COMMENT
7
Back to the future: Putin’s return to classical geopolitics Ezra Sharpe gives an overview of Russia’s modern military advancements and what they mean for Europe.
T
he Russo-Ukrainian border has been conflict-ridden for over a century. An estimated 100,000 Russian troops now lie in wait on the eastern frontier of Ukraine, ready to test the limits of Western lip service. Diplomatic frenzy has ensued; Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin discussed tensions and exchanged warnings over Ukraine on the 30th December, whilst US National Security Advisors continue to urge dialogue with Russian Foreign Policy aids. This is nothing new; Russian presence on Ukraine’s eastern-most border has become a routine exercise since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The strategic importance of Ukraine to Putin’s regime cannot be understated. Since the formation of the USSR in 1922, the insatiable Russian bear has always looked westwards for its next meal. The answer to conflict prevention lies in asking why this happens, and how we might prevent it. Most of the grand theories of classical geopolitics were sequestered at the end of the Cold War. They were overly totalising, generalising, and universal to explain modern phenomena. The new neoliberal world, with all its messy contradictions and complexities, was simply too vast and too unforeseeable to be predicted with grand theories, most argued. But Putin’s Russia has proven itself to be an exception, reviving the age-old, dusty theories of Halford Mackinder’s ‘Heartland’ and Nicholas Spykman’s ‘Rimland’ from the shadows. If the recent actions of Moscow are explicable, that is where the answer lies. The inspired military mood of Moscow has prompted much debate amongst geopolitical strategists. Should the West adopt a line of appeasement, nodding to Putin’s unwavering request that the US rescind the eventual admittance of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO? For many analysts, this is just another one of Putin’s bluffs to add to the large catalogue of unrealised threats. To others, Moscow is slowly curating a milieu to exploit as a pretext for military invasion. Either could be possible. That is why it is essential that the US, amongst other Western powers, take the initiative to mobilise active troops within Ukraine - albeit, without the intent to ever raise a fist. If the US is seen to flinch when clarion calls are issued and violence is threatened to be exerted, the consequences for global geopolitics could be fatal. Wars occur not when aggression is snuffed
“The insatiable Russian bear has always looked westwards for its next meal.” out early, but when peace is no longer deemed to be worth fighting for. The best way to prevent war is not to deploy troops once it has already started – it is to ensure that the guns are never loaded in the first place. To achieve this, however, politicians and strategists must learn to identify the precursors of war when they lie brazenly before us, much like a canary in a coal mine. History proves that large-scale conflicts do not erupt out of thin air. They occur when flickers of unchecked aggression become the status quo. And they also occur when pacifists become blind to division and identity politics, which sow the seeds for hatred, blame, and anger. Recognising the rationale for
Putin’s foreign policy is good, but understanding the common denominator in the outbreak of war alongside that is even better. The most famous translation of geopolitical hypothesis into geopolitical reality has been through Halford Mackinder’s ‘Heartland’ theory. Mackinder postulated that control over the core of Eurasian territory would be the key to global power: “Who rules Eastern Europe commands the Heartland Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island Who rules the World-Island commands the world” The ‘Heartland’ would be the most advantageous geopolitical location, located at the pivot of Eurasia, inaccessible by militant sea-vessels, and impregnable through its harsh winters and vast land fortress. He argued that power would lie in the victory of the dominant land powers over the sea powers. This was built upon by Spykman’s ‘Rimland’ theory, which argued that the strip of coastal land surrounding Eurasia was more significant. The ethos of these theories can be seen in the repudiation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, and Hitler’s invasion of the USSR in 1941. Despite sealing the diplomatic promise that Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union would not invade one another during the Second World War, Hitler chose to do so anyway. Rather than being a symptom of power-hungry petulance, it was likely that gaining control of Eastern Europe, or the ‘Heartland’, was always in the Nazi blueprint. After all, the chief Nazi geopolitician, Karl Haushofer, was an avid disciple of Mackinder’s work which explicitly outlined that the successful invasion of Russia by a Western European nation could be used as a catalyst for the reclamation of global hegemony. Putin is the most recent leader to follow suit, but with a new flavour. Of course, these theories are grossly outdated. They were written at a time before airpower had come into fruition, and where the power of the digital world would be nothing other than a figment of one’s imagination. Moscow has chosen to rewrite them instead. Amongst other enticements, Putin’s desire to irreversibly absorb Eastern Ukraine into his desired territory can be reduced to two main factors relating to these theories: access to warm water ports, aligning with Spykman’s ‘Rimland’, and the expansion and protection of Eastern land power, reflecting Mackinder’s ‘Heartland’. In a globalised world, the ability to trade with ease brings economic leverage, and leverage brings power. For a country with such vast coastal territory, Russia has appallingly bad access to global sea routes and trading, with many ports frozen year-round. The Crimean Port of Sevastopol is a missing piece to Putin’s strategic puzzle, providing warm water access to global shipping routes and allowing the Russian military to aggrandise control into the Black Sea and further beyond. Secondly, as in traditional cold-war fashion, any westwards territorial expansion is deemed as advantageous to the Russian regime, who see the US and NATO as omnipresent and ever-looming threats. To understand the actions of Putin, it is critical we attempt to analyse his motives. These examples do not tell us that Putin will invariably stick to Mackinder and Spykman’s geopolitical blueprints. But, crucially, they demonstrate that diplomacy over the new ‘Eastern Question’ only serves to kick the can down the road. If the well-thumbed geopolitical playbook continues to be followed with increasing resolve, we should preemptively prepare for escalated flare-ups along Ukraine’s eastern border. Just as much as it is important to recognise Putin’s raison d’état, it is equally important to learn the signs of warmongering before conflict is allowed to ensue. Large scale wars are not momentary spasms in the peacekeeping status quo but rather emerge when
“Moscow is slowly curating a milieu to exploit as a pretext for military invasion.” small-scale escalations of violence are left unchecked. The First World War was not a global bicker over who was responsible for the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand; it was the culmination of decades of colonial jostling, battles for naval supremacy, and military sabre-rattling. By the same token, the outbreak of The Second World War was steeped in years of uncurbed aggression extending from Nazi Germany, both in its domestic and foreign affairs. Appeasement
does not work when you are sat across the table from warmongers. The placement of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border may only seem like a momentary spasm in the otherwise smoothly running peacekeeping operations of Europe. But it is these very glitches which, when left unchallenged, can mutate into actions far more deleterious. Biden claiming that stationing US troops in Ukraine was “not on the table” is therefore a serious diplomatic blunder, severely weakening NATO’s standing by ruling out preventative military responses to Russian aggression. Global security cannot be left strictly to the realm of rhetoric. When world leaders claim their unwavering support for the retention of autonomy, sovereignty, and democracy, boundaries must be drawn and the red-line must be enforced. Artwork by Ben Beechener. Read the full article on cherwell.org
Is the Oxford collegiate system financially fair for all students?
Isobel Lewis
There are certainly big disparities between costs of accommodation at different colleges. I’m at St Peter’s, and biased as I am in its favour even I can see that it might not be as well known to applicants as somewhere like Christ Church. Inevitably, a lot of students get pooled here in the interview process, meaning offer holders are faced with the choice between stumping up the exorbitant costs of living out in second year, because there isn’t enough room for us in college, and turning down a place at Oxford. That’s just one example of how the collegiate system can be uncompromising and unfair.
Zoe Lambert
Not at all! The wealthiest Oxford colleges are St. John’s, Magdalen and Christ Church; colleges renowned for attracting students from elite private schools. They then offer subsidised accommodation and meals alongside generous grants, providing financial support to those who least need it and therefore perpetuating the cycle of privilege.
Sonya Ribner
While I recognize that colleges have different financial circumstances and different accommodation available on site, colleges that allocate housing based on students’ financial resources unnecessarily differentiates between their students. I attend Magdalen where students cannot pay more for better accommodation and, thus, all room allocation is ballot-based. However, at a college such as St. John’s, which also provides accommodation for the full duration of undergraduate courses, there are a range of pricing options. Though this system may allow for lower prices than Magdalen can offer, the different pricing of housing is inappropriate because a student’s room should not be based on their ability to pay.
Vlad Popescu
The disparity between college resources and support creates a sort of paradoxical situation where concerns about access become meaningless- particularly when the colleges providing some of the best support for students from access initiatives are also some of the same colleges with the highest proportion of private school students. The financial disparity in the collegiate system is not only unfair but also counter-productive to creating a more accessible Oxford University.
