‘Churchill’s diplomacy was crucial to winning the war.’ Discuss Elizabeth Gallagher Upper Sixth
Churchill’s diplomatic stamina throughout World War Two is commendable; he attended sixteen meetings as opposed to Roosevelt’s twelve and Stalin’s seven, and he travelled much further than them as none of the meetings was held in his home nation. This suggests that Churchill himself felt diplomacy was a crucial element in securing victory for the allies. And undoubtedly it was important, such as in securing support for his campaign in the Mediterranean, keeping both Stalin and Roosevelt on side and placating the ambitious de Gaulle. However, there are arguably other more crucial factors, namely errors made by the Germans and the allies’ successful mobilisation of their plentiful resources, both of which played a more crucial role than diplomacy in ensuring victory on the Eastern front, the event that allowed the Russians to march into Berlin and win the war for the allies in Europe in May 1945. Churchill’s diplomacy was undeniably important during the war, especially in cementing the ‘Grand Alliance’ between Britain, the US and the USSR. Even though it was Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor that brought the US into the war, it was Churchill’s skilled diplomacy at the First Washington Conference in December 1941 that led to the decision to pool American and British resources against Germany who would be deemed the ‘prime enemy’ in a ‘Europe First’ policy. The fact that General Marshall and Roosevelt conceded to Churchill’s will that Europe should be the primary theatre of war rather than Japan is testament to Churchill’s skilled oratory. For example, his address to Congress in December 1941 emphasised the unity of ‘the English-speaking world’ and their ‘common resolve’ to defeat the Axis powers. With Churchill’s speech Congress was brought on board despite the fact that the American voters were largely in favour of taking revenge on Japan and not fighting a proxy war in Europe. Moreover, Churchill’s ability to nurture the American and British diplomatic relationship was crucial to winning the war as it allowed them to launch joint offences, like that on D-Day, and aid each other when required, such as during the Soviet invasion when the Americans supplied aid. Churchill
prioritised the maintenance of this alliance at the expense of his own health, suffering a heart attack whilst in Washington in 1941 and insisting that he continue to work despite suffering from pneumonia in February 1943.
Churchill prioritised the maintenance of this alliance at the expense of his own health.
Furthermore, it appears that Churchill was the only diplomat with the ability to handle difficult characters, such as the arrogant de Gaulle and Stalin. Tensions between the allies and the USSR were rife as the US and Britain were reluctant to open a second front and relieve the beleaguered Soviet army. At the Second Moscow Conference in August 1942, Stalin bitterly accused the British of being afraid of fighting the Germans. However, Churchill counterargued brilliantly, leaving the conference on very good terms with Stalin and avoiding ‘a really serious drifting apart’ which could have compromised the allied war effort. It took skill and brute effort in order to placate Stalin, as demonstrated by a letter written by Alexander Cadogan, the British ambassador to Washington who was also present at the meeting, detailing how Churchill endured an ‘awful’ Kremlin banquet with a ‘headache’ and even then requested an additional private meeting with Stalin to iron out any disagreements. The fact that Churchill set aside his own views – principally his loathing of Communism – and wellbeing in order to achieve a desirable diplomatic coup with both de Gaulle and Stalin is testament to his commitment to diplomacy. Therefore, Churchill’s diplomacy was hugely important in getting the Americans on board – who played a major role in the offensives that secured victory for the allies – and for appeasing both Stalin and de Gaulle, avoiding a fragmentation of the ‘Grand Alliance’. However, there are many primary sources which reveal Churchill’s lack of tact, especially with his own advisors and leaders of the armed forces, an obstinacy that at points could have threatened Britain’s ability to wage war effectively. In a diary entry (Appendix A) on 19th August 1943, Sir Alan Brooke – the Chief of the Imperial General Staff – wrote that the Prime Minister behaved like a ‘spoilt child’ 33
and they ‘settled nothing’ after Churchill became incensed by Brooke wanting to make long-term contingency plans. In a similar way, Churchill was described by Cadogan as ‘a bull in a ring’ whilst in Moscow in August 1942, yet he somehow managed to come away on good terms with Stalin, having persuaded him to continue fighting on the Eastern front whilst Operation Torch was launched in Northern Africa. It was these fortuitous outcomes such as this one that have perhaps allowed Churchill to escape criticism for his often brash behaviour. Therefore, although Churchill’s diplomacy was important to the war effort, it was not the crucial factor behind allied victory, as Churchill’s occasional poor behaviour and lack of tact counteracted any progress his skilled diplomacy otherwise made for the allies. A more crucial factor to the allied victory were the errors made by the German leadership. Time and time again the overconfidence of Hitler and his generals left the German forces over-exposed and this eventually led to their defeat. For example, the historian Ben Shepherd argues that it was ‘arrogant, racially coloured assumptions of chaos and incompetence’ about the Red Army that led to Hitler making the fateful decision to invade the Soviet Union on 22nd June 1941, opening a front that would ultimately open the path for an occupation of Berlin by the Soviet Union in 1945. Hitler made poor judgements, often ignoring the recommendations of his advisers and
Winston churchill making a speech 1941
