Invasion of Ukraine: Implications for New Zealand

In a time of increased strategic competition, writes Wayne Mapp, New Zealand should be militarily prepared, both for our own protection and to be viewed as a credible partner among our friends and partners.

Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO was New Zealand’s Minister of Defence and Minister of Science and Innovation from 2008 to 2011. When I wrote this, the Russian invasion of Ukraine was unfolding. Putin’s expressed war aims, to demilitarise and to de-nazify Ukraine, requires Russia to completely occupy Ukraine or for Ukraine to surrender. After a week of war, it was not obvious that Putin would be able to succeed in his war aims.

The scale of the attack has not been seen in Europe since World War Two. This is also a reflection of Putin’s war aims. He intends, as much as possible, to restore the post-World War Two settlement. To do so means subduing the former Soviet republics, by force if necessary. However, Putin knows that he cannot reestablish the buffer that was once afforded by the Warsaw Pact. The NATO security guarantee ensures that NATO countries are pretty much immune from attack by Russia. Of course, the guarantee does not extend to non-NATO countries, as the invasion of Ukraine has amply demonstrated.

The absence of the NATO security guarantee to Ukraine means that Putin will do his utmost to rebuild the former Soviet Union. Perhaps not as a single state, but with the great majority of 15 nations that made up the USSR being held to owe their fealty to Russia. Clearly Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, being members of NATO, won’t be part of this process.

Russia is clearly willing to accept that the invasion of Ukraine will result in a new Cold War between the West and Russia. The severity of the sanctions, especially with the SWIFT payment system being denied to Russia, is such that Russia will be almost as isolated from the wider global economy as was the Soviet Union. The cutoff won’t be quite so severe, given that Russian nationals are still able to travel to a much greater degree than in the Soviet era.

What are the wider implications of such a new Cold War, both for the western world in general, and for New Zealand?

Will Russia’s actions embolden other states to reorder the status quo through military force, including direct invasion? For instance, would China now contemplate that an invasion of Taiwan would not be met with forceful resistance by the United States and its allies?

A Chinese invasion of Taiwan seems much less likely than Putin’s latest invasion. The United States and NATO made it very clear to Russia that they would not intervene militarily in the event of a Russian invasion of Ukraine. The same does not apply to Taiwan. President Biden has been quite specific that the United States would defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack. Japan and Australia have not ruled out military support for Taiwan. Such an invasion would, in any event, be a much more difficult proposition than invading Ukraine where Russia could assemble the invasion force right on Ukraine’s border.

China also has deeper reasons not to act as rashly as Russia. China is much more deeply enmeshed in the world economy. Economic sanctions on the scale of those against Russia would cripple the Chinese economy, given that so much of its manufacturing output is intended for export. Of course, sanctions on this scale would also seriously affect western economies, particularly those such as Australia and New Zealand that are heavily dependent on Chinese markets.

The Russian attack has also reinforced the fact that New Zealand is indisputably part of the West. President Biden specifically mentioned New Zealand alongside Australia as among the countries who would be applying sanctions against Russia. No country in South America, the Middle East, Africa or Asia (other than Japan) was specifically named.

No matter how much the irredentist left may desire it, New Zealand is not and will not become a non-aligned country. In the twenty years since the Afghanistan War, New Zealand has been drawn more tightly into the western orbit. There has been a substantial reversal of the level of exclusion that New Zealand had incurred in the previous 15 years since the antinuclear legislation.

A Rigid-Hulled Inflatable Boat (RHIB) heads away from HMNZS Wellington to take hydrographers to survey approaches to Nuku’alofa. Image NZDF

The December 2021 Defence Assessment reinforced the importance of the overall Five Eyes partnership being “a critical grouping for New Zealand of countries that share fundamental values and interests.” Five Eyes is not just about intelligence. The Defence Assessment stated “the defence aspect is as long-standing and as fundamental as the intelligence aspect.”

The Defence Assessment focused on the increasing strategic risks. In particular it noted the increased strategic competition between China and the United States. The Defence Assessment also referred to Russia undermining the international rules-based system and that European states considered Russia an acute threat to their security.

The counterbalance is that the United States is returning to a more proactive leadership role. Although the Defence Assessment referenced the return to a leadership role to the Biden administration, it is clear that the reassertion of this role has a bipartisan basis. The challenges of both China and Russia reach to the core of American leadership over the last 80 years. An isolationist approach still has limited appeal to both American voters and the political establishment.

The structure of the Defence Assessment makes it clear that New Zealand accepts the leadership role of the United States and its partners, and that New Zealand is prepared to contribute to the overall effort in sustaining a rules-based international order.

Where does this leave New Zealand’s independent foreign policy, which was scarcely mentioned in the Defence Assessment?

Part of the difficultly of the use of the term “independent foreign policy” is that it implies that New Zealand has no partners or allies. That all issues are determined without reference to relationships.

In reality New Zealand, through successive governments, has typically acted in concert with its partners. Very occasionally New Zealand has not done so, most notably in the refusal to be part of the coalition that invaded Iraq in 2003. More frequently the concept of an independent foreign policy is expressed by how New Zealand makes its contribution. In the fight against ISIS, New Zealand did not commit combat troops. In the current Ukrainian situation, New Zealand’s contribution will be humanitarian assistance.

In a time of increased strategic competition, the Defence Assessment provides a clear indication of New Zealand ‘s defence priorities and the likely military capabilities required to fulfil them. They have a distinctive maritime flavour.

The Defence Assessment says New Zealand’s foremost interest is in the Pacific, particularly the South Pacific. The Defence assessment states that fulfilling this interest will require tradeoffs, but that New Zealand intends Defence “remains interoperable with key partners and maintains world-class military capabilities.”

The Defence Assessment does not stipulate what these capabilities will be. However, in a recent presentation the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee, the CDF, Air Marshall Short, said New Zealand’s world class assets were the SAS, the maritime patrol aircraft and the frigates. This has been true for the last 30 years. The maritime patrol aircraft will be shortly be replaced with the state of the art P8 Poseidon. The frigates have just been upgraded with new combat systems, but they are both already more than halfway through their life.

If the New Zealand government intends the Defence Assessment to be taken seriously, particularly by our key partners, then it will be imperative to signal how the existing 25-year-old ANZAC frigates will be replaced.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine starkly illustrates the prediction of the Defence Assessment that strategic competition will become sharper. The logical imperative for New Zealand is that it is necessary to increase New Zealand’s military preparedness, both for our own protection, but also to be viewed as a credible partner, particularly among our most long standing friends and partners.