Chicago History | Fall and Winter 1991–92

CHICAGO HISTORY The Magazine of the Chicago Historical Society

EDITOR RL S~E LI . L Ell' IS

Fall and Winter 1991-92 Vo lume XX, Number s 3 a nd 4-

ASSOCIATE EDITOR

CI _\L DI.\ L\ .\ I\I W OOD ASSISTANT EDITORS R O',E\ I. \R\ ' J\ D.\\ I~

P.-\ I RIC I. \

B l路. Rl'C:K

CO TENTS

\ \ ' El KER'> ! I 1-.1\I ER

PUBLICATIONS ASSISTANT

.J L D\' SP0,~ 1.1-.R

4

EDITORIAL INTERN

CL \'ir ro N

Cl IRl 'i' I I'\ .\ DL RR DESIGNER 811. L \ ' \, t'\ t \ l\ l'E( ,1-.:S.

Antilabor Mercenaries or Defenders of Public Order?

D. L-\ URI E

33 How Lincoln Won the War

with Metaphors

ASSISTANT DESIGNER

j.\:"II ES

Ti-.n G 11rn~

M.

M CPH ERSON

PHOTOGRAPHY

J 01 I:'-. . \ LJ)ER'>O:'-.

DEPARTME TS

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C:op) ri g h1 1992 ill the Chi cago I l i~Lo1ical Sor ict\ Clark Stree1 ;11 :\01 1h . \ ,e 1n1 e Ch icago . IL Gilli I I

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appearin g in thi, ab,trau ed and ind c'\.ed in /11\tonral ~h,tratt, and lmn1ta: 1/1,tm)' and t ~fr.

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Fron1 the Editor Yesterday' s City

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journ al arc

1路0011101<..路d manu, u iph o f the ,utic.le.., appea ring in thi..., iv,ue are ;l\ailab le from th e

Chicago I li, torical Societ, \ l'ub licatio n, Ollicc .

Cm e, : /Jdail of I he Rail,p liuer. fllb, t and daft' unkumrn. Cl/.) !'0111/111/!,, 011d \ rul/1!1t1'f' Collrrtum.

66 Index to Volume XX

Chicago Historical Society OFFICERS Richard H. Needham, Chair Philip W. Hummer, Treasurer \V. Paul Krauss, Vire-Chair Philip E. Kelley, Serrelary Edgar D. Jannoua, Vire-Chair Philip D. Block III, fll1111ediate Past Chair Ellswonh II. Broll'n, President and Direr/or TRUSTEES Philip E. Kelley Lerone Bennelt,Jr. \V. Paul Krauss Philip D. Block Ill William J. McDonough Laurence Boolh Robert Meers Charles T. Brumback Mrs . Newton N. Minow Stewart S. Dixon Richard H. eedham Michael I-I. Ebner Poller Palmer Sharon Gist Gilliam Mr . Duncan \'. Henderson Gordon Segal Philip\\'. Hummer Edward Byron Smith, .Jr. Richard M. Jaffee James R. Thompson Edgar D.JannotLa Dempsey J . Travis .John R. \\'alter LIFE TRUSTEES Bowen Blair l\lrs. Frank D. Mayer l\1rs. Brooks l\lcCorrnick John T. McCutcheon, Jr. Andrew l\lcNally fll Bryan S. Reid, .Jr. Gardner 11. Stern HONORARY TRUS"rEES Richard l'vl. Daley, Mayor, City of Chicago Richard A. Devine, President, Chirago Park District The Chicago Historical Society is a prirntely endowed, indcpendcm institution devoted to collecting, interpreting, and pre enting the rich multicultural history of Chicago and Illinois, as" ell as ,elected areas of.\merican history, to the public through exhibition;, programs, research collectium, and publicatiom. It must look to its members and friends for continuing financial support. Contributions to the Socict) are tax-deductible, and appropriate recognition is acco,-ded major gifts.

Membership ~lembership is open to anyone interested in the Society\ goab and acti, itie,. C.la"e' ol annual membership and dues are as follows: lndi, idual, 30; Family. '.15: Student/Senior Citi,en, $25. \!ember, re<¡ci,e the Society\ maga1ine, Chicago His/01)'; Pa.1/ Ti111e.1. a ca lendar and newsletter; im i1atiom to ,pecial e\'ellls: free aclmi,,ion to the bui ldin g at all time,; reserved seats at films and concerts in our auditorium; and a LO percent di,count on books and other merchandise purchased in the i\luseum Store.

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FRO~I T H E EDITOR rht' onh 1hing. CL'rtain in Iii<.·. an age-old aphori m tell u . ,ire death and ta:xe,. If" few of u, n:·mt·mbcT tht' ta~e, ,, e p,1, from , ear to , ear. ''"e are ne, e1 l,tr lrom the wne memorial, in the more th.in li.nir hundred cemecene, in metropolitan C hica-.{O that remind u e, en da~ of our ultim,lle EHL'. For the Ii, ing. ho"e' er. c.emeterie, are ,ii,< important repo itone of informatHrn .t 1)t)Ut the pat. Gene.tit ...,i t, routineh ,earch g-ra,e,ard to ,erif) a dace or a name. and hi,wri.m, rnd~ them a, microco,nh ol ,oc.ien that reflect cla . 1,1cial. relig1 ,u . and ethnic di' i um . One of the mo,c curimh ,md enduri1w of Chic.a2;0· fimeran anifact i the Couch tomb. ,, hie. h 1)\ er look tockwn Ori, e from a mound located ju t north of the hica~o H 1~torical ot·iet,. rhe onh .._uni, inJ en pt from the Chicago ,emecery. the Couch tomb ) mbQlin· the e, oh ing rel.nion,hip of the Ii, 111~ .md the dead.

Th1m~h the riwaL cu,ton1'. and practice ,1' ociated ,\ith death ha,e ,aried \\ideh amon~ cultm·e throughom hi ton. inhurnation i the olde t and mo t uni, er,al method of di pJ 111 Y of the dead. For millennia ocietie h;n e buried their dead in cemeterie. 01· ·· leepi11~ pldce,. ·· In ,rntiquic, burial ::round, \\ere traditionally located ouhide the cit\ wall . Chri nan brou:.!ht gra, e into the <.it,. bun in~ their dead in catacomb . in church ,·ault. and in church,ard,. thu tran l1ffmin~ tho e ,p,Ke, into place for the Ii, ing and the dead 10 hare. But thi practice al o introduced the problem of c.rm,ding. The limited pace ,nailable could not accommodate the increa. ing number of dead. and ,anitacion condition and upkeep declined ~harply a a re ult.

B, the nmeteemh cemun. citi,en of major cicie deemed the condition of their church and municip.11 c.emeterie ha,ardou, to rhe health of the Ii, ing. ln I -"> • Jame Couch erected a family mau oleum in the Chica 0 o Cemecery. " ·hich ''"a to hou e 1he h1 d,· )f hi brother Ira. hi panner in the hotel bu ine:, . who had died in I 5 7. Bu ilt of ne hundred t n, )f Lt,ckpon. :\e,, York. cone wich pace for ele,·en bodies. the fam ily crypt 1s 1mple and cla ,1c .. I in ic de,1~n. It, a che moq expen i, e rructure in the cemetery. a fittm~ monument to .1 man of Ira 'ouch· tatu . Couch joined ocher decea eel Chicao-oan "·ho had been interred in the new cemete1; be~inning in I v-l'.?. Bounded by ,d1at are nm,· \\'ebster Pl,tLe. Clark creet. '\ ,rch Park. '\onh .-\, enue. and the Lake. the cemecen·· locat ion 1ra alreach contr..>,er ial, hen the C< lllh en pt "a builc. BelieYino- thac mia ma . or noxio u Yapor , eman,uin~ Ir m decompu,in2; b, die cau,ed di~ea e·. citiLen.., called for an end of burial "·ichin cit,· lin'll and the remm al or e~1 ting !:;ra,e . In Februan· I 69. Chicago Cemetery formally bee.a me Lmcoln Park. bur the tran,ler uf ~Ta, e to ,, hat "ere then suburban cemeterie conmued 101· more than clrn·C\ , e.u- . Onh· the Couch tomb remained. apparently becau e the ex pen,e ofmo,in '.! a ,tructure . It ,ize and, eig-lu did not "arrant it remoYal. The reation of rural or ~arden cemeterie far from urban center . "·hie 1 pro,·ided a , ani tan burial ~round within a parklike -.,euing. ,,·a one an:.wer to urbanite · deep ambi, alence abom the dead and abom cil\ life. The fear of corp e a the ,ource of epidemic di ea, e ,,·a counterbalanced b, a '.!nm in~ romamici m of death that , ie,, ed life· end with entimemal melan ho!~. :\nd "hile cit\ burial ~ound , ·ere, ie,,ed a, impediment to urban ex pan ion and economic g-ro1\ th. cititen al,, found the con equence if uch progre, di turbin~ and u::;ht a pl.ic.e ' !-Jere the- c mid periodically e cape che 1101 e. dirt. and acti, it~ Jf the cit). The gard e n cc mcte1': :,atisfi ccl a ll thc~e n eeds . ·1 he p ro m ise of a fina l rest ing p lace fo r th e d ead ll'as ra re ly fulfill ed in nin etee nth-ce ntury C hi cago; th e Co uch tomb i~ a ra re excep ti o n. But the fa te of a n)' o th er bur ial site is not ce rta in .

Th e gro" ing pop ul arity of cre mat io n, in creas ing acts of va nda li sm, a nd acce le ra tin g costs have mad e ce me te ri es mo re cl irli cult to ma nage a nd less aurac Li ve. Bul should the mod e rn ce me te ry lo~e a ll a p pea l, la nd cle,·elo pe rs a re eage rl y wa itin g to recl a im once more the citi es o f th e d ea d for th e li vin g.

RL

Antilabor Mercenaries or Defenders of Public Order?

by Clayton D. Laurie

The use offedeml troops to quell labor unrest during the Pullman Strike heightened the controversy over the militmy's role in civil disturbances.

By early July 1894, Chicago had endured more

Lhan fifty clays of a sLrike that disrupted all rail traffic coming Lo and from the city. The presence of hundrecb or policemen. U.S. clcputr marshals, and contingenLs of federal troops had failed to reopen the railroads or corl\'ince strikers and mobs or the unemployed Lo cease unlawful acti\'ities. Tensions ran high. On .Jul)' 6, Lhe violence and destruction reached the firsL of many peaks \\'hen an agent of the Jllinois Central Railroad shot and killed tll'O rioters in the city's Panhandle \'ards near Fiftieth Street.

In the aftermath or this act, a mob of six thousand destroyed an estimated se\'en thomancl rail cars and other propert) valued at ,,.' 340,000. t\Iobs e"en burned six buildings on the grounds or the \\'oriel's Columbian Exposition, which took place in Chicago the pre\'ious summer.

Faced with increasingly uncontrollable di~orclers, Chicago mayor Jolm Hopkins appealed to Illinois governor John P. Altgeld to inter\'ene ,rith state troops. \\'hile prepared to inter\'ene instantly, Altgelcl " ·as nonetheless chagrined to find that C.S. Attorne", General Richard Olne,· , had usurped his authority and prerogati,·es f'or restoring order. Olney ll'as determined to me federal military po\\'er to encl the natio1mide strike and destroy the Chicago-based American Rai lll'a)' Union (:\RU), 1d1ich supported it.

Federal troops ll'ere deployed during the summer of 189-! as a partisan strikebreaking force in an unprecedented abuse of federal military poll'er. The army, although foll011·ing the orders of its ci\'ilian superiors, including the L .S .

Attorney General , gained a negati\'e reputation among labor that took decades to 0\'ercome . Olney's actions during the spring and summer of 189-1 added fuel to the raging contro\'ersy O\'er the proper domestic role, if any, -l

or federal troops, especially in relation to disorders arising li·om labor disputes. The Chicago deployment ll'aS t lie largest inter\'ention or lederal soldiers for riot duty since the Civil \\'ar, and it prompted 1he army\ fir-,t atlempt to de,·elop a doctrine on handling ci\'il cli-,turbances.

The Pullman Strike grell' from disorders that began in t\la)' 189 -~ in the cornp:rny town or Pullman, Illinois, then tll'eh-e miles south or Chicago. Found eel in 1880 by George M. Pullman as the site or the Pullman Palace Car Company, the town ll'as intended to be a ll'orker's paradise ·'ll'here all that is ugly and di.,cordant and demorali1ing is eliminated."

The com pan)\ slick ach ertising brochures, hmre, er, did not present the emire truth about the cornpanr toll'n. \\'hilc the I\\'eh-e thousand emplo)ees and their ramilic., had companyprm·iclecl amenities, such as housing, a hotel, a post office, a bank, a church, general stores, schoob, and utilities, all ll'ere company-owned and f'inancecl h) clcductiom from workers' \\'ages. The rates 1,en· calculated to return to the comp,Ul) G percent annuall)' on the money spent to construct and maintain them. Price<, and rents in Pullman \\'ere often 20 to 25 percent higher than tlH)'>e in '>UtTouncling comrnun ities. and sornetimes 1,age deductions comumed all or an cmplo) cc\ pay, forcing them into debt Lo the company. \Vhile workers \\-CIT not compelled Lo liH' in Pullman, only residents could count on steady employment in hard limes.

In the year after the Panic of 1893, George Pullman, seeking to arnid the \\'Orst eflects or the bad economic times, folloll'ecl the lead of other industrialists and reduced employee Cluy/011 D. Lull/'//' is u lii.1 toria11 al Ifi e L'11ili'd Sia/es .\lili/(// y Hi.1/01)'·

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NI'.\\' YORK, Al'GCST 11, 1877,

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T/11• l '. ') . . I nil_\' inll' l'i'l'11ed lo /111/1 1110/i l'iolr•11ff during lh1• Great Rai/zl'(ly Strihe of 1877. L:11/ike the S!rihe, hm1 •n 1n. duri111; th1• 1877 .1/nlie the army 111m 1ed i11 lr11g1•.fim11alio11.1 a11d remained slrirtly

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5

Chicago History, Fall and TVi11ll'I 1991-92

6

1vlPn:enaries or Defendn:~?

Pnl/111a11 cars reJ;resented the e/1itome of l11x11 I)' in train travel. In this /1hotograph of Pullman car manufaclnring (oj1J1osite) takn1 brfore I 880, workers in the Detroit factory add finishing touches lo the ornate cars. Plwtogm/1/z by .Jex Bardwell. rlbove, some o(lhe more tlwn twelve thousand laborers em/1/oyed by the Pullman Palace Car IVorks leaving the jac!OI)' al noo11t ime, I 889.

wages between 25 and 45 percent. He did not, however, reduce rents, prices for goods and services in Pullman, or the salaries of managers and superintendents. The Pullman Company colllinued to pay stock dividends of between 8 and 9.5 percent, as it had since its founding in 1867, and had managed to maintain a surplus of twenty-five million dollars despite bad economic times. Pullman later claimed that the company was operating at a loss during the reductions and strike, but a later investigation by the United States Strike Commission found the opposite to be true.

Seeking relief from the hardships caused by the wage reductions, a committee representing Pullman employees met with George Pullman on May 9, 1894, to request a reduction in rents and a restoration or predepressj_on wages. Pullman claimed that wage cul were necessary to keep the factories open, but he promised to investigate. The next day, however, three me mbers of the committee were summarily fired. Outraged at what they perceived as Pullman's bad faith, the remaining members of the committee met and, oted to !>trike on May 11 unless the company rcimtat ecl the terminate d worker!>, reduced rents, and restored wages to pre-1893 levels. [ n a preemptive mm¡e, Pullman declared an indefinite lockout, putting all four thousand employees

out of work. A peaceful strike and stalemate ensued for the next three weeks, while repeated attempts by Pullman employees to reach a negotiated settlement failed.

The dispute in Pullman would probably have remained local had its existence not become known to two larger organizations whose rivalry escalated the conflict into a national one. The American Railway Union, formed by Eugene V. Debs in June 1893, had 150,000 members , including several thousand Pullman employees. Opposing the ARU was the eightyear-old General Manager's Association of Chicago (GMA), a business association consisting of the Pullman Company and twenty-four railroads, among them the giants of the rail industry. After Pullman management rebuffed employee attempts at a compromise solution, the ARU took up the cause and presented the Pullman Company with an ultimatum: unless its representatives agreed to arbitration by June 26, the union would begin a nationwide rail strike and would boycott any train carrying a Pullman car. Since most major railroads used Pullman car , the national rail sy tern would be paralyzed. When George Pullman ignored the ARC's ultim atum, the strike began.

The GMA quickly came to the defense of the Pullman Company. Railroad company lawyers called for court ir~junctions against the 7

Jr, r111 al/1'111/J/ lo ONtli' a '·worken' pamdLII'," (;l'Olg'i' 1\1. Pu/fuw11 treated !ht• ;uodfl IOil'II of Pu/11111111 in 1880. To(i11011ce the !OWi/ \ (//llfllilil's. howet 11'/', the co111/Ja11y r/1111ged 11 orke1:1 rmL1 u11d/i'e.1 that gml'mied an a11111wl fmifit of 6 /JerC1'11/. Viell' looking ll'l'.1/ 011 1

11 2th Street from the to/J of,\.Iarliet Hall.

Chirngo Histo1)', Fall a 11d ll'inter 1991-92 strike and ordered nonstriking employees to place Pullman cars on as many trains as possible, calculating that widespread disruption of passenger, freight, and mail traffic ll'Ould provoke a public outcry, cause federal inte1·vention , and tarnish the ARC's image. For the same reasons, the G IA a\'Oided calling on municipal authorities or the Illinois stale militia between June 26 and July 2 to break \\'hat was initially a peaceful and order!)· strike, hoping instead [or decisive federal actions to destroy the ARU. The railroads had a po\\'erful friend and ally in U.S. Attorney General Richard Olney.

Before and during his tenure at the Justice Department, Olney served as a director or a legal ad,·iser to several railroads that were members of the GNL\. At the same time that he earned an annual salary of eight thousand dollars as attorney general, he received more than ten thousand dollars annually as a retainer for his services to the Chicago, Burlington , & Quincy Railroad. Olney agreed that the ARU constituted an implacable foe of business to be curbed by all possible method , and he belie\'ed that its leadership and policies presented revolutionary threats to federal authority.

According to historian Jerry l\I. Cooper, Olney

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,1fterjw1i' 26, 189-1. mi/road ,1 1orkm, boycotled any train

crmying a Pullman car, /J(/m/y:ing the nr;tion 's rai(1yst1'111.

This cmtoo11, which ap/Jeal'l'd i11 the Chicago Tribune 011 Jun e 29, 1894, /Jortrayed the cul/Hit a.1 the ,,.Jmeriran Railway Union.

10

worked to break the strike primarily to destroy the ARU, to discredit Eugene Debs, and to intimidate other national labor organizations into submission.

Olney, in attempting to involve the federal government in the strike, first appointed attorney Edwin Walker as special counsel and strike adviser to Thomas E. Milchrist, the U.S. District Attorney for the Northern District or Illinois. As a former railroad lawyer and the GMA's own choice to lead antistrike efforts, Walker, like Olney, was well suited for the task ahead. Olne)''s second step was to convince President Grover Cle\'elancl of the need Lo act.

The events developing in Chicago troubled Cle\'eland, but he hesitated to commit federal troops until their presence was necessary Lo prevent lawlessness. ,\s Olney pointed out, howe\'er, Cleveland had the legal authority to intervene militarily under Re\'ised Statute 5298, a law allowing the president to use army regulars to enforce federal laws and protect federal property. Cleveland could abo intervene under the \'arious railroad acts intended to protect the mail and interstate commerce.

While the president mulled O\'Cr the events and his options, Olney directed Walker and Milchrist to initiate court injunctions to get rail traffic 1110,·ing and to break the strike.

Earlier in 189 J, Olney had used federal court injunctions to alloll' [cderal intervention in disputes with Jacob Coxey's Commonwealth or Christ and the other "industrial armies" that hijacked trains to the East. This tactic. ho\1e\'er, applied onl) to railroads in federal recei,,ership. But in Jul) 189-!, this now-familiar federal tactic no longer worked because few eastern railroads \\ere financially insoh-cnt.

Instead, Olney sought to me two other justifications for federal injunctions-to prevent interference with the U.S. mail and interstate commerce. During an earlier strike against the Great Northern Railroad, Olney's solicitor general had determined that any train hauling at least one mail car \\'as a mail train. Olney reasoned that efforts to rerno\'e the mail car, or any car, on the ame train constituted interference \\'ith the U.S. mail. On June 28, he instructed Ed"·in Walker Lo obtain federal court injunctions so that " passage of regular trains carrying U.S. mails in the usual and ordinary

Alercenaries or Defi'11de1:1? way .. . [would not be] obstructed. " As an added anti strike measure , th e CMA pressed Oln ey Lo in\'o ke the Sherm a n Anti-Trust Act, a la\\' ori g inally inte nded as a devi ce Lo co ntrol industri a l and busin ess mo nopo li es but now used aga in st trusts o r co nspi racies of o rga nized labo rer s.

Oln ey readily compli ed with C MA requests.

H av in g se lected protecti o n o f th e ma il a nd inte rsta te co mm e rce a nd inv o kin g a ntitrust legisla ti o n as g ro unds for inte rve nti o n, Oln ey so ug ht a bl a nke t injun cti o n, citin g a ll three justifi ca ti o n , th at wo uld rend er ARU in terfe rence with ra il tra ffi c in th e Chi cago a rea virtuall y impossibl e . Alth ou g h ne ith er city no r sta te o ffi cia ls had yet reques ted fede ra l a id durin g wha t had thu s fa r bee n a peaceful str ike, U.S .

C ircuit Co urt Jud ge Willi a m A. Wood s a nd .S. Di tri ce Co urt Jud ge Pe te r S. C rosscup issued , o n Jul y 2, at Oln ey's be hest, a n injuncti o n o f suc h bread th th a t la bo r lead e r s d e nounce d it as a "Callin g g un o n pa p e r. " It pro hibite d AR U m e mb er s fr o m inte rfe rin g with ma il tra in s o r tra in s e ngaged in interstate co mm e rce a nd fo rbad e uni o n me mbe rs fro m persuadin g o th ers Lo j o in th e strike o r e ncouragin g those alread y engaged in th e boycott. lf Debs co mpli ed with th e injuncti o n , th e strike would e nd imm ed ia tely, a nd the future of th e ARU wo uld be j eo pardi zed . Th e injun cti o n, ho\l'ever , as Oln ey a nd th e C MA und e rstood , mea nt littl e with o ut e nforce ment powe r.

Fed era l ma rsha ls had a lready bee n un successful at controlling what little disorder ex isted , whi ch un e mpl oyed persons un co nn ected with th e strike o r th e AR U had in sti gated , a nd they now a ppea red un a bl e Lo e nfo rce th e injun cti o n as we ll. U nde r Olney's orde rs since Jun e 26, C .S . Ma rs hal .J o hn \\'. Arn o ld h a d a ppo inted three th o usa nd m e n as de puti es in th e C hicago a rea. So me were white-co ll ar or no nstrikin g ra ilroad wo rkers vo luntee red by the ir compani es, but most were thugs, dere licts, drunks, a nd o th e r di sre putable pe rso ns who made needl ess arres ts, brutali zed citizens, and , in so me case~, plund e red th e \'Cry pro pe rty

th ey we re hire d to protec t. All we r e paid , a rm ed , a nd d e pl oyed a t th e direction of th e C MA. Ed\\'in Walker compla in ed to Oln ey that th e ma rshal a pp o inted a " mob o f de puti e s" who were "worse than useless," and,, ho, rather th a n assurin g law a nd order , were p ro\'oking strikers a nd the un e mpl oyed to \'i o le nce.

. I/Jove right, Euge11e I' . Deb., . IN1dn of the . l111erirn11 Roihi•a1· l '11io11. For hi., roh' i11 the .,trike. Deb.1 11 •a .1 co1111irted ,;fro111pimrJ to re.1/rai11 i11tersta/e ro1111111'rce. l '.S . ..f//orn1'J Cl'/leral Richard Ol11ey (right) , r111 ally of the mi/road,. lw/1ei'I'(/ Dl'bs a11d the A111erim11 Railway Union /Jrt'.11'//ll'd fl'JI0/11tio11111y th reals tofedeml (l/( /horf1_,·.

11

Chicago Histo1J, Fall and IVinter I 991-92

12

Mercenaries or Def'e11de1:1?

13

Chicago Histo1)', Foll a nd ll'in ter 1991-92

Al the request of Mayor Hopki11.1, Go11emor.Jol111 :Jltgt,fd (above) ordered state lroojJ,1lo Chirngo lo /"l's/ore order. He insisted, hoil'ever, that they 110/ be used lo break the ,1/rilw

Th e a ppa re nt fa ilure of fe de ral marsha b , d e puties, and local police to maintain law a nd ord e r left o nl y two a lterna tiv es : Illin o is's National Guard forces or federal troops, At the outset of th e boycott, Illin ois's forty-seven-yea rold, liberal, a nd prolabor gove rn or, John P. Altgeld, had de pl oyed porti ons o f th e state' n a ti on al gua rd a t tro ubl e spo ts in Da nvill e, Decatur, and Cairo, but as conditions worsened h e pre pa red to co nce nt rate th e e ntire fo rce near Chicago. Despite hi s readin ess to inte rvene, .A..ltge ld was unsy mpa the ti c to th e ra il road s, had re fu sed to accept GMA favo rs or succumb to th eir influe nce, a nd beli eved th a t th e cause of th e Pullm an workers was bas ica lly just. AbO\¡e all he was unwillin g to position state fo rces as Gi\1A-supportin g strikebreakers.

A.ltgeld 's attitudes did not surprise the Gi\IA or federal offi cials. Area businessmen and local and federal authoriti es had long distrusted th e self-educated a nd se lf-made A.ltgeld because of his Germa n-immi grant, ,rnrking-class background , hi s Po puli st lea nin gs, and hi s p as t support for radi ca l causes . Already consid ered 14

a politi ca l outsid er , Altgclcl in creased th e suspicions of those un comlo rtabl e with his philosophi es by pard onin g th e survivin g H ay ma rket Affa ir a na rchi sts soo n a ft e r ta kin g o fli ce.

Rail road own e rs had little troubl e convin cin g Walker a nd Milchri st th a t if'Altge ld used sta te troo ps in C hi cago, th e troo ps wo uld be restricted to restorin g order a nd would not brea k the str ike .

Th e act ions aga in st th e industri al armi es in the spring had e roded Olney's co nfid e nce in sta te militias a nd in th e law e nforce ment capabilities o r hi s own ma rshal fo rce. Fro m th e beginning of the Pullman boycott, Olney sought to empl oy federal troo ps. T o do thi s, he needed to de monstrate to Pres id e nt Cle\'ela nd , as required by Re\'i sed Sta tute 5298, th at it had beco me impracticab le "to e n force th e law by the ordin ary course o f judicia l proceedin g " with th e resources al ha nd.

Olney's fir st o pp o rtunity to p e r suad e Cleve la nd to se nd troo ps to Chi cago ca me on Jul y 1, 1894 . \Vh e n a mob of two th ousa nd strikers at Chicago's Blue Island rail yard de{ied Arno ld 's o rd ers to di sperse, th e U .S. mars ha l wired Olney tha t it was "impossible," even with a fo rce o f 125 de puti es, "to 1110\'e tra in s he re with out hav ing th e Fifteen th In fa n LI)' fro m Ft. Sherid an orde red he re now." Alth ough news re p orte rs, th e C hi cago chi e f o r p oli ce, a nd Mayor H opkins all la te r tes tifi ed that no significa nt di sturba nces had take n place at Blue Island or in Chicago bdo re .July 2, Olney used Arn old 's te legra m to co nl'in ce C leve la nd o f the need fo r fed e ra l milita ry inte r\'e nti o n .

Anticip a tin g pres id e nti a l o rders, the a rmy':, co mm a ndin g ge ne ra l, J o hn i\I. Sc h o fi eld , alerted the Dep artm ent of the Missouri to prep a re to move th e e n tire ga rri so n a t Fo rt Sherida n by stea mer or ra il to Chicago's La ke Front Park. Despite Olney's a nd Arnold's picas and Sch ofi e ld 's pre pa ra tions, Cleve la nd d ecided not to fo ll ow the precedent set durin g the Coxey e pisod e a nd not to de pl oy troo ps until he rece ived a j o int sta teme nt from offi cials in Chicago tha t p roved soldi e rs were needed.

Moving qui ckly, Olney insu¡ucted Walker on July 3 to forward a request fo r fede ral troops, signed j o intly by Milch r ist a nd Grosscup , and with this statement Olney persuaded Cleveland to co mmit federal fo rces. Scho field was sum-

1',lercenarif'.1 or Defi'11dn:1?

moned to the White House. Arter locating the commander or the Department or the Missouri on Long Island, where he was allegedly vacationing, Schofield ushered Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles into a White House conference with himselC President Cleveland, Secretary of State Walter Gresham, and Secretary of War Daniel Lamont. After some discussion , Schofield recounted that Miles and Gresham balked at sending federal troops to the city; they deemed them unnecessary and believed that they might provoke further violence. The other members of the conference, however, convinced by Olney, who waved Arnold's telegram as proof or the existing danger, overruled them and convinced the president that immediate federal military assistance was crucial.

The conference brought Lo the fore a longstanding rivalry between Miles and Schofield that was to have an enervating effect on the federa I mi litary intervention in Chicago . Their

respective memoirs differ sharp!)' on the sequence or events at the conference but do indicate some of the subtle hostility the two officers had long held toward each other. Miles claimed that he "happened to be on important duty in the east" when the crisis erupted, while Schofield wrote that Miles's "staff ofTicers didn 't know his whereabouts nor did the Acijutant General of the Army." Miles later claimed in his memoirs that he favored sending troops to Chicago immediately to put down a radical revolution, while Schofield portrayed Miles as " not having anticipated any emergency which would require or justif)1 . • • use of troops in his department." According to Schofield, "in [Miles's] opinion the U.S. troops ought not be employed in the city of Chicago at that time."

Miles's view that troops were unnecessary upset Schofield, who already considered Miles derelict in his duty for not ending his vacation and returning to Chicago earlier. The two

Polirerlrh•ing boch the mobfi-0111 a trni11 bloch!'d by w1 ofotructio11 011 the trnrk1 near Forty-third Street. Drawing by E. /1.\/ze from .1/tetc/1es by G. A. Coffin.

,w.

15

Chirngo HisfOI)', Fall and ll'inter /991-92

ToJJ, ,\Jaj. Gen. ,\ 'd,011 .-i/JJJ/e/011 Jlile.1. c0111111t111der of the De/Jar/111ent of !hi' ,\/i1.11111ri, L'.S. ,--ln11y. Bo/10111, Gen. john ,\I. Schofield, co11111w11di11g genem/, l '.S. ,-in11y.

16

generals had previously clashed over Miles's slowness in responding to orders from Schofield and his proclivity either to change or to ignore orders altogether. Earlier in the spring, during the coal miners' strike in Indian territory, ~files took nearly a month to comply ll'ith Schofield\ order to send troops to evict strikers from coal mines on federal property .

Schofield and Miles's strained relations reflected both a personality clash and differences in interpretation regarding the role or the army in civil diwrders. Schofield, at age sixty-three, had had a long and varied career that included both combat service and civil affairs duty. An 1853 graduate or the U.S. Military Academy with a subsequently earned law degree from the Universit-y or Chicago, he saw active duty in the Third Seminole \\'ar and commanded Union volumeers in Civil War battles at Atlanta, Franklin, and 1ashdle . Schofield helped implement Reconstruction programs in the South and briefly sen·ed as secretary of war and as commandant at \\'est Point. A highly erudite man, Schofield taught natural philosophy at \\'est Point and, for a brier period, physics at \\'ashington University in St. Louis. Cnlike most of1icers of hi:, generation, he had broad experience in ci\'il-milit,u-y relations gained in a variety or posts where he had sen·ed in daily contact ll'ith go\'ernment of1icials and civilians.

1ow within t"·o years or mandatory retirement, Schofield faced a ~cries of' domestic disorders and a recalcitrant and obstinate subordinate in Nebon ,\ppleton l\liles.

The man destined tom crsee f'ecleral troops in Chicago was different f'rom his commander in both background and temperament. Ceneral \files, firt~-three years old in 1894, ,rns a sclf'educated, hardened combat veteran ,rith liule experience in ci,·il-rnilitary affairs. ,\s a commander of' l'Olunteers, he had seen action in many major carnpaigm of the Civil \\'ar and had 11·011 the Medal of Honor for gallant1~y at Chancellors,·illc, where he 11as se,·erely \\'Oundecl. By age t11·cnty-fi, e, Miles , kno\\'n as one of the '·boy generals," had commanded a corp of t\\'enty-six thou and men. After the Cil'il \\'ar, his acti,·e combat serl'ice continued on the frontier \\'here he fought the Comanche, Kiowa , Nez Perccs, Arapaho, Sioux, Cheyenne, and ,\pache between 1866 and 1894. Cnlike

Merce1101ies or De/mde1:\?

The rioting o!July 6 and 7 changed the Pul/111011 Strike ji-om a slandoj]between managemenl and labor lo a wild and violent .1/Jree that troops could not rnnlrol. Dm11 1ing by C. W. Pe/en fimn a skl'lrh by G. A. Coffin.

Sc hori e ld , Mil es had little fo rm a l e du ca ti o n a nd no ne a t the univer sity leve l, but he could co unt o n valu abl e fa mily milita ry a nd po litica l co ntacts to compe nsa te . Hi s wife was a ni ece o f Ohi o se n a to r J o hn Sh e rm a n a nd o f G e n .

Willi a m T. Sherm an, Civil \\'ar lege nd a nd fo rme r Co mm a ndin g Ge ne ra l o f th e Arm y.

Accusto med to the inde pe nd e nce of fro n tier comm a nds a nd su re of hi s co nnectio ns, power, a nd ca p ab iliti es, Mil es g r ew res ti ve un der Scho fi e ld 's atte mpts to control the fed e ra l milita ry inte rve nti o n in C hi cago . Sc ho fi e ld , co nvin ce d th a t a ra pid a nd d ec isive military response was needed and simila rly convinced o f hi s ow n power a nd res po nsibility, ove rrul ed hi ~ stro n g-will e d su bo r d in a te a nd o rdered troo ps to be d e pl oyed in th e J\I idwes t.

Af't c r perso na ll y puttin g l\lil es o n th e next tra in we~ t, Sc ho fi e ld in st ru cted J\ lil es's a(iju tant in C hi cago, Lt. Co l. J a mes P. Ma rtin , to

concentrate all the forces from Fon Sheridan at La ke Front Pa rk . As soo n as the e ncampm e nt was comple te, its comm ander, Col. Robert E. A Cro fton , Fifteenth Infantry, was to co nfer with Arn o ld , I ilchri st, a nd Wa lker o n ho," to best d e pl oy th e troo ps to e n fo rce fed era l l,11,¡s a nd fac ilita te transpo rt o f th e ma il.

Ea rl y o n th e eve nin g o fJLily 3, C rofto n e nter e d C hi cago with e ig ht co mpa ni es o f th e Fiftee nth Infa ntry, two troo ps o f th e Seventh Cava lry, a nd o n e li g ht ba tte ry o f th e First Artill e ry. U p o n co n sul ta ti o n with Arn o ld , Ma rtin , Milchri st, a nd J ohn M . Egan , cha irma n o f th e GMA- but ig norin g bo th C hi cago and Illin ois ci,¡il and military o fTi cials- Crofi.on d ecided to d e pl oy hi s men th ro ug hout th e city rather th a n co nce ntra te the m at La ke Fron t Park as ord ered. H e sent fo ur companies o f infa ntry Lo Blu e Islan d, two co mpa ni es Lo th e Uni o n Stoc k Yard s, a nd two co mpa ni es to th e 17

Chirago 1-iistmy, F(( /1 and fl'i 11ler 1991-92 Gra nd Cross in g. Th e nex t mo rnin g, he re in fo rced th e regulars at th e stoc kyard s with t,vo ca\'alry troo ps a nd an a rtill e ry batl e ry. He the n se t up headqua rter~ cloll'n town wh e re he could ta ke acl\'a n tage o r telegraph fac iliti es.

Th ese initi a l fede ra l d e pl oy me nts we re no t e noug h. O n the reco mm e nd a ti o n o f Arn o ld , Cro fto n subseque ntl y bro ke up th e lar ger fed e ra l troo p fo rm a ti o ns lo fo rm sco res o r sm a ll de tac hm e nts of te n to twe nty me n , ass ig nin g th e m Lo wo rk a lo ngs id e p o lice squ a d s a nd posses thro ug ho ut th e city. Wa lke r la te r ad \'i secl Arn o ld th a t ce rta in a rmy units ll'o ulcl assist th e deputi es in arres tin g o ffe nd e r s and th erefore he sho uld pl ace d e puti es wh e re th e rede ra l troop s we re sta ti o ned .

By d epl oy in g fed eral forces in sma ll squ ad s to wo rk with p o li ce a nd d e puti es, Croft o n ~howecl a lack of a pprecia ti o n fo r Scho fi e ld \ policy (and that of'C en . \\'infield Scoll Hancock durin g th e 187 7 C re al Railwa y Strike) th a t troops should always remain in large form ation s

To/1, Col. Robert E. A. Croft 011, co11ww11der of the Fijteentlz Jnfa11t1y, l'.S. Anny. Crojto11 dejJ/oyed smaller contingm/:, of troops as reinforcements to ch 1ilia11 .fi1rce.1tliro11gho11t the tilJ. Below, one co11tingent set 11/1 rm11/1 rlml'nlow11 i11 jront of the co11 rtho11se.

18

Alercenmies or Defe11dn-s? under exclusive military control. [n General Order 15 issued on May 25, 189'"1, Schofield had told departmental commanders exp li citly that federal regulars were to operate on ly as coherent tactical units under the direct orders of their military superiors, not as reinforcements int egrated into the posses of federal and loca l law enforcement agenc ies. Such integration of federal troops und er control of municipal a nd stare civil a u thor iti es, as opposed to their own officers, constituted a direct violation or the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, which forbade such use. Like Hancock, Schofi e ld believed that civi l author iti es, in askin g for military a id , confessed their own in ab ility to restore order and shou ld therefore a ll ow the military to direct events.

There were sound tactical reasons to avoid the use of scatte red detachments of so ldi ers.

The sight of sma ll numbers of federal troops accompany in g policemen and deputy marshals on July 4 had failed to intimid ate the Ch icago

,,1 mrt' /!hologmj)h .1/iowi11g /roo/J1 .1/alio11ed

111

mobs. That even in g, ten thousand people, including strikers, the unemployed, you th s, and thrill-seekers, roamed the rail yard at Blue Island and the stockyards, tampering with signal li ghts, overturning rail cars, and setting fires. Restrained br Schofield's standing orders not to fire unl ess directly threatened " ¡ith assau lt, federal troops attempted to di perse the mobs from ra ilroad property that even in g and most of the following clay by using rine bulls and bayonets.

Meanwhile, Miles arrived at th e Department of the Missouri Headquarters in the Pullman Building at Michigan Avenue and Adams Street. Severa l troubling issues a1rnited him, the first of which concerned troop deployments. The lega l questions raised by Crofton's assignment of federal troops as reinforcements for posses did not concern Miles as much as the potential clanger of scattered units being overwhe lmed by mobs that might take advantage of the restrictions placed on the use of let h a l

P111/111a11 d11ri11g 1/ze strike.

19

Chirngo Histo1y, Fall and ll'inter 1991-92

Striker:, rese11/ed the /Jresenre of/i>deral troops and greeted Lhe111 with boo,1, jeen, and rnrse,1. Abo1,e, troo/1.1 maffh through the 1110b al the Union Stock ford:, . Dmuâ&#x20AC;˘ing b_)¡ Frederic Re111inglon.

20

fo rce. E\'en more troubling, Mil es \\'as fo rced to co nfront ne\\'spa pe r re porte rs, labor group~, a nd Go"ernor Altge ld , all o f wh o m criti cized federal actions a nd cha rged the army with p rotect in g th e Pullma n Pa lace Ca r Co mpa ny a nd th e railroad s. l\1il es explain ed th a t th e soldi ers "'ere prese nt to aid fe de ral marshals, to protect fed e ral pro pe rt)', to reo pe n inte rsta te co mmerce and mail ser\'ice, a nd to aid state militi a

Mercenmil's or D1'./e11de1:1? the vilest abuse and vilification," while a ne\\¡spaper correspondent wrote that the strikers "seemed to take it as a personal in ult that the soldiers were there. " Undaunted by this seeming lack of public support, federal troops continued to do their duty. Learning that mobs were converging upon federal units along the Rock Island line at Blue Island and at the stockyards, Miles authori,:ed Crofton to disperse them by warnings, pickets, and guards-and if these methods failed, by use of firearms. While such measures enhanced the security or his troops, they did little to reopen blocked rail lines . Without directly menacing the troops and risking federal firepower, large mobs cominued to obstruct the tracks and destroy railroad property. On July 5, the federal soldiers at the stockyards repeatedly tried to disperse the estimated five thousand rioters from the tracks but were unable to move the trains and soon withdrew, with the mob still controlling the area. At Blue Island, the attempts of regulars to clear the tracks and get trains moving again were also thwarted.

Miles interpreted these initial failings as an indication that reinforcements were needed, and he sent for even companies from Fort Leavenworth , Kansas, and Fort Brady, Michigan. On July 5, he telegraphed Schofield: The injunction of the United States Court is openly defied and unless the mobs are dispersed by action of police or fired upon by lJ.S. troops (whether menaced or not) , more serious trouble niay be expected. /\lob i increasing and becoming more defiant. Shall I give the order for troops to fire on mobs obstrncting trains?

and local police forces if they were in clanger of being overwhelmed, as auLl1ori,:ecl under Revised Statute 5298. Federal troop\ were not sent to restore order per se, this being a task of stale and local forces. The strikers, however, were not convinced. Hostility toward the federal troops wa~ intense; ''Lime and again, troops were met with boos, jeers, and curses." One army ofTicer stated that his "men bore patiently

To prepare for any eventuality and to enhance his firepower, Miles ordered a battery of Hotchkiss revolving guns and three batteries of artillery from Fort Riley, Kansas.

Schofield's messages to Miles indicated a growing dissatisfaction with the latter's handling of affairs in Chicago, especially his tacit approval of Crofton 's tactic of dividing federal forces into small detachments to aid civil authorities. In his haste to reproach Miles, Schofield temporarily ignored the question of firepower: 'Troops should not be scattered or clivenecl into small detachments nor should 21

Chicago H istory, Fa ll and Win ier I 991-92 7

I

j

On J uly 6, an Jlli11oi.1 Central agent killed two riotn:1at113th Street (to/J) . in res/Hlll.11', a mob 11 1ml 011 a rampage of destruction throughout the rity. Bollom, Remington Lee rifle.\ ( 1879) like tho.1e used by the state militia during the P11//111a11 Strike.

22

Merrmarie1 or Defh1de1:1·? they attempt to perform services in several places al the same time." Schofield further reminded Miles that his first duty \\'as to protect federal property. The preservation or private property and the restoration of public order were the duties of state and local authorities.

Schofield later commented that he had difficulty believing that a "Major General of the Army could be so ignoralll of the duty devolved upon the troops when ordered by the PresidenL LO enforce the laws or the United Stales."

Mi les ignored Schofield's instructions about the distribution of troops for another day . Even after five companies of regulars f'rom Fort Leavenworth and two companies from Fort Brady arrived on July 6, Miles continued to deploy federal troops (now numbering 930) in company-si,:e or smaller detachments. Tn addition Lo assigning two companies LO guard the federal building at Adams and .Jack on streets, he sent a detachment Lo each or the city's six lllajor rail depots. These detachlllents escorted deputy lllarshals LO make arrests and accolllpanied rail cre\\'S while they repaired tracks ll'ithin the city. Miles hoped these erfons \\'Ould clear the railroads and cit)' streets of rioters and obstructions. Since most of the tracks traversed Chicago's working-class residential areas, holl'ever, success was limited·and brief. As oon as trains bearing troops passed, mobs or residents, strikers, and the unemployed reappeared. Realizing the futility or these tactics, Miles belatedly complied with Schofield's order Lo reconcentrate federal forces. Late on July 6, eight companie'.> of infantry, one battery of artillery, and one troop of cavalry \\'ere '.>ent back to La.ke Front Park 10 reinforce the other seYen companies of' infantry and one rn,·alry troop still active doll'nL0\\'11.

While Miles was rearranging his troops and seeking freer use or their firepower, the destruction or railroad property reached a peak.

When an fllinois Central agent shot and killed Lll'O rioter~ on July 6, an angry mob or six thousand 11ent on a rampage and burned nearly se,en thow.and rail cars in the Fiftieth Street Panhandle \'arcb, causing an estimated ,, 3---10,000 11onh or damage, as compared to an a,·erage or Scl,000 for each or the preYiom clays or the strike. l\lob'.> destroyed railroad property el\e\\'here as 1\'ell and f'orced non-

striking railroad workers to 0ee theirjob sites.

It was now obvious to all, eYen LO Debs and the ARU leaders, that what had stanecl as a peacefi.tl attempt Lo aid the Pullman strikers had no\\' become a wild, uncontrolled ·pree involYing thousands of striker!> and the unemployed, a spree that even federal troops could not quell. Critics in the media (such as the Chicago Times) and labor and management groups were quick to point out, to the disappointment or Olney and the GMA, that the troops under Miles had failed Lo clear the tracks, o tensibly the main reason f'or summoning that force to the city. After all, impatienL businessmen complained, John Egan had predicted that the presence of regulars would "bring peace with a short, sharp jerk." Instead ,·iolence and disorder had escalated Lo alarming b ·els. Distressed at the inability of police, U.S. marshals, or federal troops to quell the violence and cognizant of press reports stating that Chicago was at the mercy or the mob, Mayor John Hopkins asked Governor Altgeld to inten'ene with stale troops.

Altgeld, increasingly angry ll'ith the federal gm·emment and the city, had impatiently waited for Hopkin 's call since July 4. He had protested that federal troops were not initially needed or wanted, espcciallr since neither local authorities nor Olne)' had requested that he commit state forces, the traditional first recourse in such cases. Although not wanting Lo appear to be turning a blind eye to la,dessness, or to be helping either the strikers, with whom he sympathized, or the GMA, with whom he did not, he continued to be one of the loudest critics of federal military i1woh·ement. In a strongly ll'Orclecl telegram to President GleYelancl, Altgeld protested the unilateral and gratuitous comlllitment or federal troops to the city ll'ithout his knowledge, consent, or input. He contended that the railroad's inability to hire enough non·triking \\'Orkers to run the train was clue to a lack of public sympathy and not the interference of strikers or of' unruly mobs. Altgeld added that the restoration of order ll'as his responsibility as goyernor, not Cb·eland's, and that if either Cook County or the railroad owners had requested stare aid he could haYe promptly proYided three regiments of infantry, one troop or caYalry, and one bauery of artillery.

23

Chirngo Histo,y, Fa ll and Wi nter 199 1-92

r :s• •t 1-:

t--1.A\1

'l'A l<I· ~

A

SIAN1> JN J"J..'

Above, the General i\lc111ager's Association and Allomey Geneml Olney sought i11tementio11 fiom federal troo/Js to de.111·0)' the A111enra11 Roilwa)' Union a11d the strike. Re/ow, 011 j uly 7, the I/li11oi.1 Nationa l Guard ft1ced the rioter., al Forty-11i11th and /,00J11i.1stl'l'ets in the bloodiest encounter of the slrilie. Drall'/1 fro111 .1/!etche.1 by.J. R. Clw/1in.

24

T o AJLge ld 's a rg um e nLs Cle ve land ter sely re plied Lhat he had ord ered fed e ral Lroo ps Lo C hi cago in sLricL accord a nce wiLh Lh e Co nsLituLion a nd fed era l sLa LULes a nd had issued , som ewhaL be la Ledl )', a cease a nd d es ist p rocl a rn aLi o n Lo Lhe r io Le rs. Eve r)' acti on was pe rfecLly legal a nd , unde r th e circumsta nces, justifi ed . E\'e nts in C hicago, Cleve la nd m a in Lained , were nothin g more Lha n simpl e issues o f law a nd ord e r. AJtge ld no ne Lh e less rema in ed convinced Lh aLfed eral act io ns conslitu ted a n il legal usurpati o n o f sta le pre rogati ves.

DeLerrnined LO assen gubernaLori al authorit)' a t lasL, A]Lge ld a nswe red Mayo r H o pkin s's request fo r aid on July 6 by sending fo ur thousand Illin o is Na Li o nal G u a rd s me n to th e city-a fo urth force o p er a tin g inde pe nde ntly to re store ord er . Repea tin g Croft.o n' s earli e r erro r, howe,·er, H o pkins scau ered Lhe Illin ois guardsme n in sm all uniLs to cl ea r Lracks a nd proLCct railroad pro pe rt y at ke)' po ints throu ghout th e cit)', Thi s di sp ersa l e ncouraged confro nta ti o ns between rniliLiamen and the mob, wi th tragic results. On th e a fte rn oo n o f Jul y 7, whil e furni shin g p rotecti o n to a wreckin g Lrain o n th e

1vleJ"Ce11aril!s or

Grand Trunk rail line at Forty-ninLh and Loomis sLreeLs, Company H of the Second Reo-imenl or Lhe Illinois raLional Guard beo came involved in the bloodiest encounLer or the strike. As Lhe train slopped Lo raise an overturned car, the crowd cursed and Lhrew slones al the esconing guardsmen . The commanding junior officer ordered the mob Lo di perse and his men Lo load their rifles. The crowd Lhinned as many women and children lefl. Reduced to its mosl militant members, the mob grew more threatening and continued throwing rock~. The officer then ordered a bayonet charge that wounded several people but again railed to disperse the crowd. When the mob retaliated by throwing more rocks, one or which struck the orricer on the head, and by firing a rew scattered gunshots, the ofTicer, rearing for the safety of his men and despairing of receiving reinforcemellls, ordered his command to lire at will and to make every shot counl. After LJring one hundred rounds in several volleys, killing or wounding at least twenty people, the mob milled around in confi..1sion until dispersed by Chicago police officers wielding revolvers and clubs.

Ahml/', /111ml'd mil rnn

011

lmck1

bl'il1 11'1' 11

D~/hzder!>.?

The intensity or the mob ,¡iolence on July 7 prompted Miles once again to scatter his forces, contrary to orders, to protect the railroads from threatened attacks. By now he had become convinced that Chicago \\'as on the verge of revolution, the result of a labor conspiracy led by the ARU and inrnl\'ing he,wily armed radicals. Miles was further convinced that only he could sa\'e the city from a bloodbath. He wrote Schofield that "the masses want peace but the agitators [are] very ugly and say they must have civil war." On Miles's orders, Crofton sent two companies to the Dearborn Station, two Lo Union Depot, and one each to the depots of the Illinois Central, Rock Island, Grand Central, and Chicago & orth Western railroads. His orders directed his subordinates to aid U.S. marshal ¡ in arresting trespassers and those "obstructing or destroying lines of communication" along the railways and to open fire if mobs attacked trains or federal troops.

By late evening on July 7, Chicago was an armed camp containing 13,430 men sworn to protect property and uphold local, state, or federal laws: 3,500 Chicago policemen, 5,000

lforn.11(/i' Cro1.,i11g a11d /0-lth Slreet,.July 15. 1894.

Chicago HislOI)', Fall and Winter 1991-92 U.S. marshals and deputies, 930 federal troops, and 4,000 Illin o is Nationa l Gu ardsmen.

Between July 6 and l 0, 1,000 additiona l federal troops arrived in C hi cago, includin g infantry, cava lry, and art ill ery from Fort Leaven\\'orth and other western posts and the 1inth Infantry from Madison Barracks, 1ew York. Initially each of these groups operated independently with only slight efforts at coord ination between city police and state guardsmen or between U.S . marshals and deputies and federal troops.

At times, severa l force · would respond simul taneously to the same disturbance but rarely accomp li shed a nyth in g because they lacked common leadersh ip, goa ls, or a plan of action.

Seeing the fo ll y of such endea\'ors, U.S. Marshal Arnold placed his deputies at Mile 's disposal. The two men then arranged a division of responsibility , with troops protecting deputies as the latter made arrests.

Disappointed a l the slow pace of police, deputies, and troops acting separately to encl the rioting, the GiVlA sent John Egan to consu lt with Mayor Hopkins and General Miles about conso lidating all forces under one commander , preferably Miles. Hopkins initially declined the proposal , prompting Miles to inform his officers that if state and local governments fa il ed to "mainta in peace and good order within the territory of theirjurisdiction, military forces would assist them , but not to the extent of leaving unprotected property belonging to or under the protection of the Un ited State ."

Three clays later, on July 10, Hopkins (inally agreed to coord in ate efforts; Chicago's police a nd Illinois·s g uardsmen \\'Ould concentrate on restoring order ll'hile federa l forces reopened rail traffic. Each force, ho\\'e,·er, remained under the leadership of it 011· 11 respective civil or military commander.

Yet lack of coordinat ion persisted, and city police and state militia officials refosed to share inte lligence on mob activities 11·ith each other or with federal fo rces. Miles turned to GMA chairman Egan for ass istance. Egan had organized a network of informants to report on the acli\'ities and plans of the ARU and had created a central intelligence agency for di bursing information on a ll strike-related incidents and activit ies .

Whenever beleaguered rai lroad officials needed federal troops to prevent or quell mob act ivity,

26

looting, or \'andalism, Egan informed Miles, who sent federal troop\ LO support deputy marshals as they arrested mob or strike leaders. (~t il es later denied in sworn testimony befi)re the U.S. Strike Commission that he had any such contact with Egan or that he acted on G~IA orders, but documents in the files of the Department of the ~tis<:,ouri prO\·e he ll'as in dail y contact II ith Egan b) memorandums and telephone.) ~files\ Oll'n reports and Lroop deployments clearly reflected the information and ideas gathered by Egan and his informant~.

As Egan de,·clopecl the intelligence framework needed for planning, Schofield issued a general order that became the foundation or army ci,·il disturbance doctrine and for the first time set ronh tactical guidelines ror riot operations. Soon incorporated in art11) regulations, Lhe wording of the general order remained almost unchanged until 19'.17. Issued on Jul)' 9, 189-1-, General Order 23 read that "a mob , . .. resisting or obstructing the execution of the laws ... or attempting to destroy property ... is a public enern)'" and how troops deal ll'ith this public enemy is " purely a tactical question."

Ale/'Ce11aries or D{:jP11dm?

D11ri11g /he .,trilil', l '. S. ,\la nhal , I mold hired t/11'/'e tho11.\// 11d odrlitio110I d1'/J//lie.1 u•/10.11' .1alari,,., wne Jxiid b_\' the Ge/leml Mo11agn\ , h.rnriatio11. Fro111 slie!rhe., by G. A. C:0J.li11. .

It ll'as up Lo Lhe commander and Lroops al the scene Lo deLermine ll'hen and how Lo quell mobs and ll'ith whaL ,reapons, either "the fire of musketry and artillery or ... the use of the bayonet and saber. '· Army officers " 'ere ordered to bear in mind thal innocent bystanders ll'ere ofkn intermingled with rioters in any croll'd, and that the fire of troops should be held until adequale warning wa~ given lcJr ''Lhe innocent to separale Lhemselves from Lhe guilty." 1V'ter this warning, holl'ever, "the actions or Lhe Lroops should be governed solely by the tactical considerations irn·olved." U.S. ,\rmy soldiers II ere told not to "consider holl' great may be the losses inflicted on the public enemy" b) military aCLion, but to concemrate on making "Lheir blcms so effective as to promptly suppress all resistance. " Punishment or the rioters, the order concl11decl, "belongs not LO the troops but 10 the courts ofjustice."

Miles agreed completely ll'ith the contems or General Order 23. Strongly support i,·e of the railroads, federal authority, and lall' and order, he now believed that labor unions, especially the ARU, ,,·ere in league 11·ith anarchists, Communists, and Socialists. \\11en Egan's pies reported that Eugene Debs wa orchestrating a general strike in Chicago, Miles ll'aS certain that this was the expected bloody re,·olution that had as its goal the O\·erthrow or the federal government. In reality, however, the now desperate Debs sought the support or Chicago's utility workers whose absence from their jobs would effectively shut clown the city. This condition of paralysis, he reasoned, could be used as a negotiating poim to get state and federal troops ll'ithdrawn from the city so the strike could proceed unhindered.

Debs's utiliLy workers' strike never occurred.

The increasingly desperate economic situation of the strikers forced them to submit. More important, Debs and the other top ARU leader had ignored the July 2 federal court injunction and ll'ere arrested on charges or contempt or court, conspiracy, and interference with the mail, all prohibited by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Denied leadership, the ARU , on the advice of American Federation or Labor president Samuel Gompers, ended the Chicago strike on August 5.

Chicago's labor dispute had cost the railroads and local, state, and federal governmen ts an estimated $685,308 in direct damages and costs for la,,· enforcement.

Strikers lost an estimated $1.-! million in ll'ages and gained nothing in return. At least 13 people were killed, 53 were ll'Ounded or otherwise injured, and 190 ..were arrested by federal oflicials. T\' one of the deaths or serious injuries ll'ere caused b)' federal troops.

Shortly after Debs's arrest, Schofield directed Miles to confer with Arnold and other o(licials to determine whether the army needed to stay in the cit)'· He also instructed Miles to inquire if Hopkins and AJtgeld could ubstitute police and state militia for regulars protecting federal courts in ll'hich strikers were being tried for obstruction of the mail. Miles vigorously and repeatedly protested the e orders.

He believed ll'ithdrawal of troops from a city on the verge or open rebellion to be premature

27

Chicago Hist01y, Fall and Winter 1991-92 and dangerous . While Walker and Arnold iniLially agreed thaL troops could be safely wiL11drawn from Lhe ciLy in mid-July, pressure from the GMA forced them Lo change Lheir opinion, and they concurred wiLh Miles. IL took an expliciL telegram from SecreLary of \\'ar Lamont ordering a federal withdrawal, and a further telegram from Schofield direcLiy ordering Miles to act, to make the laLLcr acquiesce. The withdrawal of Lhe NinLh lnfanLry to Madison Barracks and Lhe temporary removal of all other Lroops Lo ForL Sheridan on July 18 ended Lhe federal rniliLary intervention, even though the strike would drag on nonviolently for another Lwo weeks.

The loss of effecLive leadership after the arresL of Debs and his chief lieutenants and the crippling effect of the omnibus injuncLions besL explained the ARU's decision LO encl the Pullman Strike. Under escort of federal Lroops, depULy marshals had arresLed scores of strikers and mob members on charges of contempt or court, while sLaLe militiamen imilarly aided city police and clepuL)' sheriffs in arresting an additional 515 sLrikers and mob members on charges of murder, arson. burgla,¡y, assault, intimidation , rioL, conspiracy, and incitement to

28

riot. On December 14, 1894, five momhs after t.he sLrike enclecl, the U.S. DisLricL Court for the Northern DisLrict or Illinois found Debs guilLy of conspiracy to restrain intersLate commerce, in violation of Lhe Sherman Anti-TrusL Act. .Vt.er an unsuccessful U.S. Supreme Court appeal , Debs served a six-monLh prison Lerm.

Subsequent court rulings vindicated the actions of Attorney General Olney, PresiclenL Cleveland, and federal ollicials in Chicago. In Lhe landmark decision or May 27, 1895, In re Deb.1, the U.S . Supreme Court denied Debs's petition for a writ or habeas corpus, ruling thaL even withouL the permission of state governments, "the strong arm of the ' ational Government mar brush a~ide all obstructions to the freedom of interstate commerce or transportation of the mails. If. the emergency arises, the ,\rmr of the nation, and all iLs militias, are at the service of Lhe nation to co111pel obedience to its laws." This precedent-setting decision authori;:ed and confirmed presidemial power to use federal 111ilitary force domestically, under the restrictions or the Posse Comitatus .\ct, in an)' strike in\'Ol\'ing either the transportation of mail or the movement of inten,tate commerce.

Mercmarifs or DPjr11dP1s?

In late July 1894, Pres ident Cleveland appointe d a three-man commission to investigate the causes of the strike and to offer suggestions [or the preYention of future railroad upheavab. The U .S. Strike Commission's contrO\¡e rsial findings , issue d in l O\'ember 1894, were praised by labor and denounced by railroad interests. Th e commission claimed that the Pullman Company was undul y hars h in its relations with its laborers ; that the GMA illegally usurped ci\¡il powe r; and that Pullman's refusal to arbitrate its differe nces with its own worke rs and with th e ARU was largely responsible for th e strike's length and the intensity of th e violence. The commission recommended that railroad companies recognize unions, which already ex isted and were unlikel y to disappear, and that th ey ban all labor contracts forbidding union membership. A final suggestion called for compulsory negotiation and arbitration to settle labor disputes. While the recomm e ndations of the commission were initially ignored , in 1898 Congress passed the Railroad Arbitration Act, the first or man y pieces of legi~l a tion intend ed to pre\'ent nationwide rail strikes. Richard Olney, at that time a pri\'atc citizen, was its author.

The enectiveness of the federal military response in the Pullman Strike was beyond doubt.

Although many workers believed that the armr broke the strike, in fact Miles concentrated the army's e fforts on guarding federal buildings and railroad depots. Once the threa t subsided, the armr withdrew fede ral troops fi¡om the cit)' in mid-July even though the ARU did not call off the strike until early August. Illinois guardsmen and city police were actually the forces responsible for crushing riotous mobs and ending the strike. Federal troops, however, maintained a high profile in the city and were repeatedl y deployed to guard bridges, clear tracks, and aid d e puty marshals in arresting union leaders for conspiracy to interfere with the mail , hinde r interstate commerce, or block military roads , as authorized under Revised Statute 5298. The army's presence in Chicago, although it was not technically charged with quelling the riot, proved that the government's will would ultimately prevail and order would be restored.

The riot and strike duty performed in 1894 affected the army's image, organization, and doctrine significantly. On one hand, the federal military intervention confirmed labor's suspicions, held since at least 1877, that the army and \'arious state militias were sympathetic to big business and corporate interests, if not tools under their direct control. Many commanders did in fact share the beliefs of business and civic leaders and found railroad officials most gTacious and generous in fi.tmishing transportation , lodging, supplies, and intelligence for army operations. President Cle\'eland's intention in committing federal troops, however, ll'as to uphold federal laws ::nd remove obstructions to the federal mail and to western railroads under federal receivership. In reaching these goals, federal troops indirectly prevented the ARU from successfully conducting their strike and in effect aided the CMA in breaking both the boycott and the union. The inability of the union to prevent disorder unlea heel by the strike was a critical factor in Fede ml troo/Js tril'd lo kee/1 tmck clear of lllobs lo jJrevent de.1/rurtion of /Jroperty and lo reo/Je11 inler:,lale commerce and mail .1m1ire. I.Rji, deputies trying lo move an engine and car in Blue hland,July 2. Frolll sketches by C. A. Coffin.

29

Chicago llislory, Fall and If/inter I 991-92 enabling Auorner General Olney Lo persuade the president to intervene. The strike was in no sense peaceful, and mob \'iolence, br whatever panies, ga,¡e Olney Lhc opportuniL)' he soughL Lo secure military forces to break the ARU, a group he considered re,¡oluLionar')'.

As did Lheir predecessor~ af'ter Lhe Great Railway SLrike of 1877, SccreLary \Var LamonL and General Schofield quickly Look ad\'anLage of the army\ new populariLy wiLh the government and with the conservaLive urban middle and upper classes Lo ask Congress Lo finance two artillery and two cavalry regimems Lo secure the cities and railroads against future labor unresl. But congressmen ref'w,ed to augmenL Lhe si;:e of Lhe army, preferring Lo f1111d an improved sLaLe rniliLia S)'SLern composed ofLheir own congressional constiLUencies rather Lhan a larger standing army. Critic\jusLified Lhis ap-

or

l,eji, President C:le, 11'la11d's dl'Ci.1io11 lo inlervene i11 Chicago\ P11//111a11 Strike re/Jl'e.11' 11//'d a11 l'\le11.1io11 o(/ed!'ral aulhoril_l' and slirred to11/mi'e1:,_y 0111'/' !he J1ro/1er d11111e.1/ir role ofJi'deml /mojJ1. Below, C:0111/}(//1_\' D, ll/i11oi.1 ,\'atio11al Guard i11 Pul/111rw y1rr/.1, 1891.

30

Jvlercenaries or Dejh1dn,? proach by p o intin g o ut th a t Mil es's tro o p s me re ly p ro tected tra in s a nd fe de ral pro perty ,d1il e Altge lcl 's state militi a actua ll y bro ke a nd suppressed th e mobs. Con gress co ntinu ed to \'Ote only enough in appropriations to mainta in th e a rmy at twe ntr-e ig ht th o usa nd m en .

De ni ed fund s fo r ex p a nsio n , the Wa r Depa rtm e nt in creas in g ly re li ed o n co nso lida tin g ex istin g units to meet th e de ma nd s o f future labo r di so rd e rs. By th e e ncl o f 1894, th e a rm y, as part o r a n o ngo in g process und e rta ken fo r man y reasons, reduced th e number of posts from nin e ty-fi ve to e ig hty. By 1900, sixteen garri sons orregimental strength remained, twe nty-two o f fro m fo ur to seve n co mpan ies eac h , a nd fo urtee n p os ts of two co mp a ni es eac h . Th e ex p e ri e nce o f 1894 furth e r co n\' in ced th e a rm y th a t la rge garri so ns sho uld be loca te d nea r urba n ce nte rs a nd ra il roa d juncti o ns wh e re th ey were readily ava il abl e to que ll labo r-re lated vio le nce .

Ye t th e co nso lidati o n of limited a rm y ma npower near urba n areas fail ed to reassure milita ry leaders o r the ir ability to react to future disorders effectively. In a n era when the rear o r soc ia l revo luti o n was stro ng, Scho fi e ld in augunlled a majo r shift in civil di sturba nce tacti ca l d oc trin e . Wh e reas durin g th e Whi sker Rebe lli o n o r 1794 Pres ide nt Was hin gto n ha d direc ted a mass ive show o f force to intimid ate ri o te rs, a pra cti ce use d fre qu e ntl y afte r the G reat Railway Strike o f 1877, Sc ho fi e ld and hi s successors bega n to fra me army regul ati o ns to emphas ize a greater re lia nce on firepower to ma ke up fo r t he lack of numbe rs. Ge ne r a l Orde r 23 o f July 9, 1894, a nd its va ri a ti on s O\·er th e next ha ir-ce ntury, trea ted th e use of sa be rs, bayo ne ts, rifl es, a nd a rtill e ry as pure ly tactica l qu es ti o ns, a nd mobs of ri o ting citi zens as publi c e ne mies "beyo nd th e p a le o f protecti o n aga in st milita ry viol e nce accord ed to the ge ne ra l publi c." Paradoxi call y, howeve r, thi s empha is on fire power and tactica l rorce for domestic di sturba nces was acco mpa ni e d by a n in creas in g poli cy o r res tra int, whi ch has characteri1,ed mos t fe dera l milit a ry inte r\'Cnti o ns in labor cli ~putes since th e Pullma n Strik e.

Fo r Furth er Rea di,w b For mo re in fo rm a ti o n on the fe dera l military's ro le in labo r issues and civil un rest, see J en -y .\I. (:ooper, The rln11y a11d Cii,i/ Disorder: Federal ,\lilitan fo te,ve11tio11 in Labor DL1putes, 1877-1900 (\\'c;tpo ri: Gree nwood Pre;;, 1980) and Colsto n E. \\'arne. eel ., The Pullman Boyroll of" 1894: Th e Problem of Federal lnterumtion (Boston: D. C. Hea th. 1955). Fo r pe rsona l perspectives o r th e strike (i·o m two o r it~ key military pl aye rs, see Nel so n A. Mil es, Sen,ing the Re/1ublic: 1'vle111oi1:1 of the Civil and Alililary Lije of N1,fso11 A. Miles (New York: Ha rpe r Broth e rs, 19 1 I ) a nd J o hn i'vl. Scho fi e ld , Forty-six Yerm in the Ann)' (New York : Century, 1897). A good biograph y of Govern or Altgeld is I Ia rry Barnard 's Eagle Fo1go1te11: The Life of J ohn PeterAltgeld (India na po lis: Bobbs-Me1Till, 1938) .

Almo nt Lin dsey's The Pullman Strike: The Sto1J ofa U11ique Experiment all{/ a Grea t Labor U/1 heava l (C hicago: The Uni versity of C hi cago Pre s, 1942) a nd Sta nl ey Bud er's P11.l/man: An E.,peri111e11 t i11 Industrial Order and Community Pla1111i11g, 1880- 1930 (New Yo rk : O xfo rd Uni ve rsity Press, I 967) di scuss th e es tab li shm e nt o r th e Pullm a n co mmunity.

"Onward C hristian So ldi ers: The Socia l Gos pe l a nd the Pullman Strike," by Matth ew C . Lee (Chirngo Hislol'y, vol. XX, no. I and 2) examines the reactio ns of va ri ous reli gio u g ro up to the strike.

Illustra ti o ns 5, CHS, IC Hi-0-l-892; 6, C HS, ICHi -189 14; 7, IClii2 19 1 J; 8-9, C HS Prints and Photogra phs Collectio n; I 0, fro m the Chicago Tribwie, Jun e 29, 1894, C HS Li brary : l I top, Cl IS, TCHi-09990; 11 botto m, C I-IS, TC Hi -22889; 12- 13, C HS, ICHi-01 922 ; 14, CHS , ICHi-09404; 15, rro m Hmper's Weekly, Jul y 21 , 1894, CHS Library; 16 above, C HS, ICHi-22887; 16 below, CHS Prints a nd Photogra phs Collecti o n; 17, from Harper's Weekly, Jul y 28, 1894, C H S Lib1·ary; 18 above, CH S, IC Hi -22890; 18 be low, CHS , IC l-fi22888; 19, CHS Prints and Photographs Coll ectio n; 20- 2 I , fro m Ha 1j1er's Weekly, Jul y 21 , 1894 , CHS Li bra ry; 22 to p, fro m th e Chicago Tribune, Jul y 7, 189-l-, C HS Libra ry; 22 bo tto m , C HS Decora ti ve a nd Indu stri a l Arts Co ll ecti o n ; 24 top , fro m th e Chirngo Tribn11e, Jul y 5, 1894, CHS Libnu-y; 24 bo tto m , C HS , IC l-fi-048 99; 25 , fr o m th e Bufialo lllustrated Express, Jul y 1894, N ewbe rry Libra ry Specia l Collectio ns; 26-27 and 28-29, from HmjJer's Weekly, Jul y 14, 1894, CHS Library; 30 top, from the Inter-Ocean, Jul y 15, 1894, C HS Lib ra ry; 30 bo ttom , C HS, JC lli -0-l-903 .

31

How Lincoln Won the War with Metaphors

By James M. McPherson

Endeared to rnany generations ofAmericans for his eloquence and homespun hurnor, Lincoln used language brilliantly during the Civil vVctr to sustain Northern enthusiasm for the Union cause.

Editor's Note: 1n a feller sent to General Ulysses S. Grant AROUSE dated AJJ1il 7, 1865, President DIVIDED Abraham Linco/11 wrote: "Gen A.NfERICA IN THE Sheridan says 'If the thing is AGE OF LINCOLN pressed 1 think Lee will s1trrender.' Let the thi ng be /Jressed." This ftonous letter, which is on view in the Society's A House Divided: Ameri ca in the Age of Lincoln exhibition, documents all i111/Jorta11t moment in Lincoln's /Hesidency whe11 peace a11d the resloralion of the Union seemed i111111illelll ajier four bloody years of conflict. But Lincoln's letter also gives us a measure of him ((S a man through hi.1 unff11111y ability to ca/Jlure an event i11 sim/Jle /mt 111ovi11g language. More Biblical Lhall militaristic i11 tone, Lillcol11 's "Let the th in g be /Hessed" com1ey~ the dm111a and signifirnnce of the 1110menlous order being given that would elld the war.

I11 A 111erica today, where visual imagery has re/1/aced language as the medium of politic.,, Lincoln's gift for words might go unnoticed. I Vith the exception of J ohll F. Ke1111edy's impassiolled challenge Lo , I meriffms lo "J-lsk nol what your counlJy can do for you; ask what you can do for your co1wt1y," no /Hesident since, though all have tried, has left a legacy of words that continue.\ lo inspire citizens.

But in Lincoln's zuorfd, the power of language to change the hearts and 111inds ofAmericalls was dominant; and his zuords, J1er!wps more than those ofany others, heljml to change the lives oflegiolls of mm and women. In his s/Jeeches and his lettP1:1, U11coln\ ho111esjm11 humor and co1mno11sense Pxmn/1/es convinced Northerners that their cause was just and emboldened the111 to make untold sacrifices in the name offreedo111.

Opposite, in The Railsp liucr, a11 unknown arti.sl portrays Abmha111 Lincoln pe1fonning honest labor. The /Hesidenl'., mm! 11/Jbri11gi11g shaped his use of language and imageiy. Above, Lincoln as he a/J/Jeared i11 I 858, the year of hi, funous Home Dh,ided speech. Phologra/Jh allributed lo C. S. German.

In the following exmjJI Pulitzer Prize-winning historian J an1es Al. 1vlcP/zerson argues that Lincoln's great command of language gave him a distinct advantage over the Confedemcy's J efferson Davis in shajJing the outcome of the war. This article originally apj1eared in ,\ braharn Linco ln and the Seco nd American Revo lut ion, /Jllblished by Oxford r..: niversity Press, 199 1. jallles ,\/. 1\ lcPher.1011, Edwards Professor of American hi.1l01y at Princeton L'11iversity, is author of lhe Pulilzer Prize-winning book, Battle Cry of Freedom.

33

Chicago Histo1y, Fall and Winter 1991-92

One ofJ efferson Dm 1is's /Jrima1}' weaknesses was an inabilit_y to co1111111111icate effectively with Southern /Jeople and other Confederate leaders. Unlike Lincoln, Davis '¡seemed to think i11 abstraction, a11d to 1/Jeah in /Jlatitudes." Portrait by Christian F. Schwerdt, 1875.

34

How Lincoln Won the War In an essay on the reasons for Confederate defeat in the Civ il War, Southern historian David M. Potter made a strik in g assertion: "If the Un ion and Confederacy had exchanged presidents with one another, the Confederacy might have won its independence. " Is this rather dramatic conc lu sion justified? Most historians would probably agree with Potter's genera l point that [Jefferson] Davis's shortcomings as a leader played a role in Confederate defeat.

They would also agree that one of Davis's principal failures was an inab ility to commun icate effectively with other Confederate leaders and with the Southern people. As Potter put it, Davis "seemed to think in abstract ions and to speak in platitudes. " Lincoln, by contrast, most emphatically did 11ol think in abstractions and rarely spoke in platitudes. We have not had another president-except perhaps Franklin D. Rooseveltwho expressed himself in such a clear, forcefu l, logica l manner as Lincoln . It is no co in cide nce that Lincoln and Rooseve lt were great war presidents who led the Un ited States to its most decisive victories in its most important wars. Their pre-eminent quality as leaders was an abi lity to communicate the meaning and purpose of these wars in an intelligible, in sp iring manner that helped energize and mobilize their people to make the sacrifices necessary for victory. By contrast,Jefferson Davis, as another hi storian has concluded, failed to do a good j ob "in elicitin g the enthu siasm and energies of the people."

Wherein lay Lincoln 's advantage over Da,路is in this matter::- It certainly did not derive from a better education . Davis had received one of the best educations that money cou ld buy in his day. He attended one "college" in Kentucky and another in Mississippi, which were really secondary schoo ls or academ ies; he went to Tran 路ylvania University in Kentucky, which was one of the best genu in e co lleges west of the Appa lachiam at that time; and he graduated from the military academy at \\'est Point, the best American school for engineering as well as for rnilit,:lr) science in that era. From his education Da,路is acquired excellenL training in the classics, in rhetoric, logic, literature, and science. I le shou ld have been a superb communicator. And in rnan)' respects he was, by the

standards of the time. He could write with vigorous logic, turn a classical phrase, quote the leading author iti es on many a subj ec t, and close with a rhetorical fl ourish.

Lincoln had on ly a year or so of formal schooling in the typical rote-learning "blab schools" of the day, schooling that he obtained, as he later put it, "by littles"-a month here, a coup le of months there, spread out over a period of a few years. Lincoln was basically a selftaught man . Of cou rse he late r read law, which a lo n g with the practice of that profession helped to give him an ability to write and speak with clarity, a skill in logi cal a nal ys i , and a kn ack for finding exactly the right word or phrase to express his meaning. But Jefferson Dm路is also possessed most of these skills of expository writing and speaking. So we are still left with the question: wherein lay Lincoln's superiority?

The answer may be found in a paradox: perhaps the defects of Linco ln 's education proved a benefit. In stead of spending years inside the four walls of a classroom, Lincoln worked on frontier dirt farms most of his youth , he sp lit rails, he rafted down the Mississippi on a fl atboat, he surveyed land, he worked in a store where he learned to communicate with the farmers and other residents of a rural community. Lincoln grew up close to the rhythms of nature, of' wild beasts and farm animals, of forest and running water, of seasons and crops and of people who got their meager living from the land. These things, more than books, furnished his earl iest education. They infused his speech with the images of nature. And when he turned to books, what were his favorites? They were the King James Bible, Aesop's Fables, Pilgrim's Progress, and Shakespeare's plays. What do these four have in common? They are rich in figurative language-in allegory, parable, fable, metaphor-in words and stories that seem to say one thing but mean another, in images that illustrate something more profound than their surface appearance.

Here lies one of the secrets of Lincoln's success as a commun icator: hi s skill in the use of figurative language, of which metaphor is the most common examp le. We all use metaphors every day. We tell someone to stop beating around the bush; we say that we have too many

35

Cliirnio Hist01y, Fall and Winter J 991-92 irons in the fire; we express a desire Lo get Lo the heart of the rnaLLcr; we worry about fitting square pegs in round holes; ll'e see light at the end of the tunnel; and so on. Most of these examples arc "dead " metaphors-that is, they are so commonplace that " ·e often do not realize tl1at the) ai l' metaphors, and they thus lose their poll'er LO c,·oke a \'i,·id image in our minds. The best "li\'e" metaphors are those that use a simple, concrete figure Lo illustrate a complex and perhaps abstract concept, thereby giYing life and tangible meaning to something that might otherwise escape comprehension.

One of the first things that strikes a tuclent or Lincoln's speeches and writings is his frequent use of images and figurati\'c language . I Iis speeches and letters abound \l"ilh metaphors.

Many of them arc extraordinarily \\·ell chosen and apt; they ha,·e the persuasi\'e po11"er or con-

creteness and clarity. By contrast, Jefferson D,1\'is's prose contains few metaphors or images of any kind . lt is relentlessly literal. IL is formal, precise, logical , but also stiff, cold, and abstract. Da\'is's wartime leucrs and speeches bristle ll'iLh anger and biuerness toward Yankees and toward Da\'is's critics and acl\'ersaries within the Confederacy. But the few metaphors he used to illustrate his points are quite deadreferences to sowing the seeds or discontent and thereby harvesting defeat, and the like.

To be sure, a nu111bcr of Lincoln's metaphors were dead on arri,·al. I le complained of dealing with people " ·ho had axes to grind; he said more than once that he 11"anted e\'eryone to ha,·e a fair start in the race of life; he referred to the ship or slate and its naYigational problems during his presidency; and ~o on. But Lincoln could neatlr turn a !:>ecrningly clcacl metaphor

.

....

.,. .

.. . '

.

,,. ' '\.

...

A cm10011ist, who rendered the U11col11- Drwis co11f1ict a.1 a bo,i11i matrh, thamc/1'1-i::.ed Un co/11 \ lr111i1wi e 11.1 more vivid and direr/ than Davis's. Currier and h 1es, 1861. O/JjJo.,ite, 1860 RejJ11b!ica11 cr1111J;aii11 jJo.1 /er.

36

How Lincoln

NATIONAL

ff'o11

the ll'ar

REPUBLICAN CHART

37

Chirngo HislOJ)', Fall and Winter 1991-92 into a liYe on e. In hi s first message to a special sessio n o f Co ngress th a t me t three mo nths afte r the wa r bega n, Lin coln critically revi ewed th e long a nd , as he p ut it, sophistic a tte mpt by South e rn lead ers to legitimize their ac tions by a rgum e nts fo r sta te SO\'ereignty a nd the co nstitutio nal rig ht of secess ion. "With re belli on thu s sugar-coa ted ," sa id th e pres ide nt, "th ey have been dru ggin g th e public mind of their section for more than thirty years," and this war was the result. H ere Lin co ln injected life into a ra th e r tired me taph or, "s uga r-coa ted ," a nd used it to clinch his p oint in a luminous man ne r. This occas ion a lso gave Lin co ln an opportunity to d efin e hi s phil osophy of co mmuni cati on with the public. \\'he n the gO\·ern me nt printe r se t th e message in typ e he obj ected to th e phrase about sugar-coatin g th e rebelli on. "You ha\'e u ed a n undi gnifi ed expressi on in th e mes age," th e printer to ld th e pres id ent. "A message to Co ngress [is] a different affair from a speech at a mass-meeting in Illin ois . . . . Th e messages [become] a pa rt o f

hi story, and should be wriuen accordin g ly....

I would alte r the stru cture o f th a t, if I we re yo u. " Lin co ln re pli ed with a twinkl e in hi s eye: "Tha t wo rd ex presses prec ise ly my id ea, a nd I a m no t go in g to chan ge it. Th e tim e will never co me in thi s co untry wh e n th e p eo ple won 't kn ow exac tly wh a t sugar-coaled mea ns!" Lin co ln was ri g ht ; peopl e kn ew exactl y wha t h e mea nt th e n, a nd hi s me taph or re tain s its pithin ess tod ay.

Lincoln used a diffe re nt but equa lly ex pressive me ta ph or to d escribe th e threa t of secession on another importa nL occas ion, hi s speec h at Coo pe r In titute in New York in Febru a ry 1860, a speech th a t gave him great visibility a mong eastern Repu blica ns and helped launch him toward th e preside nti al nomin a ti on three month s later. This time he di ~cussed Southern warnings to the North of the dire conseque nces if a Re publican pres id e nt was e lected. "In that supp osed event," sa id Lin co ln direc tin g hi s wo rds to th e South , "you say, you will d estroy th e U ni on ; a nd th en, you say, th e grea t crim e .--.--

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38

How Lincoln of having destroyed it will be upon us! That is cool. A highwayman holds a pistol to my ear, and mutters through his teeth, 'Stand and deliver, or I shall kill you, and then you will be a murderer!"' o one cou ld fail to understand Lincoln's point. And through his whole life one of his main concerns was that everyone understand precisely what he was saying. A colleague who praised this quality once asked Lincoln where his concern with exact clarity came from.

"Among my ear li est recollections," repl ied Lincoln, "I remember how, when a mere chi ld, I used to get irritated when anybody talked to me in a way I could not understand . I don't think I ever got angry at anything else in my life . . . . I can remember going to my littl e bedroom, after hearing the neighbors talk of an evening with my father, and spend in g the night walking up and clown, and trying ¡to make out what was the exact meaning of some of their, to me, dark sayings. I cou ld not sleep . . . when I got on such a hunt after an idea, until I had caught it; and when I thought I had got it, I was not sati fiecl ... until I had put it in language plain enough, as I thought, for any boy I knew to comprehend. This was a kind of passion with me, and it has stuck by me."

Many contemporaries testified to this Lincolnian passion, and to his gen ius for using everyday metaphors to ach ieve it. Francis Carpenter, the artist who spent six months at the White House during 1864 painting a picture of Lincoln and his cabinet, noted that the president's "li ghtest as well as his most powerful thought almost invariably took on the form of a figure of speech, which drove the point home, and clinched it, as few abstract reasoners are ab le to do." Lincoln was also famous for telling stories. Many of them were parables intended to make or illustrate a point; and a parable is an extended metaphor. "It is not th e story itself," Lincoln once said, "but its purpose, or effect, that interests me."

When Lincoln said, " 1 ow that reminds me of a story," hi~ listeners knew that they could expect a parable. Take for example this story that Lincoln told soon after he had gotten rid of his controversial Secretary of \\'ar Simon Cameron. Since some other cabinet members had a lso made enemies among one faction or

11'011

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another, a delegation of politicians called on the president and adYised him that this might be a good time to make a wholesale change in the cabinet. Lincoln shook his head and replied, 'This reminds me of a story. \ \11en I was a boy J knew a farmer named Joe Wilson who was proud of his prize chickens. But he started to lose some of them to raids by skunk on the henhouse. One night he heard a loud cackling from the chickens and crept out with his shotgun to find a half~dozen of the black and white critters running in and out of the shed. -n1inking to clean out the whole tribe, he put a double charge in the gun and fired away. Somehow he hit only one, and the rest scampered off." At thi point in the story, Linco ln would act it out by holding his nose and screwing up his face in a pained express ion, while he continued . "The neighbors asked Joe why he didn't follow up the skunks and kill the rest. 'Blast it,' said Joe, 'it was eleven weeks before l got over killin ' one . lf you want any more skirmishing in thaL line you can just do it yourse lves!"' fobocly cou ld fail to get Lincoln's point.

But not everyone approved of his habit of telling Storie -some of which were a good bit more earthy than this one. Some people considered it undignified for the president of the United States to carry on in such a fashion.

But Lincoln had a reply for them, as relaLecl by Chauncey Depew, a prominent lawyer, railroad president, and New York Republican leader. "I heard him tell a great many stories," sa id Depew, "many of which would not do exactly for the drawing room, but for the per on he wished to reach, and the object he desired to accomplish with the indi\'iclual, the story did more Lhan any argument could have done. He once sa id to me, in reference to some sharp criticism which had been made upon his stOt)'telling: . .. 'I have found in the course of a long exper ience that common people'-ancl, repeating it-'common people, take them as they run, are more eas ily influenced and inform ed through the medium of a broad illustration than in any ot her way, and as to what the hypercritical few may think, I don't care."'

This was someth ing that Jefferson Davis never understood. He would never be caught telling a story about skunks to make a point about political timing and leadersh ip . He did 39

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Lincoln was especially fond of animal metaphors and parables, as in the case of the skunk story.

This derived in part from his own rural background. It also undoubtedly derived from the many boyhood hours he spent with AesojJ's Fables. During one of those hours his cousin Dennis Hanks said to him: "Abe, them yarns is all lies." Lincoln looked up for a moment, and replied: "Mighty darn good lies, Denny." And as an adult Lincoln knew that these "lies," these fables about animals, provided an excellent way to communicate with a people who were still close to their rural roots and understood the idioms of the forest and barnyard.

Some of Lincoln's most piquant animal metaphors occurred in his comments about or communications with commanding generals during the war. Gen. George B. McClellan clamored repeatedly for reinforcements and unclerslatecl his own strength while overstating that of the enemy. On one of these occasions Lincoln, who had already reinforced McClellan and knew that Union forces outnumbered the Confederates, said in exasperation that sending troops to McClellan was like shoveling 0ies across the barnyard-most of them never seemed to get there . Later . on, when Joseph Hooker had become commander of the Army of the Potomac, Lincoln visited him al the front. Hooker boasted that he had built this force into "the finest army on the planet." He added that he hoped Goel AJmighty would ha"e mercy on Bobby Lee because he, Joe Hooker, would have none. Lincoln listened to this and commented that "the hen is the wisest of all the animal creation because she never cackles until the egg is laid. " And to be sure, it was Lee who laid the egg by beating Hooker decisively at Chancellorsville. Lee then invaded the North in the campaign that led to Gettysburg. As Lee began to move north , Hooker proposed to cross the Rappahannock Ri\'er and auack his rear guard. Lincoln disapproved ,, ith these words in a telegram to Hooker: "I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half O\'er a fence , and liable Lo be torn by clogs, front and rear, without a fair chance Lo gore one way or kick the other." Napoleon himself

Ulysses S. Gmnl, 1864. On a/1poi11ti11g Grant. Lincoln told the new general a parable about a 111011//e:,¡ whose demise resulted from weaknesses much like Gmeml McC/e/lan 's.

Grant gal the /Joint. Photogm/Jh by Timothy H. O'Sullivan.

could not have given better tactical advice or phrased it half so well. A week later, when the Confederate invasion force was strung out over nearly a hundred miles of Virginia roads, Lincoln telegraphed Hooker: "If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg and the Lail of it on the Plank road between Fredericksburg and Chancellors\'ille, the animal must be very slim somewhere. Could you not 61 eak him::," But Hooker seemed reluctant to fight Lee again, so Lincoln replaced him with Georgt> G. l\Jeade, who won the Battle of Gettysburg but pro\'ed to be cautious and defensive aftenvard.

Thus in 1864 Lincoln brought to the East his most successful commander, Ulysses S. Grant, to become general in chief. In a private conference with Grant soon after he arrived in Washington, Lincoln refeITed to the military situation and Lolcl Grant he could best illustrate what he wanted to say by a story. There was once a great war among the animals, said the president, and one side had great clirliculty

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42

I low Lincoln finding a commander who had enough confidence in himself to fight. Finally they round a monkey, br the name or Jocko, who said he could command the army if his tail could be made a little longer. So the other animals found more tail and spliced it onto .Jocko's.

He looked al it admiringly, but said he thought he needed _just a little more. So they found some more and spliced it on. This process was repeated many times until Jocko's tail was so lono- that when coiled it filled the whole room . till he called for more tail , and they kept adding by coiling it around his shoulders and then around his whole body until he suffocated. Grant understood the point; unlike McClellan and other generals, he would not keep calling for more troops as an excuse for not fighting.

Instead , the new general in chief worked out a plan for the two main Union armies, in Virginia and Georgia, to advance simultaneously against the two principal Confederate armies while smaller Union forces elsewhere pinned down Confederate detachments LO prevent them from reinforcing the main armies.

Thi was the kind of coordinated oflensive that Lincoln had been urging on his generals for two years, and he was delighted final!)' to' have a commander who would do it. Lincoln's expressive description of the auxiliary role of the smaller armies on the peripheI)' was: "Those not skinning can hold a leg." Grant liked this phrase so much that he used it in his own dispatches.

Later on, when Grant had Lee's army under siege at Petersburg while Sherman was marching through Georgia and South Carolina cle~troring e\'errthing in his path , Lincoln described Union strategy in this fashion: "Grant has the bear by the hind leg while Sherman takes off the hide. " On another occasion Lincoln changed the metaphor in an ofTicial tel egra m to Grant: "I have seen your despatch expre~sing your unwillingness to break your hold where you are. Neither am I willing. Hold on with a bull-dog grip, and chew & choke, as much as possible." In the encl it was Grant's chewing and choking while Sherman took off rh e hid e that won the war.

The prin cipal cause of thi war was slavery, and one or it main consequences was the abolition of slavery. This peculiar institution gave 1:)

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rise to man y Lincolnian m etap hor~ , animal and otherwise. One of the m was a metaphor or snakes and children that Lincoln used in se\¡cral speeches during his tour of Nell' England in the late winter or 1860. The centra l tenet or¡ the Republica n panr's policy was to restrict the pread or slavery into new territories ll'hil e pledging not to interfere with it in states where it already existed and was therefore protected by the Constitution. Lincoln considered sla\'e1-y a moral wrong and a social e\¡il. He hoped that the South would eventually take steps LO e ncl it voluntarily and peacefully. In the meantime, he said, ll'e must not introduce this e\'il where it docs not now exist. "] r I saw a \'e nomous snake crawling in the road, " said Lincoln in illustration or his point, "any man would say 1 might seize the nearest stick and kill it; but if I found that snake in bed with my children, that would be another question. I might hurt the children more than the snake, and it might bite them . ... But if there was a bed newly made up , to which the children were to be taken, and it was proposed to take a batch of young snakes and put them there with them , l take it no man would say there was any question how I ought to decide .... The new Territories are the newly made bed to which our children arc Lo go, and it lies wiL11 the nation Lo say whether they shall have snakes mixed up with them or not. " In our clay of thirty-second political spot commercials on television, this metaphor seems long and in\'oh-ed. But Lincoln's audiences understood it perfectl y and appreciated it boisterou ly. The stenographic report of this speech at ew Haven indicates ptolonged applause, laughter, and cheering as he spun out the metaphor. A professor of rhetoric at Yale was so taken with Lincoln's speech that he followed him to another town to hear him speak again and then gave a lecture on Lincoln's techniques Lo his class. After Lincoln spoke at Norwich, Connecticut, the town 's leading clergyman happened to travel on the same train with Lincoln the next day and talked with him, praising his style, "especially your illustrations, which were romance and pathos, and run and logic all welded together. That story about the snakes, for example, ... was at once queer and comical, and tragic and argumentative. It broke through

Chicago History, Fall and lif/inter 1991-92 all the barriers of a man's previous opinions and prejudices at a crash, and blew up the citadel of his false theories before he could know what had hurt him."

Lincoln used a number of other metaphors to describe slavery, including that of a cancer which must be prevented from spreading lest it kill the bod)' politic. His best-known slavery metaphor formed the central theme of the most famous speech he gave before the Civil \Var, the House Divided address in 1858. Here the house was a metaphor for the Union, which had been divided against itself by slavery and could not continue to be so divided forever without collapsing. Therefore the Republicans wanted to top the further spread of slave1, as a first step toward what Lincoln called its "ultimate extinction." This metaphor of a house divided became probably the single most important

image of the relationship between slavery and 1he Union. and remains so today. It provided an instant mental picture of what Republicans stood for. It also helped provoke the South into secession when Lincoln was elected president, because no matter how much Lincoln professed his imention to tolerate slavery where it already existed, had not this Black Republican Yankee also called slavery a moral wrong and looked forward lo its ultimate extinction?

In that same speech, Lincoln elaborated the house metaphor to illustrate another of the Republican party's favorite themes-that the Democrats were dominated b)' a "slave power conspiracy"' to expand the institution of bondage over the whole country. "When we see a lot of framed timbers," said Lincoln, "different portions of which we know have been gotten out at different times and places by dif-

Lincoln 's first inauguration, 1861. In his address, he /Jroclai111ed: "The mystic chords of 111e11wry, .1 tretchi11g Jimn eve,)' battle-field and /xi/riot grave, to e;,e,)' living hl'Grt and hearthstone, all over this broad land, will yet swell the clwms of the Union when again touched, as surely they will be, bJ the bettn angels of our nature."

44

How Lincoln ferent workmen-Stephen, Franklin, Roger and James, for instance-and when we see thee timbers joined together, and see they exactly make the frame of a house ... we find it impossible not to believe that Stephen and Franklin and Roger and James all understood one another from the beginning, and all worked upon a common /Jlan or draft." The point of this rather elaborate metaphor seems obscure today. But Lincoln's audience knew exactly what he was talking about. The four men he named were Stephen Douglas, leader or the Democratic party; Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan, the previous and current presidents of the United States; both Democrats; and Roger Taney, chief justice of the Supreme Court, also a Democrat. The house for which each of them separately framed timbers, but with a secret understanding to make everything fit together, was a conspiracy to expand slavery. The timbers were the Kansas-Nebraska Act that repealed the Missouri Compromise and made possible the expansion of lavery north of latitude 36 degrees 30 minutes where it had previously been prohibited; the Dred Scott decision that legalized slavery in all territories; the Democratic pledge to acquire Cuba as a new slave territory; and other items.

After the Civil Vlar broke out, Lincoln's main problem-next to winning the war-was what to do about slavery. And by the second year of war the slavery issue became bound up with the fate of the Union itself as Lincoln gradually came to the conclusion that he could not win the war without striking down slavery.

In his public and private communications concerning slavery during the war, Lincoln used a number of telling metaphors and similes. His first effort was to persuade the loyal border states to accept a policy of gradual, compensated emancipation. This proposal, he said in an appeal to the people of the border states in May 1862, "makes common cause for a common object, casting no reproaches on any. lt acts not the pharisee. The change it contemplates would come gently as the dews of heaven, not rending or wrecking anything. \\'ill you not embrace it?" \\'hen the border states did not respond, Lincoln shifted from soft blandishment to blunt warning. In July 1862 he

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called border-state congressmen to the \\'hite House. By then the war had taken a harder turn. Republican congressmen had passed a bill to confiscate the property of rebels against the government, including their slave property. Lincoln himself had just about decided to issue an emancipation proclamation to apply to the Confederate state . The impact of these measures was bound to spill over into the Unionist border states. Slaves there were already emancipating themselves by running away to Union army lines . In these circumstances Lincoln now told border-state congressmen that his plan or gradual emancipation with compensation from the federal government was the best they could get. Otherwise, as the war continued to escalate in intensity, "the institution in your states will be extinguished by mere friction and abrasion." The image of friction and abrasion was a most appropriate one, but it left the border-state congressmen unmoved. Most of them voted against Lincoln's offer-and three more years of war did extinguish slavery by friction and abrasion, in the border states as well as in the Confederate states.

After his unsucces ful appeal to the border states, Lincoln made up his mind to issue an emancipation proclamation. He used a variety of metaphors to explain his reasons for doing so. "It had got to midsummer 1862," the president later summarized. "Things had gone on from bad to worse, until I felt that we had reached the encl of our rope on the p lan of operations we had been pursuing; that we had about played our last card, and must change our tactics, or lose the game!" Both metaphors here-the end of our rope and played our last card-are rather tired, almost dead, but nevertheless the context and the importance of the issue bring them alive and make them work.

Lincoln liked the card-playing metaphor; in letters to conservatives who objected to the government's total-war policy of confiscation and emancipation, Lincoln wrote with some asperity that "this gm¡ernment cannot much longer play a game in which it stakes all, and its enemies stake nothing .... It may as well be unclerstoocl, once and for all, that I shall not sun-ender this game leaving any available card unplayed."

Lincoln used other, more original and expressive metaphors at the same time, asking 45

Chirngo Hislol)', Fall a 11d Wi11ll'J' l 99 1-92

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The bal!/e, fo111;ht 011 S1'/Jle111bn 17, l 862. re111ai11s the bloodiest day i11 all of1l111erica11 hi.1/01)'. ll'he11 McCLel/011 '.~ army forced tee lo retreat, l,i11col11 uâ&#x20AC;˘ampd !lie South that 1111/e.1.1 ii laid down il.1 arm.1, he il'lmld der/'i'P l'111a11ci/H1lio11 of !hi' slal'es 011 Ja1111a1)' I, 1863. Plwtogm/Jh by Alexa11der Gardner.

46

How Lincoln Won the War

47

Chicago Hislo1y, Fall and Jllinler 1991-92 one conservative if he expected the government to wage this war "with cider-stalk squirts, charged with rose water." To a Southern Union ist who had complained that emancipation of sla\'eS owned by rebels would ine\'itably expand into emancipation of slaves owned by lo)'al Unionist as ,rell, Lincoln replied with an angry letter denouncing those Unionists who did nothing to help the North win the war and who expected the go\'ernment to take time out to protect their property while it was struggling for its very survi\'a l. The president spun out a metaphor of a sh ip in a storm to clinch the poinL. Do Southern Un ion ists expect, he asked, "to touch neither a sail nor a pump, but to be merely passengers,deadheads at that-to be carried snug and dry, throughout the storm, and safely landed right side up[?] 1ay, more; even a mutineer is to go untouched lest these sacred passengers receive an accidenta l wound." \\'hen the constitutiona lity of the emanc ipation proclamation was questioned, Lincoln defended it not only by citing his military pO\rer~ as commander in chief in time of war to sei1-e enemy property, but he also used an apt metaphor to illustrate how a lesser constitutional right--ofproperty in sla\'es-might have to be sacrificed in the interest of a greater constitutional du tr-that of preserving the nation's life. "Often a limb must be amputated to sa,·e a life," Lincoln pointed out in this age without antibiotics when C\'Cryone knew of wounded soldiers who had lost an arm or leg to stop the spread of fatal infections. 'The surgeon," Lincoln continued, "is so lernnl)' bound Lo try to saYe both life and limb; but when the crisis comes, and the limb must be acrificed as the only chance of saving the life, no honest man will hesitate .... In our case, the moment came when I felt that slavery must die that the nation might live!"

One final metaphor that Lincoln used toillustrate a point about slavery is particularly striking. This one concerned the definition of libeny. The South professed to have seceded and gone to war in defense of it rights and liberties. The ch ief liberty that Southerners believed to be threatened by the election of Lincoln was their right to own sla,·es. In a public speech in 1864 at Baltimore, in a border

48

state where the frictions and abrasions of war had by then just about ground up slav ery, Lincoln illustrated the paradox of connicting definitions of liberty with an Aesopian fable.

'The shepherd drives the wolf from the sheep's throat, for which the sheep thanks the shepherd as a liberator, while the wolf denounces him for the ame act as a destroyer of liberty, especially as the sheep was a black one." Th is image leaves no doubt which definition of liberty Lincoln subscribed to, or whose cause in this war-the Northern shepherd's or the Southern wolf's-was the nobler one. This passage comes as close to a lyrical expression of orthern purpose as anything short of poetry cou ld .

And al limes Lincoln's words became poetic. He liked to read poeu-y. His favorites were Burn , Byron, and above al l Shakespeare. He knew much of Burns and Shakespeare by heart.

As president, Lincoln liked to relax by going to the theater-as we know to our sorrow. He went to every play of Shakespeare's that came lo Washington. He especia ll y enjoyed reading the tragedies and hi torical plays with a political theme. The quintessence of poetry is imagery, particularly metaphor, and this is true most of all for Shakespeare's plays. Lincoln's fondne s for this medium undoubtedly helped shape his use of figurative and symbolic language. As a youth he had tried his hand at writing poetry. But the way in which we best know Lincoln as a poet is through several famous passage from his wartime speeches and state papers, in which he achie\'ecl unrivaled eloquence through the use of poetic language.

A rather modest example of this occurs in a public letter that Lincoln wrote in August 1863 to be read at a Union rally in Illinois-and of course to be published in the newspapers. This letter came at a major turning point in the war. Union armies had recently captured Vicksburg and won the Battle of Gettysburg, reversing a year of defeats that had created vitiating doubt and dissent. But even after these victories the antiwar Copperhead movement remained strong and threatening. Its an imus focused mainly on the gm·ernment's policy of emancipation and the enlistment of black troops. By the time of Lincoln's letter, several black regiments had already demonstrated their mettle in combat. Lincoln addressed all of

How unco/11 1Von !he War these issues. In delightful and easily understood imagery he noted the importance of the capture of Vicksburg in opening the Mississippi River and gave credit to soldiers and sailors of all regions, including black soldiers and loyal Southern whites, in accomplishing this result.

"The signs look better," wrote the president.

"The Father of Waters again goes unvexed to the sea. Thanks to the great North-West for it.

Nor yet wholly to them. Three hundred miles up, they met New-England, Empire, Key-Stone, and Jersey , hewing their way right and left.

The Sunny South too, in more colors than one, also lent a hand. On the spot, their part of the history was jotted down in black and white ....

Tor must Uncle Sam's Web-feet be forgotten. ... Not only on the deep sea, the broad bay, and the rapid river, but also up the narrow muddy bayou, wherever the ground was a little damp, they have been, and made their tracks. " Shifting from these cheerful, almost playful images, Lincoln turned to the Copperheads who had been denigrating emancipation and

calling the whole war effort a useless and wicked failure. Lt was nor a failure, said Lincoln; the Union had turned the corner toward victory.

And when that victory came, " th ere will be some black men who can remember that, with silent tongue, a nd clenched teeth, and steady eye, and well-poised bayonet, they ha\'e helped mankind on to this great consummation; while, I fear, there will be some white one , unable to forget that, with malignant heart, and deceitful speech, they have strove to hinder it. " Here Lincoln was wTiting primarily about a /Jrocess-a bout the means of victory in the war for the Union. lt was when he defined the Jmrpose o[ that war-the meaning of Union and why it was worth fighting for-that he soared to his greatest poetic eloquence. " nion" was something of an abstraction that required concrete symbols to make its meaning clear to the people who would have to risk their lives for it.

The flag was the most important such symbol.

But Lincoln wanted to go beyond the flag and strike deeper symbolic chords of patriotism.

Detail of e11gravi11g ofji-eed 1lji-irr111-, I11zeriw11s celebrating Lincoln's ÂŁ111m1ci/Jalio11 Proclamalion.

49

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And in so doing he furnished some of the finest examples of poetic metaphor in our national literature.

In the peroration of his first inaugural address, Lincoln appealed to the South with an evocation of the symbol of a common hiswry and shared memories as metaphors for the Union. "We must not be enemies," he declared.

"Though passion may ha\'e strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The 11l)'Stic chords of memory, stretching from eYery battle-field, and patriot grave, to e,·ery lil'ing heart and hearthstone, all over this broad land, will yet swell the choru of the Union , when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature."

Having here summoned forth the past as a metaphor for Union, Lincoln invoked the future in the peroration of his message to Congre s in December 1862. 'ow he added emancipation to Gnion as the legacy that the people of that generation would lea,·e to their children's children. "Fellow-citizens, we can52

Li11col11 '.I /Jrojm 1.1ily for telli11g _jo//1'.1 and his rl10ire of {;l'llemls wer1' .1atiri:ed i11 I larpcr\ \\'cckl)·, J r111ua1y 3, 1863. rh e l '11io11 , led br Gml'ml B11111.1 ide, had rere11tly lo.,/ the Battle of Frederic/i1b111g.

not escape histo1; The fiery trial through which we pass, will light us down, in honor or dishonor, LO the latest generation .... \Ve shall nobly Sa\'e, or meanly lose, the last best, hope of eanh .... In giving freedom to the .,lave, we assure freedom to theFN' .''

Lincoln put these symbolic theme~ of past, present, and future together in I he most lamous or his poems, the Geuysburg Address. In this elegy there arc no metaphors in a con1·entional sense; rather there arc ll'hat two literary cholars ha\'e called "concealed " or "structural" metaphors-that is, metaphors that are built into the structure or the address in such a ll'ay that they are not l'isible but are essential to its meaning. The Gcuysburg Address contain three parallel sets of' three images each that are intricately interwoven: past, present, future; continent, nation, battlefield; and birth, death , rebirth. Let us disaggregate these metaphors for purpose~ of analysis , e\'en though in the process ll'e destror their poetic 1

••••

How U11coh1 IV011 lite Wur qualities. Four score and seven years in the

For Further Reading

Jx1sl our fathers conceived and brought forth on

this co11ti11enl a nation that stood for something important in the world: the propo ition that all men are created equal. Now, our generation faces a great war testing whether such a nation standing for such an ideal can sun,ive. In dedicating the cemetery on this battlefleld, the living must take inspiration to finish the task that those who lie buried here nobly advanced by giving the last full measure of their devotion.

Life and death in this passage have a paradoxical but metaphorical relationship: men died that the nation might live, yet metaphorically the old Union also died, and with it died the institution of slavery. After these deaths, the nation must have a "new birth of freedom" so that the government of, by, and for the people that our fathers conceived and brought forth in tJ1e past "shall not perish from the earth" but be preserved as a legacy for the Jillure.

Contrary to common impres ion, Lincoln's Gettysburg Address was not ignored or unappreciated at the time. Lincoln himself may have contributed to this legend, for he reportedly told his friend and bodyguard, Ward Hill Lamon, that the speech was "a llat failure."

Mixing a live metaphor with a dead simile (as Lamon remembered it a quarter-century later), Lincoln said that the address "won't scour"; it "fell upon tJ,e audience like a \\'el blanket." It is true that admiration for the Gettysburg Address grew over the years. But many auditors and readers immediately recognized its greatness; one of them was Edward Everett, the main orator of the day, who wrote to Lincoln the next day: "I should be glad, if I could natter myself, that I came as near to the central idea of the occasion, in two hours, as you did in two minutes."

Jefferson Davis did not-and probably could not-write anything like the Geuysburg Address, or like anything else in the way of images and metaphors that Lincoln used to illustrate his points both great and small.

Communication and inspiration are t\\'O or the most important functions of a president in times or crisis. Thus perhaps David Potter's suggestion that if the Cnion and Confederacy had exchanged presidents the South might have won the Civil War does not seem so farfetched after all.

The literaLUre on Lincoln and the Ci,·il War is voluminom. One of the best multi, olume works on Lincoln\ era is Allan Nevins's eight-volume Ordeal of the Union (Nell' York: Scribner, 1947-71 ). Other general overviews of the period include Dm·id H. Donald, Libert)' and Union (Ne\\' York: I leath, 1978) and Eric Fone;· and Olivia l\lahoney, A House Divided: America in the Age of Lincoln (New York: Chicago Historical Society in association with W. \\'. Norton &:. Company, 1990). For biographical treatments or Lincoln, sec Stephen B. Oates, With Malicl' Toward None: The Life of Abmlw111 Lincoln (New York: New American Library, 1978) and James G. Randall's four-volume ll'Ork, Lincoln the President: Springfield to Gelly.1bwg (New York: Dodd and Mead, 1945-55).

Lincoln's writings are compiled in the nine-volume collection, Roy P. Ba ler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (l 953. Reprint. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990). Archer H. Shaw,

eel., The Uncoln £ncyrloj1edia: The Sj1oken and Wrillen Words ofAbmham Lincoln Arranged for Ready Reference ( 1950. Reprint. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980) is a useful resource. Lincoln the storyteller is chronicled in Paul M. Zall, Abe Lincoln Laughing:

Humol'ous A11ecdoles from Original Sources by and abonl Abraham Lincoln (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982) and Keith Jennison, The Humorous Mr. Lincoln ( ew York: Crowell, 1965). Studies of Lincoln's use of language include Herbert Joseph Edwards and John Erskine Hankins, Lincoln the Writer: The Development of his Literary Style (Orono, ME: University of Maine Press, 1962) and James Hurt, "All the Living and the Dead: Lincoln's Imagery," Amel'ican Literature 52 (1980-81):379 .

Illustrations 32, CHS Paintings and Sculpture Collection; 33, CHS, ICHi-22206; 34, CHS Painting and Sculpture Collection: 36, from Rufus Rockwell Wilson, Lincoln in Caricature, l 945, CHS Librarv; 37, from Keith \V. J cnnison, The Humorous ,\1•·. Lincoln, 1965, courtesy or the Ralph E. Becker collection of political Americana, Smithsonian Institution; 38, from Keith \V. Jennison, The Humorous i'vlr. Lincoln, 1965, CHS Libra1-y; 40, [i·om Keith W. Jennison, The Humorous Mr. Lincoln, 1965, courtesy of the Manuscripts Division of the Libra1-y or Congress; 4 l, CHS, lCHi22058; 42 above, from Keith \V . .Jennison, The Humorous i\lr. Lincoln, 1965, CH Library; 42 below, from .John J. l\!cKenclt-y, Aesop: Five Centuries of Jllll.ltrated Fables, courtesy or the Newben-y Library, the John l\-1. \\'ing Collection; 44, CHS, ICJ-li-11305; 46-4-7. CHS, ICHi-11179; 49, CHS, ICHi-22095; 50-51, CHS, ICHi-22039; 52, from Albert Shaw, Abraham Uncoln in Contemporary Caricature, 1929, CHS Library.

53

YESTERDAY'S CITY Excursion on the Lakefront by \ Vill iam Lafferty

The America a11d the Favorite laid up in winter in the North Bmnch of the Chicago River above Belmont Avenue. CHS Prints and Photographs Collection.

Chicago's lakefront is today virtually barren of the co111mercial sh ipping that established the city as one of the nation's major pons earlier in this century. The lakefront excursion boat is al111 ost the only remnant of the huge flotilla ofvessels that made the tll'O branches of the Chicago Ri,¡er and the shore area surrounding the river's mouth a hub for ll'aterborne commerce. Although fell' diesel launches serve this trade today, during the first third of this cenLury dozens of steam- and gasolinepowered passenger boats plied Lake Michigan between downtown Chicago and the major lakcfront parks , Lincoln to the north and Jackson to the south, making these routes among the most heavily traveled passenger runs on the Great Lakes. But when tragedy struck one of these boats, the Fa vo rite, in l 927, the go lden era of the lakefront excurs ion trade began its decline. The career of the Fa vorite encapsulates both the life of a lakefront excursion boat of that era and the decline of the excursion trade.

Chicago boat-builder Gilbert Anderson completed the Fa vorite-a wooden, open, doubledecked passenger boat fifty-seven feet long and nineteen tons gross, typical of those in the local excursion trade--cluring the spring of J 914 at his yard on the North Branch of the Chicago River at North Avenue for Chicagoans Henry Rinke and Phil Kegel, of a prominent fishing and excurs ion boat family. During the peak excursion season from Memorial Day to Labor Day, the Favorite, poll'ered by a small single-cylinder Kahlenberg ga engin e, ferried passengers on the Lincoln Park route bet,veen the Lincoln Park landing and Municipal Pier (now Na,¡y Pier). The Fa vo rite's Steamboat In spection Service I icense specified that the William l.,ajferty is jJrofessor of theater arts al !Vright l'11ivenily.

Stall'

55

Chicago History, Fall and Wi nter 1991-92

Three views of the Lake Michigan ew11 rsio11-boal la11di11g al Fullerton Avenue i11 Lincoln Par/1, c. 19 10. From the tum of the ce11t111J lo 1934, Lincoln Park was an important slo/J for Lakejim,t commuters and sightseer; making their way to various destinations in the city. The Silve r Spray (belo w right) srrnk ojf o!Jachso11 Parh in 1914. Courtesy of the auth or.

vessel could carry 158 passe ngers and eight crew be l:\vee n May a nd Se pte mbe r, whe n clima tic a nd lake conditi o ns mad e nav iga ti o n safe; with the return of foul weather a nd rough seas in the fall, th e lice nse reduced passenger capacity to ten a nd th e crew to three. Th e li cense also restricted the ra nge of opera ti on to th e C hi cago harbo r a nd the C hi cago Rive r, fifteen miles north or south or th e river's mouth a nd no more than three mil es oITshore.

Th e Favo rite, like h er counterparts in the lakefront excursion trade, frequentl y cha nged own e rs. Kege l acquired hi s p a rtn e r's h a lfinterest in the boat on October 8, 1917, and l:\vo year later the Favoritf beca me th e pro perty o f the Hintze family o f C hicago, on e of the city's la rges t op er ators in th e excursio n busin ess.

Fred a nd Edward Hintze sold the Fa vorite to Katharine Murphy of Sturgeon Bay, Wi sconsin , whose husband, Captain]. E. Murphy, operated several boats in the Chicago excursion trade, including th e Hazel on the Lincoln Park run and the North Shore o n th e J ac kso n Pa rk ro ute .

Murphy soon resold the boat to Mary Martinek, whose husband continued to operate the Favmite on the Lincoln Park route, and little more tha n l:\,¡o years later she sold the ves el to Carl J acobi, a member of a noth er well-kn0\\11 Chicago fi shing family. In May 1925, J acobi sold the Favorite for fifteen hundred d oll ars to partn ers Arthur St. Pe ter and Arthur "Beef ' Ol son, th e la tter a 56

prominent local boat capta in and operator a nd , accordin g to th e Chicago City Directory, a profess ional masseur as well. Within a year, "Bee f ' Olso n was so le own er o f th e Favorite. H e ope rated the Fav01ite on the Lincoln Park- Municipal Pi e r run fo r th e re maind er o f the 1926 season a nd through out 1927, in addi tio n to hi s l:\vo thirty-t, vo-foot motor-launch la kefront tax is.

T h e un eve ntful ca ree r o r th e Farâ&#x20AC;˘orite cha nged dras tica ll y in th e summ e r o f 192 7.

La te in the day on Thursday, .July 28, 1927, the Fa voritP loaded six ty- two passe nge rs, mos tl y wome n with th eir childre n e nj oy in g a summ e r aftern oon on the la kefront, at the Lincoln Park la ndin g at Full e rt o n Ave nu e. At 3:30 P.~1. , "Bee f ' Olso n a nd a crell' or fi ve stee red th e Favoritf away from Lincoln Park on a south east course headed around C hicago harbor's northern brea kwate r towar d Muni cipal Pi er, where m os t o f th e p asse ngers a nti cip a ted ma kin g co nn ecti ons with Chicago Surface Lin e tra ins [or th e trip ho me. Bare ly a mil e fro m it s e mbarkati on po int, oIT onh Avenue, th e Fa voritP e n co unte red incr eas in g ly fres he ning sou thll'es terl y wind s, while me nacin g thunderhead s appea red O\'er the city. Ol so n a tte mpted to keep th e Favorite's bow imo th e wind , but th e udd en a nd nearly ga le-stren gth storm-n o t uncommon during Chicago's summ er-proved to be di sas tro us fo r th e sma ll cra ft. Olson qui ckly los t th e battl e to keep his boa t unde r

Ye.1/erday\ City â&#x20AC;¢

l.Ar<E MICHIGAN EX C URSION STEAMEl'ls, LINCOLN PARr< , CH,CACO

I

,I

Boat LandlnC, Lincoln Park, Chicago.

57

Chicago HistOJ)', Fall and lfli11ter 1991-92

~bove,Jolmny Weissnwller al Fra11/di11 Park, 1921 . CHS, Prints and Photographs Collectio11, Di\' 62,934. rlwmj1ion swimmer and Oak Street Beach lifeguard, .Jol11my and his brother Pete were among the 11w11y lifeg11ard1 (right) who helped with resrne efforts. CHS Prints and Photographs Collectio11. DN 83,8--15.

58

} 'l'sll'J'doy\

control and, ll'ithin minutes, the Favorite began LO turn broadside to the ll'incl and wa\路es. The passengers shifi.ed to the boat's lee side, seeking shelter from the whipping wind and pelting rain, Some reported that the passengers panicked and rushed to the port side, while others maintained that they calmly proceeded there. \\'hat actuall)' happened is not known, but the shifi. in passenger load coupled with the heavy seas appears to ha\'e upset the boat. The Favorite heeled far to port with the upper deck awning catching the wind like a sail, quickly shipping torrents of water over its port rail from the raging lake. As the hull rapidly settled, passengers on deck were swept off. Those below clerk were carried doll'n with the boat, trapped between the upper and lo"路er decks. The Fa vorite seulecl keel-down on the lake bouom, a half-mile off North Avenue, the \'essel perched upright with only its pilothouse and all'ning abm路e the surface of the ll'ater. Olson, who had scrambled LO saf'et)' through an open pilothome window; engineer George .Jones, ll'ho had clashed from the cra!i 's flooded engine

City

compartment; and deckhand Leo Hersom all threw life preservers to the passengers struggling in the water. Olson e\'entually managed to release the Favorite's one small lifeboat and pushed several children into it, all of whom reached shore safely.

The sudden intensity of the squall foundered the Favorite in minutes. Around the sunken hull, passengers flailed for help, while more remained trapped within the \'essel.

The large motor yacht l)oris, owned by Chicago industrialist William Hofnauer, was bound north for Wilmette and was a few hundred yards from the Favorite when the storm struck. Poor \'isibility prevented Hofnauer from seeing the Favorite's diITiculty until lightning illuminated the craft's predicament.

Although Hofnauer was having trouble managing the Doris in the squall, he was able to maneuver it close to the sunken Fa vorite and to pull many sun路ivors from the lake. The Doris proceeded to Municipal Pier ll'here it ll'as enli ted to bring a group of unlikely municipal officials, including the president of the Board 59

Chirngo Hi~t01y. Fall and Winter 1991-92 of Education, to the disaster scene for an inspection. Meanwhile, lifeguards ll'ho had \\'itnessed the plight of the Fa vorite from shore notified the police, the fire department, and the Coast Guard. Champion swimmer Johnny Weissmuller and his brother Pete, captain of the Oak Street Beach lifeguards, " 'ere transported to the scene in a motor runabout \\'ith other lifeguards and clove clown into the hulk to recover bodies. The fire wg Grae111e Stewart raced to the scene from its Chicago River station, as did surf boats from the Coast Guard station at the breakwater opposite the riYer's mouth. More vessels joined the re 'Clte efforts, and all available police and fire department resuscitation units were dispatched to the southern edge o[ Lincoln Park to aid victims brought to the esplanade; the bodies were brought to several ear North funeral homes.

Barely an hour after the Favorite foundered, thousands of curious Chicagoans beading home

lined the lakefront north of Municipal Pier to watch the rescue operations. Just before nightfall , the tug William Lydon and derrick barge No. S, both of the Creal Lakes Dredge & Dock Company Oeet, arrived at the disaster scene. \\'orking under powerful floodlights , divers managed to rig slings beneath the Fa vorite's hull , and the derrick barge raised the hulk while the Coast Guard scurried about the Favorite's decks, looking for additional bodies.

The dead included twent)'-six women and children and one man. "Beel" Olson and his crew were whisked to the Chicago Avenue police station for interrogation, each man maintaining that the suddenness and ferocity of the squall, as well as the shift in passenger load to the craft's port side, had camecl the disaster.

Chicago's afternoon and morning newspapers played the Favorite's sinking to the hilt, providing lurid details of unsuccessful resuscitation efforts and of grief-stricken relatives' anguish in

A derrick lifts the Favorite fim11 tlzl' bo/10111 o/La//e Mirhiga11. a half111i/e off of North A11en11e. Tu 1enty-seve11 /Ja.1.1e11ge1:1 died 111 the tragedy. CHS Pri11t.1 and Photogmj1hs Col/ectio11, DN 83,8./3.

60

l'esterda_y's City early editions, while later editions or the papers speculated on Olson's seamanship and the Favorite's seaworthiness. The best journalistic coup was a Tribune reporter's discovery that a Favorite survivor, Gertrude Berndt, had t'll'elve years before survived the infamous Eastland capsizing in the Chicago River, a disaster to which Chicago papers compared tJ1e Favorite incident.

Mrs. Berndt lost four family members in the sinking of the Favorite, and her comments about the disaster were incriminating. She labeled the crew as "dumb" in their rescue efforts and said that she remarked as she boarded the craft, "I don't like the looks of this boat-it has a tendency to lean to one side." She also made disparaging remarks about the condition and placement or the vessel's life preservers.

The morning after the Favorite sank, city officials initiated four separate inquiries into the causes or the tragedy. State's attorney and police investigations weighed the possibility of

criminal negligence b)' the Favorite's crew, while the City Council appointed a commiuee to investigate the overall operation or the city's many excursion boats. The most pertinent and substantial inquiry was called by the f'ederal Steamboat Inspection Service, mandated by law to fully investigate such marine disasters. \\'hile these committees and inquiries were being formed, the sad, soggy hull of the Favorite was towed from Belmont Harbor, where it had been taken the night before for further inspection, to the Randolph Street Slip, becoming the object of much scrutiny by Loop office workers.

Predictably, the Favorite debacle had a swift and adverse (but short-lived) effect on the city's excursion boat trade. The Lincoln Park neet retired to the Ogden Slip to wait out reluctant excursionists. The Jackson Park fleet, generally composed or larger boats, maintained its schedule but served considerably fewer passengers over the next few days. By the next Sunday,

C11rio11.1 (.'!,irngo11111 i11.1/mt t/11' Farnrite ol the R.rmdol/Jh Street S/i/J the day a/ier 1111' affidenl. The emmion trade_ .111jfered /mejly o/ll'r the accide11/; 11 1/h111 11 11 eeh, lw11 evn, /Jas.1e11ger 110/11111e was nearly bach lo normal. CHS Prmls and Plwlogm/Jh1 Col/ectio11, DN 83 ,8-./2.

1

1

1

61

Tlte Favorite tmgnly 1m.1 ro111J1mPd lo the I 9 I 5 Eastland dismtn i11 u1hich 835 people lost //u,ir lii,es when o JH1.1.1e11ger boat rnpsi:ed in th!'

Chicago River. CHS Pri11t.1 and l'hologmph., Collection, J(;f-11-02033

Chimgo J-listo1y, Fall {{lld ll'inler 1991-92

!11 I 9JO "f'>eef" Ol.1011 rebuilt the Favorite, removing its 1111.1table 11/1/Hr dee!,.

H.ffhri.,tr'l/1'!1 th,, Sunbeam, the boat senwd th e l' \C111 :1io11 trade until /937. C:ourte.,y of th e (111/h or. .

howeYer, the Favorite episode appeared to haYe been forgotten by Chicagoans, with pa senger trai1ic ben,·een Lincoln Park and downtown nearly normal.

The various inquirie , though, had not forgotten the Favorite. The next week, a coroner's jury inspected lifesaYing equipmenl on various lakefront passenger boats, prompted by further allegations that the Favorite carried defecti\·e life preserYers. Both the Mineral City, which had assisted in the rescue eITort, and the larger Skater were found to have rotted life belts. The City Council appropriated funds for boats built for heayy surf to be stationed along the lakefront for aid should a similar emer-

gency occur: political bickering erupted over exactly what type of \·esscl should hm·e city sanction to call at Lincoln Park. The more important federal inquiry, however, elicited important testirnon)'· Virtually every witness, including William Hofnaucr, testified that Olson and his crew had handled themseh-es in a highly capable manner during the catastrophe. Lou Sabota, master of the forty-sixfoot excursion boat L'.S .rl. and a passenger aboard the Fa vorite that fateful afternoon, maintained that the crew had performed professionally and that, considering the suddenness and intensity of the storm, the Fa vorite had been doomed in any case . Although weather

}·l'.1taday \ C:ity bureau instruments at the University of'Chicago registered a maximum wind \'elocity or only L\\'enty-eight miles per hour at the time the boat lc)underecl, a Daily Ne,l'S motion picture or l\lunicipal Pier taken as the storm struck sho\\'ecl ferocious ll'ind gusts hurling ticker booths across the pier and smashing lights.

But the most re\·ealing testimony came rrom the excursion boat Chirngo's popular captain Freel Weimer. Weimer claimed that in 1919 he had cons id ered buying the Favorite from Phil Kegel , but he thought the \'e~sel , ll'ith its high upper deck, too unstable. Testimony from ,\u gus t Maercke, a former bookkeeper at Gilbert Anderson's boat yard, indirectly corroborated \\'eimer's opinion of the Favorite.

Maercke Lated that the Favorite had been designed as a sin gle-deck boat, but that Phil Kegel asked Anderson to acid the other deck to increase its passenger capacity. The general conclusion of the inquiry auribut ecl the disaster to an unfortunate act of nature, exacerbated by possible in stabi lity in the boat's design; Olson and his crew were exonerated. The Steamboat Inspection Service, however, indirectly implicated itse lf in the sinkin g of the Favorite. The service exem ptecl craft of u ncler fifteen net tons, such as the Favorite , from a ll'ide range of stab ility and safety requirements that .. had they been enforced, might have averted the tragedy.

To add to the service's embarrassment, its inspectors had surveyed the Favorite just sixteen clays before it sank, finding it perfectly fit. "Beer' Olson, distraught over the tragedy, vowed never again to sail the Favorite, partly out or remorse and partly because the vessel had, understandably, become a pariah among lakefront excursion boats. He continued, however, to operate his power cruisers along the city's lakefront.

Following the Favorite disaster, the number of vessels in the lake front excursion trade declined . Throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s, numerous craft were scrapped or abandoned. The Favorite was e\·entually towed up the North Branch to the boat yard of Dan Leander, a friend of Olson, at Western r\\·enue.

There it lay inacti\·e for more than two years until the promise of increased excursion traffic ror Chicago's,-\ Centlll'\' or Progress International Exposition or l 93 ~) created' a demand for suitable boats. According to records, "Beef'

Olson, acting as master carpenter, rebuilt the Farnrite during the spring of' l 930 by remm·ing her onerous upper deck. Ironically, Olson ~old the boat to its first 0ll'ner, Phil Kegel, on l\.tay 28, 1930, and Kegel renamed it the Sun/Jer1111. \\'ith a nell' appearance, a ne,,· owner. and a nell' name, the former Frworite found its way back into the Ch icago excursion trade almost four years after its foundering. Whil e the Fa vorite, resurrected as the Su11b1'a111, conLinued to travel Lake Michigan, its lc>rmer notoriety spe ll ed the end for severa l other vessels.

The J\Jinernl City , with its inrerior safety gear and an aging oak hull, was condemned by zealous offic ia ls soon after the Fa vorite sank. After the Alineml City sat forlorn and forgotten, halfsunk on the north side of the Ogden Slip for a lmost [our years, the boat was towed out into the lake and scuttled. Even the Sauga tuck, once the largest vessel on the Lincoln Park excursion route, was condemned, towed ou t into the lake and se t afire in 193 1.

The infamy of the Favorite may have contributed in part to the decline of the Chicago excursion fleet during the late 1920s, but it was hardly responsible for the quick deterioration of the trade during the 19 30s.

Throughout that decade, with expanded service by the Ch icago Surface Lines a nd , especially, the construct ion or Lake Shore Drive and the ascendancy of the private automobil e, the lakefront excurs ion boat routes declined in popularity. The Favorite, as the Su11bear11, serviced the A Century of Progress International Exposition during its 1933-34 run, ca lling at the fair's boat land in g, now the southeast edge of Chicago's lakefront airport, Meigs Field. By the mid-I 930s, though, with dwindling passenger traffic, coupled with the advanc ing age of the trade's predominantly wooden craft and the depressed economy, the go lden era of the Ch icago excursion boat trade ca me to an end.

The Sunbeam remained a seawort hy vessel for Kegel until it was no longer feasible to operate the deteriorating wood hull. In 1937 the S1111bem11's old Kahlenberg engine was removed, and that summer the ,rnoden hull wa stripped and set afire, and the scrap metal sold. The career of the Favorite, sunk but resurrected, had finally come to an end.

65

Index to Volume XX This index includes author, title, and subject entries. Illu trations are indicated in italics. If a subject i, illu,trated and discussed on the same page, the illustration is not separately indicated.

Compiled by Lesley t.!artin.

A Abolitionist moYement: and . \l"rican-Americans.

I +2: 22-37; and Second Crcat ,\11ake11i11g. I +2: 23

. lbralu1111 Lincoln and tfi,, Sern11d ,.J1111•rirnn R,•110l11tio11, by .Jame, \I. \lcPherson: 3+<!: :):-i . frimnc,' (Congregational ne\\ ,paper): on 11"orking class.

I +2: 8. 13. 20; on immigration, I +2: I'.\: on Pulllllan Strike.1+2: 1-f-l:j , 17, 18 Aesop (,culpture): I +2: -1-1 . 11'.\0f!"s Fable,: and .\brahalll Lincoln, :-i+-f: 33 , -l I. -12. -18 .-\FL: SPe American Federation or Labor African-Americans: and aboliti oni,t 1110\'ement. I +2: 22-37; population in Ch icago. J + 2: 29; in l.:nion ,\rmy. 3+ I: -t:S, -19 African ,\ lethodist Church: and abo liti onist mo,·ement, I +2: '27 Allen, Richard. bishop: and abolitionist 1110\ement. I +'2: 27 Altgeld, .John P., go,·ernor: and Pullman Strike. I +2: I J. 13, 18: 3+-f: -f. 1-f. 20. 2'.\, 27: and Haymarket .\rrai,·. '.H-f:1-f Alton. Illinois: and abolitionist mo,·ement. I +2: 2-1. 28. 37 ,-I/ton Obse,wr, I +2: 26-27. 28 A111erirn11 (boat): 3+-l: 5-1. 55 American Anti-Sla,·ery Society: I +2: '25 American Co lonization Society: and ,·esettlement or,Ia,e, in Africa. I +2: 2.J .\merican Federation of Labor: and Pullman Strike, I +'2: 13; '.H4: 27 American Railwa'.· Lnion: and Pullman Strike. l +2: 6. 9, 1-f, 15, 18: 3 +-f: -f. 7. I 0, I I, 2'.l, 23. 28. 29 Anarchi,r moYement. in Chicago: I +'2: 8: '.l+-l: 27 Ander~on, Gi lbert: 3+..f: 6;'; Anderson. Shernood: and Stanislm S7Ukabki , I +2: -10 A11111111ciatio11 (sculpture): J +'2: 48 Antietam: 3+4: 46--17 "'Antilabor :\ l ercenaries or Defenders or Public Order"" article. by Cla) ton D. Laurie: :)+ +: -1-31 .\Jnislavery mo,·ement: See abolitioni,t mmernent Arcade Building: I +2: 17 .\rnold,John \\' .. l.i .S . \larshal: 3+-f: 11, l-l, 17. 26. 27 . 28 .\rt lnstillle of Chicago. School of the: I +'2: -12 ARL": Si'e American Railll'a) Cnion Atkin;,on. Emma].. member of"Big Four .. in underground railroad: I +2: 23. 33 Atkimon, Isaac: I +2: 33 ,ltla11tea (scu lpture): J +2: 52

66

B Bal1in1ore: :l+-f: -18 Barquct,.Jo,eph 11. : and abolition mm·emc11t, I +2: '.l-f, 35 Ba,come, Flmel. mini;,ter: I +2: 28, 29 ·' Baule bet11een the ~le1Timac and ,\ lonitor,'· (panorama): I +'2: 6-1. G5-66 Beaton , Da, id: on 11"orking da,, , I +2: 8 Belmont I !arbor: '.l+ -1: 6 I Bemis. E. \\'.. prole,sor: on Pullman Strike, I +2: I .J Berndt, Cert rude: on wreck or Fm•onte , 3 + I: GI Berry. Joseph , F., editor. f:'/1worth f !emit!: 1+2: I I Bible. King.James: and Abraham Lincoln, :l+ J: '.Fi "Big Four" of underground railroad: I +2: 23, '.l'.\ .. Black .\bolitinni,ts ... article , by Oli, ia tllahoney: I +2: 22-'.\7 Black Code,. in lllinois: I +2: '.\I, :J'2. :l I, '. \7 Black Lt\\'>, in Illinois: 1+2: :II, '.l'2. :l-t, :l7 Black" Sl'l' ,\ frican- ,\mericam Blo11cr,, Frank 11.. ··.\ \\'ondedull) Bu,) Place:· \ 'e,tcrda) \ City article. edited b) 11. Roge1· Grant: I +2: .J8-72 Blue hland. lllinoi,: in Pullman S11·ike. '.l+ I: 11, 19, 21, 28-2')

Bodenheim , tllaxwell: ,:llCI Stani,Ia, S,ukal,ki. I +2: W Bo'>lon, 11. \\' .. mini;ter: and Pullman S1rikc, I +2: 21 Boule,·ard ,y,tem: I +2: 68 /fo1111d '>J11i11g (sculp1ure): I +2: /J Bridge,. ,11 ing: I +'2: 66 Bro11n . .John: 1+'2: '.! 3 Bru,hingham, J. P.. mini,ter: and Pullman Strike, I +2: 15 B,) den·, Gallen: l +2: --IS Buchanan.James::\+~: 15 Burn,, Roben: and Abraham l .incoln. :l+ I: 18 Burmidc Crm,ing: 3+ ·1: 25 B1111 o/Drmd (sculpture): 1 +2: 10 Byron. Lord: and .- \braham Lincoln. '.l+I: 18

C Cairo. lllinoi,: in Pullman ',trike. '.l+ I: I I Cald11ell. .I- \I.. mini,ter: on Pullman '>trike, I +2: 18 Cameron. Simon . ,ecretarv ol\\a1: :1+ I: :\9 Campbell. Frederick. mini,ter: and Pullman ,trike. 189-1.

I +2: '21 Carpenter, Francis: on Lincoln\ ,peaking ,t, lc, '.l +~: '.\9 Carpente,·. Philo: and abolitionist nw1en1ent, I +2: '28, 29, :tl; and underground railroad, I +2: 29 Carnarcline. \\'illiam 11.. mini,ter: I +'2: I 5: and Pullman Strike. l+2: l ~J. 18, '20-21 Catholic church: and Pullman ',trikl'. I +2: fi-21 Cemena,) \lcthoclist Church: and Pullman Strike, I +2: 21 ,\ Cenru,1 of Progre,, lmernational E»po,ition of 19'.l3-3-f: 3+~: 65 Chancellor,, ille. \ ' irginia: 3+ ·l: 16. JI Chicago and '\orth \\'estern Railroad: '.\+-l: 25 Chicago. Burlington, and Quint) Railroad: '.l + •I: IO Chicago Cit) Hall: I +2: 70 Chicago Ci, ic Federation: and Pullman Strike. I +'2: 15, 19

Fulton Street ,\lfthodist Church Ch icago Common Cou ncil: denounces Fugi1ive Slave r\ct , I +2: 32 Chicago Commons Senlerne111: I +2: 5

Chiwgo Daily New., : on im·estigation of Fm ,orite ,ink in g, 3+4: 65

Douglas,, Frederick: I +2: 22. 27, '.> I, :l'.l, '.I I Dred Srnll ca,e: :l+-1-: -15 D)er, Charle, \ 'olney: and aboliLioni,t mmement, I +2: 28.

29; and underground railroad. I +2: 29, '.l :l: and friend,hip with .John Jones, I +2: :11

Chicago Fire. 1871: I +2: 67

E

Chirago l !erald: 1+2: 68 Ch icago Police: in Pullman Strike, :1+..J: 18. 25. 26, 29 Ch icago Public Library: I +2: 70 Chicago Ri ver: I +2: 66: 3+ -k 54. 55, 6.~ C hi cago Su1fa ce Lines: 3+4: 56, 65 C/1irngo Ti111r'.1: I +2: 68: o n workin g class, I +2: 13; on Pullman Str ik e, 3+.J.: 23

Ch1rago Trib1111e: I +2: 68, 72 ; on Pull111a11 Strike. 3+ I: /0: 011 sinkin g of Fa vorite. 3+-1: 61 Chirago World: I +2: 68 Cinquc1 . .Joseph: I +2: 22 Ci, ii \\'ar: and r\braham Lincoln's speeches, 3 +.J.: 32-53 Cle-eland, Crm·er: and Pullman Strike, I +2: I.J., 18 ; 3+4: I 0. 1-1, 15 , 2:l, 24, 28, 29 Co lumbi a Theatre: I +2: 67-68 Commi 1rec fo r the Relief of Fugiti, es in Canada: I +2: 33 Commonweal Arm)': I +2: / / Commonwealih of Christ: 3+ I: 10 Communi,m, in C hicago: 3+-l: 2..J Compromi,c of 1850: I +2: 32 Comtitu ti ona l Com·ention of 1787: and ,la,er)', I +2: 25 Convent ion of the Colored Citi,cm of the Stale of Illin ois:

I +2: '.l5 , '.l7 Cooper Jn<,ti tutc: 3+4: 38

Ea1lla11d (boat): capsizes, 3+.J.: 61, 62-63 Eastman, 7.eb ina: I +2: 31; and abolitionisi 1110,emelll, I +2: 28-29 . 32 I:rho (;,cu lpture): I +2: 53 F.gan,John M.: a nd Ge nera l 1vlanager\ A,sociation , 3+ -1: 17, 23, 26 Election day, 1888: I +2 : 68 Emancipation Proclamation: I +2: 22, '.l i Ej1worlh lferald (:'llethodist newspaper): on working class.

I +2: 8: on Pullman Strike, I +2: 17: on Social Gospel.

I +2: I I; on immigration. I +2: I 8, 20 Everett, Ech\'ard: 3+4: 53 Excursion boats: '.l ++ 54-65 ·'Excursion on the Lakefront ,'' Yesterday's C ity article , b) William Lafferty: 3+4: 5.J.-65

F Fall ofMnn (sculpture):

I +2: 50

Fallm,s, Samuel, Episcopal bishop: and Pullman Strike, I +2: 18

Fm,orile (boat): sinking of, 3+4: 55-65 Federal troops: See L:nited States Arm, Feehan. P. ., archbishop: I +2: /4: founding New ll'urlrl,

Coxc,,Jacob: 3+..J: 10, I..J Crofton, Robert E. r\. , co lonel: 3+ I: 17-19, 2 1

I +2: II Fifth r\,·enue: See \\'ells Street First Baptist C hurch : and Pullman Strike. I +2: 21 First Baptist Church of Evanston: a nd Pullm a n Strike.

Cuba : '.l+.J: 15 Cuffe. Paul: I +2: 22 Curr ier & hes: cartoon, 3+ 1: 36 C)clorama,: I +2: 64, 65-66

I +2: 15 First Methodist Episcopal Chu rch: and Pullman Strike, I +2: l•l Fir,t P,·esbyterian Church: and abolitioni, t mo,ement.

C:ooper.JelT) ~I.: 3+.J.: 10 Coppe rh ead movement: 3+4: 48~19

0

D Dam illc. lllinoi,: in Pullman Strike, :l+ I: 14 Darro". Clarence: and Stani,la, S1ukal,ki. I +2: 10 Davi,, Jeffer,on: '.l+I: 33. 34: educat ion. :l+ I: '.l5: ability to comn11111ica1e. 3+4: '.3.~. 16, '.19 ..i'.l; "riting sty le, 3+-1: 36 Deb,, Eugene\ '.: and Pullman S1rike, I +2: 6 , 17, /9; '.l+ I: I 0. / /, 23, 27; arre,ted, I +2: 13. 27. 28 Decatur. lllin oi,: in Pullman Strike , :1+ I: 14 Tht' D1'fmdn (or Defense) (scu lpLU rc): I +2: -!6 Delano. 11. .\., minister: on Eugene \ '. Deb,, I +2: 15 Depe". (haume,: 011 Lincoln\ ,1, le ol ,peech. :1+ I: 39 Detroit. ~lichigan: I +2 : 67. 72 De \\'oil. Cail in: and abolitioni'>I nHl\ ement. I +2: 28, 29 Dom (1ath1): :l+.J: 59

I +2: 28 Fishburn , Janet: 1+2:6 Flight of the E111igra11/1 (sculptu rP): I +2: 55 Fort Brady, ~lichigan: 3+4: 21, 23 Fort Lemenworth, Kamas: 3+-1-: 2 1. 23, 26 Fort Rile)', Kansa,: '.l+.J.: 2 1 Fort Sheridan: '.l+4: 14, 28 Frank Le.,lie'.1 Il!ll.l!mted NewsjJa/1er: 3+4: 5 Fredricksburg, Virginia: 3+4: 41 Freer, Lemuel Cove ll Paine: and abolition i,t mm·emem, I +2: 28, 29, 33; and friendship with John J ones, l +2: 31 "From the Editor." by Russell Lewis: I +2: 3; 3+.J.: 3 Fugiti,e Slave Act: I +2: 22. 32-33 Fulton Street ~lethoclist Church: and Pullman Strike.

I +2: 15

Dougla,, Stephen ,\ .: delend, Compromi,e or 1850. I +2: '.\ 2: ,pomor, Kama,-Nebraska . \(1. I +2: :n , '.l7; leade,· ol the Democra1ic part), '.l + I: 45

67

Camel

G Garnet, ll enry Hi gh land: I +2: 22 Garrison, \\'illiam U orcl: and abo liti onist mo\'emenL, I +2: 25 C,eisn,eit, \\'. H.: 1 +2: 1'.l Genera l \J anager'; Association (Gi\1.-\): and Pullman Strike, I +2: 14, 18; 3+4: 7. 10, 11 , 23. 26, 28, 29 Ge11i11, of Uberty (abol itionist ne11 spa per): I +2: 29 Geniw of L'11ivenal E111a11cipatio11 (abolitinni,t nell'spaper): I +2: 29 Geuysbu1·g Address, metaphor, in: '.l+ .J: 52-53 (,eltysburg, Batlle of: '.1+4: 11 , 48 Gilbert and Su lli\'an: 1+2: 68 G,\IA : Sff General !\lanager\ ,\ s,ociatio n Gompers. Samuel: and Pullman Strike, '.l+ I: 27 Graeme Ste1mrt (fire 1t1gboat): :l+.J: 60 Grain ,\lerchant (m· Portrait ofa11. l1111'/"irn11) (sculpture): I +2: 5+ Grand Central Railroad: 3+4: 2:) Grand Cross in g. lllin ois: in Pullman Strike, 3+4: 18 Grand Trunk Rail Lin e: 3+4: 25 Grant, II . Roge r, editor. "A \\'o nclerfull) Busy Place."

Yesterday·s C it)' art icl e, I +2: 58-72 Grant, C lysse, S .. ge neral: 3+4: :13 . .JI, -12, 43 Creal Lakes Dredge and Dock Company: '.l+4: 60 Great l'\orthern Railroad: 3+ 1: 10 Great Rai h,·a) Strike of 18i7: 3+-1: 5, 18, :rn, 31 The Great 111'.1/em (ship): and unde1·ground railroad. I +2: 29 Green St<rne Presbrterian Church: 1 +2: -/. I '.l Gresham , \\'alter, ,ecretar) of "ate: and Pullman Strike.

3+4: 15 ·'Grip '' streetcars: I +2: 60. 61, 63, 65 Grosscup , Peter S., LJ.S. District Court.Judge: 3+4: I 1, 1-1

H I Ia ll , Abram T., I +2 : 3 1, 33; and estab li shment of Quinn Chapel. I +2: 31: lobbies against Black L111 s, I +2: 32 I Iancock, \\'infield Scott. general: and Great Raikm Strike of 1877. 3+4: 18. 19 ll and), RobertT.: 1+2: 6 ll anks, Dennis: 3+4: 41 "The I Iare and the Tortoise": 3+-1: -12 1laymarket Affair: I +2: 5; 3+4: 14 Ila.el (boat): 3+4: 56 The Hemw11/y Xur.11• (sculpture): I +2: 56 I fecht, Ben: and Stanisla,· S,ukalski, I +2: ..JO 1 lenson, J osiah: and abol it ionist mo,·emcnt , I +2: 27 1lenson. Poindexter S., minister: and Pullman Strike, I +2: 15, 2 1 1lerron, C,eorge: and Social C,ospel. I +2: 11 Hersom, Leo: 3+4: 59 I li1111e, Ed11arcl: 3+4: 56 Hinve, Fred: 3+4: 56 H ornauer, \\'illiam: 3+-k 59. 6-1 ll ooker, .J oseph, general: 3 +4: -11 l lopkins, Charles IL: l +2: 6

68

I lop kins, .J o hn P .. ma)'Or: an d Pullman Strike, I +2: 14, 15: '.l+ ·l: J, 1-1, 23. 24, 26, 27 I lotcl Florence: 3+4: l l -12 • I 1/ouse Diz,1rled: , lmerica i11 the ,.Jge o/Unro/11, ex hibiti on: I +2: 22; '.H-1: 33 "I loll' Lincoln \\'o n the \\'ar ll'ith i\letaphors,'' art icle. by Jame, :-Sl. ~lcPherson: 3+ ·1: 32-:'i'.l I lull -House seu lcment: I +2: 5

I Th,, llli11ni.1 (,h ip ): and underground rai lroad, I +2: 29 Illin ois Ant i-Sla\'ery SociC' t)': I +2: 28, 29 Illin ois Central Railroad: 1 +2: 70; 3+ I: 22, 23, 25 lllin oi, Comtitutional Conl'entio n of 18·17: and free ,\fri can-Americans, I +2: '.l I Illin ois Libert) party: and abo liti onis t mo,·cment, 1 +2 : 29 Ill ino is National Guard: and Pullman Strike, I +2: /7; 3+4: 2-1, 25. 26, 29.30, 31 Immi gration. 10 Chicago: I +2: 5, 18, 20 lnf<>rmant,: in Pullman Strike. 3+-1: 26 Interior (Pre,byterian nell'spapcr): on \\'Orking clas,. I +2: 8, 1'.l; on Pullman Strike, I +2: 14- 15, 18; o n immigration, I +2: 18, 20 lntcr,tatc Commerce Act: I +2: 17 lreland,.John, archbi,hop: and Pullman Strike, I +2: 18 hbell, Le11i,: and abolition mmement, I +2: :n-:l5; and underground railroad, l +2: '.\3; and Black Laws. I +2:'.l7

5,,

J

Jack,on Park: 3+-1: J acobi. Carl: 3+-1: 56 .John,on, \\'ill iam: and aboli1i onist mol'emcnt, I +2: 22, '.l2, '.l:l , 34: and underground rai lroad. I +2: '.l3; and Black Lall's, I +2: 37 Jone,, George: '.l+-1: 59 Jone, . .John: I +2: 29. '34: and abo liti on ist mmemcnt.

I +2: 22. '.l I, '.\3. :H, '.l5; and Blatk Codes. I +2: '.1 1; elected, ice-p1-esident of i\ational Colored Com ention, I +2: '.l l: lobbies against BhKk I .a11 s. I +2: '.l2. '.17; and underground railroad. I +2: :ti Jones. Illar) Rid1ard,on: I +2: 22. 29, 3-1

K Kansa,-:\'e bra,ka .\Cl: I +2: '.\!i, :n: '.l+ I: I., Kegel, Phil: '.l+-1: :'i5, 56, 65 Kennedv.John F.: '.l+ I: 3'.\ Kernan.John: and Pullman Strike. I +2: 18 Krakm ian .\cademy: I +2: 11. 12. L'i Krakoll'. Poland: I +2: 39

L /.,ahor (sculpture): I+ 2: 49 Lafferty, \\'illiam: Yesterday's Cit) artide: "Excursion on the Lakefront": 3+·1: 54--65 Lake Front Pa1·k: 3+-1 : I.J , 17 , 2'.I

Police: and Pul/111011 Stnke Lake .\ili ch igan: commercia l shipping, 3 +.J: 55: boat landin gs, :l+4: 56; excursion boats, 3+4: 51-65; lileguarcb.

3+4: 58. 59 , 60 Lamon, \l'ard Hill: 3+4: 53 Lamont, Daniel , secretary of war: and Pullman Strike, 3+4: I 5. 28, 30 LaSalle Count)" mi-Slavery Society: 1+2: 29 /-11 w (scu lpture): I +2: 47 l ~ande~ Dan:3+1:65 Lee, Fa,·ini a .J ones: on underground railroad , I +2: 33 Lee, Matthew C., "Onward Chri stian Sold ie rs: The Social Gospel and the Pullman Strike," anicl e : 1 +2 : •1-21 Lee, Robe rt E. , ge ne ra l: 3+4: 33 , 4 1, t:l Leo Xl 11, Pope: and Rerum Nova rum encyclical: I +2: 11 Lewis, Ru sse ll , "From the Editor'': I +2: 3; '.l + ·l: 3 The Ubera/or, abo liti onist newspaper: 1 +2: 25 Liberty Association: I +2 : 22 Lifeguards, Lake 1ichigan: 3++: 58, 59, 60 Lincoln, Abraham: 3+4: 32, 36, 42, ·16- 47, 50- 51; and ema ncip atio n proclamation, I +2: 22: 3+4: ·15, 48; use of fi gurat ive language, 3+ ·1: '.1 2-53; ed ucation , 3+ ·1: 35; first inauguration , 3+ ·1: 44 I .incoln Park: I +2: 61. 65; boat land in g, 3+ I: 55, 56, 57, 64 Lincoln Park Congregational Ch urch: and Pullman Strike, I +2: 8 Lincoln Park Zoo: I +2: 62, 63 , 65 Literary and Debating Society: condemns Black Codes, I +2: 34 U v1n1; Church (Episcopa l newspaper): and working class, I +2: I '.l; on Pullman Strike, I +2: 15-16 Lockhart, J ., minister: and Pullman Strike, I +2: 21 The Lo.,t Tune (scu lpture): I +2: 39 Lo,ejo)', Elijah P.: I +2: 26-27, 28 Lovejoy, Owen: I +2: 28 Lcn,ell , lllino i,: I +2: 28 Lundy. Benjamin: and abo liti on ist mo\'ement, I +2: 29

M \lcClellan, George, genera l: 3+-1: ·10, •11. ·l'.1 \kPher,on,.James i'd . , ·'How Lincoln \\'on the \\'an,ith Metaphors," artic le: 3+4: 32-53 /'lladison Barracks, New Yo1·k: 3+ I: 26, 28 \1 adison Street: I +2: 58-59 /'llaercke, 1\ugust: 3+4: 65 Mahoney. Oli\'ia. " Black i\bolitionist,," article: I +2: 22-37 /'llanierre, George: and abo liti onist movement, I +2: 32, 33 t-.lar,hall, John: and American Coloni1ation Society, I +2: 25 \lanin, Jame, P.. lieutenalll colonel: and Pullman Strike, '.l+I: 17 i\lartinek. \Ian·: '.l+4: 56 \l artimburg. \l'e,t \ 'irginia: '.\+-! : .JI \l arx. Karl: I +2: 1:1 \l a,, tran,it: I +2 : 60. 61, (i'.3, li:3 ~lay , 1lenry F.: I +2: 6 \leade, George(, .. general: '.l + -1: •I I Meigs Field: '. \+ l: 6:i

Michigan t\\'enue: I +2: 60 ~lilchri,t, Thomas E., L.S. District AttornC) f'or the Northern Di,trict of lllinoi,: '.\ + I: I 0, I I \liks, '\el<,on .\ .. general: and Pullman Strike, '.l+ 1: Li-I 7.

19, 21, 23, 26. 27 ,\/i11em/ Cit)' (boat): 3+4: 61. 65 ~lissi"ippi Ri,cr: 3+.J: -19 /'l li ssouri Compromise: I +2: 25, :3-1: 3+ -1. -15 Monroe.James: and American Coloni1.ation Societ), I +2: 23 Mott, Lucretia: I +2: 26 Municipal Pier: :l+4: 55. 56, 60 Murph)', .J. E., capta in: 3+4: 56 Murph)', Katherine: 3+4: 56

N National Colored Con\'ention : I +2: 3 I National l'\egro Comention: I +2: 31 , 35 Native ,\merican,: 3+-1: 16 Na")' Pier: '.l+4: 55: See also: \lunicipal Pie,· Nrw IVorld (Catholic 11t;1\";paper): on workin g clas;, I +2: IO; on Pullman Strike, I +2: 17. 18, 20; o n Eugene Debs.

I +2: 18 North Shore (boat): 3+-1: 56 North Siar (abo li tio ni st newspaper): I +2: 27 Northwest Ordinance: and slavery, I +2: 25 Norlh-ll'esta11 Uber/_\' Almanac: I +2: 30

0 Ogden Slip : 3+4: 61 Oggel , E. C., minister: and Pullman Strike, I +2: I '.l Olivet Baptist Church: and National Colored Comemion, I +2: 3 1 Olney, Richard, U.S. attorney general: an d Pullman Strike, '.\+~: 4, 10, 11, 14 , 23. 28, 30: and Railroad Arbitration act , 3+4: 29 Olson , ,\nhur "Beef, " boat captain: and Fm•ori/1', '.l+·L 56, 59 , 60, 64-65 One-Armed ,\Ian in the ll'ind (sculpture): I +2 : ,12 I I 2th Street: 3+.J: 8-9 "Onward Christian Soldi ers: The Social Go pel and the Pullman Strike." article, by~- latthew C. Lee: I +2: .J-2 1 The Orator (scu lpture): I +2: 41

p Palmer, Potte r: I +2: 67 Palmer I louse: I +2 : 68 Palmer mansion: I +2: 67 Panhandle Yards: in Pullman Strike, 3+ -1: 23 Panorama,: I +2: 64, 63-66 Payne, Daniel ,\ ., minister: on slavery, I +2: 22 People\ Church : and Pullman Strike, I +2: 2 1 Pierce, Franklin , president: 3+-1: -15 Pi/1;rim '.1 Pro1;1-e.11: 3+-1: 35 Pinkerton, t\llan: and underground railroad , I +2: 29 Police: and Pullman Strike. 3+4: 18, 25, 26, 29

69

Portrnit of an American Portrait 0(011 , l111l'l"ica11 (or Cmi11 ,\Jerclw11I) (sculpture): I +2: 5./

Skyscrapers: I +2: 67 Sla\'ery: Lincoln\ descriptions or, '.\+ ·J: l'.l- 1:"i

A Par/mil of l'a11 rle11 Be1grn (sculpture): I +2: 57

Slee/J (scu lpture): I +2: 51

P<MeComitatusAct:'.l+I: 19.28 Poner. Da, id ;\I.: 3+1: '.l3. 53

Social Cospel: ,·iews of. I +2: 5-6. I I; a, Protestant move-

Public tramponation: I +2: 60 , 61 , 6 '.l . 65

Socialism, in Chicago: I +2: 8 ; '.l+ I: 27

Pull111an, Ceo1·ge :\I.: I +2: 5, 6. I I, 17 , 18. 20: '.\+l: -1. 6, 7

South Chicago Cable Car Raih,a): I +2: 60- 61. 6 '.l. 65

Pullman Building: I +2: 66: '. l+ •I: 19

Spa ldin g , .John L., bi,hop: and ,ocial problem,, I +2: 11 : founding ,\ 'p111 ll'orlrl, I +2: I I

Pullman cars: I +2: 70, 71. 72 Pullman, town or: I +2: 6, J 8. 70, 72; 3+-1: -1, 8- 9, 12- JJ Pullman Palace Car Company: I +2: 6, 7, 16. 66 , 70. 72; 3+4: ..J, 6. 7. 20. 29

ment , I +2: 6; in Chicago, I +2: 21

Sia11dard (Bapti,,t newspaper): on working cla,s. I +2: 8, I '.l; on Pullman Strike, I +2: 11 . 17. 18 ·'Stanislav S1ukabki's Lost Tune." photo essa\': I +2: :18-57

Pullman Strike. 189-1-: and religiow, op inion, I +2: -J-2 I : o ri gins oC I +2: 6, 7; 3+-1: l, 6: aftermath. I +2: 15, I 7. 18,

Stanton , l·:Ji1abcth Cady: I +2: 26 Steamboat In spect ion Se,-vice: '.\+ I: 55, 6 I, (iii

20: '.l+-1-: 27: w,e or lcderal troops. '. l+..J: -1-31; cost>.

Streetcars: I +2: 60, (i I. 63 , 63

'.l+-1-: 27

, I .\/11/leri11[; Philoso/Jher (,culpturc): I +2: Jj St\'le,. \\'illiam: and abolitioni,t 1110,ement. I +2: :l2

Q Quinn Chapel: I +2: 22. '.l 3

Sulli,an, Louis: and Stanisla, S1ul-.alsl-.i. I +2: 10

S1111be11111 (boat): SPe Fiwonle Swedish Lutheran Evangelical Church: and Pullman Strike.

I +2: 20

R Railroad Arbitration . \ct.: '.l+ I: 29

The Rail.,JJ/i/ler (pa intin g): 3+-1-: 32

S11·edi, h ~l ethodist Church: and Pullman Strike, I +2: 20 S1ul-.al,l-.i, Stanislav: I +2: 38, :rn-57 Sll 1kal,,ki Nationa l ;\luseum: I +2: 10

Railway tra\'el, 1880s: I +2: 60. 70-7'2 Randolph Street Slip: 3+..J: 61 Rappahannock Ri,·er: 3+-1: 11 Religiow, deno111ination,: and Pullman Strike. 1 +2: 3-21 Remington Lee rilles: 3+..J: 22 Rinke. ll enn·: 3+-1: 55 Rock bland Line: '.l +-1: 21. 25 Roose"e lt , Franklin D.. president: '.l+-1: 35 Rowlandson. Bob: I +2: 68

Rerwn ,\'ovaru111 encyclical: I +2: 11 Ryan. James. bishop: and social problems. I +2: I I

T Tane1. Roger, chiefjustice: 3 + I: Li l emperance mmcmem: I +2: 12 I heaters: .',,,,, Colu111bia 1'11eatn: rhineenth ,\mendment: I +2: 36 Thomas. 11. \\'., chap lain : and Pullman Stril-.e, I +2: 18, 21 I ranS\ h-ania Gni,er,it): '.l+-1: '.l 3 J'nith. S,ijourner: I +2: 22. 28 Tubman, 1larri ct: I +2: 22 J'urn cr. :\at: I +2: 22

s

u

Sabota. Lou: 3+4: 64

L' ndergrnund railroad: I +2: 29. :l:\. :l-1-'.\j

St. Peter. Arthur: 3+4: 56 Sandburg, Carl: and Stani,lm Slllkabki, I +2: -1-0, -13

L nion Stoel-. Yards: I +2: 68. 69. 70: and Pullman Strike, '.l+ I: /7. 18. 21 L' nions: ,) I'/' Pullman Stril-.e

Sa11gat11rk (boat): 3+ -L 65

L"nited State, .\n111: in Pullman Su il-.e, I +2: 11. 18: 3+ -1:

Saloons: I +2: 8

Schoflelcl,John ;\I.. general: and Pullman Strike. 3+-1: H-17, 21, 23. 25. 27, 30

1-31: Di, i,ion or the :\I iwn,ri, I +2 : 66; poliq in ci, ii diqudJances. 3+..J: 2 L '.\I: ,i,-e ol', :\+ I: '.\0-'.l I

Second Creal Awakening: I +2: 23

L:nited State, 111an,hal,: in Pullman Strike,'.\+ I: 26. 27

Seule111ent houses: I +2:

Cnited Srntes Military ,\ cadcmy: '.\+ ·I: 16

,"">

Se111inole \\'ar. Thi,·cl: 3+ -1: 16

l.Jnitcd State, Strike commi"ion: I +2: 18, 2G. 29

Shakespeare. \\'illiam: and ,\brah am Lincoln, 3+-1: 35, -18 Sheridan. Philip Henr). general: '.l+-1: 33

Lnited State, Supreme Court: and Pullman Stril-.e. '.l+ I: 28 l.Jni,er,itrol'Chicago: 1+2:3:3+-l: 16,65

Sher111an .·\mi-Trust Act: and Pull111an Strike. I +2: 1-1: 3+-1: I I, 27

l'.S., t (boat): 3+-1: 6-1

Gpper Alton Lyceum: I +2: 2./

Sherman. John. se n ator: '.l+-1 : 17 Sherman. \\'illiam T., general: '.l+-1: I 7, -1'.l

r

V

Silver S/Ha_y (boat): 3+-1: 57

Vagabond C lub: I +2: -10

Sixty-se\'enth Street : 1 +2: 68 Ska/er (; hip ): 3+4: 6-l

\ 'ese), Denma1·l-.: J +2: 22

70

\ 'icl-.;burg, Mi ssissippi: 3+4: 18, '19

i

Yeslerday'.1 City

w Wago ner. 1-i enr)' 0. : a nd abo liti o ni , t moveme nt , I +2: 22. :32, 35; a nd Lite rar)' a nd Debatin g Soc iet)', I +2 : 34 \\'alker, David : I + 2 : 22 \\'alker. l d win : :{+ 4 : 10. 14 , 28 \\'as hin gto n, George: 3+4: 3 1 \\'a, hin gto n l,; n ivers ity: 3+4 : 16 \\'cim c r. Fred , boa t ca pta in : 3+4: 65 We ise nbo rn , Rudo lph : and Sta ni slav S1 uka lski . I +2: 40 \\'ciss mull e r, .f o hnn ;·: as lifegua rd , 3+ I: 58, 60 \\'e iss mull er. Pe te: as lifegua rd , '.\+ ..J : 60 \\'e ll s Stree t: I +2 : 58-59 \\'e,i Po int: 3+4: 16, 35 \\'es t Sid e Wate r Works: I +2: 66-67 ll'e1/n11 Citi::.e11 (abo liti oni st newspa per): I +2: 29. 3 1, 33. 34 \\'hi g party: I +2 : 35 \\'hi skey Rebe lli o n o r 179·1: 3+ 4: 3 1 ll'i/liam /,ydo11 (tugboa t): 3+·1: 60 \\'ome n\ , uffrage move me n t: I +2 : 26 \\'ood s, \\'illi a m A., G.S. circuit co urtjud ge: :{+.J: 11 ",\ \Vonderfu ll )' Busr Pl ace," Yesterday's Cit)' article, edited b; 11. Roge r Grant: I +2: 55-65 Workin g class: a nd te mpera nce move me nt, I +2: 8: a nd re li gio n, l +2 : 5-2 1 \ l'or1hin gto 11 , N icho las : a nd Pullm a n St rike, I +2 : 18 \\'right , Ca rro ll , commissioner: a nd Pullman Strike, I +2: 18 \\'ri g ht, Fra nk Ll oyd : a nd Sta ni sla,· S1,uka lsk i, I +2 : 40

y \'c,te rd ay·s C ity:",\ \\'on d erfull r Bm) Place," edited by 11. Roge r Gra nt: I +2: 58-72; " Excu rs io n 0 11 th e l..a ke fro m ," b)' Willi am La ffe n )', '.\+4: 5 1-65

71