CHACRDIGEST
THE ROAD AHEAD
In a salute to Janus – the Roman God of beginnings, endings and transitions, and from whom the first month of the year gets its name – January is typically a time we reflect on the past year and consider the one to come.
Chatham House has produced a series of articles that identify the potential flashpoints of 2025, consider what the year holds for Africa specifically and the world generally. The think tank focuses on the potential impacts of the election of Donald Trump with comments about tariffs, the threat of inflation and the impact on the outcome of the Ukraine war, but also the imperative to prepare for the next pandemic and thoughts on fairer artificial intelligence, leadership in Europe, the UK’s place in the world and the opportunities for middle powers in Africa to seize their G20 moment (discussed further in the Africa section).
These topics are replicated in the thoughts of 11 experts writing for the Council on Geostrategy, although the authors have a more pessimistic view, concluding that the risk of an axis of authoritarian nations, the ‘CRINK’ (China, Russia, Iran and North Korea) means “the world finds itself in the worst geopolitical environment since the end of the Cold War and continues to hurtle towards everincreasing instability and uncertainty”. This pessimism is also evident in a Lowy Institute article on military trends to watch in 2025, written by the former Australian General, Mick Ryan. He proposes five trends that will influence the character of conflict: greater robotic and algorithmic war; the growth in the number of nuclear weapons and rhetoric to use them; US demands for greater military spending by their allies; greater consideration of national mobilisation; and the desire of the CRINK nations to overturn the postSecond World War global order.
Equally, there is value in looking back over 2024 and the predictions that were made at the end of 2023. The International Institute of Strategic Studies’ Armed Conflict Survey has been using domestic, regional and global lenses to examine conflict trends, geopolitical exacerbators and potential flashpoints since 2015. In 2024 it identified increasing complexity of actors and dynamics, geopolitical fragmentation, accelerating climate change (or the greater impact of inaction on climate change as covered by Andrew Gilmour from the Berghof Foundation in the SMA Climate Effects Speaker Series), resurgence of inter-state wars and weakening of the global governance architecture; factors that are all likely to continue in 2025. At the end of 2023, S&P Global sought to identify the top geopolitical risks of 2024, referencing heightened non-military confrontations in the South China Sea and social unrest from food security challenges, which didn’t dramatically affect 2024, but remain areas of risk in 2025.
USA
The inauguration of Donald Trump provoked a string of articles from Chatham House predicting how the businessman-turned-politician’s second presidency might herald a remaking of the international order, provoke a grand bargain in US-China relations or – given Trump’s ambiguous stance – may raise the risk of accidental conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Equally, commentators were at pains to point out what actions Europe should take to placate and renew America’s self-interested case for an enduring commitment to the Continent.
NATO
No doubt influenced by the arrival of the Trump presidency and growing Russian acts of aggression across Europe, on the 13th January NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte told European member states that “2 percent [of GDP defence spending] is not nearly enough”. On the same day, the Armed Forces Ministers of the ‘Group of Five’ (UK, France, Germany, Italy and Poland) made a joint statement emphasising they will “support Ukraine as long as it takes by fostering defence industrial cooperation” and “strengthen our capabilities to deter and defend against Russia”. This comes in the context of the decision by Germany to create a dedicated homeland security division and, following damage to undersea cables in the Baltic, the launching of ‘Baltic Sentry’ to increase critical infrastructure security
RUSSIA
Russian aggression, sabotage and espionage levels have increased exponentially since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and now surpass levels seen during the Cold War, according to Bojan Pancevski of The Wall Street Journal in his recent presentation to the NSI, which suggests much can learned from how Baltic and Nordic states are responding. A similar message can be found in detail in the NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence publication. Elsewhere, Politico pondered why Europe isn’t fighting back, concluding that Europe’s passivity is based on “fears in Western capitals about being drawn into a conflict for which they’re not prepared”, whilst use of the term ‘hybrid’ obfuscates the “need to do anything about it”, according to the outgoing Lithuanian foreign minister. This point is also made by Keir Giles, writing in The Independent, who states that the arrival of the Trump presidency and serious doubt over foreign aid would impact “not only the survival of Ukraine but also the future of Europe” – especially in the context of comments given by Nikolai Patrushev that Ukraine could ‘cease to exist’ in 2025. Similarly, the Atlantic Council has made clear that appeasement will only fuel Vladimir Putin’s imperial ambitions in Ukraine. This was also the view of Foreign Affairs in an article entitled Why Letting Putin Win Would Cost America More Than Supporting Ukraine that concludes “Americans must have clarity on the long-term costs, not just the upfront expenses” and “supporting Ukraine is not only morally right but financially right”. Tim Marshall believes Trump’s “peace through strength” policy could get Putin to the negotiating table with the caveat that the world should take Trump “seriously, but not literally”. Conversely, Orysia Lutsevych at Chatham House points out that should Trump fall into Putin’s trap and concede to Russia’s demands without a viable mechanism of enforcement (such as NATO troops to enforce the ceasefire) it would only create a pause before a new and possibly wider war.
Jade McGlynn, writing in The Moscow Times, highlights atrocities committed during the Russian occupation of Ukraine, debunks Russian propaganda that the occupied territories want to be part of Russia and identifies that the pathway to peace with Russia is largely being proposed by the misinformed or “purveyors of appeasement”. This stream of reporting on the reality of life in Russia and Ukraine is also seen in The Center for European Policy’s analysis on how ethnic cleansing is being conducted by Russia using the approval of hugely discounted home loans to encourage ethnic Russian occupation of Donetsk and Luhansk, whilst Radio Free Europe highlights the targeting of an estimated 500,000 tonnes of Ukraine’s lithium reserves
Reliable reporting from inside Russia on the impact of the war has been difficult since 2022 but Jan Matti Dollbaum’s article for The Moscow Times on Russia’s opposition, past and future has been praised by fellow academics. It notes members of the opposition to President Putin who have left Russia seem to be “losing touch with those who remain in Russia” whilst “trying to separate Putin’s regime from the Russian people, influence Western sanctions policy in a way that harms the regime but doesn’t hurt ordinary people and compete with a narrative of collective guilt”.
The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) has published two, seemingly contradictory, articles on the impact of sanctions and alliances on Russian military capabilities and why Russia’s wartime economy isn’t as weak as it looks. The first article, using satellite imagery purchased from Maxar, details how Russia has rerouted US/EU microelectronics through regional allies (particularly Kazakhstan and China). However, it concludes that far from sanctions having little impact given how easily they are subverted by Russian allies, they have made Russia’s economy highly unstable in the medium to long term as it now relies on a small list of partners. The latter article concludes Russia’s military spending, comparable to US military spending during the Vietnam War, and economy has confounded expectations but, despite complications, remains well-placed to support the Kremlin’s ambitions in Ukraine and beyond.
The UK signed a 100-year partnership with Ukraine to strengthen their security partnership. This is discussed in detail in Mark Galeotti’s podcast In Moscow’s Shadows (episode 184), which concludes the largely symbolic act is still powerful, largely because of the power of symbolism in the international community.
Prior to the visit of Chancellor Rachel Reeves to China, Chatham House published advice on how, in light of China’s dominance of critical supply chains and emerging technologies, greater UK-China engagement can be most effective. The guidance outlines the importance of a deeper understanding of how China approaches diplomatic engagement and where UK/Chinese mindsets diverge. The article emphasised the view of the Tony Blair Institute that literacy about the modern Chinese state must be considered by business, commerce and central government to mitigate long-term technological dependence and the risk of UK dependence on China for both equipment and the underlying intellectual property.
CHINA
Foreign Affairs points out that, far from being big, scary and unbeatable, China is confronting a growing set of complex challenges. It highlights that at home China faces a troubled economy, a rapidly aging population and stifled political debate leading to brittle and reactive policy-making. Internationally China has few friends and is facing increasing scrutiny from advanced economies. It concludes the United States still has a vital edge over China but could squander it through excessive pessimism, panic or protectionist impulses when they should be capitalising on their comparative advantages.
A negative view of China’s power and influence in the international system, relative to the USA, is echoed at the military tactical level by a RUSI article on how a recent Chinese-run ‘wargame’ included the sinking of a Chinese destroyer by a US missile. However, on closer inspection the wargame hints at a focus on realistic combat training, a willingness to confront deficiencies, access to sensitive US intelligence and the ability to reverse engineer sophisticated electronic warfare countermeasures. All of which suggest a potential adversary preparing effectively for the possibility of conflict. Taiwan is likely to be a focus of Chinese regional aggression given Xi Jinping’s stated aim of reunifying the island. However, as the IISS point out in a series of illustrative maps, China is increasingly using aggressive but legal means to challenge Taiwan’s ability to self-govern, including by isolating it diplomatically. Equally, reports in Naval News of between three and five special barges with unusually long road bridges extending from their bows being observed in Guangzhou Shipyard point to increased capability to conduct the sort of amphibious landing required in an invasion of Taiwan.
MIDDLE EAST
In the Middle East, two issues predominate; the potential for peace in Israel and Gaza and the impact of the end of an Assad dominated Syria. Neither are close to resolution, nor indeed revealing which way they may go, leaving commentators to discuss factors likely to impact the result.
The Royal United Services Institute offers that Syria is not a coherent, unified state and that external (often destabilising) powers, Turkey, Israel and the US, will decide the country’s future more than the Syrian people. This is considered in detail in an article entitled Can Turkey Stabilise Syria?. It recognises that Turkey has the opportunity to capitalise on Iran and Russia’s weaknesses to increase its influence in the region but risks losing credibility if its support for HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa fails to deliver significant change. It concludes Turkey must balance its own foreign policy with supporting an inclusive Syrian-led transition if it is not to face the risk of overreaching.
It is clear the battles over who controls Syria and what the country will look like are only just beginning. This is apparent in the potential impact on Russian foreign policy as a result of the change of regime in Damascus. At the end of December last year, Joshua Huminski, director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs, concluded in an article for Breaking Defense that, as a reflection of the Kremlin’s strategic flexibility, Russia had made a clear decision that the benefit of continuing to support the Assad regime wasn’t worth the cost. However, the closure of the Turkish straits, as a consequence of the conflict in Ukraine, and the potential loss of the Tartus port led the First Sea Lord’s Fellow at RUSI to conclude Russia’s access and capacity to maintain a meaningful presence in the Mediterranean could become less assured. The impact on Russia is also assessed by Al Jazeera in an article that highlights how Syria provided the impetus to the strengthening of ties, as both Russia and Iran’s power in the wider Middle East was weakened by the loss of their key ally, al-Assad.
AFRICA
In December 2024 South Africa became the first African nation to lead the G20 Presidency and will hold it throughout almost all of 2025. The Africa Brief, a weekly spotlight on economic and security issues across Africa, highlighted that South Africa’s leadership brings an opportunity to recognise Africa as an emerging region of influence and economic strength and address overlapping crises, including climate change, underdevelopment, technological changes and geopolitical instability. However, the online hub identifies the risk that focus on Africa’s challenges may lead to traditional appeals for financial aid and that South Africa’s leadership will hinge on its ability to balance advocacy for support with promoting Africa’s strengths and contributions to the global economy.
The Africa Brief also highlighted the annual New Year tour of Africa by China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, as evidence of China’s continuing influence in Africa. The tour is a 35-year tradition designed to demonstrate Beijing’s sustained commitment to the continent. Diplomatic engagements such as this, and investments, notably in critical minerals and infrastructure projects, positions Beijing as a reliable partner in Africa and contrasts with often less consistent US or EU engagement. Equally, the support of Wagner for countries such as Mali, the Central African Republic, Mozambique and Syria demonstrated their willingness to reassert nations’ sovereignty without compromises or direct interference from external actors.
By contrast, The Africa Report details the negative impact of President Trump’s executive orders on Africa. The suspension of foreign assistance programmes will reduce US aid and the establishment of an External Revenue Service could impact African exports to the US, whilst withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and World Health Organization may undermine health initiatives and reduce support for African nations combating climate change effects. Finally, the declaration of the US National energy emergency may lower global oil prices, adversely affecting African oil-exporting economies.
