FEBRUARY 2025 #16
TITLE
Published by Hurst Publishers, Hardback, £20, ISBN: 9781911723486
Who Will Defend Europe? An Awakened Russia and a Sleeping Continent
AUTHOR
Keir Giles
REVIEWER
Major Luke Turrell, Directing Staff, Land Command and Staff College
Keir Giles has written extensively for decades about the threat from Russia, the lack of Russia literacy amongst Western military and policymakers and, as a result, errors in how to constrain and deter Russian aggression. This is based on a deep and broad knowledge of Russian security culture and access to serving soldiers, politicians and policymakers in the US, UK and Europe. Both of which are apparent in this, his most recent book, written and published just before the result of the US election. The near 50 pages of references and endnotes in a 280-page offering demonstrate this well – Who Will Defend Europe? is a product of rigorous academic research resulting in strongly justified argument, analysis and evaluation.
The structure supports the argument formulation well. Starting with a chapter entitled Russia’s next war, Giles details two key elements: Russia’s strongly held grievances and Western timidity. The former includes the will to correct their current borders (an enduring Russian security preoccupation) which they consider “incorrect, unjust and need to be put right”. The author recently briefed students at the UK Land Command and Staff College and showed the child’s map, Map of our Motherland, that he references in the book. This, he argues, speaks of a “mental geography” that supports Russia’s rightful role to exert power over its near abroad and represents a fundamental clash of world views that will unavoidably lead to confrontation between Russia and the West.
Speaking of the Ukraine war specifically, Giles is clear there are two overlapping factors that led to the invasion in 2022 –confidence that Ukraine would collapse quickly, and that the West would not intervene. And the reason why Russia invaded Ukraine is the same reason it will attack other countries too – it feels it can do so at a cost it finds acceptable. In this respect, Giles’ insight into enduring Russian security culture is hugely valuable.
He points out Vladimir Putin’s personal grievances and emotional investment have led Russia to entirely different metrics for effectiveness and success than NATO and warns against judging Russia’s deployability in future against NATO standards. Equally, that, having engineered European citizens to pressurise their governments to abandon Kyiv, success in Ukraine will be seen as a return to greatness. Paradoxically, but very Russian, the greater the Russian losses incurred, the greater the victory.
At times Giles can go too far, for example, his statement that the “Kremlin leadership... long ago abandoned all restraint” doesn’t stand up to scrutiny. However, it draws out that Western governments have repeatedly and consistently failed to act on the misguided belief that responding firmly to Russian aggression will provoke further escalation. Turkey, which shot down a Russian fighter jet in 2015 and went ‘unpunished’, is a case in point.
The author is equally unequivocal that Russia’s next war will be enabled by a “lack of demonstrable will by western nations to act” coupled with the potential for the US to “refuse to get involved or withdraw support altogether”. And that the conflict will persist until Russia suffers a clear, unambiguous and undeniable defeat. However, Russia doesn’t have to be successful or correct in its assessment of when to go to war. What deters Russia, and has done reliably over hundreds of years, Giles concludes, is a credible force in place. And, because of the strong historic sense of grievance, if Europe want peace – they must remove Russia’s ability to threaten others.
Having established the threat (An Awakened Russia), Giles moves on to the “sleeping continent”. In the chapter entitled Future of Ukraine and the future of Europe, he points to repeated delays in providing Ukraine with the resources it has needed – only for the resources to be eventually supplied, too late. More concerningly, he is clear that defeat for
Ukraine will have far wider ramifications. The chapter entitled What if Ukraine loses? supposes it would tacitly allow internationally recognised borders to be redrawn by military force in future and usher in an era of America being manipulated to abandon its allies. Both are debatable as statements of fact – but Giles is trying to engender debate – and therefore puts across a specific point of view to be debated.
Failure of US policy is explored in the chapter America – distracted and divided, where Giles highlights that, in February 2024, when Trump encouraged Russia to attack NATO countries, there was no mention of it on the front pages of the next day’s New York Times or Washington Post Giles was clearly mindful that the book would be published before the result of the election was known and is generally pessimistic about the prospect of a Trump presidency. However, he highlights that with or without Trump, the highest levels of decision making in the US have suffered from a pathological reluctance to confront Russia. This has led to fixating on avoiding further escalation rather than addressing the escalation that’s already taken place.
The UK is next in the cross-hairs of Giles’ withering scorn. He points to a consistent British approach of only recognising as much threat from abroad as it can afford and relying on allies. In a description borrowed from RUSI’s Jack Watling, he characterises
the UK as “attending a bring a bottle party empty handed, because you assume everyone else is bringing something, then realising there’s nothing to drink”. The forensic analysis of the frailties of the UK Armed Forces is painful reading. It draws out that in 21st century conflict attrition is unavoidable and quickly makes a small force irrelevant. Moreover, whilst new and novel technology can buy out some of the challenges, “you can’t cyber your way across a river”.
Part of the reason for the frailties and failings in the UK and NATO is explored in depth in the chapter NATO and Europe – half promises and broken pledges. This starts with the recognition that Europe’s new strategic reality doesn’t come easily to politicians who’ve spent their whole life not having to consider defence, whilst too few have explained to voters that the freedom and prosperity they take for granted has to be fought for and protected. This crashing realisation, shaped by ‘wars of choice’, means that “just as you can’t choose whether or not to be at war with Russia, [Europe] may be unable to choose the nature of that war and how long it lasts for”.
Unsurprisingly, Who Will Defend Europe? advocates strongly for increased defence spending, either to assist Ukraine now or fund the more expensive war that will follow if Ukraine is abandoned. Critically it differentiates between actual defence spending and hiding behind relative gross domestic
product (GDP) as a means of deterrence. As Giles highlights: “War is not a contest of GDP if, as now, only one side is using its GDP.” The path is all too clear and being demonstrated by Finland and Poland (with the former Finnish intelligence chief Pekka Toveri quoted as saying that “Finland doesn’t have a defence force, Finland is a defence force”). Critics would suggest adopting a Finnish model, culturally inculcated over the past 100 years, is difficult to achieve socially and politically across Europe. However, whilst not every country can become Finland, Giles believes that more countries can become like Poland –and match their dramatic increase in defence funding and capability.
Giles’ previous work for the Defence Academy Advanced Research and Assessment Group in 2008 concluded “history demonstrates the enormous cost of failing to recognise, and invest in containing, the danger posed by a European power which is turbulent, truculent, confident and heavily armed”. This book makes it plain, in clear and meticulously researched chapters, that the global contest the West is in, is one it needs to win. Russia goes to war when it believes it is the most effective way of achieving its political objectives, regardless of whether Europe can afford it. Conversely, the fundamental condition for peace and security in the 21st century is Russia being neutralised as a threat. In sum, according to Giles, Europe needs a strategy rather than an inexhaustible supply of excuses.