34 ‘Churchill’s diplomacy was crucial to winning the war.’ Discuss Elizabeth Gallagher

Elizabeth Gallagher Upper Sixth

Churchill’s diplomatic stamina throughout prioritised the maintenance of this alliance World War Two is commendable; he at the expense of his own health, suffering attended sixteen meetings as opposed to a heart attack whilst in Washington in Roosevelt’s twelve and Stalin’s seven, and 1941 and insisting that he continue to he travelled much further than them as work despite suffering from pneumonia in none of the meetings was held in his home February 1943. nation. This suggests that Churchill himself Churchill Furthermore, it appears felt diplomacy was a crucial element in securing victory for the prioritised the maintenance of that Churchill was the only diplomat with the ability to handle difficult allies. And undoubtedly this alliance at characters, such as the it was important, such as in securing support for his campaign in the the expense of his own health. arrogant de Gaulle and Stalin. Tensions between the allies and the USSR Mediterranean, keeping were rife as the US and both Stalin and Roosevelt on side and Britain were reluctant to open a second placating the ambitious de Gaulle. front and relieve the beleaguered Soviet However, there are arguably other more army. At the Second Moscow Conference crucial factors, namely errors made by in August 1942, Stalin bitterly accused the Germans and the allies’ successful the British of being afraid of fighting the mobilisation of their plentiful resources, Germans. However, Churchill counterboth of which played a more crucial role argued brilliantly, leaving the conference than diplomacy in ensuring victory on the on very good terms with Stalin and Eastern front, the event that allowed the avoiding ‘a really serious drifting apart’ Russians to march into Berlin and win the which could have compromised the allied war for the allies in Europe in May 1945. war effort. It took skill and brute effort in Churchill’s diplomacy was undeniably order to placate Stalin, as demonstrated by important during the war, especially in a letter written by Alexander Cadogan, the cementing the ‘Grand Alliance’ between British ambassador to Washington who Britain, the US and the USSR. Even though was also present at the meeting, detailing it was Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor how Churchill endured an ‘awful’ Kremlin that brought the US into the war, it was banquet with a ‘headache’ and even then Churchill’s skilled diplomacy at the First requested an additional private meeting Washington Conference in December 1941 with Stalin to iron out any disagreements. that led to the decision to pool American The fact that Churchill set aside his and British resources against Germany own views – principally his loathing of who would be deemed the ‘prime enemy’ Communism – and wellbeing in order to in a ‘Europe First’ policy. The fact that achieve a desirable diplomatic coup with General Marshall and Roosevelt conceded both de Gaulle and Stalin is testament to to Churchill’s will that Europe should be his commitment to diplomacy. the primary theatre of war rather than Therefore, Churchill’s diplomacy was Japan is testament to Churchill’s skilled hugely important in getting the Americans oratory. For example, his address to on board – who played a major role in Congress in December 1941 emphasised the the offensives that secured victory for the unity of ‘the English-speaking world’ and allies – and for appeasing both Stalin and their ‘common resolve’ to defeat the Axis de Gaulle, avoiding a fragmentation of the powers. With Churchill’s speech Congress ‘Grand Alliance’. was brought on board despite the fact that the American voters were largely in However, there are many primary sources favour of taking revenge on Japan and not which reveal Churchill’s lack of tact, fighting a proxy war in Europe. Moreover, especially with his own advisors and Churchill’s ability to nurture the American leaders of the armed forces, an obstinacy and British diplomatic relationship was that at points could have threatened crucial to winning the war as it allowed Britain’s ability to wage war effectively. In them to launch joint offences, like that on a diary entry (Appendix A) on 19th August D-Day, and aid each other when required, 1943, Sir Alan Brooke – the Chief of the such as during the Soviet invasion when Imperial General Staff – wrote that the the Americans supplied aid. Churchill Prime Minister behaved like a ‘spoilt child’ and they ‘settled nothing’ after Churchill became incensed by Brooke wanting to make long-term contingency plans. In a similar way, Churchill was described by Cadogan as ‘a bull in a ring’ whilst in Moscow in August 1942, yet he somehow managed to come away on good terms with Stalin, having persuaded him to continue fighting on the Eastern front whilst Operation Torch was launched in Northern Africa. It was these fortuitous outcomes such as this one that have perhaps allowed Churchill to escape criticism for his often brash behaviour.

Therefore, although Churchill’s diplomacy was important to the war effort, it was not the crucial factor behind allied victory, as Churchill’s occasional poor behaviour and lack of tact counteracted any progress his skilled diplomacy otherwise made for the allies.

A more crucial factor to the allied victory were the errors made by the German leadership. Time and time again the overconfidence of Hitler and his generals left the German forces over-exposed and this eventually led to their defeat. For example, the historian Ben Shepherd argues that it was ‘arrogant, racially coloured assumptions of chaos and incompetence’ about the Red Army that led to Hitler making the fateful decision to invade the Soviet Union on 22nd June 1941, opening a front that would ultimately open the path for an occupation of Berlin by the Soviet Union in 1945. Hitler made poor judgements, often ignoring the recommendations of his advisers and

Winston churchill making a speech 1941

rashly launching major operations, such as when he declared war on the USA on 11th December 1941 without decisively defeating the Soviet Union. From this point onwards, German resources were fatefully overstretched and this was compounded by what historian James Holland called ‘a production spiral’, where Germany and Japan – after an initial increase in production – suffered huge shortages of food, fuel and materiel after Germany’s principal industrial areas were bombed in 1942 and 1943. Therefore, one of the most crucial factors in ensuring an allied victory was poor judgements made by the Axis powers, principally Germany, as Hitler pursued an invasion of the USSR before securing victory on the western front and overstretched his armed forces as a result. The allies were able to capitalise on this fateful error, by wiping out Germany’s production lines with bombing and then mobilising the Grand Alliance’s vast resources against a weakened Germany. Perhaps the most crucial factor in winning the war then, was the plenitude of the allied resources – especially after the US joined the war – and how they mobilised them effectively to secure victory in key battles. This was a strategy that gradually wore the Axis powers down, allowing the allies to encroach further and further into Germany’s territory until they could occupy Berlin. A key example of this was the allied air forces; the US and Britain correctly predicted that air power would be essential to winning the war, so they quickly enlarged their air forces, producing 650,000 aircraft during the war compared to only 230,000 by the Axis powers. Moreover, the allies used their large air forces skilfully, such as in the Battle of Britain with the ‘Vic’ formation that allowed a concentrated attack on the enemy or during the D-Day

landings when the air force was used to drop paratroopers on the ground before the main landings. Therefore, the allies’ superior air forces and their tactical might was crucial to winning the war. And this is an example of how the allies would have still won the war regardless of Churchill’s diplomatic efforts. For example, the entry of the US into the war was undeniably brought about by the [T]he overconfidence attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 rather than any of of Hitler and his generals left the Churchill’s persuasions, especially as he had made numerous failed German forces attempts to persuade over-exposed and this eventually led the Americans to enter the war prior to Pearl Harbor. Moreover, to their defeat. his diplomacy often hampered the mobilisation of allied resources rather than helped it; for example, he stubbornly refused to go ahead with Operation Sledgehammer – the plan to open a second front - something that made relations at the Tehran Conference extremely stretched and almost led Roosevelt and Marshall to abandon the Europe First policy, a decision that would have been disastrous for the allied war effort.

Superior allied resources also helped defensively as well as offensively, as Britain and the United States’ far larger navies (42 battleships compared to Germany’s and Italy’s combined total of 7) allowed them to evacuate their armies when needed, such as at Dunkirk, and move their armies around the world in order launch attacks in vulnerable areas, e.g. in Sicily in 1943. The final way in which the allies’ superior resources was crucial in helping them win the war was their far greater access to foreign intelligence, especially after the Bletchley code breakers deciphered the Enigma code, allowing the allies to prepare for operations planned by Germany. In fact Dwight D. Eisenhower, commander of the allied forces in Europe, credited the intelligence gathered from Bletchley as contributing ‘to the speed with which the enemy was routed and eventually forced to surrender’ in a secret 1945 letter. It is significant that the commander of the armed forces himself recognised the essential role intelligence, in combination with the allies’ mobilisation of their other resources, played in winning the war as opposed to diplomacy or any particular German errors.

In conclusion, Churchill’s diplomacy was important to winning the war but it was not the crucial deciding factor. The Americans would have entered the war regardless of his diplomatic manoeuvres, following the attack on Pearl Harbor. And there is plentiful evidence to suggest that Churchill’s diplomacy could in fact have been an obstruction to success rather than a reason for it. The crucial factor to winning the war was in fact the huge numerical superiority of the allied resources, especially after the US joined the war, and the allies’ adept co-ordination, allowing them to support each other and win the crucial battles. Diplomacy played a part in this, but its success was largely derived from huge resources being united by a common cause rather than diplomacy on an individual level. This tactic allowed them to eventually wear down the Axis powers into submission, most importantly on the Eastern front, securing victory for the allies in May 1945.

Code breakers at Bletchley Park - 75% of its staff were women

From the dramatic to the meta-dramatic - comparing Die Zauberflöte with early operas in terms of contextual, textual and musical features

Tom Wild Upper Sixth

Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart

On 30th September 1791, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart’s Die Zauberflöte (K.620) premiered in the Freihaus-Theater auf der Wieden in Vienna. This theatre was owned by Emmanuel Schikaneder, who also wrote the two-act libretto which Mozart set as a singspiel, a popular form of drama in Vienna at the time. With a full orchestra and songs with complex textures, this form of opera is a far cry from the monody of early operas, and the hyperreal, magical fairy-tale does not share many similarities with the myths and legendary stories of that style. However, some similarities can be drawn between Die Zauberflöte and early operas, especially in terms of their contextual aims, even if the musical features are contrasting. opera was always meant to be a good spectacle for its audience, but it was more socially aware and important than simply that. This essay will assess some of these developments in opera, and the social importance of Die Zauberflöte and some early operas within their respective cultures.

Whilst on the outside dramatic interpretations, Die Zauberflöte is worlds away from the early monodic operas. On the most basic and integral level it shares certain similarities in its social context and aims with the earlier works. Specifically, Die Zauberflöte aligns with for his two settings of Euridice in 1600 and 1602) and Monteverdi (famous for Orpheo in 1607). In this way, the culturally educational and development aims of early operas were fundamental to the style the drama was presented in.

This is not so evident in Die Zauberflöte. Unsurprisingly, given that it was around two centuries later, Mozart and Schikaneder find slightly more intricate and varied ways to inject their work with cultural references and beliefs. Thus, in Die Zauberflöte, the cultural education of the audience is subject less to the conventions of the times, but more to the ideas of the composer and librettist than in early operas. In this particular case, there is considerable debate among musicologists regarding the possible masonic connotations of the libretto of Die Zauberflöte. For example, Martin Nedbal criticises Jan Assmann and Nicholas Till for their explanations of Mozart’s setting the Renaissance belief that opera should be which focus (in his mind) too heavily on presented and designed to enrich the soul masonic belief and do not take irony into and enhance social sophistication, although account. Regardless of what one believes, the manifestations of these designs are there is significant use of moral maxims markedly different in Die Zauberflöte (a popular trend at the time according to than in early operas. In the renaissance Nedbal) throughout the opera, notably in period, such aims of opera can be found the Quintet (No.5 ‘Hm hmhm’). Nedbal most prevalently in the style of Monody. offers theories about the ways in which The increased popularity of this style in the presentation of these maxims is the late 16th and early 17th centuries can designed not just to keep them within be attributed first and foremost to the the hyperreal world of the story, but to be extensive research led by put across without irony Girolamo Mei (1519-94) into ancient Greek Music. Music did not escape the general intellectual public fascination with GrecoRoman tradition in all aspects, and Mei’s findings Early operas were using musical means to enhance the social to the audience, as if the characters break the fourth wall. Thus both Die Zauberflöte and early operas such as Dafne and Orpheo make that the Greeks preferred a monophonic style in order to allow emotion to be expressed in the purest, sophistication of its audience. use of texture in order to enhance the social sophistication and morality of their audiences. Whilst most unconvoluted form monody used the idea of of a single line ‘proved to be a significant monophony affecting the catalyst for Florentine composers to soul in the ancient Greek style, Nedbal explore the possibilities of the new style’. points out how Mozart uses textural Early operas were using musical means change in order to draw attention to the to enhance the social sophistication of its moral maxims in the quintet. Specifically, audience according to Renaissance beliefs, he highlights the fact that most of the and this monodic style can be seen in works quintet has had a rather conversational by several prominent Italian composers of feel, with the characters addressing each that era including Guilio Caccini (famous other, predominantly in melody dominated

homophony. But when the maxim remonstrating Papageno for his lies earlier in the story occurs, all five characters, regardless of their roles within the rest of the song or even the opera as a whole, seem to address the audience in ‘impersonal, piecemeal homophonic delivery’. This forces the ‘diegetic reality to recede into the background’1 and allows the audience to clearly discern that these words are meant not just for Papageno but for everyone, at least in the eyes of those behind the work. This non-diegetic meta-dramatic touch is made possible by the musical setting of the libretto by Mozart, as a part of the Viennese moralist tradition of the time. The intricacies of the setting (such as lowering the dynamics at the sotto voce when the maxim is being delivered in homophony to increase sincerity), especially by a composer with the prominence of Mozart, corroborate the idea of the social influences of Die Zauberflöte being more defined by the creators of the opera and specific to that piece of work than those of early operas, which were more general as a part of the Renaissance movement, permeating most operas at the time. The analysis of contrasting didactic techniques used in early operas compared to Die Zauberflöte calls into question not just their audience’s developed cultural awareness, but the sophistication of the opera and its techniques themselves. Superficially, the complexities of Die Zauberflöte shine through. The musical means used by Mozart and detailed by Nedbal are clearly complex and well thought-out, to such an extent that there has been considerable debate among musicologists centred around whether or not the moral maxims are deployed earnestly or with some irony. Writers on the subject such as Till2 and Maurer Zenek do not generally subscribe to the aforementioned view that the maxims are presented meta-dramatically, thus leading them to infer that irony must be the cause as the characters who deploy the maxims (in the Quintet and Pamina’s Waltz) fail to embody their virtues later on. Whether or not this is what Mozart was intending, perhaps the conflicting interpretations of these maxims detract from their effectiveness. In essence, the sheer volume of debate about the dogmatism of the texts indicates that such dogmatism may not be as effective as some argue. Therefore,

although a larger plethora of techniques are used to enhance the morality of Die Zauberflöte, they arguably diminish the sincerity of these morals and perhaps are not as effective as they initially seem. The only thing certain is that our lack of clarity over how the audience would treat these maxims (with sincerity or irony) diminishes our ability to analyse the specifics and give a certain judgement or interpretation, which cannot be said for early operas where the simplicities in the social aims are ostensibly easier to unequivocally understand. Mozart uses textural change Early operas dealt with the enhancement of cultural sophistication in order to draw attention to the with far more simplicity, with such ideas coming simply from the libretti. moral maxims in These generally used the quintet. mythical and legendary tales with strong characters portraying virtues such as courage and love, such as Orpheus from Orfeo or Alexius of Rome from Landi’s Sant’Alessio. The traditional monophony, harking back to what they imagined the original performances of Homer’s Iliad or Odyssey might have incorporated, was used for a similar purpose. However, in the early 17th century with Renaissance ideas rampant, these techniques would have been seen as the height of sophistication due to their Greco-Roman origins, with the composers believing that their revival of the style was ‘of revolutionary importance’. Therefore, it seems that the didactic cultural techniques used in Die Zauberflöte and in Early opera were different because they were contemporarily effective. The simplicity of early Venetian monodic opera was perfect for that time period. In late 18th century (especially in Vienna), with an intellectual climate that would become famous for both the personalities and ideas it produced, from Goethe and Lessing to Freud, perhaps the ambiguity of Mozart’s settings of the moral maxims was equally a strength, allowing for interpretation, rather than simply assimilation. In the early days of opera, a strong story and a production with a clear political or moral message was what the courts of the principalities wanted to see, when opera was somewhat less commercial (before 1637 in Venice) and more private, so this was catered for. By the time of Die Zauberflöte, not only had the passing of time allowed for opera to develop and flourish in terms of its form; by this stage, opera was something to be written about and seen by many more than it had been two centuries earlier. It must be also be acknowledged that opera was designed to be a spectacle, and as the style developed and funding inevitably increased with enhanced commercialisation, many of the aforementioned changes in the style owed at least something to this aim.

Thus, it can be said that Die Zauberflöte shows developments - which are to an extent inevitable due to the passing of time - with respect to the form of the opera, the textures of the music and the complexities of the techniques used to set music and deliver morality messages. However, the basic principles of opera being used both to tell a story and to enhance the social sophistication of the audience, as well as being a spectacle for both the court (most notably in the early times) and, increasingly after 1637 the public, can be traced back from Die Zauberflöte to early operas. These principles allow us to analyse the two realisations of opera together and also as their own pieces of work with regards to their text, context and the musical techniques of the composers.