Babcock secured its first export contract for the AH140 through a licence agreement with PT PAL Indonesia, with the first keel, of the two-ship programme for the Indonesian Navy, laid this year.

Babcock’s AH140 frigate has also been selected by the PGZ-MIECZNIK Consortium as the baseline platform design for Poland’s Miecznik frigates with steel cut on the first of three frigates for the Polish Navy in August 2023.

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Nova Systems advancing Test & Evaluation (T&E) through Digital Innovation A new approach to Test & Evaluation is required to evolve from a siloed platform focus to a joint and system-of-systems focus supported by modern tools and methodologies, Nova Systems NZ General Manager Jude Rushmere says.

Defence capability is becoming increasingly complex and integrated with a focus on the joint-force mission, industry needs to continually evolve our methods to keep the best and most effective capability in the hands of our Defence forces.

This is occurring in an environment of the most challenging set of strategic circumstances our region has faced in decades.

Nova Systems, leaders in Test and Evaluation (T&E) for more than two decades, is implementing and advancing a truly digital transformation of our world-leading expertise.

This is part of ensuring our critical role as an independent capability assurance partner for industry, Defence and Government, evolves in lockstep with technological possibility.

“T&E is the foundation of Nova Systems’ business and is what we are known for,” Mr Rushmere explains.

“T&E needs to facilitate the timely delivery of joint capability efficiently, in terms of T&E methodology, workforce and infrastructure across a multitude of organisations. And keep pace with new and emerging systems and solutions.

“The technology powered leap in T&E capability, informed decision making, and risk reduction that 10

Nova Systems has been providing support to the introduction of the P-8A capability into the RNZAF for the past 3 years. Photo credit NZDF.

digitally enhanced technology solutions bring is only achievable through focused stewardship across the enterprise on all T&E programmes, rather than siloed in specific project efforts, and requires immediate investment.

With the increasing reliance on technology and interconnected systems, traditional warfare strategies are transitioning towards digital mission engineering.

While there will be a role for traditional methods, we are implementing digital engineering tools and methods including the use of modelling, simulation, and digital

twins which are becoming firmly entrenched in the way in which military equipment is tested and certified.

The centrepiece of this digital transformation is Nova Systems T&E Centre of Excellence.

It’s a hub bringing together defence, industry, and academia as a focal point for collaboration across the joint-force T&E and capability assurance environment.

The initiative aims to create an industrial ecosystem for an integrated joint T&E capability and enable the acceleration of emerging technologies, such as Line of Defence

synthetic environments, to ensure the long-term sustainability of an independent Trans-Tasman T&E workforce.

“Growing the future T&E workforce who have the best practice knowledge and skills is also a firm part of our strategy,” Mr Rushmere explains.

“Nova Systems has delivered incountry T&E training to more than 2,700 Australian and more than 145 NZ technical professionals, through short courses, workshops, and accredited Diploma and Certificate IV courses.”

Through a lens of T&E knowledge and experience gained through supporting both NZ Defence and the ADF, Nova Systems has developed a new Advanced T&E Practitioner Course; the first to be delivered in early 2024.

“There is nowhere else in the world that delivers this level of training which teaches advanced theory of T&E techniques and T&E

Photo credit NZDF

modelling and simulation using live mission systems during live test scenarios,” Mr Rushmere said.

“It’s another way we are helping to secure the future local workforce of T&E professionals.”

Nova continues to provide specialist support to the NZDF and NZ MOD across a number of projects and has grown its presence in NZ over the past 12 months to 15 people including specialists in T&E, system safety, flight test and space launch support. We’re backed by our global organisation of more than 850

people bringing a vast breadth and depth of experience to support our NZ clients.

The team is proudly supporting the introduction of the P-8A capability into the RNZAF. Nova has been embedded into the Manataū Kaupapa Waonga: NZ Defence’s Integrated Project Team, supporting the Test and Evaluation programme working alongside 5 Squadron within the RNZAF, working with the Defence Aviation Authority and other NZDF units on Design Acceptance, Logistics and Continuing Airworthiness and Capability Integration.

Since the fourth and final P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft arrived on New Zealand shores, Nova has been working to support their release for operational tasking.

As a Trans-Tasman company, Nova Systems can leverage support and provide efficiencies when engaging with T&E activities between Australia and NZ.

Scan the QR code or find out more at novasystems.com

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New Zealand Defence Policy and Capability – A Rejoinder NZDF combat skills and interoperability are likely in better shape than some recent commentary suggests, writes editor-at-large Dr Peter Greener, but there are big capability decisions that need to be made, and soon.

Dr Peter Greener is an Honorary Professor, and was previously Academic Dean at the Command and Staff College of the New Zealand Defence Force, where he has taught Defence and Strategic Studies since 2008.

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In his article in the Winter issue of Line of Defence, “National Party: Attrition, conditions of service, and interoperability,” Tim van de Molen, National Party Spokesperson for Defence and Veterans, expresses concern about attrition across the Defence Force, highlighting that, “Since 2020 this government has seriously neglected the NZDF. 89% of personnel are paid at least 5% below comparable civilian rates.”

He subsequently spells out National’s four-point Plan for Defence. In the second strand of the policy, while supporting the additional funding provided by Labour for remuneration, a pay review, enhanced living conditions and greater work variety are promised.

It is of note that in April of last year, Christopher Luxon indicated that National supported a lift in defence spending from the current level of approximately 1.5% perhaps to 2% of GDP, yet Tim van de Molen gave no funding indication.

It is a fact that governments led by both National and Labour oversaw a reduction in defence spending from a maximum of 2% during the 1980s, to less than 1% of GDP over the next two decades.

Whilst there has been some recovery, budgets over time have been inconsistent.

This was remarked on by Chief of Defence Force Air Marshal Kevin Short in the March 2023 issue of

North and South magazine. Here Air Marshall Short emphasised, “We need governments – no matter which [party] comes to power – to look at the NZDF and say, ‘We’ve got to look 10, 20, 30 years ahead’ and have consistent funding.”

Interoperability and interchangeability In the third strand of National’s Plan for Defence, Tim van de Molen notes, “National will focus on improving our interoperability with our traditional partners given the rising geopolitical tension.” He then goes on to say that National will commit to supporting NZDF personnel to undergo more training with allies and regional partners and to cooperatively share defence knowledge.

That theme of interoperability is also highlighted by Dr James McDowall, ACT Party Defence Spokesperson, in his article, “New Zealand needs to get serious on defence” (Line of Defence, Winter 2023). Here he argued that, “There is no hiding the fact that the New Zealand Defence Force has been through an extremely tough time over the last few years.”

With, as Tim van de Molen had indicated, the loss of 30% of personnel from across the Defence Force over the last two years, and a lack of opportunity to exercise combat skills, he is absolutely correct. To address the issues NZDF Line of Defence

interoperability of the respective Land and Special Operations Forces.”

Given this potential level of integration, it is important to note the observation of the Director of Army Strategic Engagements In Army News Issue 542 (May 2023) that, “Our Army will retain all sovereign functions expected of it.”

Chief of New Zealand Army Major General John Boswell and Chief of Australian Army Lieutenant General Simon Stuart sign Plan ANZAC agreement. Image: NZDF.

is facing, ACT is advocating an increase in spending to 2% of GDP over a four-year period.

Highlighting the degradation of combat skills, he observes that over time, NZDF personnel may once again have to play a larger role in conflict zones. However, he goes on to speak of New Zealand’s “irrelevance” to our only formal defence ally, Australia, then adds, “Under Labour, New Zealand has gone from being an ANZAC partner to being an afterthought.”

Yet neither spokesperson acknowledges the considerable remedial work which is already underway across all three Services to enhance training and combat capability, and more particularly interoperability, with Australia.

Of particular note is Plan ANZAC. This is the Bilateral Service Cooperation Plan that was signed by Chief of the New Zealand Army Major General John Boswell and Chief of Australian Army Lieutenant General Simon Stuart on 18 April 2023. Major General Boswell indicated that, “We will be able to better share lessons across capability development, doctrine for training, and many other areas related to the generation, and in the New Zealand Army’s current case, the regeneration of land combat capability.”

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The New Zealand Herald that day noted that the strategy would assist the New Zealand Army in enhancing its capability in joint force operations as well supporting “the enduring traits of the Anzac alliance, such as close integration in capabilities, training and readiness.”

Two months later Tim Fish, writing in the Australian Defence Magazine of 16 June 2023, added rather more detail to Plan ANZAC. He reported that there were to be two outcomes for the Plan. The first of these was that ultimately NZ Army would be “capable of contributing a Motorised Infantry Battle Group in an Australianled Brigade within an integrated ABCANZ [American, British, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand] Division”. There was though an acknowledgement that this would take some time because of the current retention issues within Army.

The Bilateral Service Cooperation Plan is undoubtedly ambitious, and the Plan’s second outcome envisages an eventual outcome that would see that, “sustained cooperation between Armies is resourced, managed and (would) support interoperability… progressing to interchangeability.”

This would ensure the, “tactical interchangeability of the NZ Army platforms and operational level

Talisman Sabre and Te Mana Another engagement of note between Australian and New Zealand forces, and international partners, is Exercise Talisman Sabre, a major biennial combined (i.e. international) and joint (i.e. Army, Navy and Air Force, and Marines) exercise. This year’s Exercise, which sees 30,000 uniformed personnel from thirteen different countries participating, is taking place from 22 July to 4 August 2023.

The NZDF contingent comprises all three Services, though NZ Army forms the largest part, with almost 250 soldiers taking part. Whilst the Green Party has raised concern about New Zealand’s participation in this year’s Exercise, my colleague Professor David Capie, from the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University of Wellington, when speaking with Radio New Zealand on 30 July 2023, said that, “New Zealand’s involvement in Exercise Talisman Sabre was a timely return to combat readiness for the defence forces.”

Whilst the Royal New Zealand Navy has only a small contingent participating in Exercise Talisman Sabre, a rather larger group are crewing HMNZS Te Mana, which is in Australian waters at the same time. Having departed New Zealand on July 17th, Te Mana is embarking on a five month deployment that will take the ship from Australia up into Southeast Asia.

Whilst in waters around Australia, Te Mana will undergo exercises utilising advanced training 13

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MNZS Te Mana retuning from upgrade in Canada, which included the installation of Sea Ceptor surface-to-air missiles, in July 2022.

Image: NZDF.

capabilities in Australia which are not available in New Zealand. The deployment to Australia will include the first firing of the ship’s new Sea Ceptor missile system, (in fact the first firing of a missile from a RNZN ship in ten years) and will conclude with the ship being re-certified for combat operations.

Te Mana will later be joined by HMNZS Aotearoa and once initial training with the Australian Defence Force is completed, the RNZN Task Group will deploy to Southeast Asia.

Following a range of port visits and bilateral exercises, the Southeast Asian deployment will conclude with participation in another significant multilateral exercise alongside other Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) members in Exercise Bersama Lima, which is scheduled for October.

Naval capability horizon However, whilst this return to military activity is welcome news for those on board the Task Group, 14

it remains the case that three Navy ships remain tied up alongside at Devonport in ‘care and custody’ whilst Navy continues to struggle with recruitment and retention.

Elsewhere in the Winter issue of Line of Defence, former Defence Minister Wayne Mapp and Captain Andrew Watts both respectively speak of the crucial need for a clear strategy to improve Navy’s capabilities into the future.

Although not contributing to the Winter issue, Labour cannot escape comment. In April this year Prime Minister Chris Hipkins told Radio New Zealand that, “We have some big decisions ahead of us … in terms of capability we have in our Defence Force.” He went on to say that, “We’ve got some decisions ahead for the navy, we know that in the next 10 years or so we’re going to have to make some decisions about the future of the Anzac frigates.”

The Defence Capability Plan 2019, when discussing planned

investments in maritime capabilities, noted that the service lives of the ANZAC frigates would be extended until beyond 2030. When the ANZACS were built, it took ten years from the government’s decision in July 1987 to proceed with ship replacement to the commissioning of the first vessel, HMNZS Te Kaha, in July 1997. A decision on replacements for the ANZACS needs to be under consideration without delay.

As Wayne Mapp states, “Security relationships require a certain level of commitment, if they are to be taken seriously… at a sufficient level to be seen to be making a useful contribution.” We shall see soon what policy position Labour will take with the imminent release of the Defence Policy and Strategy Statement. What is clear, is that whoever is in government following the election will be facing some of the most crucial decisions in decades with regards to the future of the New Zealand Defence Force.

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Revolutionary Trentham clothing store enhances NZDF operational readiness In an historic partnership between ADA NZ and the New Zealand Defence Force, the opening of refurbished store at Trentham Military Camp represents a transformation in apparel systems for NZDF personnel.

The event, held on Tuesday 26 September, was inaugurated by ADA NZ representatives, Program Director Sarah Pender and Kate Maloney.

“Inaugurating this refurbished store is a testament to our unwavering commitment to better equip our Defence personnel and enhance their operational readiness, ultimately contributing to the safety and security of our nation,” stated Pender.

“Today, we are not just unveiling a physical structure; we are symbolising our shared vision of a future where our Defence personnel have access to the very best in clothing management,” added Kate Maloney, who played a pivotal role in the store’s opening.

ADA CEO, Chris Dixon expressed his pride and support for the project. “This is a monumental moment for ADA and the NZDF,” he said. “We are committed to modernising our facilities and providing the best possible support to our Defence personnel and the teams who support them.”

As part of the Trentham opening event, an exclusive first-look tour of the newly refurbished site was offered, providing attendees with a unique opportunity to witness the state-of-the-art facilities up close.

John Bird, Clothing Coordinator of the Trentham Military Camp Clothing Store, shared his insights into the significance of the occasion. Bird remarked, “My passion for ensuring that our Defence personnel have the best clothing and gear to carry out their duties is what keeps me going. I find it immensely rewarding to support those who serve our country; every customer is important.” He said.

The significance of the occasion was highlighted by Brigadier Rob Krushka, Chief Joint Defence Services, commented on the partnership. “This opening event marks a momentous occasion as we celebrate our partnership with ADA NZ,” said BRIG Krushka.

“Together, we are committed to supporting our service men and women and fostering a thriving community.”

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L-R Sarah Pender, Kate Maloney, MAJ.Jim Maguire Tony, A.P. McQuillan & John Bird

“The opening of the upgraded Trentham Clothing Store is an exciting milestone in the partnership between ADA and NZDF,” said Tony A. P. McQuillan, Director, NZDF Defence Equipment Management Organisation of Defence Logistics Command. “It is a clear demonstration of ADA’s commitment to investing in modernising our facilities to enhance the user experience of our sailors, soldiers, and aviators.”

MAJ James ‘Jim’ Maguire, Officer Commanding Trentham Regional Support Centre, also shared his perspectives on the event, highlighting the importance of adapting to the new generations of personnel needs and requirements.

“This shows that we’re prepared to adapt to the new generation of soldiers, sailors and aviators, who bring different skills and expectations to the job,” said CAPT Maguire. “Expectations of the future of new recruits, I believe, will include more support and a more welcoming environment to the job and for a supply store like ours.”

According to ADA NZ, the opening of the refurbished Trentham Military Camp Clothing Store is just the beginning of its efforts to enhance the clothing management experience for NZDF personnel. Further upgrades and improvements are anticipated across other Camps and Bases in the coming months.

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General Atomics Aeronautical Leverages Additive Manufacturing for Product Line of UAS World Leader in Unmanned Systems leans Into Its Global Partnerships for Additive Manufacturing, creating high strength-to-weight ratio components and shortening the manufacturing process.

Being the world leader in Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) means continuing to evolve in all areas of the business enterprise in order to continue providing customers with the best product at the best price.

At least that’s the attitude of General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI), designer and developer of the MQ-9A Reaper, MQ-1C Gray Eagle, and the new MQ-9B SkyGuardian®/ SeaGuardian® UAS that have become ubiquitous in the areas of national security and defence throughout the world.

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Developing global partnerships to improve products in the design phase or through-life phase is proving to be highly beneficial to GA-ASI and its customers.

New Zealand’s highly capable, niche design and manufacturing industry, in particular, affords many opportunities to expand regional UAS opportunities well into the future.

As GA-ASI builds on its 30-year legacy, which includes more than 1,000 aircraft delivered and more than 8 million flight hours across its Predator® aircraft series, the company continues its long tradition to lead

through innovation in technologies that differentiate its UAS platforms.

One such cutting-edge technology is Additive Manufacturing(AM) for which GA-ASI has become an industry leader.

So, what is Additive Manufacturing? AM is a process by which a manufacturer takes a 3D computer-aided design (CAD) model and virtually slices it into thousands of layers. The layered data is sent to a printer where material is added one layer at a time in order to create a three-dimensional object. This process is commonly referred to as 3D printing.

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part production operations. In 2018, GA-ASI understood the need for growing a strong and knowledgeable AM team to lead the company into the future of the technology. Then in 2021, GA-ASI established a new Additive Design and Manufacturing (AD&M) Centre of Excellence.

The Centre is focused on rapid-reaction and recurring manufacturing of GA-ASI’s line of UAS using fully functional flightready AM applications, technology risk reductions, large-scale tooling, and next-generation flight hardware development.

AM at GA “We began investing in our Additive Manufacturing over a decade ago,” said GA-ASI President David R. Alexander. “Using AM, we developed the ability to create components that have a very high strength-to-weight ratio, a factor that has a direct impact on fuel efficiency and aircraft performance.”

AM also accelerates the time of product launch to market by shortening the design and manufacturing process, increasing

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productivity, reducing assembly costs, and providing cost advantages in low-number production.

Additionally, AM allows for more complex and unitized designs to be manufactured, leading to performance improvements and significant cost reductions.

When GA-ASI initially introduced AM techniques in 2011, the focus was on rapid prototyping, tooling, and shop aids.

The company has now integrated AM into its main flight-ready

AM for MQ-9B GA-ASI has several thousand AM parts currently flying on board its UAS, with a combined total of more than 300,000 flight hours with these AM parts. That includes thermoplastics, composites, and metal components.

GA-ASI’s AM team focuses on embedding AM materials and processes as well as business-savvy applications within multiple aircraft programs and acts as the primary AM resource for all GA-ASI stakeholders. The team leverages several different AM technologies, each adapted specifically to relevant applications and requirements.

For its newest platform, the MQ-9B SkyGuardian/ SeaGuardian, GA-ASI has qualified and implemented over 240 AM parts, which ultimately optimize the manufacturing process and reduce recurring costs by as much as $300,000 per aircraft and save an estimated $2 million in tooling costs.

GA-ASI is continually looking for ways to enable, accelerate, and integrate AM technologies into its designs, operations, and products.

Through the AD&M Centre of Excellence, the company adheres to a structured and stringent qualification process for AM 17

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applications that delivers a positive business case over conventional manufacturing methods.

AM for Small UAS Militaries throughout the world are looking for new small, unmanned aircraft to take on big jobs. GAASI’s small folding-wing UAS called Sparrowhawk, for example, is designed to take off from a larger mothership such as the MQ-9B SkyGuardian, fly a scouting mission, and then return and be recovered by the SkyGuardian in mid-flight. It could then be refueled and support another operation within the mission.

Meanwhile, GA-ASI’s propellerdriven Eaglet provides “air-launched effects” for an attacking force.

Suppose an MQ-1C Gray Eagle 25M released an Eaglet or two that were tasked with detecting hostile air defence radars, jamming enemy electronics systems. The aircraft might return from those missions 18

to be used again. These are some of the most dangerous assignments in the world – which is why it makes sense to send an unmanned aircraft to undertake them. If something happens to these aircraft, no human pilot ever had to risk her or his life on the flight.

Incorporating cost-saving measures such as a greater use of AM into these and other aircraft is another way GA-ASI can provide aircraft that are both as capable as customers require but also much less costly than they would be otherwise.

Global Partnerships Consistent with its global customer base, GA-ASI’s AM initiative has tapped expertise from around the world. One example is Conflux Technology. This Australianbased company specializes in AM for heat exchanger applications.

The two companies have worked together since 2018 to develop heat exchangers compatible with GA-

ASI’s MQ-9B line of UAS. In 2022, the two companies announced their collaboration on a new Fuel Oil Heat Exchanger, which is the fourth AM project the two companies have worked on together since 2018.

“When you are leading the charge on advanced technology, you need a world-class team and agility to do it right,” said Ben Batagol, Conflux’s Head of Business Development. “Our project with GA-ASI enables drop-in replacements that remove thermal load and maintain a compact profile while also increasing performance to meet higher system demand.”

In addition to Conflux, GA-ASI has partnered with companies in Europe and India. As GA-ASI’s reach extends further into the Indo-Pacific, opportunities for an expanded network of local industry partners for rapid manufacturing and AM, including in New Zealand, will increase.

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Sentinel Boats a “game-changer” for Royal New Zealand Navy The Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) Sentinel 1250 Littoral Manoeuvre Craft (LMC) fleet official launch has been met with glowing reviews from service personnel.

Tasmania-based manufacturer Sentinel Boats (formerly PFG) has built three boats for the RNZN that can be configured for a range of mission profiles, including dive operations, hydrographic survey support and reconnaissance.

The vessels showcase the unique properties of HDPE, a next generation boat building material which is virtually indestructible and offers unrivalled speed, manoeuvrability and stability.

Sentinel Boats CEO George McGuire said there was growing recognition of the benefits of HDPE in the defence, first response and rescue sectors.

“We are incredibly proud of the LMCs, which are highly versatile and deliver truly unique capabilities to the RNZN, including the ability to launch and recover a 5.3m tender,” Mr McGuire said.

“These boats have been developed as a true partnership between Sentinel Boats and the RNZN and they are already proving their worth in service applications. They have been described as a ‘game-changer’ by the RNZN.” The LMCs will be deployed by HMNZS MATATAUA as part of the RNZN’s Littoral Warfare Force.

Twin Cummins diesel engines, coupled with Hamilton Jet water jets propel the LMC to speeds over 40 knots.

The signature Sentinel hull design from One2Three naval architects and use of HDPE combine to give Line of Defence

the LMCs class-leading safety, antifatigue and handling characteristics, even in rough waters and at sustained high speeds.

RNZN Able Seaman Combat Specialist James Perham described the handling as “like a train on tracks.”

“A typical jet boat, when you turn hard, the rear end skids out a bit, whereas with the hull design of this boat, it just digs in like a boat with outboards, so this means we can turn on a dime,” ASCS Perham said.

“Once you get the feel for the LMC and put the time in on the helm it drives like a dream and is far more capable than any other boat that any of the SCS personnel at

MATATAUA have driven; it’s so much more capable.”

Mr McGuire said the completion of the New Zealand contract was just the start of exciting things to come for Sentinel Boats. “We have shown that we are capable of building world-class boats, and the world is taking notice.”

The final LMC bound for New Zealand will be displayed at the Indo Pacific 2023 International Maritime Exposition in Sydney on November 7-9.

Sentinel Boats has also partnered with international defence technology experts L3Harriss to conduct autonomous demonstrations of the Sentinel 1100 on Sydney Harbour during the expo.

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The National Party’s newly proposed policy intent for Defence Even at “the most reasonably affordable standard”, an almost total replacement of naval ships, new maritime helicopters, replacement of strategic air mobility, and a new primary combat vehicle is a big shopping list, writes Editor-at-large Peter Greener.

In my last article published in Line of Defence, “The New Zealand Defence Policy and Strategy Statement 2023; what are the implications for the Royal New Zealand Navy,” I wrote that we’d have to wait until after the upcoming General Election and into next year before we got to learn whether a future New Zealand government will be putting its money where its mouth is, particularly on naval capability. In the meantime, on 12 October, two days before the election, the National Party released their defence policy on their website.

Whilst the policy is brief and short on detail, it nevertheless reinforces the consistently bipartisan approach of both major parties.

Although it is apparent that we will still have to wait until well into next year before any finalisation of a defence capability plan, National have committed to maintaining “a strong, highly-trained, combat-ready Defence Force to keep New Zealand safe while promoting our interests and values overseas.”

In addition they have made clear in their defence policy that they support the current defence procurement plan, and will ensure regular reviews. Their goal is to provide the Defence Force with the necessary equipment, ships, planes, and weapons “to the most reasonably affordable standard”.

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As this article is being written coalition negotiations may have begun, but there is no indication as to what the final outcome might be. However, we know that ACT are committed to increasing defence spending to 1.5% of GDP over four years, with a long-term target of reaching 2% by 2030. New Zealand First’s Defence Policy matches this ambition, and commits to progressively increase real defence spending to reach 2% of GDP by 2030.

So, whether there should be one, or two, partners in coalition it seems that National will have the support necessary to make significant capability decisions. And there are indeed some significant decisions that will need to be taken.

Applying the phrase “most reasonably affordable standard” to the purchase of an almost total replacement of Navy ships, along with new maritime helicopters, replacement of the strategic air mobility for Air Force, and a new primary combat vehicle for Army does nothing to reduce the considerable costs involved.

In 2020 in Line of Defence, I wrote about New Zealand’s future maritime helicopter options. An RFI for replacement maritime helicopters was issued on 26 April of this year, with an indicative

Dr Peter Greener

cost of more than $1 billion.

Introduction into service was seen as necessary by 2028, though there has been speculation that they may not be maintainable for that long. In any case, a decision on the replacement aircraft will need to be made during the term of this incoming government.

Because of the very long lead time, decisions will also need to be made to further the acquisition of new naval ships to replace the capabilities of eight current vessels.

The lessons of Project Protector seem to have been learnt. Project Protector provided the Navy a multirole vessel, two offshore and four inshore patrol vessels, all of which had significant shortcomings. A remediation project, which had been Line of Defence

the result of a mediation claim and settlement, was intended to remedy the shortfalls but gaps in capability remain.

The RFI for the maritime fleet replacement, released on 7 September 2023, makes clear that a significant level of overall capability is being sought. Among the requirements identified, naval combat capabilities are the first to be mentioned, and of note is the requirement for Southern Ocean and polar patrol.

With sealift and littoral operation support also highlighted, it is noted that the numbers and types of each ship has not been specified.

Nevertheless, it is emphasised that replacing five different classes of vessels with fewer classes which combine multiple roles would be advantageous.

Sea-keeping qualities are this time to the fore, with a requirement for the ability to survive in the phenomenal seas which may be encountered in the deep ocean, Line of Defence

and the ability to be able operate in conditions from the Southern Ocean to the Equator. The new ships required are – of necessity – going to be expensive.

In the Defence Capability Plan 2019 the replacement of the two ageing Boeing 757s was foreshadowed, with a new strategic air mobility capability for Air Force to be introduced into service in 2028. The DCP19 foresaw a Request for Tender in 2024, with an expected cost in excess of $500 million.

In terms of the new primary combat vehicle for Army, replacing the Light Armoured Vehicles (which have now been in service for twenty years) had a similar price tag. A Request for Tender was envisaged in 2025.

Based on four-year old figures cited in DCP19, a capital spend of at least $7 billion could be expected to be committed to in the foreseeable future.

The replacement of these major platforms is in addition

to the commitment to ensuring the need for ongoing attention to recruitment and retention. National have made particular note that they want the NZDF to explore new methods of recruitment to ensure that more New Zealanders can be attracted to military service.

Attracting more recruits to military service means more money is going to be required over the term of this government.

Speaking after the launch in August of the Defence Policy and Strategy Statement 2023, former Defence Minister Andrew Little predicted that there would be an increase in defence spending, but suggested that that would be two or three budgets away. With the new Defence Capability Plan expected in 2024, it now remains to be seen what the National-led government’s fiscal planning will be to ensure that Defence is adequately funded for the strategically challenging future that is envisaged.

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Big defence spending decisions on the horizon for new government The Roche Review will be reporting back mid 2024 and its recommendations will take time to implement. That gives New Zealand’s new government a year or two to get its ducks in a row, writes Wayne Mapp.

Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO was New Zealand’s Minister of Defence and Minister of Science and Innovation from 2008 to 2011.

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With the election now over, the question arises as to the orientation of the new government’s foreign and defence policy. Will anything change from the last six years?

Throughout the election campaign, the new Prime Minister, Christopher Luxon, made a virtue of New Zealand having a bipartisan defence and foreign policy. These statements were largely made in respect of the fundamentals, being a commitment to New Zealand’s Five Eyes partners, especially Australia, to the nuclear free status of New Zealand and to the independent foreign policy.

The latter point was made with specific reference to having a balanced relationship with China, something that is strongly held by both National and Labour.

Mr Luxon also placed particular emphasis on trade policy, promising to ramp up the action for new trade agreements, most particularly with India.

Defence policy only merited a passing mention. Mr Luxon committed to expenditure of 2% of GDP over the longer term, but this was not seen as an immediate priority. Over the next three years defence expenditure is likely to remain the same, or even decline, given that major new capital expenditure is unlikely to occur prior to the next election.

National’s partners in government are a little more forthright in their expectations for defence. Both Act and New Zealand First want defence expenditure to increase to 2% of GDP, but with greater urgency than National. However, given that National is 80% of the new government and that economic issues have the highest priority, it seems likely that this will be an issue for 2025 and beyond.

Two immediate international crises have enabled a reaffirmation of New Zealand’s foreign policy positioning. The Ukrainian war meant that New Zealand continues to be firmly identified as part of the West. Only western nations have come to Ukraine’s aid. New Zealand has played a useful role in providing nearly 200 military trainers deployed to the UK. In addition, there has been several million dollars provided in logistical support. More recently the Gaza crisis meant New Zealand was firmly on the side of Israel, although also providing humanitarian aid for the civilian population of Gaza. In both cases New Zealand’s positioning was essentially the same as the rest of the western world.

Both the major political parties, Labour and National, were essentially of one voice when it Line of Defence

came to New Zealand’s positioning on both the Ukraine and Gaza.

However, National has been more forthright, a luxury afforded when in opposition. In government, both major parties are more aware of the nuance required on foreign policy. The same will also apply to National’s coalition partners.

Act and New Zealand First will be more constrained in government, especially if either of them have ministerial roles in defence or foreign affairs.

The fact that both major political parties have made a virtue of bipartisanship in defence and foreign policy, has also enabled them to be somewhat neglectful of New Zealand’s responsibilities. This is most evident in defence, where there has been very little political pressure by either party on the other to increase expenditure.

Defence spending reached a peak of 1.5% of GDP in 2020. This was largely due to the substantial capital expenditure on the new P8 Poseidon Line of Defence

and C130J Hercules aircraft. Since then expenditure has been on a downward track, largely because there hasn’t been any significant capital expenditure. The current level of defence expenditure is 1.3% of GDP and expenditure is likely to drop further, at least as expressed as a percentage of GDP. Although foreign policy and defence barely figured in the election campaign, to the point there wasn’t even a question on Israel in the last Leader’s debate, once National is in government, defence will be not so easy to ignore. There are pressing capital decisions that will need to be made, most notably around the Navy.

The Defence Review chaired

by Sir Brian Roche is due to report back in mid 2024. Inevitably it will take some time to digest its recommendations. It is almost certain that the Review will recommend a serious programme of capital purchases. These will need to be progressed during 2025 and 2026.

Given that the focus in 2024 will be

on the economy, the government will welcome the breathing space that the consideration of the Review will provide.

Nevertheless, National’s coalition partners will provide some pressure on the government to act in 2025 and 2026, and not interminably delay important decisions.

The Review’s major recommendations will undoubtedly be around replacing the two ANZAC frigates and the Project Protector ships. The total cost to replace these ships will almost certainly be in the region of $10 billion. However, the time cycle for the replacement of the ships will be able to be spread across two or three terms of government. On that basis, the annual cost is more like $1 billion, a similar level of the annualised cost of the purchase of the P8 Poseidon and the C130J Hercules.

In short, this is well within the capacity of the likely budgets of the new government to accommodate, particularly when the first block of expenditure won’t arise in the first two years.

The new government is facing a more challenging international environment. There will be expectations, particularly from New Zealand’s closest partners, that New Zealand will take account of that, particularly with respect to future defence budgets. However, there is time to plan for this. The Roche Review will be reporting back mid 2024 and its recommendations will take time to implement.

The recommendations will undoubtedly set a pathway for increased expenditure on defence, most notably around major capital purchases. This expenditure won’t arise immediately. A prudent government looking into the late 2020’s and early 2030’s will be able to responsibly plan for the increases in expenditure that will be required.

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Civil-Military Wargames: Planning for high-complexity hybrid operations in the South-West Pacific Melanesia is a potential setting for future hybrid conflict, writes Ben Morgan, and Wargames may be a cost-effective way to simulate integration of civil and military information operations in the region.

The Indo-Pacific region is currently the frontline of Sino-American competition, parts of which, like Melanesia, are especially fertile ground for the use of hybrid tactics that might leverage local colonial history, cultural differences and weak governance against conventional military capabilities. Any military seeking to engage successfully in this region needs to understand these considerations and develop tactics and doctrine that will win – not just the kinetic phase of war but also the information battle.

In 2014, Robert Haddick wrote Fire on the Water China: America and the Future of the Pacific, highlighting China’s challenge to America in the Indo-Pacific region.

He discusses America’s carrier task groups that for generations have dominated sea power, but argues their supremacy is waning.

Although expensive, a carrier task group provides formidable power projection, being able to move quickly to a trouble spot, defend itself from most threats, and strike thousands of kilometres into enemy territory.

If it is to compete with the United States, China needs to 24

develop a credible strategy to defeat carrier task groups, such as developing long-range anti-ship missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles that can be produced in vast numbers and at relatively low cost. Haddick’s book identified that the threat posed by China’s ability to swamp an American carrier battlegroup with accurate longrange missile fire is credible. This creates an exclusion zone around

missile defended land, within which a carrier task group is at extreme risk.

This strategy, ‘Area Denial,’ is a keystone of China’s conventional war-fighting doctrine. By denying America’s carriers access to an area of operations, China can compete there militarily, with ground or naval operations taking place under a protective ‘umbrella’ of precisionguided missiles.

Multinational ships moored at Pearl Harbour, Hawaii, during RIMPAC 2022.

Courtesy US Navy.

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Chinese teachers awarded Vanuatu Medal of Honor in July. Image: Chinese Embassy Port Vila.

How war-fighting doctrine shapes Pacific diplomacy Area denial drives diplomacy in the region, both sides working furiously to develop a network of diplomatic relationships that provide access to land. Land is rare in the Pacific Ocean, and vitally important because it cannot be sunk, providing bases for ships, submarines, aircraft, drones, surveillance assets and precisionguided missiles.

The US is responding by developing doctrine and new approaches to counter China’s area denial strategy. The US Marine Corps, for example, is creating Littoral Combat Regiments (LCR) designed to disperse and fight within China’s area denial zone.

The US Army is developing the Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF), a formation designed to provide long-range surveillance, precisionstrike and resources to dominate the Line of Defence

information battle and support close combat forces. Likely working ‘hand in glove’ LCRs and MDTF will require forward bases and intimate knowledge of potential areas of operation.

Melanesia, the hottest real estate in the Pacific Sino-US competition in Melanesia, an area characterised by young nations and relatively weak institutions of government, is intense. Melanesia’s political instability and history of internal violence create the potential for flash-points in the Indo-Pacific Region. A small conflict could start with little warning and with few of the diplomatic or political controls expected in other parts of the world.

Melanesia provides areas for bases with the potential to dominate Australia’s northern maritime domain.

As the US’ key ally in the South Pacific, Australia provided a secure base for America’s push north against the Japanese in World War Two. In March this year, the Sydney Morning Herald published a series of articles titled ‘Red Alert,’ in which a team of experts highlighted the risk of war with China and the potential role Australia might play supporting any future American campaign in the Pacific. This included providing military forces for any coalition and logistics support.

As the key US ally in Melanesia, Australia has built and maintained relationships with its island neighbours. However, in recent decades Australia’s influence in the region has declined and China has developed stronger relationships with Melanesian nations.

This trend was highlighted in 2022, when Solomon Islands signed 25

DEFENCE a secret security agreement with China. Recently reported activity includes Chinese training support for the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force, the announcement of Solomon Islands’ intention to develop a new defence force and, if Al Jazeera reporting is correct, the secret importation of firearms from China. Activity of great concern to Australia and the United States.

Added to this, recent political instability in Vanuatu saw the removal of a pro-US government and the election of a more proChinese one – a political process supported by the deployment to Vanuatu of Chinese police ‘experts’ and equipment. In Papua New Guinea, where rule of law is tenuously thin, a recent defence agreement with the US was criticised by pro-Chinese politicians. This nation is also struggling with Bougainville’s desire to be independent, an issue with a long and bloody history.

Recent lessons Looking at recent conflicts around the world, we can see a variety of the emerging trends ranging from how drones are deployed on the battlefield to the integration of open source and military intelligence, to the increased use of precision-guided weapons.

Two lessons stand out: • The increasing hybridisation of war, including the use of proxies and the increasing role of information operations to shape battlefield conditions.

• Insight for forward planning, especially the difficulty that conventional military planners experience appreciating the information domain.

Both are likely to apply in a future Melanesia conflict but within a unique historical and cultural context.

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China gifts security equipment to Solomon Island Police in October.

Image: Solomon Islands Government.

In this context, Anglophone or European forces deployed into Melanesia, for example, would carry the burdens of colonial history, and be challenged in their ability to understand complex local cultures.

Such factors provide opportunities for mistrust that an opposing force might leverage in the information domain – a force multiplier in hybrid conflict.

Thinking about future conflict in Melanesia While direct confrontation between China and the United States is unlikely given its potential cost, there remains the possibility that a conflict in the area could escalate into kinetic war-fighting via proxies.

Solomon Islands, for example, is centrally located in Melanesia, and well positioned as a base to support potential de-stabilisation operations across the archipelago. In addition to developing a closer defence relationship with China, Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasse Sogavare recently stated his intent to create a defence force, a process that

is likely to be supported by China.

In a worst-case scenario, this new force could develop as a proxy available in the Melanesian region with good local knowledge, community relationships and – most importantly – able to be presented within the information battle as local and legitimate. Perhaps, such a force could work with ‘advisors’ or with private security contractors ‘protecting’ Chinese investments, increasing its capability.

Melanesia’s complex geography and political instability create a potential tinderbox. Hybrid operations combining the use of proxies, pseudo-military forces and information operations leveraging anti-colonial narratives and cultural mistrust are possible, creating a very complex environment for any force deploying into the region.

Gaining insight and forward planning – A not so new approach Defeating hybrid operations requires a range of civil and military skills and insight that are difficult to Line of Defence

acquire and maintain in conventional military organisations. Ukraine teaches us that complete integration of civil and military information is an enabler, and that omnipresent access to information allows people outside the military to provide useful insight.

An example of this enabler is a United States Marine Corps University wargame that was published and analysed prior to the onset of the Ukraine War. The most famous analysis of the wargame is by Alex Vershinin in an article published on the War on the Rocks blog titled Feeding the Bear: A Closer Look at Russian Army Logistics and the Fiat Accompli.

In this article, Vershinin used the wargame to successfully predict the limits of Russia’s logistics system, contesting the idea that Russia could easily seize Ukraine – an important insight at odds with conventional military analysis of Russian capability prior to the war. The US’ offer to evacuate President Zelenskyy reflected a conventional military analysis that had over-estimated Russia’s capabilities.

Another famous example of tactical level wargaming is discussed in Simon Parkin’s A War of Birds and Wolves, which tells the story the Royal Navy’s Western Approaches Tactical Unit (WATU), established during the Battle of the Atlantic in World War Two. During this critical existential battle the Royal Navy established a ‘battle lab’ staffed by WRENS (Women’s Royal Naval Service) naval auxiliaries to wargame antisubmarine tactics.

WATU developed a system of contested wargames in which escort commanders ‘played war’ against an enemy commanded by WRENS (some of whom were talented mathematicians able to conduct statistical analysis of potential courses of action). The programme provided an opportunity for escort Line of Defence

commanders to work together in a consequence-free environment, testing tactics and building relationships with their command teams. WATU also developed new tactics that helped stop the German U-Boat force starving Britain into submission.

A WATU success was a manoeuvre used by escort forces nicknamed ‘Raspberry.’ The tactic was at odds with contemporary escort tactics, but when used in action it proved highly effective.

The WRENS playing the U-boats developed the idea from their observation of tactics and experience playing opposition.

They brought new perspectives to the discussion and the WATU process allowed these ideas to be tested using both wargames and operational analysis.

History evidences the usefulness of wargaming in conventional operations from Normandy to Desert Storm. It follows that wargaming is also likely to provide significant opportunities for the analysis of hybrid operations.

By their very nature hybrid operations require a range of skillsets, like political analysis, local cultural knowledge, communications, engagement and relationship management, that militaries struggle to develop.

Leading larger militaries are already experimenting with incorporating these capabilities. The UK Ministry of Defence’s Wargaming Handbook is supported by a Wargaming Influence Handbook published in July this year.

Simulating integrated hybrid operations involving a complex and political information domain is new ground for most militaries, and Melanesia is an especially complex environment. Its geography is difficult and has produced a range of sophisticated indigenous cultures that have diverse perspectives and politics that are often difficult

for outsiders to operate within.

Wargames may be a cost-effective way to simulate integration of civil and military information operations in this environment.

Making military wargames more effective Conventional militaries tend to be ‘closed shop’ in that training activities avoid using outsiders and can sometimes be contrived to ensure results suit a particular doctrinal approach. Mitigating these factors requires two key actions.

First, using external resources to develop simulations and secondly, making all simulations contested.

Most militaries use wargaming extensively, often as a methodology to assess courses of action during the staff planning process. It is less common to analyse new environments and develop tactics using contested wargames, and even less so using non-military inputs.

The risk of ‘losing’ to outsiders is too high. But, given the blurring the line between civil and military operations in the context of hybrid conflict, it may be time to include a more diverse range of outsiders familiar with cultural, media and political considerations.

Pacific nations like Australia and New Zealand are well-placed to become centres of excellence for this type of experimentation.

Experimental wargames are not resource intensive, and both nations have deep relationships in the Pacific and have diverse reservist communities that could be used to recruit people with key skills and experience.

Contested wargames not only provide an excellent opportunity to challenge inherited doctrine and develop solutions for future threats, but they also provide an opportunity for nations like Australia and New Zealand to use their regional advantages to play an important role.

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DEFENCE

C-130J-30 simulator build begins, as does plans for Unimog replacement The first phase of construction of the RNZAF’s C-130J-30 Super Hercules flight simulator has been completed in Canada, while the Ministry commences market research on replacing support vehicle fleet.

Construction of the Super Hercules flight simulator has reached an early milestone with completion of the life-sized replica cockpit in Montreal prior to shipping by road to Tampa, USA, for the installation of equipment, software and visuals.

The full-mission flight simulator is being delivered to New Zealand as part of a $1.5 billion deal with the United States Government to supply five Lockheed Martin C-130J-30 Super Hercules, along with spare parts, crew training, and a simulator.

Ministry of Defence Integrated Project Team Leader, Andrew Rooney, said the simulator is scheduled to arrive in New Zealand in 2025.

“The simulator will be located at RNZAF Base Auckland, where No. 40 Squadron, which maintains and flies the Hercs, are based,” he said.

At RNZAF Base Auckland, construction of the building to house the flight simulator is underway, with the foundation complete and tilt slab walls erected. In the two weeks to 04 October, construction crews installed 730 tonnes of concrete tilt slab walls that make up the almost 16 metre high building.

“Simulators reduce maintenance and flight time on actual aircraft, saving money and time, and reducing the risk to people and aircraft. They also improve crew safety and preparedness as they can train for different emergency situations and poor weather conditions in a simulated flight environment,” said Rooney.

Training of No. 40 Squadron’s first crew has also recently been completed. They are now certified to fly a US Air Force C-130J-30 aircraft.

All five aircraft are now on the production line. The first aircraft is fully built with its engines and systems installed, and testing has begun. The first aircraft is scheduled to touchdown in New Zealand in 2024.

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Image courtesy of Lockheed Martin.

Unimog and Military Support Vehicle Market Research Underway Defence has launched a market research project to replace the NZDF’s domestic support vehicle fleet, which is currently made up of Unimog trucks and Mitsubishi Tritons.

“This Request for Information to industry is a market research tool to help inform our business case,” said Sarah Minson, Deputy Secretary Capability Delivery, Ministry of Defence.

We are asking for information about commercial off the shelf vehicles, which could replace the existing Unimog trucks and Military Support utes. The Mercedes Benz Unimogs were purchased in the 1980s and are now more than 40 years old.

In addition to the standard truck requirements, the market research is asking for information, data and pricing about lower emission vehicles – hybrid or electric. It is also asking about vehicles with a high fording depth that could drive through floodwaters or broken and disturbed ground.

This Request for Information has been issued via GETS. No decisions have been made or funding committed.

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Women in Security Awards Aotearoa return for 2023 Aotearoa New Zealand’s own Women in Security Awards return for a fourth year, introducing ground breaking new award categories that reflect the current threats we face.

Defsec New Zealand, the New Zealand Security Sector Network (NZSSN), and Women in Security & Resilience Alliance (WISECRA) are pleased to announce that nominations for the 2023 Women in Security Awards Aotearoa are now being accepted.

The Women in Security Awards Aotearoa (WiSAA) initiative was established in 2020 to promote the role of women in sectors where they are still significantly underrepresented, and to recognise women who are advancing Aotearoa New Zealand’s security, risk and resilience sectors.

“What makes WiSAA uniquely special is the fact that it cuts across security domain boundaries and across the public, private, and community sectors in a way that no other awards programme in our sector does,” said NZSM chief editor Nicholas Dynon. “The awards are also famously independent, which means no sponsorships, no paid promotions, no gala award events, and no trophies.”

“This year we’re retiring our old cohort of award categories in favour of what we believe to be a revolutionary new approach in which our nine categories correspond to the protection of New Zealanders from particular threats,” said Nicholas.

“Identifying the right categories was by no means an exact science, but the process did take into account the results of the National Security Public Survey, the current National Security Intelligence Priorities, and the weight of recent public discourse.”

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And the categories are: 1. Preventing retail and violent crime 2. Securing organisations and infrastructure 3. Disrupting information and cyber threats 4. Countering incivility and violent extremism 5. Confronting bullying and online harm 6. Combatting fraud and misrepresentation 7. Protecting borders, trade, and biosecurity 8. Responding to natural disaster events 9. Building resilient communities Nominees must be women, or identify as women, with more than three years of experience in any occupation within either the physical security, personnel security, information security, cybersecurity, investigations, intelligence, risk management, emergency management or resilience domains, and be actively practising in Aotearoa New Zealand.

Nominations are encouraged from across the private, public (including government, education, military, and law enforcement) and community sectors. It is important to note that these awards are open to the broader security sector, not just ‘industry’. Self-nominations are welcomed.

Nominations will be assessed on the extent to which the nominee’s efforts over the past 18 months reflect the values articulated in the category descriptions (refer to website below).

The deadline for nominations is 4:00pm, Friday 10 November 2023, and nominations of no more than 1,000 words (including supporting material) are to be emailed to editor@defsec.net.nz For more information, including detailed descriptions of each award category, visit https://defsec.net.nz/ women-in-security-aotearoa/ A judging panel of eminent sector professionals is set to be announced in early November, and winners will be announced via the Defsec New Zealand website on 01 December.

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DEFENCE

As new Air Force Chief begins role, new leaders appointed With Air Vice-Marshal Darryn Webb officially commencing duties as the new Chief of Air Force, new appointees step into the Deputy Chief and Air Component Commander positions.

According to a 03 October NZDF report, Air Vice-Marshal Darryn Webb has officially commenced his duties as the new Chief of Air Force. Predecessor Air ViceMarshal Andrew Clark has been appointed as the Director of the Government Communications Security Bureau.

AVM Webb has served in the RNZAF for 33 years and has accumulated more than 6,000 hours of flying, conducting multiple operational missions and deployments.

He was Head of Managed Isolation and Quarantine, seconded into the All of Government response.

Courtesy of NZDF.

Courtesy of NZDF.

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He was appointed a Member of the New Zealand Order of Merit (MNZM) in the 2022 New Year Honours list for services to the Defence Force in recognition of this role.

“My connections with the Air Force runs deep and it’s an absolute privilege to stand here this afternoon.” He said at the formal Change of Command parade recently at RNZAF Base Ohakea.

“We continue to stand on the shoulders of those who have gone

before us, and we benefit from their effort and contribution,” he said, addressing aviators in attendance. “But now it’s our turn, it’s your turn to add your own stitch or thread to the tapestry that is the RNZAF.” “I ask you to make that stitch vibrant, make it strong and make it last. The future has many challenges coming at us across the horizon.

It will probably require us to be concurrently deployed around the world, it will require us to work even more closely with our critical partners.”

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Deputy Chief and ACC Meanwhile, Air Commodore Andy Scott has stepped into the role of Air Component Commander and Air Commodore D.J Hunt has become the new Deputy Chief of Air Force.

AIRCDRE Scott’s appointment follows a year of study in London at Staff College.

“If we look at where we are going to be in three years, it’s looking like quite a different Air Force,” he said.

“We are looking at what is getting introduced and also at replacement options for the Seasprites and Boeing 757s - there are some huge changes and challenges ahead and making sure all the way through we’re still delivering on operations is really exciting.”

He also indicated a focus on personnel and opportunities available across the Air Force that have opened up over the past year.

“For people who are adequately trained and can demonstrate their performance, they are going to start very quickly moving through the organisation and I think that’s really exciting,” he said. “I look forward to being able to empower our people as they come through and see what we can do to ensure they are getting the working environment that they want to work in.”

AIRCDRE D.J Hunt says his latest role in Capability Branch has prepared him to look to the future facing the Air Force.

“I was leading planning for the investments or projects we’re going to start in the few years,” he said. “I was working closely with the Ministry of Defence to give that forward look as to what investments we might be asking Government for and how that stacks up against priorities for the Service and Portfolios.”

“We need to start aligning ourselves into what our Air Force will look like in 20 years, what it needs to be delivering, what the Government expects, what our partners expect from us and making sure we can deliver.

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Courtesy of NZDF.

“And that’s exciting because the developments in technology – cyber, artificial intelligence, the information domain, the space domain – those are all relatively new for us and their use will become more prevalent in the future. We need to have an idea of how we are going to approach sequence them into Air Force operations.”

According to AIRCDRE Hunt, today’s Air Force is very different to the Air Force he as recruited into.

“Now there are so many avenues that are going to open up for new aviators as the Air Force moves quickly in line with the digital information age. The new capabilities like the P-8A Poseidon and C-130J Hercules will see changes in the way we operate, but the emerging technologies will bring some real game changers and people shouldn’t constrain their thinking about how we use it.

“There are opportunities for aviators to adjust and develop their careers to suit and I think we are much more open to this than perhaps we were 20, 30 or 40 years ago. It’s exciting times.”

Former Chief to GCSB In late August, Public Service Commissioner Peter Hughes announced the appointment of former RNZAF Chief AVM Andrew Clark to the position of Director-General and Chief Executive of the Government Communications Security Bureau and Chief Executive, the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB).

“I’m very pleased to appoint Mr Clark to this role,” Mr Hughes said. “Mr Clark is a highly respected and skilled leader with a deep understanding of the national security challenges and opportunities facing New Zealand.”

“Mr Clark is committed and well-prepared to lead the GCSB and is closely connected with the organisation’s purpose,” said continued. “He is a successful, high-performing leader and is dedicated to meeting the standards expected of the Public Service.”

He has been appointed for five years from 30 October 2023.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

New Zealand resumes Sinai peacekeeping force leadership New Zealand will again contribute to the leadership of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt, with a senior NZDF officer returning as Interim Force Commander.

Defence Minister Andrew Little and Foreign Affairs Minister Nanaia Mahuta announced on 02 October that New Zealand Army officer Major General Evan Williams will take on the role. The NZDF will also deploy two additional personnel to support him.

MAJGEN Williams will lead the MFO for up to six months from October. He previously led the organisation for three-and-a-half years from 2019.

“Major General Williams is highly qualified for this interim role and is held in high regard within the MFO,” Andrew Little said. “This is a reflection of New Zealand’s standing in the world and the trust our partners place in New Zealand.”

The MFO is a neutral arbiter in monitoring the security provisions of the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty.

It comprises 1,100 international military personnel and an additional 700 local civilian staff.

New Zealand has maintained a consistent military presence in the MFO since its formation in 1982 and two New Zealanders have previously held the Force Commander role – Major General Don McIver in 1989-91 and Major General Warren Whiting in 2010-14.

With 28 personnel, New Zealand’s contribution to the MFO is one of the country’s most significant current commitments to Middle East regional stability and 32

the international rules-based system.

This contribution is mandated until 30 September 2024.

Calls for humanitarian pause in Gaza In a 25 October statement to the UN Security Council, New Zealand has joined others in the international community calling for a humanitarian pause in Gaza and the immediate establishment of humanitarian corridors and safe areas to protect innocent civilians living in the Gaza strip.

“The provision of essential support to innocent civilians living in Gaza, such as food, water, fuel, and shelter, as well as the facilitation of humanitarian aid is an obligation under the Fourth Geneva Convention that must be upheld immediately,” Prime Minister Chris Hipkins said.

“We call on all parties to the conflict to commit to a humanitarian pause and for Israel and Egypt to use

a cessation of hostilities to rapidly facilitate unimpeded humanitarian assistance to civilians living in Gaza.

“Humanitarian corridors must be established in order for sufficient aid to regularly flow into Gaza, and safe areas must be put in place that are free from military targeting to provide a refuge for innocent civilians who have nowhere to go.”

“It’s intolerable to see civilians continue to suffer disproportionately as innocent victims of this conflict,” said Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta.

New Zealand supports the right of Israel to defend itself against Hamas’s terrorist attacks, but the way it does so matters. It must abide by international law, exercise restraint, and prioritise the protection of civilians.

Ultimately there is no military solution that will bring about a just and lasting peace for Israelis and Palestinians.”

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Breaking the Code: Understanding the linguistics of geno-urbicide in Gaza According to a Charles Darwin University academic, six linguistic strategies can offer an understanding of the complex geopolitical and ideological dynamics in Gaza.

Charles Darwin University forensic linguistics expert Dr Awni Etaywe has referred to Israel’s military offensive in Gaza as an act of ‘geno-urbicide’, which involves both systematic genocidal acts and intentional destruction of cities, resulting in significant loss of life and the devastation of urban landscapes.

A lecturer and researcher focusing on terrorism, incitement to hatred and violence, and digital deviance, Dr Etaywe is a former UN Observer/‘expert-on-mission’, with training on the law of armed conflict and the protection of civilians and children.

“Geno-urbicide can be viewed as being a strategic option adopted primarily for political reasons, aiming to intimidate, humiliate, retaliate, eliminate or force targeted homogeneous groups of population to leave their homeland, or to deprive the population of any satisfactory geopolitical and demographic settlement,” stated Dr Etaywe.

According to Dr Etaywe, genocide hinges on two elements: (i) the deliberate mass killing or destruction of specific groups based on nationality, ethnicity, race or religion, and (ii) the expression of genocidal intent.

In the case of Gaza, he states that “the end state of the destruction appears to be a national, expansionist Line of Defence

project – as stated by Netanyahu: ‘In the final stage, we will be able to build and expand […] I would say that there is a primary national, even historical, mission here’.”

Etaywe identifies six linguistic strategies that can offer understanding of the complex geopolitical and ideological dynamics in Gaza: 1. The explicit directive language of perpetrators or those inciting genocide, as in: ‘wipe out’, ‘erase’, ‘level the place’, ‘kill all Palestinians’, and ‘Turn the strip into a slaughterhouse’.

2. Dehumanising the victims, as in Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant’s order of a ‘complete siege’ on ‘non-humans’, because ‘We are fighting human animals and we are acting accordingly’: “I have ordered a complete siege on the Gaza Strip. There will be no electricity, no food, no fuel, everything is closed.”

3. Assignment of responsibility on the civilians, and blame shifting to justify a collective punishment and deliberate attack on the civilians in Gaza, as in Israeli President Isaac Herzog’s declaration: ‘It’s an entire nation out there that is responsible. This rhetoric about civilians not being

aware, not being involved, it’s absolutely not true.’

4. Demonising children to justify a deliberate attack on children; Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu describes the war as ‘a struggle between the children of light and the children of darkness’.

5. Religious legitimisation of a combined colonial project that aims for a complete dispossession of the Palestinian land: Netanyahu declares it a combined mission to realise a religious prophecy: ‘With shared forces, […] we will realize the prophecy of Isaiah 60:18’.

6. Moral justification of destroying buildings protected by international law, such as hospitals, mosques and churches: Netanyahu states that: ‘Beneath the hospitals, schools, mosques, and homes in Gaza lies a horrific underworld of Hamas terrorism. In order to dismantle Hamas, we must dismantle their underground tunnel.’

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY The Emergence of China’s Smart State

A first-of-its-kind book interrogates the complex, dynamic interactions between political, market, and technological factors that structure China’s digital development.

China’s emergence as a technology leader has become a major factor in geopolitics, transforming global political and economic relationships. In its bid to achieve digital great power status, China’s government has reformed laws and policies, drastically increased investment, and become more assertive internationally.

Since Xi Jinping’s establishment in 2014 of a government Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatisation, the Chinese government has set ambitious digital goals around internet, big data, blockchain, cloud computing, operational technologies, and artificial intelligence.

The Emergence of China’s Smart State assesses the extent to which Beijing has been able to achieve its digital goals and, more broadly, how this reflects rapidly changing domestic and international political and economic dynamics surrounding China’s rise as a major technology player.

Edited by Leiden University’s Rogier Creemers, the book explores the complexity of China’s digital policy landscape, the process of learning and iteration the Chinese Communist Party continues to experience as external events impact the policy process, and the impact China’s innovation policies, regulations, and achievements have had, or may have, in the future.

“The goal of this book is to understand and explain the various facets of China’s digital ambitions and the policies by which it seeks to realise it. That means this is a book, first and foremost, about China itself,” writes Dr Creemers in his introduction to the book.

“That means two things: first, it does not primarily approach the subject of technology in China from the angle of Sino-American tensions, a dominant theme in the literature at present. Instead, the goal of this book is to adopt a Beijing-centric perspective. Second, this book does not take an evaluative approach that attempts to gauge the extent to which China meets the criteria of any particular academic or normative framework.”

Creemers’ point is that attempts to understand China through the prisms of Western theories and values “actually tells us very little about what animates or informs decision-making and policy evolutions 34

in China… and blinds us to perceiving the logic and rationality of the Chinese system on its own terms.”

“Lastly, the point of this book is not to declare victory or defeat of the digital power strategy or smart state ambitions. Rather, it is to highlight the dynamic changes, complexities, and contradictions inherent in China’s digital development policies.”

Rogier Creemers is a lecturer in modern Chinese studies at Leiden University. His research focuses on Chinese domestic digital technology policy, as well as China’s growing importance in global digital affairs.

Fellow editors Straton Papagianneas and Adam Knight are PhD candidates at Leiden University.

The book is published by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. It is available in hardback and as an eBook, which has been made available free online.

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Who cares in peacebuilding?

Universities call for action to improve support for carers 29 October, the inaugural International Day of Care and Support, saw several universities and international organisations call for better support for peacebuilders with caring responsibilities.

On the inaugural International Day of Care and Support, several universities issued a joint statement with senior members of government agencies and international organisations, including the UN, to highlight barriers in the recruitment, retention, and advancement of peacebuilding practitioners with caring responsibilities.

Initial research undertaken by Monash University and the University of Warwick suggests that most people in the sector believe their caring responsibilities – principally having children – impacts their work, hinders career progression, or forces them to leave or change their career.

Dr Eleanor Gordon, from Monash University’s Gender, Peace and Security Centre said this is not due to personal choice, but to a wide range of organisational, normative, work culture, and practical challenges – many of which can be addressed without significant investment of time or money.

“Unpaid care remains invisible, undervalued and neglected in economic, social and foreign policymaking.

The overlooked, undervalued and highly gendered nature of unpaid care work is also a key factor in women’s persistent underrepresentation in peacebuilding,” Dr Gordon said.

The joint statement draws attention to this impact on the representation of women in peacebuilding, and the subsequent negative impacts on peacebuilding outcomes.

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The joint statement also invites peacebuilding practitioners globally to share their views on peacebuilding and care work in a survey, in order to gather data on an overlooked topic and to inform policy and practice.

Survey results will inform a report aimed at raising awareness, provoking further discussion, and effecting change in the sector to better support people with caring responsibilities in peacebuilding and, in turn, increase the success of peacebuilding.

The statement and survey was jointly developed by Monash University, University of Warwick, RMIT and the University of Sydney with senior members of Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), Swisspeace, Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF), Saferworld, International Peace Institute (IPI), UN Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO), UN Women, African Union Commission (AUC), and Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC).

The UN General Assembly invited all stakeholders globally to observe the International Day of Care and Support to raise awareness of care and support as a key contributor to the sustainability of societies and economies, as well as of the need to invest in a resilient and inclusive care economy.

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HOMELAND SECURITY

State of Threat: The challenges to Aotearoa New Zealand’s national security

Increasing US–China tensions, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, disruptions to supply chains and maritime trade, right-wing extremism and evolving digital currencies, according to a new book published by Massey University Press the security context is fraught.

Associate Professor William Hoverd, Director – Centre for Defence and Security Studies (CDSS).

In State of Threat: The challenges to Aotearoa New Zealand’s national security, published by Massey University Press in November, local and international academics and sector experts discuss the issues facing New Zealand across defence, diplomacy, intelligence, policy, trade, biosecurity and border management.

The book is edited by Associate Professor William Hoverd, Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies (CDSS) at Massey University, and Deidre Ann McDonald, a Teaching Fellow at CDSS. According to Hoverd, it is a particularly volatile time internationally. “The last time tensions were this high was in the Cold War,” he said. “All our authors see turbulence and uncertainty in the

international environment in ways which they have not seen before.”

“There is heightened language around risk and threat arising from the ongoing war in Ukraine and the tensions between the United States and China. And let’s not forget that Australia, our only military ally, has been having a particularly challenging time with China over the last couple of years.”

Each of the four parts of the book examine a relevant security issue or theme, from threats to the international rules-based order, such as Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, to the ever-present challenges of domestic terrorism and extremism, the illicit domestic drug trade and potential biosecurity breaches. New potential threats are described,

Deidre Ann McDonald is a teaching fellow with Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University.

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including the vulnerability of our deep-sea submarine cables, which connect us to the digital world, and the disruptive power of cryptocurrencies.

The book raises tough questions, especially around the decisions New Zealanders need to make about our foreign and trade policies in response to the US-China Great Power Competition in the Pacific.

It also looks at some misconceptions about our domestic safety, asking the provocative question, ‘What exactly does a terrorist look like?’.

This timely and up-to-date analysis of New Zealand’s most important security issues is a mustread for anyone interested in today’s ‘threatscape’ and how New Zealand can navigate safely through it.

Associate Professor William Hoverd is the director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies (CDSS) at Massey University.

CDSS teaches New Zealand’s

only qualifications in defence studies, security studies, border and biosecurity, and intelligence. This is his fourth book.

Deidre Ann McDonald is a teaching fellow with Centre for Defence and Security Studies at Massey University. Prior to teaching,

Dee had a legal career — mostly working in the government sector.

She now coordinates Massey University’s Diploma and Certificate in Border and Biosecurity. Dee has recently submitted her PhD on Aotearoa’s Mycoplasma bovis incursion.

State of Threat The challenges to Aotearoa New Zealand’s national security EDITED BY WIL HOVERD & DEIDRE ANN MCDONALD

Increasing US–China tensions, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, disruptions to supply chains and maritime trade, right-wing extremism, gangs and the drug trade . . . The international and domestic security environment is dynamic and fraught.

In State of Threat, local and international academics and sector experts discuss the issues facing New Zealand across defence, diplomacy, intelligence, policy, trade and border management.

PUBLISHED: 9 NOVEMBER 2023 ISBN: 9781991016522 RRP: $60

This timely and up-to-date analysis of New Zealand’s most important security issues is a must-read for policy analysts, those working in risk management and industry leaders across all sectors of the economy.

Available online and from all good bookstores www.masseypress.ac.nz/books/state-of-threat

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HOMELAND SECURITY

National Security Strategy highlights cybersecurity as a core national security issue A recently published Fortinet whitepaper echoes New Zealand’s new National Security Strategy’s concerns around the growing threat from malicious cyber activities.

Launched in last month, Aotearoa New Zealand’s first ever national security strategy breaks new ground in articulating a vision for navigating a dynamic security environment and the national security threats we face.

“The cyber domain is increasingly a theatre for strategic competition and profit, states Secure Together Tō Tātou Korowai Manaaki: New Zealand’s National Security Strategy 2023-2028. “The likelihood and disruptive impacts of malicious cyber activities impacting information systems, telecommunication networks, and information technology infrastructures is growing.”

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Cyber security means protecting people and their computers, networks, programs, and data from unauthorised access, disruption, exploitation, or modification, states the Strategy. “Malicious cyber actors, including state and non-state actors, present a persistent threat to all New Zealanders as well as New Zealand organisations, businesses, and government.”

“Beyond the risk of cyberattacks by nation states, organised crime and even lone cyber hackers have the intent and capacity to threaten businesses and individuals,” write Glenn Maiden and Nicole Quinn, authors of Fortinet’s Government

and Industry: Partnering on Cybersecurity to Strengthen Data Security whitepaper.

“The security message is clear: whatever their origin, cyber threats present substantial new risks to individuals, businesses, governments, and nations,” they state. “Developing stronger security against such threats is an essential requirement.”

National Security Threat In addition to being listed as one of the twelve “core national security issues” identified in the National Security Strategy, cybersecurity plays a critical role across almost all of them. The four core issues of

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Emerging, Critical, and Sensitive Technologies; Disinformation; Foreign Interference and Espionage; and Transnational Organised Crime, for example, are clearly issues where cybersecurity is a key component.

Importantly, cybersecurity has a clear role to play in the core national security issue of Economic Security. According to the Strategy, economic security is about “building our resilience to shocks or external pressures, with the goal of safeguarding our independence and sovereignty”, and key to this is strengthening the resilience of our critical infrastructure from cyberattack and other disruptions.

Critical infrastructure is an attractive target for cyber threats, write Maiden and Quinn, “which can be remotely delivered, such as malware arriving hidden in an email or enabled through some element of human intervention (the so-called insider threat) or by conventional military means.”

Cyber enabled disruption is not limited by geography, meaning New Zealand’s cannot rely on its relative geographic isolation. Exposed critical infrastructure is an attractive target to a financially motivated criminal in Europe. It is also a very attractive option to cause targeted disruption or manipulation by a hostile foreign power.

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During covid, for example, we saw the level of intricate interconnectivity in our supply chains. We also saw how critical digital systems are to keeping our supply chains safe. A very minor cyber incident to a single component could easily cause widespread disruption. This is a compelling motive for a cybercriminal to extort a ransom or a hostile nation state wanting to make a point.

Secure Together The Government’s ability to deliver on the National Security Strategy, state its authors, depends on working together with New Zealand society and with international partners. The bulk of cyber security capability and effort, they acknowledge, “occurs outside government, with individuals and private organisations working to protect their data, networked devices, and infrastructure.”

It’s a key point echoed in the Fortinet whitepaper. “Better cooperation between public and private entities will deliver greater visibility of threats with shared intelligence, better use of scarce cyber specialists, and better management of incident response,” state Maiden and Quinn. It’s about “working together on a shared protective mission.”

Advanced cyber defences capabilities from industry leaders

like Fortinet are already installed in every industry, in nearly every country across the globe. Harnessing this “system of systems” for real time threat intelligence is a vital component to a nation’s security.

There is no silver bullet, which necessitates the bringing of a full arsenal of advanced technical capability to the forefront of our defence strategy. Many people think that a simple firewall is enough, but providers such as Fortinet have a range of technologies to protect cloud and Operations Technology (OT) environments, as well as advanced deception, endpoint and active threat reconnaissance capability.

By converging a platform of defence to every corner of the national attack surface, combined with exercised defence strategy we can significantly raise our national resilience, and minimise the impact of a cyber threat.

“Given the growth of cyber threats, it has never been more important for the New Zealand government to coordinate with a much broader group of stakeholders, partnering to protect our shared interests,” state Maiden and Quinn. “It needs to be clearly understood that securing cyber and physical infrastructure is a shared responsibility.”

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HOMELAND SECURITY

Allied Universal releases World Security Report 2023 According to the first-ever World Security Report, large global companies lost a combined $1 trillion in revenue in 2022 due to physical security incidents. Economic unrest is expected to have major security impact over next 12 months.

In addition to economic unrest, the report also found that companies anticipate a surge in social unrest, climate change, fraud and theft. As a result, physical security budgets are predicted to increase significantly to keep people, property and assets safe. Security leaders intend to focus investments on advanced technology and providing security professionals with additional skills and training.

Fraud – deception intended to result in gain – is likely to be the biggest external threat over the coming year. The leaking of sensitive information is predicted to be the biggest internal threat. Dangers posed by hackers, protestors, spies and economic criminals are expected to soar.

Commissioned by Allied Universal and its international business, G4S, the World Security Report documents opinions of 1,775 chief security officers (CSO) or those in equivalent positions from 30 countries. Working for large, global companies with a combined annual revenue of more than $20 trillion – a quarter of the world’s gross domestic product, CSO participation was independent and anonymous.

“As the world’s leading security company, we commissioned this report for the benefit of the entire industry and the companies we protect,” said Steve Jones, Allied Universal’s global chairman and CEO. 40

“It comes at a time when organizations across the globe are increasingly navigating more complex security hazards and threats.

The research shows the impact of security threats on organizations is multidimensional – from the disruption of productivity to the loss of customers, to the potentially staggering financial impact.”

Among the report’s high-level findings: • More than USD$1 trillion in revenue was lost by companies as a consequence of physical security incidents in 2022.

• One in four (25 percent) publiclylisted companies reported a drop in their value following a physical security incident over the last year.

• Institutional Investors surveyed estimated an average decrease in value of 29 percent for publicly-listed companies due to a significant security incident in the last year.

Security-impacting hazards The report found that economic unrest will be the biggest securityimpacting hazard over the next 12 months – this was according to nearly half of CSOs surveyed. Asia Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa are anticipated to be the most impacted regions in the world.

After economic unrest, climate change is anticipated to be the

second greatest hazard by 38% of participants. Social unrest is expected to pose a threat by 35 percent of CSOs, up from 31% the previous year, and one third of CSOs expect disruption to energy supplies to impact security.

Unsurprisingly, 32 percent of respondents indicated that the threat from war and political instability is also likely to increase, up from 25 percent last year. Interestingly, the biggest hazard last year was pandemics reported by 42 percent of those surveyed.

Internal threats Internal threats are expected to increase next year, with 92 percent of CSOs anticipating their company will be targeted.

Misuse of company resources or data was identified as the most common internal threat by 35 percent of respondents, followed by leaking sensitive information at 34 percent, which is on the increase – particularly in the Asia Pacific region.

Unauthorised access to company resources or data, industrial espionage and intellectual property theft are also all expected to increase in the next year. While misuse of company resources or data was the internal incident most likely to have driven companies to improve their security in the last 12 months.

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External threats CSOs expect all external threats to increase in the next year, with fraud predicted by 25% of CSOs to be the biggest external threat, followed by phishing and social engineering (24 percent) and theft of company physical property (23 percent).

Fraud was expected to most likely impact Sub-Saharan Africa compared to any other region next year.

Geopolitical tensions are expected to compromise the security of supply chains and could result in disruptions to global trade in the next year, according to 87 percent of CSOs. Businesses in the financial services and consumer staples sectors predict the most significant increases in external threats, closely followed by those in the energy and real estate sectors.

Threat actor groups Threat actor groups include violent criminals, petty criminals, economic criminals, terrorists and subversives (hackers, protestors, or spies). The two groups predicted to cause the most security incidents in the next year are subversives and Line of Defence

economic criminals at 50 percent and 49 percent respectively – a significant increase on the previous year.

Security incidents committed by terrorists are expected to rise from 19 to 26 percent next year at a global level, while security threats from violent criminals are predicted to increase next year, from 27 to 33 percent.

In North America, CSOs expect security incidents by violent criminals to increase from 41 to 49 percent. North America is the region expected to be most impacted by both economic criminals and subversives.

Dangerous regions Respondents believe that the most dangerous region to operate in is northeast Asia. Southern Europe, North Africa and Southern Africa were all considered the least dangerous.

Companies actively operating in dangerous regions are more likely to view these regions as risky when measuring threats and potential risks, compared to companies who do not have a footprint in those territories.

People “It is clear that global companies expect security professionals to have a multitude of skills that they were not expected to have 10 years ago,” wrote Allied Universal CEO Steve Jones and G4S Executive Chairman Ashley Almanza. “For example, it is now much more important for a security professional to have technological capabilities and a high level of customer service training.”

People skills in frontline officers are more important than physical attributes of strength according to 9 out of 10 respondents. The top traits and skills that are extremely important for frontline security officers to possess are: Integrity and honesty, a strong understanding of technology, Industry-specific experience, and Customer service skills.

“Global companies recognize the value of highly skilled and intelligent security professionals protecting their most important assets, with 94% saying the ability to speak multiple languages and 96% saying a higher education degree are important for a frontline security professional,” wrote Jones and Almanza.

Recruiting security officers will be a challenge for 8 in 10 CSOs. 41

HOMELAND SECURITY Technology CSOs rated their technological advancement in terms of their physical security program, with a detailed set of criteria. These ranged from minimal tech use, to advanced and followed by cutting edge.

According to these criteria, Latin America was identified as the most advanced region in the world in its use of cutting edge technology.

The shift from purely staffed security operations to technologyenabled,] is challenging according to 9 in 10 CSOs. The top two barriers companies face when implementing technology are the cost to implement and the cost to maintain.

A third of CSOs are concerned about the lack of skills in the security workforce and the lack of internal skills in their own company to implement technology. They found that technology improves the overall effectiveness of security operations, enabling security staff to be more productive and efficient.

“As the pace of technological advancement quickens, its importance as part of the bestdesigned security solution increases,” wrote Jones and Almanza. “The challenges of combining the right technology with the right people, are made evident in this report.

CSOs were generally of the opinion that physical and cyber security are increasingly interlinked.

9 out of 10 respondents said cyber threats that threaten physical security are challenging to their businesses. Yet, 9 in 10 CSOs said company leaders are more concerned with cyber than physical security.

Security provider confidence and involvement According to survey responses, when a company uses a single third-party security provider for more than 80% of its security requirements, the number of incidents falls and confidence in being able to deal with security incidents effectively, increases.

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The average level of confidence for those with a high level of providerdelivered security is 82 percent compared to 54 percent for those with low involvement.

“The data shows that a trusted partnership between a customer and their security provider transforms the effectiveness of the overall security program,” wrote Jones and Almanza.

Physical security budgets Physical security budgets are expected to significantly increase at 46 percent of respondent companies, with budgets in North America expected to rise the most of any region. Security budgets represented approximately $660 billion (3.3 percent) of global revenue at respondent companies in 2022.

More than half of CSOs will prioritise their spending on new technology and training staff.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is top of the agenda for future physical security technology investment, with 42 percent intending to invest in AI and AI-powered surveillance over the next five years.

The three top budgetary drivers globally are expected to be rising operational costs, international economic instability and domestic security concerns.

Methodology The research was conducted with two audiences: global company physical security managers and global institutional investors In relation to global company security managers, research was carried out via an online survey between 20 and 31 March 20 2023, with a total of 1,775 respondents across 30 countries and 13 languages.

A quota-based random selection process was used within each country by industry and each country’s data was weighted to have an equal proportion in the global results (with the exception of the U.S. to reflect their larger economy).

In relation to global Institutional Investors, online research on 17 April 2023, with a total of 200 investors. A quota-based random selection process was used to select them by type and geography.

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iSANZ Awards unveils finalists for 2023 The iSANZ Awards, an annual event recognising exceptional achievements in Aotearoa New Zealand’s cybersecurity and information security sector, has revealed its highlyanticipated list of finalists for 2023.

The iSANZ Awards has revealed its highly-anticipated list of finalists for 2023.

According to iSANZ organisers, this year’s finalists showcase outstanding contributions in various categories, including Senior Cyber Security Professional of the Year, Security Team of the Year, Project/Awareness Initiative of the Year, NZ Secure Development Team of the Year, Start-up or New Business of the Year, and Up and Coming Cyber Security Star of the Year.

“We’ve seen a remarkable array of submissions from individuals and organisations nationwide who are tackling the most pressing cybersecurity challenges with unwavering dedication, excellence, innovation, and leadership,” said Kendra Ross, Chair of iSANZ. An independent judging panel faced a challenging task of selecting finalists from a 50-strong pool of nominations. The finalists are: NZ Secure Development Team of the Year BNZ Pixie Mob. Cassini Limited.

DevSecOps with the Golden Path at The Warehouse Group.

Security Team of the Year BNZ Cyber and Governance Team Datacom Cyber Defence Operations Centre EQC Security Team Project / Awareness Initiative of the Year Ministry of Education Cyber Security and Digital Services Programme.

Te Whatu Ora, Cyber Security Uplift Programme – Sector Protect.

Cyber Skills Aotearoa.

Start-up or New Business of the Year Cybershore Limited.

Outfox.

CyberCure.

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Senior Cyber Security Professional of the Year Philip Whitmore, Partner – Cybersecurity at KPMG. Conan Bradley, Cyber Incident Response Manager at Kordia.

Thomas Britton, Co-Founder of CyberTeam NZ and National Technical Program Lead – Cyber at Te Whatu Ora Health New Zealand.

Up and Coming Cyber Security Star of the Year Kent Wolstenholme, Security Consultant at PrivSec Consulting.

Megan Young, Security Governance, Risk and Architecture Specialist at Spark.

Eleanor Wright, Lead Security Consultant at Quantum Security.

“We extend our gratitude to all entrants and finalists for their invaluable contributions in safeguarding networks, people, and our nation against cybercrime and malicious online activities,” said Kendra. “Collectively, we stand as a strong force – working to secure Aotearoa’s digital tomorrow.”

The winners will be unveiled at a prestigious gala awards evening on 14th November at Wellington’s Te Papa Museum. A special nominee will also be inducted into the Hall of Fame category, recognising their outstanding contributions to the cybersecurity industry.

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HOMELAND SECURITY

Another day, another roadblock: how should NZ law deal with disruptive climate protests?

According to Waikato University’s Professor Alexander Gillespie, activists are resorting to increasingly disruptive forms of protest, and governments are hitting them with increasingly harsher penalties. What’s the answer?

Alexander Gillespie is Professor in the law faculty at the University of Waikato.

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The most recent protest by the Restore Passenger Rail climate protest group, in which a Wellington car dealership was defaced with red paint, is not just the latest in a local movement – it’s part of a global trend.

Airline bosses have been hit with cream pies, Just Stop Oil protesters have glued themselves to iconic pieces of art in famous galleries, school students are skipping school to march for climate justice, and airport runways have been invaded.

Everywhere, including in New Zealand, roads and highways have been blocked.

It’s entirely likely such protests will continue and escalate in their impact as the climate emergency worsens, and frustration grows with a perceived lack of meaningful government action.

Groups such Extinction Rebellion view “non-violent direct action and civil disobedience” as not only justifiable but crucial in the face of what they see as an urgent existential threat.

But for every climate action there has been a political and legal reaction. From Europe to Australia there have been crackdowns. New laws have been drafted in Britain to create specific offences such as

obstructing major transport works, interfering with key national infrastructure, and causing serious disruption by tunnelling.

Earlier this year, a New Zealander living in Britain was given a “draconian” three-year prison sentence for his role in a protest that shut down a busy road in London.

With the stakes rising, it’s important that governments and legal systems find ways to adapt, without risking a climate protest arms race that may only encourage increasingly unreasonable impacts on the general public.

Rights and freedoms In New Zealand, a trend towards authorities reaching for harsher penalties is also evident.

The traditional sentence for obstructing a public road without consent is a fine of up to NZ$1,000.

Such penalties are now being augmented with potential charges of criminal nuisance, and police have warned that protesters could face up to 14 years in jail for endangering transport.

That is longer than many serious crimes, including the maximum ten years under proposed law changes for ram-raiding.

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At the same time, protest is a critical part of free and democratic societies, and has been used (often in novel ways) to achieve change we now take for granted.

Although there is no specific right to protest in law, protesting is a manifestation of the rights to freedom of movement, association and peaceful assembly in most liberal societies.

Globally, such rights are protected by the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the related framework of human rights treaties. In Aotearoa New Zealand, the Bill of Rights Act 1990 guarantees those rights.

No absolute right to protest And yet, the right to protest is not absolute. As with most rights, it can be subject to such reasonable legal limits as can be justified in a free and democratic society.

In practice, this means not all forms of protest may be permissible, such as disorderly acts or ones that risk violence or public safety.

Tolerance of protest and some levels of inconvenience should be expected in liberal democracies. But intentional Line of Defence

and serious disruption to ordinary life may be illegal if it is done unreasonably.

Determining what is reasonable is the hard part. It involves assessing the scale and impact of the inconvenience, and the rights and freedoms of others affected.

So, peaceful protests that cause temporary inconvenience and limited obstruction might be permissible.

But repeatedly blocking people from going about their business for prolonged periods may not be.

Climate protests exist at a moral and legal intersection. Reducing carbon emissions means targeting roads, highways and fossil fuelpowered vehicles by creating blockades and choke-points. But for centuries, authorities have been charged with keeping those vital routes open for citizens.

Worlds collide The challenge is to find the balance between two world views that are colliding. It’s wrong to try to silence legitimate dissent, but how do governments and other authorities make room for, and even facilitate, a protest movement aimed at altering fundamental behaviours?

One response might be to designate new areas where such protests can be held (including on roads) as a way to help those messages be heard and seen. These must be authorised and conducted in ways that don’t unreasonably hinder the rights of other citizens.

But it is unlikely to be enough for more radical ends of the protest movement, which clearly view direct and increasingly disruptive actions as the only effective method.

There may be no simple answer.

But New Zealand’s next government should review the current legal frameworks to ensure they are fit for purpose. People are equal before the law, and breaking the rules means being held to account.

But the penalties must not be disproportionate.

Law and policy already acknowledge the climate crisis will demand enormous effort and change.

They cannot also become blunt tools for repressing social movements dedicated to holding those same powers to account. *This article was first published in The Conversation on 15 September 2023.

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AEROSPACE

Government backing Canterbury’s future in aerospace industry Canterbury’s aerospace industry boosted by $5.4 million in infrastructure support for the Tāwhaki Aerospace Centre at Kaitorete.

“Today I can confirm we will provide a $5.4 million grant to the Tāwhaki Joint Venture to fund a sealed runway and hangar facilities to encourage investment, growth and continued research and development in New Zealand’s aerospace industry,” Infrastructure Minister Megan Woods said in a 03 October announcement.

“Tāwhaki predicts that over the next 10 years this development will contribute to over 1,300 highly skilled, high-paying jobs and up to $2.4bn in economic benefits.

“I’m pleased to be supporting a project that so obviously benefits New Zealand. The aerospace sector works alongside our world class universities and Government agencies to help drive economic growth, innovation and new jobs.”

“Today’s funding means that Tāwhaki can immediately look at opportunities to scale up the site and help the aerospace industry in New Zealand continue to take off.”

“Without this investment there is risk that some flagship aerospace companies would move offshore.

We want this sector to continue to thrive here, directly benefitting the local community in Canterbury, and wider New Zealand economy.”

Tāwhaki is a Māori-Crown partnership between Kaitorete mana whenua - Te Taumutu Rūnanga and Wairewa Rūnanga, and the Crown, 46

Image: Tāwhaki.

with a dual kaupapa to heal and rejuvenate the unique whenua at Kaitorete and advance Aotearoa’s aerospace industry.

The Māori-Crown partnership was executed through the formal signing of a joint venture agreement on 26th May 2021. The Crown and Kaitorete Limited each own 50% of the shares in Kaitorete Land Holding Limited which owns 1,000 hectares of land at Kaitorete, 50 minutes’ drive from the Christchurch CBD. The $5.4 million funding will help build $6.1 million sealed runway and hangar infrastructure at Kaitorete. The $700,000 co-funding will be provided by Tāwhaki.

“New Zealand has natural advantages in aerospace which can help secure its position as a leading place to safely test, trial and adopt

aerospace technologies,” Minister Woods said.

“Aerospace technologies will greatly improve how we respond to issues like climate change, emergency management and monitoring our ecosystems and natural resources.”

The current facility at Kaitorete is already being used by local companies including Kea Aerospace, Aerosearch and Swoop Aero, as well as the University of Canterbury. The new infrastructure will be used by a wider range of aerospace companies onshore and abroad, and research institutes, with the intention to scale up over time.

“It’s brilliant that Canterbury will directly benefit from our aerospace sector which is innovative and globally competitive,” Megan Woods said.

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Dawn Aerospace delivers hardware to deep space mining customer Dawn Aerospace has announced the delivery of an in-space propulsion system to deep space mission customer AstroForge.

California-based start-up AstroForge has ambitions to be the first private company to mine an asteroid in space. The company plans to extract precious platinum group metals from metal-rich asteroids and return them to Earth.

According to Dawn Aerospace, platinum group metals are a finite resource on Earth yet are necessary for a wide range of important technologies. They are used in medical devices such as pacemakers and are a crucial element in some cancer treatments.

They are also used as catalytic converters in cars to reduce harmful emissions by up to 90%, and they’re an essential element in hydrogen fuel cells that will help the world transition to a lower-emission economy.

AstroForge also hopes spacebased mining will reduce the emissions that stem from mining rare earth elements on Earth.

“AstroForge is quickly making progress towards our mission to mine asteroids for Earth’s most depleted and critical resources within this decade,” said AstroForge co-founder and CEO Matt Gialich.

“Earth’s resources are running out and traditional mining practices are destroying our planet. With our second mission, AstroForge will become the first private company to ever operate in deep space.”

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While space-based mining may have historically felt like a thing of science fiction, talented teams like AstroForge are making headway in enabling new, space-based technology which has the potential to fundamentally alter the impact of terrestrial mining,” said Dawn Aerospace CEO, Stefan Powell.

Astroforge already has a CubeSat on orbit, the Brokkr-1, proving out their refining technology. The next step is to head into deep space to observe their target asteroid, in preparation for their first retrieval mission. The spacecraft for this mission, Brokkr-2, is being built by UK company OrbAstro with Dawn supplying the propulsion system.

A successful hot fire – an in-lab demonstration of the firings that will happen on-orbit – was completed last

month at Dawn’s Delft office in The Netherlands.

“It’s extremely uncommon in the industry to be able to perform these system tests due to the toxicity of common propellants like hydrazine and ASCENT. Often the first time a propulsion system fires is when it’s needed in space, which is why you see failures such as the recent Lunar Flashlight mission,” Powell said, “These tests give our customers confidence that the system will work when it needs to”.

Dawn’s propulsion systems use nitrous oxide and propylene, a nontoxic, rideshare-friendly combination that gives the high performance required for deep-space missions while removing the handling costs and complexities involved with propellants such as hydrazine.

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REACH

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