CHACRDIGEST
The views expressed in this Digest are not those of the British Army or UK Government. This document cannot be reproduced or used in part or whole without the permission of the CHACR. chacr.org.uk
WHITE HOUSE STORM’S SHOCKWAVES
On the last day of February, the world changed, live on television, as the President and Vice President of the United States, in what appeared to be a pre-arranged ambush, bullied an embattled ally, repeated, and seemingly reinforced, the Russian narrative and raised doubts over the dependability of a US security guarantee that has been the basis for European security for nearly 80 years. Commentators from across the world have spent the month trying to understand what happened during those crucial ten minutes in the Oval Office and what the implications for global peace and security may be.
Rym Momtaz, writing as editor-in-chief, Strategic Europe, for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was clear: “There is little more U.S. President Donald Trump and his administration could do to signal that their objectives in Ukraine radically differ from those of Europe. And yet, Europeans continue to be in denial.” Tom Nichols, writing for The Atlantic, a publication gifted increased visibility later in the month when one of their journalists was inadvertently added to a Signal Group including the Vice President and National Security Advisor, was damning in his condemnation for Trump and Vance who “acted like a couple of online Kremlin sock puppets instead of American leaders”. This was also the view of the podcast The Rest Is Politics The Economist added that the fullblown shouting match was a disaster for Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukraine and subsequently asked the question whether Europe can confront Vladimir Putin’s Russia on its own, concluding that paying for the assessed 50 new brigades would be hard enough but translating increased defence spending into capability, free from US dependence, will be slow and painful. Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman, Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King’s College London, concluded that “what Russia wants, the US can’t deliver and the Ukrainians won’t accept” but that “none of this should have come as a surprise”. This was echoed by John Foreman, former UK Defence Attaché to Kyiv and Moscow, writing in The Spectator that Trump’s plans to cut a deal with Putin and take a back seat in Europe emerged a year ago but Europe didn’t listen or thought Trump would resile from his campaign rhetoric. Equally, waiting for Trump’s term to end in the hope for a change in direction fails to recognise that the US shift in focus to China is both ‘generational and bipartisan’.
UKRAINE
The potential implications for Ukraine were covered by Foreign Affairs in an article that concludes the unfolding peace process “appears to replicate specific weaknesses from the Minsk [accord] process (excluding major parties to the conflict and rushing to an undefined cease-fire with little enforcement and security guarantees)” and that “Europe needs a unified position on the provision of security, military, and economic support to Ukraine; and alignment with Ukraine’s negotiation strategy”. Keir Giles, writing for the Baltic Defence College, considers that Ukraine is faced with “submitting to a ceasefire on unfavourable terms or fighting on and losing US support”, although this may be a blessing in disguise as it would remove US operational constraints and enable Europe to partner with Ukraine as a contributor to European security rather than consumer. Ukraine’s ability to regularly outpace Russia’s innovation cycle is a model for other countries to maintain their military readiness in the 21st century, writes Joyce Hakmeh for Chatham House.
RUSSIA
London’s Heathrow airport closed for most of Friday 21st March after a fire, prompting speculation of Russian involvement. This concern is covered in Arsonist, Killer, Saboteur, Spy, which accuses European countries of downplaying Russian sabotage “despite overwhelming evidence” while reorientation toward Moscow may repeat the tendency to misjudge Russia following intelligence reprioritisation in the 1990s. What is not lacking is evidence of Russian attempts to destabilise NATO countries, with the Robert Lansing Institute detailing Russian military intelligence orchestration of mass protests in support of the pro-Russian Romanian presidential candidate Călin Georgescu and The Financial Times publishing maps and diagrams of a Russian shadow war in the Baltics that raises questions about the limits of NATO’s power and the ability to protect critical infrastructure. A senior European warns: “The Baltic Sea is just the beginning”. Meanwhile the Royal United Services Institute warns that whilst the EU has adopted 16 sanctions packages, the €200 billion frozen from Russian central bank reserves needs to be urgently transferred into a reparation fund for Ukraine, otherwise the EU may have to bear all the costs. The benefits of delay to President Putin is also referenced in a Chatham House article which foresees Russia using ceasefire negotiations as a tool while the Russian army continues its battlefield advances and theorises that Putin may persuade Trump to turn his economic fire on the European countries “sabotaging peace”. Robert Kagan, writing in The Atlantic, suggests Putin may “strike a Munich-like deal to strengthen an American president who seems determined to give Putin... a complete American capitulation in the global struggle, the destruction of the NATO alliance, the isolation of a weak Europe and… the reconstitution of the Soviet Union”. The Financial Times argues that cuts to USAID have done what President Putin failed six times to do – fatally injure the Meduza investigative news outlet, headquartered in Latvia, that aims to “make the Kremlin sad”.
EUROPE, NATO, UK
Events in the Oval Office also raised potential demands on European nations in the event of US disengagement. European nations responded with a managed transfer for European defence over the next five to 10 years. Commentators determined that unity, clarity, resolve and a more transactional mindset were needed. Jack Watling and Michael Kofman concluded “with the right force balance, investment, and political framework Europe could generate a credible commitment” but “willpower, not manpower, is Europe’s main limitation”. Kajsa Ollongren, however, concluded “it’s not hard to convince Europe that we need to do more” and that a “war economy” mindset was key, enabled by relaxed budgetary rules and smarter ways to fund higher defence spending. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace advocated that Europe, through the creation of a European defence force, needs to start dictating the pace, both for the security of Ukraine and Europe. At home, discussion centred on the question, is the UK military strong enough?, while Vince Connelly, writing for RUSI, concludes that the British Army’s warfighting structure stands as an impediment to attaining mass as Army Reserve units will be required to backfill gaps in the Regular Army and therefore won’t be able to form a second echelon force.
USA
Chatham House published an article on Trump’s first 50 days in power concluding that whilst Trump’s first term was chaotic and unproductive, the United States’ eight decades of commitment to defence and diplomacy may soon be upended as it actively disrupts the foundations of NATO and the liberal international order. However, rather than fracturing Europe, this could be the making of it. Elsewhere, Foreign Affairs assesses how Trump wields American power as a new geopolitical era unfolds and a “world of cutthroat power politics” returns and whilst Professor Hal Brands suggests there may be a substantial upside to Trump’s presidency, he acknowledges it relies on Trump discovering “at the very moment he feels most empowered — the best, most globally minded and most diplomatically savvy version of himself”.
MIDDLE EAST
On the 13th March, Syrian interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa signed a constitutional declaration regulating its five-year transitional period. This is explored in detail in a Chatham House article that highlights an opaque and stalled process, the exclusion of key armed factions, notably the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and the danger al-Sharaa may exacerbate internal divisions by consolidating power within larger groups, echoing the errors of Iraq’s de-Ba’athification process. Meanwhile, the deteriorating security situation and Turkey’s ambitions to disrupt the process mean more representative security structures won’t be straightforward on any front.
On the 15th March, US attacks on Houthi targets in Yemen were a clear message that “every shot fired by the Houthis will be looked upon… as being a shot fired from the weapons and leadership of Iran”. However, whilst the Houthis’ projection of power in the Red Sea has allowed them to establish a global presence it is, explains Chatham House, a mistake to characterise them as an extension of Iran. In this context, the Center for Strategic and International Studies argue that striking Iranian nuclear facilities is a bad idea and RUSI details the challenges involved in military strikes against Iran’s nuclear programme, both concluding with the infeasibility of relying strictly on a military solution to Iran’s nuclear programme. Worryingly, a Voice of America exclusive revealed Iranian ships had imported 1,000 metric tons of sodium perchlorate missile propellant from China, enough to produce 260 mid-range missiles.
CHINA
Whilst the world was focused on the events in the Oval Office, The Economist reported that two Chinese warships had staged an unprecedented circumnavigation of Australia to highlight China’s ability to project force far from home and, timed just as America turns its back on European allies, has fuelled anxieties in Australia and New Zealand that China may cosy up to South Pacific microstates to strengthen its ability to deploy across the region.
Meanwhile, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi presented China as a “responsible and stable global power, offering a stark contrast to a decaying, chaotic and hypocritical US… the root cause of all regional and global flashpoints”. A Chatham House article suggests China hopes to capitalise on Trump’s America withdrawing its traditional role in global institutions although suggests Beijing is still reticent about its role as a global leader. However, reports that China has conducted invasion barge drills in the South China Sea and statements by Wang Yi that “reunification with Taiwan is inevitable, and China will make it happen” remain worrying.
With growing concern over the role North Korea may play in world events, the US INDOPACOM Speaker Series recognised a growing convergence between Russia, China and the DPRK to reshape the international world order. Dr Edward Howell highlighted that whilst DPRK’s behaviour is unpredictable under Kim Jong Un’s leadership, it isn’t irrational, and they have emerged as a full actor in Russia’s war in Ukraine. Moreover, China may be concerned about the potential loss of influence on the Korean Peninsula.
AFRICA
The Africa in Brief substack published a fascinating insight; in 1978, China’s GDP per capita was $150 lower than nearly all African nations. The analysis follows that Africa can learn from China by focusing on industrialisation, regional integration, infrastructure and human capital and concludes that China’s rise wasn’t magic — it was driven by strategy and execution and therefore with the world’s youngest workforce and a growing free trade area, the African continent could be the next economic giant.
The African Center reports that in 2024, while economic decline in Mali led to migration of over 16,000 people to Europe, EU-funded crackdowns elsewhere and tightened internal borders led to an overall 48 per cent drop in migration out of Africa. However, intraAfrica migration has surged by 25 per cent over the past decade, suggesting that as Africa’s population booms and Europe’s doors close, migration pressure will shift on to African cities and job hubs.
The Financial Times reports that Zambia — long a poster child for Beijing’s reach in Africa — and Tanzania are negotiating with a stateowned Chinese consortium to rehabilitate and run an iconic railway, reviving a strategic export route to Beijing. This Chinese overseas development comes as cuts to USAID and the UK’s aid budget throws western approaches to foreign assistance into question.
Meanwhile on the 21st March, the Sudanese Armed Forces announced the retaking of the presidential palace and other government buildings in Khartoum, bringing the SAF closer to ousting the RSF from the capital for the first time in two years of war, but raising the prospect of Sudan’s more permanent partition. Since February the SAF have regained military momentum, capturing swathes of territory and cities in the eastern half of the country.
OUT NOW & COMING SOON...
l “The first duty of any government is to ensure the safety and security of its people. Outwith terrorism on our shores, we have accepted that security from conventional military threats is delivered through protecting at reach, by deterring through being prepared to fight battles on the continent with allies. In the lee of the end of the Cold War, the peace dividend resulted in a deliberate switch to lean ‘just in time’ solutions and a reliance on an international military industrial base, privileging value for money over resilience. We are now coming to realise that both these methods must change if we are to counter the threats of today and tomorrow; and that there is a requirement for hard conventional security at home and increased resilience across our capabilities, from workforce to a sovereign industrial base.” – Lieutenant General Charlie Collins, Commander Standing Joint Command, writing in the latest edition of The British Army Review, Safe Home?
l The world is less safe than it has been for more than half a century – there is a storm coming.
Storm Proofing, edited by the team at the CHACR, offers the collected thoughts of 15 experts – respected practitioners and academics from the UK, US and Europe. They consider what is being done, whether that is sufficient, and how we might think differently about our preparations for 21st century war on land. This is not a book about numbers of troops and equipment, it is rather more human than that. So, it is about how we approach war, how armies might structure themselves and align themselves to modern contexts, how soldiers should think and might feel and, how all of those very human things relate to the march of technology and artificial intelligence. Register your interest for a copy here