FROM THE E D I T O R I A L S TA F F
LETTER
A New Middle East Dear Readers, The ninth issue of IsraelDefense is being published at a time of high tension in the Middle East. The summer of 2012 is marked by the ticking clock of the Iranian nuclear bomb, and the possibility that Israel, and perhaps the US, will decide on military action in an attempt to thwart its completion. The situations in Egypt and Syria are heating up as well. In light of these dramatic developments, the Israeli defense establishment is preparing for every possible scenario. As always, IsraelDefense is taking all of these directions, activities, and new perceptions developed by Israel’s defense establishment and industries into account. In addition to our published magazine, IsraelDefense’s distribution channels are expanding. Content is also being published on the internet, on iPad applications, and soon, on television as well. The conferences produced and organized by IsraelDefense
in the months of May and June were a great success. As such, we have brought many of the topics discussed during these informative sessions to the pages of this issue. Thousands of copies of IsraelDefense were distributed at the Eurosatory exhibition in Paris and among decision-makers throughout the world. Right now, IsraelDefense is organizing additional conferences for the second half of this year. The most noteworthy conference,
which will address unmanned systems, including air, sea, and ground systems, combined with the teleprocessing field, will be held in November, and is in cooperation with the IDF’s C4I Directorate. We are encouraged by the positive responses received and hope you will continue to find an interest in our media that is all things concerning Israel’s defense. Sincerely yours, IsraelDefense Staff
Major General (Res.) Dan Harel with foreign military representatives during the Second International Fire Conference Photo: Coming Up
Front Cover: Low altitude parachuting exercise held in Israel’s south
Photography: Ofer Zidon
Editor-in-Chief: Amir Rapaport Managing Editor: Ronit Magen Magazine Coordinator: Moral Ackler Graphic Design: Assi Krispin Editor, English Edition: Sareena Denis Head Translator, Editor: Michael Kadichevski Translation: Rami Hann Sub-editor: Ariel Anbar Contributing Editor: Efraim Lapid Staff Members and Contributors: Asaf Agmon, Dani Asher, Haim Assa, Moriya Ben-Yosef, Eyal Boguslavsky, Ronen Cohen, Gil David, Arie Egozi, Ehud Eilam, Meir Elran, Yehudit Gisarol, Marina Golan, Shmuel Gordon, Efraim Inbar, Tal Inbar, David Ivry, Avigdor Klein, Yossi Koffman, Avi Mor, Yoram Peled, Dudu Tzur, Ron Veisberg, Doron Veiss, Shaul Shai, Danny Shalom, Zachi Shalom, Atai Shelach, Danny Shoham, Alon Unger, Danny Yatom, Guy Zurii Graphics Department Manager: Assi Krispin Graphics:Yael Rotem Photography: Meir Azulay, Yossi Ben Hanan, Ziv Koren, Ofer Zidon, Gilad Kavlarchik Webmaster: Gil Matos Publisher: Arrowmedia Israel Ltd. All Rights Reserved © Print: Hadfus Hahadash Ltd. CEO: Guy Keren E:guyk@israeldefense.co.il VP: Meital Ben-Dov E:meitalb@israeldefense.co.il Product Manager: Eyal Boguslavsky, E: eyalb@israeldefense.co.il Sales: Itay Gabay, E:itayg@israeldefense.co.il, Dekel Zered, E:dekel@israeldefense.co.il, Arik Morgenstein, E:arikm@israeldefense.co.il Projects: Avi Yariv E: aviy@israeldefense.co.il, Udi Friedman E: udif@israeldefense.co.il, Customer Service: Eran Zilberman E: id1@israeldefense.co.il Subscriptions: sub@israeldefense.co.il W: www.israeldefense.com E: info@israeldefense.co.il T: 972-74-7031211 IsraelDefense Office Address: 9 Hamovil Street, 2nd Floor, P.O Box: 7107 Zip Code: 44424, Kfar-Saba, Israel
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co n te n ts
Features
“Ready for any scenario”
12 Special review: The Fire Conference The IDF’s Deputy Chief of Staff and Ground Force Commander on the new regional reality 26 Six Years since the Second Lebanon War: An interview with Minister of Homefront Defense, Matan Vilnai By Brig. Gen. (Res.) Efraim Lapid
32 From the Border to the Litani River Hezbollah’s new ground defense lines
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By Col. (Res.) Atai Shelach
36 “The Logistic Failures Will Not Be Repeated” Head of the Logistics Branch on the lessons learned by the IDF By Amir Rapaport
42 Robotics: The New Direction The future of the battlefield
By Ami Rojkes Dombe, Arie Egozi, Alon Unger
50 Hidden in plain sight A special review of the field of camouflage and deception By Moriya Ben Yosef
74 The Egyptian revolution: What now? The new government and what it means for Israel By Ronen Cohen, Shaul Shay
79 Cyber Supplement The First Zombie War: The fight against botnets By Dr. Gil David
Sections 54 Defense Business 60 Land 66 Air & Space 70 Naval 72 Homeland Security 74 Intelligence 78 Cyber 82 Small Arms & Tactics 98 Books
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Columns 10 Amir Rapaport 53 Tamir Porat 62 Avigdor Klein 73 Nitzan Nuriel 96 David Ivry, Meir Elran, Assaf Agmon
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July - August 2012, Issue No. 9
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“The logistics failures will not be repeated” 36
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Concerning the book review, “At the Center of gravity,” IsraelDefense Issue 8
LETTERS
An Important Book The military commentator Basil Liddell Hart once cynically commented, “History based on documents alone resembles mythology.” Maj. Gen. (Res.) Ya’akov Even and Col (Ret.) Simha Maoz, authors of “At the Center of Gravity,” can identify with Eitan Haber’s definition that historical sources are “nonsensical,” and that “every document is basically a forgery.” So what is the alternative? The authors reply that “the only device that makes it possible to pave the way to any understanding on past events is intelligent speculation.” If this is true, the question remains: who possesses those capabilities and how can we distinguish that one person’s speculation is better than that of another? The book “At the Center of Gravity” has a wanting purpose: it deepens our understanding on issues of command. In addition, it documents perspectives and viewpoints of those in senior positions at the core of the Yom Kippur campaign. I have no doubt that Even, deputy commander of Division 143 in the war, and Maoz, a senior officer in his command post, influenced the war’s course of events and stood at a high vantage point overlooking the arena. Thus, the writers’ positions and their military experiences fulfill the purpose of the book. The authors raise several discussion points: the commander’s position in the arena, replacement of commanders in war, command relations with deputy commanders, boundaries between the campaign and tactical echelons, and the relation between command and politics. This is where its chief importance lies; even if it does not pass judgment, it represents a doorway to a discussion on the basis of accumulating historical experience. It is also important as it handles controversial topics without concessions. The chief recipients of the book’s criticism – the chief of staff, the commander of Division 162, and the direct commander – come out battered and bruised, and at times, the sarcasm overshadows substantive criticism. To an extent, the authors’ advantage is also their disadvantage. They should have taken their gloves off in the book’s declaration of intent and placed them on the readers’ table. This could have strengthened their cause. As such, the book should have placed more emphasis on personal aspects alongside its conclusions about the field of command. Dr. Amiram Azov, author of “The Crossing”
On the Essence of Systemic Studying In the introduction to Maj. Gen. (Res.) Ya’akov Even and Col. (Res.) Simha Maoz’s book, “At the Center of Gravity,” I describe the essence of what I learned from reading the book. Brig. Gen. (Res.) Dani Asher praised my preface, yet criticized the book resolutely. From my perspective, I could not have written the introduction without the inspiration and insight I gained from the book. I found this book to be fascinating from a professional perspective. The writers do not merely describe a historic chapter in the annals of Israel’s wars, they also offer practical implications through their depiction of the battlefield challenges that force commanders must prepare for. Dani Asher claims that the book did not offer any new historical revelations. On this point, I would agree that the book did not have any new historical facts. However, this book offers much more. Reading this book is comparable to an audience viewing the play “Oedipus the King.” As with the play, a reader is likely to know the chain of events leading to the tragic end. In this way, he does not deal with what will happen, but rather, how it will happen. It is not the description of events in the book that fascinated me, but the way in which the story was told. The Maj. Gen. Gershon Hacohen, Commander of Force 446
At the Center of Weightlessness The swift-penned Brig. Gen. (Res.) Dr. Dani Asher succeeded in collecting eleven claims in his review concerning our book, “At the Center of Gravity.” Ten of them express a clear, negative message. Dr. Asher has achieved this wondrous result by refraining from proving, or at least demonstrating, any of his claims. Therefore, we see no need to refer to Dr. Asher’s claim one by one. We will be content with determining that some of them conflict with reality, while others give away an issue of reading comprehension concerning the essence of our book and its purpose. Here and there, Dr. Asher picks on a
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professional topic that is beyond the scope of his nominal knowledge. The full disclosure is absent from where it is called for, and there is no difficulty in recognizing scorn, ridicule, and hostility towards the authors in his review. “The best part of the book,” – according to the ruling of Dr. Dani Asher – is the introduction written by Maj. Gen. Gerhson Hacohen. To quote the summary of Maj. Gen. Hacohen’s opinion about our book from the best part: “This book is a valuable source of inspiration for instructing the IDF’s senior combat command and for successfully meeting the tests in store for us.”
Maj. Gen. (Res.) Ya’akov Even and Col. (Res.) Simha Maoz May 23, 2012
A response by Dani Asher is on page 98, in the section “books” 6
narrative emphasized essential questions and dilemmas debated by commanders. Indeed, an analysis of events, as told by Ya’akov and Simha, emphasizes the need for a corps HQ that aids in managing the campaign beyond the divisional level. In this regard, the absence of a corps HQ in those days shows just how necessary one is both from an operational perspective and in helping manage the campaign. It is through Maj. Gen. Sharon’s conduct, the strength he utilized to achieve understandings, and the agreement on what needs to be and should be done (namely, crossing the canal), that I learned of the measure of strength that a corps commander requires. A commander needs this strength to convince those in charge, including the political echelon, of his idea until it is fulfilled. Such an effort of persuasion requires considerable trust in professional jurisdiction and in the ability to see the achievement and implementation of the proposal. The way this issue is emphasized throughout the book, along with the light cast upon other command dilemmas, provided me with an exemplary lesson concerning the essence of command.
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IMAGE
Refurbishing and saving
Meir Azulay Meir Azulay is a senior photojournalist, formerly of the Hebrew-language dailies Yedioth Ahronoth and Ma’ariv, whose photos have captured many of the most dramatic moments in Israel’s history
The soldiers of the IDF’s Logistic Corps carry out grueling and tedious work. This vital job includes refurbishing all combat gear, thereby saving large sums of money by properly caring for and renovating equipment. This soldier at a supply base in Tel HaShomer examines and fixes helmets for IDF soldiers.
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INTERACTIVE EDITION
FOR IPAD
A mir R apaport
The Third Lebanon War Will Be Different
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Six years. Near the Israel-Lebanon border, close to the security fence, vegetation engulfs a narrow road. Above the road, a camera is secured to a tall flagpole that records the events of the “dead area” twenty-four hours a day. On July 12, 2006, the abduction of IDF soldiers Eldad Regev and Udi Goldwasser took place on this same road. Though regional tensions were brewing for some time, this terror attack effectively ignited the Second Lebanon War. Where armed Hezbollah men once stood, closely monitoring the area, Lebanese soldiers and UN peacekeepers now stand. Though the starting point for the 2006 war in no way looked good, it now looks much worse. Hezbollah once possessed 12,000 rockets that could reach as far as Hadera (approximately 70 km from Lebanon). Today, Hezbollah possesses nearly 60,000 rockets and missiles. Some of these missiles can reach any point in Israel, and several dozen of them are even equipped with GPS-based navigation systems with a precision level of up to 50 m. In addition, unlike Grad rockets that have 7 kg of explosives, these long-ranged warheads carry hundreds of kilograms of explosives. One advantage the IAF has over these missiles is that the launch process is long and the launcher is relatively easy to detect from the air. This enables the IAF to hunt down these launchers with a high level of efficiency like they did in 2006. In addition, IAF capabilities have only improved since the last war.
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North, south. From Israel’s perspective, the possibility of another conflict erupting this summer is not groundless - the regional situation is volatile on all fronts. Though the possibility of a war with Iran hovers above all other areas of concern, the situation in the south with Egypt is also worrisome. The Israel
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- Egypt Peace Treaty, which lasted for more than three decades, is in danger of collapse. In addition, Egypt continues to nurse its wounds from the fall of the Mubarak regime as the Muslim Brotherhood takes the reins. Even if Israel’s relations with Egypt change from ally to renewed enemy, this process will take at least a few years. Moreover, while the situation on the eastern front with Jordan seems relatively stable, it would be beneficial to remember that in the Middle East, nothing is certain and that reality can change on a dime. No less, the collapse of the Hashemite Kingdom would be a security nightmare for Israel. It is best to assume that at least the IDF’s Central Command is considering this possibility, even though there are no indications for such a nightmare. This situation in the north is worlds apart. There, the air is already filled with the stench of gasoline, residents of the Golan are bracing for more Syrian refugees, and Assad’s regime continues to weaken. The volatile situation could even erupt into fire against Israel, terror attacks in the Golan Heights, and worst of all, the transfer of strategic weapons from Syria to Hezbollah. Hezbollah has already assumed that Israel will have difficulty eliminating its strategic weapons storehouses if they are on Syrian soil. However, if the heads of Hezbollah sense that those weapons could fall into the hands of Syrian rebels, they will transfer the weapons to Lebanon. Unfortunately, it is likely that this process has already begun. In the past few years, Syria has invested no less than $3 billion (nearly its entire growth budget) in constructing an airdefense layout based on advanced Russian weaponry. Additionally, Syria could transfer its advanced anti-aircraft measures to Lebanon. Either of these moves would likely hurt the IDF’s air superiority.
The Israeli pavilion at the Eurosatory exhibition. From left: Nitza Pozner, Yossi Ben Hanan, Yossi Gal, Udi Shani, Shmaya Avieli
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Maneuver. The First Lebanon War in June 1982 was characterized by fast maneuvers that enabled the IDF to conquer Beirut and Damascus within six days. The Second Lebanon War proved to be the antithesis of the First Lebanon War, as the IDF refrained from maneuvering as much as they could and tried to tilt the balance with the use of remote counter fire. They also attempted to hurt Hezbollah symbols as a means to influence the populace’s consciousness. As is known, a conclusion was never achieved. Instead, both sides lived with a few years of silence. The problem is not with this achievement, but with the cost. The same result could have been achieved after several days of war and without thirtythree days of continued fire at northern Israeli towns. The third Lebanon war will be different from both the first and second wars. The IDF’s updated plans are expected to balance fire and maneuver. While the maneuver is back in fashion, it should be assumed that it would not happen right away. Due to the considerable improvements in the enemy’s anti-aircraft layout, the IAF will have fewer hours to deal with threats and acquire total air superiority. At the same time, the ground forces will prepare for a maneuver during the first stages of the war with the purpose of taking over and eliminating all rocket launch areas.
Photo: Ariel Hermoni
M-109 during the Second Lebanon War
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Jointness. The speakers from the ground forces and the IAF that participated in the conference on Air and Land Jointness in a Complex Environment, organized by the Artillery Association and IsraelDefense (see an extended review in this issue), emphasized that the IDF is preparing for a “fast and lethal” maneuver. It’s doubtful whether the IDF will try to “crush and dismantle Hezbollah,” which was the declared objective of the Second Lebanon War. Instead, it’s more likely that humbler goals will be defined in the next confrontation. This will ensure several years of quiet at a reasonable cost. Either way, the third Lebanon war will not take thirtythree days.
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Halamish. The IDF is presently renewing discussions regarding the new multi-year plan, Halamish. It was supposed to be signed last year and entered into effect in 2012, but was delayed due to dramatic regional changes and cuts in the defense budget. In the wake of last year’s social protests, the prime minister announced the defense budget would be reduced by $3 billion. Even as speeches were made, it was clear that there wouldn’t be cuts due to the reality of Israel’s security situation. However, the Ministry of Defense was forced to halt projects and orders that were already in progress. Luckily, all of the defense budgets were recently released,
Photo: Assi Ravi
and after a lengthy delay, most of the orders were renewed. The ground forces branch already concluded its list of preferences for the Halamish plan. Among their requests are precise rockets with ranges of up to 40 km so that the ground forces have long-ranged and independent fire. Similarly, other branches are also making requests. The General Staff will soon begin summarizing its preferences and deciding between the demands of the various branches. The new five-year plan, which will last until 2018, will be signed by the end of the summer and will determine the fates of the growth projects that are so far only on paper.
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After several difficult months at the start of the year, Israeli defense companies have since signed some noteworthy deals. The primary target countries are located in former Soviet republics, South-East Asia, Australia, and South America. Regarding South America, the Israeli Export Institute will hold a conference of unprecedented scope on HLS topics in Israel this November, which will see hundreds of foreign visitors. The conference will be an impressive display of the Israeli industries’ capabilities in this field, which will help them to secure tenders for the 2014 World Cup Games and the 2016 Olympics held in Brazil.
Israel’s Wars in Lebanon Conflict
First Lebanon War
Second Lebanon War
Third Lebanon War
Opening Action
Maneuver
Fire
Maneuver and Fire
Time Pending a Significant Maneuver
Immediately
30 Days
1-2 Days
Character of Campaign
Maneuver
Counter Fire
Maneuver and Counter Fire
Decisiveness
Seizing Terrain
Seizing Terrain, Cognitive Scorching Overcoming Rockets
Objective
Replacee the Lebanese Government
Crush and Disarm Hezbollah
5-10 Years of Quiet
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eScpi a cioavle Pr el c
SHORTENING THE DURATION OF COMBAT The regional situation has changed, and so has the IDF. Deputy IDF Chief of Staff, Major General Yair Naveh, presented the new force buildup principles at the 2nd International Conference on Air and Land Jointness in a Complex Environment organized by IsraelDefense By IsraelDefense Photo: Ofer Zidon 12
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An AH-64A Apache attack helicopter releasing countermeasures Photo: Ofer Zidon
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In the past few years, we’ve experienced dramatic developments in the Middle East,” says IDF Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Yair Naveh. With his lecture, the general opened the International Conference on Air and Land Jointness in a Complex Environment organized by IsraelDefense, in cooperation with the Israeli Artillery Association, the Artillery Corps, the Ground Forces, the Israeli Air Force, the Directorate of Military Intelligence, and the C4I Branch. A veteran of the General Staff, Naveh's lecture reflected how the IDF elite perceive the reality of the 2012 summer, six years after the Second Lebanon War.
A New Reality At the conference, Naveh touched on many topics, one of them being changing military perceptions. “The enemy campaign we face is based on fire. In recent years, the IDF has undergone a revolution in the fields of maneuvering and precision weapons. The perception that we applied in the 1990s, which deals with creating a relative technological advantage, has resulted in most of the enemies transitioning to a defensive combat perception where the point is not the maneuver, but rather the application of fire. This operational perception does not deal with tilting the balance to the front, but to the homefront and the political arena. As a result, in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, most financial investments are made in the layout of rockets and ballistic missiles, which cover all of Israel's territory. This stems from a clear vision that quantity will eventually result in quality,” Naveh explains. “The dramatic change is that the homefront is now at the front. At present, Hezbollah has approximately 60,000 rockets and missiles in Lebanon. It possessed only a tenth of this number during the Second Lebanon War in 2006. This means that their goal is to reach a situation where they can attain a victorious scenario by employing a brief strike against Israel’s homefront. Through this, they would be able to dramatically and directly influence the political echelons, the perception of victory in the eyes of its populace, and the
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F-16 fighter aircraft
negotiating table at the UN. Incidentally, Syria’s arsenal of chemical weapons includes hundreds of missiles, some of which are already precision rockets. “In contrast to the US in Afghanistan, Israel is in a situation where the homefront is directly involved in the fighting, even before troops make it to the actual front. The IDF is primarily a reserve army, and several hours of reserve recruitment, of regular army readiness, and more is needed before reaching a situation where it utilizes its ORBAT at the front. This situation creates a reality where families, including those of reserve forces, are under a missile and rocket attack prior to the presence of forces on the front. They are also the ones that ultimately influence how the war is determined. This is all in reference to the homefront. “Another change is that every enemy around us understands the exceptional strength of the Israeli Air Force. Due to this, they almost never invest in their own air forces. This is in regards to Syria, since Lebanon doesn't even have an air force, as well as other countries. The IAF has an unmistakable relative advantage, and this is the reason the enemy we face has chosen a strategy of disappearing, basic camouflage, basic deception, smoke generators, very cheap GPS jamming
systems that are readily available, and deep ground entry. This outlook is embedded in the enemy’s perception. “Correspondingly, there is considerable investment in their air-defense layouts. This should be of interest to the entire Western world, not just to the IDF. Today, we are dealing with the SA-2, SA-3, SA6, and SA-8 family of missiles, and the advanced SA-15, SA-17, and SA-22 that are produced by Russia and delivered to Syria. In the future, these missiles might find their way from Syria to Hezbollah and we may also see them in other places beyond the boundaries of the Middle East. “This air-defense layout significantly challenges the air capabilities of all armies, not just the IDF. We are discussing portable anti-aircraft measures that allow for coverage of a wide area, effectively creating a reality in which the IAF needs hours to handle air defense in a focused manner prior to becoming available for other missions. One example of this is the Syrian Army who invested nearly $3 billion in air defense layouts, which is nearly its only investment. “A fourth and significant change is that the entire world is becoming increasingly urban. Israel will be forced to fight in urban expanses. We see this in Gaza, in
Photo: Ofer Zidon
Launch of a Tamuz missile during the Shivta fire display
Lebanon, in the Golan Heights, and in nearly every place in the arena. The urbanization process creates a situation where there is combat in constructed areas more than in open areas, and the enemy is intermixed with terror, which results in a regular army being intermixed with a civilian population. This forces us to carry out different types of activities. The situation is unconditionally different from the classic regular armored wars in open expanses. “This is the current reality. The future is taking us to an Archimedean point where quality and increasingly precise tools will be a part of the central component. Will this alter the combat perception? I believe that it won't. Will it, however, allow the enemy to attack in a more specific manner with a CPA of 5-10 m? The answer is yes. “We are in a reality where there is a mixture of quantitative non-precise weaponry alongside qualitative weaponry that can hit vital areas in Israel, with emphasis on factories, national infrastructures such as electricity and water, army commands, government offices, and national symbols. There is no doubt that this increases the challenge for the IDF. Therefore, as we are preparing, it is clear that we are
"The urbanization process creates a situation where there is combat in constructed areas more than in open areas. The enemy is intermixed with terror, and a regular army is intermixed with a civilian population. This forces us to carry out different types of activities." required to make central steps in several directions with regards to the IDF’s force buildup and its operation.”
The IDF’s Force Buildup “From our perspective, the first step is to see how we can shorten the duration of warfare as much as possible. In order to do this and allow early reserve recruitment and proper operation of regular forces, we must create a simultaneous stroke of fire that is capable of reaching a near-decisive reality. We must work at all ranges, as fire is
Photo: Coming Up
operated from all ranges – medium-ranged rockets from the front, and mediumranged missiles from the depth. “Therefore, the concept of 'front' is somewhat blurred. We used to think that a front was a front, and that the depth was the depth. What happens now when a massive number of missiles are fired from the depth of Lebanon towards Israel’s center? Is the Lebanese depth a depth, or is it a front, and should it be treated differently? We will have to work with simultaneous fire strikes at all ranges, and the IAF will have to remain at the center of this fire strike. “We are a country with democratic values, and we will probably not carry out various forms of statistic fire. However, we will have to handle the enemy’s fire, command and control, and supporting infrastructure layouts (commands, supporting energy, supporting bridges) in a focused manner. “In general, there are three central targets of the fire strike – fire towards enemy layouts, towards C2 positions, and towards combat-supporting infrastructure. Moreover, we naturally require the same fire that supports the maneuver during the maneuvering stage. “In order to do this, we require three components. The first requirement is
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intelligence. In recent years, the IDF has undergone a revolution in changing from having an enemy situational picture to a target situational picture. In the end, we need intelligence that does more than tell us a battalion is sitting in a compound, or that a company is in another compound. We need to reach a situation of possessing precise 12-digit coordinates that can be turned into an air or artillery target – whether it be a house concealing a rocket, a house where a rocket-laden truck is standing in its living-room, or a 20-story building where a 4th floor apartment is used as a command. This is the reality; therefore, we must have intelligence on a variety of targets. “The second part of intelligence is realtime target intelligence. Based on sensor fusion, HUMINT, ELINT, and other layouts, this will allow us to handle numerous targets in real-time. Therefore, the central leading component is target intelligence, which starts at the strategic and operative level and goes all the way to the tactical level. “The second central component that the IDF needs is fire. The IDF focuses on precision fire from the air and precisionguided armaments from the ground. The principle approach is that the entire classic artillery layout is intended to aid the maneuvering forces, while terrain fire is based on precise armaments (we already have precise armaments on the ground). “We are talking about tens of thousands of armaments with shielding that are needed to counter GPS blockers, as even the most sophisticated, expensive precision air armament will eventually meet simple and cheap GPS jammers scattered around an area. “In terrain armament, we have advanced considerably in the field of 120 mm mortars, which have returned to the central stage with very precise armaments. In the future, these will include GPS and laser guidance systems. We are able to operate and utilize the mortar’s capability in mountainous and built-up areas as a way of supporting the brigade’s operations. “When these artillery missions become ones that are intended to hit the enemy’s infrastructure and commands, as well as objects buried in the ground, we will need precise ground rocket capabilities between
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Major General Yair Naveh at the 2nd International Fire Conference
100-200 km. This will provide us with some additional flexibility and allow the air force to fulfill its potential in situations involving the enemy’s effective air defense, as well as in problematic situations.”
C2 and Connectivityֹ “Even if we have excellent intelligence and fire systems, if we do not know how to bring intelligence into an aircraft in realtime, our advantage in this field will be rendered useless. We can have excellent fire systems, but without attaining image comparison or precise coordinate data, the aircraft will take off with one kind of armament for a different kind of target. As such, the third prominent aspect of force buildup is command and control (C2) systems, which make it possible to connect intelligence and fire in real-time to the systems of the aircraft, the squadrons, the mission preparation, the artillery, the Digital Army Program (DAP), and so on. “In addition, we are already on the way to achieving tactical connectivity. At present, the IDF knows how to connect air, land, and sea intelligence at an operational level, and we are now on the way towards this at the tactical level. This means that the infantry and armored soldiers on the ground know how to talk, provide data, and transfer precise coordinates obtained from intelligence in a precise manner to the combat helicopter in the air, thereby closing the cycle in a short amount of time while maneuvering.
Photo: Coming Up
“Nearly every day we are asked where the bottleneck is located. I believe that the bottleneck is increasingly heading in the direction of turning target intelligence into real-time intelligence. “We can have raw intelligence, targets, and destinations all at the air photography level. However, the challenge of creating a balance between the three aspects of force buildup is taking these capabilities and turning them into arranged air or artillery targets that have defined armament types, fuses, and definitions for environmental damage and ways to prevent them. “One last word on the need to create surprises. In previous generations, the term 'surprise' was one that touched upon the maneuver. The other side would think that we would come from one place while we arrived from another; would think that a brigade would be used when a division was used; would think that one point would be attacked when another was attacked. In our world, where everything is transparent and every step can be seen in real-time satellite imagery and intelligence, our ability to create a surprise through the maneuver is disappearing. We are tasked with using new tools that can generate surprises. This refers to both situational surprises and basic surprises. On this, I would like to hint that with regards to both surprises and keeping the enemy off balance, we must think about finding capabilities for surprises in other fields, and not necessarily in the maneuvering field.”
ISRAEL
AUSA 2012
at Wa s h i n g t o n D. C. U S A
October 22-24
Hakirya, Tel-Aviv 64734, Israel +972-3-6977936 +972-3-6934534 www.sibat.mod.gov.il/ausa @ sibat_bic@mod.gov.il fax
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