Strategic Reassurance

The Rise and Descent of “Strategic Reassurance” in the Obama Administration* Emily Szu-hua Chen** Keywords: US-China Relations, Strategic Reassurance I.

Introduction

American policy options toward China are often delineated as an alternative between “containment” and “engagement,” with containment focusing on coercive policies designed to keep China from developing and diminishing American influence in Asia and engagement as strategic adjustment to legitimate Chinese intentions to establish an East Asian order that is both conducive to US interests and distinguished by peaceful resolution of conflicts of interests.1 Throughout years with the change of its government, the United States has continually shifted its China policy by ongoing re-evaluation of Chinese behaviors and objectives in order to serve the US interests. During the Bill Clinton administration, U.S. pursued a “moving toward” strategic partnership policy. When George Walker Bush took over the presidency, there was a clearly divided difference in U.S.’s perception of China before and after the 911 incidents. In the early period, U.S. positioned China as its “strategic competitor,” while after the 911 attack, China was encouraged to be a “responsible stakeholder” to put collaboration ahead of competition.

When Barack Hussein Obama took office in 2009, in the face of rising China, the Obama administration was apt to regard China as “anything but an enemy” with the tendency to adopt the “engagement” policy instead of “containment.” In fact, U.S.’s containment policy toward the Soviet Union after World War II was no longer plausible. China has gradually integrated into the global economy and had been overtly urged by the United States to move in this direction since the Nixon administration.

* Part of this essay has been developed into a co-authored article, published by New Asia, a bilingual (Korean and English) quarterly journal issued by the New Asia Research Institute (NARI), under the name of “The Ties That Bind: The Emerging Asia-Pacific Regional Order and Taiwan-Korea Relations” in Summer 2012. ** Emily Szu-hua Chen is a graduate student in the Center for East Asian Studies at Stanford University.

1 Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 176.

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At the same time, a more engaging attitude toward China is best served for President Obama’s global foreign policy priorities. President Obama had four priority issues which required China’s cooperation. The most crucial one was to spur global economic recovery. China’s economic growth, averaging 10 percent of a year and its thorough integration into the economies of the region through a web of trade and investment had irreversibly altered the geopolitical landscape, not to mention China is the largest foreign holder of United States Treasury securities after boosting its stockpile by $14.7 billion to $1.17 trillion in March 2012.2 And the U.S trade deficit with China in 2012 is on pace to exceed last year's gap of $295.5 billion, which was an all-time high for any country.3 Moreover, he also met the challenge of halting or curtailing the Iranian and North Korea nuclear weapons programs. China had leverage to potentially affect these two countries with its being Iran’s largest trading partner as well as a major investor in Iran’s energy sector, and the only country with a significant relationship with North Korea. Thirdly, he wanted to end the genocide in Darfur and China’s large oil investments in Sudan gave it a voice in Khartoum, which so far had not been raised against the Darfur massacres but could be. Lastly, he also wanted to begin to cope with the problem of climate change with China’s being the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases since 2009.4 In addition, what is more apparent to the Obama team is that a uni-dimensional approach to China would generate unsatisfactory results. That is, U.S. policy toward a rising China could not merely lie on economic blandishments, military capabilities, and pressure on human rights while a policy of indulgence, endurance of assertive Chinese conduct, or indifference to its internal evolution, could embolden bad behavior and frighten U.S. allies and partners. The foreign policy team therefore would deal with China in a resolutely pragmatic and non-ideological way.5 The big picture of President Obama's policy choice of engagement toward China is as follows:

2

Wei Tian, “China Remains Largest Foreign US Creditor,” China Daily, May 16, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2012-05/16/content_15309067.htm 3 Martin Crutsinger, “U.S. Trade Deficit Widens as Imports Set a Record,” USA Today, May 10, 2012, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/story/2012-05-10/march-trade-deficit/54871710/1. (accessed May 20, 2012).

4 Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), pp. 2-21.

5 Ibid., pp. 3-5 2

President Obama's policy choice of engagement toward China

Containment policy no longer plausible

Needing for China's cooperations

China's gradual integration into global economy

Avoiding unidimensional approach

Obama's four foreign policy prioirities relating to China

Global economic recovery

Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs

Genocide in Darfur

Climate change

Pragmatic and noideological way

Diagram 1 The Big Picture of President Obama's policy choice of engagement toward China

Based on the big picture above, one can tell that the Obama foreign policy team bore some fundamental strategic judgments toward China as an essential framework for future decisions and actions under the “engagement” policy toward China. In terms of U.S.’s cognition toward China, with its most measures appearing poised, the rising China as a major power would become the second most influential country in the world within a generation. As for the U.S.’s attempts, the likelihood of China’s rise as a stabilizing and constructive force could increase with the America’s relationship with China.6 II.

The Rise of the “Strategic Reassurance”: September 2009- April 2010

Having a clear mind of intentions toward China, the Obama administration’s next step was to embody its strategic thoughts in real works. Basically, the United States is inclined to build a relationship from a base of tangible elements of cooperation, but this time was not the case. The U.S.-China relationship had to be developed from symbolically diplomatic interactions first. To the U.S., the label for the relationship could be a safety net to avoid the kind of down-turns that

6

Ibid., p.7 3

had occurred in 1981, 1989, 1993, and 2001, which were the years characterized by shifting administrations. In other words, starting with labeling the relationship could consolidate the bilateral relationship toward a positive direction during regime changes and move toward to cooperate on critical global issues soon. On the other hand, for some historical and cultural reasons, Chinese has long tended to require a title to characterize their relations with others, as we could see its establishment of “strategic partnerships” with some countries, and then move on to more specific cooperation.7 For example, the Bush administration had settled on the terms of “constructive, cooperative, and candid” to describe the bilateral relationships. i.

September-November 2009: the Shaping of the Concept of “Strategic Reassurance”

Having the request for a label for the relationship, in September 2009, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, James B. Steinberg mentioned Sino-American relations in a keynote speech delivered at the Center for a New American Security, and brought up “strategic reassurance.” It was said that the U.S. and its allies would acknowledge China’s economic strength and military modernization, and reassure that the U.S. would not suppress China’s rising in Asia on the condition that China shall ensure that its “peaceful rise” would not jeopardize other countries’ security and well-beings. In other words, the “strategic reassurance” rests on a core, if tacit, bargain between the U.S. and China, in a sense that the U.S. will not oppress the rise of China while China has to make clear its concerns of world interests.8 “Strategic reassurance” here was nothing more than a tactical concept without solid details, which stated the intentions of the United States to serve the symbolic need of the relationship.9 The concept was soon realized in President Obama’s state visit to China in November 2009. At

7

Ibid., p.23.

Part of the James B. Steinberg’s Keynote Address at the Center for a New American Security reads “…Strategic reassurance rests on a core, if tacit, bargain. Just as we and our allies must make clear that we are prepared to welcome China’s “arrival”, as you all have so nicely put it, as a prosperous and successful power, China must reassure the rest of the world that its development and growing global role will not come at the expense of security and well-being of others… “ 9 James B. Steinberg’s definition of “strategic reassurance” is different from the original meaning first introduced

by Banning Garrett in the year 2001, then the director of Asia programs at the Atlantic Council of the United States.

According to Banning Garrett, strategic reassurance hope to address and resolve the causes of mistrust among two nations, especially suspicions about the perceived “long-term” strategic intentions, such as political, military and economic objectives. It is more of a strategic method with its short-term tactical measures - “Confidence Building Measures” (CBMs) - to be carried out in advance. (The major difference between CBMs and SRMs is a country’s willingness to guarantee its strategic intent to its counterparts. That is, the CBMs are in favor of the technical level, while SRMs tends to emphasize more on psychological level like a country’s strategic interests and core values. ) However, James B. Steinberg sees “strategic reassurance” as a short-term tactical method. See Banning Garrett, “The Need for Strategic Reassurance in the 21st Century,” Arms Control Today 31, no. 2 (March 2001): 6.

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the invitation of President Hu Jintao of the People’s Republic of China, President Obama was paying a state visit to China from November 15 to 18 in 2009. On November 17, President Hu Jintao held a press conference with visiting U.S. President Obama, jointly issuing an “U.S.-China Joint Statement” in Beijing. In this statement, both countries agreed to strengthen coordination and cooperation on many major issues respecting global stability and prosperity, and promoted world peace in the face of increasing global challenges, resulting in greater interdependence among countries. The statement encompassed issues about U.S.-China relationship, building and deepening bilateral strategic trust, economic cooperation and global recovery, regional and global challenges as well as issues of climate, energy and environment. The following will take a closer look at the bilateral strategic mutual trust in the statement to examine the implementation of “strategic reassurance.”

According to the “U.S.-China Joint Statement” that the two countries reached a consensus on strengthening bilateral strategic mutual trust, it seemed that the Sino-American relations were to move towards the direction of what James B. Steinberg said about the “strategic reassurance.”10 As to China, it also responded to “China’s peaceful rise” issue that China will unswervingly follow the road of peaceful development, pursue a win-win strategy, and be dedicated to promoting a peaceful, prosperous and harmonious world.11 The United States undertook to recognize the fact of the rise of China, and reiterated the position that United States would welcome a strong, prosperous and successful China that would play a greater role in international affairs. The two countries further defined their future relationship as a partnership to jointly cope with global challenges.12 Albeit the “strategic reassurance” was not mentioned in the statement, the two sides were actually committed to each other to collaborate in addressing challenges, which should be a relevant response to “strategic reassurance.” ii.

Fleshing Out the Concept

The proposal of the concept of strategic reassurance laid a good foundation for the U.S.-China

10

Kun-Yuan Liu, “Obama Zhongguo Xing, Quanqiu Guanzhu Ruhe Wei Zhongguo Dingwei” (Obama’s Trip to China Arouses Global Concerns about How the U.S. Will Position China), The Central News Agency, November 13, 2009, http://rss.cna.com.tw/rss_topread.php?t=3&id=200911130078&class=PF&co de=911b785a240407e9b1e07b08c5c9ef3e. (accessed January 13, 2010).

11 Part of the “U.S.-China Joint Statement” reads, “…the Chinese side said that it resolutely follows the path of peaceful development and a win-win strategy of opening-up, and is committed to promoting the building of a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity…”

12 Part of the “U.S.-China Joint Statement” reads, “…the two sides reiterated that they are committed to building a positive, cooperative and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship for the 21st century, and will take concrete actions to steadily build a partnership to address common challenges…”

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relationship. In order to strengthen its efficacy, the concrete principles was then needed developing. Under the Obama foreign policy team, the concept rested on three pillars. First of all, China should be considered a potential partner in resolving crucial global issues rather than an inevitable rival. Second, the administration believed it was critical that China should rise within the context of international law and norms. Third, the administration sought to ensure that China’s rise served to stabilize the Asia-Pacific region by three ways, which were: (1) working hard to enhance existing alliances in Asia-Pacific; (2) participating actively in the multilateral institutions of the region, especially the East Asia Summit; and (3) strengthening bilateral and multilateral trade ties with the region through FTA and Trans-Pacific Partnership.13

Strategic Reassurance

Bilateral Approach : A welcoming approach to rising China.

Global Institutional Approach: A resolve to see that its rise is consistent with international norms and law.

Regional Approach: An endeavor to shape the Asia-Pacific environment to ensure that China’s rise is stabilizing rather than disruptive.

Diagram 2.1 The Three Pillars of “Strategic Reassurance” of the Obama Administration

iii.

January- February 2010: Two Head-on Challenges

The strategic reassurance was soon being applied to two sensitive issues concerning Taiwan and Tibet respectively, which Chinese officials had defined as their “core interests,” shortly after Obama’s visit to China in late 2009. On January 29, 2010, the Obama Administration announced its arms sales to Taiwan on the basis of “Taiwan Relations Act” (TRA), a U.S. law in regulating

13

Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), pp. 7, and 69-71.

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US-Taiwan relations in the absence of formal diplomatic ties, specifically in the Section 3(a).14 The sum amounted to $ 6.4 billion, including 60 Blackhawk helicopters ($ 3.1 billion), 114 Patriot missiles ($ 2.81 billion), 12 advanced Harpoon anti-ship missiles ($ 37 million), Communication equipment ($ 340 million) and 2 Osprey mine-hunting ships ($ 105 million).15 It was not included the submarine feasibility study, which the Defense Department representatives said was inconsistent with the defensive character of the TRA article, as well as Taiwan’s requests of F-16 C/D fighter aircraft to replace aging planes in Taiwan's air force.

To the U.S., arms sales to Taiwan offered three distinctive purposes, inclusive of providing Taiwan with wherewithal to resist a Chinese attack long enough for U.S. assistance, signaling the U.S. remained committed to Taiwan’s security, and demonstrating U.S. credibility to other allies in the region who would be alarmed at the use of force in the Taiwan Strait.16 However, since the Taiwan issue has long been China’s core interest, China was indignant about the incident, and accused the United States of the violation of the “August 17th Communiqué”, in which it explicitly referred that the United States “intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution.”17 In order to protest the United States’ arms sales to Taiwan, China one-sidedly suspended the bilateral military exchanges, postponed high-level consultation on strategic security, arms control and non-proliferation issues, and imposing sanctions on those U.S. companies involved in arms sales to Taiwan.18 The worse was that when this storm was not subsided yet, despite China's opposition, President Obama met Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader, on February 18, 2010. President Obama reiterated the administration’s view that it supported the genuine autonomy for Tibet for the preservation of distinct religious and cultural heritage, but stressed that Tibet was a part of China and urged the Dalai Lama to persist in dialogue with the Chinese.19 The United States saw this meeting as a religious issue, but China claimed that this act violated to their core interest.

14

Section 3(a) of the “Taiwan Relations Act” reads, “Defense articles and services in furtherance of the policy set forth in section 3301 of this title, the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”

15 Charley Keyes, “U.S. Announces $6.4 Billion Arms Deal with Taiwan,” CNN, January 29, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-01-29/world/taiwan.arms_1_one-china-taiwan-strait-strong-indignation?_s=PM:WORL D. (accessed February 5, 2010).

16 Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), p. 71 17 Shirley A. Kan, “China/Taiwan: Evolution of the ‘One China’ Policy-Key Statements from Washington, Beijing and Taipei,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (September 7,2006): 41.

18 “China Fumes at US Arms Sale to Taiwan,” The Guardian, January 30, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/30/china-reaction-us-arms-sale-taiwan. (accessed April 10, 2010).

19 Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), pp. 74-75 7

iv.

March 2010: The Implementation of Strategic Reassurance

To tackle the knotty situations, Jeffrey A. Bader, then the senior director for East Asian affairs on the National Security Council, with the ambassador from the Chinese embassy, Zhou Wenzhong, together laid out a sequence of diplomatic steps to soften the impact of these decisions on relations by chronological order: a visit to Beijing by Deputy Secretary James Steinberg and Jeffrey Bader, President Obama’s meeting with the incoming Chinese ambassador, Zhang Yesui, and the public statement by the United States on its arms sales policy that lowered the temperature. All the diplomatic moves above provided certain authoritative assurances toward the U.S.-China relations.

During the Steinberg-Bader visit to Beijing in early March 2010, in the meetings with Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, Chinese officials expressed their rages over the U.S. violations of China’s “core interests” of Taiwan and Tibet, and also claimed their rights on South China Sea, which was underlined as their “national priority.” Nevertheless, the two U.S. officials were not tempted to apologize for previous actions that the U.S. considered proper and refused to assure China with arms sales to Taiwan or meet with the Dalai Lama for some specified time frame. They even played offensive with expressing the concerns of President Obama’s dissatisfaction with the undervaluation of yuan and China’s tardy on UN Security Council action to impose sanctions on Iran. Albeit the seemingly hard-line attitudes, they assured the Chinese that the U.S. was deeply committed to the relationship with China and had devoted considerable effort into building a positive relationship in the face of some domestic criticism.

After the Beijing visit came with the President Obama’s meeting with the incoming ambassador, Zhang Yesui. As expected, the White House issued a press release accenting the president was committed to further develop a positive relationship with China and the administration’s “one China” policy.20 James Steinberg also held a press conference where he reiterated the core precepts of the “one China” policy and the U.S.’s attitude toward Tibet.21 To prove its rhetoric

20

Part of the statement reads, “…He reaffirmed our one China policy and our support for the efforts made by Beijing and Taipei to reduce friction across the Taiwan Strait.” See White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs on China,” March 29, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-press-secretary-robert-gibbs-china.. (accessed May 26, 2012).

21 Part of the statement reads, “…We’ve made clear that we do not support independence for Taiwan and we oppose unilateral attempts by either side to change the status quo…[and] on Tibet, we reaffirmed our position that we do 8

reassurance credible, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner declared that the Treasury would not declare China as a currency manipulator in early April 2010. He decided to delay publication of the report to Congress on the international economic and exchange rate policies of the U.S. major trading partners until after the “Strategic and Economic Dialogue, S&ED” with China in May and the G-20 Finance Ministers and leaders meetings in June.22 v.

April 2010: The Success of Strategic Reassurance

On April 1 the Chinese announced that President Hu Jintao would come to Washington, D.C., for the Nuclear Security Summit during April 12-13. As soon as President Hu arrived in Washington on April 12, China and the U.S. agreed to announce on the record that it would work on an Iran sanctions resolution. Two presidents underwent a 90-minute conversation before the opening of a summit meeting, mainly focusing on the issues of Iran and bilateral economic relations without dwelling on the two decisions Washington had made on Taiwan and Tibet. At the end of the meeting, President Obama warned Beijing to let market forces push up the value of China’s currency, and assured President Hu that he was “sensitive to China’s energy needs” and would work to ensure that Beijing had a steady supply of oil if Iran cut off oil shipments to China in retaliation for joining in sanctions.23 This indicated that the previous sequence of reassurance steps had worked, leading the normal setback to relations after a Taiwan arms sale and meeting with the Dalai Lama to a shorter and less intense course than usual.

III.

The Descent of the “Strategic Reassurance”

Nevertheless, by the middle of 2010, U.S.-China relations underwent a downward spiral. The rising tide of nationalism began to gain its leverage on the scholarly articles, media and finally on the public discourse on foreign policy. Starting from 2008 and continuing into 2010, there has

consider Tibet to be a part of the PRC and do not support independence for Tibet, but we strongly support continued dialogue between the Chinese government and the representatives of the Dali Lama to resolve the differences.” See U.S. Department of State, “the Deputy Secretary’s Trip to the Balkans and Asia,” FPC Briefing, March 29, 2010, http://fpc.state.gov/139203.htm. (accessed May 26, 2012).

22 Part of the statement reads,” …China's inflexible exchange rate has made it difficult for other emerging market economies to let their currencies appreciate. A move by China to a more market-oriented exchange rate will make an essential contribution to global rebalancing. Our objective is to use the opportunity presented by the G-20 and S&ED meetings with China to make material progress in the coming months.” See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Center,” Statement of Treasury Secretary Geithner on the Report to Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies,” April 3, 2010, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/tg627.aspx. (accessed May 26, 2012).

23 David E. Sanger and Mark Landler, “China Pledges to Work with U.S. on Iran Sanctions,” New York Times, April 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/13/world/13summit.html. (accessed May 25, 2012).

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been a shifted quality in the writing of Chinese security analysts, official statements and in Chinese behavior. Certain Chinese scholars assumed that Chinese should forsake the foreign policy of Deng Xiaoping since 1978, which was characterized by a slogan: Tao guang yang hui, you suo zuo wei, meaning that Chinese should keep a low profile and take selective actions.

Specifically, Deng had believed that in order to create a peaceful international environment for China’s national priority of economic development, it should get involved in global economy and international community, with substantial actions inclusive of opening up to foreign trade and investment, establishing full diplomatic relations with the United States, deepening relations with Japan, terminating support for Communist Party insurrections throughout Southeast Asia and joining the major international organizations.24 Yet, the world has no longer the same, which has been distinguished by the rising China and the relative decline of U.S. economic strength after years of massive trade deficits and domestic budget deficits, aggravated by the financial meltdown in 2008. In 2012, total foreign holdings of United States Treasury securities posted the eighth consecutive monthly increase in March, indicating strong international demand for US government debt to fund the mounting deficit, and China remains the largest foreign holder of United States Treasury securities.25 As a result, some argued that China now should exert its military assets and wealth abroad to strive for a global leadership to diminish U.S. power.26 The bilateral relations exacerbated during the annual meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi in July 2010 respecting the South China Sea. Unlike Taiwan and Tibet issues, China had not authoritatively named the South China Sea a “core interest.” What was learned by the Steinberg-Bader visit to Beijing in March 2010 concerning the South China Sea was its orientation as a “national priority.” Based on the knowledge, at a closed-door session of the ARF, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton delivered a formal speech reiterated the U.S. position of not taking sides on territorial claims to islands in the South China Sea asserted by China, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Brunei. Simultaneously, she asserted U.S. national interests in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and the expectation that all claims to rights in waters in the South China Sea would need to be based on land-based claims valid under the UN convention on the law of the sea and customary international law,

24

Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), pp. 79-82 25 Wei Tian, “China Remains Largest Foreign US Creditor,” Chinadaily, May 16, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2012-05/16/content_15309067.htm. (accessed May 18, 2012) 26 Guo Tina, “Yan Xuetong: China Should Provide Neighboring Countries with Military Protection; Eliminate American Power,” International Herald Leader, Xinhua News Agency, June 1, 2011, http://news.ifeng.com/mil/4/detail_2011_06/01/6753029_0.shtml. (accessed May 26, 2012).

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support for a collaborative process to resolve competing territorial claims, and U.S. willingness to facilitate initiatives and confidence building measures for reaching a full cold of conduct for the sea.27 Nevertheless, China’s foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, articulated strongly that there was no problem in the area and intimidated ASEAN countries not to seek outside or multilateral support with his emphasis on “a big China” rhetoric.28 Although a few weeks later, China expressed its willingness to engage in expert talks on a code of conduct in the South China Sea as what Secretary Clinton stated in the meeting, its surprisingly public belligerence still signified the mistrust between two countries.

The Concept of Strategic Reassurance Being Proposed and Ensured September - December 2009

• September 2009 - James B. Steinberg's initiative of the concept • November 2009 - President Obama's Beijing visit ensuring the concept

Two Head-on Challenges January - February 2010

• January 2010 - US arms sales to Taiwan • February 2010 - President Obama's meeting with the Dalai Lama

The Implementation of the Strategic Reassurance March 2010 The Success of the Strategic Reassurance April 2010 The Decline of the Strategic Reassurance June 2010 -

• The Steinberg-Bader visit to Beijing • President Obama’s meeting with the Chinese ambassador, Zhang Yesui • Positive public statement by the U.S. • Treasury Secretary Geithner declared that the Treasury would not declare China as a currency manipulator • President Hu's attendance to the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C. • June 2010 - Debates on the Cheonan incident at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) • July 2010 - Debates on the South China Sea issue at the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF) in Hanoi • November 2010 - North Korean artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island

Diagram 2.2 The Rise and Fall of the Concept of “Strategic Reassurance”

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Part of the statement reads,” …the United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea...[and] while the United States does not take sides on the competing territorial disputes over land features in the South China Sea, we believe claimants should pursue their territorial claims and accompanying rights to maritime space in accordance with the UN convention on the law of the sea. Consistent with customary international law, legitimate claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features. ..[and] the U.S. supports the 2002 ASEAN-China declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea. We encourage the parties to reach agreement on a full code of conduct. The U.S. is prepared to facilitate initiatives and confidence building measures consistent with the declaration.”See “Remarks at Press AvailabilitySecretary Hillary Rodham Cliton,” Hanoi, Vietnam, July 23, 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145095.htm. (accessed May 26, 2012).

28 Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), p. 105 11

As a matter of fact, the rising nationalist sentiment of China and the conflicting situation on the South China Sea issue at the ARF meeting were more like flashing points to disclose two countries’ fundamentally strategic distrust. There are three basic sources of strategic distrust between the U.S. and China.

One is related to deep-rooted “internalized elements”, which is constructed by varied political traditions, value systems, and strategic cultures of the two political bodies since the founding of the PRC in 1949. In terms of the U.S., regardless of Deng Xiaoping’s reform since 1978, China’s undemocratic politics, continuing violating human rights and non-transparency make its government untruthful. For example, the transparency issue has something to do with strategic cultures. According to Kurt M. Campbell, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Richard Weitz, a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute of the United States, that China tends to produce uncertainty to others by concealing its strength so as to intimidate other countries, while the United States believes the deterrence should be done by demonstrating what one has got, and the opaqueness of China would lead to other countries’ miscalculation and mishaps.29 On the part of China, U.S.’s consecutive pressure on these issues is regarded as an attempt to sabotage China’s legitimacy and autonomy, throwing suspicion on the U.S.’s previous statement of the welcoming approach to rising China.

The source of strategic distrust has further intensified by domestic institutions and groupings.

Officially, certain institutions relating to national security, defense and intelligence are built on the premise of uncordial U.S.-China relations, and what they do in turn generates more mutual incredulities. Privately, media in both countries are occasionally inclined to report unfavorable narratives of its counterpart to arouse attention of internal audiences. These institutions and groupings help to shape a political correctness domestically and thus make measures aiming at erasing mutual distrust less likely to achieve.30 The second source of strategic distrust is misperception of each other’s policymaking processes as well as foreign relations of the subject government. The misperception is derived from the thought that each side leans to see the other side’s moves as strategically designed, even when it is actually not the case. This can be explained in the studies of “mirror images,” which refers to

29

E. Economy & A. Segal, “The G-2 Mirage,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 3 (May/June 2009): 4.

Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust”, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph 4 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, March 2012), pp. 34-35 12

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the fact that each party holds an image that is diametrically “opposite” the other: in an unfriendly relationship, each party has a positive and benevolent self-image while holding a negative and malevolent image of the enemy.31 That is, one’s innocent deeds are likely to be misperceived as a scheme from others. For example, the investments of China’s state-owned enterprises in the United States are often viewed doubtful as part of the Chinese leadership’s grand strategy, with the fact that it is mostly driven by commercial interests. In turn, the activities by such American private sectors as media and NGOs in China are seen as politically motivated, but in fact American officials have little impact on them.32 The third source of mutual strategic distrust comes from perceived narrowing power gap between the United States and China. According to a survey conducted by Pew Research Center in the United States, which posed a question of “Will China Replace U.S. as the World’s Leading Superpower?” It revealed that 46% of Americans believe that China has or will replace U.S. with almost an equivalent percentage of Americans’ belief that U.S. will never be replaced.33 While the American may have concerns about China’s ambition to challenge its position in the world, the Chinese has also bred apprehension that the U.S. will do whatever it can to impede its becoming a global giant. Surely, leaders in Washington and Beijing are much discreet in assessing their power and position in the world, and try to produce policies that best serves national interests as well as the world. However, nationalists in both societies often polarize the power competition, taking the relations to the level of zero-sum game, and thus confine policy options of top leaders in both countries.34 As one can infer, the sources of fundamental strategic mistrust are the first and foremost works that Washington and Beijing should address to lay the foundation of mutual trusts, and make the mechanism of reassurance more likely to weather such accidentally conflicting events and incidents as occurrences being mentioned previously.

31

Jerel A. Rosati, “A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation, edited by Laura Neack, Patrick J. Haney, and Jeanne A.K. Hey (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995), pp.55-56 32 Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust”, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph 4 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, March 2012), p. 36 33 “China Seen Overtaking U.S. as Global Superpower,” Pew Research Center, July 13, 2011, http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/07/13/china-seen-overtaking-us-as-global-superpower/. (accessed December 1, 2011).

34 Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust”, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph 4 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, March 2012), p. 37.

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Partner Overcoming challenges through the effective mechanism Mechanism of reassurance

Mutual trust consolidated Addressing three sources of strategic distrust

Diagram 3 What an Effective Mechanism of Reassurance Takes

IV.

An Old Wine in a New Bottle: Starting from Building Mutual Trust

Apparently, the U.S.-China relations still undergo the “trust deficit,” as China’s vice foreign minister, Cui Tiankai, bemoaned before China’s vice president and seemingly the future leader, Xi Jinping, embarked upon a tour of the United States from February 14 to 17 in 2012, that China and the United States suffer a “trust deficit” and “nurturing and deepening mutual trust remains a major issue that both sides must give full attention to and seriously address”35 To examine whether the U.S.-China relations have established their trust foundation, one can utilize five indexes of trust, including “clarity of intention, predictability of action, shared sensibilities, a willingness to give before one takes, and mutual respect.” 36 For example, intentions between two countries, especially in security domain, are ambiguous. As it was indicated on the second round of the S&ED in 2010, Washington always requests China for an open dialogue on strategic issues, yet China has generally opposed. Chinese believes that uncertainty about its strategic capabilities can serve as a deterrent, which to U.S. increases the

35

Chris Buckley, “China Sees ‘Trust Deficit’ Before Xi's U.S. Trip,” Reuters Africa, February 7, 2012, http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE8160NS20120207.(accessed March 20, 2012).

36 Elizabeth Economy, “Xi's Tour Won't Fix the U.S.-Chinese 'Trust Deficit': The Long March to Mutual Respect,” Foreign Affairs, February 15, 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137236/elizabeth-economy/xis-tour-wont-fix-the-us-chinese-trust-deficit?pag e=show#. (accessed March 25, 2012).

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possibilities of miscalculation.

Moreover, a trust-based relationship also requires the predictability of each other’s action, which remains evasive between the U.S. and China. Since Obama came to office, he promised to a greener future and proposed a climate change legislation of “cap-and trade” system to reduce emissions of such heat-trapping gases as carbon dioxide.37 The U.S. also asked for China to commit to specific goals for slashing heat-trapping gases by 2050 at the Group of eight (G-8) meetings in 2009.38 However, Obama lost his credibility in that the domestic “cap-and-trade” legislation came to a dead end due to extensive objections to its pricey restraints and undermining the economic growth. Similarly, China failed the predictability test. China’s efforts to incorporate into the global economic community are discredited by its institution of price controls and export quotas of rare earth minerals, which are essential to the manufacture of high-tech products. By doing so, China will benefit its domestic manufacturers and force international firms to move operations to China. Thus, in March 2012, the United States, European Union and Japan collaboratively made a formal complaint to the World Trade Organization over China’s “trade protectionism,” which China refuted the export curbs were an environmentally-friendly measures and to preserve supplies of an exhaustible natural resource.39 Basically, the relations between countries can be divided into four levels: enemy, competitor or adversary, partner or friend and alliance. The Sino-U.S. relations have long been hovering between competitors and partners.

Alliance

Friend/ Partner

Adversary/ Competitor

Enemy

Diagram 4 Relations Between Countries

37

The basic information about “cap-and trade” policy in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency states,” cap and trade is a market-based policy tool for protecting human health and the environment by controlling large amounts of emissions from a group of sources. A cap and trade program first sets an aggressive cap, or maximum limit, on emissions. Sources covered by the program then receive authorizations to emit in the form of emissions allowances, with the total amount of allowances limited by the cap…”

38 Peter Baker, “Poorer Nations Reject A Target on Emission Cut,” The New York Times, July 8, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/09/world/europe/09prexy.html?pagewanted=all. (accessed September 15, 2009).

39 Damien Ma, “China Digs it: How Beijing Concerned the Rare Earth Markets,” Foreign Affairs, April 25, 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137602/damien-ma/china-digs-it?page=show. (accessed May 1, 2012).

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President Obama's policy choice of “engagement” toward China is thought to be a move toward the direction of partnership. Although along with James Steinberg and Jeffrey Bader stepping down, the “strategic reassurance” was no longer appeared in the U.S.’s official statements, the nature of the concept which serves for the “engagement policy” under the Obama administration might be embodied by another brand-new name, just as the concept of “strategic reassurance” was said to be a continuation of George W. Bush’s perception of China as a “responsible stakeholder” after the 911 event. However, before coining another title for the “moving toward” policy toward China, mutual trust must be built first.

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