Vol.2, Issue I, Fall 2013

China Hands F o r F u t u r e L e a d e r s i n US - C h i n a R e l at i o n s

A G2 World?

Inside the Strategic & Economic Dialogue

25 Under 25: Rising China Hands to Watch features, 19

Tuning into CCTV America

Interviews with Cheng Li & Jim Rogers

life & culture, 28

opinion, 42 Vol. 2 Issue I | Fall 2013

What’s Online chinahandsmagazine.com

Life & Culture Cai Guo-Qiang and the Diaspora artist Savannah O'Leary asks what is the role of the modern Chinese diaspora artist in her essay on Cai Guo-Qiang. Cai Guo-Qiang grew up in China during the Cultural Revolution, but has lived and worked abroad since 1986. In 2012, he was awarded the Premium Imperiale, which recognizes lifetime achievement in the arts not covered by the Nobel Prize. Over his career, his reception in China has gone from harsh criticism to a full embrace by the time he helped design the fireworks for the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

Opinion An interview with the New York Times' David Barboza The Shanghai bureau chief of the New York Times reflects on his decision to pursue journalism in China and the reaction to his expose on Wen Jiabao's personal wealth, which earned him a Pulitzer Prize. “There was just something about China that made me say, ‘This is the place I want to live in’,” Barboza tells China Hands. Almost a decade later, Barboza has stayed in China longer than any other Times foreign correspondent.

China Hands Journal Our growing repository of the latest scholarly thinking on China

The simplification of Chinese script Cindy Hwang traces the history of how the evolution of Chinese script in mainland China and Taiwan is deeply tied to their search for political identity. Half a century ago, reforming language was a way of reconceiving nationhood for the victorious Chinese Community Party and the vanquished, reeling Kuomintang. Today, now that the PRC has attained superpower status, the Chinese language has become a tremendous cultural asset that, for China, can be exported across the globe in a dazzling display of soft power, or, for Taiwan, needs to be safeguarded and properly appreciated.

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Volume 2 Issue I | Fall 2013

what’s inside

Table of Contents 4

Words from our Advisor & Editors

Politics & Diplomacy Carl forsberg

6 10

A G2 World?

China’s Afghanistan Conundrum

Economics & Finance Virgina hawkins Ashley feng hannah lindquist

12 15 17

Old Money Growing Cleaner Investing in the States

Features 19

25 Under 25

Life & Culture Kyle Hutzler Xiaoyu Xia Sophia Ng Jennifer lu

28 33

Watch This Space

36

At The Border of Chinatown & Soho

A Maze & A Map

Opinion Jason Parisi

40

China’s Scientific Emergence

anna Russo

41

Review: Lessons From China

David yin

42

A Bull In China: Interview with Jim Rogers

Forrest Lin

43

The Elusive Settlement: Interview with Jeff Smith

Dylan Sun

45

The Third Enlightenment and the Thucydidean Trap: Interview with Cheng Li

The contents of this magazine are copyright of China Hands and may not be reproduced without express written consent. The opinions expressed by contributors to China Hands do not necessarily reflect those of its advisor, staff, or sponsors. China Hands would like to thank Professor Harvey Goldblatt, the Council of East Asian Studies at Yale, and the Yale-China Association for their support of this publication.

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Staff Editors in Chief David Yin, Yale ‘15 Dylan Sun, Yale ‘15 Managing Editor Kyle Hutzler, Yale ‘14

Associate Editors Dhruv Aggarwal, Yale ‘16 Sandy Jin, Yale ‘16 Forrest Lin, Yale ‘16 Teddy Miller, Yale ‘16 Jason Parisi, Yale ‘16

Editors at Large Daniel Sisgoreo, Yale ‘14 Helen Gao, Yale ‘11 Outreach Director Christian Rhally, Yale ‘15

Artistic Director Michelle Korte, Yale ‘15 Associate Artistic Director Jennifer Lu, Yale ‘16

Dear China Hands and future China hands,

Words from our advisor 4

Volume 2 Issue I | Fall 2013

In this issue, the staff of China Hands— comprised of current students at Yale University—has accomplished again a tremendous compilation of pertinent and thoughtful pieces on the current state of USChina relations.

The palpable focus and thoughtful tenor of the China Hands staff, led by editors David Yin, Dylan Sun and Kyle Hutzler, reminds me of the early days of the YaleChina Association (then called the Foreign Missionary Society at Yale and founded in 1901). David, Dylan and Kyle, and YaleChina’s founders Brownell Gage, Warren Seabury, Lawrence Thurston, and Arthur Williams—just 22 years old at the time— exhibit similar characteristics: a pioneering attitude to make a change, an anxious cognizance that the US-China relationship is critical and complex, and an envious hope for greater understanding between American and Chinese people.

There is no more important group than the young people of the US and China to make a significant contribution to improved relations, mutual growth, and sustained peace.

Since 2010, I have represented the YaleChina Association on a federal advisory committee called the 100,000 Strong Initiative based at the US Department of State. This committee, led by former assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Kurt Campbell, was dedicated to expanding and diversifying the number of Americans studying Mandarin and studying abroad in China. Currently, there are twelve times more Chinese students studying in the US than American students studying in China. Earlier this year, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton LAW ‘73 shared at the launch of the 100,000 Strong Foundation, “Relationships between nations are rooted in the relationships between their people. And here, we are counting on the American and Chinese people to contribute to the enduring nature of this consequential relationship.”

For 113 years, the Yale-China Association

Illustrators Wa Liu, Yale ‘17 Karen Tian, Yale ‘15 Sherril Wang, Yale ‘17 Christina Zhang, Yale ‘17

has envisioned a US-China relationship of mutual understanding and profound respect nurtured by collaboration among individuals and institutions. Since its inception, it has established over 50 programs and institutions in China and the US, including the renowned Xiangya School of Medicine, Xiangya Hospital, Yali Middle School, and Huazhong College.

The late Ambassador James Lilley ‘51 once remarked that it reassured him to know that when diplomatic relations were fraught, there were organizations like Yale-China out there building relationships on the ground, person-to-person. It is the late Ambassador’s sentiment that has carried Yale-China in and out of China and the US through its work in education, health, and the arts.

I am pleased to share that the YaleChina Association has been selected as a Signature Partner for the 100,000 Strong Foundation in 2013-2014 collaborating with other institutions to invest in US-China relations, one student at a time. After over a century of appointing Yale graduates to teach in China, the Yale-China Association is bringing teachers from China to the US. This new initiative places talented alumni of universities in China at public schools in the US. Over the past decade, China has become the second-largest economy in the world and the United States’ fastest-growing trade partner, as well as a regional strategic power with global reach. Put simply, there is no more consequential relationship than that between the United States and China.

I applaud the great effort by the staff of China Hands. You are an inspiration to the Yale-China Association. I encourage readers to discuss the articles on these pages considering how they might contribute to improved relations person-to-person.

Jia you!

With warm regards,

Nancy Yao Maasbach Advisor, China Hands Executive Director, Yale-China Association

staff Business Director Yafeng Gao, Yale ‘16

Events Director Lucy Wang, Yale ‘15

Business Manager Kenan Jia, Yale ‘16

Website Director Alex Fu, Stanford ‘17

Dear readers, The past few months have been an exciting time for the China Hands team.

Ever since we released our inaugural issue in March 2013, we have received praise from college students, professors, as well as leaders in government and business in the US and China. However, we are fully aware of the tasks that lie ahead as we continue to build an international multimedia platform that facilitates conversations and establishes trust between the future leaders of both countries.

With these goals in mind, we have endeavored to expand our media platform and increase our outreach efforts. In addition to our print magazine, China Hands has been building its online presence. As a fledgling media platform, our Facebook page has attracted over 3,000 fans in just seven months. To supplement our magazine with a stream of high-quality content, we launched our website in August.

We are also pleased to announce that Prof.

Deborah Davis, Prof. Jessica Chen Weiss, and Ms. Nancy Yao Maasbach have joined our Board of Advisors.

Our team is also establishing collaboration with organizations in other colleges focusing on China and USChina relations. Our writers and online contributors now include students from Harvard, Duke, Stanford, Peking, and other top universities around the world.

We hope to transform these partnerships into an all-round platform for young China hands in the months ahead.

We founded China Hands in the belief that some of the most important insights on China were being formed by our own generation - the future leaders of US-China relations - and that their work deserved a platform as they begin their careers reshaping our two countries' futures. Through our original reportage, we aspire for China Hands to be a generalist magazine that both specialists and even those most removed from China's rise can learn from and enjoy.

We're excited to turn the spotlight on some of our peers who are doing

User Experience Director Jessica Yang, Yale ‘16

Board of Advisors Stephen Roach Deborah Davis Jessica Chen Weiss Nancy Yao Maasbach

incredible work on US-China relations in our inaugural 25 Under 25 feature. The diverse experiences of this exceptional group of people should give us all great optimism for a future of stronger bilateral cooperation and understanding.

In our politics section and cover story, our team reports from the summer's Strategic & Economic Dialogue, concluding that despite the limited accomplishments of this year’s summit, the dialogue is playing a significant role in constructively reshaping US-China relations. For our economics section, Virginia Hawkins, one of our 25 Under 25 honorees, writes on the emergence of the senior housing industry in China.

An international subject demands international journalism. Our multinational team at Yale is complemented in this issue by the reporting of students at Fudan University. Sophia Ng and Xiaoyu Xia take this even further by relying on Argentine author Borges to frame our understanding of the rich complexity of contemporary Chinese fiction.

Lastly, we take seriously as part of our mandate the need to occasionally and compellingly cover the Chinese-American community, as we do in this issue's profile of the Museum of Chinese in America.

We're grateful for the support of everyone who has helped bring this issue to fruition and are especially grateful to you, our readers.

Want to contribute to the China Hands team? Want to place an ad in China Hands? Contact us at chinahandsmagazine@ gmail.com

Words from the editors

Yours truly,

David Yin Dylan Sun Kyle Hutzler Editors of China Hands

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In this Section

Strategic & Economic Dialogue p. 6

China’s Afghanistan Conundrum p. 10

Politics & Diplomacy A G2 World?

China Hands reports on the Fifth Strategic & Economic Dialogue

photography by state department wikimedia commons

T

he world’s most important annual bilateral meeting began somberly and ended in disappointment.

At the opening session of the fifth annual two-day US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in July, American officials expressed their condolences to their Chinese counterparts on the death of two Chinese students in a recent plane crash in San Francisco.

Tragedy had also struck close to home for the Americans. Secretary of State John Kerry ‘66’s voice cracked as he expressed his thanks for the well-wishes his family had received following his wife’s hospitalization. He would leave the conference soon thereafter to return to watch her recovery.

Despite this, there was an undeniable sense of anticipation in the State Department’s Dean Acheson Auditorium. Just a few weeks prior, the presidents of both countries had met in a friendly summit in California.

All four co-chairs of the Dialogue - Secretary

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Volume 2 Issue I | Fall 2013

Kerry, Secretary of the Treasury Jacob Lew, Vice-Premier Wang Yang and State Councilor Yang Jiechi - were newly appointed, leading to speculation about how their personal styles would build on the work of their predecessors.

As the highest-level discussion between Cabinet-level officials from both countries, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue is instrumental to bilateral and even international issues, ranging from cyber security to foreign direct investment. Like the presidential summit a few weeks before it, the conference ended largely in disappointment from the American vantage point, with plenty of friendly rhetoric and commitments to further cooperation but little in the way of substantive progress.

As the first student journalists to receive press credentials to cover the Dialogue, China Hands has drawn on interviews with former government officials, academics, and Chinese open source material to produce an assessment of this year’s Dialogue and its impor-

tance in the context of US-China relations. Is the Dialogue worthy of its moniker as a G2?

E

ver since President Richard Nixon’s landmark visit to China in 1972 and the full normalization of relations between the two countries in 1979, the US and China have been engaged in a slow deepening of their engagement. The path to deeper engagement has largely weathered occasional, but largely temporary setbacks such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests or the accidental US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999.

Both governments see the relationship as central to their strategic calculus. To discourage China from undermining the international system and destabilizing the geopolitical order, the US aims to integrate China into prevailing international institutions and become a responsible stakeholder in addressing global issues.

politics & diplomacy China, on the other hand, remains suspicious about the US’ willingness to accept its rise. It seeks a stable security environment for its “peaceful development” and a positive-sum relationship with the US while limiting the latter’s interference in its internal affairs. In the Chinese government, US-specific policies are devised by the Foreign Affairs and National Security Leading Small Groups, which are both headed by the President of China.

Given the importance of the US to Chinese foreign policy and that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is far less powerful than its nominal US counterpart, the Department of State, China handles the relationship through a state councilor.

Beginning in President George W. Bush ‘68’s administration, the US began an active effort to influence China’s foreign policies and urged China to take on greater global responsibilities. The presidents of both countries also increased communication over key security issues such as Iran and North Korea’s nuclear programs. In 2005, the Senior Dialogue was launched to allow the US and China to discuss ways to enhance cooperation and avoid conflicts on strategic issues of mutual concern.

A year later, President Bush and President Hu Jintao established the Strategic Economic Dialogue, bringing together top leaders from both countries to discuss economic relations.

In 2009, President Barack Obama and President Hu combined and upgraded these two discussion mechanisms to create the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Held annually and alternating between the two countries’ capitals, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue has become the highest-level and highest-profile dialogue between the world’s two largest economies. Its strategic track is co-chaired by the US Secretary of State and China’s State Councilor for foreign affairs, and the economic track by the US Secretary of the Treasury and China’s Vice-Premier for foreign trade.

The Dialogue also serves as an umbrella for various sub-dialogues between the agencies and ministries of both governments.

According to John Delury ‘97 GRD ‘07, a professor of Chinese studies at South Korea’s Yonsei University, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue “passed a big hurdle towards becoming an institutionalized element in US-China relations by surviving the George W. BushBarack Obama transition … and now that the Dialogue so far is continuing into the Xi Jinping era, Beijing is making the same choice.”

“One likes to think that, in part because of the Dialogue, the breakdown in political dialogue such as occurred recently between President Obama and Putin is less likely [with

China]. To be sure, it is no guarantee against such breakdown, but probably does decrease the odds.”

F

or two days in June 2013, the private estate of Sunnylands in California was the center of US-China relations. The meeting was the first between President Obama and President Xi since the latter had officially taken office. Both the Sunnylands conference and the Dialogue that followed came at a time when Chinese-American public perceptions are at a low. A Pew Research Center poll released at the time showed that 52% of Americans have an unfavorable view of China, while only 37% express a favorable view.

American officials had a great deal of optimism going into the meeting, but acknowledged their disappointment afterwards that little beyond friendly rhetoric had been accomplished. The economy was a major theme of the leaders’ conversations, consistent with expectations that President Xi and Prime Minister Li Keqiang will soon introduce significant reforms to sustain China’s economic growth.

In Washington at the Dialogue weeks later, one could be forgiven for getting the impression from the State Department’s summary of the diplomatic track of the Dialogue that it was little more than a two-day scheduling meeting. Indeed, some two dozen of the 91-point summary announcing the agreement to schedule further meetings on everything from agricultural cooperation to counter-terrorism. And yet, this should not be completely belittled. The emergence of semi-permanent working groups was cited by scholars Kenneth Lieberthal and Eswar Prasad in a pre-Dialogue commentary arranged by Brookings as an important signal of institutional deepening of the bilateral relationship.

Daniel Zelikow, formerly the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Asia, and currently the head of JP Morgan’s Public Sector group, says the strengthening of institutional and personal relationships means that “if issues arise, there is always a point of contact with one’s counterpart.” He adds that he still maintains a relationship with his former counterpart, a former official in the Chinese finance ministry.

One day before the main dialogue began, the US and China held the third round of the Strategic Security Dialogue, which brought defense officials from both countries together. In the wake of Edward Snowden’s leaking of classified US cyber-intelligence programs and mounting reports of Chinese economic espionage, cyber security led the discussions.

The security dialogue featured the first meeting of the Cyber Working Group, a new civilian-military working group tasked with reaching consensus on norms of state behavior in cyberspace. The establishment of the working group was an important step forward because until then the two sides were reluctant to discuss cyber theft, cyber espionage, and cyber security. The US made clear that it did not recognize China’s claim that economic espionage and intelligence gathering were indistinguishable from the other.

On the larger topic of bilateral defense issues, the United States and China expanded their discussion to missile defense and nuclear policy, and they agreed to explore a notification mechanism for major military activities as well as to continue to discuss rules of behavior for air and maritime activities.

At State, “in-depth” discussions on North Korea, Syria, Afghanistan, and Iran yielded little in the way of new momentum. Human rights were also mentioned, officials assured, as they are whenever the two nations meet.

Perhaps the most tangible agreement was the decision to extend the bilateral hotline set up for the two nations’ presidents in 1998 to two special representatives from each of the two countries.

One noticeable sign of promise came from the Climate Change Working Group, which was launched a few months earlier and presented a report to a joint session at the Dialogue. Both the United States and China agreed to accelerate action on climate change through five initiatives on heavy-duty and other vehicles, carbon capture, utilization, and storage, greenhouse gas data collection and management, smart grids, and energy efficiency and industry. Moreover, the two countries declared that they would work together to implement Presidents Obama and Xi’s agreement to phase down greenhouse gases and share best practices on air quality planning, pollution reduction, environmental law and adjudication, and the study of greenhouse gases.

O

ver at Treasury on the first day of the conference, the press began assembling in the Cash Room, the golden Italian palazzo-style gem which was historically the heart of the government’s financial transactions and now houses a large conference table. As aides and security paced in and out, a female assistant from the Chinese delegation entered and began counting the chairs on the Chinese side against her notes, gesturing insistently to her American counterpart.

For the Chinese, protocol still comes first.

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politics & Diplomacy As the American and Chinese delegations walked into the Cash Room, Jacob Lew and Wang Yang took their places at the head of the long table that hung below the room’s massive chandelier. As they sat, some members of the Chinese delegation noticeably did not put on earpieces for real-time translation. No Americans appeared to leave their earpieces on the table. Both nations’ ambassadors sat at the far and opposite ends of the table.

On the second day of the Dialogue, Secretary Lew and Deputy Secretary of State William Burns, filling in for John Kerry who had left to be with his wife, chaired a roundtable of five American and six Chinese CEOs at the White House. It is not uncommon in most major international diplomatic trips for businessmen to accompany national leaders.

Intellectual property rights, regulation, market access, and energy and climate issues were the primary focus of conversation.

Later that afternoon, Treasury announced that China had agreed to pursue a bilateral investment treaty that, if realized, would mark a major opening of China’s market to US firms. It would also be the first such deal China has ever done with another country. Secretary Lew called the agreement a “significant breakthrough,” a sentiment that was echoed with cautious optimism by much of the American business community.

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O

n the sidelines of major diplomatic meetings, Western officials are constantly engaged in conversation with the press. More and more at their own major political events and some international summits as well, Chinese officials are increasingly willing to at least give the semblance of engagement. This year, Chinese Minister of Commerce Gao Hucheng spoke to the press, saying that both sides would move as quickly as possible to realize the bilateral investment treaty. China Daily’s assessment of the Dialogue was typically bland, stating that “both sides spoke highly of the importance of the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, and agreed to further improve this channel.”

Many Chinese scholars and commentators echoed the American optimism surrounding the agreement to pursue a bilateral investment treaty. According to Yuan Tangjun, director of the Center of Asia Studies, Global Investment and Trade at Fudan University, the treaty might force the Chinese government to open industries monopolized by state-owned enterprises. In an interview reported by China Daily, Yuan said, “when those industries are open to American companies, they necessarily will be open to private Chinese companies as well. This way, SOEs, multinational corporations, and domestic, privately owned companies will compete in an open and fair

market economy. SOEs will necessarily lose their policy arbitrage that they have now.”

One continued deficiency of the Dialogue from the perspective of Chinese commentators is the comparatively little progress that has been made on improving military ties. In an interview with the local newspaper Xin Min Evening News, Dr. Shen Li Ding, deputy dean of Fudan University’s Institute of International Studies, commented that “military-to-military exchanges have been the weakest part of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. On the issue of territorial disputes in East and South China Sea, the US favoring the behavior of Japan and Philippines does not help in fostering political trust between US and China. On the Taiwan issue, America’s continued intervention in our internal affairs, and possibly a new round of arms sale to Taiwan within the next two years, would be a blow to the US-China military relations.”

In a background call with American reporters after the first day of the conference, US government officials said the talks had been productive. For US officials, the most unexpected development of the Dialogue was Wang Yang, who in both of his public remarks made jokes that appeared to catch the Americans and even his fellow Chinese off-guard.

Seated next to Secretary Lew in the

politics & diplomacy Treasury Department’s Cash Room, Wang noted that the real-time translation used a phrase in reference to US-China relations that was typically only used to describe marriages.

Noting the US Supreme Court’s recent permissive rulings on gay marriage, Wang quipped in Chinese that while he understood gay marriage was permitted in the United States, that was not exactly what he had in mind with Secretary Lew. Nonetheless, the partnership was in many respects like a marriage, he said, and warned that the US and China “could not have a divorce in the way that Rupert and Wendi Murdoch did.”

The last line elicited a good chuckle from the press and some raised eyebrows from the American side; the Chinese delegation gave little in the way of reaction.

American officials said that Wang carried the same spirit of openness and candor into the closed door sessions, a stark contrast to China’s legendarily straight-faced diplomats.

If Wang represents a new, more personal style of Chinese diplomacy, it would be a significant shift that could potentially bring the two countries’ diplomats closer together.

The stock of this year’s Dialogue may indeed rise with time if the launch of the cyber and climate change working groups and agreement to pursue a bilateral investment treaty all yield substantive results. John Negroponte ‘60, former Deputy Secretary

of State under the Bush Administration, states that despite the limited results, the fact that the Dialogue is now highly regarded by Chinese officials is tangible progress in its own right.

Orville Schell, director of the Center on US-China relations at the Asia Society in New York, agrees that the Dialogue “has been one of the most important aspects of the US-China diplomacy that came out of the Bush administration.” Nonetheless, he argues that US-China relations remain very uncertain and argued that the best step forward would be for both countries to establish a designated go-to person. The last person of Kissingerian stature in China was former Secretary of the Treasury Hank Paulson. Whether the agreement between the two nations’ to extend the presidential hotline to a special representative is a step in this direction that remains to be seen.

hina is a prodigious coiner of phrases that speak to its complicated and still developing foreign policy ambitions.

Prior to the summer Sunnylands summit between Presidents Obama and Xi, China introduced the concept of a “new model of major-country relations” into the lexicon of US-China relations, joining its “peaceful rise” and intent “cross the river” towards greater cooperation with the US by “touching the

C

stones.”

One phrase both Chinese and American government officials have studiously avoided is presenting the Dialogue as a G2 meeting in which the two countries debate the fate of the rest of the world. In an interview on Phoenix TV, Zhu Wen Hui, a Chinese commentator, suggested that “China and the US are a C2 instead of a G2.” The distinction is that the “C” emphasizes communication and collaboration instead of two great powers operating beyond the reach of other nations.

As we waited with the press in the State Department’s auditorium for the opening speeches of the Dialogue, there was a telling imbalance in press representation, particularly the Japanese press. As one American contributor for NHK, the Japanese state broadcaster, told us, the Japanese can’t help but feel that significant elements of their national future are being decided without them, making a robust press presence the closest they can come to having a seat at the table.

In its summary, the New York Times reported that US government officials were privately disappointed by the inconclusiveness of the talks. “It was a measure of how little was agreed upon,” the paper wrote of the Dialogue’s closing dinner, that “the Chinese spent much of their time praising their cooperation on a single project: building a

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politics & Diplomacy Chinese garden at the national arboretum.”

While the slow gears of diplomacy were turning, the pace on neither side could be described as particularly inspired.

In significant part, the smiles without substance that have characterized the Sunnylands and most recent Strategic and Economic Dialogue may reflect a holding pattern as newly installed Chinese policymakers decide their next steps. Schell, however, believes that the principal challenge for deeper

US-China relations lies in whether the United States can sincerely recognize China’s role as a partner.

“Whether we like China’s political system or not, [the United States will] have to deal with it because there are global problems that it cannot solve without China.” Schell says that the United States will still need to be clear about its own values and will need to have “a successful system, a successful society, and a successful democratic govern-

ment” to transmit these values to China. “I can’t say that we do this very well at this point.”

This essay was reported by David Yin and Kyle Hutzler at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue in July; Christian Rhally, Dylan Sun, and Forrest Lin contributed reporting from Yale; and Angeline Lim provided additional research support from Fudan University in Shanghai.

China’s Afghanistan Conundrum Carl Forsberg analyzes China’s role in a post-American Afghanistan

photography by ssgt bradley lail US Air Force

A

s the United States withdraws from Afghanistan, the Chinese government has increasingly realized that they may soon have a failing state on their far western border, leaving Afghan officials and Western experts alike to speculate that China could replace the United States as Afghanistan’s major patron after 2014.

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China has strong interests in ensuring that the US drawdown does not precipitate a reinvigorated Taliban insurgency or a return to civil war. Before 2001, Afghanistan hosted hundreds of radical Islamist militants from the Chinese Uighur minority, many belonging to the East Turkestan movement, who used safe-haven in Afghanistan to orga-

nize attacks on Chinese soil. These groups could reclaim safe-haven in Afghanistan if the country’s government remains weak.

Chinese interests also include access to Afghanistan’s mineral resources, which are estimated to be worth nearly one trillion dollars.

Chinese firms have won major mining and drilling tenders from the Afghan govern-

politics & diplomacy ment, but persistent security fears have prevented resources from flowing into China.

While its interest in Afghanistan’s stability is perhaps even more urgent than America’s, China has devoted far fewer resources toward its strategic end, being content to watch the US do the heavy lifting. It has offered little development aid in comparison to the US, hoping that investments in mining and a growing export trade to Afghanistan will forge stronger ties while making substantial economic profits. Chinese aid to Afghanistan from 2002-2010 amounted to about $205 million, whereas total US assistance during the same period, including funding for the Afghan security forces, was about $51 billion. China has also consistently refused to cooperate with the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, and it is highly unlikely that wary Chinese leaders would deploy troops to Afghanistan in the next half-decade.

Cautious about direct involvement in Afghanistan, Chinese leaders have largely limited themselves to diplomacy. Most notably, China has attempted to use the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to encourage Afghanistan’s neighbors to develop a common policy in support of Afghanistan’s long-term stability. But while the SCO offers China a theoretical platform for developing a regional approach to stabilizing Afghanistan, it has yet to bear fruit, as Afghanistan’s neighbors continue to prioritize independent bilateral relations with the Afghan government.

Some Western foreign policy experts have praised China’s strategies as more prudent, unobtrusive, and calculated than those of the US. China’s current approach, built on diplomacy and trade, may indeed cost less than the twelve-year US commitment to Afghanistan. But it is likely to be no more effective in countering the exact challenges that have hindered US and NATO efforts in the country: the unreliability of Pakistan as an ally and client, and the dysfunctional state of the Afghan government.

Chinese leaders see their sixty-year alliance with Pakistan as their other diplomatic lever in Afghanistan. China hopes that the Pakistani government will use its outsized influence in Afghanistan – which includes its direct support to the Taliban insurgency – to protect Chinese interests. China has reportedly used its Pakistani allies for direct contacts with the Taliban, whom Chinese leaders hope can be persuaded to sever ties with terrorist groups like East Turkestan.

But China’s reliance on Pakistan has its

China is likely to be no more effective in countering the exact challenges that have hindered US and NATO efforts in Afghanistan: the unreliability of Pakistan as an ally and client, and the dysfunctional state of the Afghan government. limits and costs. Pakistan might promise China help in navigating a chaotic post-2014 Afghanistan, but Chinese leaders have already expressed frustration with the Pakistan military’s failure to take action against East Turkestan terrorists on Pakistani soil. In the long run, Pakistan is unlikely to be willing or able to dictate just which terrorist organizations find safe-haven in Afghanistan, and it is unclear what leverage, if any, China can use to influence its Pakistani allies. China’s reliance on Pakistan in fact bears a striking resemblance to America’s relationship with Pakistan since 2001 – a relationship defined by the Pakistani government’s double game of providing limited assistance in targeting groups like al-Qaeda while actively aiding the very groups that were attacking US troops across the border in Afghanistan.

Pakistan, for its part, has relied on great-power rivalries to keep China and the US from working in tandem to pressure their mutual client into abandoning its historic strategy of using terrorist and radical groups as a foreign policy proxy. China and the US would both be served by opening bilateral discussions on Pakistan. Both nations have a deep interest in seeing Pakistan distance itself from radical jihadi groups. Coordinated pressure on Islamabad from Beijing and Washington, perhaps in the very public forum of the United Nations Security Council, would make Pakistan’s continued support for radical militants a far more costly policy.

Due to the limits of its alliance with Pakistan, China, like the US, requires a friendly non-Islamist government in Kabul to achieve an acceptable level of security. As favorably disposed as Karzai or his successors are toward China, the government in Kabul is on track to remain weak, fragile, and unable or unwilling to eradicate terrorist safe-havens, the narcotics trade, or transnational organized crime from Afghan territory. Given China’s lack of state-building know-how, Chinese leadership would be well served by lending aid to capacity building and governance programs initiated by US, its Europe-

an partners, or the United Nations.

China and the US could do more to prioritize cooperation on Afghanistan through the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Critical issues for joint coordination include supporting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as well as counter-narcotics and counter-transnational organized crime. China’s current offer to train 300 Afghan police could ultimately cause even more confusion, complicating logistics, procurement, and doctrine for Afghan forces that have labored under at times poorly coordinated Western efforts. China’s efforts to support to the Afghan military and police could have a greater payoff if coordinated with well-developed US and NATO training programs that will persist in more modest forms after 2014. Both nations might also consider reinvigorating the United Nations as a critical coordinating mechanism, including for security force assistance.

Afghanistan may well be a harbinger of the problems that China will face in securing its basic interests in weak, failing, or conflict-prone states – interests that include oil and mineral extraction. With some predicting that China will soon supplant the US as the world’s leading consumer of Middle Eastern oil, China unquestionably has a stake in the future of a number of failing or war-torn societies. But with the US retreating from state-building and stabilization operations, and China lacking the tradition and tools to shore-up conflict-prone countries, China might well find that its refusal to support US efforts to stabilize countries like Afghanistan will leave it with only bad choices for muddling through in chaotic regions where it has significant interests.

Carl Forsberg is a first year PhD student in the Department of History at the University of Texas in Austin. He advised ISAF’s counter-corruption task-force in Kabul, Afghanistan from 2011-2012. Contact him at carl.w.forsberg@gmail.com.

chinahandsmagazine.com | China Hands

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In this Section

Senior Housing p. 12

Shenzhen Carbon Trading Markets p. 15

Investing in the States p. 17

Economics & Finance

Old Money Virginia Hawkins explores the rise of the nursing home industry in China

C

hina’s aging population is among the most urgent problems plaguing policymakers in Beijing. For property developers, however, it is an enormous opportunity for those who see potential in bringing nursing homes to China.

Nursing homes are not yet commonplace in China, since they are seen as incongruent with Confucian culture, which carries a strong familial obligation to take care of one’s parents in their old age.

Today, there are over 190 million people over the age of 60 in China, a figure that will swiftly increase as a consequence of the 1979 One-Child Policy. In 2010, China had about eight workers for every retiree; by 2050, there will be only two, making it ever harder for children to care for their elders.

Private companies are rushing into the senior housing market, with many Western firms among them. The story of senior living in China today is largely a story of real estate and culture. Today, there are hundreds of senior living facilities under construction in China, with thousands more in the planning. Equipped with the right permits and building expertise, Chinese property developers are becoming “senior property developers” overnight.

They shift to senior housing to enjoy tax breaks and other government benefits, but only alter their existing plans slightly. When these developers are done, their product is a normal residential development, except with perhaps wider hallways and larger doorways. Few Chinese companies have intimate knowledge of how to operate a nursing home.

People in China often have strong negative stigmas about nursing homes, describing them as the “last resort” and “shameful.” For many Chinese, putting family members into a senior living facility

12

Volume 2 Issue I | Fall 2013

photo by Romain Guy wikimedia commons

2000

Economics & Finance

Graph Nursing Homes in Taiwan

1500 1000 500 0

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

source: Taiwan Census is equivalent to abandonment. Senior living facilities in China today often corroborate that stigma. The prevailing stereotype of a senior living facility is a dingy, overcrowded home with subpar amenities and separated from the familial society. Indeed, wellmanaged nursing homes are hard to find in China.

Cultural adoption and staffing shortages are only two of the significant challenges as companies enter the market. The cultural stigma associated with nursing homes cannot be underestimated in planning a senior living facility. In many ways, Chinese seniors are no different from their peers in other countries in their reluctance to embrace nursing homes. They treasure their independence, want to spend time with their family, and fear the loss of their faculties.

Staffing is also an enormous obstacle in a country where nursing is viewed as a lower-class job. In 2010, with only 1.65 million nurses, China had less than 25% of the nurses necessary to meet demand across the country. China’s nurses earn less than the average annual wage, and are overworked within China’s overcrowded system. Turnover is a significant issue throughout the healthcare industry, as competitors offering a marginal payrise can draw nurses elsewhere. Nursing schools are not full four-year programs in China

and companies incur major costs training nurses who leave quickly thereafter. This acutely affects the senior care industry, where consistent relationships are especially important to clients and their families.

Additionally, foreign companies cannot import foreign nurses, since only Chinese nationals are allowed to practice nursing in China.

Chinese consumers are largely unaware that high-end nursing homes exist, so marketing and attracting initial clients to a senior care facility is extremely difficult.

The cultural stigma makes mass marketing very difficult, so companies rely on wordof-mouth to bring in new customers.

Existing high-end homes experience difficulty meeting occupancy. Some managers described customers’ confusion about whether or not these care facilities constituted family care; some prospective clients inquired about bringing severely disabled adult children into the assisted living section of a senior care facility, not understanding that the home was specifically designed for elder care. In more than one case, facilities admitted the adult child and amended their services to suit the clients’ needs. On site visits, a few residents had even brought healthy adult children to live with them in the facility. These inquiries suggest the average Chinese consumer does not quite understand senior living.

It also illustrates the prevalent notion of familial ties, since customers have trouble differentiating between a senior care facility and all-encompassing care facility.

Developers are still deciphering how the Chinese market would prefer to pay for a high-end senior care facility. In interviews, company executives discussed all kinds of payment plans: month-to-month rent, upfront fees with following fees for certain services, bundled packages, repaying deposits after a certain number of years, and more. The initial fees are near essential to a home paying their fixed costs, but can deter potential clients who are not willing to commit so much upfront. Managers and clients alike cited the difficulty in building a payment plan that is both attractive to the Chinese consumer and financially feasible.

Access to real estate poses another problem for investors and developers, Chinese or foreign. Without government consent and financial support, it is extremely difficult to acquire land through China’s government-run land auction process. In the real estate market, senior living companies cannot hope to bid against residential and commercial property developers in land auctions; they can simply afford to pay more. The return on investment for senior living is so uncertain that senior living developers cannot promise as high a return as residential or commercial developers, chinahandsmagazine.com | China Hands

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Economics & Finance

and certainly not in as short a time frame.

Senior living developers must either utilize government help to win the land auction at a discounted price or work with a residential or commercial developer to develop part of their property for a senior living project.

In Shanghai, Cherish-Yearn (Qinheyuan, 亲和源), stands out as a high-end senior care facility. The home prides itself on offering a true community experience, with dozens of activities available to its residents, whose ages range from the recently retired to much older. Cherish-Yearn offers residents the option of leaving Shanghai during the winter for their facility in Hainan, China’s tropical island province.

For whatever else residents may want, each building has a resident representative who sits on a committee to discuss issues with management.

Cherish-Yearn’s residents are largely more independent from their families than the norm, which is likely among the reasons they chose to move there. Cherish-Yearn offers the three levels of care often offered

by Western facilities: independent living, assisted living, and skilled nursing. Most of its residents come via word-of-mouth marketing. They are mostly Shanghainese, or Chinese who return from living abroad to retire in their homeland. Surprisingly, the management cited few clients whose children were involved in the decision to move there, and the vast majority of residents pay for the fees without their relatives’ help. Just over 500 residents have moved in since Cherish-Yearn’s opening in 2007, far fewer than the 800-person occupancy.

Establishing Cherish-Yearn required significant government support and capital investment. The government heavily subsidized Cherish-Yearn’s property in

Pudong, which lies about fifteen miles west of Shanghai’s Pudong International Airport.

It cost nearly $100 million to construct Cherish-Yearn’s fifteen buildings. Residents pay for a card to move in, and yearly fees after that. They can choose between an “A card” or “B card,” the former granting ownership of their apartment and the latter giving a fifteen-year lease. Cherish-Yearn then charges for basic services each year, offering other services on an add-on basis.

For Card A, the price was RMB 500,000 when they opened, and has since risen to RMB 980,000.

American firms are eager to profit from this emerging industry. In April 2012, US Ambassador to China Gary Locke ‘72 led a trade mission seeking to draw attention to the potential for senior housing for American companies. The Chinese government has affirmed the importance of allowing foreign companies to bring their experience to the domestic marketplace, recently revising laws that allow wholly foreign-owned companies to operate in the healthcare sector. Pressure is simultaneously intensifying on local governments to take care of seniors in their principalities, giving them an incentive to help foreign-owned and Chinese companies alike to establish senior living facilities.

Most American operators who have signaled interest in the market are partnering with Chinese property developers through joint-venture agreements. Such agreements are popular because they make it easier to break down language, culture, and potential regulatory barriers. Many companies are working to establish senior care facilities, often starting in Shanghai. Daniel Baty’s Cascade Healthcare gained the first permit to operate a senior care facility in China, and its Shanghai facility opened in October 2012. Cascade invested $5 million

Wu, White, Cash, and Foster describe the transition to a nursing home as a “process of forced choice,” where elderly people only move once they have become too significant a burden to their families. Such a tipping point may quickly be approaching in China.

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Volume 2 Issue I | Fall 2013

to renovate a hotel into a 100-bed facility, where residents pay between RMB 12,000 and RMB 18,900 each month. Fortress Investment Group has also partnered with Fosun Capital Group, opening a facility called Starcastle in Shanghai in early 2013. Merrill Gardens, in conjunction with Related Real Estate, has partnered with a Shanghai property developer and plans to open a facility in January 2014.

Others are working to establish senior care services. Right-At Home is an American company that provides various levels of in-home care, from simple housework to “skilled nursing.” The Nebraska-based company opened operations in Beijing in 2011 after Chinese businesswoman Yao Li established its Chinese franchise. She left her position as CEO of Beijing Yinda Property Management, a commercial and residential property developer, to head up Right-At Home’s China operations. The well-known United Family Hospital chain added home visits for elderly patients to their product offerings earlier this year.

Taiwan, four times richer than mainland China and well into its demographic transition, serves as a helpful point of reference in thinking about how China’s attitude toward senior living will change. At the turn of the millennium, Taiwan saw an enormous investment in establishing senior care facilities, both private and public.

Su-hsien Chang and Miao-chun Fang write that the number of Taiwanese aged 65 and above living with their children and grandchildren dropped from 58.1% in 2000 to 30.9% in 2004. Wu, White, Cash, and Foster describe the transition to a nursing home as a “process of forced choice,” where elderly people only move once they have become too significant a burden to their families. Such a tipping point may quickly be approaching in China. Until then, the emergent Chinese nursing home industry has to figure out how to answer the likes of one anonymous 73-year-old Shanghainese interviewed for this article. “I ate one potato every three days for years as a child. Why,” even with an income that would place him in China’s 95th percentile, “would I spend 1,000 yuan to have someone take care of me?”

Virginia Hawkins is a 2013 graduate of the University of Virginia and is currently spending a year studying Chinese at Tsinghua University. Contact her at virginiabhawkins@gmail.com.

Economics & Finance

Growing Cleaner Ashley Feng reports on the launch of the Shenzhen carbon emissions exchange

Graph Energy Intensity of GDP Russia China US

India Japan Brazil

source: Energy Information Administration

T

his past June, in the southern city of Shenzhen, China took a significant step forward in the effort to combat climate change by launching its first mandatory emissions exchange.

Instead of setting a strict cap for emissions, the exchange requires that companies reduce their energy intensity, or the amount of energy needed to produce $1 of GDP, by 32% between 2010 and 2015. Six other cities and provinces are scheduled to unveil their own emissions trading programs within the year.

The announcement of Shenzhen’s emissions trading program may surprise those who remember China’s strong historical opposition to emissions caps at international talks, and the country’s argument that such caps would cripple growth. Recently, however, China has taken significant steps to strengthen its environmental laws and regulations.

After failing to meet pollution control and

air quality targets set by its 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005), China set its first binding environmental targets in the 11th Five-Year Plan. Responsibility for meeting these targets, previously held by low level officials on the front lines, was assigned to the leaders of county, city, and provincial governments.

The environmental ministry was promoted to a department, with regional departments established for local enforcement.

After China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (20112015) set the goal of reducing emissions intensity 40-50% by 2020, an October 2011 government circular authorized the cities of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, and Shenzhen and the provinces of Hubei and Guangdong to establish their own municipal carbon exchanges. Shenzhen is the first of these cities to commence trading, with the other cities scheduled to follow within a year.

Shenzhen represents a substantial

improvement over previous emissions exchanges in cities such as Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin, whose extremely small scale and voluntary participation limited their effectiveness.

When asked what measures his company had taken to reduce emissions following its entry into the Beijing voluntary emissions exchange, a researcher at a national oil company explained that the exchange had little effect on his company’s total emissions.

“We do have a department that covers emissions reduction, but its focus is reducing energy intensity and emissions intensity.”

China has strong incentives to cut emissions intensity, which is different from outright emissions. Y. Chen, an emissions exchange researcher at a major state-owned oil firm, explains that “for the past 30 years, the energy consumption and waste of China’s economy has been extremely high. As China chinahandsmagazine.com | China Hands

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Economics & Finance continues to develop, its emissions and energy use will increase. Reducing emissions intensity is therefore required to sustain economic growth.” In addition to economic growth, making economic growth more environmentally efficient also strengthens the other pillar of party legitimacy: social stability.

The public health effects of air and water pollution have led to widespread unrest. A 2012 study by MIT estimated the total cost of economic cost of air pollution in China at $112 billion, including lost labor and health care costs.

Even if the central government has the political will to set emissions intensity targets, local governments must be willing to enforce them for the exchanges to succeed. Local party officials’ incentives to drive economic growth have traditionally outweighed environmental concerns. A 2013 study by the National University of Singapore found that between 2000 and 2009, spending on environmental investments reduced city-level cadres’ chances of promotion, while spending on transportation infrastructure increased them.

The central government will likely continue to increase the importance of environmental standards for promotion, at least in more developed areas. For poorer areas, economic growth remains the first priority. Polluters forced out of prosperous coastal cities by environmentally conscious governments continue to be welcomed by officials in inland cities willing to sacrifice air and water quality for growth. The National Development and Reform Commission has opposed the establishment of exchanges in areas with GDP per capita of less than $10,000. Environmental evaluation for cadres has focused on methods compatible with economic growth: expanding clean energy investment, shifting from heavy industry to higher margin industries, closing down inefficient factories and power stations, and limiting heavy metal pollution and air pollution.

There are reasons to be optimistic about Shenzhen’s exchange. It will probably meet its emissions reduction target, which at 32% is actually relatively modest. Shenzhen was already on track to meet much of this target by 2015, due to implementation of new technology. It has taken steps to counter corruption by using electronic tracking systems to monitor allowances. The city governments establishing pilots will use similar technology, but each will have the flexibility to decide what authority monitors its own emissions trading system. Some cities will set up third party independent governing bodies, while others 16

Volume 2 Issue I | Fall 2013

may form committees within the municipal government to watch over operations.

Watching and learning The central government is watching Shenzhen and the other pilots for lessons for an eventual national system. The 12th Five-Year Plan includes provisions for the launch of a national carbon trading system in 2015. Officials have since released statements pushing the deadline back to 2020 or later.

Even if Shenzhen and other upcoming pilots succeed, numerous obstacles to a national system remain.

The first and most obvious issue is corruption. Reports abound of local industries shutting down pollution control technology and officials resorting to temporary blackouts to reach emissions targets. As deadlines approached to achieve the 11th Five-Year Plan’s energy reduction targets, local officials in several regions imposed power cuts on industries, hospitals, and schools to temporarily reduce energy measurements. There is a risk that emissions permits will be allocated according to the financial interests of local officials rather than the public’s economic and environmental interests.

Other problems stem from opaque data collection procedures. Inconsistencies in emissions numbers between government agencies demonstrate the tendency to falsify data when both local officials reporting emissions data and the environmental regulators assessing them have strong incentives to hit emissions targets.

Another issue is the weakness of environmental courts, which like most Chinese

courts are not fully independent from local governments. Tseming Yang, former Deputy General Counsel of the US Environmental Protection Agency and director of the USChina Partnership for Environmental Law, notes that “officials who at one point see the creation of these environmental courts as serving their interests may not be as enthusiastic when potential cases come up that threaten business interests.”

Even if these barriers are overcome and a national system is implemented, China will continue to prioritize growth over total emissions reduction. China’s recent environmental policies demonstrate that it is willing to pursue emissions efficiency in the interests of sustainable growth and social stability, but a strict cap on national emissions remains unlikely, particularly as China continues to urbanize and move towards a consumption economy.

Lastly, there is a risk that officials may confuse profitability of the emissions exchanges with their effectiveness. “One thing driving carbon exchanges is interest in trading as an opportunity to make money. There is less concern about the integrity of the exchange in terms of making sure that credits bought and sold line up with emissions reduction,” says Yang.

“I do think there’s some value in these carbon exchanges, but I’d be quite skeptical that in the short term they’re contributing much environmental benefit.”

Ashley Feng is a sophomore at Yale University. Contact her at ashley.feng@yale.edu.

photo by ivor wikimedia commons

Economics & Finance

Investing in the States Hannah Lindquist reports on the flow of Chinese investments among the states

Percentage of business acquistions

Graph Acquisitions by ownership 100

A

80

515

60 40

Acquisition

223

Private Government

$31,833

477

(millions)

$17,845

20 0

Greenfield

$17,962

$3,974 Volume

ll politics is local, goes a popular American saying, but when it comes to Chinese investment in the United States, it is almost always national. The latest update to the China Investment Monitor by the Rhodium Group, a New York-based advisory firm, offers a unique look at the steady march of Chinese investment in the United States by breaking the flow of investment by state.

Investment in the first three quarters of 2013 has already surpassed last year’s figure at $12.2 billion worth of deals. A big chunk of that is accounted for by the May agreement by Chinese meat giant Shuanghui International to acquire Virginia’s Smithfield Foods. At $4.7 billion, it is the largest ever acquisition by a Chinese firm.

States are responding to better accommodate and attract heightened investment from China, but not without

Value

185 Volume

difficulty. Chinese investors “require a large amount of education and support over a longer period,” according to April Kappler, an International Project Manager at the North Carolina Department of Commerce. Chinese investors often come to the United States without a game plan, and, as Kappler notes, “they generally expect that their US state representative is a one-stop center for conducting all business, similar to their Chinese system, which is not the case here in the US.” The California Governor’s Office for Business and Economic Development has the only state-level organization website with a list of investment opportunities available to foreign investors.

Unsurprisingly, California has been the top recipient of Chinese investment projects in the United States by number of deals since 2000; Texas leads by value thanks to large energy deals.

Value

source: Rhodium Group

Entertainment and real estate, consumer products and services, and industrial and electronic equipment have been the largest recipients by industry. Nearly 70% of the 700 deals tracked since 2000 have been greenfield investments as opposed to acquisitions and only 26% have been by government-owned firms.

American governors and local politicians are increasingly taking their sales pitches directly to China. In the past year, governors from states including California, Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin have all led trade missions to drum up business for their states. However contentious the federal debate on Chinese investment may remain, local politicians are making it clear their doors and wallets are open.

Hannah Lindquist is a senior at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Contact her at hmwl14@email.unc.edu.

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Economics & Finance

source: Rhodium Group

State California Texas Michigan New York Illinois Missouri Oklahoma

Volume 181 64 50 48 42 5 3

Value ($m) $2,200 $5,000 $1,000 $4,000 $1,900 $2,800 $3,500

$1 $2,0

,83

$1,536 73 $1,7

Inside Chinese state-level FDI

Graph Acquisition value by industry

6

85

$12,285 (millions)

$2,293 $5,044

$7,200

Agriculture & food

Industrial and electrical equipment Auto & Aviation

Entertainment & real estate

IT

Consumer products and services

Basic materials

Energy

Graph Annual deals

120

Deals Value ($m)

100

15000 12000 9000

60 6000

40

3000

20 0 18

2000 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 Q3‘13

Volume 2 Issue I | Fall 2013

0

Millions ($)

80

In this Section

25 Rising Stars in US-China Relations p. 19

Features

25 Under 25 Rising Stars in US-China Relations

This magazine was founded with the belief that there is incredible room for exchange of ideas and knowledge between the future leaders of America and China. In this inaugural 25 Under 25 feature, we aim to highlight students and young working professionals who have worked to further mutual understanding between these two countries. As they continue building bridges between the two countries - whether in government, business or the social sector - we hope their stories will inspire others from our generation to do the same.

These 25 young leaders hail from different corners of the world, from Beijing to Boston, from Voghera to Tokyo.

They represent 16 institutions of higher learning – one is a sophomore at Stanford. They are researchers and social entrepreneurs, they are Rhodes Scholars. One is a beauty queen from Singapore. In the male-dominated world of foreign policy, 17 on the list are female. We believe they are rising stars to watch in US-China relations. all photos submit ted

About the Judging In summer 2013, China Hands began soliciting nominations for its inaugural list of 25 rising stars at the intersection of US-Chinese relations, regardless of field of endeavor. We received more than 70 nominations which were initially screened by the magazine’s editors. Forty were then forwarded to four judges: Yale professor Deborah Davis, Forbes Beijing bureau chief Simon Montlake, Jonathan Akeley, Asia-Pacific program officer at the Institute of International Education, and Chris Clarke, retired chief of China intelligence for the State Department.

The finalists were then evaluated on the basis of their academic achievement, extracurricular or professional involvement, and leadership potential.

Clarke writes that this year’s honorees are a “very impressive lot.

Thinking back on the qualifications of most people of my generation who were entering the China field, I am envious of the opportunities available today and highly impressed by the deep and varied experiences, talents, drive, and leaderships of today’s young budding China specialists. With such an outstanding crop of young people interested in US-China affairs - and with many more who did not come to the attention of the selection committee - it seems to me the future of US-China relations will be in good hands.”

chinahandsmagazine.com | China Hands

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Features Minami Funakoshi Yale ‘15 | Tokyo, Japan Funakoshi’s prolific writings on China have captured the attention of her fellow students and readers worldwide. In addition to writing for Yale’s international affairs magazine, The Globalist, she has contributed to Tea Leaf Nation, The Atlantic, and The New York Times China. Last summer, she served as an opinion intern with The Wall Street Journal Asia, reporting from Dongguan on the changing business environment for foreign firms.

Aily Zhang Yale ‘15 | San Francisco, CA “How China is going to support [its] population with its current agricultural practices is a huge ecological and societal issue,” Aily Zhang, a Yale junior and San Francisco native tells China Hands. “Somehow, China has to figure out how to maximize production on scarce arable land, and it’s going to be a challenge. Right now, people use chemical fertilizers and other intensive agricultural management styles that aren’t sustainable in the long-run.”

Promoting support for sustainable and just agricultural and environmental solutions is Zhang’s mission.

The double-major in environmental studies and East Asian studies is currently spearheading the launch of “A Time To Grow,” an exchange program designed to connect American and Chinese college students on agricultural and environmental issues. Launching the project “came from my realization that there are a lot of young people who are passionate about environmental issues and social justice in China but they don’t know how to apply it to their immediate lives.”

Zhang’s decision to start a career around environmental issues was not a “very conscious, epiphanic decision,” although she credits her first visit to the Chinese countryside in middle 20

Volume 2 Issue I | Fall 2013

school as a formative one. “That’s when my eyes were opened to inequality.”

What initially began as an interest in development work transitioned to a China-specific focus once she got to Yale and joined the Yale-China Association.

She is also the president of Yale’s Leadership Institute.

“I think that there needs to be more people teaching people about sustainable farming practices, land use, resource use, and also environmental relations. Right now in China, there are a lot of agricultural universities that are very technical, which is great, but the issue with that is that they teach a lot of conventional intensive agricultural practices, and that needs to change.”

“It’s interesting to see how much has changed [in China] just in the short span of my own life, and how much is still a work in progress,” Zhang comments.

After graduation, Aily plans to realize her ambition of launching an opensource start-up that focuses on sharing agricultural best practices and pursuing a career in academia.

Among the many inspirations she cites, she is particularly fond of Shi Yan, considered the leader of the sustainable food movement in China. She also expresses admiration for local organizers in China, people “who maybe will never be known internationally for their work but whom I think are really inspiring.”

Helen Cai Duke ‘14 | Beijing, China As the founder of the Duke-UNC China Leadership Summit, Cai directed the premier US-China Relations conference in the American South and led the development of the conference since its foundation. Through Cai’s leadership, the Duke-UNC China Leadership Summit has become a magnet for US-China policy makers, academics, and foreign relations professionals.

Additionally, she is also the President of the Duke East Asia Nexus, an undergraduate organization and publication dedicated to developments in East Asia, where she published on both Chinese criminal law and the “Great Chinese firewall.”

Cai has previously worked in Beijing at K&L Gates LLP as a summer intern.

Features Virginia Hawkins

Julian Gewirtz

Tsinghua ‘14 University of Virginia ‘13 | Dallas, Texas

Oxford ‘15 as Rhodes Scholar Harvard ‘13 | Hamden, Connecticut

A Jefferson Scholar at the University of Virginia, Hawkins wrote her senior thesis on the senior housing industry in China, a version of which was featured in this issue. Currently at Tsinghua to top off her Mandarin, Hawkins has spent several summers in China, first as a teacher and then as an intern for the Conference Board and Deloitte. The former intern with McKinsey & Company hopes to bring her senior thesis to life by introducing highquality, American-style nursing homes to China’s rapidly aging population.

“There is so much at stake for our generation to develop a deeper understanding of China,” Julian Gewirtz, a Harvard graduate and current Rhodes Scholar tells us. As he talked to China Hands from England, he explained his interest in the role that Western economists played during the time of China’s market reforms, the topic of his senior thesis in history at Harvard. Julian focused on how the Communist party leadership looked abroad for ideas and expertise from foreigners, and used them to transform the ideas put forward

by Deng Xiaoping and other top leaders into policies and ideology for the socialist market economy.

“I was interested in the way the party develops its policies and in part how the party and the Chinese state relate to the international community,” Gewirtz says. “I was also interested in how [the Chinese state and leadership] relate to individual countries in what we call ‘the West’.” At Oxford he will be completing a book manuscript looking at the role of North American and European economists during China’s economic reforms of the 1980s..

Gewirtz has worked at two of the hottest start-ups on either side of the Pacific. In 2011, he interned for Facebook, where he focused on global expansion. A year later, he reported directly to Alibaba’s General Counsel in Hong Kong, where he focused on privacy and data use policies. An accomplished writer, he has interned with Beijing’s Caijing magazine and

written for The Huffington Post and The Atlantic’s online outlets.

Gewirtz, who has been to China ten times since 2005, and started studying Chinese at eight, advises students not to think of China as being a monolithic society – in fact, he cites the remarkable variation seen in China as the reason why it is a fabulous place to visit. Substantial people-to-people contact, according to him, could resolve the “elite strategic mistrust” between the leaders of the countries over the long term. The benefits of that would not just be diplomatic or geopolitical, but in business and academic exchange as well.

“Learn Chinese, go to China, go to many different parts of China - not just Beijing or Shanghai, go to south and rural China, go to tier two and three cities, don’t be embarrassed to practice your Chinese and ask questions that get mixed reactions, and lastly, follow the news about China closely and read widely.”

Rachel Leng Harvard ‘15 Duke ‘13 | Singapore, Singapore A Singaporean native, Leng has dedicated her undergraduate years to studying socioeconomic inequities in contemporary China and presented her research on Chinese tongzhi (gay) literature at conferences across the US. While teaching at the Dandelion Middle School for Migrant Children in Beijing, she researched on the city’s migrant policies and community, which she later co-taught at a seminar at Duke. As the co-president of the Harvard East Asian Society, Leng is organizing its annual conference for graduate students to share their research.

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Features Nathan BeauchampMustafaga London School of Economics & Peking University ‘13 George Washington University ‘11 | Woodinville, Washington Beauchamp-Mustafaga has conducted significant research on China-North Korea relations for two major European think-tanks in London and Beijing. He has studied China and Chinese for 12 years, lived in five Chinese cities for a total of three years, and attended seven Chinese universities on three US Department of State scholarships. He writes for China Hands on the defining moment in his journey as a rising China specialist.

Evelyn Boettcher Cambridge ‘16 as Gates Scholar University of Pennsylvania ‘10 | Tulsa, Oklahoma As a recipient of the Harvard Presidential Public Service Fellowship during her master’s degree, Boettcher has worked in the China Focus Group at the US Pacific Command in Hawaii, conducting research into strategic security challenges in the Asia-Pacific.

At the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the US Department of State, she has completed research involving political-military affairs issues in Southeast and Northeast Asia, interning as a Cox Distinguished Scholar.

Additionally, Boettcher was awarded a David L. Boren National Security Fellowship in 2012 to support one year of advanced Mandarin studies.

Allan Hsiao Oxford ‘15 as Rhodes Scholar Harvard ‘13 | Louisville, Kentucky The son of Taiwanese immigrants, Hsiao focuses his research on development and human migration, with special emphasis on China’s urban-rural transformation.

While at Harvard, he was the youngest editor-in-chief and only undergraduate on 22

Volume 2 Issue I | Fall 2013

As I stand on the hill, overlooking the sprawling monastery all aglow with ancient hand-churned yak-butter torches, a cold, midnight Tibetan wind sweeps under the Tibetan Buddhist prayer flags, suspending them in mid-air. The steady breeze that rubs my nose numb keeps everything afloat and in constant motion.

The scene: my ten closest friends, a Chinese teacher, a Buddhist monk, and me, just your normal, average, everyday kid … conversing with a Buddhist monk at midnight on a hill that has served as one of the holiest retreats for thousands of monks for hundreds of years at one of the most important monasteries in Tibetan Buddhism.

At that moment, I could not have asked for anything more out of life. I was living a dream – another country, another culture, another place, seemingly another time. But most importantly, I understood. I wasn’t a tourist with plaid shorts who returned to the kingsized bed in a hotel suite with room service after a five star dinner of Kobe beef. Quite the contrary. My hard-won American identity flew out the window. We wore Tibetan yakfur hats with goofy flaps and Tibetan yakfur robes, and we were sputtering along in Chinese with heavy ‘Tibetan characteristics.’

It was the perfect ending to a perfect year of the editorial board of the Harvard Asia Quarterly. A polyglot with six languages to his credit, Hsiao plans to pursue an academic career, but has not ruled out the possibility of public service after finishing his research at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar. He has also participated in Strait Talk, a non-partisan program that seeks to improve the Taiwan Strait issue through dialogue at the individual level.

the perfect mix of study and travel in China. I arrived a tourist; I left a local.

This moment was the defining experience that set me on my current path towards a career in US-China relations. I first came to China during the summer of 2001 on a goodwill tour with my middle school baseball team, but it was only when I lived with a Chinese host family in Beijing for a year of high school in 2005 through School Year Abroad that I fell in love with the country.

Despite learning Chinese since sixth grade, finally living in Beijing provided the window I needed to better understand China, its people, culture, history and myself—and to establish my relationship with the country. Now having lived in five Chinese cities and attended seven different Chinese universities over more than three years, I’ve realized personal interactions can make all the difference.

Although we often speak of US-China relations in terms of strategic dialogues between government officials, mil-mil relations between the militaries and media narratives between political elites, the people of both countries are still getting to know each other.

These local interactions on both sides of the Pacific are crucial to building a sustainable and mutually beneficial relationship not only for the United States and China, but also for the world.

Features Stefano Malfitano Yale ‘14 | Voghera, Italy Malfitano has spent several summers studying and interning in China as a Richard U. Light Fellow and a Fung Scholar. The former summer analyst with Goldman Sachs has also researched on China’s Internet market with the executive vice-president of China Mobile and on pre‐1949 China’s macroeconomic developments with Prof. Aleh Tsyvinski at Yale. Currently the worldwide president of Global China Connections, Malfitano hopes to contribute to the future of US-EU-China relations.

Rachel Odell MIT PhD candidate Harvard ‘09 | Blackfoot, Idaho Odell has spent much of her career since graduating from Harvard as a research analyst in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where she coordinates several projects on USChina military relations. Her decision to devote her career to East Asia was inspired by a course on Chinese ethical and political theory taught by Prof.

Michael Puett in her first semester of college; her thesis at Harvard on China’s participation in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism was advised by Alastair Iain Johnston. In the 2012 Republican presidential primary, Odell was a member of former ambassador to China Jon Huntsman’s campaign. Odell has published and contributed to dozens of works on US-China issues and for China Hands, she writes on what she calls the “imbalanced US rebalance to Asia.”

The architects of the Obama administration’s strategy of “rebalancing” American military assets and diplomatic attention to Asia insist that the effort is not aimed at containing China, but rather, enhancing bilateral cooperation with Beijing.

To demonstrate their sincerity, US officials have recently taken steps to improve ties with their Chinese counterparts, engaging in high-profile heads-of-state summitry, expanding military-to-military relations, and strengthening coordination on Korean Peninsula issues. These efforts have been touted by both sides as evidence that the two countries are developing a “new type of great power relationship.”

In the multilateral realm, however, the rebalance has, whether by design or by accident, primarily worked to isolate Beijing. The Obama administration has inaugurated or deepened security partnerships with countries throughout the Asia-Pacific, particularly in Southeast Asia. As part of these efforts, Washington has extended military aid and offered weapons deals that directly contribute to an escalating regional arms race.

The United States has also engaged countries

in the region in broader fora, such as the USJapan-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, which have little unique strategic value outside of a China-oriented context.

Although administration officials generally avoid any explicit reference to China in the course of these discussions and insist that such enhanced ties are not aimed at Beijing, most of these efforts have arisen in the absence of any significant motivation other than alleged Chinese “bullying” (cooperation with South Korea and Japan in response to North Korean antagonism excepted.) Explicit evidence of this subtext can be found in administration officials’ expressions of solidarity with China’s neighbors against purported threats to “freedom of navigation.” Through these and similar statements, Washington has all but sided with Asian countries in their various territorial disputes with Beijing. Such maneuvers have occurred at the expense of intra-Asian cooperation, which is crucial to America’s own most fundamental security interest in the region—peace and stability.

To be sure, the original impetus for the deterioration in China’s relations with its neighbors in recent years was not US policy,

contrary to the accusations of many Chinese observers. The onset of this negative shift largely predates the “Pacific pivot” in America’s foreign policy and can be traced instead to increased tensions over territorial disputes arising from a range of provocations instigated by both China and its Asian neighbors.

Indeed, such tensions arguably helped usher in the pivot in mid-2010, providing US policymakers an excuse to implement a multipronged diplomatic and militaristic reassertion of America’s commitment to the region.

The steps Washington has undertaken as part of that effort threaten to lock Asian nations into an escalatory spiral of mutual distrust and confrontation with Beijing. If the rebalance is truly at its core an attempt to reassert responsible U.S. leadership in the Asia-Pacific region, America should be actively encouraging improved relations between Beijing and other Asian countries, accompanied by inclusive multilateral engagement. As it stands, the imbalance between bilateral accord and multilateral animus that currently characterizes US policy toward China threatens to undermine the very purpose of the rebalance to Asia.

chinahandsmagazine.com | China Hands

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Features Logan Krusac

Zachary Montague Cornell ‘13 | Arlington, Virginia

Montague is interested in China’s law and social policy, and wrote his senior thesis on the country’s system of property rights and land administration. For his research, Montague worked at the Northwest Socioeconomic Development Research Center in Xi’an and at the Peking University Center for Urban Studies and Land Policy. He wrote a thesis studying how budgetary needs are causing city-level politicians to develop land in ways that are often at odds with national party goals. Having also researched environmental policies at the Brookings Institution and US Environmental Protection Agency, Montague hopes to bring the US and China together on climate and energy legislation.

Bailey Carroll Yale ‘10 | Boston, Massachusetts While at Tsinghua University’s InterUniversity Program, Carroll co-founded NorCap China Internships, a company that provides professional internship experiences for university students and graduates in Beijing. She was also elected vice-president of the Yale Club of Beijing where she promotes Yale’s mission in China, connects alumni in Beijing, and helps Yale students and graduates engage with the local community. Carroll is a recipient of the Richard U. Light Fellowship and studied at the Harvard-Beijing Academy.

Irene Shao

Founder, Bridging Education And Mobility Cornell ‘11 | Toronto, Canada Shao is motivated by the desire to close China’s educational inequity gap through technology. As the founder and CEO of Bridging Education and Mobility (BEAM), Irene is helping those with innovative educational projects for rural and migrant communities attract the resources they need to get off the ground. Shao has previously worked as a research assistant at Oxford’s Chinese NGO Behaviour Project and the Center for International and Strategic Studies in Beijing. Additionally, Shao has been a speaker at the WEMUN Expo (the largest model UN conference in Asia), Global China Connection, and the American Chamber of Commerce.

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Taiwan Program In-country Resident Director, International Education and Resource Network University of Georgia ‘12 | Smyrna, Georgia A recipient of the University of Georgia Foundation Fellowship, Krusac has furthered her Chinese studies at universities in Harbin, Kunming, and Nanjing. While in China, Logan also surveyed individual environmental awareness, studied household water conservation practices, and presented her research at the International Symposium on Water Resources and Environmental Protection in Xi’an. As a Carl Vinson fellow, Logan researched on solutions to China’s water shortage with Chinese government officials and hopes to explore ways for the US and China to resolve global environmental issues together.

Features Alexandra Foote Harvard ‘15 | Dallas, Texas As a Weissman International Intern last summer, Foote translated documents for a forum on Tibet co-hosted by China’s State Council and the Harvard Center in Shanghai. At Harvard’s Weatherhead Center, she has analyzed Chinese source materials to understand China’s recent military development, the results of which were featured in a report for the US Navy. She has led a number of community service initiatives in the US and China and is currently the co-director of the Chinatown After School Program.

Alice Xie

University of Pennsylvania ‘14 | New York, New York As a research assistant at Penn, Xie has analyzed the rise of security organizations in China through the collection and translation of data on the provincial heads of Chinese court and police, among others. At Penn, Xie is also the founder of the Penn Symposium on Contemporary China, the university’s premier regional academic conference on modern China, and of Seneca International.

Xie hopes to pursue a master of philosophy in the UK before entering public service, working for the US government in East Asian economic diplomacy.

Andrea Wang

Stanford ‘16 | Shanghai, China

Gina Chen

Director of US Operations, Education in Sight Yale ‘11 | Chengdu, China A Fulbright Scholar, Chen conducted research on the post-quake community rebuilding efforts in China after graduating from Yale in 2011. In China, Chen became the founding director of Education in Sight, a non-profit that provides vision screenings and eyeglasses to low-income students in rural China. This year, Education in Sight provided 1,200 students with free eyeglasses and more than 8,000 students with free vision screenings. Over the next few years, Chen will be working with a Chinese NGO to expand sustainable ecologicalfarming models and to empower local farmers in villages throughout Southwest China, especially in the post-quake areas.

Jenna Nicholas

Executive Assistant to Chairman, Calvert Fund Stanford ‘12 | London, UK

An art history and management science and engineering major at Stanford, Wang is the founder and editor-in-chief of Profiles in Converse, a bilingual publication that explores the arts and humanities through the lens of a series of interviews from both the US and China. At Stanford, Wang is also the vicepresident of FACES (Forum for AmericanChinese Exchange at Stanford), which has founded chapters at Peking and Fudan, among others. Currently, Wang is planning and launching a summer humanities academy for summer 2014, which would provide an intensive four-week mentorship and training program for future Chinese leaders.

As a co-founder of Phoenix Global Impact at Stanford, Nicholas brought US philanthropists and impact investors to China and helped organize the China Philanthropy Forum. Passionate about promoting philanthropy and social investing in China, she has consulted for Hero Group (China) and Business for Social Responsibility (Beijing) on community partnerships in the country. Nicholas wrote her senior thesis on civil society in China and will be coteaching a class at Tsinghua on value creation through socially responsible investing. chinahandsmagazine.com | China Hands

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Features Ryan Kline

Yale ‘15 | Dallas, Texas A winner of Yale’s Sunrise Foundation Travel Grant, Kline has toured China extensively, having visited over six provinces.

With a passion in filmmaking, Kline interned at Village Roadshow Entertainment Group Asia last summer, where he assisted with the production of Chinese-language films in Beijing. This fall, he participated in the JP Morgan Fellows Program at Yale, where he worked on a four-person team to complete a research project on the US real estate market under the direction of Xu Niansha, chairman of China Poly Group.

Min Yang

University of North Carolina at Chapel HIll ‘15 | Guangdong, China A research fellow at the UNC Project-China, Yang participated in the operation of the Guangdong Provincial STI Control Center to study approaches to increase HIV testing uptake in South China, where he also helped organize the second UNC-South China STI’s Research Training Conference. In summer 2012, Min designed health and science classes in Kunming, China, as part of his work for the NGO Machik. At Duke, Min is the current deputy director of the Duke-UNC China Leadership Summit, a three-day conference that aims to increase US-China collaboration and understanding.

Jack Zhang

Jessica Drun

UC San Diego ‘17 Duke ‘11 | Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Research Intern at Freeman Chair in China Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies Georgetown ‘13 University of Georgia ‘11 | Lilburn, Georgia A research intern at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Drun focuses her research on US-Taiwan relations and security developments in the Pacific.

Drun’s publication “Charting Course for 2014 Elections, Taiwanese Opposition Debates China Policy” was featured by The Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief. Prior to the CISS, Drun worked with policymakers in Taiwan and the US on cross-strait relations.

Additionally, Drun has worked for the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy and the Project 2049 Institute.

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Heng Shao

Reporter/Producer at Forbes Asia Harvard ‘13 | Beijing, China As a research assistant at Harvard, Shao conducted research on Chinese specialized courts and environmental law, and also contributed to studies on the origins of the ancient Chinese state.

In summer 2011, Shao interned at the New York Times China in Beijing, where she conducted news background research and interviews. Now at Forbes Asia, Shao is responsible for covering Chinese business news, US-Chinese investment, and the entrepreneurship of Chinese immigrants. Through her work in journalism, she hopes to expose decision-makers in China to innovative ideas in governance and leadership.

A PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, Zhang has worked as a researcher at Eurasia group, where he analyzed the intersection between Chinese politics and markets for a range of institutional investors and multinational corporations. During his undergraduate year at Duke, Zhang served as editor-in-chief of the Duke East Asia Nexus journal and established the Duke-UNC China Leadership Summit in its inaugural year. Additionally, Zhang is the co-author of a chapter on the interplay of war and trade for the Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Trade.

Features

25 Under 25 Bailey Carroll

Alexandra Foote

ended up being pop stars stars will.i.am and apl.de.ap’s personal translator in Bejing for a day, carting them between their concert venue, KFC, and the after party.

can play the erhu.

Helen Cai

was 2nd Runner Up at Miss World Singapore 2013.

“I have a childhood diary written entirely in German that I can no longer read or understand; after moving from China to Germany, and then to the U.S., the German I accumulated seeped out so that English could be stored in its place.”

Fun Facts

Logan Krusac acts in Taiwanese TV shows from time to time.

Rachel Leng

Jack Zhang “Having tasted every national macrobrew beer in Northeast Asia, I would award my gold medal to North Korea’s Taedonggang.”

logan krusac

rachel leng

irene shao

evelyn boettcher

Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga “Ai Weiwei once called me lihai.”

ryan kline

aily zhang chinahandsmagazine.com | China Hands

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In this Section

A Maze and a Map p. 33

At the Border of Chinatown and Soho p. 36

Life & Culture

Watch This Space Kyle Hutzler spends an afternoon at CCTV America

I

f one were to explore the upper reaches of the cable television universe between the hours of 7 and 9pm Eastern, they might be mistaken for thinking they had stumbled upon a public television broadcast of BBC World News. They would see the same modern, red graphics; an international ensemble of anchors and guests; and a stately presentation free of soundbites and focused on the hard news that never quite make American nightly newscasts at all or with any real appreciation of their complexity. But it wouldn’t be the BBC’s logo that one would see, but that of CCTV: China Central Television, live, in English, broadcasting from Washington, and with every intention of not only superficially modeling the BBC, but ultimately rivaling its influence in every corner of the globe.

In February 2012, CCTV America began broadcasting two hours daily from

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its headquarters on New York Avenue, a few blocks east of the White House. Today, at the entrance to CCTV’s second floor office, Wang Guan, the network’s chief politics correspondent sat waiting for me. Guan, a Chinese national in his late twenties, is strikingly younger than his American counterparts. A 2007 graduate of Beijing’s Communication University, he is considered one of China’s very best television journalists. Before joining CCTV News, he spent several months as an intern producer for the Associated Press in China.

For CCTV, he has he reported from Tibet, Pakistan, and North Korea before making the jump to CCTV America.

Guan does double duty for CCTV, reporting for both the English and Mandarin sides. In all, nearly some 100 work out of Washington for CCTV America, with dozens more scattered in smaller bureaus

across the United States, including New York and Los Angeles, and soon to be Seattle and Atlanta. A contingent of about 20 correspondents is based throughout South America. An additional thirty-five or so, who serve CCTV News’ Mandarin operations, are also based in Washington. On the English side, Guan is mostly featured on the network’s BizAsia and general news programming.

For Guan, there is a real chance with CCTV America to provide a more balanced view of world affairs. “I’m a little disturbed, you know, because if you watch Fox News, you are very scared of China.

Even CNN, one day they show a dissident and the next day environmental degradation and on the next day food safety. They are real concerns that need to be addressed and as journalists we should expose these problems, but if these are the only issues

Life & Culture that they cover, that does not offer a fair picture of what China is all about.” But does CCTV America’s conception of balance ultimately consist of a comprehensive international outlook or like, Fox News, a balance defined by stridently pushing against the rest of the media landscape?

There is a sincerity and earnestness about Guan and his belief in his work that that stands in stark contrast to the American perception of journalists as the ultimate cynic. He acknowledges the inherent skepticism that a Chinese state-backed news operation will evoke. “For me personally, I think it is more important to show the Western audience that we can present balanced coverage, that we are in the fact business, that we can do better than they expect.”

No broadcasts were planned for this August evening while the station was on a summer hiatus. The studios were dark and the control rooms mostly empty with the exception of a few Chinese staffers who had come from Beijing to upgrade the equipment.

At the time of my arrival, most of the network’s senior leadership was huddled down the hall in a meeting to review demos for the next phase of the network’s expansion. With the exact timing contingent upon approval from Beijing, CCTV America this winter is scheduled to expand from two hours of daily broadcasts to five, with both revamped and new programming.

At its launch, the new channel attracted

photo by kyle hutzleR

a brief flurry of press from the likes of Foreign Policy and The Atlantic as the next wave of China’s soft power push, but has otherwise been ignored. That lack of attention, for now, appears to be just fine for the staff at CCTV America. The theme of the past year for the network has been about learning. The Washington outpost is less concerned with reaching an American audience as it is with getting the back-end right. CCTV America is first and foremost a testing ground where the network’s leadership will package the lessons learned here and apply them as it expands around the globe. For the Chinese, learning to manage an international workforce has been one of the greatest lessons of the past year.

CCTV also envisions Washington as the premier training center for its Chinese reporters, whom officials acknowledge currently lack the journalistic professionalism and creativity of their peers. The network has hired a host of Western journalists and other staff, who bring with them experience at networks including Bloomberg, CNBC, CNN, and Al Jazeera. “It is fair to concede that journalism education was few and far between in the past twenty years” in China, explains Guan. “Journalism education was really not there … it was mostly propaganda education even ten years back.”

As my time with Guan wraps up, Jim Laurie, who was ensconced in the new programming meetings, joins us. Laurie, a former print and television journalist who covered the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, and most recently a professor at the University of Hong Kong, serves the network as an executive consultant. In this role, he is primarily the person who engages with media seeking to cover the network. Laurie first began consulting for CCTV in 2007 when he was invited to a training program CCTV was organizing for its journalists prior to the launch of the London and Washington bureaus for the Mandarin service. For CCTV America, Laurie has been instrumental in advising on the hiring of Western journalists and making coverage of Latin America a priority.

Laurie thanks Guan and leads me to the office of CCTV America’s director general, Ma Jing, who permitted me to speak with her for twenty minutes on the condition that her comments be off the record. Ma, as a brief video of her on the CCTV website shows, is a soft-spoken contrast to the typical American network executive, with the hint of a British accent from her time

as a graduate student at Royal Holloway, University of London.

Ma has spent her entire career with CCTV after graduating from the Communication University of China (then the Beijing Broadcasting Institute) in 1994. She rose to the level of CCTV English News managing director before volunteering to take on the CCTV America assignment in 2011. She is the primary interface with Beijing and must balance the tricky course of personally learning how to lead an international staff and make decisions in the best interest of the network, even if it challenges the more conservative leadership in Beijing.

“I am a great fan of Ma Jing. She has made a number of autonomous decisions here. Things have been done here that would not have been done in Beijing,” says Laurie. An example of CCTV America’s autonomy was its decision to establish a YouTube channel. Laurie and some of the Western staff pushed for such a presence, a move that would be obvious for most networks, but a sensitive one for CCTV America given that the website is blocked in China. A compromise was reached in which a channel was created but managed not by full-time CCTV America staff, but American college interns.

The full review process is local and overseen by Ma Jing, and the network’s principal and deputy editor, all Chinese women. For a self-described “old-timer,” Laurie characterizes the presence of three “very powerful women” at the helm of the network as “remarkable.”

What is unmistakably clear from my time with Ma is her commitment to making CCTV News a respected voice in international journalism. The goal for CCTV America is straight-forward: build quality, gain respect, and, finally, have impact.

C

CTV America is neither the first nor the biggest new foreign news operation seeking to have a global impact. Qatari-based Al Jazeera, which first rose to prominence in America for its broadcasts of video recordings of Osama bin Laden after 9/11, is joined by Russia’s RT and France 24, which both started up in the past decade. “I think it’s fair to say that the Chinese have felt for many years that it was the Western media that was setting the news agenda” before deciding to set an alternative agenda of their own, Laurie explains.

Each network is an attempt by their

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Life & Culture

Does CCTV America’s conception of balance ultimately consist of a comprehensive international outlook or like, Fox News, a balance defined by stridently pushing against the rest of the media landscape? host governments to shape global opinion and support their nation’s soft power. All except for RT share presentation styles that mirror the BBC or CNN, although RT appears most fond of indulging in special effects out of place even for Fox News.

In an interview with Germany’s Der Spiegel news magazine, RT’s editor-in-chief, Margarita Simonyan, told the newspaper that “there is no objectivity, only approximations of the truth by as many different voices as possible.” This summer, the network became the new home for former CNN interviewer Larry King.

Al Jazeera, which earlier in 2012 acquired the cable channel Current, and RT are both lavishly funded. Since 2005, RT’s annual funding from the Russian government has grown from $30 million to $300 million, supporting a global staff of 2,500 employees and contractors, with 100 in Washington. Exact figures for the American operations alone are not available. According to Laurie, Al Jazeera is on track to have 800 people throughout the Americas, far and above CCTV America. Laurie tells me that CCTV America, which operates commercial free and is funded by CCTV’s mostly commercial-generated revenues from China, is running on a budget considerably less than that of Al Jazeera but more than Russia’s RT America operations.

The rapid rise of state-backed media and their near endless source of funding has alarmed US officials, not so much for the impact they may have in an already crowded American media landscape as abroad. In 2011, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton LAW ‘73 warned a Congressional committee that the United States was “engaged in an information war, and we are losing that war.”

In the search for global influence, reaching Africa is an unmistakable priority for the Chinese in particular, whose economic and cultural presence on the conti30

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nent has exploded in the past decade. Last year, CCTV also began broadcasting locally from Nairobi, Kenya, its second regional bureau alongside Washington. Xinhua, China’s equivalent of the Reuters, is getting in front of African readers by giving its content away for free to African newspapers. China Radio International, which is also quietly expanding in the United States, goes head to head with Voice of America and BBC on the continent. “Africa is quite a success story really,” says Laurie.

Back in the United States, CCTV America is just one pillar of a soft power push that includes radio and print, with ubiquitous China Daily newsboxes in major cities and paid weekly inserts in most major American papers. Xinhua currently holds the most prominent advertising space in Times Square. Tellingly absent, skeptics point out, is a digital presence. Writing for ChinaFile, Beijing-based American commentator Bill Bishop says, “China’s soft power push is likely a boon to Western media consultants, cable channel and radio station owners, and advertising sales people, but currently the strategy may be flawed … can you really win hearts and minds of current and future generations when you are known as a country that blocks Facebook, Google, YouTube, and Twitter?”

The BBC is the unmistaken standard against which Beijing is measuring itself.

“Interestingly enough,” Laurie tells me, “CNN would come a poor third” to Al Jazeera. Partly this is because CNN is commercial, but they also feel “Al Jazeera has achieved something different. They have an internal slogan to be the ‘voice of the voiceless’ and that is very attractive to the Chinese. That they can offer an alternative agenda is very important to the Chinese.”

Four programs make up the current CCTV America line-up. The marquee is BizAsia, a nightly world business and af-

fairs program co-anchored from Washington by Phillip Yin, formerly of Bloomberg and CNBC, and from the Nasdaq market-site in New York by Michelle Makori, formerly of Bloomberg.

The flagship program is rounded out by two weekly news and current affairs programs, The Heat, and Americas Now, a newsmagazine focusing on Latin America.

The latter was launched under the leadership of former 60 Minutes producer Barbara Dury, who left CCTV America earlier this year to return to independent consulting.

Instead of the BBC, the look and feel of the broadcasts actually resembles a somewhat more youthful – and clearly wealthier – take on PBS’ stately Newshour. Unlike the BBC, which covers the world with incisive breadth, CCTV America’s segments seem to run on longer than necessary. The live broadcasts lack the energy of the BBC or the sense that it is truly a global operation on which the sun never sets. The fall relaunch is designed in part to create a greater sense of energy.

Despite the considerable attention that CCTV America’s poaching of international talent from other networks has drawn, the long-term focus is on leveraging CCTV’s “going out” strategy to reshape the Chinese journalist corps. “They have to reach a certain production standard, a certain writing standard. One of the issues they have is the unevenness of their correspondent talent,” says Laurie.

“Perhaps I take a long view because I have been watching since the 1970s. If you take the long view you see a great deal of change, a lot more pushing of the envelope. There are quite a number of stories in the past 18 months that we’ve been on the air that would not have been told two years ago.” But on the stories most sensitive to the Chinese government, such as the scandal of convicted former politician Bo Xilai or human rights activist Chen Guangcheng’s escape from house arrest to a US consulate, CCTV America has been conspicuously silent.

While the full review process is local, Laurie acknowledges that Ma Jing and her deputy editors “know Beijing. They have lived in Beijing. They are employees of Chinese state television, but having said that, they are very deliberative and they are able to make the decisions on the ground” without direct interference from Beijing.

Life & Culture

“I

miss the food back home,” Guan tells me as I ask about the personal experience of being a Chinese journalist, but the understandable remove from one’s native culture and friends aside, the experience has been positive.

The hardest story he has covered by far, he says, was covering Jack Abramoff, the disgraced former Washington lobbyist.

“It was hard for me because I knew for Chinese back [in China], it reinforces the stereotype that a lot of aspects of capitalism are inherently corrupt.” Trying to strike a balance that showed that lobbying can be a legitimate part of the political landscape was a hard sell to editors in Beijing for the Mandarin service.

Working relations at CCTV between Chinese and Western journalists are characterized on both sides as excellent and one of mutual learning. The collegiality extends even beyond CCTV. “When I cover breaking news at a local level, local reporters at the scene are very helpful,” according to Guan.

What has the past year been like from the vantage point of a Western journalist at CCTV America? Several days after touring the studio, I reached out via email to Mike Walter, the anchor of the current affairs program, The Heat. Walter, who had spent his career mostly in local broadcasting, wrote that being associated with CCTV “was never a concern of mine. I have always tried to charge headlong embracing the next big thing in journalism.”

Walter felt that local television was “stagnant and dying” by the time he had left it. “In the last few years at WUSA [the

DC CBS affiliate], I felt like I was incessantly talking about Paris Hilton, Britney Spears, and Charlie Sheen… It’s very rare in the business that you can create something new.”

The attraction of a start-up, says Laurie, was an important selling point to attracting the network’s Western staff. So too was the strategic decision by some journalists to be on the “ground floor” of a shift in global power in favor of China. But no less important, is the recognition that “if it weren’t for the decline of American media, this place would have a much harder time” attracting talent.

According to Walter, the biggest frustration over the past year was initial equipment issues. “We married Western equipment with Chinese equipment and that produced some hiccups.”

Do Western journalists at CCTV feel respected by their peers in the Western media? “Some yes, some no,” writes Walter. “Larry McQuillan, who covered the White House from President Ford to President George W. Bush, sent me a note after our election coverage saying that we did a great job.” On the other hand, “I did a panel discussion at the National Press Club and a guy from the Washington Post teed off on CCTV, ripping us for not covering this or that … I don’t mind journalists asking tough questions about CCTV but I do have a problem with people regurgitating the same old stories over and over again.”

“No one asks the question [of respect] in reverse – and they ought to. I think I’m really surprised at my peers in the Western media. I think the picture that is painted of

photo by CCTV America

China by Western journalists is really very one dimensional.”

I think what we are doing is important,” says Walter. “If you believe in the First Amendment, what greater job can you have than the job of extending your journalistic tenants to China?”

As CCTV America heads into its second year, it is anxious to begin earning the markers of respect and legitimacy, measured in no small part by the prestige of the guests on its air. Like any network, it operates with the dilemma of attracting a sizable audience requires major guests and sources, but attracting major guests or features requires a sizable audience. Unlike most networks, it must also navigate suspicions that it is nothing more than a propaganda vehicle, albeit a sophisticated one. Those I spoke with at CCTV America were insistent upon the sincerity of their desire to practice journalism at the highest professional standards.

And indeed, it does appear that CCTV America’s breadth of coverage, at least of the world beyond China, is done with more depth and nuance that than what CCTV will run from Beijing. It is hard, for example, to imagine CCTV Beijing running more than a fleeting reference to the Egyptian protests. Coverage of domestic Chinese news itself, however, remains notably opaque. When the US and China meet, such as during the high-profile summer meeting between Presidents Obama and Xi, there is a heightened enthusiasm, but also a heightened sense of pressure to deliver. While the coverage significantly exceeds the attention paid by the American media, the American media’s relative lack of coverage is arguably a more realistic reflection of the limited results the most recent US-Chinese encounters have produced.

To date, the network has attracted several high profile guests, including former ambassador to China and Republican presidential candidate Jon Huntsman and former NBC News anchor, Tom Brokaw.

Yale’s Stephen Roach, who is a faculty adviser to this publication, has also appeared.

Most nights, however, BizAsia fields a fairly unremarkable roster of guests who would not even be a back-up for a scheduling assistant at CNBC or Bloomberg.

For a network that seeks to provide a Chinese perspective to Western viewers, the near total absence of Chinese government officials is somewhat less curious. Laurie notes that beyond the Chinese chinahandsmagazine.com | China Hands

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Life & Culture ambassador to the US, the deputy finance and foreign ministers have also appeared, but no one of Politburo-level rank. Their absence reflects several dynamics. The first is the general aversion of Chinese leadership to press coverage domestically or abroad. Second, even if Chinese leaders were willing to go on camera, CCTV America must then balance the sensitivity that their appearance would appear to only confirm the network’s existence as a government mouthpiece. Laurie thinks the day when they appear on CCTV America will eventually come.

Until then, the focus is less on satisfying curious China watchers with direct access to leaders or China itself, then, than it is on providing coverage of everything but China from a Chinese lens. Guan acknowledges that access and source development has been mixed. In some areas, CCTV has made considerable inroads, such as being the first Chinese network to be embedded with the Navy’s RIMPAC military exercises in 2012. Elsewhere, “I think it’s relatively hard. I feel like the [government] press people here in the United States are very polite, they are very helpful. I’m not sure how much they trust us. Perhaps we need to try harder.”

The network had scheduled to meet Secretary John Kerry ‘66 for an interview on the sidelines of the annual US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, before he had to cancel at the last minute when his wife fell ill. Kerry would have been the most senior American official to grant an interview to the network, which Laurie said would have been a “coup” for the network.

The blow of his cancellation, and the dashed chance for CCTV America to make the next step in its search for legitimacy, remains strongly felt around the studio weeks after.

“I think when they know we are for real, they [US government officials] will cooperate more. What I mean is that we can influence the Asian American and Pacific Islander voters, for example,” Guan tells me. It appeared to be a throwaway comment reflecting upon the near impossibility of all foreign journalists to get called on during White House press briefings. But it spoke to the possibility for a far more aggressively targeted, and thus, potentially effective, strategy.

Where it is not uncommon in lecture halls at Yale to see students occasionally flicking through Al Jazeera’s website as one of many news sources, CCTV would seem 32

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Ask Walter, “If you believe in the First Amendment, what greater job can you have than the job of extending your journalistic tenants to China?” to be ways away from reaching that level of currency, although CCTV America officials indicate that making a more concerted attempt to reach out to college students and a richer, online presence were in the works. CCTV America’s YouTube channel has 917 followers, compared to Al Jazeera’s half million and RT’s million.

David Shambaugh, a professor at George Washington University, also writing for ChinaFile, casts doubt on the enormous expenses undertaken by the Chinese government to further its soft power. China’s image is better served by “reflecting on the kinds of activities that give China a negative image abroad than simply investing in programs for cultural exchange. At the end of the day, if the ‘message’ isn’t sellable, no well-resourced ‘messenger’ can sell it.”

For now, the irony is that more eyes are watching CCTV America’s broadcasts from China and, indeed, given the sheer differential in population, may always will.

Laurie tells me that the total potential audience for the network’s broadcasts in China is capped at about 10 million of the country’s best English speakers and is limited further by its broadcast during China’s morning hours.

There is something tantalizing about the prospect that CCTV America, could in time, by presenting a more balanced perspective than CCTV’s Mandarin news, actually be more valued by and influential with an educated domestic Chinese audience. Could the instrument designed to influence the West from a Chinese perspective ultimately do more to influence Chinese from the world’s opinion?

Guan tells me that during his reports for the Mandarin service during Xi and Obama’s June meeting, he tried to explain the difference between conventional intelligence gathering and cybertheft of corporate intellectual property, a distinction that the Chinese government does not acknowledge publicly and state media dismisses as American bullying. Many Chinese are not aware that the bootlegged

DVDs they buy at stands on the street constitutes intellectual property theft, something he has also sought to elucidate in his reports back home.

“I think it would be irresponsible not to tell the Chinese audience the fine differences. It’s time for people to realize that there are merits in the US arguments and it’s time for us to improve our capacity to innovate because it’s in our interest of our education and our R&D. For us to rise as a nation, we cannot counterfeit our way up, we need to innovate and create.” It is a sentiment similar to many Chinese who have spent time in the United States. What makes Guan different is that more than a billion Chinese are hearing him say it.

C

CTV is leaving no doubt that it is playing the long game. Laurie says that CCTV America is planning on hiring an additional forty staff over the course of the next year to support its expanded reporting. Next year, a bureau in London will join its sisters in Nairobi and Washington.

It is too early to assess whether CCTV’s international ambitions will succeed.

In environments such as Africa where established international broadcasters have broadly neglected a large and increasingly affluent audience, CCTV’s decision to move first in a big way could mean the game there has already been won.

As our interview wraps up, Laurie, while emphasizing that nothing was in the works, slyly notes that the studious watchers back at CCTV headquarters in Beijing couldn’t help but take note of the muted reaction to Al Jazeera’s purchase of cable TV channel Current. The implication, like everything involving China’s rise, is that such a move is inevitable. When it happens, odds are good that a large part of the world will be watching.

Kyle Hutzler

is a senior at Yale University and managing editor of the magazine. Contact him at kyle.hutzler@yale.edu.

Life & Culture

A Maze and a Map Xiaoyu Xia & Sophia Ng reflect on contemporary Chinese literature

I

t was only a year ago that many Western readers for the first time cast a serious gaze eastward when Chinese writer Mo Yan was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature. For many Chinese, the prospect that their country’s modern literary works would be internationally recognized was almost inconceivable – in fact, PhD dissertation topics were regularly written on why China is unable to produce Nobel Laureates in Literature. Mo Yan’s win has pricked the awareness of most that there may be more hidden jewels among the rough.

In reality, Mo Yan is not the first Nobel Laureate in Literature from China. Thirteen years ago, another Chinese author, Gao Xingjian, had also received the honor. However, the sensitive political status of Gao, who left for France in 1998, did not sit quite well with the Chinese government’s policies on art and literature. The China Writers’ Association released strong criticisms of Gao, which read as near opposites of the celebratory treatment Mo Yan had received.

That Mo Yan was Vice-Chairman of the China Writers’ Association at the time of his award prompted some criticism from the Western media, which charged his writings with complicity in the assimilation between literature and the Chinese Communist Party.

Mo Yan’s works are certainly not simple repetitions or calls of support for the CCP’s policies and ideologies. In his works, one can find a deep compassion and colorful depictions of his hometown and land. More importantly, Mo Yan remains critical and sensitive to the historical trauma of modern China and its painful current transition towards modernity.

Besides Mo Yan, many other contemporary Chinese authors have also written about a politically troubled China. A representative example would be Jia Pingwa’s famed Ancient Furnace (《古炉》 Gu Lu). The Ancient Furnace is a novel more than 600,000-word long that depicts the biggest trauma that China has faced in the second half of the last century: the Cultural Revolution. Jia does not write about politics between the top government officials, nor did he write about the extreme cruelty or violence of the people. On the contrary, Jia writes from the perspective of an abandoned kid who is intellectually disabled, observing how the commoners found the strength to live

on, amidst the era’s great trauma. The closeness of village life with mother nature seems to subtly comfort and soothe all the turmoil and bloodshed. A strong will to live resides within “ancient China,” and this very same China would still continue to thrive, despite facing any forms of disaster or humiliation.

These are just two of many novels which speak to the long-lying tensions in Chinese history, not least between the political center and the commoners. The concept of a “contemporary China,” let alone “contemporary Chinese literature” is complicated because of a certain inseparability from the more distant and traditional “ancient China.” For example, Pai Hsien-yong’s stream of consciousness novel Wandering in the Garden, Waking from a Dream is named after a traditional Kun opera. Pai’s novel of war and separation overlaps with the love story of Du Liniang in ancient China, and the author’s personal nostalgia.

Another author, Luo Yijun, also intertwines the past and present in his novel, Hotel Xixia.

Luo chose to reflect his thoughts on the past 60 years of political history through a novel that was set in a short-lived dynasty in ancient China. The past and the present are superimposed, and their relationship does not demonstrate a clear-cut distinction or continuum.

Both Pai Hsien-yung and Luo Yijun are from Taiwan. For a long period of time, the impression in China was that Chinese literature only includes literary works from mainland China. In recent years, there has been a push to redefine and broaden the definition of Chinese literature, with concepts like sinophone literature and overseas Chinese lit-

erature becoming hot discussion topics. Contemporary Chinese literature is less and less bound by a geographical concept, richer and deeper in terms of history, and much more multi-faceted in terms of language and ideologies.

Contemporary Chinese literature, in many respects, can be organized by whether it focuses on the present, future, or the past. For students majoring in Chinese literature in mainland China, the phrase “literature of the wounded” is a common point of discussion.

This “wounded” literature is filled with testimonies and critiques of the Cultural Revolution and reflects upon the evils that the authors or fellow peers bore witness or committed.

How does the “literature of the wounded” reflect and critique upon the political mistakes of the previous era, and how then does the beginnings of such literature-led reflections shape and change the politics and ideologies of the present? Specific authors such as Mo Yan, Jia Pingwa, Yan Lianke, Yu Hua, and Su Tong all belong to the literary period of the “literature of the wounded.” Those living in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau, and other Chinese living overseas also have their own political ideologies and stories. While the “literature of the wounded’ in mainland China uses the Cultural Revolution as its mirror, most overseas Chinese writers continuously return to stories related to ancient China to fill in the historical gaps left behind by the trauma.

Even futuristic Chinese literature is unmistakably in conversation with China’s past, written with a sense of hope that the hold of

The “real” China is constructed through varied narratives and contains multiple images.

China’s thousands of years of history, language, geography, culture and ideologies, are constantly evolving without a fixed image. These myriad factors, though constantly changing and reshaping, can never be completely erased of its binding reality by history. chinahandsmagazine.com | China Hands

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Life & Culture the past may at last begin to loosen. Science-fiction and faith make frequent appearances in this body of literature. Liu Cixin’s magnificent Three-Body Trilogy (《三体》 San Ti), is an apocalyptic fiction that confronts the destruction of the world and collapse of all civilizations. Yet, Liu leaves open a possibility for the revival of faith and love in the future of China after post-modernism.

Still, the Cultural Revolution cannot be fully shaken off. In another short story written by Liu Cixin, The Rural Teacher, (《乡村教师》 Xiang Cun Jiao Shi), he tells a tale of a village teacher who is determined to teach the children about the basics of Newton’s three laws of motion even as he nears his deathbed. Faced with a group of children who are unable to continue schooling, and have nothing but farming and poverty to look forward to in their lives, the village teacher’s efforts are almost entirely futile and meaningless. Yet these seemingly hopeless struggles are what help save the world from destruction. Some interpret Liu Cixin’s writings as overly sci-fi and idealistic, but others feel that in the desperate, irrational, and crazy era of the Cultural Revolution, it is only writers who held on dearly to their beliefs in education, knowledge, and that immovable faith in the future, who managed to save their humanity.

An author whose view on humanity vastly differs from Liu is Han Song. Han’s futuristic novels are similarly written in dystopia while his experiences as a reporter provide him with a deeper and more comprehensive view of China’s reality. Han’s latest work, Subway (《地铁》Di Tie), is a reflection of the alienation of technology. In the novel, the subway is a living hell in the realm of humans. The subway tunnels bring to mind Yan Lianke’s similar metaphor of tunnels in war as a living hell. Both are undoubtedly iconic items of two different eras in China, and the transition from underground tunnels to subways seems to hint to the reader that China has descended into yet another living tragedy, be it war, the Cultural Revolution, or cold materialism.

Despite the weight of the past and an uncertain future, contemporary Chinese literature does not neglect the daily rhythms of how we eat, pray, and love. For those born in China during the 90s, “daily life” holds a special meaning. The China of the 1990’s rapidly turned towards materialism and mercantilism. The increasing focus on “daily life” reflects the atomization of the individual human being under the pressure of capitalism and weakened societal links.

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Ha Jin, a Chinese author who has lived in the US for near 30 years, has won several top literary prizes for his English works. In his speech, “The Individual and Literature” (《个人与文学》 Ge Ren Yu Wen Xue), he remarks that, “when I first began to write, I was always looking to be the representative voice of a specific group of people.

But I later realized that you can represent no one but yourself. To write what touches your own soul - that is the most individualistic, and yet also the most universal.”

For a reviewer of Chinese literature for Western audiences, there is a sense of helplessness that the general reader might not be genuinely concerned about contempo-

rary Chinese literature, but holds a greater interest in contemporary China instead.

When Chinese-American author Amy Tan spoke at the International Shanghai Literary Festival in 2012, a participant mentioned that some Western readers had taken the representations of China in her book as the real China today, just like how people form oversimplified impressions of China through movies such as Disney’s Mulan or Ang Lee’s Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon. None of these, of course, speaks to the real China.

How else does one recount the story of China? Is it a China that has surged in economic progress and seeking to move towards peaceful development, as shown during the

Life & Culture

illustration by karen tian Beijing Olympics? Or is it a China filled with corruption, high-speed train collisions, and earthquakes, a country with a high GDP but low standards of living and happiness index?

It is true that all the stories reflect the reality in China, but they are only different parts of the full story. In other words, individually, they do not reflect a far more objective or comprehensive view of China than what you would expect through Western movies.

The “real” China is constructed through varied narratives and contains multiple images. China’s thousands of years of history, language, geography, culture and ideologies, are constantly evolving without a fixed image. These myriad factor, though constantly

changing and reshaping, can never be completely erased of its binding reality by history. Contemporary China is the result of a gradual layering process through history.

For example, one could say that China is rooted in Confucianism. This is not inaccurate. But there also exists Taoism, which was born and developed in China; Buddhism that influenced and entered China during the Han Dynasty; and other Western influences and thoughts that shaped China in the modern era (such as the spirit of enlightenment, humanism, and even the basis of justification for the legality of today’s government – Marxism.) These influences have all converged with the lives of the people

in China. Whenever crises arise in Chinese history, one question seems to predominate: with such rich histories and cultures, do the Chinese really have a source of faith?

The countless images of China are as complicated as the maze that led a China professor to kill an overseas sinologist in Jorge Luis Borges’ short story, El jardín de senderos que se bifurcan (A Garden of Forking Paths). In it, Borges raises the eternal question of who can represent China.

It is precisely this inability to find a simple representation and summary of China that makes discussion of contemporary Chinese literature even more meaningful. Throughout history, literature has always been a complicated form of art that holds value in the implicit and sublime. It is this implicitness and complexity that holds out in the fight against the voice of dogmatic ideologies and struggles against an oversimplification of the divide between the east and the west.

As such, the most effective way to meander through the complexities and multiple images of China is probably through literature.

Contemporary Chinese literature, like the multiple images of China, is a maze, not with intent to confound, but as the only possible route to understanding the country.

Dan S. Wang, a second-generation Chinese-American artist, has also been drawn to the metaphor of the maze. In his works, the map of his ancestral hometown Shandong is transformed into a maze, the end of which may be a fairyland as told in Chinese myths or perhaps just the remains of a forced demolition. Through his maze, we see Wang’s identity search as a Chinese born and bred in America. At the same time, Wang’s artwork gives a hint of the disorienting effects of globalization and modernity - are we really left with no other escape routes?

The map is a maze, and the maze is also a map. The maze of contemporary Chinese literature provides its readers with a map to enter the realities of contemporary China, and perhaps a possible way out of the maze and into China’s future.

Xiaoyu Xia is a graduate student at Fudan University concentrating on contemporary Chinese literature and mid-20th century modern Chinese literature.

Contact her at xiaoyu_lazur@163.com.

Sophia Ng is a 2013 graduate of Fudan University, where she majored in Chinese language and literature. She is currently training at Singapore’s National Institute of Education to become a Chinese language teacher. Contact her at sophia.ngcx@gmail.com. chinahandsmagazine.com | China Hands

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At the Border

of China & Soho

Jennifer Lu visits the Museum of Chinese in America

T

he Museum of Chinese in America faces Chinatown from the front, and Soho from the back. Designed by Maya Lin ‘81, ARC ‘86, ART ‘87, MOCA has all the wood paneling, airy floor to ceiling windows and sans serif font requisite for hipster approval. From the street, it’s clear that MOCA is no Chinese kitchen supply store or supermarket; its sleek metal sign stands out among the colorful awnings of the neighboring stores.

Founded as the New York Chinatown His36

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torical Project in 1980, the museum began as a home for the neighborhood’s artifacts and stories that were being lost as the older generation passed. Between dumpster diving and oral history recording, historians Charles Lai and Jack Tchen gained the support of student activists and neighborhood residents, and the Chinatown Historical Project found a home in an old school building in central Chinatown. Over the years, it changed its name to the Museum of Chinese in America. After 9/11, MOCA was chosen by the city and

state to help anchor the revival of downtown New York. The museum moved into its current building at 215 Centre Street in 2009, and now welcomes 30,000 visitors a year.

On a summer Friday at noon, the museum floor clicks with the shoes of security guards and not much else. Two parents with their adopted Chinese daughters wander through the exhibit: one girl inspects an old laundry iron, marveling over its lack of plastic parts and flashing lights, while the other oohs and aahs over the silk shoes in Shanghai

Life & Culture

atown

photo by jennifer lu Glamour: New Women 1910s-40s, an exhibit on women’s fashion in the early twentieth century Shanghai. The parents read the plaques in murmured voices to their children.

“Isn’t that neat, girls?”

MOCA’s collection includes oral histories by Chinatown residents, who detail their immigration experience and life in a country where they were viewed with suspicion, mockery, and outright hostility. The histories have been translated into English, and recordings play throughout the museum,

integrated into various exhibits. Polished, Northeastern voices take on stories of racism and the struggle for assimilation, and you’re faintly reminded of translators whose voices run in documentaries, as the camera remains steady on the native interviewee. Something seemed lost in translation.

Some recordings are striking: you’re told to sit in a chair and suddenly an interrogation begins, as a disembodied immigration officer hurls inane and impossibly detailed questions at you, determined to ensnare you in a lie and send you on the next ship home. The clipped voice sounds familiar, similar to the ones in the other recordings.

In the back is the general store, a recreation of the buildings that served as shop, post office, pharmacy, and travel agency for the local community. It’s gorgeously installed, with exposed brick, enough shelving to make an Ikea junkie jealous, and a stunningly patterned tin ceiling seemingly made for Instagram. Faded medicinal recipes and letters lie under glass cases; apothecary jars hold roots and shoots for herbal soups. The vintage packaging is a design lover’s dream.

Such general stores may be a thing of the past, but their modern counterparts are alive and well: from garages of herbalists overflowing with dried herbs to bustling medicinal stores where assistants measure ingredients on hand-held scales, there’s a vitality and messiness the museum’s replica could not capture. Its perfection calls to mind a trendy Tribeca shop, or the set of a photoshoot, not the Chinatown stores of steaming pork buns or freshly killed fish.

The mission of heritage museums is to preserve and to educate, and to direct attention to cultural narratives that may not be remembered by the dominant history. While some see a conflict between addressing a specific cultural audience and appealing to a broader population, MOCA executive director Helen Koh disagrees. “A lot of people compare the Chinese-American experience with their own ethnic group experience—Jewish-American, Italian-American, African-American— there are things they can relate to, laws that pertain to each of their ethnic group, some of which originated with laws that excluded the Chinese.”

With the arrival of luxury condos and the spread of fashion stores in Chinatown, the border between Chinatown and Soho is becoming increasingly permeable. MOCA’s current exhibitions bridge the two neighborhoods, particularly Front Row: Chinese American Designers, which features Chinese designers in New York, many of whom have

Polished, Northeastern voices take on stories of racism and the struggle for assimilation, and you’re faintly reminded of translators whose voices run in documentaries, as the camera remains steady on the native interviewee.

Something seemed lost in translation. stores in the area. Koh notes that the Front Row and Shanghai Glamour exhibits have had a wide range of audiences, “even people who don’t really care about China, just fashion. The neighborhood’s changing [and] every museum wants a bigger audience, so we do have these shows that have a pulse on people’s interest today and make an important contribution to the discussion.”

Koh adds, “Our permanent exhibition does a good job of explaining that immigration experience, not only in a pedagogical sense, but also emotionally captivating and inclusive.”

“When [the museum] opened, much of it focused on Chinese-Americans, but it embraced all the communities in Chinatown.”

As the neighborhood continues to change and its borders shift, so will MOCA. Currently on display at the museum is a special exhibit, Front Row: Chinese American Designers. It features 16 of New York’s Chinese-American fashion designers, celebrating their achievements as well as documenting the city’s shift from the garment center to fashion capital. MOCA is open daily except for Mondays from 11am to 6pm and is open until 9pm on Thursdays, when admission is free. All other days student admission with ID is $5; general admission is $10. 215 Centre Street, New York, NY. Jennifer Lu is a sophomore at Yale University and associate artistic director for the magazine. Contact her at jennifer.lu@yale.edu. chinahandsmagazine.com | China Hands

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The

View

From the Border

by Jennifer Lu

In this Section

Lessons From China p. 41 A Bull in China p. 42 The Elusive Settlement p. 43 The Third Enlightenment p. 45

Opinion

illustrations by Sherril wang

Editorial

China’s Scientific Emergence Why the need for continued US science funding is greater than ever

by Jason parisi

D

uring the typically hot, humid summer of 2006 in Hefei, Anhui Province, Chinese physicists and engineers were putting the final finishing touches to a marvellous piece of scientific apparatus called a tokamak. A tokamak is a machine used to hold star matter in a process called nuclear fusion, the elusive dream of scientists and a staple of science fiction movies for decades. If realized, it would generate carbon-free, reliable, sustainable electricity for domestic and industrial consumption.

The tokamak was originally supposed to be built in the US, but due to a lack of funding, the project never materialized. Fifty years ago, the story probably would have ended here, and the machine would have only existed on blueprints and in the minds of a handful of physicists. However, the baton of scientific progress was picked up, not by the traditional scientific powerhouses in Europe or Japan, but by China.

China was motivated by many factors, not least addressing unanswered scientific questions, as well as providing a sustainable solution for China’s pressing energy issues. The project, known as EAST, was constructed with a budget of ¥300 million ($50 million), around a twentieth of the estimated cost of the scuttled project in the US. It has impressed many physicists and engineers with its capabilities, and is China’s

first major foray into the international fusion community.

The rise of Chinese physics acumen is not just limited to fusion research. A Yale physicist recently told me that five years ago, he rarely read Chinese published papers because the quality was far behind research conducted in the US, Japan, and Europe.

Five years later, thirty percent of the papers he reads come directly from Chinese institutions. Similar advances are being made in many other scientific fields, from space travel to the life sciences. The days when the US and Europe held a monopoly on cutting edge research are ending, as China makes scientific advancement a national priority.

In the past decade, China’s R&D budget has increased by twenty percent annually, far outpacing GDP growth, doubling its R&D intensity from 0.9% of GDP in 2000 to 1.8% of GDP in 2010. Four of the world’s top publishing cities are located in China. By 2020, China aims to spend 2.5% of GDP on R&D, putting it on par with Germany and the US, countries that leverage R&D as a key economic driver.

There are however, three main factors that could severely dampen Chinese’s rapid scientific emergence. First, the inefficient use of research funds: prominent Chinese scientists have expressed that misuse of science funding is threatening the country’s scien-

A scientifically weak US could become technologically dependent on China for many technologies, from transportation to healthcare; replacing oil import dependence with Chinese technological import dependence.

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jason parisi tific emergence. Second, the quality of Chinese university education: while China does a good job of educating students at its few elite institutions, the quality of education provided for the vast majority of its twelve million undergraduates is severely lacking.

A concentration of funds and expertise in a handful of institutions could severely stifle innovation. Third, China’s serious levels of institutional corruption: although China’s new leadership has made fighting corruption a national priority, such ingrained institutional habits will not be subdued overnight.

While China’s emerging scientific might should be a cause for celebration, it is increasingly being coupled with the demise of science funding in the US. So concerned are many of America’s academic leaders that over 100 American university presidents have issued a call for renewed scientific investment. R&D has substantial economic

Opinion value, with research showing that for some forms of research, every dollar invested leads to more than twice that amount of additional economic output within twelve months. The Chinese government has realised the economic potency of science, and is investing heavily. The US would do well to remember this lesson. In a recent survey of Chinese studying in the US, students expressed that within fifty years, they saw China becoming significantly more innovative than the US. In the 1990s, there was an exodus of Russian scientists to the US, with generous science funding in the States being a primary attractor. If China becomes more liberal and accessible to foreigners, a large migration of highly skilled STEM workers from the US is a distinct possibility. Due to the massive body of scientific capital in the US,

the brain drain may be slow, taking decades.

I have already seen Chinese born scientists, previously attracted to the US because of generous funding, spending much research time back in China, mainly because of dwindling US funding and lucrative opportunities in China; a handful have moved back altogether.

It is imperative that China’s rapid scientific expansion is not associated with a decline in US scientific might: two scientific superpowers compete productively, create greater opportunities and incentives for scientific collaboration and exchange, and disincentivise conflict. Furthermore, as eminent fusion physicist Stewart Prager has stated, “The United States can either design and build fusion energy plants or we can buy them from Asia or Europe”: a scientifically

weak US could become technologically dependent on China for many technologies, from transportation to healthcare; replacing oil import dependence with Chinese technological import dependence. Finally, scientific prowess combined with political and economic freedoms attracts minds and investment from all over the world, enriching societies and building bridges. With both China and the US as science powers, a golden age, not only of science, but also of US-China relations could be triggered, but only if the US renews its commitment to science.

Jason Parisi is a sophomore at Yale University and an associate editor of the magazine currently on an exchange at Tsinghua University. Contact him at jason.parisi@yale.edu.

Book Review

Lessons From China E

ach year, hundreds of recent American college graduates, motivated by a desire to do good or hoping for one last youthful adventure before starting their lives in earnest, decide to decamp to China to teach. The China that these Americans see is undoubtedly very different from the China most Americans know only from the front pages. Indeed, it is different from even those whose first-hand exposure to China never reaches beyond glimmering Shanghai.

Amy Werbel GRD ‘96, a former Fulbright Scholar and professor at the SUNY Fashion Institute of Technology, in Lessons from China, takes readers into her American history classroom at the Guangdong University of Foreign Studies. By looking inside China’s classrooms, Werbel gives readers a glimpse of China’s future and its complicated relationship with the United States.

The students’ essay responses on subjects spanning the Civil Rights Movement, the gilded age, the hippie movement, Viet-

nam, and Native Americans create an anthology of perspectives on American culture. Although they often give predictable, and usually generously positive analyses of America, Werbel pushes the students to make meaningful comparisons between American history and China as they are living it now.

While the book is bid as a perspective on America, the essence of her findings are instead focused on the way American history has influenced how China’s rising generation views its own society. Her students draw parallels between the Navajo and their grandparents’ dying local cultures, Carnegie and Deng’s similar “Gospels of Wealth,” and America’s Bill of Rights with China’s “not-so-Great Firewall.”

The book is hardly a simple collection of student essays. Werbel’s own experiences navigating China are the glue that holds the essays together. She describes, almost as if she were writing her own journal, the trials of adjusting to her tiny apartment, attempting to befriend fellow teachers, nav-

by Amy Werbel reviewed by Anna Russo

igating the supermarket, and traveling on her various lecture tours throughout China as a visiting scholar.

Werbel’s style is relatable, casual, and humorous. Unfortunately, in her attempts to draw meaningful conclusions and create a readable novel, Werbel can dangerously oversimplify matters, making it necessary to note that she is drawing on a class of twenty-six students in one of the most liberal and prosperous areas of China for her insights.

From its unique perspective, Lessons from China reinforces the reality of an America and China whose fortunes are increasingly bound together, and whose need for mutual understanding grows ever more pressing.

Lessons from China by Amy Werbel. 218 pp. $8.99

Anna Russo is a freshman at Yale University. Contact her at anna.russo@yale.edu.

chinahandsmagazine.com | China Hands

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Opinion Interview

A Bull in China David Yin speaks to Jim Rogers about his daughters and why he’s as bullish as ever on China

T

here are those who believe that China is headed for a hard landing, that its corruption or unsustainable growth model will ultimately herald the end of its economic miracle. And there is Jim Rogers ‘64, the unabashed China bull who has time and again expressed his optimism in the country. “There are always opportunities in China because it has 1.3 billion people and the second-largest economy in the world,” says Rogers in an interview with China Hands. “There will be huge, huge growth.”

At 70, Rogers, who co-founded the Quantum Fund with George Soros, is as energetic as ever. When he is not speaking to the media about his investment thoughts or adding to his list of bestselling books, he can be spotted sending his two daughters to school on a bicycle. Each morning, Rogers spends 90 minutes riding his exercise bicycle, and I spoke to him during one of these sessions.

When Rogers uprooted his family from New York and moved to Singapore in 2007, he famously declared, “If you were smart in 1807 you moved to London, if you were smart in 1907 you moved to New York City, and if you are smart in 2007 you move to Asia.” I ask Rogers about his daughter, Happy’s recent success at a Chinese storytelling competition. He beams with pride as he talks about his daughters’ fluency in Chinese, “Happy won the

“Great Britain was great once, Rome was great once, Egypt was great once, but China has been great three or four times. They have had disastrous catastrophes three or four times too, so we can only hope that after 300 to 400 years of decline, it will now rise again.”

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jim rogers contest for the whole country and was the youngest in the finals. My little girls grew up speaking two native languages.” He believes the rest of the world should start learning Chinese too, “When I say learn it, be sure you learn it very well because bad Mandarin won't help you very much more than bad English will help you in the United States.”

Some argue that owing to an education system that encourages rote memorization and discourages students from speaking up, China will find it difficult to transition to an innovation-driven economy. Rogers offers his thoughts, “My daughters attend a Chinese school [in Singapore] and what they learn is far more demanding and far ahead of the level of American education.

The problem here, and also in China I've heard, is that you have to give the answer that the Ministry of Education (MOE) wants. Unless you do it the MOE way, you will not get credit no matter how accurate you are. While this is a very good and rigorous education system, it has been corrod-

Opinion ed and corrupted by all the bureaucracy.

Does that kill creativity? Maybe.”

Although Rogers believes the Chinese economic model of state-driven capitalism has made China “the most successful country in the past 30 years,” he thinks China “will have to make huge changes and adaptations because historically, no government has ever done as well as individual entrepreneurs in the long run.” In September, China opened a new free trade zone in Shanghai to experiment with financial reforms such as renminbi convertibility and interest rate liberalization. Rogers continues, “I see that China is opening up more and more, and I presume that this will continue because the Chinese leadership has so far been very smart about what needs to be done.”

Rogers explains why he is optimistic about China’s long-run prospects, “First, the Chinese save and invest a very high rate of their income. And you need capital

in order to develop your economy.” Rogers, who was a history major at Yale, then looks to the past, “Second, China has had three or four period of greatness. Great Britain was great once, Rome was great once, Egypt was great once, but China has been great three or four times. They have had disastrous catastrophes three or four times too, so we can only hope that after 300 to 400 years of decline, it will now rise again.” As if to reaffirm his confidence in the country, Rogers adds, “You can ask me again in another 100 years.”

When I ask Rogers about emerging opportunities in China, he replies, “Everything.” He says, “China doesn't have much of anything. It’s developing rapidly…but still, China needs many things.” He cites the Chinese government’s efforts to reform agriculture and clean up pollution, as well as the water shortage in Northern China.

Rogers also points to rapid growth in China’s domestic and international tourism

sectors, “Historically, Chinese people have not traveled much for a few hundred years.

Now you can get a passport and take money out of the country!”

I ask Rogers if he thinks there is a lack of dialogue between people in the US and China. Almost philosophically, he answers, “Definitely. If everyone can travel and see the world, we would all be better off.

We certainly won't have so many conflicts and so much strife. Spending three weeks jumping from city to city doesn't give you much exposure at all. We need to spend much longer time in a foreign country and getting involved with local society. We have to understand each other better.”

David Yin is a junior at Yale University and editor-in-chief of the magazine. Contact him at david.yin@yale.edu.

Interview

The Elusive Settlement Forrest Lin interviews Jeff Smith about his forthcoming book on Sino-Indian relations

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hina and India are really no closer to settlement today than they were four decades ago, says Jeff Smith, a Kraemer Strategy Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council and author of a forthcoming book on Sino-Indian relations, in a conversation with China Hands.

In his new book, Smith explores why the China-India relationship continues to be in many ways characterized by strong elements of rivalry. While the relationship has become somewhat more cooperative over the past decade, other elements of rivalry have increased at an even faster pace.

Despite the fact that China is India’s second largest trading partner, Smith argues that “the political tensions between the two nations continue to serve as the predominant focal point of this relationship, overshadowing any progress of the bilateral economic relationship.”

The rivalry, which dates back to the 1950s, remains very evident. “China and India have the longest border dispute in the world. The two nations went to war over disputed territories in 1962.” In April of this year, a Chinese military helicopter crossed into disputed territory in Ladakh, India. According to Smith, one of the reasons why this rivalry remains is that both sides conduct military patrols that tread the Line of Actual Control (LAC) separating the two nations. “The problem is that China and India do not have a mutual agreement on where the LAC is. Thus, every year, there are hundreds of reported incidents in which one nation’s patrols cross the other nation’s territory, fueling tensions between Beijing and Delhi.”

Smith is nonetheless cautiously optimistic about the possibility of a solution to the territorial disputes. “The irony is that the

Jeff smith chinahandsmagazine.com | China Hands

43

Opinion two sides generally know how to resolve the conflict. India is in control of a large territory that China claims, and China is in possession of territory that India claims.

Both of them have held on to the territory since the 1962 war. Neither side will give up that territory. They both understand that a territory-swap agreement will be necessary.

The problem is the lack of political will to make that deal happen. In both countries, the idea of offering territorial concessions is becoming less and less palatable to the public. Any type of swap deal would have to involve face-saving gestures. There are significant domestic constraints in both nations.”

“The second issue that blocks a resolution is China’s desire to acquire Towang, a border town in India’s Northeast that has great significance to Tibetan Buddhism.

Since the 1980s, China has claimed that it would agree to a border swap with India only if Towang is transferred to China.”

United States Vice President Joe Biden visited India in July in an attempt to strengthen ties between the US and India.

Both countries already enjoy good relations and brisk trade. I ask Smith to what extent is the United States’ concerted effort to strengthen ties with India directly related to a desire to check China’s power in the region. Smith believes that the US’ policy is to support a vibrant, prosperous, and increasingly stronger role for India in the Asia-Pacific region, but this policy is not necessarily a result of Obama’s "pivot to Asia.” “It’s actually a policy that started in the Bush Administration,” he adds. “The Administration saw that strong ties with India were crucial to advancing US interests in the region, and they saw that the tension and hostility that had soured US-India ties were now gone with the collapse of the Soviet Union. This shift towards India has been a strong component of both the Obama and Bush Administrations. It is not explicitly designed to contain or balance China, but it is impossible to ignore the fact that the US

“In both countries, the idea of offering territorial concessions is becoming less and less palatable to the public. Any type of swap deal would have to involve face-saving gestures. There are significant domestic constraints in both nations.”

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Volume 2 Issue I | Fall 2013

and India both have common security concerns when it comes to China.”

In 1998, bilateral trade between China and India was $1 billion; by 2011 it had surged to $74 billion. India and China are two of the fastest growing economies in the world, but the large competitiveness gap between the two countries means that trade has not done much to ameliorate security concerns. “The reason that the growth in the economic relationship has not done more to help is because the trade is unbalanced. China exports to India twice more than what India exports to China. Both countries regularly challenge each other by erecting barriers to market access.”

Smith points to a few examples of how the Sino-Indian rivalry has played out in the economic realm. First, he references India’s plummeting pharmaceutical exports to China. “Many attribute this to China’s unfair trading practices that don’t give these pharmaceutical companies access to the Chinese market. China has similar complaints about Indian intervention in Chinese investments that have been deemed to pose a security threat.” Moreover, “no country in the world has brought more anti-dumping cases against China at the WTO than India has.”

In the past two years, China’s maritime disputes with Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam have become incensed, and much attention has been given to those disputes.

I ask Smith whether there is a difference in the way China approaches those maritime disputes, versus China’s approach to the Sino-Indian border dispute. Smith believes that India has actually been seen as an exception to the rule with regards to China’s dealings with land-based disputes. “In 1949, the PRC initiated 23 territorial disputes.

Almost all the land-border disputes have been resolved on reasonable terms. China reached many of these settlements only very recently. India is really the only outstanding land border dispute. China has two smaller disputes with North Korea and Bhutan, but they are relatively minor.”

“The conventional wisdom is that China has been more magnanimous in settling its territorial disputes than it has been settling its maritime disputes, which over the past few years have become quite acrimonious.

But, the Indian border dispute is the dispute that has evaded settlement for a long time.”

Forrest Lin is a sophomore at Yale University and an associate editor for the magazine. Contact him at forrest.lin@yale.edu.

Opinion Interview

The Third Enlightenment and the Thucydidean trap

Dylan Sun speaks with the Brookings Institution’s Cheng Li

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his summer was a busy one for China watchers, beginning in June when Xi Jinping, China’s new president, visited President Barack Obama at a bilateral summit in California. A week later, Madame Fu Ying, Speaker of the National People's Congress of China, toured the US capital. Less than a month later, Secretary of State John Kerry ‘66 and Treasury Jacob Lew would host a delegation of Chinese officials for the Fifth US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. In the midst of these events, Dr. Cheng Li, a political scholar and commentator at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank, shared his insights on the future of US-China relations with China Hands.

Our discussion opens with Dr. Li’s thoughts on President Xi's recent visit to the United States. Dr. Li, in his affable, easy-going style disarms the fear that there will be a new Cold War between US and China. He references Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta.

Foreign policy realists often invoke it to explain that high tension is inevitable when the rise of one superpower provokes the fear and hostility of the existing power. In Dr. Li's perspective, President Xi and Madame Fu's visits to the US have demonstrated that senior leadership in both nations are working on avoiding this Thucydidean trap, which he dismissed as something belonging to the 19th century.

"We are in an era of economic and cultural globalization. China has been endeavoring to integrate into the global system, which is drastically different from what the Soviet Union did, namely, to create its own system and isolate its people from the outside world.

In addition, there is an arms race between the two nations. China is not building a big army, and President Obama is trying to cut military expenses. Lastly, as Presidents Xi and Obama discussed, the Chinese Dream and the American Dream are interconnected.” Both countries, he says, are more than occupied with

their own domestic issues.

Nonetheless, China’s recent territorial controversies has raised the specter of US intervention. Even here, Dr. Li strikes a positive note. "There is a fundamental conceptual difference between precaution and repression of China. Many scholars have argued that the US is attempting to repress China's rise. I doubt this view. It is natural for a superpower like the US to be cautious of China … however, this is not the same as saying that the US is trying to limit China's rise or fight wars with China. Why will the US and China – two big powers – fight wars for small countries," Dr. Li challenges.

Chinese and China watchers alike are both anxious to see where President Xi will lead China's cultural and political reforms over the next decade. In the past century, China's politics and Confucian culture have been influenced by various foreign traditions, namely, liberal democracy, capitalism and Marxism.

The key question, explains Dr. Li, is how China’s political system and culture can harmonize these different traditions into one coherent future. He believes that Constitutionalism, an embrace of the rule of law as the guiding national ethos, should be the country’s central cultural and political theme in the next twenty years.

"I called it the ‘Third Enlightenment’ of China in my introduction to Professor Weifang He's book, In the Name of Justice: Striving for the Rule of Law in China. The first Enlightenment arrived along with the May Fourth Movement almost a century ago, bringing with it Western intellectual traditions.

The second Enlightenment came in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, symbolizing the return of humanism and China's economic reform and opening. The third Enlightenment, in my view, will strengthen the rule of law," and promises to cement China’s ascendance.

Before departing, Dr. Li thoughts turns to the growing number of Chinese students who

cheng li studied in America and have since returned to China to begin political careers, typically by becoming village chiefs in the Chinese countryside. He commends their dedication to the country, commenting that “the fifth-generation leaders in China [the current leadership] have undergone hardship and adverse experiences in which they did not have a choice.

The young generation in China nowadays is different. They have grown up with much better conditions. Thus working as a village chief will greatly help them grow and mature. I hope that China in the future can really reform its mechanism of choosing officials …

China needs to uphold meritocracy in order to maintain the efficiency of the government and the stability of the state." How this new generation’s time in the United States will influence China’s governance can only be seen with time.

Dylan Sun is a junior at Yale University and editor-in-chief of the magazine. Contact him at dilong.sun@yale.edu. chinahandsmagazine.com | China Hands

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Features

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Volume 2 Issue I | Fall 2013

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